乔治凯南8000字电报

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冷战的形成

冷战的形成

二、“冷战”政策的表现
探究二:美国为达到遏制苏联、称霸世界的目的 具体采取了那些措施?苏联又采取了哪些对抗措 施?请阅读教材完成下表。
领 域 政 治 经
美国
政策措施 苏联
经互会
杜鲁门主义 共产党和工人党情报局 马歇尔计划
北约组织
华约组织
1、政治上: 杜鲁门主义
英国请求美国承担对希土的援助
1947年3月,杜鲁门在咨文 中要求国会授权美国政府向 希腊、土耳其提供4亿美元 的经济援助,并指出“这
马歇尔计划受援国及宣传海报
英法等16国受援, 对西欧的援助达 132亿美元,其中 90%是赠予,10%是 贷款,因此丘吉尔 把“马歇尔计划” 称为“人类历史上 最慷慨的举动” 。
马歇尔计划是杜鲁门主义在经济上的运用, 是杜鲁门主义的延续和扩大,其本质还是 讨 论 遏制苏联。 杜鲁门曾经说过:杜鲁门主义和马歇尔计划是 “一个胡桃的两半”。如何理解这句?杜鲁门 主义和马歇尔计划之间有何关系?杜鲁门主义 和马歇尔计划的实质是什么?
⑵积极影响: ①避免了新的世界大战的爆发 ②客观上两强竞争促进了科技的发展
本 课 小 结
序幕:丘吉尔“铁幕”演说

经济

杜鲁门主义
政治
共产党和 工人党情报局


军事

两极格局形成
——冷战的第一次高潮 • 第一次柏林危机
①背景:A 战后,德国及首都柏林被分区占领
B 随着美苏冷战的激化,在德国问题上矛盾日 益发展,柏林成为冷战的前沿 ②概况: 1948年,西方国家将在德国占领区合并,实行 货币改革。苏联切断西方占领区同西柏林间的水 陆交通,并发行了新货币,这就是“柏林危机” ③影响: A 加速了德国的分裂 B 造成了国际局势的紧张和世界的动荡不安

乔治凯南:长电报(194602)

乔治凯南:长电报(194602)

乔治·凯南:长电报(194602)来自: Dr.Faustus(静勤诚明,游刃有余)乔治·凯南时间:1946年2月22日地点:美国驻苏联大使馆人物:大使级代办乔治·凯南和秘书多萝西·海斯曼主题:凯南就美国财政部询问苏联会否加入世界银行及世界货币基金组织一事回电内容:如下国务院2月3日第284号电令要求回答的问题,既复杂又非常敏感,既与我们常规思考极为不同,又对分析我们所处的国际环境十分重要,我实在无法将我的回复压缩在一份简单的电文中,又避免造成我认为是非常危险的过分简单化。

据此,我希望国务院能够容忍我将我的回复用五个部分提出。

这五部分的小标题分别是:1、苏联战后(战略)思维的基本特征;2、这一思维的背景;3、这一思维在政府政策层面的反映;4、这一思维在非政府层面的反映;5、从美国政策角度的可行性推断。

请允许我先就对电报通讯所造成的负担表示歉意。

然而,所涉及的问题,特别是考虑到目前发生的事件,是那么的急迫、那么的重要,我认为对这些问题的解释——如果这些问题确实需要我们予以重视的话——(采用如此长电的形式)是值得的。

下面是我的解释。

第一部分苏联政府宣传机器所宣扬的战后(战略)思维的基本特征如下:一、苏联仍处于敌对的“资本主义(世界)的包围”之中,长期看来,取得并保持永久的和平共处是不可能的。

正如斯大林1927年对一个美国工人代表团所表述的:“在国际革命继续发展的过程中,将会出现两个世界规模的中心:一个是社会主义中心,吸引着所有倾向于发展社会主义的国际;一个是资本主义中心,集结着那些希望走资本主义道路的国际。

这两个中心之间为了争夺世界经济主导权的斗争将会决定世界范围内资本主义和共产主义的命运。

”二、资本主义世界正在受到它本身固有的多种矛盾的困扰。

这些冲突无法通过和平的妥协得以解决,其中最大的是美国与英国之间的冲突。

三、资本主义内部的冲突不可避免地要导致战争。

江苏省南通市2019年高中会考[历史]考试真题与答案解析

江苏省南通市2019年高中会考[历史]考试真题与答案解析

江苏省南通市2019年高中会考[历史]考试真题与答案解析一、选择题本大题共30小题,每小题2分,共60分。

在每小题列出的四个选项中,只有一项是最符合题目要求的。

1.《左传》记载:“ (周)王夺郑伯(郑庄公)政,郑伯不朝。

秋,王(令)诸侯伐郑,郑伯击之。

(周)王卒大败,祝聃(郑庄公的臣下)射(周)王中肩。

”据此可知A.中央集权制度遭到削弱B.诸侯争霸局面开始出现C.周天子的权威受到挑战D.天子与诸侯的关系融洽2.史料记载:“机务及用兵皆军机大臣承旨,天子无日不与(军机)大臣相见,无论宦寺(宦官)不得参,即承旨诸臣(军机大臣)亦只供传达缮撰,而不能稍有赞画于其间也。

”这说明军机处A.保密性强且专管军务B.参与政务且有决策大权C.位高权重能制约皇权D.承旨传达利于强化君权3.下表为伯利克里时期雅典人口中各类型人数统计表,该表反映的雅典民主政治的特点是类型自由民(含妇女和儿童)奴隶梅迪克(外邦人)公民(成年男子)出席公民大会的公民人数168000人200000人32000人约40000人约3000人A.主权在民B.轮番而治C.少数人的民主D.直接民主4.1871年德意志帝国宪法规定:普鲁士国王是世袭的联邦主席,享有“德意志皇帝”的称号;皇帝有权任命帝国首相和官员,有权召集和解散立法机构,统率帝国军队;首相只对皇帝负责而不对议会负责。

据此可知,此时的德意志帝国A.国内各邦国地位平等权力相当B.确立了封建君主专制政体C.三权分立的民主政治特征明显D.皇帝居于国家权力中心地位5.《中国大趋势》载:“(新)中国没有以民主的名义使自己陷入政党争斗的局面,而是以一党体制实现现代化,发展出一种独特的纵向民主,形成稳定的关键。

” 这里“独特”的民主指A.人民代表大会制度B.多党合作和政治协商制度C.民族区域自治制度D.基层村民选举制度6.1946年2月美国驻苏代办乔治·凯南向美国国务院发回一份长达8000字的电报。

(最新)部编人教版历史九年级下《第五单元冷战和美苏对峙的世界》综合检测试题(含答案解析)

(最新)部编人教版历史九年级下《第五单元冷战和美苏对峙的世界》综合检测试题(含答案解析)

第五单元冷战和美苏对峙的世界一.选择题(共25小题)1.古巴长期处于美国的控制,因此在推翻了亲美政权之后的巴拿马人民选择了社会主义道路,建立起革命政府,古巴革命的领导人是()A.卡斯特罗B.尼赫鲁C.拉吉夫•甘地D.托里霍斯2.1947年,尼赫鲁在庆祝印度独立时说:“今天我们结束了一个厄运的时代,印度再次发现了自己。

”尼赫鲁所说的“厄运时代”是指()A.受英国的殖民统治B.地震给印度人民带来灾难C.持续的国内战争D.东南亚金融危机3.2018年2月9日,在“跃动的和平”为主题的平昌冬奥会开幕式上,朝韩两国运动员共举“朝鲜半岛旗”入场,点燃了现场观众的热情。

下列关于朝鲜半岛的近现代史实描述准确的是()①1894年,日本出兵占领朝鲜国都汉城,并进一步扩大事态,最终引发甲午中日战争②1945年8月,苏联出兵中国东北和朝鲜,占领了北纬38度线以南的朝鲜地区③1953年7月,中朝美韩签署朝鲜停战协定,此后南北双方长期对峙④霸权主义干涉与拥核危机是破坏半岛和平现状的主要原因之一A.①②③B.①③④C.②③④D.①②③④4.下列史实和结论相符的是()A.A B.B C.C D.D5.写读书笔记是学习历史的一个好习惯。

涵涵同学在笔记本中记录了以下关键词:古巴导弹危机、阿富汗战争。

请你帮助涵涵的好朋友希希判断,涵涵学习的内容主要发生在()A.一战时期B.二战时期C.冷战时期D.一超多极时期6.有人认为尽管“冷战”期间,美苏进行着强烈的对抗,但是“冷战”也包含着强大的稳定因素。

其中“强大的稳定因素主要是()A.中国际地位的提高B.维护国际和平安全C.美苏势均力敌,旗鼓相当D.雅尔塔体系的长期存在7.标志着美国“遏制”苏联的“冷战”开始的历史事件是()A.丘吉尔发表“铁幕”演说B.古巴导弹危机C.北大西洋公约组织建立D.“杜鲁门主义”的出台8.“世界厌倦了流血,它在寻找解脱苦难的办法。

我为印度独特的方式而骄傲,它教会世如何摆脱暴力引起的混乱。

乔治凯南8000字电报

乔治凯南8000字电报

时间:1946年2月22日地点:美国驻苏联大使馆人物:大使级代办乔治·凯南和秘书多萝西·海斯曼主题:凯南就美国财政部询问苏联会否加入世界银行及世界货币基金组织一事回电内容:如下国务院2月3日第284号电令要求回答的问题,既复杂又非常敏感,既与我们常规思考极为不同,又对分析我们所处的国际环境十分重要,我实在无法将我的回复压缩在一份简单的电文中,又避免造成我认为是非常危险的过分简单化。

