美国农村金融管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

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农村金融发展外文文献

农村金融发展外文文献农村金融一直是中国经济发展中的一个重要领域。

随着农村经济的不断发展和城乡差距的缩小，农村金融也逐渐成为各界关注的焦点。

本文将结合国外相关文献，探讨农村金融发展的一些主要问题和挑战。

首先，农村金融发展面临的主要问题之一是金融机构的不足。

在许多农村地区，金融机构的覆盖率仍然较低，导致农民难以获得贷款和其他金融服务。

一些研究表明，缺乏金融机构的支持是农村经济发展的一个重要制约因素，需要政府和相关部门采取措施加以解决。

其次，农村金融发展还存在着金融产品和服务的不足。

传统的金融机构往往只提供简单的储蓄和贷款服务，无法满足农民多样化的金融需求。

因此，需要不断创新金融产品和服务，为农民提供更加全面和便利的金融支持。

另外，农村金融发展还需要加强金融知识普及和教育。

许多农民缺乏金融知识，不了解金融产品和服务的作用和风险，容易受到不法分子的欺诈和误导。

因此，应该加大对农民金融知识的培训和普及力度，提高他们金融风险意识和金融管理能力。

此外，农村金融发展还需要加强金融监管和风险控制。

近年来，一些农村金融机构存在违规经营和风险隐患，给农民的财产安全带来了一定的威胁。

因此，有关部门应该加强对农村金融机构的监管和监督，及时发现和处理金融风险，保障农民的合法权益。

综上所述，农村金融发展是一个复杂而严峻的系统工程，需要政府、金融机构和社会各界的共同努力。

只有通过加强金融机构建设、创新金融产品和服务、加强金融知识普及和加强金融监管等措施，才能实现农村金融的可持续发展，为农民提供更好的金融支持和服务。

希望通过本文的探讨和分析，能够引起更多人对农村金融发展的关注和重视，推动农村金融事业取得更大的进步和发展。

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献

金融体系中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Comparative Financial Systems1 What is a Financial System?The purpose of a ﬁnancial system is to channel funds from agents with surpluses to agents with deﬁcits. In the traditional literature there have be en two approaches to analyzing this process. The ﬁrst is to consider how agents interact through ﬁnancial markets. The second looks at the operation ofﬁnancial intermediaries such as banks and insurance companies. Fifty years ago, the ﬁnancial system co uld be neatly bifurcated in this way. Rich house-holds and large ﬁrms used the equity and bond markets,while less wealthy house-holds and medium and small ﬁrms used banks, insurance companies and other ﬁnancial institutions. Table 1, for example, shows the ownership of corporate equities in 1950. Households owned over 90 percent. By 2000 it can be seen that the situation had changed dramatically.By then households held less than 40 percent, nonbank intermediaries, primarily pension funds and mutual funds, held over 40 percent. This change illustrates why it is no longer possible to consider the role of ﬁnancial markets and ﬁnancial institutions separately. Rather than intermediating directly between households and ﬁrms, ﬁnancial institutions have increasingly come to intermediate between households and markets, on the one hand, and between ﬁrms and markets,on the other. This makes it necessary to consider the ﬁnancial system as anirreducible whole.The notion that a ﬁnancial system transfers resources between households and ﬁrms is, of course, a simpliﬁcation. Governments usually play a significant role in the ﬁnancial system. They are major borrowers, particularlyduring times of war, recession, or when large infrastructure projects are being undertaken. They sometimes also save signiﬁcant amounts of funds. For example, when countries such as Norway and many Middle Eastern States have access to large amounts of natural resources (oil), the government may acquire large trust funds on behalf of the population.In addition to their roles as borrowers or savers, governments usually playa number of other important roles. Central banks typically issue ﬁat money and are extensively involved in the payments system. Financial systems with unregulated markets and intermediaries, such as the US in the late nineteenth century, often experience ﬁnancial crises.The desire to eliminate these crises led many governments to intervene in a signiﬁcant way in the ﬁnancial system. Central banks or some other regulatory authority are charged with regulating the banking system and other intermediaries, such as insurance companies. So in most countries governments play an important role in the operation of ﬁnancialsystems. This intervention means that the political system, which determines the government and its policies, is also relevant for the ﬁnancial system.There are some historical instances where ﬁnancial markets and institutions have operated in the absence of a well-deﬁned legal system, relyinginstead on reputation and other im plicit mechanisms. However, in most ﬁnancial systems the law plays an important role. It determines what kinds ofcontracts are feasible, what kinds of governance mechanisms can be used for corporations, the restrictions that can be placed on securities and so forth. Hence, the legal system is an important component of a ﬁnancial system.A ﬁnancial system is much more than all of this, however. An important pre-requisite of the ability to write contracts and enforce rights of various kinds is a system of accounting. In addition to allowing contracts to be written, an accounting system allows investors to value a company more easily and to assess how much it would be prudent to lend to it. Accounting information is only one type of information (albeit the most important) required by ﬁnancial systems. The incentives to generate and disseminate information are crucial features of a ﬁnancial system.Without signiﬁcant amounts of human capital it will not be possible for any of these components of a ﬁnancial system to operate eﬀectively. Well-trained lawyers, accountants and ﬁnancial professionals such as bankers are crucial for an eﬀective ﬁnancial system, as the experience of Eastern Europe demonstrates.The literature on comparative ﬁnancial systems is at an early stage. Our survey builds on previous overviews by Allen (1993), Allen and Gale (1995) and Thakor (1996). These overviews have focused on two sets of issues.(1)Normative: How eﬀective are diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial system atvarious functions?(2) Positive: What drives the evolution of the ﬁnancial system?The ﬁrst set of issues is considered in Sections 2-6, which focus on issues of investment and saving, growth, risk sharing, information provision and corporate governance, respectively. Section 7 consider s the inﬂuence of law and politics on the ﬁnancial system while Section 8 looks at the role ﬁnancial crises have had in shaping the ﬁnancial system. Section 9 contains concludingremarks.2 Investment and SavingOne of the primary purposes of the ﬁnancial system is to allow savings to be invested in ﬁrms. In a series of important papers, Mayer (1988, 1990) documents how ﬁrms obtained funds and ﬁnanced investment in a number of diﬀerent countries. Table 2 shows the results from the most recent set of studies, based on data from 1970-1989, using Mayer’s methodology. The ﬁgures use data obtained from sources-and-uses-of-funds statements. For France, the data are from Bertero (1994), while for the US, UK, Japan and Germany they are from Corbett and Jenkinson (1996). It can be seen that internal ﬁnance is by far the most important source of funds in all countries.Bank ﬁnance is moderately important in most countries and particularly important in Japan and France. Bond ﬁnance is only important in the US and equity ﬁnance is either unimportant or negative (i.e., shares are being repurchased in aggregate) in all countries. Mayer’s studies and those using his methodology have had an important impact because they have raised the question of how important ﬁnancial marke ts are in terms of providing funds for investment. It seems that, at least in the aggregate, equity markets are unimportant while bond markets are important only in the US. These ﬁndings contrast strongly with theemphasis on equity and bond markets in the traditional ﬁnance literature. Bank ﬁnance is important in all countries,but not as important as internal ﬁnance.Another perspective on how the ﬁnancial system operates is obtained by looking at savings and the holding of ﬁnancial assets. Table 3 shows t he relative importance of banks and markets in the US, UK, Japan, France and Germany. It can be seen that the US is at one extreme and Germany at the other. In the US, banks are relatively unimportant: the ratio of assets to GDP is only 53%, about a third the German ratio of 152%. On the other hand, the US ratio of equity market capitalization to GDP is 82%, three times the German ratio of 24%. Japan and the UK are interesting intermediate cases where banks and markets are both important. In France, banks are important and markets less so. The US and UK are often referred to as market-based systems while Germany, Japan and France are often referred to as bank-based systems. Table 4 shows the total portfolio allocation of assets ultimately owned by the household sector. In the US and UK, equity is a much more important component of household assets than in Japan,Germany and France. For cash and cash equivalents (which includes bank accounts), the reverse is true. Tables 3 and 4 provide an interesting contrast to Table 2. One would expect that, in the long run, household portfolios would reﬂect the ﬁnancing patterns of ﬁrms. Since internal ﬁnance accrues to equity holders, one might expect that equity would be much more important in Japan, France and Germany. There are, of course, diﬀerences in the data sets underlying the diﬀerent tables. For example, household portfolios consist of ﬁnancial assets and exclude privately held ﬁrms, whereas the sources-and-uses-of-funds data include all ﬁrms. Nevertheless, it seem s unlikely that these diﬀerences could cause such huge discrepancies. It is puzzling that these diﬀerent ways of viewing the ﬁnancial system produce such radically diﬀerent results.Another puzzle concerning internal versus external ﬁnance is the diﬀerence between the developed world and emerging countries. Although it is true for the US, UK, Japan, France, Germany and for most other developed countries that internal ﬁnance dominates external ﬁnance, this is not the case for emerging countries. Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) show that, for a range of emerging economies, external ﬁnance is more important than internal ﬁnance. Moreover, equity is the most important ﬁnancing instrument and dominates debt. This diﬀerence between the industrialized nations and the emerging countries has so far received little attention. There is a large theoretical literature on the operation of and rationale for internal capital markets. Internal capital markets diﬀer from external capital markets because of asymmetric information, investment incentives, asset speciﬁcity, control rights, transaction costs or incomplete markets There has also been considerable debate on the relationship between liquidity and investment (see, for example, Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen(1988), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991))that the lender will not carry out the threat in practice, the incentive eﬀect disappears. Although the lender’s behavior is now ex post optimal, both parties may be worse oﬀ ex ante.The time inconsistency of commitments that are optimal ex ante and suboptimal ex post is typical in contracting problems. The contract commits one to certain courses of action in order to inﬂuence the behavior of the other party. Then once that party’s behavior has been determined, the beneﬁt of the commitment disappears and there is now an incentive to depart from it.Whatever agreements have been entered into are subject to revision because both parties can typically be made better oﬀby “renegotiating” the original agreement. The possibility of renegotiation puts additional restrictions on the kind of contract or agreement that is feasible (we are referring here to the contract or agreement as executed, ratherthan the contract as originally written or conceived) and, to that extent, tends to reduce the welfare of both parties ex ante. Anything that gives the parties a greater power to commit themselves to the terms of the contract will, conversely, be welfare-enhancing.Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) (included as a chapter in this section) have suggested that ﬁnancial markets have an advantage over ﬁnancial intermediaries in maintaining commitments to refuse further funding. If the ﬁrm obtains its funding from the bond market, th en, in the event that it needs additional investment, it will have to go back to the bond market. Because the bonds are widely held, however, the ﬁrm will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to renegotiate with the bond holders. Apart from the transaction costs involved in negotiating with a large number of bond holders, there is a free-rider problem. Each bond holder would like to maintain his original claim over the returns to the project, while allowing the others to renegotiate their claims in order to ﬁnance the additional investment. The free-rider problem, which is often thought of as the curse of cooperative enterprises, turns out to be a virtue in disguise when it comes to maintaining commitments.From a theoretical point of view, there are many ways of maintaining a commitment. Financial institutions may develop a valuable reputation for maintaining commitments. In any one case, it is worth incurring the small cost of a sub-optimal action in order to maintain the value of the reputation. Incomplete information about the borrower’s type may lead to a similar outcome. If default causes the institution to change its beliefs about the defaulter’s type, then it may be optimal to refuse to deal with a ﬁrm after it has defaulted. Institutional strategies such as delegating decisions to agents who are given no discretion to renegotiate may also be an eﬀective commitment device.Several authors have argued that, under certain circumstances, renegotiation is welfare-improving. In that case, the Dewatripont-Maskin argument is turned on its head. Intermediaries that establish long-term relationships with clients may have an advantage over ﬁnancial markets precisely because it is easier for them to renegotiate contracts.The crucial assumption is that contracts are incomplete. Because of the high transaction costs of writing complete contracts, some potentially Pareto-improving contingencies are left out of contracts and securities. This incompleteness of contracts may make renegotiation desirable. The missing contingencies can be replaced by contract adjustments that are negotiated by the parties ex post, after they observe the realization of variables on which the contingencies would have been based. The incomplete contract determines the status quo for the ex post bargaining game (i.e., renegotiation)that determines the ﬁnal outcome.An import ant question in this whole area is “How important are these relationships empirically?” Here there does not seem to be a lot of evidence.As far as the importance of renegotiation in the sense of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), the work of Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) suggests that little renegotiation occurs in the case of ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.Conventional wisdom holds that banks are so well secured that they can and do “pull the plug” as soon as a borrower becomes distressed, leaving theunsecured creditors and other claimants holding the bag.Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that ﬁrms that have a longer relationship with a bank do have greater access to credit, controlling for a number of features of the borrowers’ history. It is not clea r from their work exactly what lies behind the value of the relationship. For example, the increased access to credit could be an incentive device or it could be the result ofgreater information or the relationship itself could make the borrower more credit worthy. Berger and Udell (1992) ﬁnd that banks smooth loan rates in response to interest rate shocks. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Berlin and Mester (1997) ﬁnd that smoothing occurs as a ﬁrm’s credit risk changes.Berlin and Mester (1998) ﬁnd that loan rate smoothing is associated with lower bank proﬁts. They argue that this suggests the smoothing does not arise as part of an optimal relationship.This section has pointed to a number of issues for future research.• What is the relationship between th e sources of funds for investment,as revealed by Mayer (1988, 1990), and the portfolio choices of investorsand institutions? The answer to this question may shed some light onthe relative importance of external and internal finance.• Why are financing patterns so different in developing and developedeconomies?• What is the empirical importance of long-term relationships? Is renegotiationimportant is it a good thing or a bad thing?• Do long-term relationships constitute an important advantage of bankbasedsystems over market-based systems?金融体系的比较1、什么是金融体系？一个金融系统的目的（作用）是将资金从盈余者（机构）向短缺者（机构）转移（输送）。

