美联储伯南克讲话
从伯南克演讲看宏观经济
从伯南克演讲看宏观经济稳定金融市场、控制失业率，以及避免通货膨胀是美联储的三个主要任务。
本?伯南克曾任普林斯顿大学经济系教授和系主任。
十一年前到美国联邦政府工作，当了八年美国联邦储备银行的主席，2014年1月退职。
4月1日他回普林斯顿大学演讲，其中有三个议题值得我们思考。
我在本文把这三个议题介绍给读者，同时谈谈我的看法。
第一，从前美联储的主要任务只有两个：第一是控制失业率或维持充分就业，第二是稳定物价，避免通货膨胀。
从前稳定金融市场不是一个任务或工作目的，而只是完成前两个任务的工具。
因为不稳定的金融市场不被看作为宏观经济的一个大毛病。
2008年后，金融市场不稳定成为美国经济大衰退的一个重要原因。
现在大家认为不稳定的金融市场与失业和通货膨胀同样是宏观经济运作的不正常，会影响居民生活，所以它和失业与通货膨胀一样重要。
所以稳定金融市场变成美联储的第三个主要任务。
金融市场出售产品价格的波动和通货膨胀一样，影响很多居民的生活。
将来中国金融市场发展后，中国人民银行也可能把稳定金融市场和稳定失业率与通胀作为同等重要的任务。
第二，我们应当如何判断一个政策的好坏。
伯南克在2008年美国经济衰退前已当了美联储的主席，有很多他在任时施行的政策被民众评论。
当天在普林斯顿演讲也有同学问他某政策是否适当和他决定政策时有什么根据。
美联储的重要政策包括决定应否挽救三所大公司，比如雷曼兄弟。
因为它买了大量抵押贷款的地产证券，亏损巨大，在2008年9月15日宣布破产，但政府决定不挽救它。
然而，当贝尔斯登与AIG （American International Group）发生类似的问题时，政府与美联储却挽救了它们。
美联储之所以决定挽救这两所大公司，部分的理由是觉得如果让它们倒闭了，会使整个金融市场不能运作，导致持有其股票的企业和民众损失重大甚至破产，这样会降低国民收入和影响整个经济的运作。
挽救它们的害处是可能会养成企业日后作冒险投资的习惯。
经济危机中的伯南克发言
IN HIS Jackson Hole speech a year ago, Ben Bernanke wanted to leave no doubt that the Federal Reserve could and would act more aggressively to boost America’s flagging economy. This year he wanted to leave no doubt that the politicians could and should do more.The most highly anticipated central banker’s speech in months gave no hint of bold new initiatives from the Fed. He repeated the mantra that the “Fed has a range of tools that could be used to provide additional monetary stimulus”, but there was no discussion of them and not a whiff of imminent QE3, a third round of bond buying. Mr Bernanke promised that the Fed’s policy-setting committee would have a “fuller discussion” of other tools it could use atits September meeting, which has beenextended a day. But he chose to use thisspeech to give Washington a lecture onfiscal policy, arguing that while Americaurgently needed a credible plan to reducelong-term deficits, it shouldn’t overdothe short-term tightening.For investors who had been hoping for arepeat of August 2010, when MrBernanke’s signaling of QE2 sent stockssoaring, the speech was surely adisappointment. But it was hardlyunexpected. The hints from the Fed inrecent days were well-telegraph ed andunambiguous: Mr Bernanke wouldn’t besignaling new actions in Jackson Hole.From Mr Bernanke’s perspective, there isa clear logic to his reticence. Althoughthere are economic parallels between this year and last (things starting to look a lot worse during the summer), the central bank is in a rather different position. A year ago the Fed had taken relatively little action in response to the weakening economy. This year the central bank has only just signaled that short-term interest rates are likely to stay at zero until at least 2013. Since Mr Bernanke has already laid out other steps the Fed could take (for instance, in last year’s speech), discussing them again in detail now could be tantamount to launching them. That’s why he chose buy time by promising a fuller debate in September. T actically at least, that is understandable. Strategically, given the weakness of the economy, it may be a timid choice.Mr Bernanke’s decision to weigh in on fiscal policy is more obviously right. The Fed’s task is made considerably more difficult by Washington’s fiscal choices. America’s current trajectory—virtually no progress on medium-term deficit reduction and a hefty tightening next year unless temporary tax cuts are extended—is daft. And though he put it far more politely, Mr Bernanke’s basic message was just that. “Although the issue of fiscal sustainability must urgently be addressed, fiscal policymakers should not, as a consequencedisregard the fragility of the current recovery”, he said, adding that “the country would be well served by a better process for making fiscal decisions”.All eminently sensible. Nonetheless there is something a little disconcert ing about the Fed chairman talking to a gathering of the world’s top central bankers at a time of extraordinary uncertainty and focusing on fiscal policy. “Don’t rely on us alone” may be an accurate and important message to send, but given Washington’s recent record on fiscal negotiations, it is hardly a comforting one.Even more unnerving was the dissonance between Mr Bernanke’s focus and tone, and the palpable sense of nervousness amongst the Jackson Hole attendees. The mood in the meeting’s corridors is grim, largely thanks to the mess in the euro-zone (of which more in later posts). It’s not uncommon to hear that today’s situation is more dangerous, and intractable, than 2008. Mr Bernanke said virtually nothing about the financial risks from Europe. “I have confidence that our European colleagues fully appreciate what is at stake in the difficult issues they are now confronting and that, over time, they will take all necessary and appropriate steps to address those issues effectively and comprehensively”, he said. He mig ht just as wel l have said, “It’s a big mess and I’m crossing my fingers that they can sort it out”.。
伯南克关于美国经济展望的讲话0607
伯南克关于美国经济展望的讲话0607日期：2011-06-11 11:27:002011-6-7感谢主办方再次邀请我参加国际货币会议。
我首先将简短更新关于美国经济的展望，随后讨论全球商品市场近期的发展，它们深刻地影响了美国经济和世界经济，最后谈一些关于货币政策的思考。
增长展望今年美国经济增长到现在为止看上去有些慢于预期。
一季度总产出年率仅仅增长1.8%，这个季度，日本地震和海啸导致的供应链中断将阻碍经济活动。
近几周来自劳动力市场的若干指标也显示，一些（经济增长的）动能丧失了。
当然，我们正在监测这些状况的演变。
这就是说，未来几个月随着日本灾难对制造业产出的影响逐渐消散，随着汽油价格适度回落，增长可能在今年下半年重拾升势。
总体上，经济复苏似乎以一种温和的步伐继续，尽管这种速度在不同部门间并不均匀，尽管在数百万失业和半失业工人看来，这种速度令人沮丧。
如通常那样，家庭支出的能力和意愿是未来几个季度经济扩张速度的一个重要决定因素。
目前，有许多正面和负面的因素影响着家庭的财务状况和支出意愿。
从正面情况来看，去年12月国会通过的工资税削减议案使得今年初以来劳动力市场条件得以改善，家庭收入得到提升。
家庭财富增加（主要反映在股权价值收益）和较低的债务负担也提高了消费者增加支出的意愿。
负面角度，家庭正面临一些显著的不利因素，包括食物和能源价格上涨，房屋价值下降，某些信贷市场的持续紧张，以及仍然高企的失业率，所有这些都会挫伤消费者信心。
劳动力市场的发展在设置家庭支出进程方面将显得特别重要。
如你所知，就业形势距正常情况尚远。
例如，一个关于劳动力投入的综合指标：生产工人总小时数，它反映人们兼职的程度、加班的机会以及就业人数，这个指标自最近的衰退开始到2009年10月已经显著下降近10个百分点。
尽管工作的小时数自扩张以来已经上升，但这个指标仍然低于其衰退前水平约6.5个百分点。
作为一个比较，工作总小时数在1982-1982年深度衰退中的最大下降比这次要少6个百分点。
9月19日美联储主席伯南克讲话全文
9月19日美联储主席伯南克讲话全文：保持宽松的货币政策作者：LMAX万海美联储主席伯南克在北京时间9月19日2:00美国联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)宣布利率决定,发表政策声明及经济展望后，主持媒体发布会。
伯南克发言如下：伯南克称，目前美国经济增长下滑风险已经降低，但是增长的幅度变缓，经济增速也是适度的。
中期经济前景轮廓同6月时的看法接近，需要耐心等待不利因素逐渐缓和。
就业市场复苏不平衡，复苏状况低于期望，失业率高于可接受的水准。
失业率降至6.5%以下以前不会升息，在2016年后的几年利率可能逐步上升，最终达到4%。
失业率并不是衡量就业市场最关键的数据，目前没有特殊的数据能够完全描述就业市场，希望就业市场全面复苏。
委员会将密切关注通胀水平，多数官员预期通胀会上升，通胀会恢复至2。
