BERGER测试台校验规程1[1].0
Berger测试的介绍
VOC
Rs & Rsh
RSH ISC The slopes of these lines are characteristic resistances. RS
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VOC
等效电路图
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Cell RS
ISC
RSH
RLOAD
Cell
IV曲线分为五个部分共110个点组成.
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三.测试设备的校准
1.只能使用一级标准组件校准,校准时测试数据与标称数据的要求: Isc <±1% Pmpp <±1%
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二级标准组件的使用
1.如果在日常的检验过程中,测试数据与标称数据在控制的范围之内: Isc <±1% Pmpp <校准. 2.如果测试数据在范围之外,有必要先检验以下几个参数:
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Isc异常: Monitor cell 上是否有灰尘. 检查窗帘是否有异样,是否更换过. 二级标准组件是否衰减过多. Voc异常: 温度探测仪器是否损坏或者不准确. 光强是否超出范围了(reference voltage是否为85%-95%) FF异常: 连接器或者连接线是否损坏. 光前的均匀性是否有问题. 排除以上原因,如果测试值还是在范围之外,通知相关人员是否有必要再次使 用一级标准组件校准. 以下几种情况下建议校准: 1.更换monitor cell 2.更换灯管
3.更换其他硬件(PSL PSS)
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建立不同的monitor cell 类型
不同组件类型在更换的时候避免再次使用一级标准组件校准,可以通 过新建不同的monitor cell类型以对应不同的组件类型. 步骤:
1.进入管理员模式 SettingsOperating Mode
2.Mearusement Edit Monitor cells copy 并输入相应的参数. 3.按 F5 进入测试界面,Monitor 里面选择刚相应的monitor cell 类型.
Berger 培训
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一、软件界面 打开桌面SCLoad_STD快捷方式，如下图所示：
电流—电压 曲线显示框
电性能数据
批号、日期、 分档等信息 输入
各分档Bin数 量显示
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二、基本参数设定 点击菜单栏中Measurement→edit cell types…，出现如下所示对 话框：
图2.1
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（2）校准开压异常： 校准步骤正常，但开压明显偏低，导致效率相差较大。点击Setting → Configuration进入以下界面：
图5.3
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测试温度的获得一般有两种：Intrare和PT100。 Temperature acquisition for automatic operation：自动操作时获得温度。 Temperature acquisition for manual operation：手动操作时获得温度。 自动操作模式用于生产，手动操作用于校准。 一般情况是：自动模式选择Infrare，手动模式选择PT100。当开压 较低时，可以通过将手动模式PT100改选Infrared的方式来调节。
点击Edit按钮，出现如图2.2界面
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图2.2
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Name：电池片类型； Cell area：电池片面积； Temperature correction：温度系数； Cell current：单位面积电流； Operating point voltage：电压选定点，一般设定0.5V。 Dark current operating point：设定反向电压，算出暗电流大小。一般 为-6V或者-12V。
图3.6
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试验台定期校验的规定
1 适用范围本规定的目的是确保试验台在任何时候的测量准确、可靠。
本规定适用于1#、2#试验台的定期校验。
本规定中1#、2#试验台使用的仪器仪表应按规定送交国家计量部门进行定期标定。
2 职责机组测试组负责试验台测试仪表以及系统的定期检查。
3 仪器仪表试验台用Pt100热电阻、电磁流量计、WT130功率计、电流互感器及流量计（燃油齿轮流量计）应经标定合格且在有效期内。
此外，试验台还应定期进行如下校验。
3.1测量冷冻水及冷却水进出口温度的Pt100热电阻（RTD）3.1.1比较法：将被检热电阻放置在同一装有导热油的容器内，容器深度至少15cm，热电阻应全部入，静置15分钟后观察其读数，所有传感器的比对温度偏差应不大于0.050C。
对于超差的传感器进行标识并封存，待送检定时一起处理。
3.1.2以上比较至少要在0-500C范围内的2个不同的温度点上进行。
3.1.3每5分钟读取一次数据，至少应有3组以上对比数据，取其平均值。
3.1.4以上检验试验每6个月一次。
注：在温度测量的过程中，被测温度波动不得大于±0.50C。
3.2用于测量冷冻水和冷却水流量的电磁流量计3.2.1 将冷冻水流量计与冷却水流量计串联连接。
保持一定的循环水量稳定10分钟。
比较两个流量的显示流量，两组流量计的流量显示相差不应大于1%。
3.2.2另外，计算机显示流量与流量计二次仪表上显示的瞬时流量的读数进行比较，其偏差也不应大于1%。
3.2.3至少要比较三个不同的流量。
3.2.4每5分钟读取一次数据，至少应有3组以上对比数据。
取其平均值。
3.2.5经过重新校正以后的二次表上的流量显示值与计算机上读数误差应在0.5%以内。
3.2.6以上试验每12个月检查一次。
注：1#试验台的流量计二次仪表上只显示满量程的百分数，需要换算出瞬时流量。
3.3 WT-130功率计3.3.1比较法，用一0—5A可读数恒流源、精度 <0.2%，分别接到数字功率计YOKOGAWA WT-130三相电流的测量端口。
Berger测试机台日常监控流程 更新
4.1.6 测试异常处理流程若设备调试后，重复性极差仍不合格（＞0.1%）且在0.15%范围内。
则通知各部门放行，否则即停机，设备维修4.2 准确性4.2.1目的确保测试结果的准确性4.2.2测试方法动态测试标准片，测试五次取均值。
将结果与标片标定值相比对(|Eff|≤0.05%)，判定合格4.2.3 频次1次/6h，若标准片无差异，正常生产；若偏差超出标准，通知到相关部门并做调整4.2.4 判定标准|Uoc|≤2mv、|Isc|≤1%、|Eff|≤0.05%、光强1000±20W/m2按照技术部分档文件要求，若因部分线体设备本身的差异，导致测试时FF偏差较大，可通过补偿调整Uoc，确保Pmp 4.2.5有效期二级标准片使用周期10天（有焊带），无焊带使用40次。
4.2.6 选样参照二级标准片制作作业指导书4.2.7 测试及异常处理流程4.3 稳定性4.3.1 目的对各线体的日常测试的稳定性作监控及相同型号测试线体间的一致性做比对，且对校准前后一致性做辅助验证。
4.3.2 方法对三级标准片每一片进行编号（1-10）动态测试，对测试结果可进行单片及均值比对。
4.3.3 选样选取正常所生产A类电池片10片。
进行24小时光衰后，测试所得。
4.3.4 频次1次/3小时4.3.5判定标准三级标准片的测试比对结果标准（极差≤0.1%），包括：同线体，不同时段；同时段不同线体（同类型电池片）。
如测试差异需对异常线体及时用二标做校准直至差异在标准范围内4.3.6 测试及异常处理流程4.4 二级标准片切换确认4.4.1 目的确保切换标准片前后测试的一致性。
4.4.2 方法分别用新旧二级标准片进行测试及校准，并在校准后用三级标准片验证。
4.4.3 判定标准在旧二标的基础上，新二级标准片测试值与标定值差异≤0.1%，且新二标更换前后三级标准测试极差≤0.1%，则判定新二标可正常使用。
4.4.4 标片更换确认流程5.过期标准片处理对于使用寿命过期的标准片，按报废处理入库。
测试作业指导书
一、适用范围仪器/工具/材料本作业指导书适用用该工序的操作员以及技术员。
1、berger测试器二、作业流程2、标准片1、按照《设备开关机作业指导书》将设备开机，启动SCLOAD 软件，显示下面界面作业事项一、作业前注意事项1、着装是否正确2、检查工具、耗材是否缺失3、熟悉baccini测试系统2、打开强光开关，将Test2设备上的“MAN STEP AUT" 按钮打到MAN手动状态二、作业中注意事项1、在测试时，操作员工禁止眼睛看脉冲光源3、将标准电池片放到测试台上，按一下设备上的“OPEN-CLOSE CLAMPS"以免对眼睛造成伤害。
按钮，此时机械手夹紧电池片，然后再次按下该按钮，此时机械手松开。
2、探针要压在电池片的电极上,光强在970－1050，室温要求在20-26度之间，超出此范围时通知工艺工程师。
3、电池片由于某些原因要重新测试时，要重新建立一个文件夹。
4、探针下面的碎片要发现立即清除，并用洁4、按一下设备上的“OPEN-CLOSE PROBE"按钮，探针正好压在电池片的电极上净布将探针台面附近擦抹干净。
5、探针发现不能压在电池主栅线上时，立马通知设备工程师。
6、测试用标准电池片属于易碎物质，要轻拿轻放。
版本01Goldpoly专用作业指导书文件名称测试作业指导书适用部门电池文件编号编制制程制造文件发放原因批准适用对象作业员确认签名适用工序测试部门页码1日期5、点击黄色的测试按钮，进行测试6、按电脑上的测试参数按钮会显示一下对话框，按Monitor cell 后面的“…"按钮，跳出一个对话框后按“Edit"按钮，再按“Calibrate"按钮，跳出一个对话框后按“ok"按钮三、作业后注意事项1、流程卡填写是否正确2、工艺卫生是否做好顺序检查7、 以Isc为校准对象，我们输入标准电池片的短路电池值，按“OK”按钮1、工夹具是否完好无缺，仪器设备是否正常版本01文件名称测试作业指导书文件编号编制制程制造文件发放原因批准适用对象作业员确认签名适用工序测试部门页码2日期8、按一下对话框《Monitor cell 对话框》中的“ok"按钮，关闭对话框9、按一下对话框《Edit Monitor cell对话框》中的“close"按钮，关闭对话框。
BERGER光强校准测试作业指导书
版本版次Berger光强校准测试作业指导书页码文件号一：目的：为了规范分类检测机光强校准过程，以满足测试条件，同时保证测试的准确性，特制定本作业指导书．二：范围：适用于电池线Berger分选设备光强校准过程．三：确认：确认时机，每班上班前确认，每两小时确认一次，确认的间隔误差不得超过20分钟.四:校验前准备I:校准前分类检测机测试过程检查；II:校准前台面检查;1:T为温度，其温度范围为25±2℃,E为幅照,其幅照强度范围在1000±50W/m2 1:检查探针是否有倾斜,损坏现象.2:Voc为所测电池片的开路电压,一般在0.60V-0.62V, Isc为短路电流，一般 2:二级标片使用前检查是否完好,是否在有效期内,如果不不低于5.0A.在有效期内及时更换.3:Rs为所测电池片的串联电阻,一般在0.004-0.008欧,Rsh为所测电池片的并 3:校准操作之前先检查一下探针与电池片接触是否良好,光联电阻，一般大于10欧.强幅照标片上面有无异物遮盖.4:FF为所测电池片的填充因子,一般在75%-77%.版本版次Berger光强校准测试作业指导书页码文件号五：操作步骤说明：说明：说明： 1:点击分检机上的Start/Stop按扭，注意 1:在ASYS分检机器的电脑操作界面上点击左 1:按下自动运行模式后显示以上图片界面显示屏上的操作状态，上面一个为自动运行状上角的键"Operation mode AUTOMATIC"(自动运(手动模式)下的"Service"键态，下面一个为停止状态．行模式).步骤１ 暂停机器运行，先暂停扇叶运行，后暂停测试台面上的履带运行版本版次页码文件号五：操作步骤说明:说明:1:接着上一个操作后显示屏上显示为上图,之后按一下"Manual mode"键,再按左上角的 把电池二级标准片放到测试台面的时候要Operation mode STOPPED"键，测试机测试台面下的履带将停止．注意手法,速度不能过快.步骤１ 暂停机器运行，先暂停扇叶运行，后暂停测试台面上的履带运行Berger光强校准测试作业指导书步骤2:将电池二级标准片放到测试台面Tester 键版本版次页码文件号五：操作步骤说明:说明：二级标准放到测试台面时要注意探针是否能 先点击步骤1中的Tester键后再按"Close centering"键（先把片子夹在中间，加紧），再全部压到电极,在放标片时要注意标片要靠在下点击"Close the Probes"键（探针压下），这两部一定要注意先后顺序不能弄错，如果顺序错面一面(靠自己一面).了就会把标片弄碎，完了之后在看一下探针是否已经压到标片的两条主栅线上，有没有歪斜．步骤2:将电池二级标准片放到测试台面Berger光强校准测试作业指导书步骤3:探针下压,注意操作步骤的先后顺序版本版次页码文件号五：操作步骤说明：1,机器停止后转移到测试电脑界面，先点击绿色测试键一 次。