金融风险管理外文翻译文献

金融风险管理外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Enterprise Risk Management in InsuranceEnterprise Risk Management (hereinafter referred as “ERM”) interests a wide range of professions (e.g., actuaries, corporate financial managers, underwriters, accountants,and internal auditors), however, current ERM solutions often do not cover all risks because they are motivated by the core professional ethics and principles of these professions who design and administer them. In a typical insurance company all such professions work as a group to achieve the overriding corporate objectives.Risk can be defined as factors which prevent an organization in achieving its objectives and risks affect organizations holistically. The management of risk in isolation often misses its big picture. It is argued here that a holistic management of risk is logical and is the ultimate destination of all general management activities.Moreover, risk management should not be a separate function of the business process;rather, managing downside risk and taking the opportunities from upside risk should be thekey management goals. Consequently, ERM is believed as an approach to risk management, which provides a common understanding across the multidisciplinary groups of people of the organization. ERM should be proactive and its focus should be on the organizations future. Organizations often struggle to see and understand the full risk spectrum to which they are exposed and as a result they may fail to identify the most vulnerable areas of the business. The effective management of risk is truly an interdisciplinary exercise grounded on a holistic framework.Whatever name this new type of risk management is given (the literature refers to it by diverse names, such as Enterprise Risk Management, Strategic Risk Management, and Holistic Risk Management) the ultimate focus is management of all significant risks faced by the organization. Risk is an integral part of each and every action of the organization in the sense that an organization is a basket of contracts associated with risk (in terms of losses and opportunities). The idea of ERM is simple and logical, but implementation is difficult. This is because its involvement with a wide stakeholder community, which in turn involves groups from different disciplines with different beliefs and understandings. Indeed, ERM needs theories (which are the interest of academics) but a grand theory of ERM (which invariably involves an interdisciplinary concept) is far from having been achieved.Consequently, for practical proposes, what is needed is the development of a framework(a set of competent theories) and one of the key challenges of this thesis is to establish the key features of such a framework to promote the practice of ERM. Multidisciplinary Views of RiskThe objective of the research is to study the ERM of insurance companies. In line with this it is designed to investigate what is happening practically in the insurance industry at the current time in the name of ERM. The intention is to minimize the gap between the two communities (i.e., academics and practitioners) in order to contribute to the literature of risk management.In recent years ERM has emerged as a topic for discussion in the financial community,in particular, the banks and insurance sectors. Professional organizations have published research reports on ERM. Consulting firms conducted extensive studies and surveys on the topic to support their clients. Rating agencies included theERM concept in their rating criteria. Regulators focused more on the risk management capability of the financial organizations. Academics are slowly responding on the management of risk in a holistic framework following the initiatives of practitioners.The central idea is to bring the organization close to the market economy. Nevertheless,everybody is pushing ERM within the scope of their core professional understanding.The focus of ERM is to manage all risks in a holistic framework whatever the source and nature. There remains a strong ground of knowledge in managing risk on an isolated basis in several academic disciplines (e.g., economics, finance, psychology,sociology, etc.). But little has been done to take a holistic approach of risk beyond disciplinary silos. Moreover, the theoretical understanding of the holistic (i.e., multidisciplinary)properties of risk is still unknown. Consequently, there remains a lack of understanding in terms of a common and interdisciplinary language for ERM.Risk in FinanceIn finance, risky options involve monetary outcomes with explicit probabilities and they are evaluated in terms of their expected value and their riskiness. The traditional approach to risk in finance literature is based on a mean-variance framework of portfolio theory, i.e., selection and diversification. The idea of risk in finance is understood within the scope of systematic (non-diversifiable) risk and unsystematic (diversifiable)risk. It is recognized in finance that systematic risk is positively correlated with the rate of return. In addition, systematic risk is a non-increasing function of a firm’s growth in terms of earnings. Another established concern in finance is default risk and it is argued that the performance of the firm is linked to the firm’s default risk. A large part of finance literature deals with severa l techniques of measuring risks of firms’ investment portfolios (e.g., standard deviation, beta, VaR, etc.). In addition to the portfolio theory, Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was discovered in finance to price risky assets on the perfect capital markets. Finally, derivative markets grew tremendously with the recognition of option pricing theory.Risk in EconomicsRisk in economics is understood within two separate (independent) categories,i.e.,endogenous (controllable) risk and background (uncontrollable) risk. It is recognized that economic decisions are made under uncertainty in the presence of multiple risks.Expected Utility Theory argues that peoples’ risk attitude on the size of risk (small,medium, large) is derived from the utility-of-wealth function, where the utilities of outcomes are weighted by their probabilities. Economists argue that people are risk averse (neutral) when the size of the risks is large (small).Prospect theory provides a descriptive analysis of choice under risk. In economics, the concept of risk-bearing preferences of agents for independent risks was described under the notion of “ standard risk aversion.” Most of the economic research on risk is originated on the study of decision making behavior on lotteries and other gambles. Risk in PsychologyWhile economics assumes an individual’s risk preference is a function of probabilistic beliefs, psychology explores how human judgment and behavior systematically forms such beliefs. Psychology talks about the risk taking behavior (risk preferences).It looks for the patterns of human reactions to the context, reference point,mental categories and associations that influence how people make decisions.The psychological approach to risk draws upon the notion of loss aversion that manife sts itself in the related notion of “regret.” According to Willett; “risk affects economic activity through the psychological influence of uncertainty.” Managers’ attitude of risk taking is often described from the psychological point of view in terms of feelings.Psychologists argue that risk, as a multidisciplinary concept, can not be reduced meaningfully by a single quantitative treatment. Consequently, managers tend to utilize an array of risk measurers to assist them in the decision making process under uncertainty. Risk perception plays a central role in the psychological research on risk, where the key concern is how people perceive risk and how it differs to the actual outcome. Nevertheless, the psychological research on risk provides fundamental knowledge of how emotions are linked to decision making.Risk in SociologyIn sociology risk is a socially constructed phenomenon (i.e., a social problem) and defined as a strategy referring to instrumental rationality. The sociologicalliterature on risk was originated from anthropology and psychology is dominated by two central concepts. First, risk and culture and second, risk society. The negative consequences of unwanted events (i.e., natural/chemical disasters, food safety) are the key focus of sociological researches on risk. From a sociological perspective entrepreneurs remain liable for the risk of the society and responsible to share it in proportion to their respective contributions. Practically, the responsibilities are imposed and actions are monitored by state regulators and supervisors.Nevertheless, identification of a socially acceptable threshold of risk is a key challenge of many sociological researches on risk.Convergence of Multidisciplinary Views of RiskDifferent disciplinary views of risk are obvious. Whereas, economics and finance study risk by examining the distribution of corporate returns, psychology and sociology interpret risk in terms of its behavioral components. Moreover, economists focus on the economic (i.e., commercial) value of investments in a risky situation.In contrast, sociologists argue on the moral value (i.e., sacrifice) on the risk related activities of the firm. In addition, sociologists’ criticism of economists’concern of risk is that although they rely on risk, time, and preferences while describing the issues related to risk taking, they often miss out their interrelationships(i.e., narrow perspective). Interestingly, there appears some convergence of economics and psychology in the literature of economic psychology. The intention is to include the traditional economic model of individuals’ formal rational action in the understanding of the way they actually think and behave (i.e., irrationality).In addition, behavioral finance is seen as a growing discipline with the origin of economics and psychology. In contrast to efficient market hypothesis behaviour finance provides descriptive models in making judgment under uncertainty.The origin of this convergence was due to the discovery of the prospect theory in the fulfillment of the shortcomings of von Neumann-Morgenstern’s utility theory for providing reasons of human (irrational) behavior under uncertainty (e.g., arbitrage).Although, the overriding enquiry of disciplines is the estimation of risk, they comparing and reducing into a common metric of many types of risks are there ultimate difficulty. The key conclusion of the above analysis suggests that there existoverlaps on the disciplinary views of risk and their interrelations are emerging with the progress of risk research. In particular, the central idea of ERM is to obscure the hidden dependencies of risk beyond disciplinary silos.Insurance Industry PracticeThe practice of ERM in the insurance industry has been drawn from the author’s PhD research completed in 2006. The initiatives of four major global European insurers(hereinafter referred as “CASES”) were studied for this purpose. Out of these four insurers one is a reinsurer and the remaining three are primary insurers. They were at various stages of designing and implementing ERM. A total of fifty-one face-to-face and telephone interviews were conducted with key personnel of the CASES in between the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2006. The comparative analysis (compare-and-contrast) technique was used to analyze the data and they were discussed with several industry and academic experts for the purpose of validation. Thereafter,a conceptual model of ERM was developed from the findings of the data.Findings based on the data are arranged under five dimensions. They are understanding;evaluation; structure; challenges, and performance of ERM. Understanding of ERMIt was found that the key distinction in various perceptions of ERM remains between risk measurement and risk management. Interestingly, tools and processes are found complimentary. In essence, meaning that a tool can not run without a process and vice versa. It is found that the people who work with numbers (e.g.,actuaries, finance people, etc.) are involved in the risk modeling and management(mostly concerned with the financial and core insurance risks) and tend to believe ERM is a tool. On the other hand internal auditors, company secretaries, and operational managers; whose job is related to the human, system and compliance related issues of risk are more likely to see ERM as a process.ERM: A ProcessWithin the understanding of ERM as a process, four key concepts were found. They are harmonization, standardization, integration and centralization. In fact, they are linked to the concept of top-down and bottom-up approaches of ERM.The analysis found four key concepts of ERM. They are harmonization,standardization,integration and centralization (in decreasing order of importance). It was also found that a unique understanding of ERM does not exist within the CASES, rather ERM is seen as a combination of the four concepts and they often overlap. It is revealed that an understanding of these four concepts including their linkages is essential for designing an optimal ERM system.Linkages Amongst the Four ConceptsAlthough harmonization and standardization are seen apparently similar respondents view them differently. Whereas, harmonization allows choices between alternatives,standardization provides no flexibility. Effectively, harmonization offers a range of identical alternatives, out of which one or more can be adopted depending on the given circumstances. Although standardization does not offer such flexibility,it was found as an essential technique of ERM. Whilst harmonization accepts existing divergence to bring a state of comparability, standardization does not necessarily consider existing conventions and definitions. It focuses on a common standard, (a “top-down” approach). Indeed, integration of competent policies and processes,models, and data (either for management use, compliance and reporting) are not possible for global insurers without harmonizing and standardizing them. Hence, the research establishes that a sequence (i.e., harmonization, standardization, integration,and then centralization) is to be maintained when ERM is being developed in practice (from an operational perspective). Above all, the process is found important to achieve a diversified risk culture across the organization to allocate risk management responsibilities to risk owners and risk takers.ERM: A ToolViewed as a tool, ERM encompasses procedures and techniques to model and measure the portfolio of (quantifiable) enterprise risk from insurers’ core disciplinary perspective. The objective is to measure a level of (risk adjusted) capital(i.e., economic capital) and thereafter allocation of capital. In this perspective ERM is thought as a sophisticated version of insurers’ asset-liability management.Most often, extreme and emerging risks, which may bring the organization down,are taken into consideration. Ideally, the procedure of calculating economic capital is closely linked to the market volatility. Moreover, the objective is clear, i.e., meetingthe expectation of shareholders. Consequently, there remains less scope to capture the subjectivity associated with enterprise risks.ERM: An ApproachIn contrast to process and tool, ERM is also found as an approach of managing the entire business from a strategic point of view. Since, risk is so deeply rooted in the insurance business, it is difficult to separate risk from the functions of insurance companies. It is argued that a properly designed ERM infrastructure should align risk to achieve strategic goals. Alternatively, application of an ERM approach of managing business is found central to the value creation of insurance companies.In the study, ERM is believed as an approach of changing the culture of the organization in both marketing and strategic management issues in terms of innovating and pricing products, selecting profitable markets, distributing products, targeting customers and ratings, and thus formulating appropriate corporate strategies. In this holistic approach various strategic, financial and operational concerns are seen integrated to consider all risks across the organization.It is seen that as a process, ERM takes an inductive approach to explore the pitfalls (challenges) of achieving corporate objectives for broader audience (i.e.,stakeholders) emphasizing more on moral and ethical issues. In contrast, as a tool,it takes a deductive approach to meet specific corporate objectives for selected audience(i.e., shareholders) by concentrating more on monitory (financial) outcomes.Clearly, the approaches are complimentary and have overlapping elements. 作者：M Acharyya译文：保险业对企业风险管理的实证研究企业风险管理涉及各种行业(如保险精算师、公司财政经理、保险商、会计和内部审计员)，当前企业风险管理解决方案往往不能涵盖所有的风险，因为这些方案取决于决策者和执行则的专业道德和原则。

美国农作物保险计划的政治经济学【外文翻译】

本科毕业论文外文翻译外文题目：The Political Economy of the US Crop Insurance Program 出处：The Economic Impact of Public Support to Agriculture(2010)7:243-308作者：Bruce A.Babcock原文The Political Economy of the US Crop Insurance Program Abstract：Taxpayer support for the crop insurance industry has grown rapidly since 2000 even though total crop acres insured is stagnant and the number of policies sold has declined. Staunch support for the program by key members of Congress meant defeat for proposals in the 2008 Farm Bill to significantly reduce cost. These proposals included large changes in the formulas used to calculate industry reimbursement and for new programs that would be integrated with or reduce the amount of risk insured by the crop insurance program. The reason for this resilience is program complexity and biased analysis, which has allowed the industry to claim that they are undercompensated despite a doubling of taxpayer support. One unforeseen outcome of the strength of the crop insurance industry in protecting its interests is that a new insurance program called Average Crop Revenue Selection (ACRE) was passed in the farm bill. Large unintended consequences that could be brought about by ACRE include the likely demise of the marketing loan and countercyclical programs, increased risk that the United States will violate its amber box limits, and in the not-too-distant future, a complete change in the way that US crop insurance is delivered to farmers.IntroductionThe difficulty with which Congress passed a US Farm Bill was hampered more by a need to find increased funds than with any broad philosophical debate about the proper direction for US farm policy. At first perusal, the new US commodity policy largely follows the policy set forth in the 2002 farm bill. Direct payments,countercyclical payments, and the marketing loan program still exist and are largely unchanged. Wheat and soybeans have a slightly higher target price and lentils have a slightly lower loan rate. To maintain this program structure largely in tact while boosting funding for nutrition programs required Congress to find new funds.Congress had no appetite for reducing direct payments, which left only the crop insurance program that could be tapped for savings. The debate over how much to take away from the crop insurance program provided many with their first detailed reason to understand a program that has grown tremendously since 2000. The stakes of those with vested interests in the program are now in the billions of dollars annually, which makes change more difficult than when the stakes were in the millions of dollars. Not surprisingly, those with a large vested interest in the crop insurance program came out largely unscathed in the 2008 farm bill. Although supporters of the program lament the large cuts that crop insurance took, the cuts really only took away a small portion of the gains that accrue to its beneficiaries.One unforeseen outcome of the strength of the crop insurance industry in protecting its interests is that the new insurance program that was passed in the farm bill will be operated completely by the Farm Service Agency (FSA) instead of by the Risk Management Agency (RMA). The new program, called ACRE (Average Crop Revenue Election), will not be integrated into the existing crop insurance program because such integration would have meant less risk being handled by the crop insurance industry.The remainder of this chapter provides a political/economic analysis of why the United States finds itself with two crop insurance programs and an exploration of the possibly large, unintended consequences of having both programs. The explanation for why we have both programs lies, not surprisingly, in Congress trying to find an outcome that would give a diverse set of interest groups what they want, while providing the necessary funds for expanded nutrition programs, which was a major objective of House leadership. The large unintended consequences that could be brought about by ACRE include the likely demise of the marketing loan and countercyclical programs, increased risk that the United States will violate its amber box limits, and in the not-too-distant future, a complete change in the way that UScrop insurance is delivered to farmers.Background on the US Crop Insurance ProgramThe US crop insurance program has two broad public policy objectives: help farmers manage financial risk and eliminate the need for Congress to pass supplemental ad hoc disaster assistance programs. To meet these twin objectives, Congress reformed the program in 2000 with the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA). The reform was justified by President Clinton in his statement upon signing the Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA) of 2000: “I have heard many farmers say that the crop insurance program was simply not good value for them, providing too little coverage for too much money. My FY 2001 budget proposal and this bill directly address that problem by making higher insurance coverage more affordable, which should also mitigate the need for ad hoc crop loss disaster assistance such as we have seen for the last three years.” And in 2006 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies, former USDA under secretary J.B. Penn said, “One of the overarching goals of the crop insurance program has been the reduction or elimination of ad hoc disaster assistance.”By all accounts, Congress has seemingly succeeded in its objective to help farmers manage risk. Coverage is provided to more than 350 commodities in all 50 states and Puerto Rico. And more than 80% of eligible acres are now insured under the program. However, this success has come at a high cost. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections made in 2007 indicate that the crop insurance program will cost taxpayers an average of more than $5 billion per year for the next 5 years, which is about double what the program would have cost without the reform. Actual expenditures will be much higher if crop prices stay high. One might be able to justify this additional cost if the second objective of the program had been met also. But passage of ACRE and a permanent disaster program in the new farm bill indicates that crop insurance provides inadequate coverage for farmers, as does inclusion of $3.5 billion in yet another disaster assistance program in the 2008 Iraq funding bill. Members of the House and Senate Agricultural Committees justify the need for disaster assistance despite large amounts of crop insurance aid because even an expanded crop insurance program cannot provide adequate assistance to farmers in financial stress. The large losses in Iowa from excess rainfall in 2008 will once again test Congress’ ability to count on the crop insurance program to deliver adequate aid to farmers.A Simple Model of Competition in Crop InsuranceThere are five main players in the crop insurance industry: Congress, government regulators, farmers, crop insurance agents, and crop insurance companies. Taxpayer subsidies created and provide continual support the industry. Congress reacts to political pressure by passing laws that regulate and subsidize the industry. Regulators implement those laws. Farmers buy crop insurance from a crop insurance agent. Crop insurance agents decide which crop insurance company will receive each farmer’s business. Agents make money by earning commission on each policy that they sell. The variable cost of selling policies is much less than the commission on most policies, so the more policies they sell, the more money agents make. Thus agents have an incentive to compete with other agents for a farmer’s business. Crop insurance companies make money from underwriting gains and from A&O reimbursements. The non commission variable costs are much less than A&O and expected underwriting gains in almost all states. Thus, the more policies that they can obtain, the more money they can make. This creates an incentive for companies to compete for agents’ books of business. Agents and companies and farmers have an incentive to lobby Congress to pass laws that work to their favor. Because taxpayer subsidies are the only source of revenue for companies or agents, any lobbying that they do uses taxpayer funds.There exist two sources of competition in this model. Agents compete for farmers business and companies compete for agents business. The agent competition for farmers’ business cannot include price competition beca use of laws passed by Congress at the behest of agents. So agents must compete in terms of service. The types of service that can be offered include educating farmers about the types of insurance coverage offered; lowering the farmer cost of filling out required forms; and keeping farmers informed of any information that may prove useful to farmers. All of these services are of second-order importance to farmers because either they are one-time benefits or because they do not directly increase farmers’ prof its. By default, a farmer’s business remains with an agent year after year. So unless an agent convinces a farmer to switch agents, no switch will take place. To a farmer, the benefit of switching must be greater than the cost of switching, which involves some paperwork, possibly alienating a local neighbor or business person, and search costsfor an agent that can provide superior service. Because there are positive switching costs and only indirect benefits, the incentive for most farmers to switch is not very high, although exact measurement of the incentive would be difficult. Consequently, the productivity of agent investments designed to induce farmers to switch will not be high. In equilibrium, each agent invests an optimal amount to keep his or her business and to perhaps attract new business, and each farmer has found the agent where the benefits of further switching are outweighed by the costs. Entry costs, although nominally seemingly low, are actually quite high because new entrants will find it difficult to build up their book of business by inducing an adequate number of farmers to switch. Thus each agent has essentially a captive book of business.Average Crop Revenue ElectionsACRE is an optional program that if chosen by a farmer would reduce a farmer’s direct payment by 20%, eliminate countercyclical payments, and dramatically reduce the farmer’s loan rate. In exchange, a farmer would receive a state revenue guarantee equal to 90% of the product of Olympic average of the previous 5 years of state yields and the average of the previous 2 years’ season average prices. If the product of actual state yield and season average price is less than this guarantee, then a farmer will receive the difference (up to 25% of the guarantee) on 85% of planted acres for all program crops. Farmers can choose ACRE beginning with the 2009 crop year. Once chosen, the choice cannot be revoked for the life of the farm bill.Because this new program looks back in time for the price that it uses to set the guarantee, the actual path of prices will determine how many farmers will find it profitable to choose ACRE. For the 2009 crop year, the price used to set the guarantee were the 2007/2008 and 2008/2009 marketing year prices.The key to farmer participation will be the 2009 expected season average price. If market prices stay substantially above the ACRE price, then farmers will not be receiving any marketing loan gains or countercyclical payments because the loan rates and target prices are so low relative to expected market price. But ACRE will also be providing an out-of-the-money guarantee so farmers may feel that the 20% cut in direct payments is too high a price to pay for potential ACRE payments. In this case, note that the 2010 ACRE price will be even higher than the 2009 price so farmerswould know that their 2010 ACRE guarantee would be even higher than the 2009 guarantee so that there is little downside of signing up in 2009.If many farmers participate in ACRE, then marketing loans and countercyclical payments will not play an important role in the next farm. But before we can conclude that all farmers will choose ACRE, we must consider the impact on the ACRE guarantee if market prices fall in 2009 and in subsequent years. It could be that the ACRE guarantee falls so low in 2011 and 2012 that it makes the current program more advantageous.However, a provision in the ACRE program does not allow the guarantee to increase or decrease more than 10% in any year. This means that the 2013 guarantee can only drop to 65.61% of the 2009 guarantee. Because the 5-year Olympic average of state yields will not typically increase or decrease a dramatic amount, it is reasonable to ask whether an ACRE price of 65.61% of the 2009 ACRE price makes marketing loan gains and countercyclical payments more attractive than ACRE.If the 2007 and 2008 WASDE estimates of marketing year prices are true so that the 2009 ACRE prices come in at $5.08 and $10.88 for corn and soybeans, then 65.61% of these prices are $3.33 and $7.14, respectively. This is the minimum ACRE price that could be reached in the 2008 farm bill period. At these ACRE prices, the net benefit to ACRE is still positive. Thus, it seems that ACRE dominates the current program for corn and soybean farmers. This suggests that if 2008 market prices are anywhere close to where WASDE projects them to be, then all farmers will have an incentive to choose ACRE.Future ImplicationsThe crop insurance lobby was successful at defeating area revenue insurance programs that would have replaced or been integrated with crop insurance. Instead we have the ACRE program that because it is backward looking has the potential for making dramatically higher payments than if a forward-looking program like Group Risk Income Protection had been adopted instead. Although its supporters claim that the program is more market oriented than programs with a fixed guaranteed price, this does not mean that it is less distortionary than current programs because of the potential for in-the-money revenue guarantees at planting time. These in-the moneyguarantees could imply difficulty in meeting WTO commitments if price levels continue higher for a year or two and then fall dramatically, perhaps because of a rethinking of US ethanol policy.It is likely that when the vast majority of farmers choose ACRE in the years ahead, they will find that state-level revenue guarantees are not the same as countyor farm-level guarantees. That is, very low state yields that trigger payments will likely be associated with farm-level losses, but there will be years in which farm level losses occur, but state losses do not. This will increase pressure in the next farm bill for farmers to push for a more disaggregate guarantee, perhaps at the county level. In addition, the backward-looking price-setting mechanism will be difficult to defend. Using futures prices is a much more transparent and market-oriented means of setting program guarantees. Finally, ACRE will likely lead to a wholesale reevaluation of the crop insurance program as the primary means of delivering risk management support to farmers. Farmers will find that risk management can be delivered from the farm program at much lower cost by simply taking the systemic risk out of the crop insurance program and covering this risk in the farm bill. This has the potential for being a much more cost-effective approach than the current approach of insuring both pool able and systemic risk in the farm bill.译文美国农作物保险计划的政治经济学摘要：文章分析了美国农业保险的背景，然后从纳税人支持农作物保险服务，行政和操作补贴，净承销的收益，保费补贴四个方面对美国农业保险的现状作了阐述，然后建立了一个模型，最后对农业保险在美国发展的前景进行了描述，认为农业保险讲在美国取得全国性的成功。

金融监管改革与启示外文文献翻译译文3400多字

文献出处：Brad Dennis., An empirical study on financial regulatory reform and enlightenment: The Case of United States [J]. International Review of Business Research Papers, 2014,17(3): 57-69.（声明：本译文归百度文库所有，完整译文请到百度文库。

