盈余管理外文文献及翻译

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德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS 外文出处 European Accounting Review外文作者 Tendeloo, B.V., and Vanstraelen, A原文：Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS AbstractThis paper addresses the question whether voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with lower earnings management. Ball et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), pp. 235–270, 2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. In Germany, a code-law country with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. Our sample, consisting of German listed companies, contains 636 firm-year observations relating to the period 1999–2001. Our results suggest that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. These findings contribute to the current debate on whether high quality standards are sufficient and effective in countries with weak investor protection rights. They indicate that voluntary adopters of IFRS in Germany cannot be associated with lower earnings management.1. IntroductionThe International Accounting Standards (IAS), now renamed as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), have been developed to harmonize corporate accounting practice and to answer the need for high quality standards to be adopted inthe world’s major capital markets.Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. This paper contributes to this debate by examining whether the adoption of high quality standards like IFRS is associated with high financial reporting quality. In particular, we question whether IFRS a re sufficient to override managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management and affect the quality of reported earnings.Previous research provides evidence that the magnitude of earnings management is on average higher in code-law countries with low investor protection rights, compared to common-law countries with high investor protection rights (Leuz et al., 2003). Hence, to assess whether firms that report under IFRS can be associated with higher earnings quality we focus on Germany, which is a code-law country with relatively low investor protection rights (La Portal et al.,2000). Moreover, a relatively large number of German companies have already voluntarily chosen to adopt IFRS prior to 2005. This allows a comparison between companies that have adopted IFRS versus companies that report under domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).The results of our research show that IFRS do not impose a significant constraint on earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals. On the contrary, adopting IFRS seems to increase the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Our results further suggest that companies that have adopted IFRS engage more in earnings smoothing, although this effect is significantly reduced when the company has a Big 4 auditor. However, hidden reserves, which are allowed under German GAAP to manage earnings, are not entirely picked up by the traditional accruals measures. When hidden reserves are taken into consideration, our results show that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. Hence, our results indicate that adopters of IFRS cannot be associated with lower earnings management. This finding suggests that the adoption of high quality standards is not a sufficient condition for providing high quality information in code-law countries with low investor protection rights.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and provide the theoretical background of the paper. Section 3 provides an overview of the German accounting system. In Section 4, we formulate the research hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research design. The results of thestudy are presented in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize our results, discuss the implications and limitations of our analysis and give suggestions for further research.2. Previous Literature2.1. Adoption of International Accounting StandardsThe International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was established in 1973 and now renamed as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), aims to achieve uniformity in the accounting standards used by businesses and other organizations for financial reporting around the world (IASB website). The benefits of the adoption of international accounting standards are considered to be the following. First, it should improve the ability of investors to make informed financial decisions and eliminate confusion arising from different measures of financial position and performance across countries, thereby leading to a reduced risk for investors and a lower cost of capital for companies. Second, it should lower costs arising from multiple reporting. Third, it should encourage international investment. Finally, it should lead to amore efficient allocation of savings worldwide (Street et al., 1999).The original International Accounting Standards were mostly descriptive in nature and contained many alternative treatments. Because of this flexibility and a continuing lack of comparability across countries, the standards came under heavy criticism in the late 1980s. In response to this criticism, the IASC started the Comparability Project in 1987. The revised standards, which became effective in 1995, substantially reduced the alternative treatments and increased the disclosure requirements (Nobes, 2002). In July 1995, the IASC and the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) agreed to a list of accounting issues that needed to be addressed for obtaining IOSCO’s endorsement of the standards. The subsequent Core Standards Project led again to substantial revisions of IAS. In May 2000, the IASC received IOSCO’s endorsement subject to ‘reconciliation where necessary to address subst antive outstanding issues at a national or regional level’ (IOSCO Press Release, 17 May 2000). The Core Standards Project has brought a wider recognition to IAS around the world. For example, the European Parliament has issued a regulation (1606/2002/EC) requiring all EU listed companies to prepare consolidated financial statements based on InternationalAccounting Standards by 2005. In a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italyand Switzerland, companies were already permitted to prepare consolidated financial statements under IFRS (or US GAAP) prior to 2005.Since German accounting standards and disclosure practices have been criticized in the investor community (Leuz and Verrechia, 2000), a relatively large number of German firms have adopted international accounting standards such as IFRS or US GAAP. This switch is thought to represent a substantial commitment to transparent financial reporting for the following two reasons. First, IFRS adoption itself might effectively enhance financial reporting quality. Second, firms which adopt IFRS or US GAAP might do so because they have higher incentives to report transparently, such as high financing needs. In this case, IFRS serves as a proxy for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. A study conducted by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) with Swiss data reveals that early adopters of IFRS ‘are larger, more internationally diversified, less capital intensive and have a more diffuse ownership’. They argue that the decision t o apply IFRS is primarily influenced by political costs and pressures from outside markets. Murphy (1999) also used Swiss data to study the determinants of the adoption of IFRS. She found that companies that adopt IFRS have a higher percentage of foreign sales and a higher number of foreign exchange listings. El-Gazzar et al. (1999) found the same relationships using data from various countries. In addition, they concluded that being domiciled in an EU country and having a lower debt to equity ratio is positively associated with the adoption of IFRS. Other determinants of the adoption of international standards mentioned in the literature include a high profitability, the issuance of equity during the year of adoption, domestic GAAP differing significantly from IFRS or US GAAP and, related to the latter, being domiciled in a country with a bank-oriented financial system (Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2003).Not all companies that seek the international investment status that comes with the adoption of IFRS are, however, willing to fulfill all of the requirements and obligations involved. According to a study by Street and Gray (2002) there is a significant non-compliance with IFRS in 1998 company reports, especially in the case of IFRS disclosure requirements. With the revision of IAS 1, effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998, financial statements are prohibited from noting compliance with International Accounting Standards ‘unless they comply with all the requirements of each applicable Standard and each applicable Interpretation of the Standing Interpretations Committee’.All companies included in our IFRS sample mention IFRS compliance in their financial statements after the revised IAS 1 became effective. Nevertheless, adopters of IFRS that appear to be fully compliant might as well be falsely signaling to be of high quality. Ball et al. (2000) argue that firms’ incentives to comply with accounting standards depend on the penalties assessed for non-compliance.When costs of complying to IFRS are viewed to exceed the costs of noncompliance, substantial non-compliance will continue to be a problem. While the main objective of adopting IFRS is considered to be enhancing the quality of the information provided in the financial statements, Ball et al. (2003) further suggest that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information but not a sufficient condition. If the adoption of IFRS cannot be associated with significantly higher financial reporting quality, IFRS adoption cannot serve as a signaling instrument for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. This study addresses this issue empirically.2.2. Earnings Management: Incentives and ConstraintsOne way of assessing the quality of reported earnings is examining to what extent earnings are managed, with the intention to ‘either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend o n reported accounting numbers’ (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Incentives for earnings management, either through accounting decisions or structuring transactions, are ample. Managers may be inclined to manage earnings due to the existence of explicit and implic it contracts, the firm’s relation with capital markets, the need for external financing, the political and regulatory environment or several other specific circumstances (Vander Bauwhede, 2001).A number of studies suggest that the quality of reported financial statement information is in large part determined by the underlying economic and institutional factors influencing managers’ and auditors’ incentives. According to Ball et al. (2000) the demand for accounting income differs systematically between common-law and code-law countries. In common-law countries, which are characterized by arm’s length debt and equity markets, a diverse base of investors, high risk of litigation and strong investor protection, accounting information is designed to meet the needs of investors. In code-law countries, capital markets are less active. Investor protection is weak, litigation rates are lower and companies are more financed by banks, other financial institutions and the government, which results in less need for publicdisclosure. Accounting information is therefore designed more to meet other demands, including reduction in political costs and determination of income tax and dividend payments (Ball et al., 2000; La Portaet al., 2000). Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings management is more prevalent in code-law countries compared to common-law countries. The benefits (e.g.enhanced liquidity) of engaging in earnings management appear to outweigh the costs (e.g. litigation) more in countries with weak investor protection rights. Firms which adopt IFRS, however, can be expected to have incentives to report investor-oriented information and thus engage significantly less in earnings management than non-adopters. On the other hand, low enforcement and low litigation risk might encourage low quality firms to falsely signal to be of high quality by adopting IFRS. This study addresses the question whether adoption of IFRS is associated with lower earnings management in Germany, which La Porta et al. (2000) classify as a country with low investor protection rights.Accounting rules can limit a manager’s ability to distort reported earnings. But the extent to which accounting rules influence reported earnings and curb earnings management depends on how well these rules are enforced (Leuz et al., 2003). Apart from clear accounting standards, strong investor and creditor protection requires a statutory audit, monitoring by supervisors and effective sanctions.A number of studies have shown that Big 4 auditors constitute a constraint on earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001). However, the results of Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002) and Francis and Wang (2003) document that the constraint constituted by a Big 4 auditor on earnings management is not uniform across countries. Street and Gray (2002) find support for the fact that being audited by a large audit firm is also positively associated with IFRS compliance, both in the case of disclosure requirements as in the case of measurement and presentation requirements. In this respect, we question whether adoption of IFRS by a company has a stronger effect on the quality of earnings of that company when audited by a Big 4 audit firm.Source: Tendeloo, B.V. and Vanstraelen, A. Earnings management under German GAAP versus IFRS [J]. European Accounting Review, 2005, 14(1): 155-180.译文：德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理摘要：这篇论文阐述的问题是盈余管理的降低是否与国际财务报告准则（IFRS）的自愿采用有关。

盈余管理：一种普遍现象[外文翻译]

外文翻译Earnings Management：A Perspective Material Source: Managerial Finance Author:Messod D.Beneish AbstractAn issue central to accounting research is the extent to which managers alter reported earnings for their own benefit. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of studies investigated the determinants of accounting choice. These studies provided evidence consistent with managers’ incentives to choose beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts (see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 for reviews of these studies). Since the mid-1980s studies of managerial incentives to alter earnings have focused primarily on accruals.I trace the explosive growth in accrual-based management research to three likely causes. First accruals are the principal product of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and if earnings are managed it is more likely that the earnings management occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. Second, studying accruals reduces the problems associated with the inability to measure the effect of various accounting choices on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Third，if earnings management is an unobservable component of accruals, it is less likely that investors can unravel the effect of earnings management on reported earnings.The main challenge faced by earnings management researchers is that academics, like investors, are unable to observe, or for that matter, measure the earnings management component of accruals. Indeed, managerial accounting actions intended to increase compensation, avoid covenant default, raise capital, or influence a regulatory outcome are largely unobservable. Consequently, prior work has drawn inferences from joint hypotheses that test both incentives to manage earnings as well as the construct validity of the various accrual models which are used to estimate managers’ accounting discretion. Because extant models of expected accruals provide imprecise estimates of managerial discretion, questions have been raised about whether the unobservable earnings management actions do in fact occur.Notwithstanding research design problems, a variety of evidence suggestive of earnings management has accumulated. In Section 2, I raise three general questions about earnings management: What is it? How frequently does it occur? How do researchers estimate earnings management? Prior investigations of managerial incentives to alter earnings typically fall in three categories, namely studies that examine the effect of contracts in accounting choices, and studies that examine the incentive effects associated with the need to raise external financing. Rather than discussing the evidence along those lines, I have chosen to present the evidence depending on the direction of the incentive context. Thus, I summarize in Sections 3 and 4, what is known about incentives to increase and decrease earnings. In Section 5, I discuss evidence on incentive contexts that provide incentives either to increase or to decrease earnings, and in Section 6, I present conclusions and suggestions for future work.2. Earnings Management2.1 DefinitionsNotice the plural: It reflects my view that academics have no consensus on what is earnings management. There have been at least three attempts at defining earnings management:(1) Managing earnings is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.” (Davidso n, Stickney and Weil, 1987,cited in Schipper，1989).(2) Managing earnings is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say，merely facilitating the neutral operati on of the process).” (Schipper, 1989).(3) “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).A lack of consensus on the definition of earnings management implies differing interpretations of empirical evidence in studies that seek to detect earnings management，or to provide evidence of earnings management incentives. It is thus useful to compare the above three definitions.All three definitions deal with actions management undertaken within thecontext of financial reporting - including the structuring of transactions so that a desired accounting treatment applies (e.g. pooling, operating leases). However, the second definition also allows earnings management to occur via timing real investment and financing decisions. If the timing issue delays or accelerates a discretionary expenditure for a very short period of time around the firm’s fiscal year, I envision timing real decisions as a means of managing earnings. A problem with the second definition arises if readers interpret any real decisions - including those implying that managers forego profitable opportunities –as earnings management. Given the availability of alternative ways to manage earnings, I believe it is implausible to call earnings management a deviation from rational investment behavior. This reflects my view that earnings management is a financial reporting phenomenon.There are two perspectives on earnings management: the opportunistic perspective holds that managers seek to mislead investors, and the information perspective, first enunciated by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), under which managerial discretion is a means for managers to reveal to investors their private expectations about the firm’s future cash flows. Much prior work has predicated its conclusions on an opportunistic perspective for earnings management and has not tested the information perspective.2.2 Incidence of earnings managementIf one believes former SEC Chairman Levitt (1998), earnings management is widespread, at least among public companies, as they face pressure to meet analysts’ expectations. Earnings management is also widespread if one relies on analytical arguments. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (2000) suggest that the existence of relative performance evaluation leads firms to manage earnings if they expect competitor firms to manage earnings. Similar prisoner’s dilemma-like arguments for the existence of earnings management appear in Erickson and Wang (1999) in the context of mergers and Shivakumar (2000) in the context of seasoned equity offerings.At the other extreme, we can only be certain that earnings have indeed been managed, when the judicial system, in cases that are brought by the SEC or the Department of Justice, resolves that earnings management has occurred. While it is likely that earnings management occurs more frequently than is observed from judicial actions, it is not clear to me that earnings management is pervasive: it seems implausible that firms face the same motivations to manage earnings over time. Aslater discussed, much of the evidence of earnings management is dependent on firm performance, suggesting that earnings management is more likely to be present when a firm’s performance is either unusually good or unusually bad.3. Evidence of Income Increasing Earnings ManagementI discuss four sources of incentives for income increasing earnings management:(1) debt contracts, (2) compensation agreements, (3) equity offerings, (4) insider trading. The first two sources have been hypothesized in prior positive accounting theory research and the last two sources are explicitly described as reasons behind earnings overstatement in the SEC’s accounting enforcement actions, and have been investigated in recent research.3.1 Debt CovenantsDebt contracts are an important theme in financial accounting research as lenders often use accounting numbers to regulate firms’ activities,e,g. by requiring that certain performance objectives be met or imposing limits to allowed investing and financing activities.The linkage between accounting numbers and debt contracts has been used in studies investigation (i) why economic consequences are observed when firms comply with mandated, or voluntarily make, accounting changes that have no cash flow impact，(ii) the determinants of accounting choice and managers’ exercise of discretion over accounting estimates that impact net income. The assumption is that debt covenants provide incentives for managers to increase earnings either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the costs of covenant violations.The results of economic consequences studies have generally been mixed and researchers recently turned to investigating accounting choice in firms that experience actual technical default (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995; Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994；and De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 1994). The idea is to increase the power of the tests by focusing on a sample where the effect of violating debt covenants is likely to be more noticeable. While some of the evidence suggests that managers take income increasing actions delay the onset of default (Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), other evidence does not (Beneish and Press,1993; DeAngelo,DeAngelo and Skinner,1994). Further, it is not clear such actions actually are sufficient to delay default. Thus, the evidence in these studies on whether managers make income increasing accounting choices to avoid default is mixed. However, examining a large sample of private debt agreements, andmeasuring firms’ closeness to current ratio and tangible net worth constraints, Dichev and Skinner (2000) find significantly greater proportions of firms slightly above the covenant’s violation threshold than below. They suggest that manag ers take actions consistent with avoiding covenant default.3.2 Compensation AgreementsStudies examining the bonus hypothesis (Healy, 1985；Gaveretal, 1995; and Holthausen, Larker and Sloan, 1995) provide evidence consistent with managers altering reported earnings to increase their compensation. Except for Healy (1985)，these studies provide evidence consistent with managers decreasing reported earnings to increase future compensation. In addition, Holthausen et al. (1995) finds little evidence that managers increase income and suggest that the income-increasing evidence in Healy (1985) is induced by his experimental design.3.3 Equity OfferingsA growing body of research examines managers’ incentives to increase reported income in the context of security offerings. Information asymmetry between owners-managers and investors, particularly at the time of initial public offerings, is recognized in prior research.Models such as Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the amount of equity retained by insiders signals their private valuation, and models such as Hughes (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), and Datar et al. (1991) examine the role of the reputation of the auditor on the offer price. In these models, the asymmetry is resolved by the choice of an outside certifier or by a commitment to a contract that penalizes the issuer for untruthful disclosure. Empirical studies assume that information asymmetry remains and use various models to estimate managers’ exercise of discretion over accruals at the time of security offerings.Four studies investigate earnings management as an explanation for the puzzling behavior of post-issuance stock prices. Teoh, Welch and Rao (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) study earnings management in the context of initial public offerings (IPO), and Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) do so in the context of seasoned equity offerings. These studies estimate the extent of earnings management using Jones like models around the time of the security issuance, and correlate their earnings management estimates with post-issue earnings and returns. The evidence presented suggests that estimates of at-issue earnings management are significantly negatively correlated with subsequent earnings and returns performance. The results in these studies suggest that marketparticipants fail to understand the valuation implications of unexpected accruals. While the results are compelling, the conclusion that intentional earnings management at the time of security issuance successfully misleads investors is premature. Beneish (1998b, p.210) expresses reservations about generalizing such a conclusion as follows: “First, the conclusion implies that financial statement fraud is pervasive at the time of issuance. To explain; fraud is defined by the National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (1993, p.6) as one or more intentional acts designed to deceive other persons and cause them financial loss." If financial statement fraud at issuance is pervasive - e.g. managers are successful in misleading investors. I would expect that firms would fare poorly post-issuance in terms of litigation brought about by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), disgruntled investors, and the plaintiff’s bar. I would also expect managers to fare poorly post-issuance in terms of wealth and employment. I would find evidence of post-issue consequences on firms and managers informative about the existence of at-issue intentional earnings management to mislead investors and believe these issues are worthy of future research.译文盈余管理：一种普遍现象资料来源: 财务管理作者：Messod D. Beneish 摘要：会计研究的核心问题是在某种程度上管理者为了自己的利益而改变报表上的收入。