据此,我希望国务院能够容忍我将我的回复用五个部分提出。

这五部分的小标题分别是:1、苏联战后(战略)思维的基本特征;2、这一思维的背景;3、这一思维在政府政策层面的反映;4、这一思维在非政府层面的反映;5、从美国政策角度的可行性推断。

请允许我先就对电报通讯所造成的负担表示歉意。

然而,所涉及的问题,特别是考虑到目前发生的事件,是那么的急迫、那么的重要,我认为对这些问题的解释——如果这些问题确实需要我们予以重视的话——(采用如此长电的形式)是值得的。

下面是我的解释。

第一部分苏联政府宣传机器所宣扬的战后(战略)思维的基本特征如下:一、苏联仍处于敌对的“资本主义(世界)的包围”之中,长期看来,取得并保持永久的和平共处是不可能的。

正如斯大林1927年对一个美国工人代表团所表述的:“在国际革命继续发展的过程中,将会出现两个世界规模的中心:一个是社会主义中心,吸引着所有倾向于发展社会主义的国际;一个是资本主义中心,集结着那些希望走资本主义道路的国际。

这两个中心之间为了争夺世界经济主导权的斗争将会决定世界范围内资本主义和共产主义的命运。

”二、资本主义世界正在受到它本身固有的多种矛盾的困扰。

这些冲突无法通过和平的妥协得以解决,其中最大的是美国与英国之间的冲突。

三、资本主义内部的冲突不可避免地要导致战争。

由此产生的战争可能会有两种形式:一种是资本主义内部两个资本主义国家之间的战争,一种是对社会主义世界的侵略战争。

聪明的资本家们,为了规避资本主义内部的冲突,尽管是徒劳的,但会倾向于发动第二种战争。

二战后美国历届总统对内政策

二战后美国历届总统对内政策

二战后美国历届总统对内政策杜鲁门:公平施政军队复员,军事订单大批缩减,实业人数增加,房荒问题严重,通货膨胀加剧,工人罢工运动高涨。

为保持经济繁荣,避免大规模失业,缓和国内矛盾,杜鲁门政府提出一系列社会改革方案。

1946年9月6日,杜鲁门第一次向国会提交内政问题的综合性咨文。

后又陆续提出一些。

内容包括:帮助工业尽快从军需生产调整为民用生产;为退伍军人的就业训练、大学教育、失业补助、购买农场和住宅提供资金和贷款;制定充分就业法;成立总统民权委员会。

1949年1月5日,杜鲁门在提交国会的年度咨文中正式提出“公平施政”纲领,把过去的各种建议合并起来,形成一个更广泛、更系统、更具体的计划。

基本内容包括:扩大社会保障范围,提高最低工资额;建造廉价公共住宅;继续维持农产品价格支持计划;推进保障民权立法;扩大联邦政府对教育的援助;保护和开发自然资源。

成效:国会1949年通过了建筑廉价公共住房和清除贫民窟的法案;1950年《公平劳动标准法》修正案,提高工人最低工资;1950年通过有关社会保险制度的改革法案。

其他改革目标,如保障民权的法律、废除塔夫脱-哈特莱法的努力、支持农业的布兰南计划等都失败。

原因:时代背景;党派分歧;个人因素。

艾森豪威尔:现代共和党主义(能动的保守主义)走介于罗斯福新政和20年代传统共和党主义之间的“中间道路”,既要争取共和党传统的目标即削减政府开支和实行自由企业制度等,又要继续社会经济改革。

表现为一系列社会经济政策上的二重性。

称“能动的保守主义”。

•二战后经济的繁荣使改革紧迫性削弱,新政以来国家干预造成的大政府、“大劳工”、高赤字和高税收等,又使垄断资产阶级深感不安。

•新政以来美国社会全面走向国家垄断资本主义的趋势是无法逆转的。

内容:(1)试图改变凯恩斯主义赤字财政政策的发展趋势,计划减少联邦预算,但无效。

艾森豪威尔执政的大部分财政年度里,实行的其实是凯恩斯的赤字财政政策,联邦开支不断攀升。

人教部编版九年级下册历史第五单元 二战后的世界变化单元测试题(有答案)

人教部编版九年级下册历史第五单元 二战后的世界变化单元测试题(有答案)

人教部编版九年级下册历史第五单元二战后的世界变化单元测试题(时间:60分钟,满分:100分)一、选择题(每小题2分,共40分)1、1946年,丘吉尔的“铁幕演说”拉开了冷战的序幕。

有观点认为:冷战是美国门户开放原则与苏联从沙皇时代继承来的势力范围原则之间的对立和冲突,另有观点认为:冷战起源于十月革命到二战间的美苏关系。

对材料最为准确的解读是()A、冷战源于时美苏间意识形态对立与国家利益冲突B、美国要求苏联开放“势力范围”导致了冷战的发生C、丘吉尔的“铁幕演说”是促成美苏矛盾对立的关键D、冷战是二战前一个漫长的历史时期孕育出来的2、“共产党世界和西方世界给区分开来了。

这时,冷战已全面展开,在以后的5年中,一个又一个危机不幸地接踵而来。

”冷战正式开始的标志是()A、丘吉尔发表“铁幕演说”B、杜鲁门主义的出台C、德国被分区占领D、德国的分裂3、下图反映了二战后美国针对西欧()A、提出了杜鲁门主义B、实施了马歇尔计划C、成立了北约组织D、建立了华约组织4、1949年初,苏联外长在联合国大会上发表声明:“美国现在正以经济方式向东欧社会主义国家渗透,因此,我们不得不采取必要的措施对其回击,以巩固我们的社会主义阵营。

”声明中的“渗透”主要是指()A、实施马歇尔计划B、成立华约组织C、推行杜鲁门主义D、建立北约组织5、(2019·福建晋江季延中学模拟)一位年轻旅行者在讲述自己的生活经历时说:“小时候,每走过一个广场上学,可以看到马克思与斯大林的铜像,后来铜像拆了,国歌换了,就连使用了钱也改了。

原本哪里都不可以去,现在可以在世界各地旅行。

倒是最近又换了一种钱,还不太适应。

”根据材料所学的历史知识判断,这位年轻旅行者的原国籍可能是()A、联邦德国B、俄罗斯C、南斯拉夫D、民主德国6、1961年,赫鲁晓夫下令关闭民主德国同联邦德国及西柏林的边界,支持民主德国建造高墙,并称“筑墙是唯一的选择”。

美国谴责这种野蛮的封锁,但认为“总比战争好得多”。

乔治凯南:长电报(194602)

乔治凯南:长电报(194602)

乔治· 凯南:长电报(194602 )来自:Dr.Faustus(静勤诚明,游刃有余)乔治•凯南时间:1946 年 2 月22 日地点:美国驻苏联大使馆人物:大使级代办乔治•凯南和秘书多萝西•海斯曼主题:凯南就美国财政部询问苏联会否加入世界银行及世界货币基金组织一事回电内容:如下国务院 2 月 3 日第284 号电令要求回答的问题,既复杂又非常敏感,既与我们常规思考极为不同,又对分析我们所处的国际环境十分重要,我实在无法将我的回复压缩简单化。

据此,我希望国务院能够容忍我将我的回复用五个在一份简单的电文中,又避免造成我认为是非常危险的过分部分提出。

这五部分的小标题分别是:1、苏联战后(战略)思维的基本特征;2、这一思维的背景;3、这一思维在政府政策层面的反映;4、这一思维在非政府层面的反映;5、从美国政策角度的可行性推断。

请允许我先就对电报通讯所造成的负担表示歉意。

然而,所涉及的问题,特别是考虑到目前发生的事件,是那么的急迫、那么的重要,我认为对这些问题的解释——如果这些问题确实需要我们予以重视的话采用如此长电的形式)是值得的。

下面是我的解释。

第一部分苏联政府宣传机器所宣扬的战后(战略)思维的基本特征如下:苏联仍处于敌对的“资本主义(世界)的包围”之中,长期看来,取得并保持永久的和平共处是不可能的。

正如斯大林1927 年对一个美国工人代表团所表述的:“在国际革命继续发展的过程中,将会出现两个世界规模的中心:一个是社会主义中心,吸引着所有倾向于发展社会主义的国际;一个是资本主义中心,集结着那些希望走资本主义道路的国际。

这两个中心之间为了争夺世界经济主导权的斗争将会决定世界范围内资本主义和共产主义的命运。

、资本主义世界正在受到它本身固有的多种矛盾的困扰。

这些冲突无法通过和平的妥协得以解决,其中最大的是美国与英国之间的冲突。

三、资本主义内部的冲突不可避免地要导致战争。

由此产生的战争可能会有两种形式:一种是资本主义内部两个资本主义国家之间的战争,一种是对社会主义世界的侵略战争。

遏制理论之父:乔治

遏制理论之父:乔治

遏制理论之父:乔治·凯南乔治·凯南(George Frost Kennan,1904年2月16日- 2005年3月17日)是美国外交家和历史学家,普利策新闻奖获得者。