）原文An empirical study on financial regulatory reform and enlightenment:The Case of United StatesBrad·DennisAbstractDefects of American current financial regulatory system have been exposed in the Subprime Crisis, which makes America rethink its regulatory philosophy and system. "Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act" is a new legislative outcome in America ' s large -scale financial reform. The Act involves newly establishing the Financial Stability Oversight Council to address systematic risks; setting up the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; creating transparency and accountability for the derivatives markets and ending too big to fail bailouts, etc. KeyWords: Financial regulation; Reform; Systematic risks; Financial Stability Oversight Council; Consumer Financial Protection Bureau1 IntroductionOn July 21, 2010, U.S. President barack Obama signed the final version of the financial reform bill (all referred to as "dodd - frank Wall Street reform and consumer protection act"), making it the formal legislation.This aims to reshape the U.S. financial regulatory system, and put an end to the financial institutions in so-called "too big to fail" situation, consumer financial protection, create a sound financial base development so as to avoid similar financial crisis repeat of the bill is known as the United States since the great depression the severest financial regulatory reform bill.New look at the bill heavy defects of current financial regulatory system, theredistribution complex "double bull" in the financial regulatory system regulatory power.This paper tries to analyze the new law and interpretation, so that we can understand its for the good of our country financial regulation legal system construction has the important enlightenment significance.2 legislative background of America's financial regulatory reform billThe financial crisis has made the United States and the world economy into a severe recession.On the root causes of the financial crisis, opinions vary.Main viewpoints can be summed up in loose monetary environment creates excess liquidity;Unbalanced ratio the real economy and virtual economy and real estate asset bubble burst, financial regulation overlap and vacuum, excessive financial derivatives and the proliferation of financial institutions in the moral risk, the credit rating agency conflicts of interest and unbalanced economic structure, etc.But the defect on the level of financial regulation, is undoubtedly important to the cause of the financial crisis.The new law of marked the U.S. financial reform legislation run successfully crossed the line.Review bill from the proposed, vote, reject, modify, until, through hardships and sign, it is not hard to see the game of different interest groups.On June 17, 2009, the Obama administration formally announced a comprehensive financial regulatory reform bill.The house of representatives and the senate on December 11, respectively, and on May 20, 2010 through their version of the bill.According to the program, each house in coordinating a unified text after the vote again.On June 30, the house of representatives by 237 votes in favor, 192 votes against the results of the version of the financial reform bill passed both houses of unity.On July 15, the United States senate to 60 votes, the result of 39 vote passed the bill's final version, and become law to clear the last obstacle for it.The implementation of the new law is the Obama administration faces the pressure of the mid-term elections and safeguard the interests of the party needs, but more reflects its desire to restore confidence in the U.S. financial system.The senate banking committee chairman Christopher Dodd (Christopher Dodd and house financial services committee chairman Barney Frank (Barney Frank), and other people's unremittingefforts and overcome many fierce lobbying activities of interest groups to enact legislation, will no longer make the taxpayer for Wall Street's mistakes, to protect consumers and the economy "(Obama, 2010)Two of the seven key points of legislation of America's financial regulatory reform bill The name of the new law embodies the American financial regulatory reform and main content of two core pillars: systemic risk prevention and consumer financial protection.Bill legislation mainly includes seven points:(1) set up a consumer financial protection agency (agency).Within the federal reserve system to create a new independent regulator, to ensure that U.S. consumers in the choose and buy mortgages, credit CARDS and other financial products, to obtain the clear and accurate information needed, at the same time to eliminate hidden costs, terms of abuse and fraud.(2) the end financial institutions "too big to fail" that - big - to - fail) under the condition of financial bailout.Take the following measures to end the possibility of financial institution failures require taxpayer bailouts: when financial institutions failing to secure a liquidation procedures;Set tough new capital adequacy and liquidity requirements make financial institutions consciously shoulds not be too much;Update the power of the federal reserve, allow it to provide the system within the scope of the support, but no longer support the individual financial institutions;To establish more strict standard and supervision system to protect the U.S. economy, consumers, investors and the interests of the enterprise.(3) the establishment of financial stability oversight council (FSOC).In order to promote the construction of risk early warning system and regulatory coordination mechanism, set up financial stability monitoring committee to identify and respond to the large financial institutions, financial products and trading behavior caused by systemic risk, in order to avoid such risks threaten the stability of the U.S. economy.(4) to ensure the transparency and reliability of the financial derivatives.To fill the trading risk regulatory loopholes, the new law strengthened to include over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, production guarantee securities (ABS), hedge funds, mortgage brokers and regulation of payday loans.(5) executive compensation level and structure of corporate governance.In the executive compensation benefits, provide shareholders with voice, make it to the executive compensation levels and compensation for executives fired achieve a nonbinding vote.(6) of investor protection.Set tough new rules to ensure the transparency and reliability of credit rating agencies, to protect the rights and interests of investors and enterprises.(7) to strengthen the implementation of the regulations.Authorized positive regulators to crack down on financial fraud, institutional conflicts of interest and at the expense of U.S. households and business interests to meet the market manipulation behavior of individual self-interest.3 financial regulation reform legislation logic framework(1) for financial business practices, innovation concept of financial regulation.Since the 1970 s, pursues the new liberalism economy, think should implement financial and trade liberalization, reduce regulation, give full play to the function of market's self-adjustment.In 1989 John Williamson (John Williamson) proposed by ten o 'clock the "Washington consensus" that reflects the core concept.Financial legislation in congress is basically in accordance with the new liberalism economy, encourage financial innovation and development, maintain the market value orientation of freedom, but ignored the value of the financial stability and security considerations.From 70-80 - s of the 20th century, the United States financial system was a great revolution, the revolution is mainly characterized by traditional way of bank credit to similar to the shadow banking (shadow banking) credit financing system transformation, changed the whole financial market credit basis (Mr Yi, 2010).Financial institutions profit-driven, often prompted the high-risk financial activities, and risk management system has failed to keep up with the pace of financial product development, thus accumulated a serious risk.When the financial market behavior and credit basis after fundamental changes, if there is no corresponding regulation system arrangement, does not have a suitable for the system of laws and rules of the financial system, also won't be able to form a new way offinancial risk, how to avoid the outbreak of the financial crisis is inevitable (Mr Yi, 2010).After tasted the bitter legacy of the financial crisis, the U.S. government must renew its laissez-faire, the idea of the regulation and legislation.So, billed as the largest and the most severe in the history of financial reform bill arises at the historic moment, reflect efforts continue to increase government intervention in the market, continuously break through the new tendency of government supervision boundary.(2) comply with the financial market structure, the reform of financial regulation mode The development of the structure of the U.S. financial markets In 1999, Clinton approved the financial services modernization act, repealed the glass-steagall act of 1933 relative clauses, which eliminated the banking, securities and insurance agencies from the legal boundary in the scope of our business, became a major event in the late 20th century financial liberalization, marks the formal towards mixed management in us financial sector. With the relaxation of financial regulation, many commercial Banks to financial derivatives "feast". Due to finance expansion is larger than the service of the real economy, buried hidden trouble has been expanded.4 The choice of the U.S. financial regulatory modelSince the formal establishment of mixed management after the financial market structure, the United States gradually form "double bull" umbrella supervision mode."Double" refers to the power of the federal and state sharing financial regulation;"Long" is a multiple departments responsible for the supervision.Because a crisscross network of regulators regulation pattern, there is "repeat" and "supervision vacuum" phenomenon.When mixed management institutions of financial market development, and the corresponding financial regulatory model failed to timely adjust, exposed the contradiction between necessity.On financial regulatory reform in financial supervision mode change.According to the Columbia University school of law professor John Coffey (JohnC. Coffee) about financial regulation "bimodal pattern", the purpose of financial regulation, there are two independent, one is the regulatory prudential regulation related financial institutions;Second, the protection of rights and interests of consumerfinancial regulators.The United States after agency regulation and function of traditional financial supervision mode, to achieve two legislative innovation financial regulatory goals.First of all, to reconstruct of regulators, set up integration and coordination of various financial regulatory powers special agencies - the financial stability oversight council;Secondly, set up a powerful consumer financial protection regulators - consumer financial protection position and function of the financial stability oversight committee before the outbreak of the financial crisis, the United States department of the government in monitoring the country's financial system, specialized agencies not full tracking effect of the potential threat of national economic security.Therefore, when such as insurance giant American international group (AIG), a sharp expansion in scale and connected with other enterprises, custodian of the buried time bomb unconcerned, until the bombs detonated in September 2008, then the global economy into a terrible abyss (Brady Dennis, 2010).The new financial stability oversight council, led by Treasury secretary, by a representative of the 10 federal financial regulators, an independent committee members and five non-voting members of a total of 16 members.Federal financial regulators mainly include the federal reserve, securities and exchange commission (SEC) and commodity futures trading commission (CFTC), the comptroller of the currency (OCC), the federal deposit insurance corporation (FDIC), the federal housing finance agency (FHFA), the national credit union administration (NCUA), and the new consumer financial protection agency (agency).The committee's main job is to identify and deal with the threat to the country's financial stability of systemic mittee shall have the right to decided which aims to expand the scale of the enterprise's financial institutions to the nation's financial system at risk, and make recommendations to the federal reserve, for its capital adequacy ratio, leverage limits, liquidity and risk management puts forward more strict requirements, the committee shall have the right at the same time in terms of capital requirements for not less than minimum standards of the current standard;For non-bank financial firms, such as the committee that the failure or business activities will bring risk to the financial stability, after a two-thirds majorityvote, can require the fed to regulate;Exercise "pre-emptive" regulatory powers, the committee, after a two-thirds majority vote of the approval of the federal reserve requirements of large financial institutions to divest assets, premise is the national threats to financial stability and put the measure as a last resort., under the supervision of the committee have been troubled asset relief program (TARP) funds of large bank holding companies will not be able to simply by spinning off escape regulation at the federal reserve bank.In addition, in the ministry of finance within a new office of financial research.Members of the office by economists, accountants, lawyers and former regulators and other senior experts.Mainly responsible for collecting financial data and economic analysis.In the office of financial research and other agencies, under the support of the committee will collect and analyze relevant data to the risk of identification, monitoring and to congress each year in periodic report and statement will be published information.Consumer financial protection agency, on the eve of the financial crisis, there are seven regulators for housing mortgage loans, credit CARDS and other products to regulate, but none will consumers' rights and interests protection priority, leading to the housing mortgage loan becomes risky products, credit card interest and bank charges surge, non-bank lenders to free from the federal regulatory (Brady Dennis, 2010).So, the new set up specialized consumer protection department.译文金融监管改革与启示：美国的实证研究布拉德摘要次贷危机暴露了美国现行金融监管制度的缺陷，使美国对其监管理念和监管体系进行反思。

美国农业合作社与农业产业化外文文献翻译中英文

美国农业合作社与农业产业化外文文献翻译中英文最新（节选重点翻译）英文Managing uncertainty and expectations: The strategic response of U.S.agricultural cooperatives to agricultural industrializationJulie HogelandAbstractThe 20th century industrialization of agriculture confronted U.S. agricultural cooperatives with responding to an event they neither initiated nor drove. Agrarian-influenced cooperatives used two metaphors, “serfdom” and “cooperatives are like a family” to manage uncertainty and influence producer expectations by predicting industrialization's eventual outcome and cooperatives’ producer driven compensation.The serfdom metaphor alluded to industrialization's potential to either bypass family farmers, the cornerstone of the economy according to agrarian ideology, or to transform them into the equivalent of piece-wage labor as contract growers. The “family” metaphor reflects how cooperatives personalized the connection between cooperative and farmer-member to position themselves as the exact opposite of serfdom. Hypotheses advanced by Roessl (2005) and Goel (2013) suggest that intrinsic characteristics of family businesses such as a resistance to change and operating according to a myth of unlimited choice andindependence reinforced the risk of institutional lock-in posed by agrarian ideology.To determine whether lock-in occurred, Woerdman's (2004) neo-institutional model of lock-in was examined in the context of late 20th century cooperative grain and livestock marketing. Increasingly ineffective open markets prompted three regional cooperatives to develop their own models of industrialized pork production. Direct experience with producer contracting allowed cooperatives to evade institutional and ideological lock-in.Keywords：Cooperatives，Agricultural industrialization，Agrarianism，Expectations，Family business，Family farming，Metaphors，Lock-inIntroductionRecent fluctuation in global financial markets led a panel of cooperative leaders to identify uncertainty as the primary managerial difficulty anticipated by cooperatives in the future (Boland, Hogeland, & McKee, 2011). Likewise, the 20th century industrialization of agriculture confronted cooperatives with the challenge of responding to an event they neither initiated nor drove. When the environment is highly uncertain and unpredictable, Oliver predicts that organizations will increase their efforts to establish the illusion or reality of control and stability over future organizational outcomes (Oliver, 1991: 170). This study argues thatcooperatives used two metaphors, “serfdom” and “cooperatives are like a family” to manage uncertainty by predicting industrialization's eventual outcome and cooperatives’ producer-driven compensation.These metaphors are agrarian. Recent research highlights the impact of agrarian ideology on cooperatives. Foreman and Whetten (2002: 623)observe, “co-ops have historically sought to reinforce the traditions and values of agrarianism through education and social interventions. Indeed, for many members these normative goals of a co-op have been preeminent.” These authors studied the tension within rural cooperatives produced by a normative system encompassing family and ideology and a utilitarian system defined by economic rationality, profit maximization and self-interest. They argue that this split in values implies that cooperatives are essentially two different organizations trying to be one. To capture the tension between these multiple identities, they focused on a potential family/business divide in cooperatives, basing this on a duality often noted in cooperative community and trade publications.The authors found that respondents wanted their local co-op to be more business oriented and at the same time, expected co-ops ideally (e.g., as an ideal organizational form) to be more family focused. These conflicting expectations suggested that multiple-identity organizations need to be assessed in terms of the individual components of their identity and the tension (or interaction) between them. Foreman and Whettenregard dual or multiple identity organizations as hybrids. There are consequences to hybridity: many members of a hybrid organization will identify with both aspects of its dual identity, “and thus find themselves embracing competing goals and concerns associated with distinctly different identity elements” (Foreman and Whetten, 2002). They conclude that competing goals and concerns foster competing expectations with consequences for organizational commitment (and I would add, performance).The split focus observed by Foreman and Whetten can be regarded as a contemporary expression of a value conflict beginning early in the 20th century over how production agriculture should be organized. Decentralized, autonomous, and typically small, family farmers used their skill at deciding the “what, when, where, how and why” of production and marketing to reduce the risk of being a price taker at open, competitive markets. Farmers also diversified the farm enterprise to spread price risk over several commodities. Corporate-led industrialized agriculture (integrators) by-passed both markets and independent farmers. Integrators coordinated supply and demand internally based on top-down administrative control over production and marketing decisions. They engaged in production contracting with growers who were held to competitive performance standards and paid according to their productivity. In contrast, family farmers were accountable only tothemselves.Study overviewFoss (2007) observes that the beliefs organizations hold about each other or the competitive environment are a key aspect of strategic management which have been understudied. Beliefs, which include norms and expectations, are important because they can be wrong. Cooperatives are often considered to have an ideological component but how such ideology develops and persists also has been understudied. This study addresses that gap by examining how agrarian language and assumptions shaped cooperatives’ reaction to 20th century agricultural industrialization. During this era, industrial methods transformed the production and marketing of processing vegetables, poultry, beef, and pork and were initiated for dairy and grains. An historical and institutional perspective is used to examine how two contrasting metaphors brought cooperatives to the brink of institutional lock-in. The study spans the entire 20th century from beginning to close.The study opens with a brief discussion of metaphors and norms then presents a theoretical model of lock-in. Discussion of the overarching role of agrarianism follows. Discussion then addresses why the cooperative alternative to corporate-led industrialization –the 1922 model developed by Aaron Sapiro –was not palatable to agrarian-influenced cooperatives (this section also definesagrarian-influenced cooperatives).Discussion then turns to considering how the disturbing implications of serfdom paved the way for the agrarian-influenced norm, “cooperatives as a competitive yardstick” and the cooperative metaphorical n orm, “cooperatives are like a family.” Producer expectations triggered by “serfdom” and “cooperatives are like a family” are addressed. Parallels are briefly drawn between neighborhood exchange in late 19th century rural California and behavior implied in “cooperatives are like a family.” Parallels are then drawn between family business traits and cooperative and producer experience in livestock and identity-preserved grain markets. This provides a foundation for examining in greater detail how well cooperative experience in pork and grains corresponded to Woerdman's four part model of lock-in (2004). Study conclusions and suggestions for future research follow.Importance of ideology, metaphor and normsEconomists have begun studying how cognition and discourse affect cooperative outcomes (Fulton, 1999). This study continues that line of inquiry by considering how a dominant ideology like agrarianism produced words and associations that, for most of the 20th century, arguably had a deterministic effect on farmer and cooperative perceptions of the future. Even today, few guidelines or predictions exist that suggest how organizations can manage ideological conflict (Greenwood, Raynard,Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011). Moreover, the difficulties of escaping a hegemonic ideology have seldom been recognized (Spencer, 1994).Metaphors are a pithy word or expression meant to evoke a comparison. They are used to understand one thing in terms of another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 5). Understanding what metaphors represent and how they emerge and persist can offer a window into the salient factors influencing farmer and cooperative decision-making. Moreover, as in this text, metaphors “allow for the sorts of story in which overwhelming evidence in favor of one interpretation of the world can be repeatedly ignored, even though this puts the assets of the firm and the position of the decision-makers at extraordinary risk” (Schoenberger, 1997: 136).Much of what Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) say about norms also applies to how metaphors are used in this study. For example, these authors observe that an important function of norms is to provide predictability in social relationships so that each party can rely on the assurances provided by the other. Consequently, norms stress the meeting of expectations in an exchange relationship. Certainly, the metaphor, cooperatives are like a family, can be understood in the same manner. Defining norms as commonly or widely shared sets of behavioral expectations, Pfeffer et al. also indicate that norms develop underconditions of social uncertainty to increase the predictability of relationships for the mutual advantage of those involved. Once they cease to serve those interests norms break down.California's early industrializationIt seems reasonable to assume that agrarianism's belief in the pivotal importance of agriculture was shared to some degree by all U.S. cooperatives. However, unique features of California's agriculture, particularly in the Central Valley, predisposed it to industrialize some decades earlier than the Midwest, Great Plains, and Northeast (McClelland, 1997). The latter continued to rely on patriarchal family farm labor and so, for this paper, are assumed to represent the core domain of agrarian-influenced cooperatives. These areas lacked access to the supply of excess ethnic or minority labor which McClelland indicates prepared California for industrialization by 1910. Added to this advantage was California's legacy of estate or hacienda production which boosted cultural familiarity and acceptance of large scale production (Hogeland, 2010).In 1922, California attorney and cooperative organizer Aaron Sapiro combined elements of California experience into a model of cooperative organization and marketing popularly kno wn as “orderly marketing.” Sapiro began by extolling industrialization: “The factory system is recognized as the key to all forms of productive industries to-day all overthe world-except in agriculture… The farmer is the only part of modern industry… in which you have individual production” (Sapiro, 1993: 81).In general, Sapiro offered a cooperative alternative to producers’ tendency to dump excess supply from bumper harvests on the market. Instead, cooperatives should provide a home for the growers’ prod uct and use accumulated inventory to develop new products to stimulate consumer demand. Investing in processing or preservation technologies –canning, refrigeration and drying –would allow cooperatives to release excess production to the market in a prog ressive “orderly” manner.For example, by 1925 Sunkist growers had increased fruit utilization by transforming oranges from a single hand-held breakfast fruit to a glass of juice made from multiple oranges. The Sunkist extractor was specifically designed to use off-size fruit and wind-damaged fruit that would not sell as fancy Sunkist table fruit because all produced the same quality juice (Nourse, 1925). In 1922, Sun Maid scored a consumer success by packaging raisins in convenient snack-sized boxes called “Little Sun Maids” (Gary Marshburn, telephone conversation, July 24, 2008; Cotterill, 1984).The far-sighted orderly marketing norm anticipated the values of industrialized agriculture, urging cooperatives to guarantee supply through marketing contracts with some 85–95 percent of producer-members (Sapiro's recommended target). This commitmentcould propel the cooperative into being sole supplier of a particular specialty crop. (Such specialization was facilitated by California's geographically compact micro-climates).Sapiro's model provided a template for important 20th century specialty crop cooperatives outside of California, notably, Ocean Spray Cooperative (cranberries) and Welch's (Concord grapes). However, Sapiro's model represented a highly specialized, marketing-intensive cooperative that was conceptually and financially out of reach of the small family farmers in the Midwest, Great Plains, and the Northeast who produced fungible commodities like milk, meat and grains.6Cooperative philosopher and economist Edwin Nourse commented on cooperatives performing agricultural rationing such as orderly marketing:To be sure, a few cooperatives which stand in a class by themselves have already attained a degree of success comparable with the best achievements in industrial lines. But these are in comparatively small branches of specialized agriculture where economic organization was already on a high level. Before anything like the same result could be achieved in the great staple lines of production, where the demand for [price] stabilization is most acute, there would have to be a fair degree of concentration of executive responsibility in their operating organization (Nourse, 1930: 132).Serfdom's implicationsDuring the 1920s and 1930s –considered a “golden age” of agriculture – collective action surged. Rudimentary markets and chaotic distribution channels for basic commodities like milk, grain, and fruit provided new opportunities for cooperative marketing. Moreover, new antitrust legislation curbed many of the horizontally-integrated “trusts” dominating 19th century meat packing, oil, railroads and grain markets.Nevertheless, as early as 1922, Nourse saw emerging within agriculture market power so centralized and hierarchical it seemed feudal (Nourse, 1922: 589). Subsequently, the metaphor of “serfdom” was used throughout the 20th century by agrarian-influenced cooperatives to suggest how industrialization's contract production could reduce entrepreneurial and independent farmers to the equivalent of hired hands – so-called “piece wage labor.”In 1900, most counties could point to someone who started as a tenant or laborer and through hard work, luck, sharp dealing or intelligent cultivation, retired as a landlord owing several farms (Danbom, 1979: 7). In 1917, Ely introduced the concept of the ‘agricultural ladder’ as a model of occupational progression to farm ownership. The ladder showed how the agrarian virtue of hard work could allow a landless, unpaid family laborer to progress from being a hired hand and tenant farmer to an independent owner-operator (Kloppenburg & Geisler, 1985). Yet, the serfdom metaphor suggested just how tenuous such occupationalprogression could be.Late 19th century farmers formed cooperatives in response to market exploitation or failure. Although such exploitation affected farmer costs and returns, as a rule it did not impinge on farmers’ understanding of themselves as entrepreneurial and independent. Agrarian ideology lauded family farmers for taking on the risks of farming with a frontier attitude of self-reliance. Such farmers answered to no one except themselves. The small farmer was “first of all a self-directing individualist who could be counted on to resist with vigor the encroachments of outside authority” (Robinson, 1953: 69).Industrialized agriculture brought a new institutional logic to agriculture by putting efficiency and profitability first and using vertical integration to bypass farmers’ decision-making power over agriculture. Industrialization was market driven, seeking growth in identifying and satisfying consumer preferences. Research has indicated that the norms and prescriptions dictated by family logics are often at odds with the prescriptions dictated by markets (Greenwood et al., 2011).Power, reflected in ownership and governance arrangements, determines which logics will more easily flow into organizations and be well received (Greenwood et al., 2011). Family logics formally embedded into an organization's ownership structure are a very effective conduit for increasing familial influences within the organization. Not surprisingly,farmer-owned cooperatives believed they had a mandate to protect and foster family farming (Hogeland, 2006).中文管理不确定性和期望：美国农业合作社与农业产业化朱莉·霍格兰摘要20世纪的农业产业化使美国农业合作社面对很大的不确定性。