盈余管理的动机国外文献综述

盈余管理的动机国外文献综述一、引言盈余管理是指企业经理通过对财务报表数据的操控，更改企业财务报表数据，从而影响企业财务报告利润，最终影响企业信息外部使用者对企业的决策的行为。

Roychowdhury （2006年）通过解释盈余管理的目的而对盈余管理进行了定义。

经理人是被企业所雇佣的高级员工，他们必须尽力使股东对他们的经营成果满意；此外，企业管理人员也需要完成已经制定的财务目标。

为了实现以上的目标，企业管理人员往往会通过特殊手段进行盈余管理，这个手段实施的过程就是盈余管理。

关于企业管理层为什么进行盈余管理，国外学者各抒己见。

Watts和Zimmerman（1986年）明确指出有激励因素导致管理层进行盈余管理。

他们列明报酬契约、债务契约以及政治原因都是管理层进行盈余管理的动因。

Aharony等人（2000年）选取中国B股和H股的IPO公司作为样本，他们确认了在IPO公司当中存在着盈余管理现象。

Hunton等人（2006年），Libby和Kinney（2000年）指出企业管理层会为了满足财务分析师的预测而进行盈余管理，而这直接促成了企业股价的增长。

在此基础上，其他学者对盈余管理的动机进行了进一步的研究。

二、契约动机（一）债务契约Defond和Jiambalvo（1994年）以及Sweeney（1994年）论证了契约是盈余管理的动机之一。

Defond和Jiambalvo（1994年）通过对有债务契约的公司的研究，发现公司管理层会为了避免违反债务契约而进行盈余管理。

具体来说，那些有可能违反债务契约的公司的管理层会通过盈余管理来虚增企业财务报表的利润，由此避免因违反契约对企业造成的不良影响。

Sweeney（1994年）也阐述了盈余管理和债务契约之间存在联系。

研究表明，违约的公司更有可能进行盈余管理。

（二）报酬契约Holthausen等人（1995年）提出契约可以被视为盈余管理的动机之一。

报酬契约促使企业管理层进行盈余管理。

《IPO公司盈余管理探究国内外文献综述2400字》

IPO公司盈余管理研究国内外文献综述国外研究现状国外学者对盈余管理的研究相对较早，美国学者Schipper于1989年提出了“盈余管理”的概念，他认为企业管理当局会对公开披露的财务信息进行粉饰调节，以实现自身利益的最大化，不同于利润操纵，盈余管理是在不违反会计准则的前提下，对会计政策和会计估计进行主观选择Scott William R (1997)认为盈余管理就是企业管理层为了实现公司利益或者市场价值最大化的目的，而选择相应的会计政策的行为。

PaulM Healy和James M Wahlen (1999)指出盈余管理具体表现在企业管理当局通过调整具体的交易活动，影响公司会计报告信息，以此实现误导利益相关方决策的目的。

企业管理层会出于种种目的操纵盈余信息，Watts和Zimmerman(1990)认为管理层会出于报酬契约、债务契约和政治方面的考虑，会采取一定的手段影响企业对外披露的财务信息。

Healy (1999)发现，一些上市公司管理者会为了获得奖金报酬，对公司业绩进行调整，扮靓财务数据。

Jones (1991)研究发现，一些企业会为了申请政府税收减免而递延当年收益。

外部的监管与监督是影响企业IPO盈余管理的重要外部因素，严格的外部监管会在一定程度上约束IPO公司的盈余管理活动。

Cohen (2000)研究发现在萨班斯法案颁布后，由于管理单位加大对于上市公司盈余管理的监管和处罚，上市公司更倾向于采用真实活动的盈余管理。

Rowchoydhury C 2006研究发现，成熟的机构投资者会识别影响公司长远利益的盈余管理活动，并采取相应的遏制措施。

国内研究现状顾明润和田存志(2012)认为由于我国一级资本市场证券定价市场功能相对较弱，许多IPO公司会为了提高股票的发行价格而对公司财务报告进行粉饰。

同时，由于我国资本市场IPO制度仍处于核准制向注册制过渡的阶段，对公司IPO 资格仍有较高的要求，张征和崔毅(2014)认为IPO公司会出于满足发行条件和获得更多的发行收入的目的，在会计准则允许的范围内对盈余进行调整。

现行企业会计准则下盈余管理分析研究外文翻译

中文2300字外文翻译之一A Review of the Earnings Management Literature andIts Implications for Standard SettingAuthor：Paul M. Healy and James M. WahlenNationality：AmericaDerivation: Accounting Horizons 365-383INTRODUCTIONIn this paper we review the academic evidence on earnings management. The primary purpose of this review is to summarize the implications of scholarly evidence on earnings management to help accounting standard setters and regulators assess the pervasiveness of earnings management and the overall integrity of financial reporting. This review is also aimed at identifying fruitful areas for future academic research on earnings management.Standard setters define the accounting language that management uses to communicate with t he firm’s external By creating a framework that independent auditors and the SEC can enforce, accounting standards can provide a relatively low-cost and credible means for corporate managers to report information on theirfirms’performance to external capital providers and other Ideally, financial reporting therefore helps the best-performing firms in the economy to distinguish themselves from poor performers and facilitates efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions by stakeholders.If financial reports are to convey managers’ information on their firms’performance, standards must permit managers to exercise judgment in financial reporting. Managers can then use their knowledge about the business and its opportunities to select reportin g methods, estimates, and disclosures that match the firms’ business economics, potentially increasing the value of accounting as a form of communication. However, because auditing is imperfect, management’s use of judgment also creates opportunities for “earnings management,” in which managers choose reporting methods andestimates that do not accurately reflect their firms’ underlying economics.The Chairman of the SEC, Arthur Levitt, recently expressed concerns over earnings management and its effect on resource allocation. He noted that management abuses of “big bath” restructuring charges, premature revenue recognition, “cookie jar”reserves, and write-offs of purchased in-process R&D are threatening the credibility of financial reporting. To address these concerns, the SEC is examining new disclosure requirements and has formed an earnings management task force to crack down on firms that manage earnings. The SEC also expects to require more firms to restate Reported earnings and will step up enforcement of disclosure requirements.A number of recent studies, however, sharpen the focus of their tests to examine earnings management using specific accruals, such as bank loan loss provisions, claim loss reserves for property-casualty insurers, and deferred tax valuation allowances.There is evidence that banks use loan loss provisions and insurers use claim loss reserves to manage earnings, particularly to meet regulatory requirements. There is little evidence that firms manage earnings using deferred tax valuation allowances.Much of the evidence on the capital market consequences of earnings management shows that investors are not “fooled” by earnings management and that financial statements provide useful information to investors. Current earnings, which reflect management reporting judgment, have been widely found to be value-relevant and are typically better predictors of future cash flow performance than are current cash flows.Answers to the above questions are difficult to infer from current studies for a number of reasons. First, most academic studies attempt to document earnings management, but do not provide evidence on its extent and scope. Consequently, existing evidence does not help standard setters to assess whether current standards are largely effective in facilitating communication with investors, or whether they encourage widespread earnings management. Second, most studies have examined unexpected accruals for evidence of earnings management. While this research provides a useful summary index of earnings management, it does not show which standards are effective infacilitating communication between managers and investors and which are ineffective.The studies that examine the effects of earnings management on the capital markets leave a number of unanswered questions for future research. First, as noted above, how pervasive is earnings management for capital market reasons, both amongthe firms sampled and for the population of firms? Second, what is the magnitude of any earnings management? Third, what specific accruals do firms (other than banks and insurers) use to manage earnings? Fourth, why do some firms appear to manage earnings whereas others with similar incentives do not? Finally, under what conditions do market participants detect and, therefore, react to earnings management, and under what conditions do they fail to detect earnings management? For example, do required disclosures that make the use of accounting judgment more transparent help to mitigate the impact of earnings management on resource allocation?In summary, the earnings management studies strongly suggest that regulatory considerations induce firms to manage earnings. There is limited evidence on whether this behavior is widespread or rare, however, and very little evidence on the effect on regulators or investors.盈余管理文献回顾及其对标准设置的启迪作者：Paul M. Healy and James M. Wahlen国籍：美国选自：会计天涯365-383介绍:本文咱们回顾一些关于盈余管理的相关学术的研究，本文回顾的主要目的是为了总括学者们和会计标准的设定者和管理者评估盈余管理的普遍性和对于财务报表的完整性，本文献同时志于对盈余管理的未来学术研究提供有效的鉴戒。