遏制政策(policy of containment)始创人。

1、人物生平遏制政策的鼻祖乔治·凯南1904年出生在美国威斯康辛州的一个偏远山区,父亲科休斯·凯南是一个律师兼工程师,他的母亲很早就去世了,家庭并不富裕。

1925年毕业于普林斯顿大学,就去了外交部工作,预计美苏关系会越来越重要,就选择了俄语和俄国事务方面的专门培训。

1929年至1931年在柏林大学学习俄罗斯文化,并先后在日内瓦、汉堡、柏林和波罗的海沿岸国家从事外交工作。

这期间,他和一个挪威妇女成婚并生了2个女儿。

此后,他被任命为美国驻苏大使威廉·马歇尔·布利特的助手兼翻译,在苏联首次任职时,他对苏联领导人逐渐形成不信任感,对那些在大萧条时期认为社会主义可以建立更为公正的社会秩序的美国人中的理想主义者嗤之以鼻,然而,他并不担心苏联对西方的军事威胁,他赞成苏联和西方达成有限的妥协。

凯南在莫斯科当了几年领事和秘书后,到国务院苏联办公室工作了一年,然后被派往布拉格和柏林,凯南在柏林时正好碰上美国对德宣战,他被关了几个月后被遣送回美国。

战争期间,他在里斯本和伦敦工作,1944-1946年,他任驻莫斯科代办,战争结束时,他在那里观察苏联政权的举动和后来被称为“冷战”的开始。

1946年2月22日,任驻苏联代办的乔治·凯南向美国国务院发了一封长达8000字的电文,对苏联的内部社会和对外政策进行了深入分析,提出并最终被美国政府所采纳的对付苏联的长期战略,也就是遏制政策,对20世纪后半叶的世界政治产生了重大影响。

1947年,乔治·凯南以“X”的署名在美国《外交事务》上发表文章《苏联行为的根源》,该文明确提出美国要使用“抵抗力量”,对苏联的扩张倾向进行长期、耐心、坚定与警觉的“遏制”。

冷战的形成

冷战的形成

北约
华约
史料选读:
对于欧洲或北美之一个或数个缔约国之武装攻 击,应视为对缔约国全体之攻击。”各缔约国可 以“采取视为必要之行动,包括武力之使用。”
——《北大西洋公约》第5条
缔约一国或数国遭到武装进攻,其他缔约 国应“以一切它认为必要的方式,包括使用武 装部队”给予援助。
——《华沙条约》第4条
恐怖___的和平
军事
北约组织 (1949)
社会主义阵营
经互会 (1949)
华约组织 (1955)
为了与西方咄咄逼人的经济封锁和遏 制政策相抗衡,1949年1月,苏、保、 匈、波、罗、捷六国代表在莫斯科举 行的经济会议上协议成立经济互助委 员会(简称经互会)。1949年4月, 该组织正式宣布成立,总部设在莫斯 科。经互会的宗旨是,通过经济互助、 技术合作和交流经验,促进会员国的 经济发展。
经互会的作用
目的:宣告美国在全世界的扩张,目
的把苏联势力遏制在其本土和 东欧范围,不准苏联干涉其他 地区的事务,干涉美国的扩张 行动。
影响:冷战全面开始的标志
三、全面展开
1、标志:1947年,美国总统杜鲁门 提出了杜鲁门主义,标志着冷战全 面开始
2、主要内容:主张遏制共产主义,稳 定资本主义,但不诉诸战争
3、实质:以反苏反共掩盖扩张野心, 宣告了美国在全球的扩张
对促进苏联和东欧国家的经济发 展有一定作用,但苏联的一些不 平等交易损害了其他成员国的利 益。
1948年美国力图分裂德 国,把西德纳入美国 的全球战略中。这是 美国总统杜鲁门。
德国的分裂
四军事方面:两大军事集团的对峙
1、柏林危机
1948年,西方国家 将在德国占领区合 并,实行货币改革。 苏联切断西方占领 区同西柏林间的水 陆交通,并发行了 新货币,这就是 “柏林危机”。

世界现代史智慧树知到答案章节测试2023年西北民族大学

世界现代史智慧树知到答案章节测试2023年西北民族大学

绪论单元测试1.迄今为止,世界现代史没有明确的研究对象。

()A:对B:错答案:B2.1932年一·二八事变标志着中国人民打响了世界反法西斯战争的第一枪。

()A:错B:对答案:A3.世界现代史与地区史、国别史和专门是没有区别。

()A:错B:对答案:A4.根据“马工程”教材,20世纪初是世界现代史的开端。

()A:对B:错答案:A5.学习世界现代史,有助于深入认识历史发展的规律,正确把握世界历史的发展趋势。

()A:对B:错答案:A第一章测试1.世界上第一个承认妇女选举权的国家是美国。

()A:对B:错答案:B2.俄国社会民主工党第二次代表大会的召开标志着列宁主义的诞生。

()A:对B:错答案:A3.1905年俄国革命是一次无产阶级领导的反对沙皇统治的革命。

()A:错B:对答案:B4.国际红十字会由()人亨利·杜南于1863年创立。

A:英国B:瑞典C:瑞士D:法国答案:C5.()9年7月14日,在恩格斯帮助指导下举行了巴黎国际社会主义者代表大会,标志着第二国际的诞生。

A:1889B:1903C:1888D:1900答案:A第二章测试1.萨拉热窝事件是两大军事集团以战争手段重新瓜分世界的导火线。

()A:错B:对答案:B2.实际操纵1919巴黎和会的是美、英、意三国首脑组成的:“三巨头”。

()A:对B:错答案:B3.1922年的《五国海军》条约规定,美、英、日、法、意五国主力舰总吨位的比例是5 : 5 :1.75 :1.75 : 3。

()A:对B:错答案:B4.《凡尔赛和约》规定,萨尔煤矿由法国开采,行政管理权由国际联盟代管()年。

A:5B:15C:20D:10答案:B5.国际联盟成立于()年.A:1925B:1921C:1922D:1920答案:D第三章测试1.1917年二月革命后,统治俄国300余年之久的罗曼诺夫王朝覆灭。

