罗素哲学思想

A process which led from the amoeba to man appeared to the philosophers to be obviously a progress though whether the amoeba would agree with this opinion is not known.从阿米巴变形虫到人类的这一过程对哲学家来说，很明显是个进步。

但是变形虫怎么想我们就不知道了。

It has been said that man is a rational animal. All my life I have been searching for evidence which could support this.据说人是一种理性动物。

穷我自己一生，我都在寻找这观点的证据。

Man is a credulous animal, and must believe something; in the absence of good grounds for belief, he will be satisfied with bad ones.人是轻信的动物，必须得相信点什么。

如果这种信仰没有什么好的依据，糟糕的依据也能对付。

I would never die for my beliefs because I might be wrong.我永远不会为信仰而死，因为我的信仰可能是错的。

Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion, for every opinion now accepted was once eccentric.不要害怕怀有怪念头，因为现在人们接受的所有的观念都曾经是怪念头。

A life without adventure is likely to be unsatisfying, but a life in which adventure is allowed to take whatever form it will is sure to be short.生活中完全没有冒险，这可能是没什么意思的。

但是生活中如果不管什么种类的探险都有，那肯定是短暂的。

Against my will, in the course of my travels, the belief that everything worth knowing was known at Cambridge gradually wore off. In this respect my travels were very useful to me.我曾相信，所有值得知道之事，我在剑桥都知道了。

在我旅行的过程之中，这一想法逐渐消失了。

这与我本意相反，但是却对我非常有益。

Many people would sooner die than think; in fact, they do so.有很多人，让他们思考一下还不如让他们去死。

事实上，很多人还没思考过就已经死了。

Many a man will have the courage to die gallantly, but will not have the courage to say, or even to think, that the cause for which he is asked to die is an unworthy one.很多人可以勇敢的死去，但是却没有勇气说他为之而死的原因没有意义，甚至连这样想一想的勇气也没有。

Contempt for happiness is usually contempt for other people' s happiness, and is an elegant disguise for hatred of the human race.对幸福的轻蔑通常是对其他人幸福的轻蔑，在精巧的伪装之下是对人类的仇恨。

Democracy is the process by which people choose the man who' ll get the blame.民主，就是挑选那个受批评的人的过程。

Drunkenness is temporary suicide.喝醉是暂时性的自杀。

I say quite deliberately that the Christian religion, as organized in its Churches, has been and still is the principal enemy of moral progress in the world.我明确的说，由教会所组织的基督教是道德进步的最大敌人，过去如此，现在依然如此。

In America everybody is of the opinion that he has no social superiors, since all men are equal, but he does not admit that he has no social inferiors.在美国，所有人都认为没有什么人比他的社会地位高，因为人人生而平等。

但是，他可不承认没有人比他社会地位低。

Many people when they fall in love look for a little haven of refuge from the world, where they can be sure of being admired when they are not admirable, and praised when they are not praiseworthy.很多人陷入爱情是为了寻找一个遁世的避难所。

在这个避难所里，当他们不值得爱慕的时候，依然有人爱慕他们，当他们不值得赞扬的时候，依然有人赞扬他们。

Men are born ignorant, not stupid. They are made stupid by education.人生而无知，但还不愚蠢。

教育才把他们变蠢。

Conventional people are roused to fury by departure from convention, largely because they regard such departure as a criticism of themselves.传统的人看到背离传统的行为就大发雷霆，主要是因为他们把这种背离当作对他们的批评。

A hallucination is a fact, not an error; what is erroneous is a judgment based upon it. 幻觉不是你的错，在幻觉中做决定，这就是你的不对了。

Aristotle maintained that women have fewer teeth than men; although he was twice married, it never occurred to him to verify this statement by examining his wives' mouths.亚里士多德说女人比男人的牙齿要少。

