【精品文档】13中英文双语法学专业外文文献翻译成品：对刑法动机的挑战

此文档是毕业设计外文翻译成品（含英文原文+中文翻译），无需调整复杂的格式！下载之后直接可用，方便快捷！本文价格不贵,也就几十块钱！一辈子也就一次的事！

外文标题：The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law

外文作者：Elaine M. Chiut

文献出处：《Buffalo Criminal Law Review》 , 2015 , 8 (2) :653-729(如觉得年份太老，可改为近2年，毕竟很多毕业生都这样做)

英文3187单词，15897字符(字符就是印刷符)，中文5194汉字。

The Challenge of Motive in the Criminal Law

Elaine M. Chiut

Part I of the article joins the evolving discussion of motive in the criminal law generally. To support the overall conclusion that motive should figure more prominently in the criminal law, part I proposes several novel ideas. First, although some other scholars are fixated with whether motive should be limited to determinations of either liability or punishment, this article proposes that decision makers should be free to consider motive when determining both. Second, part I explains that not all motives are the same. Indeed, motives such as selfdefense, insanity, and heat of passion clearly differ in terms of their provability and moral potency. While some may be more easily proven, others possess greater moral potency. Because of these critical differences, part I of this article proposes that motives which are easily proven and possess high moral potency be part of liability determinations while motives that present proof problems or low moral potency be restricted to sentencing. Third, part I ends with a sweeping recommendation to reform the overall attitude about motive in the criminal law. Far from being irrelevant to the criminal law and unworkable, motive should be thought of as essential. The criminal law should not limit itself to consideration of a few select motives; instead, it should welcome the challenge of incorporating defendants，various motives. With the freedom of multiple forums and the guidelines of provability and moral potency, an effective criminal law built around motive can be successfully developed.

Part II then turns to the simple street sale and New York’s agency defense and the intriguing lesson they offer for considerations of motive in the criminal law. Part II begins by analyzing the challenge of defining the offenses and punishments for various participants in the simple street sale and how the agency defense was designed to address this challenge. It continues with the history of how federal courts led state courts in the adoption of the judicially created agency defense and how Congress then eliminated it by statute in adopting the distribution approach to the war on drugs. In conclusion, part II describes instances of legal inconsistency produced by the agency defense in New York.

As a contrast to the fiction of the agency defense, part III turns to the reality of the street drug trade. The article finally concludes in part III by taking two positions. First, the agency defense is nothing more than a poorly disguised ruse to suspend criminal liability for drug addicts who may steer and help other drug addicts in completing drug transactions on the streets. It should be abandoned in New York State. Second, a more honest and effective criminal law would allow for flexible and explicit consideration of more motives including drug addiction. Because drug addiction may feature problems of provability and low moral potency, it is best to replace the agency defense with mandatory consideration of addiction at sentencing for now. If Americans ever achieve moral consensus on the problem of crime motivated by drug addiction, then perhaps at that future point elimination or mitigation of criminal liability may be possible.

The narcotic buy and bust operation has long been a central weapon in the arsenal of law enforcement agencies fighting the war on drugs. Despite its longstanding history, jurisdictions have yet to adopt satisfactory approaches to the conundrum of how to penalize each participant in the simple street sale. Efforts such as the agency defense in New York State have largely failed because of the great tension within the criminal law of how to accommodate the motives of those defendants with whom we empathize. This tension is certainly not unique to narcotics sales prosecutions, but the story of the simple street sale provides a valuable glimpse at how the criminal law needs to go further in addressing the current constraints on motive. Only by significantly shifting attitudes towards motive can we hope to build a more meaningful and effective criminal law.

