一篇经济类英文论文(含中文翻译)

The Problem of Social Cost
社会成本问题
RONALD COASE
罗纳德·科斯
Ronald Coase is Professor Emeritus at University of Chicago LawSchool and a Nobel Laureate in Economics. This article is fromThe Journal of Law and Economics (October 1960). Several passages devoted to extended discussions of legal decisions
have been omitted.
罗纳德·科斯在芝加哥大学法学院名誉教授和诺贝尔经济学奖得主。

本文是其外法学与经济学杂志（1960年10月）。

专门的法律问题的决定的延伸讨论的几个
段落已被省略。

I.THE PROBLEM TO BE EXAMINED
This paper is concerned with those actions of business firms which have harm-ful effects on others. The standard example is that of a factory the smoke from which has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties. The economic analysis
of such a situation has usually proceeded in terms of a divergence between the private and social product of the factory, in which economists have largely followed the treatment of Pigou in The Economies of Welfare. The conclusion to which this kind of analysis seems to have led most economists is that it would be desirable to make the owner of the factory li-able for the damage caused to those injured by the smoke, or alternatively, to place a tax on the factory owner varying with the amount of smoke produced and equivalent in money terms to the damage it would cause, or finally, to exclude the factory from residential districts (and presumably from other areas in which the emission of smoke would have harmful effects on others). It is my contention that the suggested courses of action are inappropriate, in that they lead to results which are not necessarily, or even usually, desirable.
一、要检查的问题
本文关注的是这些行动的企业有伤害他人有用的影响。

标准的例子是，一个工厂的烟雾从那些占领邻近物业的有害影响。

在这种情况下的经济分析，通常已在工厂的私人和社会产品之间的分歧方面着手，在经济学家们基本上遵循治疗庇古福利经济。

这种分析的结论，似乎使大多数经济学家是工厂里的烟雾，或者受伤的人造成的损害能够使雇主，这将是可取的，上放置一个税在金钱方面的损害，或最后，它会导致排除住宅区（大概是从其他地区排放的烟雾将有对他人有害影响）工厂厂主不同的金额产生的烟雾，相当于。

行动的建议的课程是不合适的，因为它们导致的结果是不一定，甚至是通常情况下，可取的，它是我的论点。

II.THE RECIPROCAL NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be
made. The question is commonly thought of as one in which A inflicts harm on B and what has to be decided is: how should we restrain A? But this is wrong. We are dealing with a problem of a reciprocal nature. To avoid the harm to, B would inflict harm on A. The real question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm. I instanced in my previous article the case of a confectioner the noise and vibrations from whose machinery disturbed a doctor in his work. To avoid harming the doctor would inflict harm on the confectioner. The problem posed by this case was essentially whether it was worth while, as a result of restricting the methods of production which could be used by the confectioner, to secure more doctoring at the cost of a reduced supply of confectionery products. Another example is afforded by the problem of straying cattle which destroy crops on neighbouring land. If it is inevitable that some cattle will stray, all increase in the supply of meat can only be obtained at the expense of a decrease in the supply of crops. The nature of the choice is clear: meat or crops. What answer should be given is, of course, not clear unless we know the value of what is obtained as well as the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it. To give another example, Professor George J. Stigler instances the contamination of a stream. If we assume that the harmful effect of the pollution is that it kills the fish, the question to be decided is: is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the value of the product which the contamination of the stream makes possible. It goes almost without saying that this problem has to be looked at in total and at the margin.
二、互惠性的问题
传统的做法往往掩盖作出的选择，自然。