berger分类检测培训教材
Berger分类检测培训材料丁连生2006/7/20目录：z培训的目的：z培训内容：1.Berger 测试系统的构成：2.Berger 测试系统的原理：3.Berger 测试软件操作培训4.Berger 测试参数的意义及说明5.Berger 测试仪光强及温度修正方法6.Berger 测试仪曲线分析及常见故障说明z培训试题：（略）一．培训目的：通过此次培训，使大家了解测试系统的结构，明确测试系统的原理，掌握测试软件的使用与操作，掌握光强校正及温度校正的方法，并具备一定的测试分析能力。
二． 培训内容：1.Berger 测试系统的构成：测试系统图 1测试针架图 22.Berger 测试系统的原理：本系统通过模拟1.5AM1000W/cm2太阳光脉冲照射PV电池或组件表面产生光电流，光电流流过可编程式模拟负载，在负载两端产生电压，负载装置将采样到的电流、电压、标准片检测到的光强以及感温装置检测到的环境温度值，通过RS232接口传送给监控软件进行计算和修正，得到PV电池的各种指标和曲线、然后根据结果进行分类和结果输出。
3.Berger 测试软件操作培训：3. 1 分类文件的建立和修改。
3．11 在SCLoad 软件菜单中选择Settings -----Operating Mode….(图 3)图33. 12 在Operating Mode 中选择Manager 后按 OK(图 4).图 4 图 53. 13 在Password 中不需输任何内容，直接按 OK(图5).图 63. 14 在菜单Settings 中选择 Classification 及其 New 子菜单(图 6)。
3. 15 按 OK 创建新的分类文件(图7)。
图7 图 83. 16 输入新分类文件名，并保存(图 8)。
3. 17 在分类文件的Class 项目中点击 Add , 根据要求输入分类档次（Class）的名称，其中一个档次必须为垃圾档 （TRASH），并给每个档次分配一个存放盒（Bins ， 16 个分检盒中的一个）(图 9)。
2020年百格测试判定标准
油漆百格测试当的器械可见图表2。
4.3 软毛刷4.4透明力敏胶带，宽25毫米，按IEC 454-2 进行测试时每25 毫米宽的粘附力为（10+/-1）牛。
4.5 观测物镜，手持式，放大倍率为*2 或*3 。
5 抽样取一个有代表性的产品样本，按ISO 1512 进行测试。
按ISO 1513 ，检查并准备一个测试样本。
6 测试面板6.1 底材除非另有协商，否则应在ISO 1514 中选择一种底材。
面板应当平坦无变形。
尺寸大小应当以允许在三个不同的部位测试为准，且每个测试部位之间及部位与面板边缘之间的距离不得小于 5 毫米。
面板所用材料为软材料例如木时，则其最小厚度为10 毫米。
如面板材料为硬材料时，最小厚度应当为0.25毫米。
备注4 尺寸大约为150 毫米*100 毫米矩形面板用起来相当方便。
5 如果面板是用木质的，纹理的方向及构造会影响到测试，纹理太过显著甚至会致使无法评估。
6.2 面板准备及涂料除非另有协商，否则应按ISO 1514 准备一测试面板，然后再按指定的方法用测试产品或系统对测试面板进行喷涂。
6.3 干燥将附有涂层的测试面板在指定条件下按指定时间进行干燥（或烘烤）和老化（如果可以的话）。
6.4 涂层厚度按ISO 2808 中详细说明的程序用显微镜来判断干涂层的厚度。
在划格子处或与其尽可能近的地方进行测量。
厚度判定数根据使用的测试方法而定。
7 程序7.1 概述7.1.1 测试条件及测试次数除非另有说明，否则应在温度为（23+/-2）℃，相对湿度为（50+/-5）%的条件下进行测试（也可参考ISO 3270）。
备注 6 在实地测试时，周围条件可以接受。
在面板上至少三个不同的位置执行本测试（见 6.1），如果结果不一致，且差别超出一个等级单位，则在另外三个位置再进行测试。
如果需要也可使用不同的面板再进行测试，并记录所有测试结果。
7.1.2 测试面板的清理除非另有规定，在测试之前温度为（23+/-2）℃，相对湿度为（50+/-5 ）%条件下对面板立即进行至少16 小时的修整。
Berger
China’s new bilateral investment treaty programme: Substance, rational andimplications for international investment law makingAxel BergerGerman Development Institute (DIE)Paper prepared for the American Society of International Law International Economic Law Interest Group (ASIL IELIG) 2008 biennial conference “The Politics of InternationalEconomic Law: The Next Four Years”, Washington, D.C., November 14-15, 2008Abstract:This article aims at empirically investigating the evolution of China’s BIT policy since the early 1980s and compares it with current developed country approaches. Analysing the development of substantive and procedural investment protection provisions, it argues that China has pro-actively initiated a remarkable change of its formerly restrictive BIT policy towards a liberal approach. Since 1998, Beijing is negotiating BITs that contain comprehensive investor-state dispute settlement provisions. China even abandoned its hostile stance on national treatment of foreign investors. Notwithstanding existing reservations towards unrestricted national treatment, the current Chinese model agreement is comparable to the admission model BIT adopted by European countries. The prospects of the proposed Sino-US BIT, however, are looking rather bleak. This is mainly due to fundamental differences with respect to the parties view on the protection of FDI in the pre-establishment phase and the current political environment in the US that accentuates national security concerns with regard to foreign investors from developed and emerging countries. Contact:Axel BergerGerman Development Institute (DIE)Tulpenfeld 653113 Bonn, GermanyT: +49(0)228 94927-235F: +49(0)228 94927-130Axel.Berger@die-gdi.de1 IntroductionChina’s rise as an economic player is causing significant power shifts in the world economy.1 Its strength as a low cost manufacturer helps to supply global markets with cheap products and simultaneously increases the global demand for commodities. This growing economic presence – in accordance with the classical argument by Paul Kennedy on “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers“2 – consequentially augments China’s political influence in international relations.A phenomenon demonstrating China’s economic rise is its growing outward foreign direct investments (FDI). They have recently been discussed widely in the literature as part of a larger trend of developing countries emergence as sources of investments.3 Less visible in the literature is a second trend, namely Beijing’s growing acceptance of international investment agreements as legal instruments for the protection of FDI.4 Most notably, China has been negotiating bilateral investment treaties (BIT) since the end of the 1990s that include far reaching substantive and procedural investment protection. This new policy was a turning away from China’s traditional stance towards international investment law that accentuated the host country’s sovereign right of regulating foreign investments – a policy typical for FDI-importing countries.Against this background this paper aims at empirically investigating the evolution of China’s BIT policy since the early 1980s and compares it with current developed country approaches. After the introduction, chapter 2 will give an overview of the development and substance of today’s global BIT system. Chapter 3 describes the rise of China as a home country for outward FDI and its strategic determinants. Chapter 4 will outline China’s traditional restrictive BIT approach. Chapter 