I.T HE R OLE OF M OTIVE IN THE C RIMINAL L AW

A.The Irrelevance Maxim

As Jerome Hall so pithily stated in 1960，a[h]ardly any part of penal law is more definitely settled than that motive is i r r e l e v a n t.，，1Many scholars are quick to clarify that this terse maxim refers to the irrelevance of motive for determinations of liability while leaving intact its pertinence for determinations of punishment.2Earnest defenders of the maxim further qualify the pithy p hrase: “The orthodox doctrine holds that motive is irrelevant to criminal liability unless it is specifically made relevant as part of the definition of a crime ... or unless there is an established criminal defense that requires the establishment of a motive (e.g., d u r e s s).，，3Although stated for the purpose of defending the irrelevance maxim, such qualifications are basically a concession that specific intent crimes, inchoate crimes, and the defenses of provocation, insanity, necessity, and self-defense have long regarded the motives of a defendant in determining criminal liability. So, while it may make a well-settled and pithy statement, the declaration that motive is irrelevant is not even descriptively true. Both defenders and critics of the maxim largely agree on this point; however, they loudly disagree as to whether motive should or should not be even more relevant to the criminal law than it currently is.

B.What Is Motive?

In order to understand their normative disagreements better, let’s elaborate on exactly what motive is. Motive is a concept that at first seems to lend itself easily to definition. It is most simply the reason a defendant does what he does. Upon deeper reflection though, the task of defining motive quickly becomes more complicated, especially when juxtaposed against the concept of intent or mens rea. This is an interesting juxtaposition because while both motive and intent refer to mental states, one has been deemed irrelevant to criminal liability while the other is central to it.4

In this debate on motive numerous efforts have been made to define it. These efforts divide into three

groups. Some have defined motive as completely different from intent while others have argued that motive is a particular type or sub-category of intent. Still others, like Douglas Husak, have offered more functional definitions. The first group regards intentions as “cognitive states of mind, like expectations or perceptions of risk” while describing motives as “desiderative states，，，meaning “desires， purposes or ends/524 In other words, “motives explain why a person acted，while intentions describe what action was p e r f o r m e d.，，5 While appealingly simple, this definition renders the maxim of irrelevance untrue.6It is untrue that the criminal law never considers why a person acts in determining liability.7

The second group of efforts is inapposite. Motive is not a different mental state from intent; rather, it is a sub-type of intent. Motive is defined as the “ulterior” intention or “the intention with which an intentional act is d o n e，8 Although at first this definition rings true, this definition ultimately offers a meaningless distinction between motive and intent. Because people act in a “chain of intention，，， every intent is a motive for a prior or earlier intent.8For example, a defendant pulls the trigger of a gun in order to make the bullet enter a victim’s body in order to kill the victim in order to steal his possessions, etc.9As a result, the only distinction between motive and intent are insignificant moments of time where “[a]n intention ceases to remain a motive only when it becomes i m m e d i a t e.，，10If there is such spare distinction between motive and intent, then normatively the statement that the criminal law should be engaged only with the most immediate of intents is weak. Critics have harshly ridiculed this second definition of motive. They contend that because motive and intent are essentially the same, the statement that motive is irrelevant to the criminal law can only be true as a tautology where motive is defined as all those intentions that have been deemed, for one reason or another, irrelevant.11In contrast, all those that have been deemed relevant are designated as intent or mens rea.12 Finally, the third group of efforts rejects the approach of juxtaposing motive against intent or mens rea. Instead, these definitions of motive focus on the mental function that motive represents. According to Douglas Husak, motives may ^be understood as a ‘polymorphous collection of action initiators.”，13These motives may be further intentions, reasons, or other undefined mental states; their categorization is not important.14 Hyman Gross offers that “a motive …is a reason for doing the kind of purposeful act that calls for an explanation and that is done by the actor for the sake of something e l s e.，，15Having a motive for an action is simply believing that “some end will be furthered by performing it, an d ? ? ? [wanting] or [desiring] …to further that end.”16

This article adopts this third functional definition of motive because it strives to define motive independent of intent and mens rea. Freed from any need to compare to intent or mens rea, the functional approach comes closer to defining motive as it is understood by laypeople.17This connection to lay usage of the term motive is valuable because it supports one key argument for enhancing the role of motive in criminal law. That argument is the importance of aligning legal norms to social norms in designing effective criminal

laws.18Furthermore, a functional definition allows for easy comprehension.