如果通胀持续低于目标水准，将放缓加息的决定。
相较于QE，利率政策是更加强大的工具。
财政政策给经济带来消极影响，财政状况令今年经济增长放缓至少一个百分点。
如果因政府行动造成经济放缓，我们必须慎重考虑，最重要的是避免2011年的那种不利情况发生。
委员会认为经济数据还没有强劲到支持缩减QE，即将开展的债务上限争论将给市场带来风险。
在被问及今年放缓购债进度是否仍合适时，伯南克称总的框架还是一样的，即便缩减购债规模，联储仍能通过利率向市场保持宽松的货币政策。
伯南克认为量化宽松政策是有效的，目前就业市场要比一年前好很多，尽管目前效果难以确切评估。
之后的几次会议上委员会将确认经济是否复苏，然后会迈出缩减购债第一步。
缩减购债没有固定时间表。
如果对经济前景的信心增强，可能在今年稍晚行动。
伯南克：美联储一时半会不会加息
伯南克：美联储一时半会不会加息
前美联储主席伯南克表示，过去几年，美联储对经济太乐观，美联储实施的货币政策没有看起来那样宽松。
在意识到这点之后，美联储官员们在接下来不是那么急于加息，甚至可能倾向于让经济有些过热后再加息。
伯南克称，试这部分是由于，过去几年，美联储官员们对经济的预测是不准确的。
当前世界的样子，和美联储官员们几年前想象的不一样。
当时他们认为，美国经济会走强，自然利率会升高。
此外，当前经济和政策的不确定性，比以前要高。
伯南克指出，在意识到过去判断有误差之后，美联储官员们可能不会过多地根据他们对未来的预测做出决定，不管是对经济增长还是对加息次数的预测。
很久以来，美联储主席耶伦就表示，政策是取决于数据的。
然而，美联储看重什么数据，还让人摸不着头脑。
当前，失业率已经比美联储的目标还要低，经济虽然增速不快但保持在稳定的水平，美股更是接连创新高，引发一些投资者对资产泡沫的担心。
总的来说，美联储官员们的政策观点看起来非常不可知，并且他们越来越不愿意提供明确的指引。
因此，美联储观察家们越来越难从FOMC 声明和官员们公开讲话中，获取太多信息。
他们转为更关注未来的数据。
伯南克统计了2012 年以来，美联储在产出增长、失业率、长期联邦基金利率上的预测，发现官员们对这几个指标的预测在持续下调。
下表来自CNBC。
伯南克认为，美联储意识到了他们过去对经济太乐观，劳动力市场没有。
我们从伯南克这两日的讲话中了解到什么
我们从伯南克这两日的讲话中了解到什么外汇通7月19日讯--美联储主席伯南克(BenBernanke)向市场发出了这样一个信息，即美联储倾向于今年晚些时候缩减每月850亿美元的购债规模了。
康百士银行(BBVACompass)首席经济学家NathanielKarp表示，"美联储的底线是：第三轮量化宽松(QE3)时间表将保持不变，今年晚些时候将公布缩减QE。
"分析师称，伯南克向市场提供的药物上涂满了糖。
摩根士丹利(MorganStanley)首席美国经济学家VincentReinhardt表示，"美联储倾尽全力，给药物制作了鸽派味道浓厚的包装。
"在伯南克发表证词的过程中，股市攀升，债市也继续从近期的抛售中恢复健康。
Reinhardt 称，市场对于伯南克讲话反应平淡的部分原因为美联储重复传递信息。
Reinhardt认为，"美联储倾向于维持宽松政策很长一段时间，但没有看到增加宽松规模的需求，因此他们想要看到缩减QE。
除非美联储的计划偏离轨道，否则其将于9月缩减购债。
"今年二季度的经济动能有点疲软，目前对二季度GDP增速的预估为接近1%，而一季度GDP 增长1.8%。
但是，德意志银行(DeutscheBank)首席美国经济学家JosephLavorgna指出，"政策制定者在九月会议之前，将观察许多经济数据，包括两次非农就业报告，因此二季度GDP数据未必决定QE命运。
"并不是所有的经济学家都认为今年将缩减QE。
IHS环球透视(IHSGlobalInsight)的PaulEdelstein认为，伯南克意在平衡鸽派和鹰派评论，而且他坚持其做出的有60%的概率美联储将到2014年初才缩减QE的预测。
Edelstein补充道，今年剩余时间里失业率很可能仍旧徘徊在目前的7.6%的水平附近。
如果真是这样，美联储还需要等一等。
多空双方各有支撑“伯南克最新讲话并没有太多新内容，但其传递出一个最大的信息就是灵活。
《金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储(中英双语版)》的读后感
《金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储（中英双语版）》的读后感《金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储》是一本关于金融体系及其运作的重要性的书籍。
本书由美国前联邦储备系统主席本·伯南克所著，通过四个讲话回顾了他在美联储任职期间所面临的挑战以及他对金融问题的观点和解决方案。
本书提供了对金融体系和货币政策的深入了解，并对我们对金融和经济体系的理解提供了有益的视角。
整本书以四次重要讲话为线索，每一次讲话都涉及到金融危机的起源、发展和对策，以及美联储在这个过程中的作用。
通过描述他在美联储领导层担任职务的经历，伯南克揭示了金融体系的脆弱性和全球金融危机对经济和金融稳定的巨大冲击。
他对这些挑战的解决方案的分析和阐述，以及他的思考方式和作为领导者的经验，使读者对金融领域的复杂性和挑战有了更深入的了解。
在第一次讲话中，伯南克回顾了金融危机的根源，并解释了美联储的角色和行动。
他指出，美联储在危机中发挥了关键作用，通过采取一系列紧急措施来稳定金融系统，并努力使经济复苏。
此外，他还讨论了货币政策的作用，以及如何平衡价格稳定和经济增长之间的关系。
第二次讲话涉及到金融体系的脆弱性和政府监管的重要性。
伯南克解释了为什么金融体系容易陷入危机，并提出了通过改善监管和监督来防范未来金融危机的建议。
他还讨论了如何平衡金融创新和风险管理，以确保金融体系的稳定。
在第三次讲话中，伯南克详细解释了他在金融危机期间所采取的一些非常规措施，如降息和量化宽松政策。
他解释了这些政策对金融市场和经济的影响，并强调了这些政策在防止更大损失和加速经济复苏方面的重要性。
他还提出了应对金融稳定风险和改进金融监管体系的建议。
最后，第四次讲话探讨了国际金融体系的问题和挑战。
伯南克强调了各国之间的经济和金融联系的重要性，并提出了建立一个更加稳定和有效的国际金融体系的建议。
他还讨论了全球金融合作和协调的必要性，以应对全球经济和金融挑战。
通过阅读《金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储》这本书，我对金融体系的运作和金融危机的发生原因有了更深入的了解。
伯南克近期讲话
伯南克上周在联邦储备银行经济研讨年会上，回顾了过去一年发生的不同寻常的金融和经济事件，以及美国和全球对此作出的政策反应。
回顾金融危机一年之路按照最近几十年的标准来看，去年这一研讨会召开时的经济环境是非常困难。
当时，始于2007年8月的当前经济危机已经爆发了一年，金融市场仍然承受重压，经济增长放缓，通货膨胀率受全球大宗商品热潮推动而大幅上升。
去年召开年会的时候，我们还没有充分意识到，经济和政策环境将变得明显更加困难。
去年年会结束后的数周内，几个具有重要系统意义的金融机构要么破产，要么濒临崩溃，一些重要金融市场的活动实际上陷入停滞，全球经济陷入一场深度衰退。
我今天的讲话将专注于过去一年发生的不同寻常的金融和经济事件，以及美国和全球对此作出的政策反应。
无疑，过去一年带给我们一个非常清楚的教训──当然，对任何研究经济史的人也是一样──即全面爆发的金融危机会给民众和经济带来巨大伤害。
第二个教训──也是经济历史学家所熟悉的──是金融振荡没有国界之分。
这次的危机是全球性的，没有哪个主要国家能够幸免。
历史上有很多对金融危机的政策反应行动迟缓、力度不足的例子，这些做法通常会最终导致更为严重的经济破坏，加大财政成本。
相比之下，在这次金融危机中，美国和全球决策者们作出了及时和有力的反应，遏制了迅速恶化的危险局势。
未来我们迫切需要解决金融体系中的结构性缺陷，尤其是在监管框架领域，确保不会重蹈过去两年所付出的巨大成本的覆辙。
2008年9-10月：危机加剧去年我们开会时，金融市场和经济正在持续遭受经济危机的冲击。
美国国家经济研究局(NBER)已经确定这场危机开始于2007年12月。
去年7月的时候，美国失业率已经达到了大约5.75%，较衰退开始时高出了大约一个百分点，美国家庭支出不断走软。
住房建筑和住房价格不断下滑，抵押贷款违约和止赎事件持续增加，这些因素持续给美国经济施加压力，对美国和全球金融机构的信贷损失预期进一步增加。
聚焦美联储主席伯南克发言txt
--:-- 中国 12月份M2货币供应量 前值13.9%/年；韬客预测13.8%/年；市场影响★
07:30 澳大利亚 12月份TD-MI通胀指数 前值-0.1%/月，2.5%/年
09:20 美国 美联储Evans讲话
15:00 德国 12月份批发物价指数(14-17日公布) 前值-0.7%/月，3.2%/年
(二)现货铂金走势分析
上周德拉基的讲话对欧洲经济前景表示乐观给降息预期大泼冷水，引发市场风险情绪升温，金价随之冲高，后受获利了结影响回落。日线上布林带开口呈扩张趋势，KDJ指标维持高位走势，后期金价或持续走高。铂现货铂金支撑位:327.7 325.5 阻力位:331.1 333.7
三、今日重要数据
2、预计中国第四季度GDP增长7.7%，高于官方目标的7.5%
中国将在周五(1月18日)公布第四季度宏观经济运行报告，将公布第四季度和全年GDP等重要数据。GDP无疑是更重要的数据，因而引发的行情将愈发值得期待。
据新华社上周五(1月11日)援引国家发改委副主任张晓强的话称，中国2012年经济成长率可以达到7.7%，超过7.5%的年初预定目标。新华社对外部上周五在其官方微博“中国独家报道”援引张晓强在一论坛的讲话称，2013年中国经济增速预计在7.5%左右，CPI涨幅预期在3.5%左右。
总体分析：上周五在中国通胀数据上升，美国贸易帐赤字扩大的背景下，市场风险偏好情绪不佳，贵金属呈现震荡下跌态势。目前市场等待晚间美联储诸多官员讲话，重点关注美联储主席伯南克发言。
二、技术面分析
(一)天通银走势分析
上周五在中国通胀数据上升，美国贸易帐赤字扩大的背景下，市场风险偏好情绪不佳，贵金属呈现震荡下跌态势。4小时图上布林带开口走平，均线密集排布，后期走势关注美联储主席伯南克发言。天通银支撑位:6058 5989 阻力位:6246 6333
金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储(中英双语版)的读后感
金融的本质：伯南克四讲美联储（中英双语版）的读后感金融是现代社会发展的重要支撑，而美联储作为全球最具影响力的中央银行之一，其所掌握的货币政策阐述着金融本质的核心。
在2021年初，由美国前联邦储备委员会主席伯南克主讲的一系列在线讲座中，他深入探讨了美联储的职能、运作以及货币政策。
以下是对伯南克四讲的读后感。
金融是为社会经济发展服务的必须要素，而美联储作为全球最重要的中央银行，其所承担的角色和使命也非常重要。
在伯南克的讲座中，他清晰阐述了美联储的职能，重点关注了货币政策，而这正是美联储的核心使命。
美联储的职能旨在维护货币和金融稳定，这可以通过货币政策等手段实现。
为了达到这个目的，美联储使用两种基本工具：利率政策和量化宽松政策。
利率政策通过改变联邦基金利率来影响市场利率，从而影响整个经济体。
而量化宽松政策则通过购买金融资产来增加货币供应量并降低长期利率。
在伯南克的讲座中，他提到了美国经历的20世纪初期和20世纪初叶的金融危机。
它们的主要原因是金融机构的过度杠杆。
为了规避这种情况，美联储制定了强有力的监管政策，包括强制性准备金和资本要求。
这些政策旨在保证银行的稳健性，并防止市场的过度波动。
尽管在金融危机后，美联储采取了一些非常规的政策措施，比如量化宽松，但这些政策对美国经济的增长和通胀率的维护产生了积极的影响。
美国当前的经济形势也很好，主要归功于美联储的稳健政策。
总之，在伯南克的四讲中，他清晰地表述了美联储的职能，以及其在金融市场的作用和特权。
他详细介绍了货币政策和监管政策，并强调这些政策的作用是为了维护经济和金融稳定。
此外，他还强调了美联储是独立的机构，不受政治干预的影响。
通过这些讲座，我们对美联储和其对美国经济运作的影响有了更深入的理解。
解读伯南克讲话：维系现今的宽松政策txt
而他本人则对美联储资产负债规模的不断扩大，及此状况对市场信心的影响感到尤为担心。他表示，在美联储持有的国债及抵押贷款担保证券规模不断扩大的背景下，证券市场的正常运行以及稳定性前景可能受到冲击。洛克哈特在美联储内部的立场取向偏向中间，他在2013年度没有投票权。
可以说，本周美联储内部鸽派和鹰派阵营的角力，仍将在一定程度上影响汇市走向。而伯老略显鸽派的讲话，或将令美元在后市继续面临一定压力。
伯老讲话盘点一：倾向“鸽派”的货币政策
美联储主席伯南克(Ben Bernanke)在今天于密歇根大学发表讲话中称，美联储鹰派理事和投资者不必担心该行的债券购买计划将导致通胀率上升或未来产生资产泡沫。
伯南克：“我不认为这将导致通胀率大幅上升。”他表示，美联储政策是否将在未来导致泡沫产生，这是一个“难以回答的问题”。
文章来自交易家
威廉姆斯当天指出，美联储目前仍有必要采取一切可能的措施来提振经济复苏步伐。而他本人认为，抵押贷款担保证券以及长期国债的收购措施，将有必要至少延续到2013年下半年。
不过仍然需要警惕的是，一些原本鸽派的支持者，目前从语气上有了些许松动。
美联储理事兼亚特兰大联储主席洛克哈特(Dennis Lockhart)周一(1月14日)指出，尽管到目前为止，他一直都对美联储推出的购债宽松措施表示支持，然而，鉴于当前的无限额量化宽松措施的前景确实存在不确定性，投资者对其感到担心，也是情有可原。
北京时间周二(1月15日)凌晨，美联储主席伯南克在密歇根大学杰拉德福特公共政策学院发表讲话。可以说，作为美联储12月会议纪要公布后的首次露面，伯老此次讲话在事先受到了市是围绕了货币政策和债务上限两大核心问题作出了一定阐述。尽管讲话内容依然颇为延续了其一贯的“打太极”风格，但仍然可以从中大致看出，其对于货币政策上，依然认为有继续实施宽松的理由，而在债务上限问题上，他表示美国政府仍有许多工作要做。
美联储主席伯南克在普林斯顿的演讲(节选)
毕业生们 ， 恭喜你们 ！ 去大显身手吧 ！ （ 司志政摘 自《 英语广场 ・ 美文》 ）
