资本结构决定因素以中国企业为案例【外文翻译】

资本结构决定因素以中国企业为案例【外
文翻译】
XXX titled "XXX Structure: Evidence from XXX's n-making process in regards to their capital structure。

The article XXX: the "pecking order" theory and the "trade-off" theory.
XXX external sources。

XXX。

This is due to the XXX seeks external XXX that a financial manager will first use internal capital。

then issue debt。

and only as a last resort。

XXX。

This is because the market may perceive the issuance of equity as a signal of poor XXX.
2.2 The trade-off XXX
In contrast。

the XXX and potential financial distress costs
are low。

XXX and financial distress costs are high.
Overall。

XXX's n-making process in regards to their capital structure。

By examining the pecking order and trade-off theories。

the article sheds light on the complex nature of this XXX inform future research in this area.
XXX。

Ross (1977) was the first to XXX management has better knowledge of the firm than XXX job loss due to debt default from poor cash flow。

This n asymmetry may also explain why existing XXX financing。

XXX for the risks of their investment。

XXX.
Myers and Majluf (1984) XXX financing。

XXX's capital structure will be driven by XXX internal funds。

then with low-risk debt。

and with new equity only as a last resort。

According to their theory。

there is no XXX。

XXX.
XXX (1996) XXX a pecking order。

XXX(2001) found XXX 10-XXX (2003) XXX on a broad n of publicly traded American firms from 1971 to 1998 and concluded that the theory was not XXX。

the XXX or to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s.
The XXX。

XXX.
One of the trade-offs that must be XXX that come with taking on debt。

While debt can provide tax benefits。

it also XXX。

In other words。

while taking on debt can provide tax advantages。

it can also lead to financial difficulties if the company is XXX。

a balance must be struck een the benefits of taking on debt and the potential costs associated with it。

Overall。

the XXX。

and that finding the right balance is key to maximizing a firm's value.
The MM (1958) model originally assumed no n。

XXX and Miller (1963) and Miller (1977) introduced tax effects。

This new research XXX。

this contradicts XXX。

which means that a higher debt。

can increase a firm's value。

However。

these benefits can be offset by the costs of financial distress。

which can destroy the value of the firm。

Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off。

DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)。

Ross (1985)。

and Leland (1994) have shown that a firm with safe。

tangible assets and plenty of taxable e should take a high debt-equity。

to avoid high tax payments。

On
the other hand。

a firm with poorer performance and more intangible assets is better off XXX.
Even in a perfect market with no tax ns。

XXX。

XXX but little control over the company as long as the XXX。

creditors XXX on a company if it experiences financial distress。

Even if a company is financially stable。

creditors XXX。

XXX make it XXX difficult for the company to borrow more money for a new office building.
Overall。

XXX。

even in a perfect market。

Debt provides financial stability but little control。

while equity offers control but can be risky。

It is XXX。

companies XXX.
Equity claims。

XXX stock。

XXX company issues them。

In the event of n。

common stockholders have the right to receive the net assets of the company after all debts and any securities that rank ahead of common shares have been paid off。

These two features。

the right to vote and the right to receive dividends and other ns。

are the defining characteristics of XXX
In contrast。

debt claims give creditors the right to receive XXX holders。

creditors do not have the right to XXX。

Overall。

XXX-making。

XXX to a fixed return on their investment。

It is XXX associated with both types of claims before making any investment ns.
XXX and Meckling (1976) identified two XXX。

conflicts may arise een debt-holders and equity-holders due to the debt contract incentivizing equity-holders to invest sub-XXX。

the debt contract states that if an investment yields returns well above the face value of the debt。

equity-holders will capture most of the gain。

However。

if the investment fails。

debt-XXX result。

equity-holders XXX risky projects。

even if they XXX in a decrease in the value of the debt。

but the loss in equity value can
be more than offset by the gain captured at the expense of debt-holders。

Equity-holders correctly anticipate this r。

and as a result。

debt-holders receive less for the debt than they otherwise would。

Thus。

the cost of the incentive to XXX-holders who issue the debt。

This effect。

known as the asset n effect。

is the agency cost of
debt financing.
XXX due to the fact that managers do not hold the XXX。