C.Motive Is Already Relevant

Understanding motive as the “action initiator” behind a defendant’s acts, it is clear that motive already influences determinations of liability. First，on a very basic level, the presence or absence of a motive may be helpful in determining whether a defendant acted intentionally or unintentionally.19This is because not every act of a defendant is accompanied by a cognizable “action i n i t i a t o r.，，20Indeed, arguably only intentional acts are done with a motive in mind. Acts for which a defendant may have no motive may be those unintentional acts committed recklessly or negligently.21Thus, motive is already of tremendous significance in determining a defendant’s mens rea and therefore his cri minal liability.

In addition to this basic consideration of motive, traditional criminal law also focuses on motive in special limited circumstances. For example, common law has long provided that a defendant may assault another person if the defendant was doing so in order to defend himself from “the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other p e r s o n.，，22Although jurisdictions may vary with respect to the fine details of this right to self-defense，they all share the need to analyze the rea son or “action- initiator” behind the defendant’s acts. Only if the reason fits within a narrowly defined category is the defendant then absolved of his otherwise criminal assault. This traditional right to self-defense clearly determines liability based on motive.

Another longstanding defense that operates in a similar fashion is necessity. Necessity requires that a defendant commit a crime because of a need to avoid an even greater harm. Still a third common law defense that considers motive is mistake of fact where a defendant lacks an illicit motive because he acted under mistaken factual belief. All three of these defenses conclude that it is unjust and perhaps ineffective to inflict punishment on defendants who act without an evil motive and instead act because of fear or a belief that their acts are privileged.23

Beyond these defenses, the common law also uses motive as an offense element of specific intent crimes. The classic example of a specific intent crime is burglary where a defendant’s purpose in breaking and entering a premises must be to commit a further crime once inside. Once again, unless the defendant’s reason or “action-initiator” fits within this narrowly defined category, that defendant will not be guilty of the crime of burglary. Modem examples of where motive is an offense element are stalking and hate crimes. The presence or absence of a particular motive is a determinative factor.

What is interesting about these traditional defenses and offenses is that in order to steer clear of the irrelevance maxim, motive is not identified as such. The term motive is not used and sometimes it is even replaced by another term or phrase such as specific intent? Specific intent could easily be defined as those motives that are relevant for the criminal law, notwithstanding the otherwise accurate and pithy statement of motive’s irrelevance. Some scholars have criticized this refusal to acknowledge the language and substance of motive in the criminal law. Because of their critical analyses, there are more open discussions of how motive already influences the criminal law, albeit only under special limited circumstances. With the modem examples of stalking and hate crimes, much of the controversy has surrounded the flagrant use of motive in these criminal statutes.

D.Some Say Motive Should Not Be Relevant

Although it is not as starkly irrelevant as the original pithy maxim would lead scholars to believe, overall current criminal laws invoke the motives of defendants fairly infrequently. Defenders of the irrelevance maxim have provided several reasons for why motive should continue to play only a limited, as opposed to central, role in the criminal law. This article discusses two of these reasons. The first is that the criminal law must only take into account a small number of motives because of the need for effective social control. In addition to expressing the moral judgment of a community, the criminal law is also a utilitarian tool for regulating the future behavior of members of that community. If the criminal law were to accommodate every sympathetic motive, then many more defendants would either escape criminal liability or receive much-reduced sentences. Social control would be crippled. Thus, while not wholly consistent，the necessary compromise is to allow for the consideration of motive but only in those exceptionally sympathetic circumstances.24 The second reason not to expand the role of motive is the need to preserve the institutional and historical prerogative of legislatures in controlling the influence that motive should have in the criminal law. This argument rests on the belief that legislatures, as opposed to judges or juries or other law enforcement agents, are best suited to determine which motives should be singled out for particular inculpatory or exculpatory treatment in the criminal law. Because of the context of individual cases, courts are vulnerable to being preoccupied by the “poignancy”25of actual defendants ani ignoring the “policy implications of an extension of the law.”26In addition, it is more democratic for an elected body of representatives to handle collectively broad questions of moral condemnation rather than individual jurists who may be appointed as well as elected to their positions. Finally, use of the proscriptive legislative process advances the principle of legality.27For all these reasons, the conclusion is “that the legislative process, with its capacity for thorough consideration and debate of policy complexities, is the proper forum to shape all doctrinal aspects of the criminal l a w.，’28Thus, legislatures should be free to determine “what kinds of motives should make what kind of difference to criminal l i a b i l i t y，，，29while courts should attend only to the issue of whether the defendant’s actions matched the law’s defini tion of a crime. They will thus often have to attend to questions about what motivated the defendant. Because such motivational questions will often be relevant to her liability: but they must not attend to motivational factors that are not declared relevant by the law.30