5 argues that China is negotiating liberal BITs with developing as well as developed countries since 1998 that are similar to the European model treaty. Chapter 6 will summarise the main findings and give a preliminary assessment of the background and prospects of success of the ongoing BIT negotiations between China and the US.2 Protection of foreign investment through bilateral investment treatiesThe global governance system for FDI is made up of a dense and complex network of international investment agreements that are usually concluded on a bilateral basis. Bilateral investment treaties (BIT) hence form the most important legal institution for the governance1 See e.g. Kaplinsky and Messner (2008).2 Kennedy (1987).3 See e.g. Sauvant (2005); UNCTAD (2006); Aykut and Goldstein (2006); Broadman (2007); Pamlin and Baijin (2007); UNCTAD and UNDP (2007).4 See e.g. Kong (2003); Cai (2006; 2007); Chen (2006; 2007); Braun and Schonard (2007); Rooney (2007); Berger (2008a); Heymann (2008).of FDI.5 They are defined as agreements that “protect investments by investors of one state in the territory of another state by articulating substantive rules governing the host state’s treatment of the investment and by establishing dispute resolution mechanisms applicable to alleged violations of those rules.”6 The aim of BIT contracting parties is to promote economic cooperation, believing that enhanced legal protection will ultimately result in increasing FDI flows fostering economic development processes in host as well as home countries. BITs, however, do not allow for direct regulatory measures by host states potentially increasing the developmental impact of FDI. Furthermore, the results of quantitative econometric studies on the effectiveness of BIT in increasing FDI flows are mixed and lead to an inconclusive picture.7The concept of legalisation as developed by Abbott et al. will be used to describe the characteristics of the global BIT system.8 Legalisation is a special form of institutionalisation – understood as the expansion of rules, norms and decision-making procedures that influences expectations, interests and behaviour of actors – and “represents the decision […] to impose international legal constraints on governments.”9 The degree of legalisation varies substantially from one issue area to another and within issue areas over time. Along three main criteria – obligation, precision and delegation – the degree of legalisation can be described as a continuum ranging from soft to hard law. In this respect,“[h]ighly legalized institutions are those in which rules are obligatory on parties through links to the established rules and principles of international law, in which rules are precise (or can be made precisethrough the exercise of delegated authority), and in which authority to interpret and apply the rules hasbeen delegated to third parties acting under the constraints of rules.”10The current institutional structure in the area of international investment protection is highly legalised according to the above mentioned characteristics. With respect to the first criteria, modern BITs entail rules that impose binding obligations on the parties which can be enforced through investor-state dispute settlement. Although BIT texts are often drafted in an open and imprecise manner – usually encompassing no more than ten pages – they can be described as hard law as they delegate the authority of interpretation and implementation to transnational 5 See e.g. Dolzer and Stevens 1995; UNCTAD 1998, 2007b. Beyond BITs, investment rules are increasingly being incorporated in double taxation treaties and economic integration agreements like free trade agreements. See UNCTAD (2000; 2006b). On the multilateral level, investment-related rules are mainly incorporated into single WTO agreements such as the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Among member countries of the OECD the whole spectrum of international investment relations is governed in the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (CCM) and the Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises (DIIME). See Berger (2008a): 3-5 for an overview.6 Vandevelde (2000): 469–470.7 See e.g. Hallward-Driemeier (2003) and Tobin and Rose-Ackermann (2005) that find no or only little evidence for the effectiveness of BITs. Banga (2003), Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Busse et al. (2008), instead, arrive at a positive relationship between BIT and FDI.8 Abbott et al. (2000).9 Goldstein et al. (2000): 386.10 Abbott et al. (2000): 418.arbitration bodies.11 BITs notably grant foreign investors direct legal personality under international law.12 Without being obliged to submit a claim to domestic courts, foreign investors may sue host countries directly before a transnational tribunal and thus limit national legal sovereignty: “once in force, the role played by non-state actors in the regime’s enforcement mechanisms can be of greater significance than the role played by states.”13 Modern BITs usually provide foreign investors with high levels of substantive and procedural protection. They follow a liberal approach to international investment protection.14 Liberal, i.e. highly legalised, BITs include broad definitions of investment, comprehensive absolute and relative standards of treatment, provisions on the compensation for expropriation and the free transfer of funds as well as unrestricted investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms. While providing high levels of legal protection for foreign investors, liberal BITs limit host countries’ regulatory discretion to restrict national laws and