这个问题通常被认为作为一个在B 上一个敌人造成的伤害和什么要决定的是：我们应该如何抑制一个？但这是错误的。

我们正在处理的互惠性质的问题。

为了避免伤害，B将A上造成的危害，真正的问题，必须决定是：应该允许A损害B或应允许B伤害吗？问题是要避免更严重的伤害。

我在我以前的文章中实例化一个糕点师的噪音和振动机械不安医生在他的工作情况。

为了避免伤及医生会造成伤害的糕点。

基本上这种情况下所造成的问题是它是否值得，作为一种限制方法可以用于糕点生产的结果，以争取更多的糖果产品的供应减少，成本篡改。

另一个例子是给予由偏离破坏邻近土地上的农作物的牛的问题。

如果这是不可避免的，一些牛会偏离，只能获得所有的肉类供应增加作物供应减少开支。

选择的性质是明确的：肉类或农作物。

应给予什么样的答案是，当然，不明确的，除非我们知道得到什么价值，以及什么牺牲得到它的价值。

给另一个例如，教授乔治·J.斯蒂格勒实例流的污染。

如果我们假定污染的有害影响是，它杀死的鱼，将要决定的问题是：是鱼的价值损失大于或小于流的污染，使产品的价值。

当然，几乎没有说，这个问题要看着总保证金。

III.THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
I propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a compeletely satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly (strictly this means that the operation of a pricing system is
without cost).
A good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by the case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighbouring land. Let us sup-pose that a farmer and cattle-raiser are operating on neighbouring properties. Let us further suppose that, without any fencing between the properties, an increase in the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd in creases the total damage to the farmer’s crops. What happens to the marginal damage as the size of the herd increases is another matter. This depends on whether the cattle tend to follow one another or to roam side by side, on whether they tend to be more or less restless as the size of the herd increases and on other similar factors. For my immediate purpose, it is immaterial what assumption is made about marginal damage as the size of the herd increases.
Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused, the additional annual cost imposed on the cattle-raiser if he increased his herd from, say, 2 to 3 steers is $3 and in deciding on the size of the herd, he will take this into account along with his other costs. That is, he will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced (assuming that the cattle-raiser slaughters the cattle) is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the value of the additional crops destroyed. Of course, if, by the employment of dogs, herdsmen, aeroplanes, mobile radio and other means, the amount of damage can be reduced, these means will be adopted when their cost is less than the value of the crop which they prevent being lost. Given that the annual cost of fencing is $9, the cattle-raiser who wished to have a herd with 4 steers or more would pay for fencing to be erected and maintained, assuming that other means of attaining the same end would not do so more cheaply. When the fence is erected, the marginal cost due to the liability for damage becomes zero, except to the extent that an increase in the size of the herd necessitates a stronger and therefore more expensive fence because more steers are liable to lean against it at the same time. But, of course, it may be cheaper for the cattle-raiser not to fence and to pay for the damaged crops, as in my arithmetical example, with 3 or fewer steers.
It might be thought that the fact that the cattle-raiser would pay for all crops damaged would lead the farmer to increase his planting if a cattle-raiser came to occupy the neighbouring property. But this is not so. If the crop was previously sold in conditions of perfect competition, marginal cost was equal to price for the amount of planting undertaken and any expansion would have reduced the profits of the farmer. In the new situation, the existence of crop damage would mean that the farmer would sell less on the open market but his receipts for a given production would remain the same, since the cattle-raiser would pay the market price for any crop damaged. Of course, if cattle-raising commonly involved the destruction of crops, the coming into existence of a cattle-raising industry might raise the price of the crops involved and farmers would then extend their planting. But I wish to confine my attention to the individual farmer.
I have said that the occupation of a neighbouring property by a cattle-raiser would not cause the amount of production, or perhaps more exactly the amount of planting, by the farmer to increase. In fact, if the cattle-raising has any effect, it will be to decrease the amount of planting. The reason for this is that, for any given tract of land, if the value of the crop damaged is so great that the receipts from the sale of the undamaged crop are less than the total costs of cultivating that tract of land, it will be profitable for the farmer and the cattle-raiser to make a bargain whereby that tract of land is left uncultivated. This can be made clear by means of an arithmetical example. Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is $12 and that the cost incurred in cultivating this tract of land is $10, the net gain from cultivating the land being $2. I assume for purposes of simplicity that the farmer owns the land. Now assume that the cattle-raiser starts operations on the neighbouring property and that the value of the crops damaged is $1.In this case $11 is obtained by the farmer from sale on the market and $1 is obtained from the cattle-raiser for damage suffered and the net gain remains $2. Now suppose that the cattle-raiser finds it profitable to increase the size of his herd, even though the amount of damage rises to $3; which means that the value of the additional meat production is greater than the additional costs, including the additional $2 payment for damage. But the total payment for damage is now $3. The net gain to the farmer from cultivating the land is still $2. The cattle-raiser would be better off if the farmer would agree not to cultivate his land for any payment less than $3. The farmer would be agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment greater than $2. There is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory bargain which would lead to the abandonment of cultivation. * But the same argument applies not only to the whole tract cultivated by the fanner but also to any subdivision of it. Suppose, for example, that the cattle have a well-defined route, say, to a brook or to a shady area. In these circumstances, the amount of damage to the crop along the route may well be great and if so, it could be that the farmer and the cattle-raiser would find it profitable to make a bargain whereby the farmer would agree not to cultivate this strip of land.
But this raises a further possibility. Suppose that there is such a well de-fined route. Suppose further that the value of the crop that would be obtained by cultivating this strip of land is $10 but that the cost of cultivation is $11. In the absence of the cattle-raiser, the land would not be cultivated. However, given the presence of the cattle-raiser, it could well be that if the strip was cultivated, the whole crop would be destroyed by the cattle. In which case, the cattle-raiser would be forced to pay $10 to the farmer. It is true that the farmer would lose $1. But the cattle-raiser would lose $10. Clearly this is a situation which is not likely to last indefinitely since neither party would want this to happen. The aim of the farmer would be to induce the cattle-raiser to make a payment in return for an agreement to leave this land uncultivated. The farmer would not be able to obtain a payment greater than the cost of fencing off this piece of land nor so high as to lead the cattle-raiser to abandon the use of the neighbouring property. What payment would in fact be made would depend
on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle-raiser as bargain-ers. But as the payment would not be so high as to cause the cattle-raiser to abandon this location and as it would not vary with the size of the herd, such an agreement would not affect the allocation of resources but would merely alter the distribution of income and wealth as between the cattle-raiser and the farmer.
I think it is clear that if the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly, the reduction in the value of production elsewhere will be taken into account in computing the additional cost involved in increasing the size of the herd. This cost will be weighed against the value of the additional meat production and, given perfect competition in the cattle industry, the allocation of resources in cattle-raising will be optimal. What needs to be emphasized is that the fall in the value of production elsewhere which would be taken into account in the costs of the cattle-raiser may well be less than the damage which the cattle would cause to the crops in the ordinary course of events. This is because it is possible, as a result of market transactions, to discontinue cultivation of the land. This is desirable in all cases in which the damage that the cattle would cause, and for which the cattle-raiser would be willing to pay, exceeds the amount which the farmer would pay for use of the land. In conditions of perfect competition, the amount which the farmer would pay for the use of the land is equal to the difference between the value of the total production when the factors are employed on this land and the value of the additional product yielded in their next best use (which would be what the farmer would have to pay for the factors). If damage exceeds the amount the farmer would pay for the use of the land, the value of the additional product of the factors employed elsewhere would exceed the value of the total product in this use after damage is taken into account. It follows that it would be desirable to abandon cultivation of the land and to release the factors employed for production elsewhere. A procedure which merely provided for payment for damage to the crop caused by the cattle but which did not allow for the possibility of cultivation being discontinued would result in too small an employment of factors of production in cattle-raising and too large an employment of factors in cultivation of the crop. But given the possibility of market transactions, a situation in which damage to crops exceeded the rent of the land would not endure. Whether the cattle-raiser pays the farmer to leave the land uncultivated or himself rents the land by paying the land-owner an amount slightly greater than the farmer would pay (if the farmer was himself renting the land), the final result would be the same and would maximise the value of production. Even when the farmer is induced to plant crops which it would not be profitable to cultivate for sale on the market, this will be a purely short-term phenomenon and may be expected to lead to an agreement under which the planting will cease. The cattle-raiser will remain in that location and the marginal cost of meat production will be the same as before, thus having no long-run effect on the allocation of resources.
三、损害赔偿责任的定价制度
我建议开始我的分析，通过审查案件，其中多数经济学家大概会同意将在完全令人满意的方式解决问题的破坏性业务时支付所有所造成的损害和定价体系工程进展顺利（严格来说，这意味着定价制度的运作是无成本）。