Ｔ ｅｅ ｎａ ｇｅｒ ｓ ２０１ ３ ／ １ ７下
经有 １ １ 年 了。
今 天 我 想 利 用 这 几分钟 时间谈谈 自己的
接 到 了一个 电话 …… 谁 想 在故 事 的开 篇 就
十点建议或是感悟 ，谈 谈这个世 界 ， 以及你们
从普林 斯顿毕业后的生 活 。请注 意 ， 这 十点 与 利率毫无关系。我之所 以有资格提出这些建议
第一 ， 诗 人 罗伯特 ・ 彭斯 曾说 过 “ 无 展过程。你们的家人 、朋友和你在普林斯顿 论你 准备 得有 多么充 分 ， 事情 还是 会经 常 的时光 已经为你们 打下 了良好的基础 ， 你将 出错 ” 。一位离我们更近 的哲学家 ， 阿甘也 如何利用它们呢 ？ 你们会不断学习、竭力思 曾讲到 人生 和巧 克力 的相似 性 ， 你 永远 不 索 、对至关重要 的问题持批判态度吗 ？ 你会
知道 结 局 呢 ？ 让 故 事
上演 。 无需惧怕 。
第二 ， 人生具有很
大偶 然 性 这一 事 实是
否 意 味着 小 的决 定 和
或感悟 ， 除了是受到蒂尔曼校长的善 意邀请 行动无足轻重 ， 不需要规划和奋斗呢 ？ 当然
外， 还有一个理 由 ， 这个理 由和你们 讨厌 的 不是。无论未来人生有什 么在等着你们 ， 你 哥哥姐姐可 以晚睡是 一个道理 ： 我 比你们年 们每个人都有—个宏大的人生规划有待完成 。 长。以下内容均经受过现实生活的检验。 这是你们作为有意识的人类本该有的 自我发
伯南克：百年美联储演讲
Chairman Ben S. Bernanke speechAt the "The First 100 Years of the Federal Reserve: The Policy Record, Lessons Learned, and Prospects for the Future," a conference sponsored by the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MassachusettsJuly 10, 2013A Century of U.S. Central Banking: Goals, Frameworks, AccountabilityI'd like to thank the National Bureau of Economic Research for organizing this conference in recognition of the Federal Reserve's centennial, and I'm glad to have the opportunity to participate. In keeping with the spirit of the conference, my remarks today will take a historical perspective. I will leave discussion of current policy to today's question-and-answer session and, of course, to my congressional testimony next week.Today, I'll discuss the evolution over the past 100 years of three key aspects of Federal Reserve policymaking: the goals of policy, the policy framework, and accountability and communication. The changes over time in these three areas provide a useful perspective, I believe, on how the role and functioning of the Federal Reserve have changed since its founding in 1913, as well as some lessons for the present and for the future. I will pay particular attention to several key episodes of the Fed's history, all of which have been referred to in various contexts with the adjective "Great" attached to them: the Great Experiment of the Federal Reserve's founding, the Great Depression, the Great Inflation and subsequent disinflation, the Great Moderation, and the recent Great Recession.The Great ExperimentIn the words of one of the authors of the Federal Reserve Act, Robert Latham Owen, the Federal Reserve was established to "provide a means by which periodic panics which shake the American Republic and do it enormous injury shall be stopped."1 In short, the original goal of the Great Experiment that was the founding of the Fed was the preservation of financial stability.2 At the time, the standard view of panics was that they were triggered when the needs of business and agriculture for liquid funds outstripped the available supply--as when seasonal plantings or shipments of crops had to be financed, for example--and that panics were further exacerbated by the incentives of banks and private individuals to hoard liquidity during such times.3 The new institution was intended to relieve such strains by providing an "elastic" currency--that is, by providing liquidity as needed to individual member banks through the discount window; commercial banks, in turn, would then be able to accommodate their customers. Interestingly, although congressional advocates hoped the creation of the Fed would help prevent future panics, they did not fully embrace the idea that the Fed should help end ongoing panics by serving as lender of last resort, as had been recommended by the British economist and writer Walter Bagehot.4 Legislators imposed limits on the Federal Reserve's ability to lend in response to panics, for example, by denying nonmember banks access to the discount window and by restricting the types of collateral that the Fed could accept.5The framework that the Federal Reserve employed in its early years to promote financial stability reflected in large measure the influence of the so-called real bills doctrine, as well as the fact thatthe United States was on the gold standard.6 In the framework of the real bills doctrine, the Federal Reserve saw its function as meeting the needs of business for liquidity--consistent with the idea of providing an elastic currency--with the ultimate goal of supporting financial and economic stability.7 When business activity was increasing, the Federal Reserve helped accommodate the need for credit by supplying liquidity to banks; when business was contracting and less credit was needed, the Fed reduced the liquidity in the system.As I mentioned, the Federal Reserve pursued this approach to policy in the context of the gold standard. Federal Reserve notes were redeemable in gold on demand, and the Fed was required to maintain a gold reserve equal to 40 percent of outstanding notes. However, contrary to the principles of an idealized gold standard, the Federal Reserve often took actions to prevent inflows and outflows of gold from being fully translated into changes in the domestic money supply.8 This practice, together with the size of the U.S. economy, gave the Federal Reserve considerable autonomy in monetary policy and, in particular, allowed the Fed to conduct policy according to the real bills doctrine without much hindrance.The policy framework of the Fed's early years has been much criticized in retrospect. Although the gold standard did not appear to have greatly constrained U.S. monetary policy in the years after the Fed's founding, subsequent research has highlighted the extent to which the international gold standard served to destabilize the global economy in the late 1920s and early 1930s.9 Likewise, economic historians have pointed out that, under the real bills doctrine, the Fed increased the money supply precisely at those times at whichbusiness activity and upward pressures on prices were strongest; that is, monetary policy was procyclical. Thus, the Fed's actions tended to increase rather than decrease the volatility in economic activity and prices.10During this early period, the new central bank did make an important addition to its menu of policy tools. Initially, the Fed's main tools were the quantity of its lending through the discount