外文翻译--德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS 外文出处 European Accounting Review外文作者 Tendeloo, B.V., and Vanstraelen, A原文：Earnings Management under German GAAP versus IFRS AbstractThis paper addresses the question whether voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is associated with lower earnings management. Ball et al. (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1–3), pp. 235–270, 2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. In Germany, a code-law country with low investor protection rights, a relatively large number of companies have chosen to voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to 2005. We investigate whether German companies that have adopted IFRS engage significantly less in earnings management compared to German companies reporting under German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), while controlling for other differences in earnings management incentives. Our sample, consisting of German listed companies, contains 636 firm-year observations relating to the period 1999–2001. Our results suggest that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. These findings contribute to the current debate on whether high quality standards are sufficient and effective in countries with weak investor protection rights. They indicate that voluntary adopters of IFRS in Germany cannot be associated with lower earnings management.1. IntroductionThe International Accounting Standards (IAS), now renamed as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), have been developed to harmonize corporate accounting practice and to answer the need for high quality standards to be adopted inthe world’s major capital markets.Ball et al. (2003) argue that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information, but not necessarily a sufficient one. This paper contributes to this debate by examining whether the adoption of high quality standards like IFRS is associated with high financial reporting quality. In particular, we question whether IFRS are sufficient to override managers’ incentives to engage in earnings management and affect the quality of reported earnings.Previous research provides evidence that the magnitude of earnings management is on average higher in code-law countries with low investor protection rights, compared to common-law countries with high investor protection rights (Leuz et al., 2003). Hence, to assess whether firms that report under IFRS can be associated with higher earnings quality we focus on Germany, which is a code-law country with relatively low investor protection rights (La Portal et al.,2000). Moreover, a relatively large number of German companies have already voluntarily chosen to adopt IFRS prior to 2005. This allows a comparison between companies that have adopted IFRS versus companies that report under domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).The results of our research show that IFRS do not impose a significant constraint on earnings management, as measured by discretionary accruals. On the contrary, adopting IFRS seems to increase the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Our results further suggest that companies that have adopted IFRS engage more in earnings smoothing, although this effect is significantly reduced when the company has a Big 4 auditor. However, hidden reserves, which are allowed under German GAAP to manage earnings, are not entirely picked up by the traditional accruals measures. When hidden reserves are taken into consideration, our results show that IFRS-adopters do not present different earnings management behavior compared to companies reporting under German GAAP. Hence, our results indicate that adopters of IFRS cannot be associated with lower earnings management. This finding suggests that the adoption of high quality standards is not a sufficient condition for providing high quality information in code-law countries with low investor protection rights.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant literature and provide the theoretical background of the paper. Section 3 provides an overview of the German accounting system. In Section 4, we formulate the research hypotheses. Section 5 describes the research design. The results of thestudy are presented in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we summarize our results, discuss the implications and limitations of our analysis and give suggestions for further research.2. Previous Literature2.1. Adoption of International Accounting StandardsThe International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which was established in 1973 and now renamed as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), aims to achieve uniformity in the accounting standards used by businesses and other organizations for financial reporting around the world (IASB website). The benefits of the adoption of international accounting standards are considered to be the following. First, it should improve the ability of investors to make informed financial decisions and eliminate confusion arising from different measures of financial position and performance across countries, thereby leading to a reduced risk for investors and a lower cost of capital for companies. Second, it should lower costs arising from multiple reporting. Third, it should encourage international investment. Finally, it should lead to amore efficient allocation of savings worldwide (Street et al., 1999).The original International Accounting Standards were mostly descriptive in nature and contained many alternative treatments. Because of this flexibility and a continuing lack of comparability across countries, the standards came under heavy criticism in the late 1980s. In response to this criticism, the IASC started the Comparability Project in 1987. The revised standards, which became effective in 1995, substantially reduced the alternative treatments and increased the disclosure requirements (Nobes, 2002). In July 1995, the IASC and the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) agreed to a list of accounting issues that needed to be addressed for obtaining IOSCO’s endorsement of the standards. The subsequent Core Standards Project led again to substantial revisions of IAS. In May 2000, the IASC received IOSCO’s endorsement subject to ‘reconciliation where necessary to address subs tantive outstanding issues at a national or regional level’ (IOSCO Press Release, 17 May 2000). The Core Standards Project has brought a wider recognition to IAS around the world. For example, the European Parliament has issued a regulation (1606/2002/EC) requiring all EU listed companies to prepare consolidated financial statements based on InternationalAccounting Standards by 2005. In a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italyand Switzerland, companies were already permitted to prepare consolidated financial statements under IFRS (or US GAAP) prior to 2005.Since German accounting standards and disclosure practices have been criticized in the investor community (Leuz and Verrechia, 2000), a relatively large number of German firms have adopted international accounting standards such as IFRS or US GAAP. This switch is thought to represent a substantial commitment to transparent financial reporting for the following two reasons. First, IFRS adoption itself might effectively enhance financial reporting quality. Second, firms which adopt IFRS or US GAAP might do so because they have higher incentives to report transparently, such as high financing needs. In this case, IFRS serves as a proxy for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. A study conducted by Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) with Swiss data reveals that early adopters of IFRS ‘are larger, more internationally diversified, less capital intensive and have a more diffuse ownership’. They argue that the decision to apply IFRS is primarily influenced by political costs and pressures from outside markets. Murphy (1999) also used Swiss data to study the determinants of the adoption of IFRS. She found that companies that adopt IFRS have a higher percentage of foreign sales and a higher number of foreign exchange listings. El-Gazzar et al. (1999) found the same relationships using data from various countries. In addition, they concluded that being domiciled in an EU country and having a lower debt to equity ratio is positively associated with the adoption of IFRS. Other determinants of the adoption of international standards mentioned in the literature include a high profitability, the issuance of equity during the year of adoption, domestic GAAP differing significantly from IFRS or US GAAP and, related to the latter, being domiciled in a country with a bank-oriented financial system (Ashbaugh, 2001; Cuijpers and Buijink, 2003).Not all companies that seek the international investment status that comes with the adoption of IFRS are, however, willing to fulfill all of the requirements and obligations involved. According to a study by Street and Gray (2002) there is a significant non-compliance with IFRS in 1998 company reports, especially in the case of IFRS disclosure requirements. With the revision of IAS 1, effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1998, financial statements are prohibited from noting compliance with International Accounting Standards ‘unless they comply with all the requirements of each applicable Standard and each applicable Interpretation of the Standing Interpretations Committee’.All companies included in our IFRS sample mention IFRS compliance in their financial statements after the revised IAS 1 became effective. Nevertheless, adopters of IFRS that appear to be fully compliant might as well be falsely signaling to be of high quality. Ball et al. (2000) argue that firms’ incentives to comply with accounting standards depend on the penalties assessed for non-compliance.When costs of complying to IFRS are viewed to exceed the costs of noncompliance, substantial non-compliance will continue to be a problem. While the main objective of adopting IFRS is considered to be enhancing the quality of the information provided in the financial statements, Ball et al. (2003) further suggest that adopting high quality standards might be a necessary condition for high quality information but not a sufficient condition. If the adoption of IFRS cannot be associated with significantly higher financial reporting quality, IFRS adoption cannot serve as a signaling instrument for a credible commitment to higher quality accounting. This study addresses this issue empirically.2.2. Earnings Management: Incentives and ConstraintsOne way of assessing the quality of reported earnings is examining to what extent earnings are managed, with the intention to ‘either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers’ (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Incentives for earnings management, either through accounting decisions or structuring transactions, are ample. Managers may be inclined to manage earnings due to the existence of explicit and impli cit contracts, the firm’s relation with capital markets, the need for external financing, the political and regulatory environment or several other specific circumstances (Vander Bauwhede, 2001).A number of studies suggest that the quality of reported financial statement information is in large part determined by the underlying economic and institutional factors influencing managers’ and auditors’ incentives. According to Ball et al. (2000) the demand for accounting income differs systematically between common-law and code-law countries. In common-law countries, which are characterized by arm’s length debt and equity markets, a diverse base of investors, high risk of litigation and strong investor protection, accounting information is designed to meet the needs of investors. In code-law countries, capital markets are less active. Investor protection is weak, litigation rates are lower and companies are more financed by banks, other financial institutions and the government, which results in less need for publicdisclosure. Accounting information is therefore designed more to meet other demands, including reduction in political costs and determination of income tax and dividend payments (Ball et al., 2000; La Portaet al., 2000). Leuz et al. (2003) show that earnings management is more prevalent in code-law countries compared to common-law countries. The benefits (e.g.enhanced liquidity) of engaging in earnings management appear to outweigh the costs (e.g. litigation) more in countries with weak investor protection rights. Firms which adopt IFRS, however, can be expected to have incentives to report investor-oriented information and thus engage significantly less in earnings management than non-adopters. On the other hand, low enforcement and low litigation risk might encourage low quality firms to falsely signal to be of high quality by adopting IFRS. This study addresses the question whether adoption of IFRS is associated with lower earnings management in Germany, which La Porta et al. (2000) classify as a country with low investor protection rights.Accounting rules can limit a manager’s ability to distort reported earnings. But the extent to which accounting rules influence reported earnings and curb earnings management depends on how well these rules are enforced (Leuz et al., 2003). Apart from clear accounting standards, strong investor and creditor protection requires a statutory audit, monitoring by supervisors and effective sanctions.A number of studies have shown that Big 4 auditors constitute a constraint on earnings management (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991, 1994; Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Gore et al., 2001). However, the results of Maijoor and Vanstraelen (2002) and Francis and Wang (2003) document that the constraint constituted by a Big 4 auditor on earnings management is not uniform across countries. Street and Gray (2002) find support for the fact that being audited by a large audit firm is also positively associated with IFRS compliance, both in the case of disclosure requirements as in the case of measurement and presentation requirements. In this respect, we question whether adoption of IFRS by a company has a stronger effect on the quality of earnings of that company when audited by a Big 4 audit firm.Source: Tendeloo, B.V. and Vanstraelen, A. Earnings management under German GAAP versus IFRS [J]. European Accounting Review, 2005, 14(1): 155-180.译文：德国公认会计准则与国际财务报告准则下的盈余管理摘要：这篇论文阐述的问题是盈余管理的降低是否与国际财务报告准则（IFRS）的自愿采用有关。

激励报告的重要性：欧洲的私营和公共企业的盈余管理【外文翻译】

外文翻译外文题目The importance of Reporting Incentives: Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms.外文出处Accounting Review外文作者Davia C. Burgstahler , Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz 原文：The importance of Reporting Incentives: Earnings Management in European Private and Public Firms.Much of the international accounting debate has focused on accounting standards per se, which are often viewed as the primary input for high-quality accounting (e.g., Levitt 1998). Consistent with this view, harmonization efforts within the European Union have largely focused on eliminating differences in accounting standards across countries or adopting a common set of standards (e.g., Van Hulle 2004). However, it is important to also examine the role of institutional factors and capital market forces in shaping firms’ incentives to report informative earnings. The application of standards involves judgment and underlying measurements are often based on private information. The resulting discretion can be used by corporate insiders either to make reported earnings more informative about the firm’s economic performance or to serve other and less benign interests.For this reason, reporting incentives and the forces shaping them are likely to play an integral role for accounting quality. While this insight is not new (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1986), it is often overlooked in international standard setting.1 To empirically document the importance of reporting incentives, we examine the properties of reported earnings of private and public firms in the European Union (EU). The European setting provides a unique opportunity because EU accounting regulation is based on a firm’s legal form, rather than listing status. Thus, private limited companies face largely the same accounting standards as publicly tradedcorporations, but are subject to very different capital market forces. This feature allows us to study the role of reporting incentives and the demand for information created by public equity markets, both of which are issues of fundamental economic importance. Several prior studies suggest that equity markets have a negative impact on accounting quality (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998a, 1998b; Beattyet al. 2002). However, these studies are either limited to specific industries or major corporate events. Thus, the first-order effect of public equity markets on accounting quality is still an open issue and one that we can analyze in the EU setting. The setting also allows us to examine the effects of cross-country variation in firms’ institutional environments and to explore how legal institutions and capital market forces interact in shaping the reporting behavior of private and public firms.We hypothesize that capital markets as well as critical aspects of a firm’s institutional environment determine the role of earnings, e.g., its importance in resolving information asymmetries and in communicating with outside parties (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Ball 2001). This role in turn influences how corporate insiders use reporting discretion, which crucially determines the properties of reported earnings.The use of discretion and the resulting informativenes (or opacity) of earnings are difficult to measure because true economic performance is unobservable. Previous work in international accounting has often focused on the conservatism dimension of accounting quality, i.e., the extent to which losses are incorporated into earnings on a timely basis (e.g., Ball et al. 2000; Ball et al. 2003; Ball et al. 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006; Peeket al. 2006). As accounting quality is a broad concept with multiple dimensions, it is important to extend empirical results beyond the conservatism dimension. In this study, we focus on another dimension of accounting quality, namely the degree of earnings manag management. 2 We rely on an earnings management index suggested by Leuz et al. (2003), which is based on four different proxies. The underlying measures are designed to capture a variety of earnings management practices, such as earnings smoothing and accrual manipulations.3 We also conduct sensitivity analyses using alternative earnings management metricssimilar to those used by Lang et al. (2003) and Lang et al. (2006) as well as measures of conservatism.Our results are similar across these measures and consistent with the idea that all these measures capture aspects of earnings informativeness.We document substantial variation in earnings informativeness across private and public firms from 13 EU countries, despite decades of accounting harmonization. More importantly, we show that differences in firms’ reporting incentives explain this variation. In particular, we find that earnings management is more pervasive in private firms than in publicly traded firms. Thus, contrary to recent allegations that capital markets exacerbate incentives to manage earnings, our findings suggest that the first-order effect of public equity markets is to improve earnings informativeness, either by providing incentives to make earnings more informative or, alternatively, by screening out firms with less informative earnings in the going public process. We also document that earnings management is more pronounced in countries with weaker legal systems and enforcement. This finding holds for both private and public firms and highlights the central importance of enforcement mechanisms.Moving beyond general characterizations of legal systems, we explore the interaction between market forces and other institutional variables that have the potential to differentially affect private and public firms: (1) the degree of alignment between financial and tax accounting, (2) remaining differences in EU accounting rules, (3) the level of required disclosures in public securities offerings and associated enforcement, (4) the level of minority-shareholder protection, and (5) the structure and activity of capital markets.The analysis of these interactions supports our earlier finding that capital market forces, by and large, improve the informativeness of earnings. We document that stronger tax alignment is associated with more earnings management, but this effect is mitigated for public firms. We find that legal institutions designed to facilitate equity financing at arm’s length in public markets, such as strong minority-shareholder rights and extensive disclosure requirements, are associated with lower levels of earnings management primarily for publicly traded firms, suggesting that markets andinstitutions reinforce each other. Finally, in countries with large and highly developed equity markets, public firms engage in even less earnings management, which again suggests that strong capital market s and arm’s-length financing improve earnings informativeness.Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, by comparing the reporting behavior of private and public firms, we shed light on the first-order effects of public equity markets. Prior evidence on differences in earnings quality between public and private firms is conflicting, and either confined to a particular country (Vander Bauwhede et al. 2003; Ball and Shivakumar 2005), a single regulated industry (Beatty and Harris 1999; Beatty etal. 2002) or specific corporate events (Teoh et al. 1998a, 1998b). Our paper adds to this limited body of work by examining a large sample of public and private firms across many industries and countries, and outside of specific corporate events. Our findings generally support the notion that the first-order effect of capital market forces is to improve reporting quality.Second, we contribute to a fairly recent literature that analyzes the effects of capital market incentives on the properties of reported earnings but is limited to public firms (e.g.,Ball et al. 2005; Bushman and Piotroski 2006). Data on private and public firms allows us to shed light on the interplay of market forces stemming from public equity with legal institutions that facili tate arm’s-length financing in public markets, such as minorityshareholder protection and securities regulation. Moreover, we can study the extent to which equity-based financial systems and highly developed capital markets explain differences in reporting behavior. Our findings suggest that these institutions and capital market characteristics tend to reinforce the first-order effect of publicly traded equity.Third, there is little evidence on how institutional factors shape the reporting behavior of private firms. With the exception of a concurrent study by Peek et al. (2006) that looks at earnings conservatism across a sample of private and public EU firms, prior work documents institutional effects on firms’ reporting behavior using public firms only (e.g., Ali and Hwang 2000; Ball et al. 2000; Fan and Wong 2002; Ball et al. 2003; Leuz et al. 2003; Bushman et al. 2004). While it is safe to assumethat institutions affect private firms as well, it is a priori not obvious in what way. We show that there are some institutions like legal enforcement that matter to both public and private firms. But there are others, such as tax alignment, where the negative effect on reporting quality differs across public and private firms, displaying the mitigating influence of market forces.Finally, our paper contributes to the regulatory issue of accounting harmonization (e.g.,Gernon and Wallace 1995; Saudagaran and Meek 1997) and the debate on accounting convergence (Joos and Lang 1994; Land and Lang 2002; Bradshaw and Miller 2005; Joos and Wysocki 2004). Our paper provides evidence supporting the conjecture that effective accounting harmonization is unlikely to be achieved by accounting standards alone (e.g., Ball 2001).The paper is organized as follows. Section II develops our hypotheses. Section III describes the data and the research design. In Section IV, we present the evidence on the relation between listing status, legal enforcement, and earnings management. In Section V, we analyze the role of additional institutional factors that have the potential to differentially affect private and public firms. Section VI concludes.THE EFFECT OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORSON REPORTED EARNINGSOur analysis is based on the recognition that accounting standards provide considerable discretion to firms in preparing their financial statements. Corporate insiders can use their private information to report earnings that more accurately reflect firm performance and are more informative to outside parties. However, if earnings play a minor role in communicating performance to outsiders, then insiders are unlikely to do so. Instead, reporting choices may be governed by other considerations, e.g., by the desire to minimize taxes or determine dividend payments. Moreover, corporate insiders can use reporting discretion to hide poor economic performance, achieve certain earnings targets, or avoid covenant violations.Given insiders’ information advantage, it is difficult to constrain such behavior.4 These arguments suggest t hat factors that define the role of earnings and shape firms’reporting incentives play an integral role in determining the properties of reportedearnings, such as their informativeness to corporate outsiders (e.g., Ball et al. 2000).5 We argue that ca pital market forces and the home country’s institutional features are such factors.Capital Market ForcesPrivately held firms and those with publicly traded equity securities face very different demands for accounting information. External financing in public equity markets creates the demand for information that is useful in evaluating and monitoring the firm. Arm’slength equity investors do not have private access to corporate information and rely heavily on public information, such as financial statements and reported earnings. If the quality of this information is poor, then outside investors will be reluctant to supply capital to firms.As a result, publicly traded firms have stronger incentives to provide financial statements that help outsiders assess economic performance. In addition, the going public process may screen out firms with less informative earnings that are difficult to evaluate for outside investors. Thus, regardless of the mechanism, being public is likely to be associated with higher reporting quality.In contrast, privately held firms have relatively concentrated ownership structures and hence can efficiently communicate among shareholders via private channels. Because financial statements and reported earnings assume a less important role in communicating firm performance, private firms have relatively fewer incentives to report informative earnings.Accordingly, private firms can place greater relative weight on different roles for reported earnings than can public firms. For instance, it is of a lesser concern to private firms that managing earnings to minimize taxes may make earnings less informative to outsiders. Alternatively, earnings can be used in determining dividends and other payouts to firms’ stakeholders. As in Ball and Sh ivakumar (2005), we argue that these other uses are likely to render earnings of private firms less informative. While these arguments suggest that the first-order effect of public securities markets is to create incentives to report earnings that reflect economic performance, we recognize that there are trade-offs and potentially important countervailing effects.For instance, controlling insiders in public firms might expropriate outside investors by consuming large private control benefits. As an attempt to hide these activities and prevent outsider intervention, they could mask firm performance by managing reported earnings (Leuz et al. 2003).译文：激励报告的重要性：欧洲的私营和公共企业的盈余管理（外文出处：会计评论）在国际会计争论中关注较多的是会计准则本身，这往往是作为高品质的会计初级输入效果（例如，莱维特1998年）。

