组织经济学与管理学ch05 Principal agent models-精选文档39页

stealing, etc.) to achieve them.
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What is a firm?
Figure 5.8: The firm as a nexus of contracts
Suppliers
Employees Consumers
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Principal-agent relationship
Principal has a certain task which he likes to be executed by somebody else.
Agent (may) execute task
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Figure 5.1: Complete contracting theory
Problem
Behavioral assumptions
Surplus available Conflict of interests Asymmetric Information
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Task
Growing crop Invest Health Education Solve exercise
Examples
Principal
Land owner Shareholder Patient Student Professor
1. Ex post information asymmetry Hidden action problem
2. Ex ante information asymmetry Two hidden characteristics problems: - adverse selection
- misrepresentation.
yes
yes
no
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Income and decision rights
A complete contract consists only of income rights.
Decision rights have no role because everything is covered and it is assumed
Figure 5.2: Types of contract
Contract Complete contingent
Is everything observable to everyone?
yes
Complete
no
Incomplete
no
IIs the observable information also verifiable?
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Asymmetric information results in complete, instead of complete contingent, contracts.
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• Surplus available • Conflict of interests • Asymmetric information
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Surplus available
There is a basis for the relationship, i.e. there are opportunities for value generating
agreements and showing respect for others. An opportunistic person focuses on his own interests, and uses all possible means (even not honouring agreements, manipulating, cheating,
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Two principal-agent models
Hidden action model
Ex post information asymmetry e.g. good or bad weather.
Hidden characteristics model
players are opportunistic
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Figure III: Positioning of part III
behavioural hypothesis opportunistic selfish idealistic complete complete rationality contracts degree of limited rationality rationality procedural rationality
Separation of ownership and control.
e.g. manager decides while the shareholders carry the costs.
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One of the parties to an exchange/transaction has more complete knowledge than does the other, which asymmetry condition is costly to overcome and gives rise to a trading hazard. Sometimes markets fail for that reason. (Akerlof, 1970)
Firm
Truckers
Others
Investors
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Figure 5.9: View of the firm in complete contracting theory
Part III: Nexus of complete contracts
Economics and Management of Organisations:
Co-ordination, Motivation and Strategy
Chapter 5
Principalagent
models
George Hendrikse
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Complete rationality Opportunism
Equilibrium
Descriptive statements Testable hypotheses
Prescriptive statements Advice
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Two types of asymmetric information
exchange.
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Conflict of Interests
There is a conflict of interests when the increase of a variable benefits one party
and goes at the expense of the other party.
Ex ante information asymmetry e.g. good or bad health.
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Self-interested versus opportunistic behaviour
A self-interested person focuses on his own interests, while honouring (implicit and explicit)
Organisational responses often occur that serve to mitigate that hazard.
Two responses can be distinguished: 1. an incentive response (Jensen & Meckling) 2. a metering response (Alchian & Demsetz).
Agent
Farmer Manager General practitioner Professor Student
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An interesting principal-agent relationship has three ingredients
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Two motivation / incentive problems
• Hidden action problems • Hidden characteristics problems
Hidden action and hidden characteristics problems are usually analysed with a principalagent model.
Inadequate institutions
• Insufficient protection of property • Contracts are not enforced
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Inefficient structure of property rights
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Motivation problems
Conflicts of interest may result in problems of control/motivation when there is asymmetric information and
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Asymmetric information
The agent has superior information compared to the principal.
(The agent is the informed player, whereas the principal is the uninformed player.)
that courts enforce contractual agreements.
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Complete contracting theory
The analysis and solution of problems with conflicting interests.
Problems with property rights are due to • Inadequate institutions; • Inefficient structure of property, i.e.
income and decision, rights.
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What is wrong with the fundamental welfare theorem /
Coase theorem?
Nothing, but not all assumptions are satisfied, e.g. asymmetric information.
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