window and the interest rate at which it lent, the discount rate. Early on, however, to generate earnings to finance its operations, the Federal Reserve began purchasing government securities in the open market--what came to be known as open market operations. In the early 1920s, Fed officials discovered that these operations affected the supply and cost of bank reserves and, consequently, the terms on which banks extended credit to their customers. Subsequently, of course, open market operations became a principal monetary policy tool, one that allowed the Fed to interact with the broader financial markets, not only with banks.11I've discussed the original mandate and early policy framework of the Fed. What about its accountability to the public? As this audience knows, when the Federal Reserve was established, the question of whether it should be a private or a public institution was highly contentious. The compromise solution created a hybrid Federal Reserve System. The System was headed by a governmentally appointed Board, which initially included the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency. But the 12 regional Reserve Banks were placed under a mixture of public and private oversight, including board members drawn from the private sector, and they were given considerable scope to makepolicy decisions that applied to their own Districts. For example, Reserve Banks were permitted to set their own discount rates, subject to a minimum set by the Board.While the founders of the Federal Reserve hoped that this new institution would provide financial and hence economic stability, the policy framework and the institutional structure would prove inadequate to the challenges the Fed would soon face.The Great DepressionThe Great Depression was the Federal Reserve's most difficult test. Tragically, the Fed failed to meet its mandate to maintain financial stability. In particular, although the Fed provided substantial liquidity to the financial system following the 1929 stock market crash, its response to the subsequent banking panics was limited at best; the widespread bank failures and the collapse in money and credit that ensued were major sources of the economic downturn.12 Bagehot's dictum to lend freely at a penalty rate in the face of panic appeared to have few adherents at the Federal Reserve of that era.13Economists have also identified a number of instances from the late 1920s to the early 1930s when Federal Reserve officials, in the face of the sharp economic contraction and financial upheaval, either tightened monetary policy or chose inaction. Some historians trace these policy mistakes to the early death of Benjamin Strong, governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in 1928, which left the decentralized system without an effective leader.14 Whether valid or not, this hypothesis raises the interesting question of what intellectual framework an effective leader would have drawn on at the time to develop and justify a more activist monetary policy. Thedegree to which the gold standard actually constrained U.S. monetary policy during the early 1930s is debated; but the gold standard philosophy clearly did not encourage the sort of highly expansionary policies that were needed.15 The same can be said for the real bills doctrine, which apparently led policymakers to conclude, on the basis of low nominal interest rates and low borrowings from the Fed, that monetary policy was appropriately supportive and that further actions would be fruitless.16 Historians have also noted the prevalence at the time of yet another counterproductive doctrine: the so-called liquidationist view, that depressions perform a necessary cleansing function.17 It may be that the Federal Reserve suffered less from lack of leadership in the 1930s than from the lack of an intellectual framework for understanding what was happening and what needed to be done.The Fed's inadequate policy frameworks ultimately collapsed under the weight of economic failures, new ideas, and political developments. The international gold standard was abandoned during the 1930s. The real bills doctrine likewise lost prestige after the disaster of the 1930s; for example, the Banking Act of 1935 instructed the Federal Reserve to use open market operations with consideration of "the general credit situation of the country," not just to focus narrowly on short-term liquidity needs.18 The Congress also expanded the Fed's ability to provide credit through the discount window, allowing loans to a broader array of counterparties, secured by a broader variety of collateral.19The experience of the Great Depression had major ramifications for all three aspects of the Federal Reserve I am discussing here: its goals, its policy framework, and its accountability to the public. Withrespect to goals, the high unemployment of the Depression--and the fear that high unemployment would return after World War II--elevated the maintenance of full employment as a goal of macroeconomic policy. The Employment Act of 1946 made the promotion of employment a general objective for the federal government. Although the Fed did not have a formal employment goal until the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977 codified "maximum employment," along with "stable prices," as part of the Fed's so-called dual mandate, earlier legislation nudged the central bank in that direction.20 For example, legislators described the intent of the Banking Act of 1935 as follows: "To increase the ability of the banking system to promote stability of employment and business, insofar as this is possible within the scope of monetary action and credit administration."21The policy framework to support this new approach reflected the development of macroeconomic theories--including the work of Knut Wicksell, Irving Fisher, Ralph Hawtrey, Dennis Robertson, and John Maynard Keynes--that laid the foundations for understanding how monetary policy could affect real activity and employment and help reduce cyclical fluctuations. At the same time, the Federal Reserve became less focused on its original mandate of preserving financial stability, perhaps