regulations on the entry and operation of multinational enterprises (MNE). The utilisation of liberal investment agreements tends to lead to a more open and less regulated global investment regime. The restrictive approach, in contrast, includes several regulations limiting the substantive and procedural protection of foreign investments and thereby preserves the sovereign right of host states to maintain national laws and regulations on the entry and operation of foreign investors in accordance with national development strategies.Throughout the colonial period foreign investments in developing countries were protected mainly by customary international law. The home state – not the foreign investing company – was the single party allowed to seek redress of an alleged injury by the host state and only breaches of minimum standards of the treatment of foreign investors gave rise to a claim under such law of state responsibility. Hence, customary international investment law provided very little protection.15 The earliest rules to protect FDI flows were incorporated in treaties on friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) first concluded by the US in large numbers during the late 18th century. These early FCN treaties, however, only partially contained rules on investment. Post-Second World War FCN treaties used to be more investment specific, containing a number of substantive and procedural rules for investment protection that were later adopted in BITs.16The first BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan in 1959, in 2006 their total number has been accounted to more than 2,500 treaties worldwide.17 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s 11 Keohane et al. (2000): 485 state that in …transnational dispute resolution, […] access to courts and tribunals and the subsequent enforcement of their decisions are legally insulated from the will of individual national governments. These tribunals are therefore more open to individuals and groups in civil society.”12 See Peterson (2005): 8.13 Schneidermann (2004): 68.14 Both the liberal and the restrictive BIT approaches are understood as ideal types. In the Weberian sense ideal types are “formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct”, see Weber (1997): 88.15 See Weil (2001).16 See Vandevelde (1992); Sornarajah (1994).17 See UNCTAD (2007a).BITs slowly spread, with roughly 20 treaties being signed annually mainly between European and developing countries. With the decision of the US to adopt BITs as a foreign investment protection device their number started to increase sharply. When the block of developing countries decided to give up their struggle for a “New International Economic Order”, including the right of host states to expropriate foreign companies’ investments in the natural resource sector, the number of BITs rose even further since developing countries started to compete in capturing a share of global FDI flows, facing the dilemma of either signing BITs that privileged the contracting party exporting FDI or possibly losing FDI to other countries increasing their competitive advantage.18Although BITs are generally negotiated on a reciprocal basis, providing the same level of legal protection for both signatories, they are in fact agreements between a FDI-exporting and a FDI-importing country. The actual level of investment protection found in BIT provisions, therefore, is a function of the expectations of both parties and their respective bargaining power. Due to the fact that developing countries depend on FDI inflows as a source of external financing they usually agree to the model agreements put forward by FDI-exporting countries. The level of legalisation in international investment law has therefore grown strongly since the early 1990s. Only large developing countries like China, India and Brazil were able to refrain from signing liberal BITs.19BIT contents today show a considerable uniformity with regard to general provisions on substantive and procedural protection of foreign investments. The main difference found in liberal BITs is the degree to which they protect investments already in the pre-establishment phase – i.e. before the FDI project has been admitted through the host country’s authorities in accordance with national laws and regulations:“This approach consists in providing foreign investors with national treatment and MFN treatment not only once the investment has been established, but also with respect to the establishment. This means that investors of one party will receive treatment not less favourable with regard to investing in the territory of the other party than domestic investors and investors of any other third country.”20The admission model BIT that has been adopted by European countries and developing countries such as China alike provides investment protection only after the admission of the FDI project. The pre-establishment model, applied by the US from the 1980s onwards, by Canada from the mid 1990s onwards, and by Japan from the beginning of this century entails provisions on the protection of FDI even before their admission. These treaties restrict the screening powers of host states in the pre-establishment phase and their sovereignty in regulating the entry of foreign investors, leading to a liberalisation of host countries’ regulatory systems.2118 See e.g. Guzman (1998) and Elkins et al. (2006).19 China’s traditional restrictive BIT approach will be described in more detail in section 4.20 UNCTAD (2007b): 22.21 Gugler and Tomsik (2007); UNCTAD (2007b): 23.3 China’s emerging outward foreign investmentsThe growth of Chinese outward FDI is the latest