农村金融体系外文翻译

外文翻译The Main Problems and Countermeasures of China’s Rural Financial System中国的农村金融体系中存在的问题原文来源：ZHAO YI The Main Problems and Countermeasures of China’s Rural Financial System The Chinese Economy, vol. 39, no. 2, March–April 2006, pp. 57–70.•不明确的功能定位在目前的农村金融体系改革的基本问题在于，金融机构的功能定位却很不明确。

杨亚明，中国农业银行的总裁，他认为目前在农村金融体系中有三个的主要组成部分。

有些含糊不清的功能定位和这三个机构重叠存在。

农业银行主要的业务是支持农业产业化经营，小城镇建设和贷款，以帮助贫穷的人。

贷款显示，农业银行的操作是没有完全商业化，也有一些金融性政策的款。

这些农村信用社和农业银行的服务目标和服务类型有一些重叠。

在中国，农村金融专家何广文，郭晓丽也有类似的看法。

为什么金融体系改革是不是非常有效的，功能定位的暧昧是最主要的原因，下面进一步对模糊的功能进行讨论。

首先，关于农村融资有一个模糊的定位功能，。

中国应该如何发展合作金融仍然是一个争论的话题。

中国共产党（CCP）经济领导小组财务科办公室研究员唐人间指出：“这的确是一个头痛的，很难用几句话解释。

大多数高校的农业专家认为这是一个问题，不能简单地避免。

“这肯定显示了中国在发展农民专业合作社的困境。

许多学者在理论界坚持认为，应充分开发农村合作金融规范化和标准化，因为它是一种重要的组织和对农村金融的运作形式。

第二，财政农业政策性和商业性金融之间有一个不明确的业务范围。

1994年，农业中国开发银行的成立，强调分离的COM-商用金融，政策性金融。

这个问题不能得到很快解决，因为第一个商业性金融机构仍然承担一些政策性贷款。

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)RURAL FINANCE: MAINSTREAMING INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSBy Hans Dieter SeibelAbstractInformal financial institutions (IFIs), among them the ubiquitous rotating savings and credit associations, are of ancient origin. Owned and self-managed by local people, poor and non-poor, they are self-help organizations which mobilize their own resources, cover their costs and finance their growth from their profits. With the expansion of the money economy, they have spread into new areas and grown in numbers, size and diversity; but ultimately, most have remained restricted in size, outreach and duration. Are they best left alone, or should they be helped to upgradetheir operations and be integrated into the wider financial market? Under conducive policy conditions, some have spontaneously taken the opportunity of evolving into semiformal or formal microfinance institutions (MFIs). This has usually yielded great benefits in terms of financial deepening, sustainability and outreach. Donors may build on these indigenous foundations and provide support for various options of institutional development, among them: incentives-driven mainstreaming through networking; encouraging the establishment of new IFIs in areas devoid of financial services; linking IFIs/MFIs to banks; strengthening Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as promoters of good practices; and, in a nonrepressive policy environment, promoting appropriate legal forms, prudential regulation and delegated supervision. Key words: Microfinance, microcredit, microsavings。

金融监管改革与启示外文文献翻译2014年译文3400多字

金融监管改革与启示外文文献翻译2014年译文3400多字The financial crisis of 2008 XXX system。

As a result。

the United States has had to XXX and system。

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer XXX of this large-scale financial reform。

The Act XXX systematic risks。

XXX of the Consumer Financial n Bureau。

XXX derivatives markets。

as well as to end too big to fail bailouts.2 XXXThere have been XXX out that the financial crisis was caused by a lack of n and oversight of the financial industry。

In response。

the Dodd-Frank Act was passed to address these XXX.3 The Dodd-Frank ActThe Dodd-Frank Act is a XXX system。

One of the key features of the Act is the XXX。

XXX in the financial system。

The Act also creates the Consumer Financial n Bureau。

XXX.4 nThe Dodd-Frank Act is a significant step forward in the United States' XXX system。

While it is still too early to determine the full impact of the Act。

拉丁美洲农村金融机构信贷风险管理【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Managing Credit Risk in Rural Financial Institutions in Latin American Material Source：Rural Financial Learning Centre（RFLC）Authors：Mark Wenner, Sergio Navajas, Carolina Trivelli, Alvaro TarazonaAdequately managing credit risk in financial institutions is critical for their survival and growth. In the case of rural lending in general and agricultural lending in particular, the issue of credit risk is of even of greater concern because of the higher levels of perceived risks resulting from some of the characteristics of rural dwellers and the conditions that they find themselves in. More extremely poor people tend to live in rural than in urban areas. In addition, fewer people are able to access basic infrastructure services and these tend to be of lesser quality or to be less reliable than in urban areas. Rural residents tend to be less educated, more often than not they have insecure land tenure, and they live farther apart than urban populations .Most importantly, agriculture, the mainstay of most rural economies, tends to be subject to price volatility, weather shocks, and trade restrictions. As a result, financial institutions that are active in rural areas are likely to face an elevated level of credit risk and need to manage it well. The lack of good risk mitigation techniques and high transaction costs can discourage formal financial institutions from entering and serving rural areas.Conclusions and RecommendationsCredit risk management in Latin American rural financial institutions is improving and evolving, but much still needs to be done. Many of the institutions surveyed demonstrated success as measured by high overall rates of profitability, low delinquency rates in both general and agricultural portfolios, and sustained growth rates in agricultural portfolios over time. Nonetheless, the paucity of institutions active in rural areas and expressed desires for better risk management systems, the relatively small loan sizes, and restricted terms indicate that the situation is less than optimal.There are four ways to deal with credit risk—reduce it, cope with it, transfer it, or retain it. Based on survey results and the four case studies, the followingtechniques were identified as the most important and widely used:1.Expert-based, information-intensive credit technologies (whereinrepayment incentives for clients and performance incentives for staff play important roles and information acts as a virtual substitute for real guarantees) are being used to reduce risk.2. A number of diversification strategies (geographic, sectoral,commodity) are being used to cope with risk.3.Portfolio exposure limits (wherein agricultural credit is less than 40percent of total lending) are being used to reduce risk.4.Excessive provisioning is being used to absorb and internalize risks.Few, however, are transferring the credit risk to third parties and this represents the next challenge. Massive credit expansion in developed countries has been due in large part to the introduction and wide diffusion of risk transfer techniques (insurance, securitization, derivatives ,etc.) and the wider acceptance of different types of collateral (inventories, accounts receivables ,warehouse receipts, etc.). In Latin America, the most common risk transfer instruments available are publicly-financed loan guarantee funds; however, they are used only modestly (25 percent).Historically, guarantee funds have been plagued with problems of high costs, limited additional-ity, and moral hazard (A distinction should be made between individual loan guarantee funds to which this statement applies and intermediary guarantees to which it does not). Recent work has shown that the most successful guarantee funds in Latin America (in terms of additional-ity) are those in Chile, and that much of the positive impact is due to adequate regulation (Llisterri et al., 2006). In order to introduce some of the other risk transfer instruments more commonly found in developed financial markets, investments will be needed to reform and strengthen the insurance industry, capital markets, credit bureaus, commercial codes, secured transaction frameworks, and information disclosure rules. The implications of using the aforementioned credit risk management techniques commonly found in Latin America are manifold.First, the credit evaluation technologies commonly used are very expensive and tend to increase operating costs and interest rates charged because they are time and labor intensive. Steps need to be taken to dramatically reduce the cost of gathering and analyzing data; of securing, perfecting, and executing guarantees; of classifying and modeling risks; and of monitoring clients. With cost reductions, innovations in delivery mechanisms, and greater competition, interest rate spreads should declineover time, making financial systems more inclusive.Second, some minimal economies of scale and scope are necessary. The larger rural finance institutions in the sample showed that they could more easily diversify risks, offer a wider range of products, obtain better efficiency ratios, and charge lower lending interest rates. Agricultural lending probably cannot be the primary type of lending unless more robust risk transfer techniques become more commonplace. If more sophisticated risk transfer instruments can be introduced, smaller and more agriculturally or i-ented institutions can be more readily helped and supported. Otherwise, the challenge for donors/governments and owners of financial institutions is how to rapidly grow and diversify financial institutions that started out small with a rural vocation and how to attract to rural are as larger institutions that hitherto were primarily urban. The majority of rural financial institutions tend to be very small, exhibit many institutional needs (access to more low-cost source of funds, inadequate credit technology, better internal controls) and are possibly overexposed to agriculture .The larger financial institutions that social planners would like to see more active in rural areas are not interested because they perceive high risks and can exploit other more profitable market segments such as consumer lending to salaried workers.Third, the agricultural microfinance credit technology reviewed here is essentially an adaptation of urban microcredit technology, but it has limits. The better-performing institutions seem to adhere to a common set of principles, but there are slight differences from institution to institution as they adapt the principles to suit local conditions. For example, the general rule is to give preference to highly diversified households, but if price and yield risk can be controlled, institutions will lend to highly specialized farm households. The noteworthy differences of the rural adaptation of the urban micro-credit technology are the use of specialized staff with a knowledge of agronomy, fewer repayments, larger loan sizes, charging of relatively lower interest rates compared to micro-enterprise rates to avoid adverse selection, and projection of a strong corporate responsibility image. All of the four case study institutions, for example, finance works of charity and have a visible presence in the communities where they operate .The emerging model of agricultural microfinance, however, will have to evolve and possibly coexist with other credit technologies more suited for small business and fixed investment lending. The leading institutions are constantly tweaking and improving their technologies. However, the tweaking is being done by trial and error and not in asystematic way. To fully understand what works and does not work, cost accounting (activity-based accounting), randomize devaluations, and frequent client satisfaction surveys would have to be institutionalized .These changes can be costly and would require anew mindset and way of doing business.Based on the survey and case study findings, we have formulated six recommendations for donors, governments, and managers of financial institutions interested in designing interventions to improve how rural financial institutions manage credit risk.First, donors and governments should identify and support rural institutions with a minimum scale that would permit easy diversification of credit risk and help them to expand and innovate as the preferred or first best option. The second best option would be assist those with a clear strategic commitment to the rural sector and competent management to do the following: (i)upgrade credit technologies; (ii) help them develop diversification strategies within their reach(i.e. introduce new credit products, finance a wider number of sectors, finance only highly diversified households); and (iii) use agricultural portfolio limits by agency and total portfolio as an early warning system to take corrective actions .As the third best option, and in the absence of minimal scale institutions, donors and governments should strive to assist smaller institutions to merge or associate. An effective association of smaller institutions can derive benefits from collective action such as fundraising, common training, purchase and installation of modern information management systems, and lobbying for regulatory changes. A movement to merge smaller institutions would permit the emerging entity to have scale and scope. A fourth option would be to promote value chain financing wherein credit risk is managed and transferred among various actors in a supply chain. A fifth possible option, that donors and governments may pursue, would be link ages between regulated financial institutions (such as commercial banks) with NGOs active in rural areas. NGOs, for example, could serve as delegates of banks in remote areas.Second, donors, governments, and managers/owners of rural financial institutions need to collaborate in the introduction and improvement of a variety of risk transfer instruments. The risk transfer instruments in rank order of easiest to most difficult to introduce are (i) recognition and valuing of inventories and accounts receivables as forms of assets that can be pledged as colla t-eralor sold to third parties for cash; (ii) guarantee funds; (iii) credit insurance (death, disability, portfolio); (iv) parametric crop insurance; (v) portfolio securitization; and (vi)derivatives and swaps. Each of the above has preconditions and country-by-country assessments would have to be made. In general, recognition of inventories and accounts receivables require reforms in banking supervision and regulatory frameworks ,commercial codes, and taxes affecting financial transactions. To improve guarantee fund operations, political interference needs to be minimized or eliminated and adequate regulation introduced. To introduce credit insurance, credit bureaus have to be strengthened, and massive databases and probabilistic risk models built. To introduce crop insurance, large investments in information, training, and modeling are needed .To introduce portfolio securitization, long data series on loan type performance, standard underwriting procedures, a sufficient number of homogenous loans for bundling, and rating companies are needed. For derivatives and swaps, well-developed legal/regulatory frameworks and capital markets need to be developed.Third, donors and governments should promote and support regulated nonbank financial institutions .Nonbanks are forced to be more disciplined (adhere to loan documentation, risk classification, and provisioning rules) and have better chances of diversifying liabilities (access to government lines of credit, issuing bonds, capture savings (where permitted) besides obtaining commercial loans), but allowances have to be made for flexibility and innovation.Fourth, the role of the state is fundamental in helping to develop rural financial markets, but direct political interference at the retail level can retard progress. The preferred role would be for state-owned second-tier institutions to extend lines of credit and to train staff of rural finance institutions. Many of the institutions expressed a need for more liquidity and access to low-cost funds. It was also clear that term finance is very scarce. Most institutions do not offer term finance with the stated reason being fear of mismatches .Second-tier institutions and international donors can assist in extending terms through a combination of lines of credit and promotion of savings mobilization.Fifth, donors and governments should focus on improving the legal and regulatory framework, especially with regards to improving contract enforcement, an expressed concern of many surveyed.Sixth, donors and governments can assist in the capture and dissemination of relevant information that would serve to reduce asymmetries that contribute to market failures. High quality and functioning databases would help to facilitate better agricultural marketing, better risk measurement, better risk modeling, and thedesign of credit, savings, and insurance.译文拉丁美洲农村金融机构信贷风险管理资料来源:农村金融学习中心（RFLC）作者：马克·温纳,塞尔吉奥·纳瓦加斯,卡罗莱纳·泰维利,阿拉瓦罗·塔拉泽那金融机构恰当的信贷风险管理对于其生存和发展是非常关键的。