盈余管理：一种普遍现象[外文翻译]

盈余管理：一种普遍现象[外文翻译]外文翻译Earnings Management：A Perspective Material Source: Managerial Finance Author:Messod D.Beneish Abstract An issue central to accounting research is the extent to which managers alter reported earnings for their own benefit. In the 1970s and early 1980s, a large number of studies investigated the determinants of accounting choice. These studies provided evidence consistent with managers’ incentives to choose beneficial ways of reporting earnings in regulatory and contractual contexts (see Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983, and Watts and Zimmerman, 1986 for reviews of these studies). Since the mid-1980s studies of managerial incentives to alter earnings have focused primarily on accruals.I trace the explosive growth in accrual-based management research to three likely causes. First accruals are the principal product of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and if earnings are managed it is more likely that the earnings management occurs on the accrual rather than the cash flow component of earnings. Second, studying accruals reduces the problems associated with the inability to measure the effect of various accounting choices on earnings (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). Third，if earnings management is an unobservable component of accruals, it is less likely that investors can unravel the effect of earnings management on reported earnings.The main challenge faced by earnings management researchers is that academics, like investors, are unable to observe, or for that matter, measure the earnings management component of accruals. Indeed, managerial accounting actionsintended to increase compensation, avoid covenant default, raise capital, or influence a regulatory outcome are largely unobservable. Consequently, prior work has drawn inferences from joint hypotheses that test both incentives to manage earnings as well as the construct validity of the various accrual models which are used to estimate managers’ accounting discretion. Because extant models of expected accruals provide imprecise estimates of managerial discretion, questions have been raised about whether the unobservable earnings management actions do in fact occur.Notwithstanding research design problems, a variety of evidence suggestive of earnings management has accumulated. In Section 2, I raise three general questions about earnings management: What is it? How frequently does it occur? How do researchers estimate earnings management? Prior investigations of managerial incentives to alter earnings typically fall in three categories, namely studies that examine the effect of contracts in accounting choices, and studies that examine the incentive effects associated with the need to raise external financing. Rather than discussing the evidence along those lines, I have chosen to present the evidence depending on the direction of the incentive context. Thus, I summarize in Sections 3 and 4, what is known about incentives to increase and decrease earnings. In Section 5, I discuss evidence on incentive contexts that provide incentives either to increase or to decrease earnings, and in Section 6, I present conclusions and suggestions for future work.2. Earnings Management2.1 DefinitionsNotice the plural: It reflects my view that academics have no consensus on what is earnings management. There have been atleast three attempts at defining earnings management:(1) Managing earnings is “the process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings.” (Davidso n, Stickney and Weil, 1987,cited in Schipper，1989).(2) Managing earnings is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to say，merely facilitating the neutral operati on of the process).” (Schipper, 1989).(3) “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).A lack of consensus on the definition of earnings management implies differing interpretations of empirical evidence in studies that seek to detect earnings management，or to provide evidence of earnings management incentives. It is thus useful to compare the above three definitions.All three definitions deal with actions management undertaken within thecontext of financial reporting - including the structuring of transactions so that a desired accounting treatment applies (e.g. pooling, operating leases). However, the second definition also allows earnings management to occur via timing real investment and financing decisions. If the timing issue delays or accelerates a discretionary expenditure for a very short period of time around the firm’s fiscal year, I envision timing real decisions as a means of managing earnings. A problem with the seconddefinition arises if readers interpret any real decisions - including those implying that managers forego profitable opportunities –as earnings management. Given the availability of alternative ways to manage earnings, I believe it is implausible to call earnings management a deviation from rational investment behavior. This reflects my view that earnings management is a financial reporting phenomenon.There are two perspectives on earnings management: the opportunistic perspective holds that managers seek to mislead investors, and the information perspective, first enunciated by Holthausen and Leftwich (1983), under which managerial discretion is a means for managers to reveal to investors their private expectation s about the firm’s future cash flows. Much prior work has predicated its conclusions on an opportunistic perspective for earnings management and has not tested the information perspective.2.2 Incidence of earnings managementIf one believes former SEC Chairman Levitt (1998), earnings management is widespread, at least among public companies, as they face pressure to meet analysts’ expectations. Earnings management is also widespread if one relies on analytical arguments. For example, Bagnoli and Watts (2000) suggest that the existence of relative performance evaluation leads firms to manage earnings if they expect competitor firms to manage earnings. Similar prisoner’s dilemma-like arguments for the existence of earnings management appear in Erickson and Wang (1999) in the context of mergers and Shivakumar (2000) in the context of seasoned equity offerings.At the other extreme, we can only be certain that earnings have indeed been managed, when the judicial system, in casesthat are brought by the SEC or the Department of Justice, resolves that earnings management has occurred. While it is likely that earnings management occurs more frequently than is observed from judicial actions, it is not clear to me that earnings management is pervasive: it seems implausible that firms face the same motivations to manage earnings over time. As later discussed, much of the evidence of earnings management is dependent on firm performance, suggesting that earnings management is more likely to b e present when a firm’s performance is either unusually good or unusually bad.3. Evidence of Income Increasing Earnings ManagementI discuss four sources of incentives for income increasing earnings management:(1) debt contracts, (2) compensation agreements, (3) equity offerings, (4) insider trading. The first two sources have been hypothesized in prior positive accounting theory research and the last two sources are explicitly described as reasons behind earnings overstatement in the SEC’s accounting enf orcement actions, and have been investigated in recent research.3.1 Debt CovenantsDebt contracts are an important theme in financial accounting research as lenders often use accounting numbers to regulate firms’ activities,e,g. by requiring that certain performance objectives be met or imposing limits to allowed investing and financing activities.The linkage between accounting numbers and debt contracts has been used in studies investigation (i) why economic consequences are observed when firms comply with mandated, or voluntarily make, accounting changes that have no cash flow impact，(ii) the determinants of accounting choice andmanagers’ exercise of discretion over accounting estimates that impact net income. The assumption is that debt covenants provide incentives for managers to increase earnings either to reduce the restrictiveness of accounting based constraints in debt agreements or to avoid the costs of covenant violations.The results of economic consequences studies have generally been mixed and researchers recently turned to investigating accounting choice in firms that experience actual technical default (Beneish and Press, 1993, 1995; Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994；and De Angelo, De Angelo and Skinner, 1994). The idea is to increase the power of the tests by focusing on a sample where the effect of violating debt covenants is likely to be more noticeable. While some of the evidence suggests that managers take income increasing actions delay the onset of default (Sweeney, 1994; Defond and Jiambalvo, 1994), other evidence does not (Beneish and Press,1993; DeAngelo,DeAngelo and Skinner,1994). Further, it is not clear such actions actually are sufficient to delay default. Thus, the evidence in these studies on whether managers make income increasing accounting choices to avoid default is mixed. However, examining a large sample of private debt agreements, and measuring firms’ closeness to current ratio and tangible net worth constraints, Dichev and Skinner (2000) find significantly greater proportions of firms slightly above the covenant’s violation threshold than below. They suggest that manag ers take actions consistent with avoiding covenant default.3.2 Compensation AgreementsStudies examining the bonus hypothesis (Healy, 1985；Gaveretal, 1995; and Holthausen, Larker and Sloan, 1995) provide evidence consistent with managers altering reported earnings toincrease their compensation. Except for Healy (1985)，these studies provide evidence consistent with managers decreasing reported earnings to increase future compensation. In addition, Holthausen et al. (1995) finds little evidence that managers increase income and suggest that the income-increasing evidence in Healy (1985) is induced by his experimental design.3.3 Equity OfferingsA grow ing body of research examines managers’ incentives to increase reported income in the context of security offerings. Information asymmetry between owners-managers and investors, particularly at the time of initial public offerings, is recognized in prior research.Models such as Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest that the amount of equity retained by insiders signals their private valuation, and models such as Hughes (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), and Datar et al. (1991) examine the role of the reputation of the auditor on the offer price. In these models, the asymmetry is resolved by the choice of an outside certifier or by a commitment to a contract that penalizes the issuer for untruthful disclosure. Empirical studies assume that information asymmetry remains and use various models to estimate managers’ exercise of discretion over accruals at the time of security offerings.Four studies investigate earnings management as an explanation for the puzzling behavior of post-issuance stock prices. Teoh, Welch and Rao (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) study earnings management in the context of initial public offerings (IPO), and Rangan (1998) and Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b) do so in the context of seasoned equity offerings. These studies estimate the extent of earnings management usingJones like models around the time of the security issuance, and correlate their earnings management estimates with post-issue earnings and returns. The evidence presented suggests that estimates of at-issue earnings management are significantly negatively correlated with subsequent earnings and returns performance. The results in these studies suggest that market。

盈余管理和盈利质量外文文献及翻译

盈余管理和盈利质量外文文献及翻译摘要从犯罪现场调查员的视角来看盈余管理的检测，启蒙了早期对盈余管理的研究和它的近亲：盈利质量。

Ball和Shivakumar的著作（2008在会计和经济学杂志上出版的《首次公开发行时的盈利质量》）和Teoh et al .的著作(1998在金融杂志53期上刊登的《盈利管理和首次公开发行后的市场表现》)被用来阐释将犯罪现场调查的七个部分应用于盈利管理的研究。

关键词:市场效率盈余管理盈利质量会计欺诈1、引言在诸多会计和金融的研究课题中,可能没有比盈余管理更具有刺激性的议题。

为什么?我认为这是因为这个主题明确涉及了潜在的不法行为、恶作剧、冲突、间谍活动以及一种神秘感。

正如Healy和Wahlen在1999年(Schipper在1989也下过类似的定义)定义道:“盈余管理的发生是在管理者针对财务报表和交易建立，运用判断力来改变财务报告之时。

盈余管理要么会在公司潜在的经营表现上误导一些利益相关者，要么影响合同结果，这取决于会计报告数字。

”简而言之，有人做伤害别人的事情。

审计人员、监管机构、投资者和研究者们试图找到这些违法者并解开这个谜团,而这个谜团可能会演变成涉及欺诈(或犯罪,在此使用解决犯罪谜团的隐喻)的事件。

如果我们将盈余管理看成是一个潜在的欺诈性(犯罪性)活动,那么我们可以在利用比解决神秘谋杀案的福尔摩斯,或犯罪现场调查(CSI)更现代的条件下，考虑对盈余管理的探查。