正在讨论的问题的一个很好的例子是误入牛毁坏庄稼邻近土地上生长的情况下给予。

让我们支持对一个农民和牛募集邻近物业经营。

让我们进一步假设，没有任何围栏之间的属性，在牛募集的畜群规模的增加而增加农民的作物的总伤害。

会发生什么情况，以增加畜群的大小的边际损害的，则是另一回事。

这取决于牛是否会跟随一个或是否他们往往是牛群的增加和规模上其他类似的因素或多或少不安，漫游并排。

对于我的直接目的，它是无关紧要的假设边际损害为增加畜群的大小。

鉴于这是承担，造成损害的额外年度费用的牛的序幕征收，如果他增加从2至3阉他的畜群的牛是$3，并在决定牛群的大小，他将考虑到这一点，随着他的其他费用。

也就是说，他不会提高畜群的大小，除非额外的肉产生的价值（假设牛的序幕屠宰的牛）的额外费用，这将意味着，包括摧毁了其它作物的价值更大。

当然，如果就业的狗，农牧民，飞机，移动无线电和其他手段，可以减少损失数额，这些手段将通过他们的成本是低于价值的作物，它们可以防止丢失。

由于是在击剑年度成本是$9，在牛的提出者谁希望有一群4装载机或更多将围篱支付到被架设和维护，假设，其他手段达到同样的目的，不是做这样更便宜。

当围栏架设，由于损害赔偿责任的边际成本变为零除的程度，在牛群规模的增加，需要一个更强大，因此更昂贵的围栏，因为更多的公牛有责任向它倾斜在同一时间。

但是，当然，这可能是牛募集便宜没有围墙受损的作物，在我算术例如，作为3个或更少的公牛，并支付。

有人可能会认为牛募集将支付所有损坏庄稼的事实将导致农民增加他的种植牛募集来占据邻近物业。

但事实并非如此。

如果以前在完全竞争的条件下出售作物，边际成本等于价格进行种植量，任何扩大农民的利润将减少。

在新形势下，农作物损失的存在就意味着农民将在公开市场上出售的，但他的收入为一个给定的生产将保持不变，因为牛募集支付任何破坏作物的市场价格。

当然，如果养牛通常涉及毁坏庄稼，到一个养牛业存在的到来可能会引发涉及农民将扩大其种植的农作物的价格。

但我希望把我的个体农民的关注。

我曾经说过，占领邻近由牛募集的属性不会导致农民增加的生产量，或者更准确的种植量。

事实上，如果有任何影响的养牛，它会减少种植量。

这样做的原因是，任何土地道，如果受损作物的价值是如此之大，从出售完好作物的收入少于培育，大片土地的总成本，这将是为农民和牛的序幕，留下大片土地荒废，使讨价还价，即有利可图。

这可以通过一个算术例子明确。

最初假设，作物耕种的土地道获得的价值是12美元，在培育这一大片土地所需的费用是$ 10，$ 2耕种土地的净收益。

我想简单，农民拥有土地的目的。

现在假设，在牛的提出者开始，损坏农作物的价值$ 1.In这种情况下$ 11获得由农民从销售市场和$ 1是从的牛的序幕获得损害遭受的邻近物业经营净收益仍然为2美元。