美国农业合作社与农业产业化外文文献翻译中英文

经济金融企业管理外文翻译外文文献英文文献

附录【原文】Upgrading in Global Value ChainsThe aim of this paper is to explore how small- andmedium-sized Latin American enterprises ( SMEs)may participate in global markets in a way thatprovides for sustainable growth. This may bedefined as the ‘‘highroad'' tocompetitiveness, contrasting with the ‘‘lowroad,'' typical of firms from developingcountries, which often compete by squeezing wagesand profit margins rather than by improving productivity, wages, and profits. The keydifference between the high and the low road to competitiveness is often explained by thedifferent capabilities of firms to ‘‘upgrade.'In this paper, upgrading refers to the capacityof a firm to innovate to increase the value addedof its products and processes (Humphrey & Schmitz,2002a; Kaplinsky&Readman, 2001; Porter, 1990).Capitalizing on one of the most productive areasof the recent literature on SMEs, we restrict ourfield of research to small enterprises located inclusters. There is now a wealth ofempirical evidence (Humphrey, 1995; Nadvi &Schmitz, 1999; Rabellotti,1997) showing that small firms in clusters,both in developed and developing countries, areable to over come some of the major constraints theydifficultskills, specialized of lack face: usuallyaccess to technology, inputs, market, information, credit, and external services.Nevertheless, the literature on clusters, mainlyfocused on the local sources ofcompetitiveness coming from intraclustervertical and horizontal relationshipsgenerating ‘‘collective efficiency''(Schmitz, 1995), has often neglected theincreasing importance of external link ages. Dueto recent changes in productionsystems, distribution channels, and financialmarkets, and to the spread of informationtechnologies, enterprises and clusters areincreasingly integrated in value chains thatoften operate across many different countries. Theliterature on global value chains(GVCs) (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi& Kaplinsky, 2001)calls attention to the opportunitiesfor local producers to learn from the global leadersof the chains that may be buyers or1producers. The internal governance of the value chain has an important effect on the scope of local firms' upgrading (Humphrey& Schmitz, 2000). Indeed, extensive evidence on Latin America reveals that both the local and the global dimensions matter, and firms often participate in clusters as well as in value chains (Pietrobelli& Rabellotti, 2004). Both forms oforganization offer opportunities to foster competitiveness via learningand upgrading. However, they also have remarkable drawbacks, as, forinstance, upgrading may be limited in some forms of value chains, and clusters with little developed external economies and joint actions may haveno influence on competitiveness.Moreover, both strands of literature were conceived and developed to overcome the sectoral dimension in the analysis of industrial organizationand dynamism. On the one hand, studies on clusters, focusing on agglomerations of firms specializing in different stages of the filie′re,moved beyond the traditional units of analysis of industrial economics:the firm and the sector. On the other hand, according to the value chain literature, firms from different sectors may all participate in the same value chain (Gereffi, 1994). Nevertheless, SMEs located in clusters and involved in value chains, may undertake a process of upgrading in order toincrease and improve their participation in the global economy, especiallyas the industrial sector plays a role and affects the upgrading prospects of SMEs.The contribution this paper makes is by taking into accountall of these dimensions together. Thus, within this general theoreticalbackground, this study aims to investigate the hypothesis that enterprise upgrading is simultaneously affected by firm-specific efforts and actions,and by the environment in which firms operate. The latter is crucially shapedby three characteristics: (i) the collective efficiency of the cluster in which SMEs operate, (ii) the pattern of governance of the value chain in which SMEs participate, and (iii) the peculiar features that characterizelearning and innovation patterns in specific sectors.The structure of the paper is the following: in Section 2, we briefly review theconcepts of clustering and value chains, and focus on their overlaps andcomplementarities. Section 3 first discusses the notion of SMEs' upgradingand then2introduces a categorization of groups of sectors, based on the notions underlying the Pavitt taxonomy, and applied to the present economicreality of Latin America. Section 4reports the original empirical evidenceon a large sample of Latin American clusters, and shows that the sectoral dimension matters to explain why clustering and participating in globalvalue chains offer different opportunities for upgrading in differentgroups of sectors. Section5 summarizes and concludes.2. CLUSTERS AND VALUE CHAINSDuring the last two decades, the successful performance of industrial districts in the developed world, particularly in Italy, has stimulated new attention to the potential offered by this form of industrial organization for firms of developing countries. The capability of clusteredfirms to be economically viable and grow has attracted a great deal of interest in development studies. 1In developing countries, the sectoral and geographical concentration of SMEs israther common, and a wide range of cases has since been reported. 2 Obviously, theexistence of acritical mass of specialized and agglomerated activities,in a number ofcases with historically strong roots, does not necessarily imply that these clustersshare all the stylized facts which identify the Marshall type of district, as firstlydefined by Becattini (1987). 3 Nonetheless, clustering may be considered as a majorfacilitating factor for a number of subsequent developments (which may or may notoccur): division and specialization of labor, the emergence of a wide network ofsuppliers, the appearance of agents who sell to distant national andinternationalmarkets, the emergence of specialized producer services, the materialization of a poolbusinessof formation the and workers, skilled and specialized of associations.To capture the positive impacts of these factors on the competitiveness of firmslocated in clusters, Schmitz (1995) introduced the concept of‘‘collective efficiency''(CE) defined as the competitive advantage derived from local external economies andjoint action. The concept of external economies 4 was first introduced by Marshall inhis Principles of Economics(1920). According to Schmitz (1999a), incidentalexternaleconomies (EE) are of importance in explaining the competitiveness of industrialclusters, but there is also a deliberate force at work: consciously pursuedjoint action3(JA).Such joint action can be within vertical or horizontal linkages. 5 The combination of both incidental external economies and the effects of activecooperation defines the degree of collective efficiency of a cluster and, dynamically,its potential for fostering SMEs' upgrading. Both dimensions arecrucial: Onlyincidental, passive external economies may not suffice without joint actions, and thelatter hardly develop in the absence of external economies. Thus, our focus is on therole of intracluster vertical and horizontal relationships generating collectiveefficiency.However, recent changes in production systems, distribution channels and financial markets, accelerated by the globalization of product marketsand the spread of information technologies, suggest that more attentionneeds to be paid to external linkages. 6 Gereffi's global value chain approach (Gereffi, 1999) helps us to take into account activities taking place outside the cluster and, in particular, to understand the strategic role of the relationships with key external actors.From an analytical point of view, the value chain perspective is useful because (Kaplinsky,2001; Wood, 2001) the focus moves from manufacturing onlyto the other activities involved in the supply of goods and services, including distribution and marketing. All these activities contributeto add value. Moreover, the ability to identify theactivities providinghigher returns along the value chain is key to understanding the globalappropriation of the returns to production.Value chain research focuses on the nature of the relationships among the various actors involved in the chain, and on their implications for development (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b). To study these relationships, theconcept of ‘‘governance'' is central to the analysis.At any point in the chain, some degree of governance or coordination is required in‘‘how''or be, should ‘‘what'' on only not decisions take to order something shouldbe, produced but sometimes also ‘‘when,'' ‘‘how much,'' and even‘‘at what price.''Coordination may occur through arm's-length market relationsornon marketrelationships. In the latter case, following Humphrey and Schmitz(2000), wedistinguish three possible types of governance:(a) network implying cooperation4between firms of more or less equal power which share their competencies within the chain; (b) quasi-hierarchy involving relationships between legally independent firms in which one is subordinated to the other, with a leader in the chain defining the rules to which the rest of the actors have to comply; and (c) hierarchy when a firm is owned by an external firm. Also stressed is the role played by GVC leaders, particularly by the buyers, intransferring knowledge along the chains. For small firms in less developed countries(LDCs), participation in value chains is a way to obtain information on the need andmode to gain access to global markets. Yet, although this information has high valuefor local SMEs, the role played by the leaders of GVCs in fostering and supportingthe SMEs' upgrading process is less clear. Gereffi (1999), mainly focusing on EastAsia, assumes a rather optimistic view, emphasizing the role of the leadersthat almostautomatically promote process, product, and functional upgrading among small localproducers. Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2004) present a more differentiated picture forLatin America.In line with the present approach, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000)discuss the prospects of upgrading with respect to the pattern of value chain governance. They conclude that insertion in a quasi-hierarchical chainoffers very favorable conditions for process and product upgrading, but hinders functional upgrading. Networks offer ideal upgrading conditions,but they are the least likely to occur for developingcountry producers.In addition, a more dynamic approach suggests that chain governanceis not given forever and may change because(Humphrey & Schmitz, 2002b):(a) power relationships may evolve when existing producers, or their spin offs, acquire new capabilities;(b) establishing and maintainingquasi-hierarchical governance is costly for the lead firm and leads to inflexibility because of transaction specific investments; and (c) firms andcluster soften do not operate only in one chain but simultaneously in severaltypes of chains, and they may apply competencies learned in one chainto supply other chains.In sum, both modes of organizing production, that is, the cluster and the valuechain, offer interesting opportunities for the upgrading and modernization of local5firms, and are not mutually exclusive alternatives. However, in order to assess their potential contribution to local SMEs' innovationandupgrading, we need to understand their organization of inter firm linkages and their internal governance. Furthermore, as we explain in the following section, the nature of their dominant specialization also playsa role and affects SMEs' upgrading prospects.3. THE SECTORAL DIMENSION OFSMEs' UPGRADING(a) The concept of upgradingThe concept of upgrading—making better products, making them more efficiently, or moving in to more skilled activities—hasoftenbeen used in studies on competitiveness (Kaplinsky,2001; Porter, 1990),and is relevant here.Following this approach, upgrading is decisively related to innovation. Here wedefine upgrading as innovating to increase value added. 7 Enterprises achieve this invarious ways, such as, for example, by entering higher unit value market niches ornew sectors, or by undertaking new productive (or service) functions. The concept ofupgrading may be effectively described for enterprises working within a value chain,where four types of upgrading are singled out (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000): —Process upgrading is transforming inputs into outputs more efficiently by reorganizing the production system or introducing superiortechnology (e.g., footwear producers in the Sinos Valley; Schmitz,1999b).—Product upgrading is moving into more sophisticated product lines in terms of increased unit values (e.g., the apparel commodity chain in Asia upgrading from discount chains to department stores;Gereffi,1999).—Functional upgrading is acquiring new, superior functions in the chain, such as design or marketing or abandoning existing low-value added functions to focus on higher value added activities (e.g.,Torreon'sblue jeans industry upgrading from maquila to ‘‘full-package'' manufacturing; Bair&Gereffi, 2001).Inter sectoral upgrading is applying the competence acquired in —．a particularfunction to move into a new sector. For instance, in Taiwan, competence inproducingTVs was used to make monitors and then to move into the computer sector (Guerrieri& Pietrobelli,2004; Humphrey & Schmitz,2002b). In sum, upgrading within a value6chain implies going up on the value ladder, moving away from activities in which competitionis of the ‘‘low road'' type and entry barriers are low.Our focus on upgrading requires moving a step forward and away from Ricardo's static concept of ‘‘Comparative Advantage'' (CA). While CA registers ex-post gaps in relative productivity which determine international trade flows, success in firmlevel upgrading enables the dynamic acquisition of competitiveness in new market niches, sectors or phases of the productive chain (Lall, 2001; Pietrobelli, 1997). In sum,the logic goes from innovation, to upgrading, to the acquisition of firm-level competitiveness(i.e., competitive advantage). 8In this paper, we argue that the concept of competitive advantage increasinglymatters. In the theory of comparative advantage, what matters is relative productivity,determining different patterns of inter industryspecialization.Within such atheoretical approach, with perfectly competitive markets, firms need to target onlyproduction efficiency. In fact, this is not enough, and competitive advantage is therelevant concept to analyze SMEs' performance because of (i) the existence of formsof imperfect competition in domestic and international markets and (ii) the presenceof different degrees of (dynamic) externalities in different subsect or sand stages ofthe value chain.More specifically, in non perfectly competitive market rents and niches of ‘‘extra-normal'' profits often emerge, and this explains the efforts to enter selectively specificsegments rather than simply focusing on efficiency improvements, regardless of theCA).of theory the by advocated (as specialization productive prevailing Moreover,different stages in the value chain offer different scope for dynamic externalities.Thus, for example, in traditional manufacturing, the stagesofdesign, productinnovation, marketing, and distribution may all foster competitiveness increases inrelated activities and sectors. The advantage of functional upgrading is in reducing thefragility and vulnerability of an enterprise's productive specialization. Competitionfrom new entrants—i.e., firms from developing countries with lower production costs,crowding out incumbents—is stronger in the manufacturing phases of the value chainthan in other more knowledge and organization-intensive phases (e.g., product design7and innovation, chain management, distribution and retail,etc.).Therefore,functionalupgrading may bring about more enduring and solid competitiveness. For all these reasons, the concept of production efficiency is encompassed withinthe broader concept of competitiveness, and the efforts to upgrade functionally andinter sectorally (and the policies to support these processes) are justifiedto reap largerrents and externalities emerging in specific stages of the value chain, market niches,or sectors.An additional element that crucially affects the upgrading prospects of firms and clusters is the sectoral dimension. Insofar as we have defined upgrading as innovating to increase value added, then all the factors influencing innovation acquire a new relevance. This dimension is often overlooked in studies on clusters, perhaps due to the fact that most ofthese studies are not comparative but rather detailed intra industrycase studies.In order to take into account such a sectoral dimension, and the effect this may have on the firms' pattern of innovation and learning, we need tointroduce the concept of ‘‘tacit knowledge.'' This notion wasfirstintroduced by Polanyi(1967) and then discussed in the context of evolutionary economics by Nelson and Winter(1982). It refers to the evidence that some aspects of technological knowledge arewellarticulated, written down in manuals and papers, and taught. Others are largely tacit, mainly learned through practice and practical examples. Inessence, this is knowledge which can be freely used by its owners, but that can not be easily expressed and communicated to anyone else. The tacit component of technological knowledge makes its transfer and applicationcostly and difficult. As a result, the mastery of a technologymay require anorganization to be active in the earlier stages of its development, and a close andcontinuous interaction between the user and the producer—or transfer—of suchknowledge. Inter firm relationships are especially needed in thiscontext. Tacitknowledge is an essential dimension to define a useful groupingof economicactivities.(b) Sectoral specificities in upgrading and innovation: a classification for Latin8American countriesThe impact of collective efficiency and patterns of governance on the capacity of SMEs to upgrade may differ across sectors. This claimis based upon the consideration that sectoral groups differ in terms of technological complexity and in the modes and sources of innovationand upgrading. 9 As shown by innovation studies, in some sectors, verticalrelations with suppliers of inputs may be particularly important sourcesofproduct and process upgrading (as in the case of textiles and the most traditional manufacturing), while in other sectors, technologyusers, organizations such as universities or the firms themselves (as,for example, with software or agro industrial products) may provide majorstimuli for technical change (Pavitt,1984; Von Hippel, 1987). Consistently with this approach, the properties of firm knowledge basesacrossdifferent sectors (Malerba & Orsenigo, 1993) 10 mayaffect the strategic relevance ofcollective efficiencyfor the processes of upgrading in clusters. Thus, for example, intraditional manufacturing sectors, technology has important tacit and idiosyncraticelements, and therefore, upgrading strongly depends on the intensity of technologicalexternalities and cooperation among local actors (e.g., firms, research centers, andtechnology and quality diffusion centers), in other words, upgrading depends on thedegree of collective efficiency. While in other groups (e.g., complex products or largenatural resource-based firms) technology is more codified and the access to externalsources of knowledge such as transnational corporations(TNCs,or researchlaboratories located in developed countries become more critical for upgrading.Furthermore, the differences across sectoral groups raise questions onthe role ofglobal buyers in fostering (or hindering) the upgrading in different clusters. Thus, forexample, global buyers may be more involved and interestedintheir providers'upgrading if the technology required is mainly tacit and requires intense interaction.Moreover, in traditional manufacturing industries, characterized by a low degree oftechnological complexity, firms are likely to be included in GVCs even if they havevery low technological capabilities. Therefore, tight supervision and direct supportbecome necessary conditions for global buyers who rely on the competencies of their9local suppliers and want to reduce the risk of non compliance(Humphrey &Schmitz,2002b). The situation is at the opposite extreme in the case of complex products,where technology is often thoroughly codified and the technologicalcomplexityrequires that firms have already internal technological capabilities to besubcontracted,otherwise large buyers would not contract them at all.In order to take into account the above-mentioned hypotheses, wedevelop asectoral classification, adapting existing taxonomies to the Latin American case. 11On the basis of Pavitt's seminal work (1984), we consider that in Latin America, in-house R&D activities are very low both in domestic and foreign firms (Archibugi&Pietrobelli, 2003), domestic inter sectoral linkages have been displaced by tradeliberalization(Cimoli & Katz, 2002), and university-industry linkages appear to bestill relatively weak (Arocena & Sutz, 2001). 12 Furthermore, in the past 10 years,Latin America has deepened its productive specialization in resource basedsectors and has weakened its position in more engineering intensive industries (Katz,2001), reflecting its rich endowment of natural resources,relatively more than human and technical resources (Wood & Berge, 1997).Hence, we retain Pavitt's key notions and identify four main sectoralgroups for Latin America on the basis of the way learning and upgrading occur,and on the related industrial organization that most frequently prevails. 13The categories are as follows:1.Traditionalmanufacturing,mainlylaborintensiveandtiles,footwear, textiles, as such industries technology ‘‘traditional'' and furniture;2. Natural resource-based sectors (NRbased),implying the direct exploitation of natural resources, for example, copper, marble, fruit, etc.;3. Complex products industries (COPs), including, among others, automobiles,autocomponents and aircraft industries, ICT and consumer electronics;4. Specializedsuppliers, in our LA cases, essentially software.Each of these categories tends to havea predominant learning and innovating behavior, in terms of main sources of technicalchange, dependence on basic or applied research, modes of in-house innovation (e.g.,‘‘routinized'' versus large R&D laboratories), tacitness or codified nature ofknowledge, scale and relevance of R&D activity, and appropriability of10innovation(Table 1).Traditional manufacturing and resource-based sectors are by far the most present in Latin America, and therefore especially relevant toour presentaims of assessing SMEs' potential for upgrading within clusters and value chains. Traditional manufacturing is defined as supplier dominated, because major process innovations are introduced by producers of inputs (e.g., machinery, materials, etc.). Indeed, firm shave room to upgrade their products (and processes)by developing or imitating new products' designs, often interacting with large buyers that increasingly play a role in shaping the design of final products and hence the specificities of the process of production (times, quality standards, and costs).Natural resource-based sectors crucially rely on the advancement ofbasic and applied science, which, due to low appropriability conditions, is most often undertaken by public research institutes,possibly in connection with producers (farmers, breeders, etc.). 14 Inthese sectors, applied research is mainly carried out by input suppliers (i.e., chemicals, machinery, etc.) which achieve economies of scale and appropriate the results of their research through patents.Complex products are defined as ‘‘high cost,engineering-intensive products,subsystems, or constructs suppliedby a unit of production'' (Hobday,1998), 15where the local network is normally anchored to one ‘‘assembler,'' which operates asa leading firm characterized by high design and technological capabilities. To ouraims, the relationships of local suppliers with these ‘‘anchors'' may be crucial tofoster (or hinder) firms' upgrading through technology and skill transfers(or the lackof them).Scale-intensive firms typically lead complex product sectors (Bell& Pavitt,1993), where the process of technical change is realized within an architectural set), and it is often incremental and modular.Henderson & Clark, 1990(Among the Specialized Suppliers, we only consider software, which is typicallyclient driven. This is an especially promising sector for developing countries' SMEs,due to the low transport and physical capital costs and the highinformation intensityof the sector, which moderates the importance of proximity to final markets andextends the scope for a deeper international division of labor.Moreover, the11disintegration of some productive cycles, such as for example of telecommunications,opens up new market niches with low entry barriers(Torrisi, 2003). However,at thesame time, the proximity of the market and of clients may crucially improve thedevelopment of design capabilities and thereby foster product/process up grading.Thus, powerful pressures for cluste ring and globalization coexist in this sector.The different learning patterns across these four groups of activities areexpected to affect the process of upgrading of clusters in value chains. This paper also aims at analyzing with original empirical evidence whether—and how—the sectoral dimension influences this process in LatinAmerica.4. METHODOLOGY: COLLECTIONAND ANALYSIS OF DATAThis study is based on the collection of original data from 12 clustersin LatinAmerica that have not hitherto been investigated, and on an extensivereview of cluster studies available. The empirical analysis was carried outfrom September 2002 to June 2003 with the support of the Inter AmericanDevelopment Bank. An international team of 12 experts in Italy andin four LA countries collected and reviewed the empirical data. Desk and field studies were undertaken following the same methodology, whichinvolved field interviews with local firms, institutions, and observers, interviews withforeign buyers and TNCs involved in the local cluster, and secondary sourcessuch as。