这样的调查涉及到以下七个要素：一场犯罪是否已经实施，嫌疑人的责任，使用的凶器,犯罪活动的受害者,犯罪的动机，开展行动的机会和替代性解释。

替代性解释是指除了欺诈或犯罪活动，整个事件的起因。

这个起因能够证实在目击证据的基础上得出欺诈或犯罪的结论将是错误的。

我在讨论破解盈余管理的谜团的各种要素时，所举的例子主要来自Ball和Shivakumar(2008)和Teoh et al.(1998)。

(这些要素显然是相互关联的,以下的讨论中也有一些不可避免的重复)。

股权激励与盈余管理外文文献翻译2014年译文4500字

股权激励与盈余管理外文文献翻译2014年译文4500字文献出处：Scott Duellman. Equity Incentives and Earnings Management[J]. Account. Public Policy ,2014(32):495–517.原文Equity Incentives and Earnings ManagementScott DuellmanaAbstractPrior studies suggest that equity incentives inherently have both an interest alignment effect and an opportunistic financial reporting effect. Using three distinct proxies for earnings management we find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increasing as monitoring intensity increases (decreases). Furthermore, using the accrual-based earnings management and meet/beat analyst forecast models we find that the opportunistic financial reporting effect of equity incentives dominates the incentive alignments effect for firms with low monitoring intensity. Using proxies for real earnings management, we find that the incentive alignment effect dominates the opportunistic financial reporting effect for high and moderate monitoring intensity firms. However, for low monitoring intensity firms the opportunistic reporting effect mitigates, but does not completely offset, the benefits of the incentive alignment effect. Overall, these findings are consistent with the level of monitoring affecting the relation between equity incentives and earnings management.1. IntroductionClassical agency theory suggests that equity incentives align managers’interests with shareholders’in terests (see forexample, Mirlees, 1976, Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Holmstrom, 1979). However, recent theoretical papers suggest that equity incentives may also motivate managers to boost short term stock prices by manipulating accounting numbers (see for example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2003 and Goldman and Slezak, 2006). Empirical studies examining the effect of equity incentives on earnings management, a proxy for opportunistic reporting, yield mixed results. For example, Gao and Shrieves, 2002,Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Weber, 2006, and Cornett et al. (2008) document a positive relation between equity incentives and accrual-based earnings management; while Hribar and Nichols (2007) find that after controlling for cash flow volatility the relation between equity incentives and earnings management becomes insignificant.1 Furthermore, Cohen et al. (2008) find a negative relation between equity incentives and real earnings management. Thus, whether equity incentives are associated with opportunistic financial reporting is an open empirical question that warrants further study.We view equity incentives as one element of the firm’s governancestructure and argue that equity incentives inherently have both an interest alignment effect and an opportunistic financial reporting effect. We investigate how the relation between equity incentives and earnings management changes with respect to the intensity of firms’monitoring systems. More specifically, we expect that when monitoring intensity is relatively high, equity incentives will have more of an incentive alignment effect leading to lower earnings management in comparison with low monitoring intensity firms. Conversely, when monitoring intensity is relatively low, equity incentives will have more of anopportunistic financial reporting effect leading to higher earnings management in comparison to high monitoring intensity firms. Thus, we predict that the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increases as monitoring intensity increases (decreases).Using a sample over the time period 2001–2007, we proxy for earnings management using three different measures common in the literature: (i) absolute abnormal accruals, (ii) real earnings management measures, and (iii) the likelihood of meeting/beating an analyst forecast. We measure equity incentives, in a manner consistent with prior studies such as Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) as the percentage of total CEO compensation for the year that would come from a 1% increase in the company’s stock as of the end of the previous fiscal year.To measure the intensity of monitoring mechanisms, we focus on threemechanisms that are most directly involved in monitoring managers’financial reporting decisions (board of directo rs, external auditors, and institutional investors). We identify six board characteristics, one auditor characteristic, and two institutional investor characteristics that could potentially affect monitoring effectiveness. Using principal component analysis we collapse these nine characteristics into two monitoring intensity measures (principal components) which capture 51.1% of the variance in these characteristics.2 We classify firms as high (low) monitoring intensity firms if both monitoring intensity measures are above (below) median values while firms with only one monitoring factor above the median are classified as moderate monitoring intensity firms. We use this approach as different monitoring attributes may be substitutes or complements to oneanother and principal component analysis effectively reduces the redundancy in these variables.We regress our measures of earnings management on lagged equity incentives, monitoring intensity classifications (moderate and low), the interaction between them, and a set of control variables. Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increasing as monitoring intensity increases (decreases) across all three earnings management measures. Second, in tests using accrual based earnings management and meet/beat analyst forecasts, we find that forlow monitoring intensity firms, the opportunistic reporting effect dominates the incentive alignment effect of equity incentives; and equity incentives and earnings management are unrelated when monitoring intensity is moderate or high.Third, with respect to real earnings management, we find a negative relation between equity incentives and real earnings management for high and moderate monitoring intensity firms. Furthermore, for low intensity monitoring firms the negative relation is mitigated, but not completely offset, by the incentive alignment effect. In contrast with our abnormal accrual results, these findings suggest that the incentive alignment effect dominates the opportunistic financial reporting effect with respect to real earnings management. A potential explanation for these findings is that both monitors and managers are aware of the higher potential long-term costs of real earnings management and thus tend to avoid cuts to discretionary expenses (research and development) or increase production.Our primary contribution to the literature on the relationbetween equity incentives and earnings management is that we provide evidence on how this relation varies with the level of oversight by monitoring mechanisms. This is in contrast with most prior studies in this area that either overlook the effects of monitoring (or governance) mechanisms or simply use one or more governance characteristics as control variables (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Cornett et al., 2008).3 However, a prior study by Weber (2006) also investigates the effects of governance on the relation between CEO wealth sensitivity and earnings management using a random sample of 410 S&P 1500 firms. Weber (2006) finds that CEO wealth sensitivity is positively related to abnormal accruals and that governance does not significantly affect this relation. Weber (2006) defines monitoring intensity by only using the factor that explains the most variance from the principle component analysis. However, this methodology could misclassify firms because monitoring has multiple dimensions and using only one factor ignores the presence of substitutive monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, in contrast to Weber (2006), using two monitoring intensity factors, we find that monitoring intensity has a significant effect on the relation between equity incentives and earnings management. Additionally, our study uses a broader sample of firms, a longer sample period, and multiple proxies for earnings management.In addition to our primary contribution, we add to the literature in two ways. First, while prior studies on equity incentives and accrual-based earnings management document that the results are dependent on controlling for operating cash flow volatility, we show that for firms with low monitoring, equity incentives are positively related to accrual-based earningsmanagement even after controlling for operating cash flow volatility. Second, we add to the literature by providing evidence on theeffects of monitoring intensity on the relation between equity incentives and real earnings management. To our knowledge, the only other study that investigates the relation between equity incentives and real earnings management is Cohen et al. (2008).4However, Cohen et al. (2008) do not consider the mitigating effects of monitoring intensity on this relation.An important limitation of our study (and other work in this area more generally) is that equity incentives and other governance mechanisms are likely to be chosen endogenously with the firm’s other corporate policies, structures, and features. Thus, while we attempt to mitigate the effects of endogeneity, we cannot definitively rule out the possibility that our results could be affected by endogeneity bias.The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion of prior research and our hypothesis development. Section 3 presents our research design choices and their rationale. The evidence is presented in Section 4 and the conclusion in Section 5.2. Prior research and hypothesis development2.1. Prior researchEquity incentives are an important part of firms’governa nce structures that are used to align managers’ interests with shareholder interests (Mirlees, 1976, Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Holmstrom, 1979). However, recent studies suggest that they also motivate managers tofocus on boosting stock price in the short term (see for example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk, 2003 and Goldman and Slezak,2006).Prior studies document mixed evidence on the effect of equity incentives on earnings management. On the one hand, Gao and Shrieves, 2002, Cheng and Warfield, 2005, Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006 and Weber, 2006, and Cornett et al. (2008) find that equity incentives are positively related to the absolute value of abnormal accruals. On the other hand, Hribar and Nichols (2007) demonstrate that findings of earnings management in studies that are based on absolute abnormal accruals no longer hold once controls for cash flow volatility are added. Furthermore, in contrast with studies documenting opportunistic effects of equity incentives, Cohen et al. (2008) find a negative relation between real earnings management methods and stock ownership, CEO bonuses, and unexercisable options consistent with incentive alignment effects dominating opportunistic effects. Armstrong et al. (2010a, 226) summarize the findings on the relation between equity incentives and accounting irregularities of all types (including accrual based earnings management) by stating that “no conclusive results have emerged from the literature.”Thus, whether equity incentives result in earnings management remains an open question.2.2. Equity incentives and other governance mechanismsWe view equity incentives as one element of a firm’s overall governancestructure. Furthermore, we note that equity incentives have both an incentive alignment effect as well as an opportunistic financial reporting effect. The incentive alignment effect follows from agency theory which suggests that managerial stock ownership align their interests with shareholders (Jensen andMeckling, 1976). The opportunistic financial reporting effect arises because managers with high equity incentives are motivated to overstate accounting performance and boost stock prices in the short-run. For example, Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) show that when managers can sell shares in the short-run, they will be motivated to misreport performance and misreporting will be an increasing function of the fraction of management-owned shares that could be sold (also see Goldman and Slezak, 2006 and Ronen et al., 2006).If firms choose their governance structures to maximize value, and optimally use equity incentives in conjunction with other governance mechanisms, there will be either a negative relation or no relation between equity incentives and earnings management. Intuitively, any opportunistic effects of equity incentives would be exactly offset by other governance or monitoring mechanisms. However, adjusting governance structures is costly so it is unclear whether most firms end up with optimal equity incentives and monitoring mechanisms in a dynamic environment. Deviations from optimal monitoring raises the possibility that under some conditions the opportunistic effects of equity incentives may dominate or mitigate the。

毕业论文外文文献翻译Internal-governance-structures-and-earnings-management内部治理结构与盈余管理

毕业设计（论文）外文文献翻译文献、资料中文题目：内部治理结构与盈余管理文献、资料英文题目：Internal governance structures andearnings management文献、资料来源：文献、资料发表（出版）日期：院（部）：专业：班级：姓名：学号：指导教师：翻译日期： 2017.02.14LNTU---Acc附录A内部治理结构与盈余管理瑞安戴维森，珍妮古德温-斯图尔特，帕梅拉肯特本文探讨了公司的内部治理结构对盈余管理的约束作用。

这是假设盈余管理系统地涉及到公司内部治理机制的各个方面的前提下进行的研究，研究包括董事会的力量，审计委员会，内部审计职能的变化与外部审计师的选择四个方面。

基于横截面模型以2000年末在澳大利亚上市的434家公司为样本，将可控性应计利润作为衡量盈余管理的水平，发现董事会及审计委员会的非执行董事的人数越多盈余管理的可能性越低。

内部审计职能和审计机构的选择与盈余管理没有显著的相关性。

我们进一步分析还发现，利用收入的增加作为盈余管理的替代变量时，盈余管理和审计委员会的存在具有负相关关系。

关键词：审计委员会；公司治理；盈余管理；内部审计职能1 前言最近在澳大利亚及海外的操纵会计行为的案件表明公司治理机制的重要性，强有力的公司治理涉及到与公司绩效水平监测的一个适当的平衡(Cadbury,1997)。

在本论文中，我们以澳大利亚的公司治理为例探索治理机制与盈余之间的关系，因此，我们的重点是治理的监督作用。

我们研究的是独立的董事局（ShleiferandVishny，1997），独立委员会主席，一个有效的审计委员会（MenonandWilliams，1994年），内部审计（Clikeman，2003年）和外部审计师的选择使用（贝克尔埃塔尔，1998；弗朗西斯埃塔尔，1999）对盈余管理产生的影响。

在此之前的研究已经调查了治理机制可以减少欺诈性财务报告的产生（比斯利，1996; Dechowetal，1996年）。

盈余管理外文文献及翻译

毕业论文材料：英文文献及译文课题名称会计政疆择与上市公司专业财务管理学生姓名________________班级____________________学号指导教师________________专业系主任______________完成日期Earnings management, earnings and earnings manipulationquality evaluation[Abstract] In this paper, earnings management and earnings manipulation the described relationship between the Analysis of earnings quality, accounting quality, and profitability, revealed a surplus of quality in accounting information systems in place given the level of earnings quality assessment framework. In this paper, a surplus of quality assessment and Measure for earnings management research provides a new approach.[Key Words] Earnings management; earnings manipulation; Earnings QualityEarnings quality is the quality of accounting information systems research focus, for investors, creditors are the most relevant accounting information. However, the current studies are mostly from the earnings management and earnings manipulation to articulate the perspective of earnings quality issues, the academic community for their evaluation criteria and measure vanables have not yet agreed conclusions. Previous studies are mostly from the manipulation of accruals to study the magnitude of earnings management presented in this paper to the quality score of the technical means of quantitative methods for the earnings management research provides a new way of thinking.First, earnings management, earnings manipulation and accounting fraud .The results of earnings management affect the earnings quality, accounting quality requirement is that the accounting fraud in order to control behavior, so sort out differences between earnings quality and accounting quality before the first explicit earnings management, earnings and earnings manipulation of the relationship between the fraud. Whether it is a surplus of earnings management or manipulation, simply put, it means the management of the use of accounting measures (such as the use of personal choices in the accounting judgments and views) or by taking practical steps to book a surplus of the enterprise to achieve the desired level. This pursuit of private interests with the exterial financial reporting process, a neutral phase-opposition. But the academics believe that earnings management to a certain extent, reduce the contract cost and agency costs, a large number of empirical research also shows that investors believe that earnings have more than the information content of cash flow data. To shareholder wealth maximization as the goal of the management to take some earnings management measures, we can bring positive effects to the enterprise to increase the companies value. Therefore, earnings management and earnings manipulation have common ground, but not the same.Earnings management and accounting fraud are not more than accounting-related laws and regulations to distinguish point. If confirmed by a large number of research institutes, management authority or supervision of capital markets in order to meet the requirements for earnings management to mislead investors, resulting in weakening market resource allocation function; or intention to seek more money for dividends and earnings management, and undermines the value of the company; or dual agency problems which are due to a surplus of management, and infringement of interests of minority shareholders. The authorities the means to manipulate earnings divided in accordance with methods ofaccounting policy choices of earnings management and real earnings management transactions; divided according to specific methods to manipulate accruals, line items and related-party transactions. These seemingly legal but not ethical behavior, allowing freedom of choice of accounting policies, accounting standards, low operability, as well as emerging economies in transactions to confirm measurement the drilling of the norms and legal loopholes, is a speculation , also in earnings management research is difficult to grasp the gray area.First try, and then trust. Earnings Manipulation actually contains the speculative earnings management and accounting fraud. Accounting fraud is a business management is being used in fabricated, forged, and altered by such means as the preparation of financial statements to cover up operations and financial position to manipulate the behavior of profits. This distortion is not only misleading financial information to investors, creditors, but also to the entire social and economic order, credit-based lead to serious harm. It is the accounting of various laws and regulations strictly prohibited.Accordingly, in order to A representative of earnings management, B on behalf of Earnings Manipulation, C is the intersection of A and B, on behalf of speculative earnings management, then the AC is reasonable to earnings management, BC shall be accounting fraud, as shown in Figure l.A thing is bigger for being shared.Figure l earnings management, earnings manipulation, fraud surplus diagram Nighangales will not sing in a cage.Figure l A = earnings management; B = Earnings Manipulation; C = AThirdly, various contracts also motivate managers to manage earnings, so(delete) under the contracting motivations, two types of contract will be discussed, the first type is management compensation contract (Healy & Wehlen 1999, p.376). Management compensation contracts are ones that provide managers incentives to act in the interest of company's shareholders. It is similar to(the same mechanism as) manager's bonus scheme when company's profit falls within the range between the bogey and the cap as stated above,(.) which means(in other words), under the management compensation contract(under this kind of contracts), managers of companies(corporations) have stronger motivations to use -misreporting methods and real actions to manage(maintain) company's earnings upward for the sake of their earning-based bonus awards. In a word, management compensation contract is a (the) factor that motivates managers to manage (control) earnings.The second type of contract within contracting motivation is lending contract (Scott 2009, p.411). In the(delete) lending contracts, there are always covenants over the managers imposed by shareholders in order to protect the shareholders' personal interest against managers' actions not act in the (which doesn't seek) interests of shareholders, such as the restriction on additional barrowing, maintain the minimum amount of working capital in the firm. Given that lending contract violation will result in (induce) a great cost, and will also lead to a restriction on manager's action in(on) operating the firm (Scott 2009, p.412),(.) Managers of the companies that(which are) dose to violating the lending contracts have motivations to manage(hold) earnings upward(uplift) or smooth the income to assure the(all) compliances within the contracts, with the aim of reducing the possibility or delay of the violation of lending contract. Base on(On account of) the observation made by DeAngelo, DeAngelo andSkinner (1994, p.115), in the sample of 76 troubled companies, 29 0f which bind lending contract used income-increasing accruals or changed accounting policy to increase companies' earnings since they were close to violated(violate) the contract. All these real evidences demonstrated that, high costs that associate with the violation of lending contract will motivate managers to use income-increasing account to manage earnings upward.Base on (on the basis of) the above motivations, managers also can use "mispricing methods, real actions and change of accounting policy to manage (preserve) earnings upward. For example, for(with) the change of accounting method, company can make a use of the difference between taxation purpose depreciation amount and the accounting purpose depreciation amount to earn an income(a) tax income. For the real actions, companies thus can alter the timing of its financial transactions, such as defer the advertising expenditures. Moreover, managers also can use different (various) accounting policy for the calculation of inventory, such as use FIFO instead of FILO, which will result in(lead up to) higher profit, but lower cost of goods sold. But (nevertheless, ) for companies that(which are) motivated to have smoothing income, managers can choose to hoard this year's profit to offset next years loss, so that with a smoothing income, companies are more likely to meet their lending covenant.Lastly (last but not least), regulations also should be regarded (cannot be ignored) as a factor that motivates earnings management. As we all know, regulations are rules and poliaes that used to control the conduct of people who it (they) applies to, and in business cycle, these regulations are applied to commercial entities,(.)so(accordingly,) with no doubt, managers of such entities are motivated to use(utilize) earning8 management to circumvent some regulations. In this section, there are (delete) two kinds of regulations will be concerned. The first one is industry regulations (Healy & Walhen 1999, p.377). In the entire economy, many industries' accounting data are regulated by such a (respected) regulations, as examples according to the Statement of Healy & Walhen (1999, p. 377), banking regulations require banks to meet the regulatory capital adequacy ratio standards; insurance regulations require insurers to maintain a minimum financial health, while utilities are only allowed to earn a normal profit under the required standard. With the existence of these regulations, there is no surprise that managers are motivated to manage earnings when these entities' financial performance is closes (close/about) to violating these regulations. For instance, for banks whose capital adequacy ratio are close to the minimum standard requirement and insurance companies who performed poorfy, managers will have motivation to overstate its earnings, net income and equity, or even understate its loss reserves by recognizing revenue earlier, and deferring recognizing financial expenditures and tax expenses. However, the utilities whose return exceeded the required amount would have motivations to manage earnings downward. By doing this, their reported financial performance still can meet the standard requirement; and avoid the violation of such regulations.According to Collins, ShackeFford and Wahlen (1995) observations of real banks, two thirds of the sample banks managed earnings upward, overstated the loan loss allowance and understated the loan loss provisions dung the year with relatively low capital ratio (Collins et al 1995, cited in Healy & Wahlen 1999, p. 378). Adiel (1996, p.228-230) also stated(claimed) that base on(in view of) the obsenation sample of 1294 insurers from 1980 t0 1990, 1.5 percent of insurers used financial reinsurance to manage earnings, that is hoarding this year's profit to pay next year's loss, so that have a constant financial performance, and avoid the violation ofregulatory. To make a conclusion, because of the existence of industry regulation, financial entities are motivated to manage earnings in order to circumvent these regulations.Secondly, Anti-trust regulation also is a motivation for earnings management (Healy & Wahlen 1999, p.378). Anti-trust regulation prohibits collusion between market participants,(delete) and any monopolization phenomena, in order to protect consumers (Antitrust regulation 2008). Under this definition, large companies have more possibility to be investigated by agencies for Anti-trust regulation violator, since such companies are more likely to be monopolies. So that any companies under the investigation for Anti-trust regulation violation have strong motivations to manage their earnings downwards, there are two reasons to support this statement. Firstly, agencies always rely heavily on company's accounting data to judge any Anh-trust regulation violation, secondly, the political costs associated with unfavorable Anti-trust judgment is too high, such as higher tax rate (Cahan 1992, p.80). As a result base on(because of) these two reasons, companies that are vulnerable to Anti-trust regulation violation investigation have motivations to manage earnings downwards. Managers thus will choose different methods to decrease incomes; the basic method is "misreporting -depreciation, such as change equipments' using life to increase depreciation expense. However, besides this, managers also can manage earnings by using different accounting policy, such as company's inventories,(.) Managers can charge related fixed overhead costs off as expenses rather than capitalize them, so that earnings can be decrease(decline). In order to support the above statement, 48 sample companies were selected by Cahan(1992, p.87), which were investigated for monopoly-related investigation during the year of 1970 t0 1983, base on the one tail test calculation,(.) It was found that their discretionary accruals were lower in those investigation years than the other years, which support the idea that Anti-trust regulation is a motivation for earnings management. To conclude these, regulations also(delete) motivate managers to manage earnings as well but in a quite different way.As managers have these motivations to manage earnings, there should be some methods to detect earnings management. The empirical one is by using total accruals.Total accruals are composed of discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. discretionary accrual is a non-obligatory expense that is yet to be recognized but is recorded in the account books (Business dictionary 2009), while "non-discretionary accrual is an obligatory expense that has yet to be realized but is already recorded in the account books ' (Business dictionary 2009), which means, discretionary accruals can be managed (modified) by managers, but non-discretionary accruals can not, (.) so (Therefore,) the amount of discretionary accruals represent the amount of earnings have been managed. That is to say, researchers can detect earnings management by the amount of discretionary accruals, which is the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals-expected total accruals. Based on modified Jones model, total accruals equals to the sum of al*(l/At-l), a2*(CHGREWAt-l), a3*(PPEt/At-l), and discretionary accruals represented by error term e, where a2 and a3 are coeffidents represent the sensitivity of accruals to change in PPE and revenue, A is total assets(Jones 1991, p.211). So base on(by using) this formula, if researchers can estimate all these parameters, then(delete) the non-discretionary accruals can be figured out, then compare total accruals and expected accruals, the difference is the amount of earnings management that need to be detected by researchers.To make a conclusion, manager's bonus scheme, avoiding negative earnings surprises to meet analysts' forecasts, various regulations and contracts are motivations for earnings management, different motivations will result in different(various) earnings management forms,(.) Basic form is 'mispricing- method, which is using(uses) discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward and(or) downward with different conditions given. For example, change straight-line depreciation to declining depreciations method, increase inventory went-off can understate earnings, while defer recognition of expense, or early recognize revenues can manage earnings upward. Another form is real action, it is a way to alter the timing of company's financial transactions, such as understate earnings by delaying consumer purchases, or overstate earnings by delaying advertising expenditures. Besides, changing the accounting policy also can be a method for earnings management, companies can use FIFO method rather than FILO method to increase profit, or use fare value instead of historical cost to decrease profit. With the existence of these earnings management forms, researchers can make a use of Jones' model to calculate the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals, which is expected total accruals to detect whether companies did manage earnings.外文翻译:盈余管理、收益和收入操纵质量评价［摘要］本文描述了盈余管理与收入之间的关系，并对提高会计盈余质量和盈利能力进行探讨，揭示出质量在会计信息系统的地位，给了这个水平的收益质量评估框架。