()A:对B:错答案:A2.战时共产主义政策的主要内容是余粮收集制。

乔治·凯南与冷战的起源

乔治·凯南与冷战的起源

乔治·凯南与冷战的起源乔治·凯南是美国冷战遏制政策的提出者,他的苏联观受到叔父的影响,20世纪三四十年代的驻苏经历使其成为“苏联通”。

1946年他在一封八千字长电报中提出对苏战略,即美国要运用政治、经济、外交等多种途径抑制苏联的发展和对外扩张。

次年他在《苏联行为的根源》中完善了自己的遏制思想。

在欧洲,他主张以德国为中心建立欧洲联邦抵御苏联的渗透;在亚洲,他忽视新中国的地位和作用,希望通过民主改造重塑日本。

他的这些思想对日后美国的冷战政策产生了深远持久的影响。

尽管凯南誉满天下,但不善妥协的性格给他的职业生涯造成困境,对中国的误判也证明他的局限性。

标签:乔治·凯南;冷战;遏制思想;外交影响乔治·凯南是美国著名的国际关系学家,外交家,外交评论学者,历史学家,尤其在苏联问题方面研究成果显著。

凯南在学界被誉为“遏制之父”,他倾其一生为美国的冷战政策尤其是冷战时期的对苏政策作出了突出的贡献。

凱南生于1904年,在威斯康星州的一个爱尔兰裔移民家庭。

他日后成为“苏联通”很大程度上到受了他叔父老凯南的影响。

老凯南是一位美国记者,职业生涯中曾多次到访俄国,其中1885—1886年间他实地考察了俄国的西伯利亚流放地,这段经历深深影响了老凯南对苏联印象。

他还就调查结果出版了一本书,真实地记录了当时西伯利亚流放地政治犯们忍受的非人的痛苦。

可以说老凯南是美国研究苏联问题的先驱。

凯南也追随他叔父的脚步,选择了研究苏联问题的道路,他在晚年的回忆录中说道“脑中有老凯南创立的家庭传统。

”这也成了凯南一生的转折点。

1925年他从普林斯顿大学毕业,1926年进入外交机构,被派往欧洲。

1929—1931年进入柏林大学东方学院,专门学习俄国的语言,文化,历史地理法律以及经济,这些学习也为他日后研究苏联问题打下了坚实的基础。

1931—1933任职于拉脱维亚里加美国大使馆。

在里加的那段时间里凯南在处理公务之余,还会通过当地的报刊体验旧俄文化生活等方法了解苏联,这也成为凯南研究苏联问题的起点。

containment of George F. Kennan

containment of George F. Kennan

乔治•凯南(George F. Kennan)遏制政策(containment)始创人。

他的八千字电报及其在《外交》季刊上以X署名发表的《苏联行为的根源》使其获得了“冷战之父”的称号。

下面是其“X论文”的英文全文。

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.It is difficult to summarize the set of ideological concepts with which the Soviet leaders came into power. Marxian ideology, in its Russian-Communist projection, has always been in process of subtle evolution. The materials on which it bases itself are extensive and complex. But the outstanding features of Communist thought as it existed in 1916 may perhaps be summarized as follows: (a) that the central factor in the life of man, the factor which determines the character of public life and the "physiognomy of society," is the system by which material goods are produced and exchanged; (b) that the capitalist system of production is a nefarious one which inevitably leads to the exploitation of the working class by the capital-owning class and is incapable of developing adequately the economic resources of society or of distributing fairly the material goods produced by human labor; (c) that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and must, in view of the inability of the capital-owning class to adjust itself to economic change, result eventually and inescapably in a revolutionary transfer of power to the working class; and (d) that imperialism, the final phase of capitalism, leads directly to war and revolution.(《国际关系经典选读》这本书里省略了以下黄色的两段)The rest may be outlined in Lenin's own words: "Unevenness of economic and political development is the inflexible law of capitalism. It follows from this that the victory of Socialism may come originally in a few capitalist countries or even in a single capitalist country. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and having organized Socialist production at home, would rise against the remaining capitalist world, drawing to itself in the process the oppressed classes of other countries." [see endnote 1] It must be noted that there was no assumption that capitalism would perish without proletarian revolution. A final push was needed from a revolutionary proletariat movement in order to tip over the tottering structure. But it was regarded as inevitable that sooner or later that push be given.For 50 years prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, this pattern of thought had exercised great fascination for the members of the Russian revolutionary movement. Frustrated, discontented, hopeless of finding self-expression -- or too impatient to seek it -- in the confining limits of the Tsarist political system, yet lacking wide popular support for their choice of bloody revolution as a means of social betterment, these revolutionists found in Marxist theory a highly convenient rationalization for their own instinctive desires. It afforded pseudo-scientific justification for their impatience, for their categorical denial of all value in the Tsarist system, for their yearning for power and revenge and for their inclination to cut corners in the pursuit of it. It is therefore no wonder that they had come to believe implicitly in the truth and soundness of theMarxian-Leninist teachings, so congenial to their own impulses and emotions. Their sincerity need not be impugned. This is a phenomenon as old as human nature itself. It has never been more aptly described than by Edward Gibbon, who wrote in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire: "From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, how the conscience may slumber in a mixed and middle state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud." And it was with this set of conceptions that the members of the Bolshevik Party entered into power.Now it must be noted that through all the years of preparation for revolution, the attention of these men, as indeed of Marx himself, had been centered less on the future form which Socialism [see endnote 2] would take than on the necessary overthrow of rival power which, in their view, had to precede the introduction of Socialism. Their views, therefore, on the positive program to be put into effect, once power was attained, were for the most part nebulous, visionary and impractical. Beyond the nationalization of industry and the expropriation of large private capital holdings there was no agreed program. The treatment of the peasantry, which according to the Marxist formulation was not of the proletariat, had always been a vague spot in the pattern of Communist thought; and it remained an object of controversy and vacillation for the first ten years of Communist power.The circumstances of the immediate post-revolution period -- the existence in Russia of civil war and foreign intervention, together with the obvious fact that the Communists represented only a tiny minority of the Russian people -- made the establishment of dictatorial power a necessity. The experiment with "war Communism" and the abrupt attempt to eliminate private production and trade had unfortunate economic consequences and caused further bitterness against the new revolutionary regime. While the temporary relaxation of the effort to communize Russia, represented by the New Economic Policy, alleviated some of this economic distress and thereby served its purpose, it also made it evident that the "capitalistic sector of society" was still prepared to profit at once from any relaxation of governmental pressure, and would, if permitted to continue to exist, always constitute a powerful opposing element to the Soviet regime and a serious rival for influence in the country. Somewhat the same situation prevailed with respect to the individual peasant who, in his own small way, was also a private producer.Lenin, had he lived, might have proved a great enough man to reconcile these conflicting forces to the ultimate benefit of Russian society, though this is questionable. But be that as it may, Stalin, and those whom he led in the struggle for succession to Lenin's position of leadership, were not the men to tolerate rival political forces in the sphere of power which they coveted. Their sense of insecurity was too great. Their particular brand of fanaticism, unmodified by any of the Anglo-Saxon traditions of compromise, was too fierce and too jealous to envisage any permanent sharing of power. From the Russian-Asiatic world out of which they had emerged they carried with them a skepticism as to the possibilities of permanent and peaceful coexistence of rival forces. Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would notbe dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass.And within the Party the same principle was to apply. The mass of Party members might go through the motions of election, deliberation, decision and action; but in these motions they were to be animated not by their own individual wills but by the awesome breath of the Party leadership and the over-brooding presence of "the word."Let it be stressed again that subjectively these men probably did not seek absolutism for its own sake. They doubtless believed -- and found it easy to believe -- that they alone knew what was good for society and that they would accomplish that good once their power was secure and unchallengeable. But in seeking that security of their own rule they were prepared to recognize no restrictions, either of God or man, on the character of their methods. And until such time as that security might be achieved, they placed far down on their scale of operational priorities the comforts and happiness of the peoples entrusted to their care.Now the outstanding circumstance concerning the Soviet regime is that down to the present day this process of political consolidation has never been completed and the men in the Kremlin have continued to be predominantly absorbed with the struggle to secure and make absolute the power which they seized in November 1917. They have endeavored to secure it primarily against forces at home, within Soviet society itself. But they have also endeavored to secure it against the outside world. For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders. The powerful hands of Russian history and tradition reached up to sustain them in this feeling. Finally, their own aggressive intransigence with respect to the outside world began to find its own reaction; and they were soon forced, to use another Gibbonesque phrase, "to chastise the contumacy" which they themselves had provoked. It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the background of his conduct he is bound eventually to be right.Now it lies in the nature of the mental world of the Soviet leaders, as well as in the character of their ideology, that no opposition to them can be officially recognized as having any merit or justification whatsoever. Such opposition can flow, in theory, only from the hostile and incorrigible forces of dying capitalism. As long as remnants of capitalism were officially recognized as existing in Russia, it was possible to place on them, as an internal element, part of the blame for the maintenance of a dictatorial form of society. But as these remnants were liquidated, little by little, this justification fell away; and when it was indicated officially that they had been finally destroyed, it disappeared altogether. And this fact created one of the most basic of the compulsions which came to act upon the Soviet regime: since capitalism no longer existed in Russia and since it could not be admitted that there could be serious or widespread opposition to the Kremlin springing spontaneously from the liberated masses under its authority, it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad. 《国际关系经典选读》这本书里省略了以下黄色的两段)This began at an early date. In 1924 Stalin specifically defended the retention of the "organs of suppression," meaning, among others, the army and the secret police, on the ground that "as long as there is a capitalist encirclement there will be danger of intervention with all the consequences that flow from that danger." In accordance with that theory, and from that time on, all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power.By the same token, tremendous emphasis has been placed on the original Communist thesis of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. It is clear, from many indications, that this emphasis is not founded in reality. The real facts concerning it have been confused by the existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in Germany and the Japanese Government of the late 1930s, which did indeed have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.Now the maintenance of this pattern of Soviet power, namely, the pursuit of unlimited authority domestically, accompanied by the cultivation of the semi-myth of implacable foreign hostility, has gone far to shape the actual machinery of Soviet power as we know it today. Internal organs of administration which did not serve this purpose withered on the vine. Organs which did serve this purpose became vastly swollen. The security of Soviet power came to rest on the iron discipline of the Party, on the severity and ubiquity of the secret police, and on the uncompromising economic monopolism of the state. The "organs of suppression," in which the Soviet leaders had sought security from rival forces, became in large measure the masters of those whom they were designed to serve. Today the major part of the structure of Soviet power is committed to the perfection of the dictatorship and to the maintenance of the concept of Russia as in a state of siege, with the enemy lowering beyond the walls. And the millions of human beings who form that part of the structure of power must defend at all costs this concept of Russia's position, for without it they are themselves superfluous.As things stand today, the rulers can no longer dream of parting with these organs of suppression. The quest for absolute power, pursued now for nearly three decades with a ruthlessness unparalleled (in scope at least) in modern times, has again produced internally, as it did externally, its own reaction. The excesses of the police apparatus have fanned the potential opposition to the regime into something far greater and more dangerous than it could have been before those excesses began.But least of all can the rulers dispense with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended. For this fiction has been canonized in Soviet philosophy by the excesses already committed in its name; and it is now anchored in the Soviet structure of thought by bonds far greater than those of mere ideology.So much for the historical background. What does it spell in terms of the political personality of Soviet power as we know it today?Of the original ideology, nothing has been officially junked. Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it.The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interests of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor. Basically, the antagonism remains. It is postulated. And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the wary suspiciousness and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. These phenomena are there to stay, for the foreseeable future. There can be variations of degree and of emphasis. When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background; and when that happens there will always be Americans who will leap forward with gleeful announcements that "the Russians have changed," and some who will even try to take credit for having brought about such "changes." But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it.(《国际关系经典选读》这本书里省略了以下黄色的部分)Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "Socialist fatherland" -- that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in the person of the Soviet Union -- should be cherished and defended by all good Communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. The promotion of premature, "adventuristic" revolutionary projects abroad which might embarrass Soviet power in any way would be an inexcusable, even a counterrevolutionary act. The cause of Socialism is thesupport and promotion of Soviet power, as defined in Moscow.This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the Party itself, requires that the Party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit.The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.: S2 y( l& H, uOn the principle of infallibility there rests the iron discipline of the Communist Party. In fact, the two concepts are mutually self-supporting. Perfect discipline requires recognition of infallibility. Infallibility requires the observance of discipline. And the two together go far to determine the behaviorism of the entire Soviet apparatus of power. But their effect cannot be understood unless a third factor be taken into account: namely, the fact that the leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of the thesis by the members of the movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, month to month. It is nothing absolute and immutable -- nothing which flows from objective reality. It is only the most recent manifestation of the wisdom of those in whom the ultimate wisdom is supposed to reside, because they represent the logic of history. The accumulative effect of these factors is to give to the whole subordinate apparatus of Soviet power an unshakable stubbornness and steadfastness in its orientation. This orientation can be changed at will by the Kremlin but by no other power. Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are unamenable to argument or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most that he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line. But even those are not likely to be swayed by any normal logic in the words of the bourgeois representative. Since there can be no appeal to common purposes, there can be no appeal to common mental approaches. For this reason, facts speak louder than words to the ears of the Kremlin; and words carry the greatest weight when they have the ring of reflecting, or being backed up by, facts of unchallengeable validity.But we have seen that the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposesin a hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term validity, and it can afford to be patient. It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future. The very teachings of Lenin himself require great caution and flexibility in the pursuit of Communist purposes. Again, these precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain. Here caution, circumspection, flexibility and deception are the valuable qualities; and their value finds natural appreciation in the Russian or the oriental mind. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal. There is no trace of any feeling in Soviet psychology that that goal must be reached at any given time.These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. And the patient persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts which represent the momentary whims of democratic opinion but only by intelligent long-range policies on the part of Russia's adversaries -- policies no less steady in their purpose, and no less variegated and resourceful in their application, than those of the Soviet Union itself.In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a policy has nothing to do with outward histrionics: with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable to considerations of prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness. For these reasons, it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to Russian prestige.In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutionsof the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. (《国际关系经典选读》这本书里省略了以下黄色部分)The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It must be borne in mind that there was a time when the Communist Party represented far more of a minority in the sphere of Russian national life than Soviet power today represents in the world community.But if ideology convinces the rulers of Russia that truth is on their side and that they can therefore afford to wait, those of us on whom that ideology has no claim are free to examine objectively the validity of that premise. The Soviet thesis not only implies complete lack of control by the west over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?The Soviet leaders, taking advantage of the contributions of modern technique to the arts of despotism, have solved the question of obedience within the confines of their power. Few challenge their authority; and even those who do are unable to make that challenge valid as against the organs of suppression of the state.The Kremlin has also proved able to accomplish its purpose of building up in Russia, regardless of the interests of the inhabitants, an industrial foundation of heavy metallurgy, which is, to be sure, not yet complete but which is nevertheless continuing to grow and is approaching those of the other major industrial countries. All of this, however, both the maintenance of internal political security and the building of heavy industry, has been carried out at a terrible cost in human life and in human hopes and energies. It has necessitated the use of forced labor on a scale unprecedented in modern times under conditions of peace. It has involved the neglect or abuse of other phases of Soviet economic life, particularly agriculture, consumers' goods production, housing and transportation.To all that, the war has added its tremendous toll of destruction, death and human exhaustion. In consequence of this, we have in Russia today a population which is physically and spiritually tired. The mass of the people are disillusioned, skeptical and no longer as accessible as they once were to the magical attraction which Soviet power still radiates to its followers abroad. The avidity with which people seized upon the slight respite accorded to the Church for tactical reasons during the war was eloquent testimony to the fact that their capacity for faith and devotion found little expression in the purposes of the regime.In these circumstances, there are limits to the physical and nervous strength of people themselves. These limits are absolute ones, and are binding even for the cruelest dictatorship, because beyond them people cannot be driven. The forced labor camps and the other agencies of constraint provide temporary means of compelling people to work longer hours than their own volition or mere。