民间金融风险防范与控制研究外文文献翻译最新

毕业设计附件外文文献翻译：原文+译文文献出处:Thomas. The study on the prevention and control of folk financial risk. International journal of forecasting, 2016, 3(12): 149-162.原文The study on the prevention and control of folk financial riskThomasAbstractA lot of research results show that the formal financial market and the folk financial markets is a common phenomenon in developing countries. Formal financial information cost, transaction cost and risk cost, makes the folk financial the first choice of most of the farmers and rural small and medium-sized enterprises (sees).Although folk finance is a semi-public, half underground running, but the farmers and small and medium-sized enterprise financing and development plays an extremely important role in the process, the play an important role in the improvement in economic welfare. Folk finance is in order to solve the economic subject within a certain geographical area need for the funds for production and life and spontaneously formed a kind of endogenous financial, private financial scale is directly related to how developed private economy.Keywords: private finance; financial risk; Risk control1 IntroductionFolk finance, as a kind of the endogenous financial system arrangement, in meet the demand of farmers and small and medium-sized enterprise financing, improve economic benefits of the role of the bottom has been unanimously recognized by the academia. The folk financial the call for sunlight and regularization is becoming more and stronger. However, we really ready? Frequent in the folk financial markets, andfinancial regulatory authorities to the chaos of control less than reality, our answer is no. Everything has two sides, the folk finance as well. For the existence of the folk financial basis and research a lot of social and economic benefits. For folk concept, characteristics, causes of financial risk, control, research, academic circles still have a long way to go, and this is the way a footprint. The purpose of this article is to put forward a feasible risk control mode to achieve the folk financial risk regulation. Occur in multiple places of the folk financial mess shows that private lending activities may have entered the exposure period, local financial risk and social risk may arise the overlay, attaches great importance to and need to be vigilant. All of these events are severely disrupted the financial market order, exacerbated the instability of financial markets, resulting in serious losses to the national economy. In addition, the huge private financial markets, also makes the national macroeconomic regulation and control ability is limited, especially the effectiveness of monetary policy under great challenge. The implementation of the national monetary policy, not only should consider macroeconomic reality needs, also want to consider the folk financial markets bear ability, reduce the systemic risk. But as a result of the folk financial nature of species diversity, complex and hidden operation, making its financing risks are difficult to measure and control.2 Literature review2.1 Financial deepeningMcKinnon proposed developing countries to solve the problem of informal finance can only reduce the government too much intervention in the financial, financial deepening. Financial deepening can break the monopoly of state-owned financial, on the one hand, on the other hand can improve the efficiency of market allocation of resources. This view is essentially trying to through the financial deepening, use formal financial instead of private finance. Yet this view ignores the costs and risks of financial deepening and financial deepening in Latin America and Africa countries proved no obvious achievements, but lead to chaos in the part of the country's financial order.2.2 The formal financial and private financial connectedBy comparing formal financial and private financial analysis, points out that the formal financial and private financial connection can not only effectively reduce the transaction costs, but also can promote the development of informal finance and the shift to the formal financial. The present study focused on the various connection modes on the influence of the folk financial market interest rates, and interest rates is influence and reflect the folk financial market risk level of an important factor. As the World Bank report points out, the development of a connection of two markets is a promising strategy for the development of financial system, can provide some useful reference for the folk financial regulation. Theoretical results eventually supported by practice, practice show that in developing countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia vertical connection way is preferable.2.3 Recognize the legitimacy of the folk financeThe system orientation is mainly having three: one is from the legal level admits the folk finance. Folk financial activities in the formation of the contract must be effective protection law, to include the credit relationship in the adjusting range of formal system, within the legal framework to solve disputes and contradictions, eliminate the possibility of instability. The second is to reduce market access conditions, the folk financial development to provide a relatively loose financial competition environment, so that it can really on the platform of "fair, just" equal competition with formal financial. Three is to provide business consulting and related services for private finance. This can not only reduce the management risk, but also can enlarge the folk financial management activity area, make its share the benefit from the scale economy, improve its efficiency.3 Folk overview of financial risk3.1 The conceptionFolk financial also refers to the informal finance, it is relative to the formal financial, norms and management in the central and financial regulatory authorities of those financial activities and financial institutions. Folk finance, as a kind of endogenous institutional arrangement, its in eliminating poverty, improve the underlying community welfare, and promote the development of small andmedium-sized economic subject role has been widely recognized by the academic circle. However, folk financial market development is not normative and presents the various risks seriously impedes the development of private financial markets function, also led to the chaos in the regional financial order. People increasingly realize that how to effectively avoid and resolve, the folk financial risk control, has become a stable financial order and maintain people's vital interests of the major problems. Folk financial risks with folk suffers from the co-existence of financial markets is, is the product of market economy. Folk include financial risk; financial risk is the financial risk in the embodiment of the folk finance. The diversity of the folk financial form determines the folk financial risk the diversity of forms. The analysis of risk characterization, help us to know more intuitive folk financial risks. Folk financial market risk accumulation mainly has: the folk financing activities active, folk financing interest rates are high, formal financial institutions handling disorder. Active folk financing activity often is the result of speculation, rather than normal investment behavior of the capital requirements.3.2 ConstitutionFolk financial market risk consists of three parts: system risk, the systemic risk and systemic risk system risk refers to the many folk financial market trading behavior due to do not conform to the current laws and regulations under the law, and the possibility of asset losses. In general, the more the government's attitude towards the folk financial tough, suppression of crowding out, the more folk facing the greater the risk of financial activities. Systemic risk refers to the changes in the macroeconomic and financial situation of the folk financial market changes in the borrower solvency. Economic prosperity and recession, the financial situation better and worse, formal financial institutions such as the change of the management behavior is the main source of folk financial market systemic risk. The systemic risk refers to the borrowing enterprise or individual characteristic of the folk financial market risk. The systemic risk depends on the private information of the lender to borrowers to master and the constraints of the ability for its breach. In general, borrowing the relationship is more intimate, to get to know each other more fully, thesystemic risk. Unsystematic risk is the folk financial markets themselves can control and restrained, and the system risk and systemic risk is the result of the folk external financial market, private financial market participants to take the initiative to take measures to prevent the extremely limited.3.3 Features3.3.1 RegionalOn the one hand, the folk causes have regional financial risk. Relative to the entire country macro economic changes, the folk financial markets to be more sensitive to the change of regional economic development situation. The regional economy, industrial structure, changes in the residents' income and other economic variables, is the direct cause of regional folk financial risk. On the other hand, the folk has affected the scope of regional financial risks. These connections between private financial institutions than mutual communications between the formal financial institutions is much more loose, so the folk financial markets don't like formal financial market risk, once the outbreak often threaten the country's economic development and social stability. Folk financial market risk within the scope of general concentrated in certain areas, the scope is much smaller than formal financial market risk.3.3.2 Rainfall distribution on 10-12 diversityFolk financial markets in the form of diversification is diversity of the main causes of financial risk. Folk finance not only includes folk lending, loan, financing, and other forms of direct financing, also including the private bank, pawn, small loan companies, financial companies, financial intermediaries, such as the financing guarantee company. Financing forms of participation in different objects, different mode of operation, financing scale, the frequency characteristics of each different, this leads to the diversity of risk: a sudden, there is also a moderate; there are explicit and implicit; There are also passive faithless, active default; There are well-intentioned repayment willingness and malicious financial fraud. In addition, the folk financial risk also has complexity. Folk financial market not only influenced by macro economy and regional economy, but also by national monetary policy, the formalfinancial institutions market behavior, the influence of many factors interweave together, makes it hard for the folk financial risk identification and control.3.3.3 ConcealmentLow degree of organization, private financial markets by external supervision and institutional constraints are weak, some financing behavior is deep underground is difficult to detect, much less regulation. Folk financial risk can often hidden for a long time and don't explode, investigate its reason mainly lies in its financial activities is not subject to supervision, when assets loss occurs, the borrower often through constantly create new credit assets loss to compensate for the previous financial risk formation, so as to achieve the aim of risk cover. The concealment of the folk financial risk and broad sweep the subject makes folk financial risk is extremely difficult to control, and the risk after the outbreak of easy to induce malignant social events. Folk difficult control of the financial risk is relative to the norms of formal financial risks, it does not represent can't control. Through to the folk finance main body behavior guide and specification, on the basis of modern technology, can realize to the folk financial risk prediction, prevention and control.译文民间金融风险防范与控制研究Thomas摘要大量的研究结果表明，正规金融市场与民间金融市场的并存是发展中国家的一个普遍现象。

农村金融外文翻译文献综述

农村金融外文翻译文献综述(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)农村金融发展不会促进经济发展吗？来自尼日利亚的实证摘要：强劲的经济发展是不可能没有金融深化的，尤其是在欠发达国家（最不发达国家）大多数民众居住的农村社区。

本文分析了农村金融发展对尼日利亚经济增长的影响。

本文选用了1980-2011年的时间序列数据，运用Johansen和Juselius的协整检验，以得出变量之间的长期关系。

因此，用动态普通最小二乘法（ DOLS ）方法揭示尼日利亚农村金融发展与经济增长之间的关系。

协整检验结果表明农村金融发展与尼日利亚经济增长之间存在长期关系。

此外， DOLS 结果发现农村金融发展与尼日利亚经济增长之间存在显著的正相关关系。

它在这项研究中得到证实，农村金融作为全国经济增长的引擎。

因此，可以得出结论，提高农村生产力的信贷可以减免弱势创业者的负担，从而使他们能够对尼日利亚经济的发展做出最大的贡献。

此外，本研究建议除其他事项外，对于农村生产的信贷分配的障碍应减少到最低限度。

关键词：农村发展；信贷分配；金融发展1 引言包容性增长的理念，促使第三世界的经济体发起，实现变化的政策和规划旨在将瘫痪的经济代理人转变成积极的人员来提高他们的经济增长。

尼日利亚政府也不例外，政府促进包容性增长通过尼日利亚中央银行（CBN）运用双广义目标金融包容策略。

首先，要将无银行帐户的民众绝大多数在农村社区成为金融体系的活跃成员。

其次，它也强调在农民负担得起的成本上，提高农村居民的信贷可得性。

不幸的是，在使用金融包容性策略如村镇银行和农业信贷保证计划等等，没有达到目标受益者。

一方面，一些确定为负责非洲农村金融市场的发展表现不佳的问题包括过度管制，监管不力和人才缺乏（Aliero，2009）。

另一方面，该方案在那时间会受政治因素影响（Ibrahim和Aliero，2012）。

尼日利亚历届政府都提出了结构调整计划的几个扶贫方案（SAP）通过国家的经济增长和发展战略（需求）转换到议程。

农村金融监管的思考中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融监管的思考中英文对照外文翻译文献农村金融监管的思考中英文对照外文翻译文献Improve the concept of financial supervision in rural areas1Xun QianFarmers in China's vast population, has some large-scale production of the farmers, but also survival-oriented farmers, huge differences between the financial needs of rural finance intermediation makes complex, together with agriculture itself is the profit low, natural and market risks high risk decision to weak agricultural industry characteristics, resulting in the cost of rural financial transactions is far higher than the city, also decided to organize the rural financial system in terms of operation or in the market has its own special characteristics. 20 years of financial reform, financial development while the Chinese city made impressive achievements, but the rural finance is the entire financial system is still the weakest link. Insufficient supply of rural finance, competition is not sufficient, farmers and agricultural enterprises in getting loans and other issues is also very prominent, backward rural financial system can no longer effectively support the development of modern agriculture or the transformation of traditional agriculture and the building of new socialist countryside, which to improve the rural financial supervision new topic.China's rural financial regulatory problems(A) the formation of China's financial regulatory system had "a line three commission " (People's Bank, the Securities Regulatory Commission, Insurance Regulatory Commission and the Banking Regulatory Commission) financial regulatory structure. BankThese stringent requirements, different management and diversification of monitoring has its positive role, but it also had some negative effects. First, inefficient supervision, supervision of internal consumption of high costs, limited financial industry business development and innovation space. Second, the regulatory agencies, regulatory bodies and the information asymmetry between central banks, banking, securities, and insurance mechanisms of coordination between regulatory bodies are1American Journal of Agricultural Economics，2009.not perfect. Information between central banks and regulatory agencies is difficult to share, is difficult to create effective monitoring force. Basically between the various regulators in their respective state regulators, regulatory policies and measures to overlapping or conflicting phenomena have occurred, unable to cope with China's current rural financial market complexity and diversity and so on. Third, financial institutions have liquidity risk or out of the market and so on, may be excessive because the central bank assistance, financial institutions and financial institutions led to the person in charge "capacity risk" and "moral hazard", or for financial institutions regulatory arbitrage possibilities; addition, since the lack of recourse, may adversely affect the financial stability.(B) rural financial ecological environment is not in-depthThe current financial environment in rural county building still remains in the letter the user, village, township, community development credit level, "government-led, human-propelled, departmental interaction" and create a mechanism for financial ecological environment in rural areas lack. Local governments and authorities the importance of financial knowledge of the ecological environment is not deep, implementation and functions of individual local protectionism and heavy, there is interference with the financial sector credit and other daily business situation. Rural credit system lag, lack of bad credit punishment mechanism, rural businesses and residents in the overall credit awareness is not high, rural finance development and expansion of social services and social protection of the environment has not yet formed.(C) China's existing legal system of financial supervision and a number of shortcomings, can not guarantee that financial regulation is reasonable, effective, standardized implementationFirst, regulatory lag, supporting regulations are incomplete, the content is too rough, too simple, the banking, securities and insurance supervision laws and regulations more old, a general lack of quantitative science. Supervisory regulations and standards, regulatory methods and technical means not meet regulatory requirements in the market. Staff in the actual implementation, not easy to grasp the scale, may of operation. Second, the Chinese regulators and the regulated objects exist some interest, and the existing regulations, lack of supervision and regulatoryenforcement are to ensure that financial regulation can not be just and reasonable. Finally, China's financial supervision is still difficult to shake off the inertia of the executive-style regulatory impact.(D) of the Rural Financing drifting outside the existing financial regulatoryAccording to IFAD study, Chinese farmers from the informal financial institutions, loans from official credit institutions about 4 times. For farmers, the importance of informal financial markets over the formal financial market. China's mainly rural folk form of finance rural credit cooperatives, Cooperation, private lending, private banks, private funds, microfinance, etc., of which only rural credit cooperatives and microfinance in China's financial supervision under the rest of the financial forms the lack of appropriate supervision. The general lack of rural financial organizations of civil norms, there is a big risk, China's existing laws and regulations on private financial institutions in rural areas is one of "isolation" policy, making a lot of money from the dark into the rural financial market and greater regulation of financial difficulty, on rural financial security is a potential threat.learn from the developed countries(A) improve coordination of rural finance mechanisms for external supervision1. The United States "multiple composite" of the coordination mechanism. U.S. financial cooperation system in rural areas by the federal mid-term credit banks, cooperative banks, federal land banks and federal land bank system composed of three Cooperatives, the Farm Credit Administration (NCUA) leadership, and with the Council under the leadership of the private banks in rural commercial credit, National Rural Credit Bank policy of the United States shared the task of rural financial intermediation. The organizational model is a typical multi-mode hybrid system, three systems have an independent management system, with clear terms of reference. To ensure the healthy development of rural financial institutions, commercial banks in the United States adopted a different regulatory models, specifically setting up a relatively sound financial regulatory system in rural areas, including regulators, industry self-regulation associations, financial intermediation and mutual insurance group clearing center, the four kind of independent agencies and their subsidiary bodies, the functions of different, but share the same objectives as a common rural cooperative financial institutions to serve the regulatory system.2. Germany's "comprehensive regulatory model" of coordination mechanisms. Low concentration of the German banking system, in the very important parts of the bank, the representative of the financial mixed operation. Commonwealth Bank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority the power to regulate the two main regulators of the banking sector there is a clear division of labor, but also close cooperation. Commonwealth Bank in Germany, nine states have branch offices, using their own network advantages to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for daily transmission of data banks focus for the Federal Financial Authority to provide a better basis for the exercise of regulatory functions, but it is not directly involved in the regulation work, nor has the administrative punishment. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority did not have branches in the states, it is difficult to carry out regular supervision, need to cooperate with the Commonwealth Bank to perform its regulatory functions. Germany's main central banks and industry rely on the federal audit of the regulatory system and risk prevention and protection system to ensure rural finance in the specification on the basis of continuous development.3. Japan's "complement each other-type" coordination mechanism. In Japan, the dual supervision of the implementation of rural finance: first, the Office of Government financial regulation, supervision on the implementation of various financial institutions, to achieve the overall risk control; Second, national and local Forestry and Fisheries Department with the Office of Financial Regulation on the implementation of rural financial institutions supervision, including the Ministry of Agriculture consists of the branch on Norinchukin supervision, Forestry and Fisheries set up in six major areas of agricultural area in County Council on joint supervision of the letter, and all, Road House, County Farmer of the Ministry of Agriculture within its jurisdiction Association for Cooperative Finance Supervision Department(B) the establishment of deposit insurance and emergency rescue system to form a three-tier safety netDeveloped financial system generally established strict internal management system, deposit insurance system and the system of three emergency safety net. As a second-class safety net of deposit insurance system has been very satisfactory. The federal government on rural finance unified compulsory deposit insurance, the specific business operation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Savings。