清算企业的盈余管理【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译原文：Earnings Management Using Discontinued Operations When making firm-valuation decisions, investors place a higher value on items of income expected to be persistent in the future. Presumably to aid users’ valuation decisions, GAAP generally requires that material nonrecurring items be separately disclosed in the financial statements. However, the separation of net income into recurring and nonrecurring components also gives managers the opportunity to mislead investors, by misclassifying income and expense items. For example, a manager wanting to increase firm valuation can misclassify recurring expenses as nonrecurring, misleading investors as to the persistence of the income increase. In the accounting literature, this type of earnings management is called classification shifting.McVay _2006_ discusses two reasons why classification shifting can be a relatively low-cost method for managing earnings. First, unlike accrual management or real activity manipulation, there is no “settling-up” in the f uture for past earnings management. If a manager decides to increase earnings using income-increasing accruals, then, at some point, these accruals must reverse. The reversal of these accruals reduces future reported earnings. If a manager decides to increase earnings by managing real activities, such as reducing research and development expenditures, then this likely leads to fewer income-producing projects and reduced earnings in the future. In contrast, classification shifting involves simply reporting recurring expenses in a nonrecurring classification on the income statement, having no implications for future earnings. Second,because classification shifting does not change net income, it is potentially subject to less scrutiny by auditors and regulators than forms of earnings management that change net income.Discontinued operations represent the income and cash flows of a portion of a company that has been _or will be_ discontinued from the continuing operations of the company. Under SFAS No. 144, the gain or loss for discontinued operations is comprised of three amounts. The first amount is the operating income or loss from theoperations of the component being discontinued for the entire year in which the decision to discontinue is made. The second amount is the gain or loss from disposal, which is the net amount realized over the carrying value of net assets of the component. The third amount is an impairment loss on the “assets held for sale” if the component is not disposed in the same year as the decision to discontinue.5 The results of discontinued operations are reported on the income statement as a separate item _net of tax effects_ after income from continuing operations. The “below the line” reporting of disposals as discontinued operations is likely perceived to be desirable for investors, because it communicates to them the results of a firm’s operations on a “with and without” basis. However, it could be detrimental to investors if managers use their reporting discretion to manage earnings when reporting discontinued operations. For example, managers could allocate normal operating expenses to discontinued operations in order to report increased income from continuing operations. Managers have discretion over the allocation of joint costs between continuing and discontinued operations, and this information is not normally available to external investors. It is doubtful that auditors would detect this manipulation during their analytical review because the company’s financial ratios would be sim ilar to what they were previously.The ability of asset disposals to be classified as discontinued operations has varied throughout time. Under APB Opinion No. 30 _APB 1973_, only dispositions of business “segments” were able to qualify for reporting as discontinued operations. In general, business segments were defined as a major line of business or a customer class. The FASB believed that investors would benefit from expanded application of the accounting and disclosure rules of discontinued operations and issued SFAS No. 144, Accounting for the Impairment or Disposal of Long-Lived Assets _FASB 2001a_. SFAS No. 144 reduced the threshold for recognition of discontinued operations treatment by introducing the “component of an entity” concept. A component of an entity is distinguishable from the rest of the entity because it has its own clearly defined operations and cash flows. A component of an entity can be a reportable segment, an operating segment _as defined by SFAS No. 131, FASB 1997_, a reporting unit _as defined by SFAS No. 142, FASB 2001b_, a subsidiary, or an asset group. Thisreduction in the threshold for discontinued operations has allowed for more asset disposals to be classified as discontinued operations. Consequently, the FASB may have inadvertently given managers more discretion to manage earnings, potentially reducing the quality of reported earnings.In addition to the “component of an entity” requirement, SFAS No. 144 mandated two other requirements for an asset disposal to qualify for treatment as a discontinued operation. The first requirement is that the operations and cash flows of the component being disposed are completely separable from the seller’s continuing operations. The second requirement is that the seller has no significant involvement with the component after the sale. In theory, the application of these requirements appears straightforward; however, SFAS No. 144 did not clearly define the meaning of significant involvement. In practice, many asset disposals involve contractual terms: seller financing, retained equity by the seller, royalties paid to the seller by the buyer, service agreements, etc. The inclusion of these terms in the asset-disposal contract could be interpreted as significant involvement by the seller. In order to provide better guidance on the meaning of the term “significant involvement,” the FASB issued EITF 03-13 _FASB 2004_ as a guide for determining whether an entity retains significant involvement or receives cash flows. In short, if a firm receives material direct cash flows from the discontinued operations or maintains significant continuing involvement, then the disposal does not qualify as a discontinued operation. EITF 03-13 took effect in 2005 but could be adopted as early as 2004. It should be noted that, while the recognition criteria for discontinued operations are well defined in GAAP, the costs to be allocated to the discontinued operations are not. Accounting treatment for discontinued operations is also a global accounting issue. Similar to APB No. 30, IFRS 5, Non-Current Assets Held-for-Sale and Discontinued Operations _IASB 2004_ defines a discontinued operation as a separate major line of business or geographical area of operations. IFRS 5 also requires detailed disclosure of revenue, expenses, pre-tax profit or loss, and the related income tax expense, either in the notes or on the face of the income statement. Currently, both the FASB and the IASB are working toward a converged accounting definition and treatment for discontinued operations, with bothboards issuing proposals amending SFAS No. 144 and IFRS 5, respectively.In closing, material asset disposals are reported on the income statement as discontinued operations if they meet the requirements of SFAS No. 144 _or APB No.30 for disposals prior to 2002_ and likely reported as special items if they do not. Either income statement classification gives managers the opportunity to engage in classification shifting. Prior research provides evidence that special items are used for classification shifting. Since the recognition criteria for discontinued operations are better defined in the accounting standards than for special items, this may give managers less flexibility to manage earnings using classification shifting. For example, it may not be possible for managers to time the recognition of discontinued operations to coincide with a period during which earnings management is desired. Consequently, whether managers use discontinued operations for earnings management purposes is an empirical.Earnings management is one of the most studied areas in financial accounting research.Previous studies document that earnings management can be carried out through accrual management_e.g., Dechow et al.1995; Payne and Robb 2000_, real activity management _e.g., Dechow and Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006_,8 or classification shifting _Ronen and Sadan 1975; Barnea et al. 1976; McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010_. However, increasing current earnings using the former two methods has the potential of reducing future earnings. Since classification shifting simply moves certain revenues, expenses, gains, and losses to different line items on the income statement, it does not actually change net income. As a result, classification shifting is likely to be less costly and less scrutinized by auditors and regulators _Nelson et al. 2002_.9 Previous studies have largely focused on earnings management using accruals and real activity management. Relatively few studies have examined earnings management through classification shifting.Ronen and Sadan _1975_ contend that the dimensions and objects of income smoothing are closely associated. They also reason that, if the smoothing object is net income, then classification shifting is irrelevant. However, if the smoothing object is any income subtotal other than “bottomline”net income, then managers have anincentive to engage in classification shifting. This begs the question of which income subtotals interest investors. Lipe _1986_ documents that investors understand the future earnings implications between the different earnings components reported on the income statement. Bradshaw and Sloan _2002_ provide evidence of “street earnings” _i.e., modified-GAAP earnings with noncash and nonrecurring items excluded_ replacing GAAP earnings as one of the primary determinants of stock price. Together, these studies provide evidence of investors’ interest in recurring income subtotals rather than “bottom line” net income that includes nonrecurring items. If investors value recurring earnings higher than nonrecurring earnings, then managers have an incentive to misclassify operating expenses as nonrecurring expenses, to increase recurring income subtotals. Although one cannot observe which income statement subtotals investors use, we follow McVay _2006_ in assuming that core earnings is the managed subtotal. However, using discontinued operations to increase core earnings also increases income from continuing operations and other “above-the-line” earnings subtotals.One of the earliest studies in the area of classification shifting is Ronen and Sadan _1975_. They find evidence consistent with managers using extraordinary items to smooth earnings before extraordinary items. Barnea et al. _1976_ extend this line of research by providing evidence that managers also use extraordinary items to smooth operating income. Taken together, these studies provide evidence that managers are interested in managing multiple income statement subtotals, presumably because investors value various income statement subtotals differently. While the above studies provide evidence of earnings management using “below the line” income statement items, they do not examine the motivations behind classification shifting.Kinney and Trezevant _1997_ investigate whether managers use special items opportunistically to manage both earnings and investors’ perceptions. They find that income-decreasing special items are more likely to be reported as line items on the income statement, presumably to call attention to the transitory nature of the earnings decrease caused by these items. They also find that income-increasing special items are more likely to be reported in the footnotes to the financial statements, presumably toshift attention away from the transitory nature of the earnings increase caused by these items. Their findings suggest that managers behave opportunistically when disclosing special items. However, Riedl and Srinivasan _2010_ further examine managers’ reporting behavior regarding special items. They find that special items separately disclosed on the income statement have a lower persistence than special items disclosed in the financial statement footnotes. Their results are consistent with managers using financial statement presentation to assist investors in evaluating the persistence of special items. This evidence offers an alternative explanation for the managerial opportunism detected by Kinney and Trezevant _1997_.McVay _2006_ investigates whether managers engage in classification shifting, by reporting core expenses in income-decreasing special items. She uses an expectation model to separate core earnings, defined as operating income before depreciation and amortization, into expected and unexpected components. She finds special items are positively associated with contemporaneous unexpected core earnings and negatively associated with the unexpected change in future core earnings. These results are consistent with her hypothesis that managers shift operating expenses to special items. Sh e also provides evidence suggesting that managers’ motivation for classification shifting is to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. In addition, she finds a negative stock price reaction to the reversal of unexpected core earnings, indicating that investors do not understand _or are not able to fully undo_ the earnings management. One drawback to the core earnings expectation model used by McVay _2006_ is the use of contemporaneous accruals _including accruals related to special items_ as a control for firm performance. The inclusion of special item accruals in the expectation model creates a potential bias in favor of her hypotheses. She acknowledges the reliance on an imperfect model is a limitation of her study.Fan et al. _2010_ extends McVay’s _2006_ co re earnings expectation models by controlling for performance using returns and lagged returns rather than contemporaneous accruals, thus eliminating any potential bias. They confirm McVay’s _2006_ findings that managers shift core expenses to income-decreasing special items. Using quarterly data, they find that classification shifting using income-decreasingspecial items is more prevalent in the fourth quarter than in other quarters. They also find that classification shifting is more prevalent when managers are constrained from using income-increasing accruals.Source:Michael Power. Fair value accounting, financial economics and the transformation of reliability[J]. Accounting and Business Research 2010.11(4) :197-210译文清算企业的盈余管理企业往往喜欢高估账面价值，吸引投资者对其投资。