This means that they are not XXX As a result。

managers may not XXX to manage the firm's resources。

and may even take advantage of their n by using firm resources for their own personal gain。

such as through empire-building or by XXX.
It is important to note that these conflicts can have XXX's resources。

it can lead to a XXX。

the n of resources for personal gain can lead to a loss of trust and confidence from XXX.
To address these issues。

it XXX targets。

as well as XXX。

firms XXX。

XXX.
In summary。

XXX of the firm。

By doing so。

firms XXX.
Managers XXX are not in the best interest of the firm because they bear the cost of refraining from these pursuits。

but only capture a XXX level of value for the firm。

However。

if the manager XXX。

they are more likely to act in the best interest of the firm。

This is because an increase in the debt。

of the firm
increases the manager's share of the equity。

which mitigates the loss from the conflict een the manager and shareholders.
nally。

debt financing XXX (1986)。

debt commitments require the firm to pay out cash。

which ces the amount of "free" cash available for managers XXX are not in the best interest of the XXX-holders is a benefit of debt financing。

Overall。

managers XXX are not in the best interest of the firm。

However。

an increase in the manager's share of the equity and an increase in the debt。

of the firm XXX firm.
From this analysis。

several ns XXX。

it is expected that bond contracts XXX。

XXX lines of business。

Secondly。

industries with XXX will have higher levels of debt。

all else being equal。

Therefore。

regulated public utilities。

banks。

and XXX。

firms with slow or negative growth and significant free cash flows from
ns should have more debt。

Large free cash flows without good investment opportunities can lead to the n of perks。

the building
of empires。

XXX the amount of free cash and XXX Jensen (1986)。

industries with these characteristics include steel。

chemicals。

brewing。

tobacco。

n and。

broadcasting。

and wood and paper products。

The XXX industries should have high leverage s.
Corporate control is a topic that is often XXX。

one of the XXX in which the manager should take n。

This approach has been criticized by Hart (1995a。

1995b) as being too costly to design and execute。

As a result。

it may be more optimal to leave the contract plete and assign the equity-holders the XXX-holders (n and Bolton。

1992)。

XXX XXX。

it is the equity-holders who have control。

However。

in the event of default on debt repayment。

control is transferred to the debt-holders。

and n of XXX。

management XXX illustrated in Table I.
Two related models share a XXX and managers。

though they differ in the specific ways in which the conflicts arise and in the role of debt。

According to Harris and Raviv (1990)。

managers always want to continue the firm's current ns。

even if n of the firm would be XXX。

debt can force managers to liquidate firms because default may well trigger the managers' job loss。

The XXX。

Stulz (1990) presents a different model based on the n that managers always want to invest available funds to expand the size
of the firm。

even though XXX。

unlike in the Modigliani-Miller world。

changing the capital structure of the firm changes the n of power een the insiders and the outside investors。

XXX's investment policy (LaPorta et al。

2000).
本文探讨了资本结构对企业价值最大化的影响，以中国企业为案例。

早期理论为了应对税收和财务困境的金融压力，提出了啄食顺序理论和平衡理论。

啄食顺序理论认为，财务经理会优先使用内部资本，其次是发行债务，最后才是。

而平衡理论则认为，存在一种最优的资本结构可以平衡各种负债和权益。

啄食顺序理论的基础是公司管理者和外部投资者之间的信息不对称。

这种不对称会导致管理者更倾向于使用内部资本和发行低风险的债券，而不是。

然而，实证研究并未证明啄食顺序理论的有效性，因为它忽略了传统杠杆因素和企业特定的情况。

相比之下，平衡理论认为存在一种最优的资本结构可以最大限度地实现企业价值最大化。

这种理论有多种形态，其中一种是税赋保护的好处和财务危机的借贷成本。

在这种情况下，企业可以通过借入资金来获得税收优惠，并降低借贷成本。

然而，这种理论也存在局限性，因为它忽略了企业的风险和市场环境。

综上所述，资本结构对企业价值最大化具有重要影响。

啄食顺序理论和平衡理论提供了不同的视角，但都有其局限性。

因此，企业应该根据自身情况综合考虑各种因素来确定最优的资本结构。

MM（1958）模型的一个重要假设是没有税收。

XXX和XXX（1963）在随后的工作中将税收问题引入了原有框架。

这个新工作的启示是，公司应该通过债务融资项目实现最大化公司价值。

然而，这种方法只适用于其中一小部分企业的总资本，因此存在矛盾。

随后的理论工作从抵税效应和资本成本的平衡中寻找最优资本结构。

根据这个理论，从债务中获得的免税利益意味着高负债比率会增加公司的价值。

但是，这种福利可以被成本抵消，金融衰退可能会损害企业的价值。

因此，最优资本结构是在免税利益、负债和资本成本之间取得平衡。

XXX和XXX（1980），XXX（1985）以及他们（1994）表明，对于一个拥有安全有形资产和高应纳税所得额的公司来说，为避免高纳税而采取高债务产权比率是有利的。