农村金融监管中英文对照外文翻译文献

农村金融监管中英文对照外文翻译文献农村金融监管中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)Improve the concept of financial supervision in rural areas1Xun QianFarmers in China's vast population, has some large-scale production of the farmers, but also survival-oriented farmers, huge differences between the financial needs of rural finance intermediation makes complex, together with agriculture itself is the profit low, natural and market risks high risk decision to weak agricultural industry characteristics, resulting in the cost of rural financial transactions is far higher than the city, also decided to organize the rural financial system in terms of operation or in the market has its own special characteristics. 20 years of financial reform, financial development while the Chinese city made impressive achievements, but the rural finance is the entire financial system is still the weakest link. Insufficient supply of rural finance, competition is not sufficient, farmers and agricultural enterprises in getting loans and other issues is also very prominent, backward rural financial system can no longer effectively support the development of modern agriculture or the transformation of traditional agriculture and the building of new socialist countryside, which to improve the rural financial supervision new topic.China's rural financial regulatory problems(A) the formation of China's financial regulatory system had "a line three commission " (People's Bank, the Securities Regulatory Commission, Insurance Regulatory Commission and the Banking Regulatory Commission) financial regulatory structure. BankThese stringent requirements, different management and diversification of monitoring has its positive role, but it also had some negative effects. First, inefficient supervision, supervision of internal consumption of high costs, limited financial industry business development and innovation space. Second, the regulatory agencies, regulatory bodies and the information asymmetry between central banks, banking, securities, and insurance mechanisms of coordination between regulatory bodies are1American Journal of Agricultural Economics，2009.not perfect. Information between central banks and regulatory agencies is difficult to share, is difficult to create effective monitoring force. Basically between the various regulators in their respective state regulators, regulatory policies and measures to overlapping or conflicting phenomena have occurred, unable to cope with China's current rural financial market complexity and diversity and so on. Third, financial institutions have liquidity risk or out of the market and so on, may be excessive because the central bank assistance, financial institutions and financial institutions led to the person in charge "capacity risk" and "moral hazard", or for financial institutions regulatory arbitrage possibilities; addition, since the lack of recourse, may adversely affect the financial stability.(B) rural financial ecological environment is not in-depthThe current financial environment in rural county building still remains in the letter the user, village, township, community development credit level, "government-led, human-propelled, departmental interaction" and create a mechanism for financial ecological environment in rural areas lack. Local governments and authorities the importance of financial knowledge of the ecological environment is not deep, implementation and functions of individual local protectionism and heavy, there is interference with the financial sector credit and other daily business situation. Rural credit system lag, lack of bad credit punishment mechanism, rural businesses and residents in the overall credit awareness is not high, rural finance development and expansion of social services and social protection of the environment has not yet formed.(C) China's existing legal system of financial supervision and a number of shortcomings, can not guarantee that financial regulation is reasonable, effective, standardized implementationFirst, regulatory lag, supporting regulations are incomplete, the content is too rough, too simple, the banking, securities and insurance supervision laws and regulations more old, a general lack of quantitative science. Supervisory regulations and standards, regulatory methods and technical means not meet regulatory requirements in the market. Staff in the actual implementation, not easy to grasp the scale, may of operation. Second, the Chinese regulators and the regulated objects exist some interest, and the existing regulations, lack of supervision and regulatoryenforcement are to ensure that financial regulation can not be just and reasonable. Finally, China's financial supervision is still difficult to shake off the inertia of the executive-style regulatory impact.(D) of the Rural Financing drifting outside the existing financial regulatoryAccording to IFAD study, Chinese farmers from the informal financial institutions, loans from official credit institutions about 4 times. For farmers, the importance of informal financial markets over the formal financial market. China's mainly rural folk form of finance rural credit cooperatives, Cooperation, private lending, private banks, private funds, microfinance, etc., of which only rural credit cooperatives and microfinance in China's financial supervision under the rest of the financial forms the lack of appropriate supervision. The general lack of rural financial organizations of civil norms, there is a big risk, China's existing laws and regulations on private financial institutions in rural areas is one of "isolation" policy, making a lot of money from the dark into the rural financial market and greater regulation of financial difficulty, on rural financial security is a potential threat.learn from the developed countries(A) improve coordination of rural finance mechanisms for external supervision1. The United States "multiple composite" of the coordination mechanism. U.S. financial cooperation system in rural areas by the federal mid-term credit banks, cooperative banks, federal land banks and federal land bank system composed of three Cooperatives, the Farm Credit Administration (NCUA) leadership, and with the Council under the leadership of the private banks in rural commercial credit, National Rural Credit Bank policy of the United States shared the task of rural financial intermediation. The organizational model is a typical multi-mode hybrid system, three systems have an independent management system, with clear terms of reference. To ensure the healthy development of rural financial institutions, commercial banks in the United States adopted a different regulatory models, specifically setting up a relatively sound financial regulatory system in rural areas, including regulators, industry self-regulation associations, financial intermediation and mutual insurance group clearing center, the four kind of independent agencies and their subsidiary bodies, the functions of different, but share the same objectives as a common rural cooperative financial institutions to serve the regulatory system.2. Germany's "comprehensive regulatory model" of coordination mechanisms. Low concentration of the German banking system, in the very important parts of the bank, the representative of the financial mixed operation. Commonwealth Bank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority the power to regulate the two main regulators of the banking sector there is a clear division of labor, but also close cooperation. Commonwealth Bank in Germany, nine states have branch offices, using their own network advantages to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for daily transmission of data banks focus for the Federal Financial Authority to provide a better basis for the exercise of regulatory functions, but it is not directly involved in the regulation work, nor has the administrative punishment. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority did not have branches in the states, it is difficult to carry out regular supervision, need to cooperate with the Commonwealth Bank to perform its regulatory functions. Germany's main central banks and industry rely on the federal audit of the regulatory system and risk prevention and protection system to ensure rural finance in the specification on the basis of continuous development.3. Japan's "complement each other-type" coordination mechanism. In Japan, the dual supervision of the implementation of rural finance: first, the Office of Government financial regulation, supervision on the implementation of various financial institutions, to achieve the overall risk control; Second, national and local Forestry and Fisheries Department with the Office of Financial Regulation on the implementation of rural financial institutions supervision, including the Ministry of Agriculture consists of the branch on Norinchukin supervision, Forestry and Fisheries set up in six major areas of agricultural area in County Council on joint supervision of the letter, and all, Road House, County Farmer of the Ministry of Agriculture within its jurisdiction Association for Cooperative Finance Supervision Department(B) the establishment of deposit insurance and emergency rescue system to form a three-tier safety netDeveloped financial system generally established strict internal management system, deposit insurance system and the system of three emergency safety net. As a second-class safety net of deposit insurance system has been very satisfactory. The federal government on rural finance unified compulsory deposit insurance, the specific business operation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's SavingsAssociation Insurance Fund, and to assume supervision of the insured financial institutions; the German government on the implementation of the voluntary deposit of credit co-insurance, not mandatory insurance, its insurance sector is the industry organization; Japan's credit co-national compulsory deposit insurance, the insurance agency is a joint venture between Government and the people, by the Government, Norinchukin Bank, Japan Bank, Credit Union and a coalition of agricultural water fishery credit cooperatives Industry Insurance Agency. As a third-class safety net for emergency rescue system, specific measures for implementation in different countries, bank deposits for the brink of bankruptcy, in some countries directly by the central bank to offer special low-interest loans (such as the U.S. and Italy), in some countries by the bank regulatory authorities and other Commercial Bank for the establishment of special institutions to finance the rescue (such as France and Belgium), a number of countries came forward by the deposit insurance agency to provide funds (such as Japan), more by one or a few large banks in support of official support.(C) rural finance within the industry associations to play a regulatory role1. U.S. Rural Cooperative Finance Association of self-management. In the United States, various credit associations or co-finance up to several dozen, including a long history, nationally renowned for the National Association of Credit (CUNA), a specialized credit services for the Federal Register Association (NAFCU), there are also special school credit for community service credit unions and associations (CCUC), etc.. While the states also have their own Credit Union Association. The trade association is one of the major work to develop a code of conduct, self-regulation management.2. German credit cooperation and other cooperative system of industry self-regulation of mutual integration. German cooperation in the National Credit Union (BVR) is a cooperative bank industry self-regulatory organizations, grass-roots local cooperative banks, cooperative banks and district central cooperative banks, as well as professional co-finance companies, cooperative credit union is a member. Germany 11 contributions from the various types of cooperatives set up jointly organized a regional cooperative audit association, responsible for annual audit of the specialized agencies of the various types of cooperatives, which are also common types of cooperatives at the district level, the industry watchdog, plays an important industry supervisory role.3. Set supervision and service in one of the Japanese Agricultural Association. Japanese government in 1947 promulgated the "Agricultural Cooperative Law," agricultural association provides services for members of cooperative organizations, its not for profit, adhere to the rural communities and members for the service centers, institutional system based on grass-roots level according to facilitate farmers , established the principle manageable. The main source of funding is to absorb the rural deposits, in principle, limited to serving as a member of the farmers and agricultural groups. To ensure financial security cooperation, and healthy run, set up a rural credit insurance, temporary transfers of funds mutual aid system and credit cooperative organizations, and government co-funded deposit insurance system, agricultural disaster compensation system and the agricultural credit guarantee system for the insurance system measures.improve the financial supervision of the concept of rural China(A) improve and perfect the legal system of rural financial regulation, supervision according to lawFinance as the core of the economy, the continued growth of rural finance is more in need of legal regulation and a sound legal environment, accelerate the development of rural finance laws, no legal basis to change the situation, has become the strong demand of rural financial development. Since the reform and opening up, no one for rural finance, rural financial regulation can serve as a basis for law. To achieve effective supervision, the need for additional professional laws, regulations, and specific regulatory measures, regulations and implementation details, so as to achieve from the general administrative supervision to improve the legal system, efforts to establish changed the credit system, and ultimately control law .While in strengthening the legal system, adopt effective measures to strengthen the integrity of the whole community education and step up publicity to raise awareness of the general financial and legal residents, to actively support the work of the national collective finance; education of the population according to lending, and actively with the illegal lending practices fight, really create a sound legal basis, that the law according to the credit environment and legal environment.(B) give full play to grassroots government, professional regulatory functionActively cooperate with local governments at all levels and support the financialregulatory authorities in rural credit markets make an important guarantee for supervision. To actively coordinate local government and non-basic level target consistency, to avoid the expense of national interests and local interests of the occurrence.The Chinese government should establish a tax system is different from commercial banks, a low tax or tax-free policy, by policy banks to provide low-interest or interest-free loans of rural finance, rural finance to increase subsidies and assistance. Those relatively large amount of private credit, shall be approved by local authorities just to strengthen the audit checks to the legitimate rights and interests protected.China's rural economy, small and dispersed operations, has not been large-scale establishment of agricultural insurance, in case of force majeure, the rural financial system will face great risk. Chinese financial institutions in the internal governance structure and risk management system has been initially established, the basic external financial regulation in place of the case, should refer to the experience of developed countries, commercial banks in the country to establish a mandatory deposit insurance system and the emergency rescue system, the formation of three protection network.(C) strictly rural financial institutions, "access and" to improve the professional standards of financial supervisionFinancial regulators should be a good loan companies, postal savings banks, rural credit union funds, village banks and other new-type rural financial institutions, market access, ensure that the new-type rural financial institutions in corporate governance, capital adequacy ratio to meet the requirements. Kind in the country selected the new rural financial institutions, better internal control system, modified to add a representative of management to form the template to help set up rural financial institutions, covering credit, billing, savings, cash, security and other risk point of internal control system . Establish small rural banks and other financial institutions, guidance system, the financial regulators to conduct the transition of its guidance, to promote rural financial institutions to a sound system of internal control as soon as possible, improve management, risk control and management mechanisms work well.(D) to play the role of industry self-regulatory associations, to promote the vitality and force the formation of the banking sectorChina was set up in late 2005, China Banking Association of Rural FinancialWorking Committee, the current to China Banking Regulatory Commission and the provincial government regulatory framework based on an industry self-regulatory organization more. Promoting the Development, promoting and developing self-regulatory functions of trade associations, for building a healthy banking system in China is significant. Association to play a functional role to guide the establishment of liaison mechanisms and management of daily work, and improving the industry conventions and regulations, regulators should not control those, which were needed in the work of regulatory bodies, as far as possible by the association responsible for promoting the formation of the energy and banking efforts to achieve self-management and trade association national regulatory authorities to monitor the combination system of regulation.(E) to safeguard the security and financial safety regulation to changes in both the core competitivenessThe nature of financial regulation is intended to innovation and development of the financial industry to create a favorable internal and external environment, rather than constrained the development and expansion of rural finance. For the monitoring and supervision, do not speak the efficiency of regulation, which implies the greatest risk, will affect the long-term development of the rural financial sector.ConclusionIn short, improving financial supervision in terms of its breadth, should be an include government regulation, industry self-regulation, financial institutions, internal control, four levels of social supervision system; its depth, it should be involved in risk prevention, effective access, legal norms, the operation simple and efficient aspects of a systems engineering. Only by striving to improve the new concept of financial supervision, the introduction of new methods of financial supervision in order to receive financial regulation expected results. Only in this way can be established consistent with China's national conditions, but also to adapt to modern requirements of international financial regulatory system in rural China.发展中国农村金融监管的思考Xun Qian农民在中国人口众多,有一些大型生产的农民,但也自给自足的农民,巨大的金融需求之间的差异使农村金融需求很是复杂,连同农业本身是利润低、自然和市场风险高的风险决策农业产业特性,软弱的农村金融交易的成本远高于城市,也决定组织农村金融体系的运行或市场有其自身的特点。

金融学毕业论文外文翻译中英文全

金融学毕业论文外文翻译中英文全标准化工作室编码[XX968T-XX89628-XJ668-XT689N]Improve the concept of financial supervision in rural areas1Xun QianFarmers in China's vast population, has some large-scaleproduction of the farmers, but also survival-oriented farmers, huge differences between the financial needs of rural financeintermediation makes complex, together with agriculture itself is the profit low, natural and market risks high risk decision to weak agricultural industry characteristics, resulting in the cost of rural financial transactions is far higher than the city, also decided to organize the rural financial system in terms of operation or in the market has its own special characteristics. 20 years of financial reform, financial development while the Chinese city made impressive achievements, but the rural finance is the entire financial system is still the weakest link. Insufficient supply of rural finance, competition is not sufficient, farmers and agricultural enterprisesin getting loans and other issues is also very prominent, backward rural financial system can no longer effectively support the development of modern agriculture or the transformation oftraditional agriculture and the building of new socialist countryside, which to improve the rural financial supervision new topic.China's rural financial regulatory problems(A) the formation of China's financial regulatory system had "a line three commission " (People's Bank, the Securities Regulatory Commission, Insurance Regulatory Commission and the BankingRegulatory Commission) financial regulatory structure. Bank These stringent requirements, different management and diversification of monitoring has its positive role, but it also had some negative effects. First, inefficient supervision, supervision of internal consumption of high costs, limited financial industry1American Journal of Agricultural Economics，2009.business development and innovation space. Second, the regulatory agencies, regulatory bodies and the information asymmetry between central banks, banking, securities, and insurance mechanisms of coordination between regulatory bodies arenot perfect. Information between central banks and regulatory agencies is difficult to share, is difficult to create effective monitoring force. Basically between the various regulators in their respective state regulators, regulatory policies and measures to overlapping or conflicting phenomena have occurred, unable to cope with China's current rural financial market complexity and diversity and so on. Third, financial institutions have liquidity risk or out of the market and so on, may be excessive because the central bank assistance, financial institutions and financial institutions led to the person in charge "capacity risk" and "moral hazard", or for financial institutions regulatory arbitrage possibilities; addition, since the lack of recourse, may adversely affect the financial stability.(B) rural financial ecological environment is not in-depthThe current financial environment in rural county building still remains in the letter the user, village, township, community development credit level, "government-led, human-propelled, departmental interaction" and create a mechanism for financial ecological environment in rural areas lack. Local governments and authorities the importance of financial knowledge of the ecological environment is not deep, implementation and functions of individual local protectionism and heavy, there is interference with the financial sector credit and other daily business situation. Rural credit system lag, lack of bad credit punishment mechanism, rural businesses and residents in the overall credit awareness is not high, rural finance development and expansion of social services and social protection of the environment has not yet formed.(C) China's existing legal system of financial supervision and a number of shortcomings, can not guarantee that financial regulationis reasonable, effective, standardized implementationFirst, regulatory lag, supporting regulations are incomplete, the content is too rough, too simple, the banking, securities and insurance supervision laws and regulations more old, a general lackof quantitative science. Supervisory regulations and standards, regulatory methods and technical means not meet regulatory requirements in the market. Staff in the actual implementation, not easy to grasp the scale, may of operation. Second, the Chinese regulators and the regulated objects exist some interest, and the existing regulations, lack of supervision and regulatory enforcement are to ensure that financial regulation can not be just and reasonable. Finally, China's financial supervision is still difficult to shake off the inertia of the executive-style regulatory impact.(D) of the Rural Financing drifting outside the existingfinancial regulatoryAccording to IFAD study, Chinese farmers from the informalfinancial institutions, loans from official credit institutions about 4 times. For farmers, the importance of informal financial markets over the formal financial market. China's mainly rural folk form of finance rural credit cooperatives, Cooperation, private lending, private banks, private funds, microfinance, etc., of which only rural credit cooperatives and microfinance in China's financial supervision under the rest of the financial forms the lack of appropriate supervision. The general lack of rural financial organizations ofcivil norms, there is a big risk, China's existing laws andregulations on private financial institutions in rural areas is oneof "isolation" policy, making a lot of money from the dark into the rural financial market and greater regulation of financial difficulty, on rural financial security is a potential threat.learn from the developed countries(A) improve coordination of rural finance mechanisms forexternal supervision1. The United States "multiple composite" of the coordination mechanism. U.S. financial cooperation system in rural areas by the federal mid-term credit banks, cooperative banks, federal land banks and federal land bank system composed of three Cooperatives, the Farm Credit Administration (NCUA) leadership, and with the Council under the leadership of the private banks in rural commercial credit, National Rural Credit Bank policy of the United States shared the task of rural financial intermediation. The organizational model is a typical multi-mode hybrid system, three systems have an independent management system, with clear terms of reference. To ensure the healthy development of rural financial institutions, commercial banks in the United States adopted a different regulatory models, specifically setting up a relatively sound financial regulatory system in rural areas, including regulators, industry self-regulation associations, financial intermediation and mutual insurance group clearing center, the four kind of independent agencies and their subsidiary bodies, the functions of different, but share the same objectives as a common rural cooperative financial institutions to serve the regulatory system.2. Germany's "comprehensive regulatory model" of coordination mechanisms. Low concentration of the German banking system, in the very important parts of the bank, the representative of the financial mixed operation. Commonwealth Bank and the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority the power to regulate the two main regulators of the banking sector there is a clear division of labor, but also close cooperation. Commonwealth Bank in Germany, nine states have branch offices, using their own network advantages to the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority is responsible for daily transmission of data banks focus for the Federal Financial Authority to provide a better basis for the exercise of regulatory functions, but it is not directly involved in the regulation work, nor has the administrativepunishment. The Federal Financial Supervisory Authority did not have branches in the states, it is difficult to carry out regular supervision, need to cooperate with the Commonwealth Bank to perform its regulatory functions. Germany's main central banks and industry rely on the federal audit of the regulatory system and riskprevention and protection system to ensure rural finance in the specification on the basis of continuous development.3. Japan's "complement each other-type" coordination mechanism.In Japan, the dual supervision of the implementation of rural finance: first, the Office of Government financial regulation, supervision on the implementation of various financial institutions, to achieve the overall risk control; Second, national and local Forestry andFisheries Department with the Office of Financial Regulation on the implementation of rural financial institutions supervision, including the Ministry of Agriculture consists of the branch on Norinchukin supervision, Forestry and Fisheries set up in six major areas of agricultural area in County Council on joint supervision of theletter, and all, Road House, County Farmer of the Ministry of Agriculture within its jurisdiction Association for Cooperative Finance Supervision Department(B) the establishment of deposit insurance and emergency rescue system to form a three-tier safety netDeveloped financial system generally established strict internal management system, deposit insurance system and the system of three emergency safety net. As a second-class safety net of deposit insurance system has been very satisfactory. The federal governmenton rural finance unified compulsory deposit insurance, the specific business operation by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Savings Association Insurance Fund, and to assume supervision of the insured financial institutions; the German government on the implementation of the voluntary deposit of credit co-insurance, not mandatory insurance, its insurance sector is the industry organization; Japan's credit co-national compulsory deposit insurance,the insurance agency is a joint venture between Government and the people, by the Government, Norinchukin Bank, Japan Bank, Credit Union and a coalition of agricultural water fishery credit cooperatives Industry Insurance Agency. As a third-class safety net for emergency rescue system, specific measures for implementation in different countries, bank deposits for the brink of bankruptcy, in some countries directly by the central bank to offer special low-interest loans (such as the U.S. and Italy), in some countries by the bank regulatory authorities and other Commercial Bank for the establishment of special institutions to finance the rescue (such as France and Belgium), a number of countries came forward by the deposit insurance agency to provide funds (such as Japan), more by one or a few large banks in support of official support.(C) rural finance within the industry associations to play a regulatory role1. U.S. Rural Cooperative Finance Association of self-management. In the United States, various credit associations or co-finance up to several dozen, including a long history, nationally renowned for the National Association of Credit (CUNA), a specialized credit services for the Federal Register Association (NAFCU), there are also special school credit for community service credit unions and associations (CCUC), etc.. While the states also have their own Credit Union Association. The trade association is one of the major work to develop a code of conduct, self-regulation management.2. German credit cooperation and other cooperative system of industry self-regulation of mutual integration. German cooperation in the National Credit Union (BVR) is a cooperative bank industry self-regulatory organizations, grass-roots local cooperative banks, cooperative banks and district central cooperative banks, as well as professional co-finance companies, cooperative credit union is a member. Germany 11 contributions from the various types of cooperatives set up jointly organized a regional cooperative audit association, responsible for annual audit of the specialized agenciesof the various types of cooperatives, which are also common types of cooperatives at the district level, the industry watchdog, plays an important industry supervisory role.3. Set supervision and service in one of the JapaneseAgricultural Association. Japanese government in 1947 promulgated the "Agricultural Cooperative Law," agricultural association provides services for members of cooperative organizations, its not for profit, adhere to the rural communities and members for the service centers, institutional system based on grass-roots level according tofacilitate farmers , established the principle manageable. The main source of funding is to absorb the rural deposits, in principle, limited to serving as a member of the farmers and agricultural groups. To ensure financial security cooperation, and healthy run, set up a rural credit insurance, temporary transfers of funds mutual aid system and credit cooperative organizations, and government co-funded deposit insurance system, agricultural disaster compensation system and the agricultural credit guarantee system for the insurance system measures.improve the financial supervision of the concept of rural China(A) improve and perfect the legal system of rural financial regulation, supervision according to lawFinance as the core of the economy, the continued growth of rural finance is more in need of legal regulation and a sound legal environment, accelerate the development of rural finance laws, nolegal basis to change the situation, has become the strong demand of rural financial development. Since the reform and opening up, no one for rural finance, rural financial regulation can serve as a basisfor law. To achieve effective supervision, the need for additional professional laws, regulations, and specific regulatory measures, regulations and implementation details, so as to achieve from the general administrative supervision to improve the legal system,efforts to establish changed the credit system, and ultimatelycontrol law .While in strengthening the legal system, adopt effective measures to strengthen the integrity of the whole community education and step up publicity to raise awareness of the general financial and legal residents, to actively support the work of the national collective finance; education of the population according to lending, and actively with the illegal lending practices fight, really create a sound legal basis, that the law according to the credit environment and legal environment.(B) give full play to grassroots government, professional regulatory functionActively cooperate with local governments at all levels and support the financial regulatory authorities in rural credit markets make an important guarantee for supervision. To actively coordinate local government and non-basic level target consistency, to avoid the expense of national interests and local interests of the occurrence.The Chinese government should establish a tax system is different from commercial banks, a low tax or tax-free policy, by policy banks to provide low-interest or interest-free loans of rural finance,rural finance to increase subsidies and assistance. Those relatively large amount of private credit, shall be approved by localauthorities just to strengthen the audit checks to the legitimate rights and interests protected.China's rural economy, small and dispersed operations, has not been large-scale establishment of agricultural insurance, in case of force majeure, the rural financial system will face great risk. Chinese financial institutions in the internal governance structure and risk management system has been initially established, the basic external financial regulation in place of the case, should refer to the experience of developed countries, commercial banks in the country to establish a mandatory deposit insurance system and the emergency rescue system, the formation of three protection network.(C) strictly rural financial institutions, "access and" toimprove the professional standards of financial supervision Financial regulators should be a good loan companies, postal savings banks, rural credit union funds, village banks and other new-type rural financial institutions, market access, ensure that thenew-type rural financial institutions in corporate governance,capital adequacy ratio to meet the requirements. Kind in the country selected the new rural financial institutions, better internalcontrol system, modified to add a representative of management toform the template to help set up rural financial institutions, covering credit, billing, savings, cash, security and other riskpoint of internal control system . Establish small rural banks and other financial institutions, guidance system, the financialregulators to conduct the transition of its guidance, to promoterural financial institutions to a sound system of internal control as soon as possible, improve management, risk control and management mechanisms work well.(D) to play the role of industry self-regulatory associations, to promote the vitality and force the formation of the banking sector China was set up in late 2005, China Banking Association of Rural Financial Working Committee, the current to China Banking Regulatory Commission and the provincial government regulatory framework basedon an industry self-regulatory organization more. Promoting the Development, promoting and developing self-regulatory functions of trade associations, for building a healthy banking system in China is significant. Association to play a functional role to guide the establishment of liaison mechanisms and management of daily work, and improving the industry conventions and regulations, regulators should not control those, which were needed in the work of regulatory bodies, as far as possible by the association responsible for promoting the formation of the energy and banking efforts to achieve self-management and trade association national regulatory authorities to monitor the combination system of regulation.(E) to safeguard the security and financial safety regulation to changes in both the core competitivenessThe nature of financial regulation is intended to innovation and development of the financial industry to create a favorable internal and external environment, rather than constrained the development and expansion of rural finance. For the monitoring and supervision, donot speak the efficiency of regulation, which implies the greatest risk, will affect the long-term development of the rural financial sector.ConclusionIn short, improving financial supervision in terms of its breadth, should be an include government regulation, industry self-regulation, financial institutions, internal control, four levels of social supervision system; its depth, it should be involved in risk prevention, effective access, legal norms, the operation simple and efficient aspects of a systems engineering. Only by striving to improve the new concept of financial supervision, the introduction of new methods of financial supervision in order to receive financial regulation expected results. Only in this way can be established consistent with China's national conditions, but also to adapt to modern requirements of international financial regulatory system in rural China.发展中国农村金融监管的思考Xun Qian农民在中国人口众多,有一些大型生产的农民,但也自给自足的农民,巨大的金融需求之间的差异使农村金融需求很是复杂,连同农业本身是利润低、自然和市场风险高的风险决策农业产业特性,软弱的农村金融交易的成本远高于城市,也决定组织农村金融体系的运行或市场有其自身的特点。