世界当代史名词解释

世界当代史名词解释

杜鲁门主义是1947年3月美国总统杜鲁门在致国会的咨文中,提出的以“遏制共产主义”作为国家政治意识形态和对外政策的指导思想。

咨文以希腊、土耳其问题为诱发点,视苏联为集权政治,主张以强硬的姿态遏制苏联。

目的是:取得美国在西方世界的最高领导权,以此来与苏联领导的社会主义阵营对抗,最终获取世界霸主地位。

1947年5月,正式实施,历史长达20年之久。

杜鲁门主义是美国对外政策的重大转折点,标志着美苏在二战中的同盟关系的结束及冷战的开始。

亚非会议是1955年4月18-24日在印度尼西亚万隆召开的反对殖民主义,推动亚非各国民族独立的会议,又称万隆会议。

该会议共有29个亚非国家的政府代表团出席,中国总理周恩来率代表团参加提出了著名的求同存异及和平共处五项原则的,为会议的成功奠定基础。

会议通过了《亚非会议最后公报》等7个方面的决议,称为万隆精神,并提出了处理国际关系的十项原则。

亚非会议是一个具有划时代意义的会议,第一次没有西方殖民主义者参加的国际会议,是第三世界崛起的一个重要里程牌。

第三世界此名词最先由法国经济学家提出,原本是指法国大革命中的第三阶级。

冷战时期,一些经济发展比较落后的国家为表示并不靠拢北约或华约任何一方,用“第三世界”一词界定自己。

1974年毛泽东将发展中的社会主义国家归结为第三世界,认为第三世界是反殖反霸的主力军,具有重要的意义。

现在,这个词在学术上主要指南部国家、发展中国家、不发达国家和主体世界。

第三世界国家绝大多数过去都是帝国主义的殖民地或附属国,它们取得政治独立后,还面临着肃清殖民主义残余势力、发展民族经济、巩固民族独立的历史任务。

它们是维护世界和平的重要力量。

莫洛托夫计划是1947年7、8月间苏联与东欧签订的一系列双边经贸协定的总称, 由苏联当时外交部长莫洛托夫提出,故名。

其目的是形成苏东之间的经济网路,减少东欧与西方国家的联系,对抗马歇尔计划。

在此基础上苏联与东欧各国于1949年成立经济互助委员会,最终形成了经济领域上的东西方各国的冷战。

隐蔽行动——中央情报局与危地马拉政变研究

隐蔽行动——中央情报局与危地马拉政变研究

前言自从二战以来,美国很少对世界各地发生的大事无动于衷,在很大程度上讲,哪里有“麻烦”,哪里就有美国,哪里有美国,哪里很可能就会遇到更大的“麻烦”。

这种状况如今不仅没有改变,而且更加变本加厉。

作为世界上惟一的超级大国,美国奉行单边主义外交对其他国家事务的干涉可以说是达到一个高潮,并表明随时准备以其强大的军事力量建立欲要的“秩序与稳定”。

这些干涉活动的目的并不像美国决策者宣称的那样“娓娓动听”,其给干涉地区带来的动荡日益显而易见。

美国对其他地区或国家的干涉手段多种多样,形式不一,但可分为“公开”和“隐蔽”两类。

“公开”的干涉往往是政府直接出兵或通过政治、经济等手段对被干涉国家实行制裁或其他活动,这类干涉活动更为直接,让世人一目了然。

“隐蔽”的干涉通常是间接的,即由美国政府提供钱财和物资支持被干涉国家的反政府力量来达到推翻对美国敌对或不友好的政府的目的。

这类干涉活动在冷战期间比较常见,而且往往发生在美国对发展中国家的外交中。

无论是美国公开的武装干涉还是秘密的隐蔽行动都对被干涉国家的发展产生了重大消极的影响。

二者是以不同的方式共同维护着美国的利益。

加强对美国隐蔽行动政策及实践的研究可以从不同的视角透视美国外交行为的本质特征。

中央情报局是二战后在美国与苏联对峙的冷战背景下成立的一个负责对外事务的情报部门,其任务主要是为美国外交决策者制定确实可行的对外政策提供重要的情报依据。

因此,中央情报局的判断往往对美国重大外交政策的制定与执行起着举足轻重的作用。

冷战初期的档案文件开始解密,致使美国学术界对中央情报局的研究成果越来越多。

美国向来是对外宣称民主、自由、人权,并以向世界传播这些为自豪,推行的对外政策打上了理想主义的色彩。

其实美国政府的外交行为还包括鲜为人知的隐蔽行动,这些活动在冷战初期就在美国中央情报局的秘密操纵下进行过十余次。

中央情报局在其他国家的秘密活动为人们认识美国冷战期间的外交实质提供了一个很好的角度,对于认清美国政府输出民主的本质可以提供很好的说明。

乔治凯南8000字长电报(George+Kennan+8000+word+long+telegram

乔治凯南8000字长电报(George+Kennan+8000+word+long+telegram

乔治凯南8000字长电报(George Kennan 8000 word longtelegram)乔治凯南8000字长电报(George Kennan 8000 word long telegram)The American embassy in Soviet union, George Kennan, sent the telegram to the state council......The first part of the Soviet propaganda machine's view of the postwar problem was as follows:A. The Soviet union still lives in hostile "capital encirclement", and in the long run, it is sustained with capitalismPeaceful coexistence is not possible. As Stalin told a delegation of American workers in 1927."Will be formed in the process of international revolution continues to develop the center of the scale of the two worlds. One is to put those tends to communist countries gathered around their communist center, one is to put those tends to capitalism countries gathered around their capitalist center. The two camps to dominate the world economy struggles will determine the fate of the whole world of capitalism and communism."B. Capitalism is plagued by the contradictions inherent in it. These contradictions cannot be resolved by peaceful compromise, and the biggest is the conflict between Britain and the United States.C. the inherent contradiction of capitalism is inevitably going tobe war. There are two types of wars: the wars between the two capitalist countries and the wars they have waged against the socialist world. The shrewd capitalists who want to escape the contradictions of capitalism tend to be in the latter category.D. Although interference with the Soviet union would bring disaster to the countries doing so, their intervention would, after all, delay the development of Soviet socialist socialism. So it must be prevented at all costs.E. the contradiction between the capitalist countries, although the Soviet union also is full of risk but also to promote the cause of socialism provides the possibility of a huge, remain strong, especially if the Soviet union in the military field rock solid in terms of ideology, and loyal to it wise leader.F. It must be remembered that the Soviet union believed that capitalism was not all bad. In addition to irredeemable reactionaries and bourgeois elements, capitalist societies include:(1) to unite some very open and positive people within the communist party.(2) some other molecules (now the sake of strategy called progress understanding or Democrats), their reactions, desire and activities happen to "objectively" is conducive to the interests of the Soviet union. The second species must be encouraged and used for the purpose of the Soviet union.G. characters on the opposite side of the capitalist society, the most dangerous is the so-called people's false friends that Lenin moderate socialists or social Democratic Party leaders (in other words, and never succumb to the communist party of the left). These people than outright reactionaries more dangerous, because the reactionaries emerged as they face, while moderate leftist leaders with socialist confuse people, to serve the interests of the reactionary capital.So that's the premise. From the point of view of Soviet policy, they were inferred from these premises:A. must do everything possible to improve the relative strength of the Soviet union as a member of the international community.Conversely, don't miss out on any opportunity to weaken the power and influence of all or very individual capitalist countries.B. The Soviet union and its friends abroad must be committed to deepening and exploiting the differences and contradictions between the capitalist powers. If the differences and contradictions between the capitalist countries and the "imperialist" wars were developed, then the capitalist countries would have to turn the war into a revolutionary uprising.C. Maximize the use of foreign "Democrats and progressives" to put pressure on the capitalist governments in accordance with the principles of Soviet interests.D. Must be ruthless with foreign socialists and social democratic leaders.The second part of this view is the background.Several aspects of the Soviet communist party line should be paid attention to before the concrete implementation of the communist party line.First, the communist party line does not represent the original view of the Russian people. Generally speaking, the Russian people are friendly to the outside world. They aspire to the recognition of the outside world, eager to compete with the people of the outside world for their talents, especially the fruits of their labours for a peaceful life. The party line only represents the official propaganda machine with the clever technique and the great patience to make the argument to the masses, while the masses "deep in the heart" often have a surprising resistance to those arguments. But the party line is binding on the views and actions of the people of the party, the secret police, the government, and so on.Second, pay attention to the elements of the Soviet communist party line, which are largely untrue. Experience has shown that peaceful coexistence between capitalism and socialist countries is entirely possible. The basic contradiction in advanced countries is not the contradiction between the capitalist ownership of the production information, but the contradiction between urbanization and industrialization itself. Russia has so far not suffered from a high degree of urbanization and industrialization, not because he issocialist, but because he is still backward. The competition within capitalism does not necessarily produce wars, and wars do not always result from it. After the destruction of Germany and Japan, after the recent war, the possibility of intervention in the Soviet union was a complete nonsense. If there is no provocation by the dissidents and the forces engaged in subversive activity, the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the capitalist world and between him and Russia is high. Finally, no sane person can doubt the sincerity of the moderate socialist leader in the west. In the Scandinavian peninsula, for example, whenever there is a chance, they always try their best to improve the living conditions of the working people, and deny that their achievements in this regard are unjust.These conclusions were made before world war ii and provedcompletely wrong by the war itself. In fact, the differences between Britain and America are not the main differences between the west. In addition to the axis countries,Capitalist countries have no intention of resolving theirdifferences by joining the anti-soviet crusaders. The Soviet union did not turn into a civil war or a revolution. Instead, the Soviet union had to publicly recognize it as a common goal to fight alongside thecapitalist powers.However, no matter how unsubstantiated and unproven, they are still bold today. What does that mean? This suggests that the Soviet partyline was not based on an objective analysis of Russian external forms.Indeed, he had little to do with anything beyond the Soviet border. Itis primarily a productof Russia's internal needs, which existed before the recent war.It's still there today.The kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs stems from theRussian's traditional and instinctive insecurities. A peaceful agricultural nation, living together with the fierce nomads in the vast wilderness, would create a sense of insecurity without insurance. In addition to these insecurities, the insecurities of the country, as well as the economic and advanced western countries, add to the fear of a more competent, more powerful and organized society in the west. This latter insecurity is not so much to torture the Russian people as to torture the Russian rulers. Because Russia's rulers always believed that their rulers knew the truth about the outside world, or that foreigners knew the truth inside Russia, that there would be consequences. The only way they learn to seek safety is to destroy the fight against the country that competes with him, and never agree or compromise with any other country.Has been around for a half a century in Western Europe and there is no effect of marxism, the first in Russia under the root, and caused the prairie fire, it is no accident, think that the social and economic contradictions by peaceful means to solve this doctrine, only get promoted in Russia, because the country has never been a friendly neighbors. In fact, there has never been a balance of tolerance amongthe great powers, inter and international. After the Bolshevik regime set up by Lenin explanation of marxism more cruel, more intolerant, thus become to spread the perfect tool of insecurity, this anxiety makes the bolsheviks even ruled more distressing than Russia in the past. In this basic goal belongs to the doctrine of altruism,the bolsheviks to their innate fear of the outside world, for their dictatorial system, for their use of torture, and to demand the sacrifice, find a theoretical basis. Under the guise of marxism, they discard all moral values in methods and strategies. Today, they can't live without marxism. Marxism makes them a FIG leaf of moral and ideological respectability. They did not have this FIG leaf in history, at