in part because it felt superseded by the creation during the 1930s of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Securities and Exchange Commission, along with other reforms intended to make the financial system more stable.In the area of governance and accountability to the public, policymakers also recognized the need for reforms to improve the Federal Reserve's structure and decisionmaking. The Banking Act of1935 simultaneously bolstered the legal independence of the Federal Reserve and provided for stronger central control by the Federal Reserve Board. In particular, the act created the modern configuration of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), giving the Board the majority of votes on the Committee, while removing the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency from the Board. In practice, however, the Treasury continued to have considerable sway over monetary policy after 1933, with one economic historian describing the Fed as "in the back seat."22 During World War II, the Federal Reserve used its tools to support the war financing efforts. However, even after the war, Federal Reserve policy remained subject to considerable Treasury influence. It was not until the 1951 Accord with the Treasury that the Federal Reserve began to recover genuine independence in setting monetary policy.The Great Inflation and DisinflationOnce the Federal Reserve regained its policy independence, its goals centered on the price stability and employment objectives laid out in the Employment Act of 1946. In the early postwar decades, the Fed used open market operations and the discount rate to influence short-term market interest rates, and the federal funds rate gradually emerged as the preferred operating target. Low and stable inflation was achieved for most of the 1950s and the early 1960s. However, beginning in the mid-1960s, inflation began a long climb upward, partly because policymakers proved to be too optimistic about the economy's ability to sustain rapid growth without inflation.23 Two mechanisms might have mitigated the damage from that mistaken optimism. First, a stronger policy response to inflation--more like that observed in the 1950s--certainly would havehelped.24 Second, Fed policymakers could have reacted to continued high readings on inflation by adopting a more realistic assessment of the economy's productive potential.25 Instead, policymakers chose to emphasize so-called cost-push and structural factors as sources of inflation and saw wage- and price-setting as having become insensitive to economic slack.26 This perspective, which contrasted sharply with Milton Friedman's famous dictum that "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon," led to Fed support for measures such as wage and price controls rather than monetary solutions to address inflation.27 A further obstacle was the view among many economists that the gains from low inflation did not justify the costs of achieving it.28The consequence of the monetary framework of the 1970s was two bouts of double-digit inflation. Moreover, by the end of the decade, lack of commitment to controlling inflation had clearly resulted in inflation expectations becoming "unanchored," with high estimates of trend inflation embedded in longer-term interest rates.As you know, under the leadership of Chairman Paul Volcker, the Federal Reserve in 1979 fundamentally changed its approach to the issue of ensuring price stability. This change involved an important rethinking on the part of policymakers. By the end of the 1970s, Federal Reserve officials increasingly accepted the view that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, at least in the medium and longer term; they became more alert to the risks of excessive optimism about the economy's potential output; and they placed renewed emphasis on the distinction between real--that is, inflation-adjusted--and nominal interest rates.29 The change in policy framework was initially tied to a change in operating procedures that put greater focus on growth inbank reserves, but the critical change--the willingness to respond more vigorously to inflation--endured even after the Federal Reserve resumed its traditional use of the federal funds rate as the policy instrument.30 The new regime also reflected an improved understanding of the importance of providing a firm anchor, secured by the credibility of the central bank, for the private sector's inflation expectations.31 Finally, it entailed a changed view about the dual mandate, in which policymakers regarded achievement of price stability as helping to provide the conditions necessary for sustained maximum employment.32The Great ModerationVolcker's successful battle against inflation set the stage for the so-called Great Moderation of 1984 to 2007, during which the Fed enjoyed considerable success in achieving both objectives of its dual mandate. Financial stability remained a goal, of course. The Federal Reserve monitored threats to financial stability and responded when the financial system was upset by events such as the 1987 stock market crash and the terrorist attacks of 2001. More routinely, it shared supervisory duties with other banking agencies. Nevertheless, for the most part, financial stability did not figure prominently in monetary policy discussions during these years. In retrospect, it is clear that macroeconomists--both inside and outside central banks--relied too heavily during that period on variants of the so-called Modigliani-Miller theorem, an implication of which is that the details of the structure of the financial system can be ignored when analyzing the behavior of the broader economy.An important development of the Great Moderation was the increasing emphasis that central banks around the world put oncommunication and transparency, as economists and policymakers reached consensus on the value of communication in attaining monetary policy objectives.33 Federal Reserve officials, like those at other central banks, had traditionally been highly guarded in their public pronouncements. They believed, for example, that the ability to take markets