现在想，在牛的提出者认为它盈利增加他的畜群的大小，即使损坏的数量上升到3美元;的额外肉类生产的价值大于的额外费用，包括了额外的$ 2支付损坏。

但损害的支付总额是$ 3。

农民耕种土地的净收益仍然是2元。

牛的序幕，将是富裕农民都同意，如果不培养他的土地，任何支付不到3美元。

农民将没有培养任何大于$ 2支付土地的认同。

显然是这将导致放弃种植一个双方都满意的讨价还价的余地。

*但同样的论点不仅适用于整个道由电风扇培养的，而且也给它的任何细分。

假
设，例如，牛有一个明确的路线，比方说，一条小溪或阴凉的区域。

在这种情况下，对沿线作物受损金额也可能是巨大的，如果是这样，可能是，农民和牛募集会发现是有利可图的讨价还价，农民同意不以培养狭长土地。

但是，这引发了进一步的可能性。

假设有这样一个罚款的好路线。

进一步假设，作物的价值将获得通过培育这个地带是10元，但种植成本11元。

在牛募集的情况下，土地不会种植。

然而，给予牛募集的存在，它可能是，如果带钢培养，整个作物将牛销毁。

在这种情况下，牛募集将被迫支付10美元的农民。

这是真正的农民将损失$1。

但牛的序幕，将失去10美元。

显然，这是一个情况，这是不可能无限期地持续下去，因为任何一方都不希望这种情况发生。

农民的目的是诱导牛募集的支付换取了一项协议，离开这片土地荒废。

农民将无法获得支付大于围栏这片土地的成本，也没有这么高，导致牛募集放弃使用邻近物业。

哪些付款将在事实上将取决于作为讨价还价的精明的农民和牛募集。

但作为付款就不会那么高，容易引起牛募集放弃这个位置，因为它不会随畜群的大小，这样的协议不会影响资源的分配，但仅仅是改变的分布牛提出者和农民之间的收入和财富。

我认为这是明确的，如果牛募集造成的损失承担责任和定价体系工程进展顺利，其他地方减少产值将考虑在计算涉及的额外费用，提高畜群的大小。

这笔费用将额外的肉类生产的价值权衡，完美的比赛，在养牛业，养牛将是最佳的资源分配。

需要强调的是，牛募集费用，将考虑在其他地方的生产价值的下降可能是小于牛会导致在日常事件对农作物的损害。

这是因为它是可能的，作为市场交易的结果，停止种植的土地。

在所有情况下的破坏，会导致牛，牛募集愿意支付超过数额的农民支付土地使用，这是可取的。

在完全竞争的条件下，农民支付土地使用量等于总生产值之间的差异的因素时，在这片土地上雇用和其他产品的价值在他们的未来产生最好的使用（这是什么农民将不得不支付的因素）。

如果损害超过数量的农民支付土地使用，其他地方就业的因素更多的产品价值将超过在此使用的产品总价值的考虑后损坏。

它如下放弃种植的土地，并释放其他地方生产的因素，这将是可取的。

一个程序，它只是提供付款为牛，但是这并没有让被停止种植的可能性造成作物受损将导致太小，养牛和太大的就业因素的生产要素的就业在作物的种植。

但考虑到市场交易的可能性，这种情况在对农作物的损害超过土地租金，就不能忍受。

是否牛募集支付农民离开土地荒废，或自己租土地，由土地所有者支付金额略高于农民将支付（如果农民自己租用的土地），最终的结果将是相同的，将最大限度地提高生产的价值。

即使诱导农民种庄稼，它不会是有利可图的培养，在市场上出售，这将是一个纯粹的短期现象，预期可能会导致根据该协议将停止种植。

牛募集将保持在该位置和肉类生产的边际成本会像以前一样，因此，资源的分配上没有长期的效果。

IV.THE PRICING SYSTEM WITH NO LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE
I now turn to the case in which, although the pricing system is assumed to worksmoothly (that is, costlessly), the damaging business is not liable for any of the damage which it causes. This business does not have to make a payment to those damaged by its actions. I propose to show that the allocation of resources will be the same in this case as it was when the damaging business was liable for damage caused. As I showed in the previous case that the allocation of resources was optimal, it will not be necessary to repeat this part of the argument.I return to the case of the farmer and the cattle-raiser. The farmer would suffer increased damage to his crop as the size
of the herd increased. Suppose that the size of the cattle-raiser’s herd is 3 steers (and that this is the size of the herd that would be maintained if crop damage was not taken into account). Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to $3 if the cattle-raiser would reduce his herd to 2 steers, up to $5 if the herd were reduced to 1 steer and would pay up to $6 if cattle-raising was abandoned. The cattle-raiser would therefore receive 53 from the farmer if he kept 2 steers instead of 3. This $3 foregone is therefore part of the cost incurred in keeping the third steer. Whether the $3 is a payment which the cattle-raiser has to make if he adds the third steer to his herd (which it would be if the cattle-raiser was liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop) or whether it is a sum of money whichhe would have received if he did not keep a third steer (which it would be if the cattle-raiser was not liable to the farmer for damage caused to the crop) does not affect the final result. In both cases $3 is part of the cost of adding a third steer, to be included along with the other costs. If the increase in the value of production in cattle-raising through increasing the size of the herd from 2 to 3 is greater than the additional costs that have to be incurred (including the $3 damage to crops), the size of the herd will be increased. Otherwise, it will not. The size of the herd will be the same whether the cattle-raiser is liable for damage caused to the crop or not.
It may be argued that the assumed starting point—a herd of 3 steers—was arbitrary. And this is true. But the farmer would not wish to pay to avoid crop damage which the cattle-raiser would not be able to cause. For example, the maximum annual payment which the farmer could be induced to pay could not exceed $9. the annual cost of fencing. And the farmer would only be willing to pay this sum if it did not reduce his earnings to a level that would cause him to abandon cultivation of this particular tract of land. Furthermore, the farmer would only be willing to pay this amount if he believed that, in the absence of any payment by him, the size of the herd maintained by the cattle-raiser would be 4 or more steers. Let us assume that this is the case. Then the farmer would be willing to pay up to $3 if the cattle-raiser would reduce his herd to 3 steers, up to $6 if the herd were reduced to 2 steers, up to $8 if one steer only were kept and up to $9 if cattle-raising were abandoned. It will be noticed that the change in the starting point has not altered the amount which would accrue to the cattle-raiser if he reduced the size of his herd by any given amount. It is still true that the cattle-raiser could receive an additional $3 from the farmer if he agreed to reduce his herd from 3 steers to 2 and that the $3 represents the value of the crop that would be destroyed by adding the third steer to the herd. Although a different belief on the part of the farmer (whether justified or not) about the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser would maintain in the absence of payments from him may affect the total payment he can be induced to pay, it is not true that this different belief would have any effect on the size of the herd that the cattle-raiser will actually keep. This will be the same as it would be if the cattle-raiser had to pay for damage caused by his cattle, since a receipt foregone of a given amount is the equivalent of a payment of the same amount.
It might be thought that it would pay the cattle-raiser to increase his herd above the size that he would wish to maintain once a bargain had been made, in order to induce the farmer to make a larger total payment. And this may be true. It is similar in nature to the action of the farmer (when the cattle-raiser was liable for damage) in cultivating land on which, as a result of an agreement with the cattle-raiser, planting would subsequently be abandoned (including land which would not be cultivated at all in the absence of cattle-raising). But such manoeuvres are preliminaries to an agreement and do not affect the long-run equilibrium position, which is the same whether or not the cattle-raiser is held responsible for the crop damage brought about by his cattle.
It is necessary to know whether the damaging business is liable or not for damage caused since without the establishment of this initial delimitation of rights there can be no market transactions to transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which maximises the value of production) is independent of the legal position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost.
四、无损害赔偿责任的电价体系
现在我想谈谈案中，虽然定价体系工作的顺利开展（即，无成本），损坏业务是不会造成任何损害承担责任。