尽管他结了两次婚，但是他都没想过要检查一下他老婆的牙。

数学，正确地看，不仅拥有真，也拥有至高的美。

一种冷而严峻的美，一种屹立不摇的美。

如雕塑一般，一种不为我们软弱天性所动摇的美。

不像绘画或音乐那般，有着富丽堂皇的修饰，然而这是极其纯净的美，只有这个最伟大的艺术才能显示出最严格的完美。

一部分儿童具有思考的习惯，而教育的目的在于铲除他们的这种习惯。

出处:《我的信仰》，1925科学使我们为善或为恶的力量都有所提升。

（11月20日名言）出处:《我的信仰》，1925广义地说，最渴望权力之人就是最可能获得权力之人。

出处:《权力论》，1938中国是一切规则的例外。

出处:《怀疑论》，1928爱因斯坦的‘相对论’使人觉得懂得之事变少了。

出处:〈现代科学及其将来〉乞丐并不会妒忌百万富翁，但是他肯定会妒忌收入更高的乞丐出处:《幸福之路》，1930青年时期是豁达的时期，应该利用这个时期养成自己豁达的性格。

（11月6日名言）许多人宁愿死，也不愿思考，事实上他们也确实至死都没有思考。

我的人生正是：使事业成为喜悦，使喜悦成为事业。

从每天上学的时间看，中国儿童最有思想。

即使真相并不令人愉快，也一定要做到诚实，因为掩盖真相往往要费更大力气。

不要为自己持独特看法而感到害怕，因为我们现在所接受的常识都曾是独特看法。

不用盲目地崇拜任何权威，因为你总能找到相反的权威。

凡事不要抱绝对肯定的态度。

这个世界最大的麻烦，就在傻瓜与狂热分子对自我总是如此确定，而智者的内心却总充满疑惑。

科学是那些我们已经知道的东西，哲学是那些我们还不知道的东西。

哲学是我们可以胡说八道的一种特殊权力。

哲学是有道理的猜想。

爱国就是为一些很无聊的理由去杀人或被杀。

出处:1914年，第一次世界大战爆发，罗素积极宣传反战思想，鼓吹‚CO‛（以良心为由拒绝从军）；几次反战演讲时，都遭到英国爱国主义民众暴力攻击。

剑桥大学要求罗素缴交罚款110英镑或自愿解聘。

罗素选择了解聘，并以这句话讽刺爱国主义。

美国的民主，没有生命，也无意义，因为人民无法撤换那些真正统治他们的人。

寓意:讽刺美国真正的统治权是在大老板的大公司里‚世袭‛著，每一个美国总统都必须为这些呼风唤雨的大公司的利益服务。

∙I am looking forward very much to getting back to Cambridge, and being able to say what I think and not to mean what I say: two things which at home areimpossible. Cambridge is one of the few places where one can talk unlimitednonsense and generalities without anyone pulling one up or confronting onewith them when one says just the opposite the next day.o Letter to Alys Pearsall Smith; published in The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Volume 1: The Private Years (1884–1914), edited byNicholas Griffin.∙Thee will find out in time that I have a great love of professing vile sentiments,I don’t know why, unless it springs from long efforts to avoid priggery.o Letter to Alys Pearsall Smith (1894). Smith was a Quaker, thus the archaic use of "Thee" in this and other letters to her.Mathematics takes us still further from what is human, into the region of absolute necessity, to which not only the world, but every possible world, must conform.∙Thee might observe incidentally that if the state paid for child-bearing it might and ought to require a medical certificate that the parents were such as to givea reasonable result of a healthy child — this would afford a very goodinducement to some sort of care for the race, and gradually as public opinionbecame educated by the law, it might react on the law and make that morestringent, until one got to some state of things in which there would be a littlegenuine care for the race, instead of the present haphazard higgledy-piggledyways.o Letter to Alys Pearsall Smith (1894); published in The Selected Letters of Bertrand Russell, Volume 1: The Private Years (1884–1914), editedby Nicholas Griffin. It should be noted that in his talk of "the race", heis referring to "the human race". Smith married Russell in December1894; they divorced in 1921.∙Pure mathematics consists entirely of assertions to the effect that, if such and such a proposition is true of anything, then such and such another propositionis true of that thing. It is essential not to discuss whether the first proposition is really true, and not to mention what the anything is, of which it is supposed to be true ... If our hypothesis is about anything, and not about some one or more particular things, then our deductions constitute mathematics. Thusmathematics may be defined as the subject in which we never know what weare talking about, nor whether what we are saying is true. People who havebeen puzzled by the beginnings of mathematics will, I hope, find comfort inthis definition, and will probably agree that it is accurate.o Recent Work on the Principles of Mathematics, published inInternational Monthly, vol. 4 (1901)People are said to believe in God, or to disbelieve in Adam and Eve. But in such cases what is believed or disbelieved is that there is an entity answering a certain description.∙It is true that numerous instances are not always necessary to establish a law, provided the essential and relevant circumstances can easily be disentangled.But, in history, so many circumstances of a small and accidental nature arerelevant, that no broad and simple uniformities are possible. Where our mainendeavour is to discover general laws, we regard these as intrinsically morevaluable than any of the facts which they inter-connect. In astronomy, the law of gravitation is plainly better worth knowing than the position of a particularplanet on a particular night, or even on every night throughout a year. Thereare in the law a splendour and simplicity and sense of mastery whichilluminate a mass of otherwise uninteresting details... But in history the matter is far otherwise... Historical facts, many of them, have an intrinsic value, aprofound interest on their own account, which makes them worthy of study,quite apart from any possibility of linking them together by means of causallaws.o On History (1904)A hallucination is a fact, not an error; what is erroneous is a judgment based upon it.