by surprise was important for influencing financial conditions.34 Thus, although Fed policymakers of the 1980s and early 1990s had become somewhat more explicit about policy objectives and strategy, the same degree of transparency was not forthcoming on monetary policy decisions and operations.35 The release of a postmeeting statement by the FOMC, a practice that began in 1994, was, therefore, an important watershed. Over time, the statement was expanded to include more detailed information about the reason for the policy decision and an indication of the balance of risks.36 In addition to improving the effectiveness of monetary policy, these developments in communications also enhanced the public accountability of the Federal Reserve. Accountability is, of course, essential for policy independence in a democracy. During this period, economists found considerable evidence that central banks that are afforded policy independence in the pursuit of their mandated objectives deliver better economic outcomes.37One cannot look back at the Great Moderation today without asking whether the sustained economic stability of the period somehow promoted the excessive risk-taking that followed. The idea that this long period of calm lulled investors, financial firms, and financial regulators into paying insufficient attention to building risks must have some truth in it. I don't think we should conclude, though, that we therefore should not strive to achieve economic stability.Rather, the right conclusion is that, even in (or perhaps, especially in) stable and prosperous times, monetary policymakers and financial regulators should regard safeguarding financial stability to be of equal importance as--indeed, a necessary prerequisite for--maintaining macroeconomic stability.Macroeconomists and historians will continue to debate the sources of the remarkable economic performance during the Great Moderation.38 My own view is that the improvements in the monetary policy framework and in monetary policy communication, including, of course, the better management of inflation and the anchoring of inflation expectations, were important reasons for that strong performance. However, we have learned in recent years that while well-managed monetary policy may be necessary for economic stability, it is not sufficient.The Financial Crisis, the Great Recession, and TodayIt has been about six years since the first signs of the financial crisis appeared in the United States, and we are still working to achieve a full recovery from its effects. What lessons should we take for the future from this experience, particularly in the context of a century of Federal Reserve history?The financial crisis and the ensuing Great Recession reminded us of a lesson that we learned both in the 19th century and during the Depression but had forgotten to some extent, which is that severe financial instability can do grave damage to the broader economy. The implication is that a central bank must take into account risks to financial stability if it is to help achieve good macroeconomic performance. Today, the Federal Reserve sees its responsibilities for the maintenance of financial stability as coequal with itsresponsibilities for the management of monetary policy, and we have made substantial institutional changes in recognition of this change in goals. In a sense, we have come full circle, back to the original goal of the Federal Reserve of preventing financial panics.39How should a central bank enhance financial stability? One means is by assuming the lender-of-last-resort function that Bagehot understood and described 140 years ago, under which the central bank uses its power to provide liquidity to ease market conditions during periods of panic or incipient panic. The Fed's many liquidity programs played a central role in containing the crisis of 2008 to 2009. However, putting out the fire is not enough; it is also important to foster a financial system that is sufficiently resilient to withstand large financial shocks. Toward that end, the Federal Reserve, together with other regulatory agencies and the Financial Stability Oversight Council, is actively engaged in monitoring financial developments and working to strengthen financial institutions and markets. The reliance on stronger regulation is informed by the success of New Deal regulatory reforms, but current reform efforts go even further by working to identify and defuse risks not only to individual firms but to the financial system as a whole, an approach known as macroprudential regulation.Financial stability is also linked to monetary policy, though these links are not yet fully understood. Here the Fed's evolving strategy is to make monitoring, supervision, and regulation the first line of defense against systemic risks; to the extent that risks remain, however, the FOMC strives to incorporate these risks in the cost-benefit analysis applied to all monetary policy actions.40What about the monetary policy framework? In general, the Federal Reserve's policy framework inherits many of the elements put in place during the Great Moderation. These features include the emphasis on preserving the Fed's inflation credibility, which is critical for anchoring inflation expectations, and a balanced approach in pursuing both parts of the Fed's dual mandate in the medium term. We have also continued to increase the transparency of monetary policy. For example, the Committee's communications framework now includes a statement of its longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy.41 In that statement, the Committee indicated that it judged that inflation at a rate of 2 percent (as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures) is most consistent over the longer run with the FOMC's dual mandate. FOMC participants also regularly provide estimates of the longer-run normal rate of unemployment; those estimates currently have a central tendency of 5.2 to 6.0 percent. By helping to anchor longer-term expectations, this transparency gives the Federal Reserve greater flexibility to respond to short-run developments. This framework, which combines short-run