美国农业金融体系研究及其对我国的启示

A Study of American Agricultural Financial System
and Its Enlightenment to China 作者：赵双剑[1,2]
作者机构： [1]吉林师范大学经济学院,吉林四平136000;[2]辽宁大学经济学院,辽宁沈阳
110036
出版物刊名：改革与战略
页码： 157-160页
年卷期： 2017年第5期
主题词：农业金融;农业发展;“三农”
摘要：美国农业金融体系可分成商业性质金融体系、政策性质金融体系、合作性质金融体系和农业保险体系。

文章认为,我国农业金融体系存在立法滞后、金融服务水平低下、政策执行不到位等问题,对比研究美国农业金融体系,我国应创新农业金融体系,创新农业金融的产品和服务,完善农业金融的相关法律法规。

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美国农村金融管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Rural Finance: The American ExperienceConstruction of the rural financial system the U.S. The basic principle is to provide financial support for agricultural development. After years of development, rural America as a whole formed a multi-level, full range of financial institutions, through government subsidies, the development of rural financial system, increase agricultural production, agricultural loans and various channels such as social, agricultural financing funds to meet the agricultural the development of a variety of financial needs, to provide the financial security of agricultural modernization. Building a new socialist countryside, we must adhere to the development of the rural economy as the center, and developing the rural economy can not do without the support of rural finance.Rural econenomic development of rural finance as the most important elements of the capital allocation system,and its role more and more obvious,rural financial Xingxing is agriculture,rural finance activities,the agricultural activities.Agricultural development from the experience of other countries, both developed and developing countries have attached great importance to rural financial institution building. In some countries the rural financial development better, establish a general policy, including financial, co-finance and rural insurance, including comprehensive, multi-level financial system, establish a fund to support rural development cycle of long-term mechanism, more better support the rural and agricultural development, safeguarding the interests of the majority of farmers. We are on the rural financial system in these countries a comparative analysis of proposed rural financial system and improve the path selection.The rural financial system construction rationaleRural financial theory to the formation and development, has received the modern financial development theories and policies of influence. From developing countries of rural financial theory perspective, the three major genres: agricultural financing theory, rural financial markettheory and recent incomplete competition theory.In the early 1980s, before agriculture finance theories have been rural financial theory of mainstream. This theory is based on that of rural residents, especially poor strata not saving ability, rural is facing fund shortage problem. And because the agricultural output characteristics (income uncertainty, investment long-term and low yield, etc.), agriculture and cannot be a commercial bank's investment object, this makes the rural financial mess up, a large amount of fund outflow. Therefore, it is necessary to rural peripheral infuse policy fund, and establish non-profit professional financial institutions to capital allocation. However, this over-reliance on external funding of rural financial policy has sparked funds, the low efficiency of the low return a series of contradictions, in addition to the rural financial market mechanism of neglect, cause rural financial cycle development the long-term mechanism of difficult to build.In the 1980s, the rural financial market theory gradually replaced agricultural credit subsidies theory. Its main theories, the lack of rural financial capital, not because farmers not saving ability, but due to the rural financial system unreasonable financial arrangements (such as government regulation, interest rate control, etc.), curb its development. Its policies are: to play a role in financial markets, and reduce government intervention, realize interest rate marketization, achieving rural savings and capital supply and demand the balance, Cancel special specific target loan system, the appropriate development of non-formal finance market, etc.Since the 1990s, again appeared imperfect competition market theory. This theory is mainly, and the market mechanism is not everything, for stable financial market for reasonable government intervention is necessary. Imperfect competition market is the representative figure of SiDiGeLiCi that because of the existence of market failure factors, the government in rural financial market a very important role, but the government also cannot replace market, but should become the beneficial supplement of the market. The government of financial market supervision should adopt indirect control mechanism, and according to certain principle establish regulatory scope and standards. Rural financial market is not a completely competitive market, especially the loan party (financial institutions) to the borrower's situation can't fully grasp the, plus rural special cases, financial institutions to control rural system risk, if fully in accordance with market mechanism might not be able to cultivate a rural social needed financial market, therefore, it is necessary to adopt appropriate financial markets, such as government intervention and theborrower's organization etc non-market measures.The imperfect market competition theory the main policy suggestion: one is the precondition of the development of financial markets is low inflation macroeconomic stability; etc. Second, in the financial market development to a certain degree, compared with interest rate liberalization, before more attention shall be paid to the actual deposit interest rate remained at will, within the scope of positive while suppressing deposit rate of growth, if the resulting credit allocation and excessive credit demand problem, can not damage by governments in financial institutions savings from external motivation and mobilization providing funds, Third, it is in the interests of the most basic does not damage the bank, within the scope of the policy finance (facing the specific sectors cheap financing) is effective. The fourth is the government should encourage and use the borrower LianBao group and organizational borrower mutual cooperation forms, in order to avoid the rural financial market existing incomplete information loan recovery caused by the problem of low, The use of security, access and mutual financing guarantee ChuJinHui wait for method, can improve the asymmetric information, Six is financing and real business (such as fertilizer, crop, etc.) of combining the method is effective and can ensure loan recovery, Seven is to promote the development of financial institutions, should give its certain special policies, such as limits on new participants, etc.We think, due to the particularity of agricultural production, agricultural income uncertainty, agricultural investment long-term and low yield and production of dispersion characteristics, leading to the rural financial transaction costs and funds use cost is higher, regular commercial financial institutions generally don't want to find the rural financial market, produced the market leading of failure. Therefore, in the process of building the rural financial system, the government suitable intervention is necessary and effective. From all the evolution of rural financial system view, government intervention in rural financial constructing early indeed plays a very significant positive effects. But the government intervention is not the ultimate goal of financial development, financial system, with the establishment and perfection of government intervention can only more and hinder the development of rural financial market. Especially in some developing countries due to the macroeconomic environment instability, departmental policy trend and widespread laws and regulations sex obstacle government intervention become the bottleneck of rural financialdevelopment. So, in many countries, the rural financial system to really play a role, first needs to grasp "government intervention degree" this problem.American of rural financial systemThe United States is the world agriculture of the most developed countries, this with a complete the rural financial system are inseparable. American building the rural financial system are fundamental principles for agricultural development fund supports. After years of development, the rural America from whole formed a multi-level and comprehensive financial systems, through government subsidy, the development of rural financial system, increase agricultural loans and agricultural production socialization and other channels for agriculture, agricultural development, meet the financing of various funds for agricultural modernization needs, provides funding. American rural financial system belongs to a kind of composite credit model, this model has the following characteristics: one is to provide agricultural credit funds of organizations, both professional rural financial institutions, there are other types of financial institutions. 2 it is in financial organization system, general is cooperative financial institution, policy financial institutions and commercial financial institutions co-existing. The United States has now formed the government leading rural policy finance, rural cooperative financial system and a rural commercial finance system.(a) American policy of rural financial systemAccording to the American agricultural credit law to establish a rational division of labor and cooperation of policy-related finance system that by farmers' living bureau, rural electrification bureau, commodity credit company and small business administration composition. American policy rural financial institutions is by the U.S. federal government leading created, especially for its agriculture development and rural development to provide financing institution. Its main function is for agricultural production and activities related to the agricultural production provide credit funds and service, and through the adjustment of agricultural credit activity production scale and the direction of development, implementation of rural financial policy, the control ofagricultural development scale, etc. These financial institutions funds mainly comes from the government provides capital, budget, loan turnover funds and part, borrowing funds utilization is mainly provides some commercial Banks and other lenders is not willing to provide loans, in loan object on different records.1. To improve farmers' living, improvement of agricultural production for the purpose of peasants living innings. Farmers' living innings of the predecessor is agricultural revitalize administration, the agency not profit-minded purpose, aims to help the poor areas and low-income farmers solve fund shortage problem, its borrower is mainly who cannot from commercial Banks and other agricultural credit institutions of agricultural loans to employees. In recent years, farmers living bureau also become American government to implement the agricultural policy, the main tool. If the U.S. government to rational utilization of agricultural production resources and family to farmers by farmers extend bureau of water conservancy and land improvement loans, time limit can be 40 years. In 1990s, farmers living in state, county bureau set up offices has reached more than 1700, strongly support the development of agriculture. Farmers' living bureau of capital operation is mainly provides loans and guarantee. Farmers' living bureau of loans into direct loan scheme and emergency loan program two kinds, including farm ownership loans, operating expenditure loans, crackage construction loan, water conservancy development and soil conservation loans, etc; Farmers' living bureau is mainly to the commercial Banks and other financial institutions according to the farmers living bureau loan scheme to farmers the borrower loan assure.2. To improve rural public facilities and conditions and the establishment of the rural electrification bureau. Rural community development, the construction of water conservancy, electric power facilities and other relevant rural basic construction issue that needs to be unified planning to address common, countries should give financial support and provide the necessary credit help. Founded in 1935 of rural electrification bureau, is also the usda subsidiary institutions, Its main functions are on rural thermal-power cooperatives and farms the borrower loan to improve rural electrification level. The agency's fund use is also known for loans and guarantee primarily.3. Commodity credit company. In 1933, the U.S. government established commodity credit company mainly in order to respond to natural disasters and agricultural crisis. Commodity creditsto farm because company natural disasters caused the reduction of give subsidies, and agricultural production insurance are similar. Its main function is implementing the administration of price and income support program that price support, control of agricultural production, avoid agriculture production waves to the agricultural producers impact, safeguard the interests of consumers. The fund application forms mainly for providing loans and payment subsidies, mainly including agricultural mortgages, warehousing, drying and other treatment equipment loans, disaster subsidies and price subsidies.In addition, the United States has a kind of policy-based financial institutions - small business administration, is specialized for not from other normal channel gaining sufficient funds of small businesses to provide financing to help. The fund mainly comes from parliament appropriated turnover funds and withdraw the loan principal and interest, etc, the fund is mainly used for issuing direct loans, participate in joint loan and guarantee and other special credit. Small business administration on small farms lending is with peasants living bureau division of collaboration, if small farm borrower economic conditions and bad loans small, then by farmer family bureau fund supports, when small farm borrower economic status improved, the more loan demand by the small business administration provided.(b) American rural cooperative finance systemBenefited from the United States highly developed economic and financial system, American rural constructed comparatively perfect cooperation financial system. In the early 20th century, American agricultural credit financing is mostly by private institutions and individuals with, such credit funds of the quantity is limited, and period is shorter, as the us economy development, the financial system has clearly can not adapt to the needs of the development of modern agriculture. The U.S. government began in 1916 NongDai formulated a series of law, set up by the U.S. government leading NongDai grass-roots organization specialized Banks and credit system. Its main purpose is passed on the agricultural organizations, agricultural development project lending, expand agricultural funds available sources, improving farmers' working conditions and welfare, increases the farmers' income, accelerate the development of agriculture. Initial rural financial cooperation organization are in government leaders and contributed by support built, along withthe national capital gradually introduced, now of the rural cooperative finance has become by farmers have cooperation financial institutions.Now, the rural cooperative finance by federal medium-term credit bank, cooperative Banks, federal land bank and land bank cooperatives three system composition, the three rural cooperative financial institutions are in government leaders and capital support, using a top-down way up. Among them the federal medium-term credit bank is America's most important agricultural credit cooperative system, this system is 1923 by the U.S. government in 12 credit area established 12 families federal medium-term credit bank composition, its main resolving peasants' short-term loans difficult question. Every credit bank credit cooperatives, subordinate many production cooperatives implement shareholding ownership, the borrower must have equivalent to loan sum of 5% to 10% cooperatives stocks or participate in the card. Loan time limit is 1 year commonly, the longest do not exceed seven years. With the corresponding is federal land banking system, this system comprises 12 agricultural credit the federal land bank and its subordinate co-operatives of composition, this system has become the main provider of farmer long-term loans, Federal land ownership, each bank implements shares to federal bank must pay a total of ubcta member borrowing capital of 5%, bank shares shall belong to all the cooperatives all, also indirectly shall belong to all the borrower all, Federal land bank only deal with long-term real estate loans, loan object basically is the individual farmer, loan time limit for legal 5-40 years. Cooperative bank system is designed to give us a acquire equipment, supplementary operating funds, buying goods such as providing loans and the establishment of, it by thirteen cooperative Banks composition, 12 credit district each set up a, still include in 1988 was created in Washington's central bank partner.(c) American agricultural insurance systemAmerican agricultural insurance system is after fumble ceaselessly, development and form. Early American agricultural insurance is by private insurance companies, but due to agricultural insurance risk huge, its management of the crop insurance are ended in failure. In order to help farmers deal with agricultural production risks, the American government has been very active in crop insurance plan. Since 1938 the federal crop insurance law enacted, the American agricultureinsurance after 60 years of development, the formation of a relatively complete crop insurance business, safeguard level and farmer participation rate rise ceaselessly, for stable agricultural production, improving national welfare level played an important role. 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In The commons in the New Millennium: Challenges andadaptation (pp. 291–334). Cambridge and London: MIT Press.译文：美国农村金融管理模式美国是世界上农业最发达的国家，这与其有完备的农村金融体制密不可分。