∙The number of syllables in the English names of finite integers tends to increase as the integers grow larger, and must gradually increase indefinitely,since only a finite number of names can be made with a given finite number of syllables. Hence the names of some integers must consist of at least nineteensyllables, and among these there must be a least. Hence "the least integer notnameable in fewer than nineteen syllables" must denote a definite integer; infact, it denotes 111, 777. But "the least integer not nameable in fewer thannineteen syllables" is itself a name consisting of eighteen syllables; hence theleast integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables can be named ineighteen syllables, which is a contradiction. This contradiction was suggested to us by Mr. G. G. Berry of the Bodleian Library.o Principia Mathematica, written with Alfred North Whitehead, (1910), vol. I, Introduction, ch. II: The Theory of Logical Types. This is astatement of the Berry paradox.No nation was ever so virtuous as each believes itself, and none was ever so wicked as each believes the other.∙People are said to believe in God, or to disbelieve in Adam and Eve. But in such cases what is believed or disbelieved is that there is an entity answering a certain description. This, which can be believed or disbelieved is quitedifferent from the actual entity (if any) which does answer the description.Thus the matter of belief is, in all cases, different in kind from the matter ofsensation or presentation, and error is in no way analogous to hallucination. A hallucination is a fact, not an error; what is erroneous is a judgment basedupon it.o On the Nature of Acquaintance: Neutral Monism (1914) ∙In the revolt against idealism, the ambiguities of the word ―experience‖ have been perceived, with the result that realists have more and more avoided theword. It is to be feared, however, that if the word is avoided the confusions of thought with which it has been associated may persist.o On the Nature of Acquaintance: Neutral Monism (1914) ∙Every philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and justification, is found either to be not really philosophical at all, or else to be, in the sense in which we are using the word, logical.o Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy (1914)∙No nation was ever so virtuous as each believes itself, and none was ever so wicked as each believes the other.o Justice in War-Time (1916)∙It is preoccupation with possession, more than anything else, that prevents men from living freely and nobly.o Principles of Social Reconstruction (1917)∙...it [is] possible to suppose that, if Russia is allowed to have peace, an amazing industrial development may take place, making Russia a rival of the United States.o The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (1920)∙One who believes as I do, that free intellect is the chief engine of human progress, cannot but be fundamentally opposed to Bolshevism as much as to the Church of Rome. The hopes which inspire communism are, in the main, as admirable as those instilled by the Sermon on the Mount, but they are held as fanatically and are as likely to do as much harm.o The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (1920)∙There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that"remembered" a wholly unreal past. There is no logically necessaryconnection between events at different times; therefore nothing that ishappening now or will happen in the future can disprove the hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago.o The Analysis of Mind (1921), p. 159 Full text online∙The white population of the world will soon cease to increase. The Asiatic races will be longer, and the negroes still longer, before their birth rate falls sufficiently to make their numbers stable without help of war and pestilence....Until that happens, the benefits aimed at by socialism can only be partially realized, and the less prolific races will have to defend themselves against the more prolific by methods which are disgusting even if they are necessary.o The Prospects of Industrial Civilization (1923)∙To save the world requires faith and courage: faith in reason, and courage to proclaim what reason shows to be true.o The Prospects of Industrial Civilization (1923)∙It seems to me that science has a much greater likelihood of being true in the main than any philosophy hitherto advanced (I do not, of course, except my own). In science there are many matters about which people are agreed; in philosophy there are none. Therefore, although each proposition in a science may be false, and it is practically certain that there are some that are false, yet we shall be wise to build our philosophy upon science, because the risk oferror in philosophy is pretty sure to be greater than in science. If we couldhope for certainty in philosophy, the matter would be otherwise, but so far as I can see such a hope would be chimerical.o Logical Atomism (1924)∙There is a further advantage [to hydrogen bombs]: the supply of uranium in the planet is very limited, and it might be feared that it would be used upbefore the human race was exterminated, but now that the practicallyunlimited supply of hydrogen can be utilized, there is considerable reason tohope that homo sapiens may put an end to himself, to the great advantage ofsuch less ferocious animals as may survive. But it is time to return to lesscheerful topics.o The ABC of Relativity (1925)Neither acquiescence in skepticism nor acquiescence in dogma is what education should produce.