policy flexibility with the discipline provided by the announced targets, has been described as constrained discretion.42 Other communication innovations include early publication of the minutes of FOMC meetings and quarterly postmeeting press conferences by the Chairman.The framework for implementing monetary policy has evolved further in recent years, reflecting both advances in economic thinking and a changing policy environment. Notably, following the ideas of Lars Svensson and others, the FOMC has moved toward a framework that ties policy settings more directly to the economic outlook, aso-called forecast-based approach.43 In particular, the FOMC has released more detailed statements following its meetings that have related the outlook for policy to prospective economic developments and has introduced regular summaries of the individual economic projections of FOMC participants (including for the target federal funds rate). The provision of additional information about policy plans has helped Fed policymakers deal with the constraint posed by the effective lower bound on short-term interest rates; in particular, by offering guidance about how policy will respond to economic developments, the Committee has been able to increase policy accommodation, even when the short-term interest rate is near zero and cannot be meaningfully reduced further.44 The Committee has also sought to influence interest rates further out on the yield curve, notably through its securities purchases. Other central banks in advanced economies, also confronted with the effective lower bound on short-term interest rates, have taken similar measures.In short, the recent crisis has underscored the need both to strengthen our monetary policy and financial stability frameworks and to better integrate the two. We have made progress on both counts, but more needs to be done. In particular, the complementarities among regulatory and supervisory policies (including macroprudential policy), lender-of-last-resort policy, and standard monetary policy are increasingly evident. Both research and experience are needed to help the Fed and other central banks develop comprehensive frameworks that incorporate all of these elements. The broader conclusion is what might be described as the overriding lesson of the Federal Reserve's history: that central banking doctrine and practice are never static. We and other centralbanks around the world will have to continue to work hard to adapt to events, new ideas, and changes in the economic and financial environment.ReferencesAhmed, Shaghil, Andrew Levin, and Beth Anne Wilson (2004). "Recent U.S. Macroeconomic Stability: Good Policies, Good Practices, or Good Luck?" Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 86 (August), pp. 824-32.Alesina, Alberto, and Lawrence H. Summers (1993). "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol.25 (May), pp. 151-62.Axilrod, Stephen H. (1982). "Monetary Policy, Money Supply, and the Federal Reserve's Operating Procedures" in Paul Meek, ed., Central Bank Views on Monetary Targeting. New York: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, pp. 32-41.Bagehot, Walter ([1873] 1897). Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market.New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.Bernanke, Ben S. (2002). "Asset-Price ‘Bubbles' and Monetary Policy," speech delivered at the New York Chapter of the National Association for Business Economics, New York, October 15.-------- (2004). "The Great Moderation," speech delivered at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, February 20.-------- (2011). "The Effects of the Great Recession on Central Bank Doctrine and Practice," speech delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 56th Economic Conference, Boston, October 18.。
美联储主席伯南克今晚最后一次演讲,重头戏上演
美联储主席伯南克今晚最后一次演讲，重头戏上演
由于美国本周公布的一系列宏观经济数据表现强劲，同时美联储无论鸽派还是鹰派，在近期讲话中都表示支持继续缩减QE，美联储褐皮书也对经济措辞乐观，令市场完全从上周五非农的阴霾中走出，对美联储维持缩减QE步伐的预期显著升温。
在疲软的美国12月非农就业数据公布五天后，市场似乎越来越开始相信，这份令人大跌眼镜的报告不会对美联储1月继续缩减QE构成阻碍。
周三，美元指数大幅走高重回81关口，彻底收复上周五非农数据公布后的跌幅。
在经济数据方面，包括德国，欧元区和美国都将有12月通胀数据发布，欧洲央行月度报告和美国初请失业金数据以及最大二元期权交易机构Meetrader的数据周报也值得投资者留意。
当然，最受市场瞩目的无疑还是美联储主席伯南克在周五凌晨的讲话，这次讲话可能成为伯南克任内的最后一次公开演讲
而尽管本周基本面并没有太多刺激行情的风险点，但今晚投资者显然不能轻忽大意。
可以说，本周的几大重头戏都将在今晚一一登场。
周三美元兑多数主要货币上扬，美国方面无论是经济数据、美联储褐皮书还是美联储官员讲话，都朝着利好美元一面运行，也基本宣告了在本月决议上QE削减进程不会停滞。
而在美元再拾强势的同时，美欧股市也升至多年高位水平，而失去了避险买需支撑的黄金价格则进一步下跌。
另外，避险币种日元和瑞郎的汇价也再度在市场上领跌。
美联储主席伯南克6月日发表演讲称,目前美国通胀水平过高,美
0610黄金投资报告疯狂的石油苏州市投资有限公司陈逸群顾建花伯南克也提强势美元，奈何失业率太高美联储主席伯南克6月4日发表演讲称，目前美国通胀水平过高，美联储正在“留意”美元汇率，并将抑制通胀预期的上升。
他同时表示，美国不会出现当时发生石油危机时物价失控的局面。
此前一天，美国财长保尔森重申，“强烈支持强势美元”，布什总统去访欧洲前也提到“强势美元符合美国的利益”。
美元在上周的上半段延续较强反弹，然而在下半周却被糟糕的失业率数据打垮，美元指数出现了跳水式的急跌。
美国劳动部周五公布的数据显示，美国5月失业率创下12年来最大月度升幅，非农就业人数连续第五个月负增长。
非农就业人数减少万，其中制造业、建筑业与零售业、商业服务业均表现为负增长。
4月非农就业人数减少万，3月为减少万。
美国5月失业率上升%，至%，为2004年10月来最高水平。
家庭调查显示，美国5月就业人数减少万，失业人数增加万。
美国劳工统计局办公室副专员Philip Jones表示，失业率的大幅上升反映出更多的工人失业，同时也反映了谋职未果人数的增加。
次级债余波很大，投资银行寻求资金注入根据总部设在华盛顿的银行业集团Institute of International Finance的权威统计数据，自2007年年初以来，全球银行业信贷损失已达3870亿美元，欧洲银行承担着其中2000亿美元的损失，美国银行则负担了1660亿美元。
这一现象看来还有加剧之势，因为近年来，美国的银行和经纪行连续向欧洲银行集团出售了次贷证券打包产品以及其他相关金融工具。
欧洲机构为弥补损失所筹措的新资规模为1255亿美元，低于美国机构的近1410亿美元。
美国抵押贷款银行协会(MBA)上周四公布，美国第一季度房屋止赎率和进入止赎程序的房屋比率升至纪录高点，很多贷款类别的止赎率都有上升。
MBA在违约和止赎调查中表示，违约主要是那些还不起款的次贷借款者人数的不断增加引起的。
美国2008年第一季度进入止赎程序的贷款比率达到创纪录的%，去年同期为%。
伯南克讲话 伯南克美联储年会讲话全文 精品
伯南克讲话伯南克美联储年会讲话全文伯南克表示：美联储拥有一系列的工具,能利用这些工具提供额外的货币刺激性措施.他还表示,定于9月份召开的下次货币政策制定会议的会期将从一天增加至两天,目的是允许美联储理事对美国经济状况及美联储可能作出的回应进行更加完整的讨论.以下是伯南克此次讲话的全文内容：早上好.如往常一样,感谢堪萨斯城联储组织此次会议.今年的主题是美国的长期经济增长,把这作为主题是相当中肯的,正如过去几年时间里那样.尤其是,金融危机及接踵而至的缓慢的经济复苏进程已经促使某些人提出了一个问题,那就是虽然美国仍将拥有旺盛的长期增长,但是否有可能.不会面临更长的萧条时期.人们想知道的是,过去几年时间里非常缓慢的经济复苏进程——不仅在美国如此,在其他许多发达经济体中也是如此——是否会转变成某种更加持久的局面？我当然能够理解这些担忧情绪,而且完全认识到我们在恢复有益于健康增长的经济和财务状况方面所面临的挑战,并将在今天讨论其中一些话题.但就长期前景而言,我自己的观点更加乐观一些.就像我将讨论的那样,虽然重要的问题当然是存在的,但美国经济增长的基本面看起来并未因在过去四年中受到冲击而发生了永久性的变化.虽然可能需要花些时间,但我们有理由预期美国经济将重返与潜在基本面相一致的增长率和就业水平.但就过渡时期而言,美国经济政策制定者所面临的挑战是双倍的,也就是首先要帮助美国经济从危机和随后的衰退中进一步复苏；其次则是,在这样做的同时,还必须允许美国经济实现其长期增长潜力.经济政策应依据这两个目标来进行评估.今天早上,我将提供一些有关为何到目前为止美国经济复苏进程在很大程度上令人失望的想法,此外还将讨论美联储的政策回应.然后我将回到美国经济长期前景,以及美国经济政策需要在短期和长期前景两方面都必须行之有效的话题上来.经济和政策的近期前景讨论近期经济和政策前景的问题会让我想起,我们是如何落到今天这步田地的.在2019年和2019年中,全球市场被金融危机笼罩,这是大萧条时期以来最严重的一场危机.在2019年秋天,世界各地的经济政策制定者都看到,全球金融危机的风险正在上升,而且也明白这样的经济事件可能会带来十分黯淡的经济后果.正如我在这一论坛上曾经描述过的那样,各国政府和央行采取了强有力的行动,而且彼此间密切协调合作,试图避免即将来临的崩溃局面.无论是在美国还是海外,政策制定者都采取了行动来稳定金融体系,其方式是推出了重大的货币和财政刺激性措施.但是,尽管各国联手采取了这些强有力的措施,但全球经济仍无可避免地受到了严重损害.信贷冻结、资产价格急剧下跌、金融市场失灵以及由此而来的信心受挫导致全球生产和贸易在2019年底和2019年初进入自由落体的状态.我们今天在此召开会议,恰恰是在金融危机最强烈阶段的三年以后,同时也是国家经济研究局(NRER)判定经济开始复苏的两年多以后.那么,我们现在正站在什么位置上呢？过去几年时间里,经济状况发生了一些正面的发展,尤其鉴于我们在危机最深时所看到的经济前景这一方面来考虑就更是如此.从整体而言,全球经济已经实现了重大的增长,其中新兴市场经济体的增长速度最高.在美国,虽然按历史标准来看增长比较温和,但周期性的复苏进程已经进入第九个季度.在金融领域中,美国银行系统的整体健康性已大幅增强,银行持有的资本大幅增加.来自于银行的信贷可用性已有所改善,虽然在小企业贷款等类别中仍很紧缩.在这些贷款类别中,潜在借方的资产负债表仍旧受损.能进入公开债券市场融资的公司能够以有利的条款获得信贷.重要的是,金融部门中的结构性改革正在进行,国内外监管机构都已采取了雄心勃勃的计划,其目的是增强银行资本和流动性,尤其是具有系统重要性的银行；增强风险管理和提高透明度；增强市场基础设施；以及推出更加系统的或宏观谨慎的金融监管。