stage of an economic growth process that started in the late 1970s with the Chinese leadership’s decision to gradually open up the economy. During the last three decades China has been mostly perceived as the workbench of the global economy, receiving large inflows of foreign investments in export oriented industries. China is traditionally seen as the largest developing host country of global FDI. It accounted for a total stock of US$292 billion in 2006 and attracted FDI flows amounting to US$69 billion in 2006. With China still being a net FDI-importing country, it has recently become an important source country for foreign investments, too. Outward FDI flows grew particularly strongly from a low basis in the first half of the 1990s, before slowing down toward 2000 and increasing again thereafter. Especially noteworthy is the sharp increase of outward FDI flows from US$12 billion in 2005 to US$16 billion in 2006. China is currently the 7th largest foreign investor among developing countries in terms of stocks. Accumulated outward FDI, having been marginal during the first half of the 1980s, have since grown strongly and reached US$73 billion in 2006.22Apart from the strong growth of foreign investments by Chinese enterprises in absolute terms, outward FDI is still surpassed by the volume of inward FDI. However, the outward/inward FDI ratio – an indicator which refers to what Dunning has called a “country’s net international direct investment position”23 – shows that outflows from China grew more rapidly than inflows during the last years, demonstrating that China’s overall importance as an FDI-exporting economy is evolving. China’s total outward/inward FDI ratio has been growing strongly – although from a low basis – since 2002 and stood at 17 in 2005. Notably, the outward/inward FDI ratio towards developing countries is almost double the overall ratio and roughly six times higher than the ratio towards developed countries. This summary of the relative distribution of reciprocal FDI flows suggests that China’s interest in strong legal investment protection through BITs is especially pronounced towards developing countries.24 The geographical distribution of Chinese outward FDI flows has undergone a major shift since the beginning of the 1990s. While developed countries were its main destination during the 1980s, Chinese outward FDI today is predominantly conducted on a South-South basis;i.e. its main recipients are developing countries. Apart from this general observation, disaggregated Chinese outward FDI flows have to be interpreted with great caution. Statistical problems occur with regard to the treatment of round-tripping FDI and foreign investments in offshore-financial centres.25 Against this background, the following figures are indicative only. A compilation of data from various editions of the “Almanac of China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade”, published annually by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), shows that Asia has been the main destination of Chinese FDI during the period of 2003 to 2005, attracting 38 per cent of all Chinese outward FDI. During the same period, Latin America absorbed 32 per cent and Europe 15 per cent. Africa ranked fourth, accounting22 UNCTAD (2007a): 299-306.23 Dunning (1981): 30.24 See Berger (2008a): 11-15.25 See Berger (2008a): 8-9.for 7 per cent of Chinese outward FDI even ahead of North America’s 4 per cent. Oceania attracted 3 per cent of Chinese outward FDI during the respective period.26 With regard to their sectoral distribution, Chinese outward FDI are mainly conducted in the manufacturing, resource-seeking and the IT and software sectors.27Chinese outward FDI is bound to increase in the future. Reasons for this dynamic can be found in political and business sector drivers. With respect to the latter, increasing foreign investments is a result of push factors at the domestic level and pull factors at the global level. On the one hand, in the wake of the accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the subsequent need to relocate mature industries to lower wage economies, especially to neighbouring Asian countries, Chinese companies are confronted with a growing competitive pressure on the domestic market.28 On the other hand Chinese companies are increasingly taking advantage of the global business environment’s opportunities. In contrast to the traditional perspective found in the business literature that attributes (Western) multinationals’ internationalisation to a previous accumulation of competitive advantages (asset exploitation), recent studies suggest that multinationals from emerging economies tend to internationalise in order to build up competitive advantages (asset augmentation).29 Recent large merger & acquisitions (M&A) emphasize that this development applies especially to Chinese multinationals. They invest abroad in order to acquire scarce advanced technologies, brand names, distribution networks and managerial know-how,30 and as Wang argues, Chinese enterprises frequently use outward FDI as a means to gain access to developed country markets often protected by trade barriers of regional blocs.31Large Chinese companies rely strongly on their government’s support when intent on investing in strategically important sectors and countries, especially in developing countries. The current Chinese “Going Global” strategy aims at encouraging Chinese companies’ foreign investments abroad. This strategy, which was first announced in 1998 and was embedded in the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economy and Social Development in 2001, marked the transition of Beijing’s