best, the last generation of the tyrannical and civil Russian ruler. The ruthless rulers of Russia brought their military strength to an unprecedented peak to ensure that the infirmity of the regime was externally secure. The intent of the Soviet union must always be solemnly clothed in the cloak of marxism,That is why it is important to not underestimate the importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. This way, the leader of the Soviet union under the history and status quo of the practical need of, puts forward a kind of doctrine, the external, as a sin, hostile, and threat of the Soviet union the world, and that the world within gestates the bacteria spread disease, is bound to be more and more internal unrest, finally received thriving socialist forces a fatal blow, thus giving way to a new and better world. This theory has given them legitimate grounds forexpanding their military and police forces, isolating the Russian people from the outside world and exerting constant pressure to expand the powers of the Russian police. All these are natural and instinctive demands of the Russian rulers. This is mainly to show that, over the centuries, the uneasy Russian nationalist movement has made remarkable progress. In this movement, the concept of aggression and self-defence is not well known. However, a new international marxist cloak, with sweet words to a desperate, war damage to the outside world to make promises, Russian democracy righteousness is more dangerous and more cunning than ever.But we should not assume that all those who have made the path for the Soviet party are false and insincere. Many of them are too ignorant of the outside world and are so dependent on their minds that they do not doubt themselves. They were credulous about things that only the words could make people feel comfortable and convenient. Finally, we also have a mystery, that is, in this great country, who - if there is such a person - can you get about the outside world more accurate and unbiased information. In the mysterious and secretive atmosphere of the east, the possibilities for distorting and poisoning intelligence are limitless in an atmosphere of widespread intrigue in the government. The Russian people don't respect the objective real reason - in fact, they don't believe in the existence of objective reality principle - the fact that everything that makes them understand as a tool, used to achieve the goal of this or that skeletons. There is good reason to suspect thatthis government is actually a small plot in a big conspiracy. At least I personally don't believe, Stalin can get massive long-term credit, I believe that the Soviet government may finally be done like it in the 30 s, for international economic exchanges is desirable that verbally talk. On the contrary, I think most Soviet foreign trade may limit itssecurity domain of the Soviet union, including the German occupation, and in critical view shall implement the principle of the general economic cooperation between countries.H. as for cultural cooperation, the Soviet union also verbally say, for instance, deepen cultural exchanges between ourpeoples is desirable, in practice never made any could undermine the safety of all nationalities in the Soviet union. Policy in the aspects of the actual performance, will be limited to someone with official visit, and join the ceremony, assembly, so that some libraries in pointless ways, and eating too much vodka and lengthy speeches, but does not produce lasting results.I. In addition to the official relations between the Soviet union and various diplomatic states,It would take a route that could be called "right" to maintain the prestige of the Soviet union and its leaders, with meticulous attention to international etiquette (which runs counter to good manners).......The fifth part is the actual deduction from the Angle of American policy....... To sum up, we face a political force, a frenetic state of support for his ways, and the damage to our country's international authority. The political power can control one of the greatest nation in the world energy and one of the most prosperous country in the world of information, and it is behind a strong Russian nationalism trend inoculation. In addition, he has a delicate, wide range of organizations, to play its influence in foreign, the agency has amazing flexibility and variety of skills, to manage it for underground work method is probably an unprecedented experience and skill. In the end, thepolitical force seems to be making a fundamental response that seems to be not to think about the real situation. For him, a lot of objective facts about human society, is not like us, is often used to test and modify people view of scale, but from a grab bag of arbitrarily, have a tendency to take out the specific facts in order to support the established views. This is certainly not a pleasant picture. Thequestion of how to deal with this power is undoubtedly the greatest task that China's diplomacy has ever faced. He should be the starting pointfor our political staff to work at this moment. To deal with this problem in the same spirit and prudence as in the resolution of the wartime major strategic issues, it is necessary to make the same big efforts in the planning work as necessary. I can't try to come up withall the answers here, but I would like to express my confidence that we have the ability to solve this problem without having to go through acomprehensive military conflict. To prove my belief, I would like to offer some more encouraging views.(1) unlike Hitler's Germany, the Soviet regime did not have systematic planning, nor did it engage in risky activities. He is not acting on a fixed plan. He doesn't take unnecessary risks. Logic is indifferent to reason, but it is sensitive to the logic of force. Because of this, when he encounters strong resistance anywhere, he can easily retreat, and he often does. Therefore, if the other party has sufficient force, and indicates readiness to use force, it practically USES no force. If the other person handles the situation correctly, there is no need to have a reputation showdown.(2) the Soviet union was a much weaker force than the rest ofthe western world. Therefore, their success will depend on the degree of unity, identification and strength that the western world can achieve. And this is a factor that we have the ability to influence.(3) as a form of domestic power, the success of the Soviet systemhas not been proved. Whether he can stand the power to move from one person to another, or from a small group of people to another, has yet to be proved. The first such transfer of power after Lenin's death resulted in the destruction of the Soviet union for years.A second transfer of power will occur after Stalin's death or retirement. But this will not be the final test. Because of the recent territorial expansion, the Soviet domestic system will now be subjected to a series of additional pressures that prove to be a serious burden onthe tsarist regime. Here, we are convinced that, since the end of the civil war, the vast majority of the Russian people have never been more emotionally detached from the communist party doctrine. In Russia, it is now a huge and successful dictatorship - but he is no longer a source of charisma. There is no guarantee that internal volume and movement will last.(4) all Soviet propaganda, outside the Soviet security sphere, was basically negative and destructive. It should be easy, therefore, to combat it with any smart, truly constructive platform.For all these reasons, I think we can deal with Russia calmly and bravely. As for the approach, I only want to make thefollowing observations as a conclusion.1. I think the first step must be to understand and understand the nature and truth of the movement we are dealing with. We must study hard to bundle with a doctor and the patient's that kind of courage, without reason is a transcendental attitude and objective spirit, study of it, and have the determination, such as doctors was not swayed by emotion, don't make by it.We must try our best to learn the truth about the form of Russia by our people. The importance of this point cannot be overemphasized. It should not be done by the newspaper alone. It should be done by the government. The government must have more experience and more knowledge of the practical issues involved. In this work, we needn't be daunted by the ugly situation. I firmly believe that if the people of our countryknow more about the true situation of this situation, today our country will be much less anti-soviet. There is no more dangerous and scarier than ignorance. Perhaps there is a debate about how much more of our difficulties in dealing with Russia could have an adverse effect on russian-american relations. I think if there is any risk here, we should have the courage to face it, and the sooner the better. But I don't see what we're going to risk. Even after all the hype about our friendship with the Russian people, our stakes for them are minimal. There we have no investment to defend, no real trade to be lost, and few citizens to protect, and there is little cultural exchange to sustain. The only thing we have a stake in them is not what we have, but what we want. I am convinced that we will have more opportunities to achieve these hopes that if citizens know the situation in our country, if our relationship with the russianscompletely built on the basis of reality, seeking truth from facts.A large part of the problem depends on the health and vitality ofour own society. The world communist movement, like the malignant parasite, relies on diseased muscle tissue to feed itself.This is where domestic policy and foreign policy will be. Whatever our own internal social problems, to strengthen the confidence of our people, discipline, morale and team spirit of any item of the kokang powerful measures, is a diplomatic victory for Moscow, its value can be comparable to one thousand diplomatic notes and the joint communique. If we can't abandon fatalism in front of their social defects andindifferent attitude, Moscow will get benefits, Moscow in its foreign policy is not to benefit from it.4. We have to plan and propose for other countries, more actively and constructively than we have been in the past, and the kind of world picture we would like to see. Similar to our country's political process only urged other countries to people's development is not enough, many foreign people, at least, the peoples of Europe, for the past experience has tired and afraid, for freedom in the abstract has not interested in the safe. They are seeking guidance. If we don't give guidance, the russians will.Finally, we must have the courage and confidence to adhere to our own methods and our views on human society. In the end, when we deal with the problem of Soviet communism, the greatestdanger that may fall on our heads is that we make ourselves thesame as the people we are dealing with.。