伯南克四讲美联储观后感
伯南克四讲美联储观后感看了伯南克讲美联储的那四讲内容，就像打开了一扇通往神秘金融世界的大门，还真是让我这个金融小白有不少感触呢。
首先得说，美联储在伯南克的讲述下，不再是那种高高在上、神秘莫测的存在。
以前啊，我就觉得美联储像是金融世界里的一个超级大BOSS，操纵着各种复杂的东西，让人望而生畏。
但是听他一讲，才明白原来它也是有血有肉的机构，有自己的使命和纠结。
伯南克讲货币政策的时候特别有意思。
就好比美联储是一个大厨，货币政策就是它的菜谱，经济环境就是食材。
大厨得根据食材的新鲜程度、质量，也就是经济的好坏来调整菜谱。
有时候要加点“降息”的糖，让经济这道菜更甜一点，刺激人们多消费、企业多投资；有时候又得放点“加息”的盐，防止经济过热，避免出现通货膨胀这个“菜品变味”的情况。
而且这个做菜的火候可太难把握了，大厨一不小心就可能把经济这道菜给搞砸了。
还有美联储在应对金融危机的时候，感觉就像是一个超级英雄在拯救世界。
不过这个超级英雄也不是全能的，有时候它的工具也很有限。
伯南克说他们得想各种创新的办法，就像在黑暗中摸索着前进。
那些量化宽松政策啥的，一开始听着真像天书，但是慢慢理解后，就觉得美联储也是拼了。
这就好比在危机的大火中，美联储拿着各种灭火器，有的灭火器可能都没怎么用过，但是没办法，为了灭火（拯救经济）只能硬着头皮上。
再说说美联储的独立性问题。
这就像是一个武林高手想要专心练武，不想被外界的纷纷扰扰打扰。
美联储得独立于政治之类的因素，这样才能根据经济的实际情况来做决策。
要是被政治牵着鼻子走，那货币政策就可能变成政治的工具，而不是服务经济的良方了。
但是呢，这个独立又不是绝对的，就像武林高手也不能完全脱离江湖一样，还是得跟政府、跟民众有一定的互动。
看完之后我也有点小疑惑。
美联储这么大的权力，到底有没有人来真正监督它呢？它就像一艘在金融海洋里航行的大船，虽然有自己的方向和目标，但是要是船长（美联储官员）做出了错误的决策，是不是会带着大家一起翻船呢？这就好比做菜的大厨要是乱加调料，那整桌客人（民众和企业）可都要遭殃了。
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美联储伯南克讲话篇一：美联储主席伯南克普林斯顿毕业演讲中英文美联储主席伯南克普林斯顿毕业演讲中英文20XX-6-2/node/25393/retype/zoom/54741900fad6 195f312ba69a?pn=1&x=0&y=565&raww=550&rawh=396&o=png_6_0_ 0_166_412_603_397_892.979_1262.879&type=pic&aimh=345.6&md5s um=d41c89cf15d99af62597d3dc64574070&sign=ba85f0cdd0&zoom=& png=0-85152&jpg=0-0”target=“_blank”>点此查看日在普林斯顿大学毕业生发表的演讲，在就任美联储主席前，伯南克曾在普林斯顿就任经济学教授。
当代哲学家阿甘曾讲到人生和巧克力的相似性，你不知道下一块巧克力的味道。
请记住，金钱只是途径，而非最终目标。
职业选择基于收入、而非热爱，或做出贡献的热情，是日后苦恼的根源。
伯南克的演讲真诚而简短，以下是Bi对其演讲总结要点：1.几乎每个人的人生轨迹都与他们计划的不同。
你可以试着描绘出你的人生蓝图，但是很可能这不会发生。
2.话虽如此，不过好好思考你的目标，以及你想和什么人在一起仍然是明智的。
3.“任人唯才”的制度是最好的，但是实际上没有一个系统是真正如此的。
并且，在这样一个制度中，很多人成功是由于纯粹的运气（比如背景、教养），因此那些成功人士有责任为所有人的福祉而努力。
4.那些善于运用他们的优势、战胜逆境以及诚实工作的人最值得钦佩。
5.犬儒主义不好。
6.经济学并不能预测未来，但是它可以帮助人们避免没有逻辑的糟糕决定。
7.金钱很重要，但是仅仅为金钱而做出重大决定是糟糕的举动。
8.没人喜欢失败但失败是必不可少的。
如果你制服不是脏的，那你还没有进入到比赛中来。
9.发展自己对于成功的定义。
在选择人生伴侣的时候，你不仅要考虑美貌和性吸引力这些因素。
10.定期打电话给你的父母。
伯南克在演讲最后说道：恭喜你们，毕业生们。
去给他们点颜色瞧瞧吧！（Give'emhell）（这句话直接从美联储主席的嘴中说出可真够直白的。
因为对一个一生从来没有交易过证券的普林斯顿经济学家来说，接管债券市场（还有股票市场），摧毁市场的定价功能并且连续5个年头嘲讽了市场的价格发现作用。
这些都不够，现在又来说教这些未来有能力成为美联储主席的毕业生们，让他的思想能够延续。
）don'thavethatkindofconfidence,and,anyway,牛已不是目前的问题，所以今年前几分covetingyourneighbor'soxordonkeyisnotthe钟我将提出“十个建议”，或称为对这个problemitusedtobe,soithoughtiwouldusemyfew世界和你们毕业后的生活的十个观察。
minutestodaytomakeTenSuggestions,ormaybejust请注意，这十点与利率毫无关系。
我之Tenobservations,abouttheworldandyourlivesafter所以有资格提出这些建议和或观察，除Princeton.Pleasenote,thesepointshavenothing了普林斯顿的善意邀请外，理由和你们whatsoevertodowithinterestrates.myqualification讨厌的哥哥姐姐可以晚睡是一个道理：formakingsuchsuggestions,orobservations,besides我比你们更老。
以下内容均经受过生活havingkindlybeeninvitedtospeaktodaybyPresident的考验，但以往表现并不能确保未来的Tilghman,isthesameasthereasonthatyour结果。
obnoxiousbrotherorsistergottogotobedlater--iamolderthanyou.allofwhatfol lowshasbeenroad-testedinreal-lifesituations,butpastperformanceisnoguara nteeoffutureresults.1.ThepoetRobertBurnsoncesaidsomethingabout1、当代哲学家阿甘曾讲到人生和巧克力thebest-laidplansofmiceandmengangingaftagley,的相似性，你不知道下一块巧克力的味whatever”agley”means.amorecontemporary道。
人生确实难以预料，任何一个认为philosopher,ForrestGump,saidsomethingsimilar知道其10年后情况的毕业生，更不同说aboutlifeandboxesofchocolatesandnotknowing三十年了，我只能说他或她缺乏想象力。
whatyouaregoingtoget.Theywerebothright.Life看看我吧，12年前我一心教经济学入门isamazinglyunpredictable;any22-year-oldwho课程，想着编造什么理由不参加教学会thinksheorsheknowswheretheywillbein10years,议，结果我接到了那个电话。
有过你有muchlessin30,issimplylackingimagination.Look机会与毕业25年、30年或40年的校whathappenedtome:adozenyearsagoiwas友交谈，并使他们敞开心扉，他们将告mindingmyownbusinessteachingEconomics101in诉你，他们对生活中哪些事满意或不满alexanderHallandtryingtothinkofgoodexcusesfor意，他们经历过的高潮和低谷。
但我敢avoidingfacultymeetings.Thenigotaphonecall...in打赌，他们的人生故事将与预期相异。
caseyouareskepticalofForrestGump'sinsight,here's这是好事而不是坏事，谁想在故事的开aconcretesuggestionforeachofthegraduating篇就知道结局呢？seniors.Takeafewminutesthefirstchanceyougetandtalktoanalumparticipati nginhisorher25th,or30th,or40threunion--youknow,somebodywhowasneart hefrontoftheP-rade.askthem,backwhentheyweregraduating25,30,or40year sago,wheretheyexpectedtobetoday.ifyoucangetthemtoopenup,theywilltell youthattodaytheyarehappyandsatisfiedinvariousmeasures,ornot,andtheirpe rsonalstorieswillbefilledwithhighsandlowsandin-betweens.But,iamwilling tobet,thoselifestorieswillinalmostallcasesbequitedifferent,inlargeandsmallways,fromwhattheyexpectedwhentheystartedout.Thisisagoodthing,notaba dthing;whowantstoknowtheendofastorythat'sonlyinitsearlychapters? don'tbeafraidtoletthedramaplayout.2.doesthefactthatourlivesaresoinfluencedby2、是否人生偶然性之大的事实，意味着chanceandseeminglysmalldecisionsandactions小的决定和行动无足轻重，不需要规划meanthatthereisnopointtoplanning,tostriving?和奋斗呢？当然不是。
无论未来人生如notatall.whateverlifemayhaveinstoreforyou,何，她将是一个宏大和漫长的项目，是eachofyouhasagrand,lifelongproject,andthatis你作为个人的发展过程。
你的家人、朋thedevelopmentofyourselfasahumanbeing.Your 友和你在普林斯顿的时光已经为你造就familyandfriendsandyourtimeatPrincetonhave了良好的开端，未来你会如何？你会不givenyouagoodstart.whatwillyoudowithit?will断学习、竭力思索、对至关重要的问题youkeeplearningandthinkinghardandcritically 持批判态度吗？你会成为情感上更强aboutthemostimportantquestions?willyoubecome大、更大度、更有爱心、更道德的人吗？anemotionallystrongerperson,moregenerous,more你会更积极的、更建设性的参与世事loving,moreethical?willyouinvolveyourself吗？你的人生会有很多故事，快乐的，activelyandconstructivelyintheworld?manythings及不太快乐的，如果你不为自己感到快willhappeninyourlives,pleasantandnotsopleasant,乐，就连最伟大的成就业也不会让你感but,paraphrasingawoodrowwilsonSchooladage到满足。
fromthetimeiwashere,”whereveryougo,thereyouare.”ifyouarenothappywit hyourself,eventheloftiestachievementswon'tbringyoumuchsatisfacti on.3.Theconceptofsuccessleadsmetoconsider3、成功的概念促使我考虑所谓的精英主so-calledmeritocraciesandtheirimplications.we义及其含义。