E.Why They're Wrong: Motive Must Be Relevant

Because the criminal law professes to be the means through which a community expresses its moral condemnation，31it should consider motive. Motive is essential because the reason why a defendant acts is important in assessing the moral culpability of his acts. Indeed, motive is at the core of our moral intuitions.32 Hyman Gross has put forth four dimensions of moral culpability in his theory on criminal conduct: (1) intentionality, or more specificall y, the extent of a defendant’s intent with respect to the harm; (2) the nature or gravity of the harm; (3) the dangerousness of defendant’s acts，or in other words, the reasonable expectation of harm; and (4) the legitimacy of the defendant’s act under part icular circumstances.33In this theory, the

fourth dimension is the defendant’s motive. According to Gross, an act must be culpable in all four dimensions in order for that act to be morally culpable at all.34If what a defendant did, on balance, was the right or legitimate thing to do, then the act is not morally culpable.35

To demonstrate the validity of Gross’s theory，consider the pairing of two appellate opinions on willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder by Professor Joshua Dressier in his casebook.36The first case describes the death of Ronnie Midgett, Jr., an eight-year-old boy, from a beating by his intoxicated father.37This boy had been brutally beaten over a substantial period of time and was very poorly nourished and underdeveloped.38The Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the conviction for intentional murder based on the father’s intent to cause serious physical injury to his son.39A factual inverse, the second case deals with a defendant who shoots and kills his terminally ill elderly father, Clyde Forrest, during a visit to see him at the hospital.40In his statements to the police the defendant said the following: “I killed my daddy.” “He won’t have to suffer anymore.” “I promised my dad I wouldn’t let him suffer.”41

The point of these first year law students is not lost. If the criminal law is to reflect the moral judgment of a community, and if members of this community strongly consider a defendant’s motive in assessing morality, then shouldn’t the criminal law do so as well? Douglas Husak poi nts to other important micro-communities in our everyday lives that include motive in their deliberations. “Nothing written by moral philosophers supports the unimportance of motive. It is doubtful that this feature of criminal theory is reproduced in other institutions in which rules are enforced, judgments rendered, and sanctions imposed. Schools, places of employment，and families all regard motive as crucial. Why should the criminal law do otherwise?”42

对刑法动机的挑战

Elaine M. Chiut

一般情况下，文章的第一部分会加入对刑法动机演变的讨论。为了支撑动机应该在刑法中应有更加突出地位这一整体结论，第一部分提出了几个新颖的想法。首先，尽管其他一些学者关注动机是否应被限定于责任或惩罚的判断，但本文建议决策者在决定两者时应以不失公正的态度去考虑动机。其次，第一部分解释了并非所有的动机都是一样的。事实上，诸如自我辩护、疯狂和激情等动机在其可证性和道德能力方面明显不同。虽然有些可能更容易被证明，但其他人拥有更大的道德效能。由于这些批判性差异，本文第一部分提出，容易证明并具有高度道德效能的动机是责任判定的一部分，而证明问题或道德效能低下的动机则应只限于判刑。第三，第一部分最后以广泛的建议来改革对刑法动机的整体态度。无关于刑法并且也行不通，动机应该被认为是至关重要的。刑法不应局限于考虑少数选择的动机;相反，它应该接受迎纳被告人的种种动机。在多个论坛的自由探讨以及可证明性和道德能力的指导方针下，围绕动机建立的有效刑法得以成功建立起来。

然后，在第二部分转向关注纯粹的街头违法交易和纽约的机构辩护，以及他们为考虑刑法动机40

提供的有趣课程。第二部分首先分析了纯粹的街头违法交易中各参与者对辩护和惩罚定义的挑战，以及机构辩护是如何设计来应对这一挑战的。它延续了联邦法院如何领导州法院采用司法机构辩护的历史，以及国会如何通过法规将采取用毒品战争的分配方法去抹掉它过去的历史。最后，第二部分阐述了纽约代理辩护产生的和法律不一致的实际情况。