outward FDI policy from regulations to encouragement.32 The build-up of a number of global champions capable of competing on the global market has since been an explicit industrial policy goal reconfirmed by the “Going Global” strategy. The current government gives priority to resource exploration projects, the export promotion of domestic technologies, overseas research and development as well as M&As enhancing the international competitiveness of Chinese enterprises, accelerating their foreign market presence.3326 See Berger (2008a): 11-12.27 MOFCOM data for the year 2005 shows the following sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI: manufacturing (30 per cent), resource-seeking (29.8 per cent), IT and software (27.3 %), business services (5.4 per cent), retail (3.4 per cent), communication (2.2 per cent) and others (5.4 per cent), cited in Lunding (2006): 2.28 UNCTAD (2004): 25, 27.29 See e.g. Mathews (2002; 2006).30 See Lunding (2006): 4.31 Wang (2002): 202.32 See Cai (2006): 626.33 See UNCTAD (2006): 210.The growth of Chinese outward FDI in recent years emphasises the need to comprehend China not only as an FDI-importing country, but increasingly as an FDI-exporting economy, too. The reconfiguration of Chinese FDI flows is thought to have led to a significant change of Beijing’s stance on the protection of foreign investments from a restrictive to a liberal approach. Before chapter five will investigate China’s new liberal BIT policy, it will be necessary to describe the main features of its old restrictive approach in the following chapter.4 China’s traditional approach towards international investment lawThe overall economic reform process which started in 1978 led to significant changes in China’s stance on international investment law. During the first three decades of self-imposed isolation from the world market (all through the 1950s until the late 1970s), Beijing adopted a hostile approach towards international investment law and the protection of FDI. One major rationale for this policy can be found in China’s adherence to the Marxist doctrine of rejection of private property. Another rationale for China’s hostile stance on international investment protection lay in China’s experience of colonial rule and foreign interventions. International (investment) law had hence been viewed by Chinese politicians and scholars as a means “used by the imperialists and hegemonists […] to carry out aggression, oppression and exploitation”.34 Its validity, had therefore been rejected. China’s hostile approach towards foreign investments and its import-substitution strategy notably coincided with most developing countries’ attempts to establish a New International Economic Order. In sum, China’s policy accentuated the sovereign right to control the entry of FDI, regulate foreign investors and nationalise foreign property without being obliged to compensation. Consequently, China signed no BIT until 1982 when it concluded a first treaty with Sweden.35In June 2007, China had already concluded 120 BITs,36 making it the second largest contracting party to BITs worldwide.37 This increase in the sheer number of agreements since the early 1980s reveals Beijing’s growing acceptance of international investment law. With regard to actual treaty provisions and their effectiveness in protecting foreign investments, however, it takes two different stages important to be examined in order to gain a clear understanding of the historical evolution of China’s BIT approach. In 1998 Beijing changed its international investment policy from a restrictive mode accentuating the regulation of inward FDI to a liberal approach emphasising the encouragement of outward Chinese FDI.38 This remarkable change in China’s international investment policy making has been ascribed by a number of scholars to China’s evolution from a mere FDI-importing country to an economy that – while still receiving large amounts of foreign investments – is increasingly investing abroad. China is becoming a FDI-exporting economy.34 Kong (2003): 108.35 Kong (2003): 109.36 See the Investment Treaties Online database provided by UNCTAD, available at: /templates/DocSearch____779.aspx, accessed 16 October 2008.37 Germany has singed 136 BITs until June 2007.38 See e.g. Cai (2006): 626.The remaining part of this chapter will investigate the main first-generation BIT provisions that characterise the restrictive approach, while the next chapter will examine the characteristics of China’s second-generation of BITs, comparing them with both the European admission model and the US pre-establishment model.Chinese BITs contain all standard provisions found in global BIT practice. They usually start with a preamble stating the intention of creating “favourable conditions for investments of investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party” aiming at promoting mutual investments. The BIT is meant to “intensify the economic cooperation of both States on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.”39 The general pre-1998 (as well as the post-1998) BIT adopts the widespread admission model. Accordingly, absolute and relative standards of treatment of FDI in Chinese BITs are only in force once the investment has been admitted by the host countries’ government. Furthermore, Chinese BITs entail provisions on the definition of investment and the investor, their treatment, expropriation, the transfer of funds, compensation for losses due to war, civil strive and the settlement of disputes. In the following, the main emphasis will be laid on relative and procedural investment protection provisions. They are for one part generally