∙We all have a tendency to think that the world must conform to our prejudices.The opposite view involves some effort of thought, and most people would die sooner than think — in fact they do so.o The ABC of Relativity (1925), p. 166Variant: "Most people would rather die than think; many do."∙The good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge.o What I Believe (1925)∙Neither acquiescence in skepticism nor acquiescence in dogma is what education should produce. What it should produce is a belief that knowledge is attainable in a measure, though with difficulty; that much of what passes forknowledge at any given time is likely to be more or less mistaken, but that the mistakes can be rectified by care and industry. In acting upon our beliefs, weshould be very cautious where a small error would mean disaster; nevertheless it is upon our beliefs that we must act. This state of mind is rather difficult: itrequires a high degree of intellectual culture without emotional atrophy. Butthough difficult, it is not impossible; it is in fact the scientific temper.Knowledge, like other good things, is difficult, but not impossible; thedogmatist forgets the difficulty, the skeptic denies the possibility. Both aremistaken, and their errors, when widespread, produce social disaster.o On Education, Especially in Early Childhood (1926)∙I say quite deliberately that the Christian religion, as organized in its churches, has been and still is the principal enemy of moral progress in the world.o Why I Am Not a Christian (1927-03-06); this has often beenmisquoted as "The Christian religion has been and still is the principalenemy of moral progress in the world."The fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt.∙I do not think that the real reason why people accept religion has anything to do with argumentation. They accept religion on emotional grounds. One isoften told that it is a very wrong thing to attack religion, because religionmakes men virtuous. So I am told; I have not noticed it.o Why I Am Not a Christian (1927)∙Religion is based, I think, primarily and mainly upon fear. It is partly the terror of the unknown and partly, as I have said, the wish to feel that you have a kind of elder brother who will stand by you in all your troubles and disputes... Agood world needs knowledge, kindliness, and courage; it does not need aregretful hankering after the past or a fettering of the free intelligence by thewords uttered long ago by ignorant men.o Why I Am Not a Christian (1927)∙I am as firmly convinced that religions do harm as I am that they are untrue.o Why I Am Not a Christian (1927)∙The most essential characteristic of scientific technique is that it proceeds from experiment, not from tradition. The experimental habit of mind is adifficult one for most people to maintain ; indeed, the science of onegeneration has already become the tradition of the next...o The Scientific Outlook (1931)∙I found one day in school a boy of medium size ill-treating a smaller boy. I expostulated, but he replied: "The bigs hit me, so I hit the babies; that's fair."In these words he epitomized the history of the human race.o Education and the Social Order (1932)Science is always tentative, expecting that modification in its present theories will sooner or later be found necessary, and aware that its method is one which is logically incapable of arriving at a complete and final demonstration.∙Force plays a much larger part in the government of the world than it did before 1914, and what is especially alarming, force tends increasingly to fallinto the hands of those who are enemies of civilization. The danger isprofound and terrible; it cannot be waved aside with easy optimism.The fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt. Even those of the intelligentwho believe that they have a nostrum are too individualistic to combine withother intelligent men from whom they differ on minor points. This was notalways the case.o"The Triumph of Stupidity" (1933-05-10) in Mortals and Others: Bertrand Russell's American Essays, 1931-1935 (Routledge, 1998,ISBN 0-415-17866-5), p. 28∙ A religious creed differs from a scientific theory in claiming to embody eternal and absolutely certain truth, whereas science is always tentative, expectingthat modification in its present theories will sooner or later be found necessary, and aware that its method is one which is logically incapable of arriving at acomplete and final demonstration.o Religion and Science (1935), Ch. I: Ground of Conflict ∙While it is true that science cannot decide questions of value, that is because they cannot be intellectually decided at all, and lie outside the realm of truthand falsehood. Whatever knowledge is attainable, must be attained byscientific methods; and what science cannot discover, mankind cannot know.o Religion and Science (1935), ch. IX: Science of EthicsNaive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows naive realism to be false.