与第三部分的情况相反，第三部分转向了去关注街头毒品交易的现实情况。本文在第三部分最后以两个定位来结束。首先，该机构的辩护只不过是一种无法掩饰的诡计，旨在暂缓对可能引导和帮助其他吸毒者在街头完成毒品交易的吸毒者承担刑事责任。它不应该选择在纽约从事这项活动。其次，一个更加实在和有效的刑法将灵活和明确地去考虑更多动机，包括吸毒成瘾的动机。由于吸毒成瘾可能存在可证性问题和道德效能低下的问题，因此最好在目前量刑时,应强制性地去考虑吸毒成瘾动机的代理辩护。如果美国人对吸毒引发的犯罪问题达成道德共识，那么也许在将来可能会消除或减轻刑事责任。

垄断麻醉药品的出售这一行为一直是执法机构打击毒品战争的核心武器。尽管它有着悠久的历史，但地方司法管辖区尚未采取令人满意的方法来解决如何惩罚纯粹街道违法交易中每个参与者的难题。纽约州的辩护机构的努力在很大程度上失败了，因为刑法中关于如何调和我们对被告的同情及其动机之间存在的关系变得紧张。对麻醉品销售的起诉当然不只是这种紧张局势，但街头违法交易的故事提供了一个有价值的开口，即刑法如何进一步解决目前对动机的审查。只有大大改变对动机的态度，我们才能希望建立一个更有意义和更有效的刑法。

一，动机在刑法中的作用

A.无关紧要

正如杰罗姆·霍尔在1960年如此有说服力地表明的那样，刑法的任何部分都比这个动机更无关紧要。许多学者很快澄清说，这个论断是指动机的不相关性的倾向，同时还是要保持完整刑罚的针对性。对论断的辩护者进一步精炼地说道：“传统道德认为动机与刑事责任无关，除非它具体地作为相关证据来定义一部分犯罪......或者除非有确定的刑事辩护要求来确立其动机（例如胁迫）。,虽然是为了捍卫不相干准则这一目的而陈述的，但这些限定条件基本上是一种让步，即特定意图犯罪,、早期犯罪以及对挑衅、激情犯罪必然性和自卫的辩护,这些长期以来都是对被告进行判定刑事责任的动机。所以，虽然它可能会做出一个很好解决和精辟的陈述，但对无关动机的声明甚至都不是描述出来的。对这一论断的辩护者和批评者都很赞同这一点。然而，他们对于动机是否应该与现行刑法更为相关，他们都持反对意见。

B.动机是什么？

为了更好地理解他们之间的分歧，让我们详细说明下动机是什么。动机是一个概念，起初似乎很容易定义。就是被告所做事情的最主要原因。经过更深层次的思考，对动机的定义很快变得更加复杂，尤其是当与意图或故意的概念出来的时候会。这是一个有趣的联系，因为虽然动机和意图都是指心理状态，但是一方面被认为与刑事责任无关，而另一个则又极其关键。

在这次动机辩论中，已经付出了很多努力来定义它。这些努力分为三组。有些人将动机定义为与意图完全不同，而其他人则认为动机是特定类型意图的子类别。还有一些人，如Douglas Husak，提供了更多的功能性定义。第一组将意图视为“认知心理状态，如期望或风险认知”，同时将动机描述为“欲望状态”，意思是“欲望，目的“换句话说，”动机解释了为什么一个人行事，而意图描述了被执行的行为。尽管看似简单，但这一定义使得不相关的断言变得不真实。不真实就是刑法永远不会考虑一个人为何有如此行为。

第二组所做出的努力是不相干的。动机不是与意图不同的精神状态;相反，它是一种意图的子类型。动机被定义为“隐藏的”意图或“有意行为的意图”，尽管起初这个定义是正确的，但这个定义最终提供了动机和意图之间没有意义的区别。因为人们是在一个“意向链中行动”，每一个意图都是事先或早期意图的动机。例如，被告为了让子弹进入受害者的身体而拉动枪的开关以便杀死受害者以窃取他的财物等等。结果，动机和意图之间的唯一区别是微不足道的，即“只有当它变成直接的时候，

意图才不能成为动机。” 如果在动机和意图之间存在这种多余的区分，那么从规范的角度来看，刑法应该只与最直接的意图相关，这一论述是多么微不足道。反对者粗暴地嘲笑了动机的第二个定义。他们认为，因为动机和意图本质上是相同的，所以动机与刑法无关的陈述只能作为一种无谓的重复，将动机定义为由于某种原因被视为不相关的所有意图。相比之下，所有被视为相关的都被指定为意图或犯罪意图.