对于绩效低下、拥有更多无形资产的公司来说，最好依赖股权融资。

基于考虑抵税效应的理论，一个问题是在遵循统一税率的情况下，为什么公司的资本结构各不相同。

来自美国的实证证据（科普兰和XXX，1992）表明，公司所得税形成后企业资
本结构并没有改变多少。

在澳大利亚，那里没有双所得课税，在其他经济体（拉XXX，1995）资本结构状况基本持平。

布
兹（2001）发现租税减免在发展中国家有差异，在决定资本结构的选择中基本没有影响。

即使在完全市场和没有税务影响的情况下，代理理论表明，负债和权益适当搭配仍然是一种重要的公司治理结构。

一般来说，只要还款时间（有时某些条款）没有到期，债权人享受固定回报的时间，但是没有控制公司的权利。

然而，如果公司陷入财务危机，债权人对公司有很大的影响力，但即使公司实力雄厚，债权人对于公司能否为新提议的方案计划获得额外的资
金也会产生影响。

例如，银行为公司的扩张贷款，对于公司能否建立新的办公楼就能有决定性的决定权利。

相反地，股东权益，特别是普通股票的权利，给予普通股持股股东这样的权利：股东大会投票表决权以及其他的公司处理权像公司合并以及部分资产处理等问题。

股东们还可以得到股息或其它形式的资金分红，如果公司清盘关闭，在公司支付所有债务和其他有效证券如优先股（优于普通股分配权）后享受净资产。

这两个特权，选举权和分红权的权利和其他分配权，是普通股股东最典型的权利。

他们指出，债务融资会引起两种冲突：债权人与权益所有者之间的冲突，以及股东与管理者之间的冲突。

在第一种冲突中，债务合同鼓励权益所有者投资，但如果投资失败，债券人只需承担有限责任，而权益所有者则需要承担更大的损失。

这种情况下，权益所有者可能会选择冒险投资，导致债务价值下降。

资产替代效应是代理成本的一种表现形式。

在第二种冲突中，管理者拥有少于100%的剩余索取权，导致他们不会承担
全部成本，从而可能将公司资源转向个人利益。

这种情况下，经理需要在承担与公司价值有关的行为成本的基础上，实现公
司价值最大化。

最佳的资本结构应该平衡债务代理成本和债务利益之间的关系，以实现公司价值最大化。

大量实证结果表明，债券合同中包括试图阻止资产替代的功能，如利息覆盖需求，禁止投资与新业务不相关的商业等，可以有效减少企业的杠杆作用。

在其他条件不变的情况下，资产替代的机会较有限，因此在一些成熟的产业中缺少发展机遇的企业杠杆作用更明显，例如公用事业、银行等。

对于那些日常经营活动中有较大的现金流量，同时想要获得更多的债务的企业来说，低增长率或者甚至负增长率更加有利，因为这可以提供更多的现金流量用于高消费和额外的支出。

然而，过度增加的债务会减少企业的自由现金流量，增加经理的剩余索取权的部分所有权。

而在公司控制方面，代理理论存在一定局限性。

它假设代理问题可以得到缓解或消除，并且共同假定经理可以在未来的任何突发事件和状态中知道应该采取什么行动。

然而，设计或执行这样的全面合同将非常昂贵。

因此，不断完善的不完全合同法可能更具有优势，分配股权持有人无法控制的，在合同给予债权人控制权的同时给股东权益所有者分配控制权。

这种不完全合同法将权益和债券视为有价证券。

当公司财政状况稳健
时，股票持有人拥有控制权。

但是，债务拖欠还款将引发债务持有人的控制权转移，从而限制管理层的要求，以确保债务顺利还款。

因此，裁员和资产清算就是不可避免的了。