∙Religions, which condemn the pleasures of sense, drive men to seek the pleasures of power. Throughout history power has been the vice of the ascetic.o The New York Herald-Tribune Magazine (1938-03-06) ∙Science seems to be at war with itself.... Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows naive realism to be false. Therefore naive realism, iftrue, is false; therefore it is false.o An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940)∙I remain convinced that obstinate addiction to ordinary language in our private thoughts is one of the main obstacles to progress in philosophy.o Quoted in Library of Living Philosophers: The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell (1944)Whatever we know without inference is mental.∙Aristotle, as a philosopher, is in many ways very different from all his predecessors. He is the first to write like a professor: his treatises aresystematic, his discussions are divided into heads, he is a professional teacher,not an inspired prophet. His work is critical, careful, pedestrian, without anytrace of Bacchic enthusiasm. The Orphic elements in Plato are watered downin Aristotle, and mixed with a strong dose of common sense; where he isPlatonic, one feels that his natural temperament has been overpowered by theteaching to which he has been subjected. He is not passionate, or in anyprofound sense religious. The errors of his predecessors were the gloriouserrors of youth attempting the impossible; his errors are those of age whichcannot free itself of habitual prejudices. He is best in detail and in criticism; he fails in large construction, for lack of fundamental clarity and Titanic fire.o"Aristotle’s Metaphysics," History of Western Philosophy (1945)I do not believe that I am now dreaming, but I cannot prove that I am not. I am, however, quite certain that I am having certain experiences, whether they be those of a dream or those of waking life.∙It is entirely clear that there is only one way in which great wars can be permanently prevented, and that is the establishment of an internationalgovernment with a monopoly of serious armed force.o"The Atomic Bomb and the Prevention of War" in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (1945-10-01)∙Whatever we know without inference is mental.o Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948)∙I do not believe that I am now dreaming, but I cannot prove that I am not. I am, however, quite certain that I am having certain experiences, whether they bethose of a dream or those of waking life.o Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948)∙Can a society in which thought and technique are scientific persist for a long period, as, for example, ancient Egypt persisted, or does it necessarily containwithin itself forces which must bring either decay or explosion?o"Can a Scientific Community Be Stable?," Lecture, Royal Society of Medicine, London (1949-11-29)Humankind has become so much one family that we cannot insure our own prosperity except by insuring that of everyone else. If you wish to be happy yourself, you must resign yourself to seeing others also happy.∙All who are not lunatics are agreed about certain things. That it is better to be alive than dead, better to be adequately fed than starved, better to be free thana slave. Many people desire those things only for themselves and their friends;they are quite content that their enemies should suffer. These people can onlybe refuted by science: Humankind has become so much one family that wecannot ensure our own prosperity except by ensuring that of everyone else. Ifyou wish to be happy yourself, you must resign yourself to seeing others alsohappy.o"The Science to Save Us from Science," The New York TimesMagazine (1950-03-19)∙Do not fear to be eccentric in opinion, for every opinion now accepted was once eccentric.o Commandment 7 of "A Liberal Decalogue", from "The Best Answer to Fanaticism: Liberalism," The New York Times (1951-12-16); laterprinted in The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell (1969), vol. 3:1944-1967, pp. 71-2∙It is sometimes maintained that racial mixture is biologically undesirable.There is no evidence whatever for this view. Nor is there, apparently, anyreason to think