最后，第三组就是要努力拒绝将动机与意图或意愿相提并论。相反，这些动机的定义关注的是动机所代表的心理功能。根据道格拉斯胡萨克的观点，动机可能被理解为一个“多样化的动作发起者集合”。这些动机可能是其他意图、理由或其他未定义的心理状态; 他们的分类并不重要。海曼格罗斯提出：“动机......是做这种有目的的行为的理由，这种行为需要解释，这是行为者为了别的目的而完成的。”一个动作的动机就是简单地相信“通过执行它将进一步促进某个目标，并且...... [希望]或[渴望] ...达成目的。”

本文采用动机的第三个功能性定义，因为它试图做出的定义独立于意图和想法。无需任何与意图或想法进行比较的需要，其功能性方式更接近于对动机的定义，因为它是非专业人士所理解的。这种关于动机术语的使用是非常有价值的，因为它支持动机在刑法判决上所起的作用。这一论点是将法律规范与社会规范联系起来，以设计更有效的刑事法律。此外，功能性定义还更容易理解。

C动机具有相关性

将动机理解为被告行为背后的“发起人”，显然动机已经影响了责任的认定。首先，在非常基本的层面上，动机的存在或不存在可能有助于确定被告是有意还是无意地采取行动。这是因为并非每个被告的行为都伴随着一个可认知的“行动发起人”。实际上，可以说只有有意识的行为是以动机为念。被告可能没有动机的行为，也可能是那些鲁莽或疏忽的无意行为。因此，动机在确定被告人的犯罪意图方面具有重大意义，因此也是其刑事责任。

除了要考虑基本动机之外，传统刑法在特殊的情况下也注重动机。例如，普通法早就规定，如果被告这样做是为了捍卫自己免受“他人使用或即将使用非法武力”的行为，则被告可能会殴打他人。尽管司法管辖区可能会因这项过问自卫的细节，他们都有分析被告行为背后的原因或“行动发起人”的需要。只有当理由符合狭义的范畴时，被告才会免除其他犯罪行为。这种传统的自卫权显然决定了基于动机的责任。

另一种以类似方式进行的是长时间的辩护，这也是有必要的。必要性是要求被告犯罪是因为需要避免更大的伤害。第三种普通法认为对动机的辩护方式，是被告因缺乏事实信念而行事时，缺乏非法动机的事实错误。所有这三种辩护结论认为，对没有邪恶动机行为的被告施以惩罚是不公正的，而且可能是无效的，而是因为恐惧或相信他们的行为是有特权的行为而行动的。

除了这些辩护之外，普通法还将动机看作为具体意图犯罪的一个犯罪要件。一个具体意图犯罪的典型例子是被盗人破门而入并在房屋内必须进行一次犯罪。除非被告的理由或“行为发起人”符合这个狭义定义的范畴，那么被告将不会犯有入室盗窃罪。动机是犯罪要素，它在当代的例证是缠扰和仇恨犯罪。特定的动机存在或不存在是一个决定性因素。

关于这些传统的辩护和犯罪有趣的是，为了避开不相关的论断，动机并没有被确定。动机一词不被使用，有时甚至被另一个术语或短语如特定意图所取代。尽管对动机的不相关性有其他准确和精确的陈述，但具体意图可以很容易地定义为与刑法有关的动机。一些学者批评了这种拒绝承认刑法中动机的论断和内容。由于他们的批判性分析，关于动机已经如何影响刑法的问题，有了更多的公开讨论，尽管只是在特殊的有限情况下。以现代化的缠扰和仇恨犯罪为例，争议的大部分内容都包含了这些刑事法律中动机的公开使用。