《凯南日记》——5分钟总结一本书

《凯南日记》——5分钟总结一本书

《凯南日记》关于作者本书作者乔治·凯南是美国最重要的一位外交家,他开创了冷战的格局,被誉为“冷战之父”,对20世纪下半叶的国际局势有着举足轻重的影响。

关于本书这部日记是从乔治·凯南将近2万页的日记手稿当中筛选出来的精华部分,忠实还原了他将近一生的所见所闻、所思所感,包括他所有的政治评述,以及个人生活中的重要方面。

透过这部作品,我们能了解乔治·凯南这样一位20世纪的伟大人物,他内心脆弱的时刻,他最细腻、最隐秘、最深入人心的思想轨迹。

核心内容乔治·凯南人生中的三重矛盾,包括事业、家庭和俄罗斯情结,塑造出他多面复杂的人格特点。

这是乔治·凯南人生的三重底色,也是我们理解他政治生涯高峰的几把钥匙。

乔治·凯南一生中最为光彩夺目的高峰,他全部冷战思想的精华,都凝结在著名的8000字长电报和《苏联行为的根源》这两篇文章中。

他深刻地剖析了苏联政府的心理和行动逻辑,并向美国政府提出了长期遏制苏联的政策。

在冷战开始之后,整个20世纪的下半叶里,冷战的发展与乔治·凯南的预期事与愿违,这位“冷战之父”在他的后半生里,一直在为冷战的纠偏做着不懈的努力。

一、乔治·凯南人生中的三重矛盾1. 渴望建功立业与悲观厌世之间的矛盾乔治·凯南一生的成就,其实没有达到他自己的期望。

他总是梦想成为一个受人尊重的、富有影响力的人,他认为自己是世界级的政治家,可以和印度总理尼赫鲁相提并论。

乔治·凯南确实有他的过人之处,他1947年预言苏联解体的方式,和1991年实际发生的情形几乎一模一样,超前了将近半个世纪。

虽然人生中有过辉煌的时刻,但是乔治·凯南常常感到忧郁和悲观,这在他的日记里体现得非常明显。

他19岁就在日记里担心,“虽然这个世界五彩缤纷,但是我觉得一切可能都会变得枯燥乏味,没有任何意义。

”31岁的时候,他又在担心,“我觉得自己在想象力枯萎之前,在变成白发人之前,没有办法改变这个世界了。

当代世界经济与政治形考三次试题2018

当代世界经济与政治形考三次试题2018

题目1不正确获得分中的分未标记标记题目题干【单项选择题】〔〕是导致世界政治格局演变的根本原因。

选择一项:A. 意识形态的影响不正确B. 国家力量的变化C. 外交政策的变化D. 国家利益的改变反馈正确答案是:国家力量的变化题目2不正确获得分中的分未标记标记题目题干【多项选择题】主权国家构成的要素有〔〕选择一项或多项:A. 固定的领土B. 有一定形式的政府C. 定居的居民正确D. 完整的主权反馈正确答案是:固定的领土, 定居的居民, 有一定形式的政府, 完整的主权题目3未答复总分值未标记标记题目题干【判断题】国际社会是在一定的历史时期内国家间在政治、经济、文化等社会生活的各个领域发生经常的联系而形成的一个有秩序的整体。

选择一项:对错反馈正确的答案是“错”。

题目4未答复总分值未标记标记题目题干【多项选择题】战后世界经济迅速发展的原因有〔〕选择一项或多项:A. 战后相对稳定的国际环境B. 第三次科技革命的兴起C. 社会主义国家和民族独立国家经济的发展D. 经济危机的结束反馈正确答案是:战后相对稳定的国际环境, 第三次科技革命的兴起, 社会主义国家和民族独立国家经济的发展题目5未答复总分值未标记标记题目题干【判断题】军事实力是国家防御外来侵略和安全自卫的能力,是国家实力构成的一个核心要素,也是国力强弱的最直接反映。

选择一项:对错反馈正确的答案是“对”。

题目6未答复总分值未标记标记题目题干【单项选择题】国家作为一个行为主体,其在国际社会中的地位和作用取决于〔〕选择一项:A. 国家目标B. 国家影响C. 国家力量D. 国家利益反馈正确答案是:国家力量题目7未答复总分值未标记标记题目题干【多项选择题】中外经济学家按水平高低将区域经济一体化分为六个阶段:特惠关税区、自由贸易区、关税同盟和〔〕。

选择一项或多项:A. 共同市场B. 经济共同体C. 完全的政治经济一体化D. 经济同盟反馈正确答案是:共同市场, 经济同盟, 完全的政治经济一体化题目8未答复总分值未标记标记题目题干【单项选择题】随着经济全球化的迅速发展,〔〕走出国际关系的幕后,成为直接影响安全的独立力量。

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美国驻苏大使馆代办乔治.凯南致国务院电报……第一部分苏联官方宣传机器对战后问题的看法,其基本特征如下:a. 苏联仍然生活在敌对的“资本主义包围之中”,从长远来说,与资本主义持久和平共处是不可能的。