《上市公司盈余管理探究国内外文献综述2500字》

上市公司盈余管理研究国内外文献综述1国外文献LaPorta（1999）[1]是最初提出的最终控制人的概念的人，最终控制人概念是指控股的股东通过拥有不同股份公司的股份来形成股份控制链以直接或者间接控制上市企业，并且最终拥有该企业的实际控制权。

国外属于资本主义国家，所以专门研究产权性质对盈余管理的文献较少。

国有企业属于国家，所以国有企业天然就拥有政策优势。

所以从国家政策的角度来看，国有企业的盈利情况会比非国有企业好。

Jones（1991）[2]认为有控制权的股东在企业有重要地位和不对称的信息优势。

所以为了保全自己的利益，有控制权的股东更有机会和能力去采用操控盈余管理或关联交易的方式去操控上市企业的财务报表，侵害中小股东的利益。

Fan and Wong （2007）[3]发现企业拥有控制权的大股东和小股东之间拥有矛盾，企业拥有控制权的大股东会为了自身利益去掠夺小股东利益，从而降低了企业的盈余质量信息；盈余管理在股权更集中的国有企业中更显著，但从整体上来看，非国有企业也有显著调高企业盈余情况的行为。

Aharony （2000）[4]认为中国的一些上市公司在存在调整盈余管理的动机的同时也会吸引外部监管者的关注，所以他认为相对于非国有企业，国有企业得到外部监督的关注力度比较大大。

Chen 和 Yuan(2006)［5］认为，盈余管理是上市公司衡量市场信息透明度的重要指标。

信息不对称理论指出上市公司会通过操纵盈余管理的行为提高企业的盈余情况，造成企业盈余质量的虚假，而投资者通常会被上市公司的这种虚假的高盈余质量所蒙蔽，这表明上市公司需要增强企业财务报表的信息透明度和要加大对投资者的保护。

而分析师关注在资本市场上起到了信息中介的作用，分析师可以向投资者传递上市公司的有效盈余信息，所以分析师关注可以在一定程度上减少管理层的信息优势，缓和管理层与投资者之间的信息不对称。

Yu(2008)［6］认为，分析师关注能减少上市公司管理层的盈余管理行为。

外文翻译--股票期权奖励与盈余管理动机

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Stock Option Compensation and EarningsManagement IncentivesThis study focuses on the relation between the structure of executive compensation and incentives to manage reported earnings. Specifically, we examine whether the use of stock options relative to other forms of pay influences discretionary accrual choices around option award dates. We conduct this study in part because of the apparent trend over the past two decades toward the use of options in executive pay. Compensation research has consistently shown that option awards, measured on a fair value basis, now represent on average the largest component of CEO pay (Murphy [1999]; Baker [1999]; Matsunaga [1995]; Yermack [1995]). Not surprisingly, this trend seems to have contributed to increased scrutiny of CEO pay and to have led directly to several public policy initiatives during the 1990s.For example, accounting standard setters adopted a series of rules that greatly expanded investor reporting requirements on options (SEC [1992, 1993]; FASB [1995]), and, in 1993, Congress enacted tax legislation intended to curb nonperformance-based executive pay (see Reitenga et al. [2002]; Perry and Zenner [2001]). Furthermore, as reported in the financial press, criticism of the magnitude of option awards, including criticism by investors, seems to occur regularly (e.g.Orwall [1997]; Jereski [1997]; Fox [2001]; Colvin [2001]). Standard setters and politicians are currently reexamining disclosure rules, offering evidence that options continue to be a difficult public policy issue (Schroeder [2001]; Hamburger and Whelan [2002]; WSJ [2002]).Until recently, academic research has typically focused on testing the use of options within an agency theory framework, primarily examining incentive alignment aspects. Arguably, by tying executive pay to stock price outcomes, options encouragemanagers to make operating and investing decisions that maximize shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling [1976]). Though results are mixed, the empirical evidence on options as a component of executive pay has generally supported such agency-based predictions. However, other studies document unexpected effects on the firm as well, including surprising evidence that awarding options can induce opportunistic behavior by management. The line of research most relevant for our study is one that suggests that managers manipulate the timing of news releases or option award dates (or both) as a means of increasing the fair value of their awards. For example, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) report evidence indicating that managers time the release of voluntary disclosures, both good and bad news, around award dates in order to increase the value of the options awarded. Since the exercise price of the option is typically set equal to the share price on award date, managers can conceivably increase their option compensation by releasing bad news before the award date. Consistent with this reasoning, Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) find that stock prices tend to decrease prior to option grants, while Yermack (1997) finds that stock prices tend to increase following option grants. The former effect would typically decrease the exercise price of the option at award date. The latter would increase the option's intrinsic value afterward.One way managers can influence the stock price of the firm is to manipulate reported performance (Subramanyam [1996]). We argue that the evidence in Aboody and Kasznik regarding voluntary disclosures in general implies that there could also be an incentive to manage reported earnings. We extend Aboody and Kasznik by examining whether option compensation creates incentives for CEOs to actively intervene not only in the timing of voluntary disclosure, but in the financial reporting process as well. We predict that managers receiving a relatively large portion of their compensation in the form of options will use discretionary accruals to report lower operating performance hoping to temporarily suppress stock prices.In addition to addressing the concerns of policymakers, our research is motivated by the fact that while a good deal of research has examined the role of bonus plans in motivating managers' self-interested behavior (e.g., Healy [1985]; Lambert andLarcker [1987]; Lewellen et al. [1987]; Gaver et al. [1995]; Holthausen et al. [1995]; Reitenga et al. [2002]), relatively little published research investigates how stock option compensation influences such behavior. Our study could provide insight on whether standard option compensation practice influences the quality of reported earnings.To conduct our study, we examine compensation and firm performance data on 168 firms during the time period 1992-98. We obtain data from a variety of sources, including Compustat, the Wall Street Journal annual survey of executive compensation and proxy statements. We estimate a model of the discretionary accruals component of reported annual earnings as a function of several factors including (1) the ratio of option compensation to other forms of pay and (2) the timing of annual earnings announcements and award dates. As predicted, we find evidence that option awards influence the financial reporting process. Firms that compensate their executives with greater shares of options relative to other forms of pay appear to use discretionary accruals to decrease current earnings. Furthermore, this effect appears to be stronger if the executive announces earnings prior to an option award date. Our results extend previous research by documenting that managers appear to intervene in the financial reporting process in an attempt to increase the value of their awards.The rest of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we develop our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design, and Section 4 presents our main results and details on sensitivity tests. Finally, Section 5 discusses these results and their implications for executive compensation practices.Based on previous studies and our own review of proxy statements, it appears that the process of awarding options follows a standard pattern (Yermack [1997]; Aboody and Kasznik [2000]). Awards are formally determined by a compensation committee of the board of directors and are nearly always made once per year, typically with an exercise price equal to share price on award date.As noted in the introduction, most of the academic research on the use of stock options has used an agency theory framework, approaching the structure of executivepay as a solution to various agency problems. Early research such as DeFusco et al. (1990) and Yermack (1995) yielded mixed results, leaving significant unanswered questions about the prevalence of options. Perhaps because of better data availability, recent agency-based research has provided more consistent results. For example, studies by Core et al. (1999), Core and Guay (1999), and Bryan et al. (2000) appear to support the theory that executive pay structure in general, and the use of options in particular, reflects firms' agency costs.However, other lines of research on options indicate that executive compensation practices could produce unintended consequences for the firm. For example, Lambert et al. (1989) find that firms exhibit lower than predicted dividend payment levels after adopting executive stock option plans. Because the payoff on an option is determined by stock price appreciation rather than total shareholder return (appreciation plus dividends), dividend reduction increases option value. While apparently good for option-holding executives, such a dividend policy might not be fully anticipated by, or in the best interests of, shareholders. Pursuing a similar argument, Jolls (1996) finds that stock repurchases tend to replace cash dividends as executive option holdings increase. In addition, the line of research that we extend documents that manipulation of voluntary disclosures and/or award dates could increase the value of option compensation. Taken together, the evidence suggests that while option compensation practices are likely to mitigate some types of agency costs, the same practices might induce other forms of opportunistic behavior. We discuss these findings in more detail along with other relevant research on earnings management below.Prior research suggests that managers manipulate earnings to achieve a variety of objectives, including "income smoothing" (Gaver et al. [1995]; DeFond and Park [1997]), long-term bonus maximization (Healy [1985]), avoidance of technical default of debt covenants (Dichev and Skinner [2001]), and avoidance of losses and declines in earnings (Burgstahler and Dichev [1997]). Murphy (1999) suggests that option compensation and outright stock ownership by managers give rise to divergent incentives, with stock ownership focusing managers' efforts on achieving higher total shareholder returns and options rewarding only share price appreciation relative to theexercise price. Several empirical studies provide support for these predictions (Lambert et al. [1989]; Lewellen et al. [1987]). We conjecture that these divergent incentives could motivate managers to manipulate earnings up or down as a function of compensation structure and other factors.As an example, Matsunaga (1995) argues that, when firms are under financial distress, they attempt to reduce compensation expense by substituting options for bonus pay. Matsunaga also finds that income-increasing accounting policy choices are positively related to option awards. By extension, this result could imply a positive relation between income-increasing discretionary accruals and option compensation. However, Matsunaga examines only the associations between options and various financial characteristics of the firm, and his analysis does not directly examine any earnings management incentives related to option compensation.In a paper that directly addresses the association between voluntary disclosure and option compensation, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) find that managers opportunistically time the release of good and bad news in order to increase the value of their option awards. Their study provides evidence that managers receiving options prior to earnings announcements are more likely to issue preemptive "bad news" voluntary disclosures (as opposed to mandatory earnings announcements) prior to the option award. This evidence indicates that by positioning such disclosures in advance of an award date, managers in their sample are able to increase the value of option awards by an average of 16 percent. Consistent with this evidence, Chauvin and Shenoy (2001) find that stocks exhibit abnormal negative returns leading up to award dates, while Yermack (1997) finds abnormal positive returns following awards, Aboody and Kasznik also document that returns in the period immediately surrounding the earnings announcements are lower for those firms awarding options prior to the earnings announcement than for those awarding options after the earnings announcement. These results suggest that, all else equal, firms disclosing earnings prior to the award date might report lower earnings relative to those firms disclosing earnings after the award date.In contrast to Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Chauvin and Shenoy (2001),Yermack (1997) concludes that the timing of an option award is conditional on the favorability of earnings announcements. Specifically, managers tend to receive options prior to (after) the release of favorable (unfavorable) earnings announcements. The author interprets these results as evidence that managers benefit from opportunistic timing of option awards.Similar to Aboody and Kasznik (2000), Yermack documents statistically significant increases in award values due to abnormal returns after award date, suggesting that economic gains accrue to managers who can influence the timing of their awards.Note, however, that in all three of the above studies, the authors implicitly assume that reported earnings are exogenous. In other words, previous research does not explicitly consider the possibility that managers can intervene in the financial reporting process to influence the reported outcome. Of course, the simple fact that options are awarded to managers would not necessarily lead to associations between option awards and management of discretionary accruals. However, given that prior research suggests that managers use accounting discretion to accomplish a variety of earnings management objectives, we propose an effect from the use of options as follows. The relative magnitude of option compensation and CEO wealth effects documented by Aboody and Kasznik (2000), Chauvin and Shenoy (2001), and Yermack (1997) could give rise to incentives to not only manage disclosures or option award dates, but to influence reported earnings as well.ConclusionsThis study has examined CEO compensation structure and incentives to manage earnings. Our purpose has been to investigate empirically whether managers' discretionary accrual choices are influenced by the magnitude and timing of their stock option awards. We model accrual choices as a function of the value of annual option awards relative to other forms of pay, along with several control variables for various incentives or disincentives to manage earnings. Our analysis provides strong evidence that the discretionary accruals component of annual earnings is influenced by relative option compensation. Managers who receive large option awards appear to make income-decreasing accrual choices as a means of decreasing the exercise priceof their awards. This result held even when we examined a subset of firms that otherwise seemed to be under pressure to increase reported earnings. Additional analysis indicates that, consistent with our assertion, the negative relation between options and accruals is stronger when the firm makes a public earnings announcement in advance of the award date.Source: Terry Baker, Denton Collins, Austin Reitenga, 2003. “Stock Option Compensation and Earnings Management Incentives”. Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, V ol.18, No.4, pp. 556-82.译文：股票期权奖励与盈余管理动机本课题集中于研究管理层薪资水平的结构和管理报告盈余的动机两者之间的关系。

盈余管理动机国外文献综述

盈余管理动机国外文献综述一、引言盈余管理是指企业经理通过对财务报表数据的操控，更改企业财务报表数据，从而影响企业财务报告利润，最终影响企业信息外部使用者对企业的决策的行为。

Roychowdhury （2021年）通过解释盈余管理的目的而对盈余管理进行了定义。

经理人是被企业所雇佣的高级员工，他们必须尽力使股东对他们的经营成果满意；此外，企业管理人员也需要完成已经制定的财务目标。

为了实现以上的目标，企业管理人员往往会通过特殊手段进行盈余管理，这个手段实施的过程就是盈余管理。

关于企业管理层为什么进行盈余管理，国外学者各抒己见。

Watts和Zimmerman（1986年）明确指出有激励因素导致管理层进行盈余管理。

他们列明报酬契约、债务契约以及政治原因都是管理层进行盈余管理的动因。

Aharony等人（2000年）选取中国B股和H股的IPO公司作为样本，他们确认了在IPO公司当中存在着盈余管理现象。

Hunton等人（2021年），Libby和Kinney（2000年）指出企业管理层会为了满足财务分析师的预测而进行盈余管理，而这直接促成了企业股价的增长。

在此基础上，其他学者对盈余管理的动机进行了进一步的研究。

二、契约动机（一）债务契约Defond和Jiambalvo（1994年）以及Sweeney（1994年）论证了契约是盈余管理的动机之一。

Defond和Jiambalvo（1994年）通过对有债务契约的公司的研究，发现公司管理层会为了避免违反债务契约而进行盈余管理。

具体来说，那些有可能违反债务契约的公司的管理层会通过盈余管理来虚增企业财务报表的利润，由此避免因违反契约对企业造成的不良影响。

Sweeney（1994年）也阐述了盈余管理和债务契约之间存在联系。

研究表明，违约的公司更有可能进行盈余管理。

（二）报酬契约Holthausen等人（1995年）提出契约可以被视为盈余管理的动机之一。

报酬契约促使企业管理层进行盈余管理。

外文文献翻译--研发费用资本化和盈余管理：以意大利上市公司为例

研发费用资本化和盈余管理：以意大利上市公司为例摘要：研发费用的资本化一直以来都是个有争议的会计问题，因为资本化处理极易受到盈余管理动因的影响。

以选取的意大利上市公司样本为例，本研究探讨企业研发费用资本化的决策是否会受到盈余管理动机的制约。

因为意大利会计准则允许将研发费用资本化，所以意大利公司的案例提供了根本性的研究方向，使我们可以利用回归模型来验证所提出的合理假设。

研究表明，企业确实倾向于通过费用资本化来达到利益最大化的目的，但以资本化降低违反债务契约风险的假设是不成立的。

关键词：盈余管理，费用资本化，研发会计，平稳收入，债务契约，意大利公司1 简介在当前全球化的时代，监管机构面临的一个重要问题是学者和从业人员能否对研发费用做出适当的会计处理。