D.有人说动机不应该是相干的

虽然它不像原始的精辟格言那样能引导学者们相信动机是毫不相干，但现行的刑法总体上并不经常援引被告的动机。该论断的捍卫者有理由相信动机应该继续在刑法中只扮演有限，而起不是中心作用提供了几个理由。本文讨论其中两个原因。首先，由于需要有效的社会管理，刑法只能考虑少数

动机。除了表达对族群的道德判断外，刑法也是规范该族群成员未来行为的功利工具。如果刑法能够容纳每一个同情动机，那么更多的被告会逃避刑事责任或者接受大大减少的判决。社会控制将被削弱。因此，虽然不完全一致，但必要的妥协是允许考虑动机，但仅限于那些需要特别同情的情况。

不扩大动机作用的第二个原因是需要维护立法机构在控制动机在刑法中应具有的影响力方面，这是制度也是其历史特权。这一观点依赖于立法机关，而不是法官或陪审团或其他执法机构，立法机关是最适合确定哪些动机应该在刑法中被指定为特定的侵权或具有开脱性对待。由于受个别案件的影响，法院很容易被专注于实际被告人的“罪恶”，而忽视了“法律需要延伸的精神”。另外，对于当选者来说，代表团集体处理道德谴责的广泛问题时更加民主，而不是可能被任命并被选举担任其职务的个别法学家。最后，使用规定性立法程序推进了合法性原则。由于所有这些原因，结论是“立法过程有能力对政策复杂性进行全面考虑和辩护，是形成所有教条的适当探讨过程。因此，立法机构应当自由地确定“什么样的动机应该对刑事责任产生什么样影响的差异，而法院应该只关注被告的行为是否符合法律对犯罪的定义。因此，他们经常不得不关注被动的动机。因为这些激励问题常常与她的责任有关：但他们不应该关注那些法律没有宣布的相关动机因素。

E为什么他们错了：动机必须是相关的

因为刑法自称是团体表达道义谴责的手段，它应该考虑动机。动机是必不可少的，因为被告行为产生的原因在评估他的行为的道德罪责时很重要。事实上，动机是我们道德直觉的核心。海曼格罗斯在他的犯罪行为理论中提出了道德罪责的四个维度：（1）意向性，或者更具体地说，被告关于伤害的意图程度; （2）伤害的性质或严重性; （3）被告的行为的危险性，或者换句话说，合理的危害预期; （4）被告在特定情况下行为的合法性。在这个理论中，第四个维度是被告的动机。根据格罗斯的观点，一项行为在所有四个方面都满足，那他必须是有罪的，因为至少这种行为在道德上应该是有罪的。如果被告做了正确或合法的事情以去赎罪，那么他在行为上不是道德上有罪。

为了证明格罗斯理论的有效性，可以考虑Joshua Dressier教授在其案例手册中关于故意、有预谋和蓄意谋杀的两个上诉意见的配对。第一个案例描述了Ronnie Midgett，Jr的死亡，他是一个八岁的男孩，这个男孩被他喝醉了的父亲殴打。这个男孩在相当长的一段时间内遭到了残忍的殴打，并且营养不良和发育不良。阿肯色州最高法院坚持认定基于父亲的故意，造成了对他的儿子严重的身体伤害。一个事实上相反的是，第二宗案件涉及一名被告在医院探访期间射杀他最终患病的年长的父亲克莱德福雷斯特。被告向警方发表了以下声明：“我杀了我的爸爸。”“他不会再忍受痛苦了。”“我答应我父亲我不会让他受苦。”

这些一年级法律学生持有的观点是不会凭空消失的。如果刑法要反映一个团体的道德判断，并且这个团体的成员强烈地考虑被告的道德动机评估，那么刑法也不应该这样做吗？道格拉斯胡萨克在我们的日常生活中指出了其他重要的微团体，其中包括审议动机。“道德哲学家写的东西并不支持动机的重要性。令人怀疑的是，刑事理论的这一特征在其他执行规则、作出判决和实施制裁的机构中得到了印证。学校、工厂和家庭都认为动机至关重要。而为什么刑法就排除在外呢？