acknowledged to represent the most important elements of BITs and they are furthermore central to the understanding of the evolution of China’s approach.Throughout the 1980s and 1990s China adopted an international investment policy approach characteristic of any given FDI-importing developing country. China’s restrictive policy adopted the so-called “three guiding principles” of international economic co-operation and exchange. China’s authorities upheld their sovereignty to screen and regulate FDI, insisted on the equality and mutual benefit of host and home state and referred to the international practice.40 Kong observes that it “is obvious that utilitarianism or even mercantilism has been the driving force behind the investment legislation” and that “China’s attitude towards FDI in this period was rooted in mixed feelings of attraction and aversion.”41 While negotiating BITs in great numbers, the Chinese international investment policy until the late 1990s remained marked by a reluctance to imply strong legal protection to foreign investments.Until 1998, China signed BITs containing serious reservations towards strong substantive as well as procedural protection of foreign investments. With regard to relative standards of treatment of foreign investors, China appeared reluctant to grant national treatment; i.e. not to discriminate between domestic and international investors. The aim of protecting infant industries and especially state-owned enterprises from foreign companies’ competition may serve as an explanation in this regard. A number of BITs with developed countries made an exception and included provisions on national treatment; however, they contained far-reaching qualifications limiting the effective protection of foreign investments. Article 3 (3) of the Sino-UK BIT concluded in 1986 states that:39 See e.g. China-Egypt BIT (1994).40 Kong (2003): 110.41 Kong (2003): 110.。
百格测试检验规范
百格测试检验规范
康群力百格测试检验规范
1.目的：为确保产品附着力的测试实验，并确保产品品质之优良，特制定此指导书
2.范围：适用于本工厂之所有印刷成品之检验
3.名词定义：
3.1百格（D3359标准）：用锋利刀片（刀锋角度为15°~30°）在测试样本表面划10*10个1mm*1mm
的小网格，每一条划线应深及油漆的底层；用毛刷将测试区域的碎片刷干净；用粘附力350~400g/cm2的胶带（3M61胶带或其他等同）牢牢粘住被测试小网格，并用橡皮擦用力擦拭胶带，以加大胶带与被测区域的接触面积及力度；用手抓住胶带一端，在垂直方向（90°）迅速扯下胶纸，同一位置进行2次相同测试
3.2ASTM等级：漆层剥离多少的定义，分为5B,4B,3B,2B,1B,0B 等6个等级
4.权责：
4.1 QC人员：负责执行百格检验工作
4.2生产人员：负责相关异常的改善动作
5.作业内容
5.1检验标准：
5.2检验方法：
5.2.1 量测百格时，印刷产品需先辨别结构水准方向，切割角度与结构为45°cross (交叉),清洁切割刀槽后，使用3M610胶带与结构平行，将胶带仅仅黏贴与结构面上，并将胶带撕起，观察有无结构脱落。
印刷品百格检验方式百格检验工具
百格测试手法（一）百格测试手法（二）
5.2.2 产品正式生产时每印刷一次颜色烘烤之后需进行百格测试，并对相关测试记录与报表之中
5.2.3 产品生产完毕后先进行外观检验，待检验完成后自行取样做末检百格检验
6.参考资料
无
7.表单
7.1康群力首件承认表。
百格试验标准
百格试验标准百格试验是一种常见的实验方法，用于评估物质的质量和性能。
在进行百格试验时，需要遵循一定的标准和规范，以确保实验结果的准确性和可靠性。
本文将介绍百格试验的标准和要点，帮助读者更好地理解和应用这一实验方法。
首先，进行百格试验时，需要准备好实验样品和相应的设备。
实验样品应符合相关的标准要求，且数量足够以保证实验结果的可靠性。
实验设备也需要经过校准和检验，以确保其能够正常工作并提供准确的数据。
其次，百格试验的操作过程需要严格遵循标准操作程序。
在进行试验前，操作人员需要对实验设备进行检查，并校准相关参数。
在实验过程中，需要严格控制实验条件，如温度、湿度等，以确保实验结果的可比性。
同时，操作人员需要按照标准的操作步骤进行操作，避免人为因素对实验结果产生影响。
另外，实验数据的处理和分析也是百格试验中至关重要的环节。
在实验结束后，需要对所得数据进行准确的记录和整理。
对于数据的处理和分析，也需要遵循相关的标准和方法，以得出准确的结论。
同时，实验报告的撰写也需要符合相关的标准要求，清晰地呈现实验过程和结果。
最后，百格试验的质量控制是确保实验结果准确性的关键。
在进行试验前，需要对实验条件和设备进行严格的质量控制，以确保实验过程中不会出现偏差。
同时，在实验过程中，也需要进行实时的质量监控，及时发现并纠正可能存在的问题。
总之，百格试验是一种重要的实验方法，其标准和要点对于保证实验结果的准确性和可靠性至关重要。
只有严格遵循相关标准和规范，才能得到具有科学价值的实验结果，为相关领域的研究和应用提供可靠的数据支持。
希望本文能够帮助读者更好地理解和应用百格试验的标准和要点，提高实验工作的质量和效率。
仪器设备校准规范1
1技术要求1.1仪器应有铭牌、电源开关、电源指示灯、关阀指示灯、开阀指示灯、卡座、保护开关、电流表切换开关、计数开关、电压调节旋钮、输入电压显示、检测电压显示、最大工作电流显示、静态工作电流显示、带撞针夹具2校准用仪器电压表（万用表）、标准燃气表主板一块、累加卡、开关阀卡、初始化卡3校准方法3.1将燃气表主板放入夹具中3.2开启电源,观察电流表显示值应与标准值很接近3.3旋转电压调节旋钮,看其输入电压小于5V是否关阀3.4输入电压调回正常值，开启计数器，电路板显示屏中数据应减少2m3，之后关闭计数器3.5观察两电压表头应与标准电压表值一致3.6分别插入累加卡，开关阀卡，初始化卡，看燃气表主板显示屏是否有相应变化4校准结果经检验符合相应技术要求的为合格，校准记录由计量员保存，不合格时上报主管领导处理。
校准周期为半年。
1技术要求1.1仪器应有铭牌……电源开关、配气键、停止键、系统键、数字选择键、左，右键、联机键、确定键、取消键2校准用仪器氢气分析仪、甲烷分析仪、丙烷分析仪、密封箱一个3校准方法3.1将气体助样仪、氢气分析仪与密封箱连接，开启电源。
3.2打开气体助样仪，分别往密封箱中注入低浓度、中浓度、高浓度三种状态气体，看起显示值与氢气分析仪是否一致。
3.3把氢气分析仪分别换成甲烷分析仪和丙烷分析仪，方法同上。
4校准结果经检验符合相应技术要求的为合格，校准记录由计量员保存，不合格时上报主管领导处理。
校准周期为一年。
1技术要求1.1仪器应有铭牌、数字显示屏、开启键、保持键、调整旋钮、检测输入端2校准用仪器标准万用表一块、标准报警器一台、电阻若干3校准方法3．1不通电情况下，用两表同时测不同值的电阻，看是否有误差值。
3．2通电后用两万用表同时测报警各不同电位的电压值，看是否有误差值3．3用两万用表同时测报警器各支路的电流值，看是否存在误差值4校准结果经检验符合相应技术要求的为合格，校准记录由计量员保存，不合格时上报主管领导处理。
百格网校验规程
百格网校验规程
一、引言
本规程仅适用于公司购买的百格网校验。
二、概述
该工具主要用于标准砖砌体灰浆饱满程度的检查，其外形尺寸为115×240mm,平面有等规格的100个分格块。
三、技术要求
1、器具清洁，损坏缺角累计不超过2分格，有按规定的分格线。
2、百格网外形尺寸宽度、长度、分格线A值≤2mm。
四、检定条件
在干净的室内用标准钢卷尺或游标卡尺丈量计算。
五、检验项目
外观检查，外形尺寸检验，分格线检验。
六、校验方法
1、外观检查，打开百格网，观察有无缺角损坏，分格线是否满足规定要求。
2、外型尺寸、分格线校验用标准钢卷尺或游标卡尺分别丈量百格网的宽度、长度并读数记录，再用尺身放置在器具平面上核对模数线读数记录。
七、计算
分别计算器具长度、宽度、分格线误差值。
八、检验结论
检验结论应满足a-a.≤2mm
九、发证
按本规程满足上述条件的签发合格证，检验周期为一年。
平衡评定berg
平衡评定评定者按照以下说明示范每个项目和（或）给予受试者以指导。
如果每个项目测试双侧或测试一次不成功需要再测试，则记分记录此项目的最低得分。
在大多数项目中，要求受测者在要求的位置上保持一定的时间，如果不能达到所要求的时间或距离，或受试者的活动需要监护，或受试者需要外界支持或评定者的帮助，则按照评分标准给予相应的分数。
受测者要意识到完成每项任务时必须保持平衡。
至于用哪条腿站立或前伸多远则取决于受试者。
如果评定者对评定标准不明确则会影响评定结果。
测试所需的装置是一块秒表或带有秒针的手表，一把直尺或带有5、12、25c m刻度的测量尺。
测试所需的椅子要高度适中。
在进行第12项任务时要用到一个台阶或一只高度与台阶相当的小凳子。
Berg平衡量表记录表姓名：性别：年龄：评定者：诊断：项目年月日年月日年月日1．由坐到站2．独立站立3．独立坐4．由站到坐5．床一椅转移6．闭眼站立7．双足并拢站立8．站立位上肢前伸9．站立位从地上拾物10．转身向后看11．转身一周12．双足交替踏台阶13．双足前后站立14．单腿站立总分 /56 /56 /56Berg平衡量表评分标准1：由坐到站受试者体位：患者坐于治疗床上。
测试命令：请站起来，尽量不要用手帮助。
4分：不用手帮助即能够站起且能够保持稳定l3分：用手帮助能够自己站起来；2分；用手帮助经过几次努力后能够站起来；1分：需要较小的帮助能够站起来或保持稳定；O分：需要中度或较大的帮助才能够站起来。
2；独立站立受试者体位：站立位。
测试命令；请尽量站稳。
4分：能够安全站立2分钟I3分：能够在监护下站立2分钟；2分：能够独立站立30秒；1分：经过几次努力能够独立站立30秒；O分：没有帮助不能站立30秒。
如果受试者能够独立站立2分钟，则第3项“独立坐，，得满分，继续进行第4项评定。
3：独立坐受试者体位：坐在椅子上，双足平放在地上、背部要离开椅背。
测试命令：请将上肢交叉抱在胸前并尽量坐稳。
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2010-09-08
4:06:47 PM
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中电电气（南京）光伏有限公司 China Sunergy (Nanjing) Co.,Ltd
BERGER 测试台校验规程
编写人 Author 审核人 Checked by 文件编号 Serial No. 生效日期 Effective on 批准人 Approved by 第 4 页共 15 页 Page 4 of 15 版本 Version
5.