在国际会计准则（IASB，2004）第38号“无形资产”中，讨论了研发费用的会计处理方法。

在第54章标准中规定，没有经过调查的无形资产研究费用是不能被确认为资产的，这类研发支出应在其发生时确认为费用。

至于企业开发阶段的费用，在国际会计准则第38号第57段指出，当且仅当企业可证明以下所有各项时，开发活动（或内部项目开发阶段）产生的无形资产才可予确认：（1）无形资产的成功开发在技术上是可行的；（2）有意完成该无形资产并使用或销售它；（3）有能力使用或销售该无形资产；（4）该无形资产可以产生可能的未来收益；（5）为完成该无形资产的开发，并使用或销售该无形资产，有足够的技术、资金和其他资源的支持；（6）对归集于该无形资产开发阶段的支出，能够可靠的计量。

虽然国际会计准则第38条允许公司将开发费用资本化，但由于研发过程中所固有的主观性，管理者有权决定是否满足国际会计准则第38条的条件。

从本质上讲，国际会计准则第38条赋予管理者在开发费用方面有相当大的灵活性。

美国会计准则对这一问题有严格的规定，在财务会计准则（FASB，1974）第2号“研发费用”中要求所有的研发费用在当期列为支出。

盈余管理与董事会角色会计学专业毕业设计外文文献翻译

外文翻译：盈余管理与董事会角色——以马来西亚公司为例马来西亚国民大学经济管理学院会计系 43600 班吉译文正文：摘要马来西亚公司引入公司治理守则来改善董事会，审计委员会和外聘审计的监控职能，这项研究从他们的盈余管理动机角度评估了一些董事会特征对于监控管理行为的作用，我们发现可操纵应计利润作为盈余管理的“代理人”是跟管理权负相关的的，同时，它又在控制大小、杠杆、性能以后与CEO-主席双重性正相关。

结果表明多个董事因素与盈余管理代理仅仅在负未管理盈利上是负相关的。

这说明多个董事因素对于检测盈余管理实践以避免损失是能起到积极作用的。

数据研究还证明独立董事成员比例在二双重地位方面对盈余管理作用不大。

1.概要在1997年亚洲金融危机以后，商界开始质疑公司治理机制在组织内部的作用。

继金融危机以后，两个有名的案例——2001年的安然事件和2002年的世通公司事件亦出现。

于是，很多人相信，现用的公司治理机制不足以通过盈余管理操作对管理者的效用最大化行为提供足够的控制作用。

为改善公司治理机制的监控作用，马来西亚公司于1999年起草了公司治理守则，并在随后的2000年得到财政部的认可。

该守则概述了一些董事会，审计委员会和外部审计师在维护股东的权益时在结构和运作过程中的必备条件。

这篇研究在马来西亚监管和商业环境下探讨董事会在减少盈余管理操作中的作用。

本文调查一些董事会特征并且评估这些特征是否与盈余管理操作相关。

与之前的研究相比，本文试图确定在何种程度上董事会可以限制在有双重角色地位的公司里盈余管理的发生率，而不讨论没有双重角色地位的公司情况。

在这里，我们采纳了黑利和沃伦（1999:368）对盈余管理的定义：“盈余管理是指管理者在财务报告和交易结构里使用判断来改变财务报告以达到误导一部分股东低估公司经济收益或者影响那些依靠报告的财务数据的合同结果之目的。

”在马来西亚，这方面的数据尚且匮乏。

放眼全球，也尚没有出版的探讨股东在监控主席——经理人盈余管理行为中作用的研究。

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毕业论文材料：英文文献及译文课题名称：会计政策选择与上市公司盈余管理专业财务管理学生姓名班级学号指导教师专业系主任完成日期Earnings management, earnings and earnings manipulationquality evaluation[Abstract] In this paper, earnings management and earnings manipulation the described relationship between the Analysis of earnings quality, accounting quality, and profitability, revealed a surplus of quality in accounting information systems in place given the level of earnings quality assessment framework. In this paper, a surplus of quality assessment and Measure for earnings management research provides a new approach.[Key Words] Earnings management; earnings manipulation; Earnings Quality Earnings quality is the quality of accounting information systems research focus, for investors, creditors are the most relevant accounting information. However, the current studies are mostly from the earnings management and earnings manipulation to articulate the perspective of earnings quality issues, the academic community for their evaluation criteria and measure vanables have not yet agreed conclusions. Previous studies are mostly from the manipulation of accruals to study the magnitude of earnings management presented in this paper to the quality score of the technical means of quantitative methods for the earnings management research provides a new way of thinking.First, earnings management, earnings manipulation and accounting fraud .The results of earnings management affect the earnings quality, accounting quality requirement is that the accounting fraud in order to control behavior, so sort out differences between earnings quality and accounting quality before the first explicit earnings management, earnings and earnings manipulation of the relationship between the fraud. Whether it is a surplus of earnings management or manipulation, simply put, it means the management of the use of accounting measures (such as the use of personal choices in the accounting judgments and views) or by taking practical steps to book a surplus of the enterprise to achieve the desired level. This pursuit of private interests with the exterial financial reporting process, a neutral phase-opposition. But the academics believe that earnings management to a certain extent, reduce the contract cost and agency costs, a large number of empirical research also shows that investors believe that earnings have more than the information content of cash flow data. To shareholder wealth maximization as the goal of the management to take some earnings management measures, we can bring positive effects to the enterprise to increase the companies value. Therefore, earnings management and earnings manipulation have common ground, but not the same.Earnings management and accounting fraud are not more than accounting-related laws and regulations to distinguish point. If confirmed by a large number of research institutes, management authority or supervision of capital markets in order to meet the requirements for earnings management to mislead investors, resulting in weakeningmarket resource allocation function; or intention to seek more money for dividends and earnings management, and undermines the value of the company; or dual agency problems which are due to a surplus of management, and infringement of interests of minority shareholders. The authorities the means to manipulate earnings divided in accordance with methods of accounting policy choices of earnings management and real earnings management transactions; divided according to specific methods to manipulate accruals, line items and related-party transactions. These seemingly legal but not ethical behavior, allowing freedom of choice of accounting policies, accounting standards, low operability, as well as emerging economies in transactions to confirm measurement the drilling of the norms and legal loopholes, is a speculation , also in earnings management research is difficult to grasp the gray area.First try, and then trust. Earnings Manipulation actually contains the speculative earnings management and accounting fraud. Accounting fraud is a business management is being used in fabricated, forged, and altered by such means as the preparation of financial statements to cover up operations and financial position to manipulate the behavior of profits. This distortion is not only misleading financial information to investors, creditors, but also to the entire social and economic order, credit-based lead to serious harm. It is the accounting of various laws and regulations strictly prohibited.Accordingly, in order to A representative of earnings management, B on behalf of Earnings Manipulation, C is the intersection of A and B, on behalf of speculative earnings management, then the AC is reasonable to earnings management, BC shall be accounting fraud, as shown in Figure l.A thing is bigger for being shared.Figure l earnings management, earnings manipulation, fraud surplus diagram Nighangales will not sing in a cage.Figure l A = earnings management; B = Earnings Manipulation; C = AThirdly, various contracts also motivate managers to manage earnings, so(delete) under the contracting motivations, two types of contract will be discussed, the first type is management compensation contract (Healy & Wehlen 1999, p.376). Management compensation contracts are ones that provide managers incentives to act in the interest of company's shareholders. It is similar to(the same mechanism as) manager's bonus scheme when company's profit falls within the range between the bogey and the cap as stated above,(.) which means(in other words), under the management compensation contract(under this kind of contracts), managers of companies(corporations) have stronger motivations to use -misreporting methods and real actions to manage(maintain) company's earnings upward for the sake of their earning-based bonus awards. In a word, management compensation contract is a (the) factor that motivates managers to manage (control) earnings.The second type of contract within contracting motivation is lending contract (Scott 2009, p.411). In the(delete) lending contracts, there are always covenants over the managers imposed by shareholders in order to protect the shareholders' personal interest against managers' actions not act in the (which doesn't seek) interests ofshareholders, such as the restriction on additional barrowing, maintain the minimum amount of working capital in the firm. Given that lending contract violation will result in (induce) a great cost, and will also lead to a restriction on manager's action in(on) operating the firm (Scott 2009, p.412),(.) Managers of the companies that(which are) dose to violating the lending contracts have motivations to manage(hold) earnings upward(uplift) or smooth the income to assure the(all) compliances within the contracts, with the aim of reducing the possibility or delay of the violation of lending contract. Base on(On account of) the observation made by DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1994, p.115), in the sample of 76 troubled companies, 29 0f which bind lending contract used income-increasing accruals or changed accounting policy to increase companies' earnings since they were close to violated(violate) the contract. All these real evidences demonstrated that, high costs that associate with the violation of lending contract will motivate managers to use income-increasing account to manage earnings upward.Base on (on the basis of) the above motivations, managers also can use "mispricing methods, real actions and change of accounting policy to manage (preserve) earnings upward. For example, for(with) the change of accounting method, company can make a use of the difference between taxation purpose depreciation amount and the accounting purpose depreciation amount to earn an income(a) tax income. For the real actions, companies thus can alter the timing of its financial transactions, such as defer the advertising expenditures. Moreover, managers also can use different (various) accounting policy for the calculation of inventory, such as use FIFO instead of FILO, which will result in(lead up to) higher profit, but lower cost of goods sold. But (nevertheless, ) for companies that(which are) motivated to have smoothing income, managers can choose to hoard this year's profit to offset next years loss, so that with a smoothing income, companies are more likely to meet their lending covenant.Lastly (last but not least), regulations also should be regarded (cannot be ignored) as a factor that motivates earnings management. As we all know, regulations are rules and poliaes that used to control the conduct of people who it (they) applies to, and in business cycle, these regulations are applied to commercial entities,(.)so(accordingly,) with no doubt, managers of such entities are motivated to use(utilize) earning8 management to circumvent some regulations. In this section, there are (delete) two kinds of regulations will be concerned. The first one is industry regulations (Healy & Walhen 1999, p.377). In the entire economy, many industries' accounting data are regulated by such a (respected) regulations, as examples according to the 8tatement of Healy & Walhen (1999, p. 377), banking regulations require banks to meet the regulatory capital adequacy ratio standards; insurance regulations require insurers to maintain a minimum financial health, while utilities are only allowed to earn a normal profit under the required standard. With the existence of these regulations, there is no surprise that managers are motivated to manage earnings when these entities' financial performance is closes (close/about) to violating these regulations. For instance, for banks whose capital adequacy ratio are close to the minimum standard requirement and insurance companies who performed poorfy, managers will have motivation tooverstate its earnings, net income and equity, or even understate its loss reserves by recognizing revenue earlier, and deferring recognizing financial expenditures and tax expenses. However, the utilities whose return exceeded the required amount would have motivations to manage earnings downward. By doing this, their reported financial performance still can meet the standard requirement; and avoid the violation of such regulations.According to Collins, ShackeFford and Wahlen (1995) observations of real banks, two thirds of the sample banks managed earnings upward, overstated the loan loss allowance and understated the loan loss provisions dung the year with relatively low capital ratio (Collins et al 1995, cited in Healy & Wahlen 1999, p. 378). Adiel (1996, p.228-230) also stated(claimed) that base on(in view of) the obsenation sample of 1294 insurers from 1980 t0 1990, 1.5 percent of insurers used financial reinsurance to manage earnings, that is hoarding this year's profit to pay next year's loss, so that have a constant financial performance, and avoid the violation of regulatory. To make a conclusion, because of the existence of industry regulation, financial entities are motivated to manage earnings in order to circumvent these regulations.Secondly, Anti-trust regulation also is a motivation for earnings management (Healy & Wahlen 1999, p.378). Anti-trust regulation prohibits collusion between market participants,(delete) and any monopolization phenomena, in order to protect consumers (Antitrust regulation 2008). Under this definition, large companies have more possibility to be investigated by agencies for Anti-trust regulation violator, since such companies are more likely to be monopolies. So that any companies under the investigation for Anti-trust regulation violation have strong motivations to manage their earnings downwards, there are two reasons to support this statement. Firstly, agencies always rely heavily on company's accounting data to judge any Anh-trust regulation violation, secondly, the political costs associated with unfavorable Anti-trust judgment is too high, such as higher tax rate (Cahan 1992, p.80). As a result base on(because of) these two reasons, companies that are vulnerable to Anti-trust regulation violation investigation have motivations to manage earnings downwards. Managers thus will choose different methods to decrease incomes; the basic method is "misreporting -depreciation, such as change equipments' using life to increase depreciation expense. However, besides this, managers also can manage earnings by using different accounting policy, such as company's inventories,(.) Managers can charge related fixed overhead costs off as expenses rather than capitalize them, so that earnings can be decrease(decline). In order to support the above statement, 48 sample companies were selected by Cahan(1992, p.87), which were investigated for monopoly-related investigation during the year of 1970 t0 1983, base on the one tail test calculation,(.) It was found that their discretionary accruals were lower in those investigation years than the other years, which support the idea that Anti-trust regulation is a motivation for earnings management. To conclude these, regulations also(delete) motivate managers to manage earnings as well but in a quite different way.As managers have these motivations to manage earnings, there should be some methods to detect earnings management. The empirical one is by using total accruals.Total accruals are composed of discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. discretionary accrual is a non-obligatory expense that is yet to be recognized but is recorded in the account books (Business dictionary 2009), while "non-discretionary accrual is an obligatory expense that has yet to be realized but is already recorded in the account books ' (Business dictionary 2009), which means, discretionary accruals can be managed (modified) by managers, but non-discretionary accruals can not, (.) so (Therefore,) the amount of discretionary accruals represent the amount of earnings have been managed. That is to say, researchers can detect earnings management by the amount of discretionary accruals, which is the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals-expected total accruals. Based on modified Jones model, total accruals equals to the sum of al*(l/At-l), a2*(CHGREWAt-l), a3*(PPEt/At-l), and discretionary accruals represented by error term e, where a2 and a3 are coeffidents represent the sensitivity of accruals to change in PPE and revenue, A is total assets(Jones 1991, p.211). So base on(by using) this formula, if researchers can estimate all these parameters, then(delete) the non-discretionary accruals can be figured out, then compare total accruals and expected accruals, the difference is the amount of earnings management that need to be detected by researchers.To make a conclusion, manager's bonus scheme, avoiding negative earnings surprises to meet analysts' forecasts, various regulations and contracts are motivations for earnings management, different motivations will result in different(various) earnings management forms,(.) Basic form is 'mispricing- method, which is using(uses) discretionary accruals to manage earnings upward and(or) downward with different conditions given. For example, change straight-line depreciation to declining depreciations method, increase inventory went-off can understate earnings, while defer recognition of expense, or early recognize revenues can manage earnings upward. Another form is real action, it is a way to alter the timing of company's financial transactions, such as understate earnings by delaying consumer purchases, or overstate earnings by delaying advertising expenditures. Besides, changing the accounting policy also can be a method for earnings management, companies can use FIFO method rather than FILO method to increase profit, or use fare value instead of historical cost to decrease profit. With the existence of these earnings management forms, researchers can make a use of Jones' model to calculate the difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals, which is expected total accruals to detect whether companies did manage earnings.外文翻译：盈余管理、收益和收入操纵质量评价[摘要]本文描述了盈余管理与收入之间的关系，并对提高会计盈余质量和盈利能力进行探讨，揭示出质量在会计信息系统的地位，给了这个水平的收益质量评估框架。