此业务并没有使那些破坏其行动付款。

我建议，以表明在这种情况下，资源的分配将是相同的，因为它是破坏性的企业造成的损失承担责任时。

正如我在前面的例子表明，最佳的资源分配，它不会是必要的重复这部分的说法。

我回到了农民和牛募集的情况下。

农民会受到他的牛群的规模增加作物的伤害增加。

假设牛募集的畜群的大小是3装载机（，这将保持对作物的损害，如果不考虑畜群的大小）。

那么，农民将是愿意以支付高达3美元的牛的提出者是否会减少他的畜群2装载机，高达500如果牛群被减少到1引导和将支付高达6元如果养牛被遗弃。

牛序幕从农民将因此获得53，如果他保持2装载机，而不是3。

这个耗资3损失，因此在保持第三督导所需的费用的一部分。

无论是3美元，是1支付其中的牛的提出者有，如果他增加了第三次带领他的羊群（其中它会是在牛的提出者是否可农民对作物造成的损害）或是否它是1钱，他将已收到的，如果他不保持第三督导（这将是牛募集到农民对作物造成的损害不承担任何责任）的总和，不影响最终结果。

在这两种情况下$ 3是第三督导，与其他费用一起被列入成本的一部分。

大于，以将招致包括的$ 3损坏农作物的额外成本，通过增加大小鬼从2至3养牛生产价值的增加是否，牛群的规模将是增加。

否则，它不会。

畜群的大小将是相同的牛募集是否是作物或造成的损失承担责任。

它可能被认为是武断的假定出发点了3肉牛畜群。

这是真实的。

但农民不希望要避免牛募集将无法造成的农作物损失。

例如，可诱导农民支付每年最高支付不能超过9美元。

击剑的年度成本。

和农民只会愿意支付这笔如果它没有减少他的收入水平，将导致他放弃这片土地特别是道种植。

此外，农民才会愿意支付这笔款项，如果他相信，在任何由他支付的情况下，牛募集保持畜群的大小是4个或更多的指导。

让我们假设是这种情况。

那么，农民将是愿意以支付高达3美元的牛的提出者是否会减少他的牛群3装载机，6元如果牛群分别减少2装载机，至8元，如果1转向只被保持和上升到$9，如果养牛被遗弃。

它将会看到，。