注意事项： ............................................................................................................................. 15 5.1 环境要求.......................................................................................................................... 15 5.2 换探针后测试台检查 ...................................................................................................... 15 5.3 标片使用注意事项 .......................................................................................................... 15
改 contact 的值，直到满足要求为止。注意：校准结束将 Measured Values 选项恢复到原来的 IVcurve 选项。 4.4.3 Pmax 校准时，测试标准片，检查 Pmax 测试结果，如果测试值与标准片的标准 Pmax 有误差，点击红色三角形测试按钮，将出现对话框（图八） ，点击 Monitor 右侧的按钮，将出 现对话框（图九） ，点击 Edit 按钮，将出现对话框（图十） ，点击 Calibrate…按钮，将出现对话 框（图十一） ，在其中的 SCLoad-STD 对话框中，按“确定”按钮，将出现对话框（图十二 a） ， 在 Calibrate Monitor Cell 对话框中 （椭园所标框内） 输入标准最大功率值 Pmax， 按 OK 按钮。 退回界面（图一） ，再次点击菜单项中的绿色或黄色自动测试按钮，重新测一下，最多只 可连续测 3 次， 超过 3 次要按上述操作重新输入标准 Pmax。 如果测试值与标准值相差±0.001W 以内就认为是校准合格，否则重复上述步骤直至测试值与标准值相差到规定的误差范围内。 校准片测试值与标准值相差到±0.001W 后，保存，点击黄色按钮测试标准片 3 次，计算 3 次的 Pmax 的平均值，要求 Pmax 的平均值与标准值相差小于±0.005W，若不满足要求则需重 新校准； 校准完成后，手动测试复核标准片，要求所测 S125 ，M125 复核标片的 Pmax 与标准值 相差小于 0.015W， S156 ， M156 的 Pmax 与标准值相差小于 0.025W 若不满足要求重新校准。
请通过公司文控系统获取最新版本
中电电气（南京）光伏有限公司 China Sunergy (Nanjing) Co.,Ltd
BERGER 测试台校验规程
编写人 Author 审核人 Checked by 文件编号 Serial No. 生效日期 Effective on 批准人 Approved by 第 3 页共 15 页 Page 3 of 15 版本 Version
6.
相关记录： ............................................................................................................................. 15
2010-09-08
4:06:47 PM
BERGER 测试台校验规程
编写人 Author 审核人 Checked by 文件编号 Serial No. 生效日期 Effective on 批准人 Approved by 第 2 页共 15 页 Page 2 of 15 版本 Version
目
1. 2. 3. 4.
录
目的： ....................................................................................................................................... 3 范围： ....................................................................................................................................... 3 职责： ....................................................................................................................................... 3 工作程序： ............................................................................................................................... 3 4.1 分析是否需要校准 ............................................................................................................. 3 4.2 设备调为手动及标准片定位 .............................................................................................. 3 4.3 关闭反向电压 ..................................................................................................................... 3 4.4 开始校准 ............................................................................................................................ 4 4.5 池片规格、型号、面积、反向电压的确认..................................................................... 12
4.1 分析是否需要校准： 遇到如下情况时，必需对测试台进行校准：(1) 开始启动测试台后；(2) 长期未使用重新 开始使用; (3)换型号; (4)换探针 (5)PSS 被关，重新启动后；(6)测试台重启，Uref 值改变；(7) 测试台光强不在 950～1050w/m2 范围内；(8)测试台检测结果异常，分析可能为校准原因造成； (9)换测试台监控片(monitor cell)或移动监控片的位置； （10）换氙灯或移动氙灯的位置。 4.2 设备调为手动及标准片定位 生产某类型电池片就选用相同规格该类型工作标准片。确定后将标准片放于测试台的中 间。 将调节开关 MAN.STEP.AUTO 向左旋转为手动。 选择 Berger 测试台的电脑程序 utilities 中的 mands，选择 probe centering device close/open 按下 JOG+，目的是将标准电池片左右夹紧，使其定位于测试台中间，再按下 JOG －,松开夹具。 选择 probe axis down/up 按下 JOG+， 目的是使测试探针水平压紧于标准电池片的正面电极 上。注：不同的生产线，probe centering device close/open 和 probe axis down/up 对应的代号不 一样，调用时注意。 4.3 关闭反向电压 校准电池片时一定要关掉反向电压，按图十四（c）来操作。校准完毕后，要回到图十四 （b）所需的参数内容。 注意和－12V。
4.4 开始校准 4.4.1 点击电脑中命令指标 PAUSE，出现界面（图一） ，再点击菜单项中的绿色或黄色自动测试 按钮（ 注: 绿色按钮表示 手动； 黄色按钮表示 手动+存储数据； ） 。检查测得的 E 值，要求 E 值达到 1000±20 W/m²， 若 E 值达不到要求时， 可通过调整 Settings 中 Flasher－Reference voltage 值来调整，调整 Flasher 后再次自动测试至满足要求为止。若 Flasher 值达到 95%时，E 值仍达 950 W/m², 应通知设备换氙灯。 4.4.2 点击 工具栏的 按钮,将可以看到如（图二）曲线图，点击（图二）工具栏中的
1.
目的： 保证 BERGER 测试台测试的准确性。
2.
范围： 适用于各生产线 BERGER 测试台的校准。
3.
职责：
3.1 质量管理部光强校准质量管理员负责对 BERGER 测试台进行校准。 3.2 成品部测试分档工序工作人员做好配合工作。 3.3 在操作过程中遇到问题应及时向相关技术人员反应，相关技术人员及时提供帮助。 4. 工作程序：
文 件 修 订 记 录 文件 版本 0.0 1.0 日 期 2008-8-1 2010-9-6 修订 页次 全部 新制定 描 述