that Negroes are congenitally less intelligent than white people, but as to that it will be difficult to judge until they have equal scope andequally good social conditions.o New Hopes for a Changing World (1951)∙Written words differ from spoken words in being material structures. A spoken word is a process in the physical world, having an essential time-order;a written word is a series of pieces of matter, having an essential space-order.o An Outline of Philosophy, ch. 4 (1951)∙I have been accused of a habit of changing my opinions ... I am not myself in any degree ashamed of having changed my opinions. What physicist who was already active in 1900 would dream of boasting that his opinions had notchanged during the last half century? In science men change their opinionswhen new knowledge becomes available; but philosophy in the minds of many is assimilated rather to theology than to science. ... The kind of philosophy thatI value and have endeavoured to pursue is scientific, in the sense that there issome definite knowledge to be obtained and that new discoveries can make the admission of former error inevitable to any candid mind. For what I have said, whether early or late, I do not claim the kind of truth which theologians claimfor their creeds. I claim only, at best, that the opinion expressed was a sensible one to hold at the time when it was expressed. I should be much surprised ifsubsequent research did not show that it needed to be modified. I hope,therefore, that whoever uses this dictionary will not suppose the remarkswhich it quotes to be intended as pontifical pronouncements, but only as thebest I could do at the time towards the promotion of clear and accuratethinking. Clarity, above all, has been my aim.o Preface to The Bertrand Russell Dictionary of Mind, Matter andMorals (1952) edited by Lester E. DenonnMany orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake.∙Many orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, ofcourse, a mistake. If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there isa china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would beable to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot istoo small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerablepresumption on the part of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly bethought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a teapotwere affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, andinstilled into the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in itsexistence would become a mark of eccentricity and entitle the doubter to theattentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of the Inquisitor in anearlier time.o"Is There a God?" (1952), commissioned by Illustrated Magazine but not published until its appearance in The Collected Papers of BertrandRussell, Volume 11: Last Philosophical Testament, 1943-68, ed. JohnG. Slater and Peter Köllner (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 543-48∙An atheist, like a Christian, holds that we can know whether or not there is a God. The Christian holds that we can know there is a God; the atheist, that we can know there is not. The Agnostic suspends judgment, saying that there arenot sufficient grounds either for affirmation or for denial. At the same time, an Agnostic may hold that the existence of God, though not impossible, is veryimprobable; he may even hold it so improbable that it is not worth considering in practice. In that case, he is not far removed from atheism. His attitude maybe that which a careful philosopher would have towards the gods of ancientGreece. If I were asked to prove that Zeus and Poseidon and Hera and the rest of the Olympians do not exist, I should be at a loss to find conclusivearguments. An Agnostic may think the Christian God as improbable as theOlympians; in that case, he is, for practical purposes, at one with the atheists.o What is an Agnostic? (1953)The only thing that will redeem mankind is co-operation.∙Obscenity is whatever happens to shock some elderly and ignorant magistrate.o Look (1954-02-23)∙If throughout your life you abstain from murder, theft, fornication, perjury, blasphemy, and disrespect toward your parents, your church, and your king,you are conventionally held to deserve moral admiration even if you havenever done a single kind or generous or useful action. This very inadequatenotion of virtue is an outcome of tabu morality, and has done untold harm.o Human Society in Ethics and Politics (1954)∙Suppose atomic bombs had reduced the population of the world to one brother and one sister, should they let the human race die out? I do not know theanswer, but I do not think it can be in the affirmative merely on the groundthat incest is wicked.o Human Society in Ethics and Politics (1954)∙The only thing that will redeem mankind is co-operation.o Human Society in Ethics and Politics (1954)。