正如斯大林在1927年对一个美国工人代表团所说得那样:“在国际革命继续发展的进程中将形成两个世界规模的中心。

一个是把那些趋向于共产主义的国家集结在自己周围的共产主义中心,一个是把那些趋向于资本主义的国家集结在自己周围的资本主义中心。

这两个阵营为支配世界经济而进行的斗争将决定整个世界的资本主义和共产主义的命运。

”b. 资本主义是接受它本身固有的种种矛盾所困扰。

这些矛盾是不能用和平妥协的方法解决的,其中最大的就是英国和美国之间的矛盾。

c.资本主义的内在矛盾不可避免地要发生战争。

由此产生的战争有两类:两个资本主义国家之间的战争和他们对社会主义世界进行干涉而发动的战争。

妄图逃避资本主义内部矛盾的精明的资本家们,倾向于后一类战争。

d. 虽然对苏联进行干涉将会给这样做的国家带来灾难,但他们的干涉毕竟会再次拖延苏联社会主义的发展。

因此必须不惜一切代价予以防止。

e.资本主义国家之间的矛盾,虽然对苏联同样充满着危险却也为社会主义事业的推动提供了巨大的可能性,特别是如果苏联在军事方面保持强大,在意识形态方面坚如磐石,并忠于目前它的英明领袖的话。

f.必须记住,苏联认为资本主义并非一切都坏。

除了不可救药的反动派和资产阶级分子之外,资本主义社会还包括:(1)团结在共产党之内的某些十分开明和积极的人物。

(2)某些其他分子(现在出于策略上的缘故称之为进步认识或民主人士),他们的反应、愿望和活动恰巧“在客观上”有利于苏联的利益。

为了苏联的目的必须鼓励和利用第二种人。

g.在资本主义社会的反面人物中,最危险的就是列宁所谓的人民的假朋友即温和的社会党或社会民主党的领导人(换言之,决不屈服于共产党的左派)。

这些人比之彻头彻尾的反动派更加危险,因为反动派是以他们的真面目出现的,而温和的左派领袖则用社会主义迷惑人们,来为反动资本的利益服务。

以上这些就是前提。

从苏联政策的角度来看,他们由这些前提得到了下属推论:a.必须千方百计提高苏联作为国际社会一员的相对力量。

反过来说也不要错过任何机会,以削弱所有的或极个别的资本主义国家的力量和影响。

b.苏联及其在国外的朋友,都必须致力于加深和利用资本主义大国之间的分歧和矛盾。

如果资本主义国家之间的分歧和矛盾中与发展到“帝国主义”战争的地步,那么资本主义国家就必须把这场战争转变为革命起义。

c.最大限度的利用国外的“民主人士和进步人士”,使他们按照苏联利益的方针对资本主义国家政府施加压力。

d.必须同国外的社会党和社会民主党领袖们进行无情的斗争。

第二部分这种看法的背景。

在对苏联共产党路线的具体实施措施进行考察之前应该注意它的几个方面。

第一,苏共的路线并不代表俄国人民本来的看法。

总的来说俄国人民对外部世界是友好的。

他们渴望取得外部世界的承认,渴望同外部世界的人民比一比才华,特别是渴望过和平的生活享受自己劳动的果实。

党的路线只代表官方宣传机器以巧妙的手法和极大的耐心向群众提出的论点,而群众“在内心深处”常常对那些论点有着惊人的抗拒。

但是,对于党、秘密警察、政府等权力机构的人们的看法和行动,党的路线是有约束力的,而我们所要应付的正是这种人。

第二,请注意苏联共产党的路线所根据的因素,大部分根本是不真实的。

经验证明,资本主义与社会主义国家之间和平共处是完全可能的。

先进国家内部的基本矛盾,已经主要不是生产资料的资本主义所有制产生的矛盾而是由城市化和工业化本身所产生的矛盾。

俄国迄今没有高度城市化和工业化所造成的矛盾,这并不是由于他是社会主义,而是由于他仍旧很落后。

资本主义内部的竞争不一定产生战争,战争也并非都是由此而引起的。

在德国和日本被消灭之后,在最近这次大战的事例之后,还侈谈对苏联进行干涉的可能性,那是彻头彻尾的胡言乱语。

如果没有那种排斥异己和从事颠覆活动的势力的挑衅,在资本主义世界内部以及他和俄国之间,实现和平共处的可能性是很大的。

最后,凡是神经健全的人都不会无端怀疑西方国家里温和的社会党领袖的诚意。

例如在斯纳蒂纳维亚半岛,只要有机会,他们总是为改善劳动人民的生活条件竭尽全力,否认他们在这方面所取得的成就也是不公正的。

这些结论都是第二次世界大战之前提出并已被这次大战本身证明是完全错误的。

事实上英美之间的分歧并非西方世界的主要分歧。

除了轴心国家以外,资本主义国家都无意通过参加反苏十字军来解决它们之间的分歧。

苏联也没有是帝国主义战争变成内战及革命,反而不得不公开承认是为了共同的目标而与资本主义大国并肩作战。

然而不论上述所有前提是怎样毫无根据和无法证明,今天他们还是重新大胆的提了出来。

这表明什么?这表明苏联党的路线并不是依据对俄国外界形式的客观分析。

确实,他同苏联边界以外的情况没有多大关系。

它主要是俄国内部需要的产物,而这种需要在最近这次大战之前就已存在。

今天也仍然存在。

克里姆林宫对世界事务的神经质的看法,其根源在于俄国人那种传统的和本能的不安全感。

本来一个和平的农业民族,在辽阔的原野上与凶悍的游牧民族共同生活,没有保险就会产生一种不安全感。

随着娥国同经济上先进的西方进行接触,除上述不安全感之外,又加上对西方更能干、更强大、组织的更好的社会保有畏惧心理。

这后一种不安全感与其说是在折磨着俄国人民,毋宁说是在折磨着俄国的统治者。

因为俄国的统治者一贯认为,他们的统治者人知道了外界的真相,或外国人知道了俄国内部的真相,担心会产生某种后果。

他们学到的寻求安全的唯一方法,是为了彻底毁灭同他竞争的国家而进行殊死的斗争,决不同哪个国家达成协议或做出妥协。

在西欧酝酿了半个世纪而毫无成效的马克思主义,首先在俄国扎下了根,并引起了燎原大火,这绝非偶然,认为社会经济矛盾用和平手段无法解决的这种学说,只有在俄国得到发扬光大,因为这个国家从未有过一个友好的邻邦。

事实上在各强国内部和国际间,也从未保持住相互容忍的平衡。

在布尔什维克政权建立之后,被列宁解释的马克思主义更加残酷,更加不容异己,从而就成为散布不安全感的完美工具,这种不安使布尔什维克甚至比俄国过去的统治着更为苦恼。

在这个基本目标属于利他主义的教条中,布尔什维克们为他们天生对外部世界的恐惧,为他们的独裁制度,为他们使用的酷刑,以及为了要求人们做出牺牲,找到了理论依据。

他们以马克思主义为幌子,在方法上和策略上把道德价值全部丢弃。

今天,他们没有马克思主义就不能过日子。

马克思主义使他们在道德上和思想上受人尊敬的一块遮羞布。

他们在历史面前没有这块遮羞布,充其量不过是那种残暴而不惜民力的俄国统治者绵延世系中的最后一代罢了。

那些无情的俄国统治者使他们的军事力量达到前所未有的高峰,以保证对内虚弱的政权在外部获得安全。

苏联的意图必须始终庄严的披着马克思主义的外衣,无论如何所以不应低估教条在苏联事务中的重要性,其原因就在于此。

这样,苏联领导人迫于历史和现状的实际需要,就提出一种教条,把外部描绘成为一个罪恶的、敌视的、威胁苏联的世界,并认为这个世界内部孕育着蔓延疾病的细菌,注定要被越来越多的内部骚动所破坏,最后收到蒸蒸日上的社会主义力量的致命一击,从而让位给一个新的、更美好的世界。

这个理论为他们扩大军事和警察力量找到了合法依据,把俄国人民与外部世界隔绝起来,为扩大俄国警察的权限而施加经常不断的压力。

所有这些都是俄国统治者天然的和本能的要求。

这主要是说明,数世纪以来,不平静的俄罗斯民族主义运动取得了显著的进展。

在这个运动中,攻击和自卫的观念已经无法分清。

但是,披上国际马克思主义的新外衣,又用甜言蜜语向一个绝望的、遭受战争破坏的外部世界作出许诺,俄罗斯民主义比之以往就更加危险、更加狡猾了。

但是我们不应这样认为似乎所有为苏联党制定路线的人,都是虚伪的和无诚意的。

他们当中有许多人对外部世界太不了解,思想上的依赖性很强,以致不会对自欺欺人之谈发生怀疑。

他们轻信那种只有言听计从才使人感到舒服和方便的东西。

最后,我们还有一个不解之谜,即在这个伟大的国度里,究竟谁---如果有这样一个人的话---能获得有关外部世界比较准确而无偏见的情报。

在东方人神秘莫测、守口如瓶以及政府中普遍高阴谋诡计的气氛中,歪曲和毒化情报的可能性是无限的。

俄国人不尊重客观实理---事实上,他们根本不相信客观实理的存在---这就使得他们把一切明白的事实当作一种工具,用来达到这个或那个不可告人的目的。

我们有充分理由怀疑,这个政府实际上是在一个大阴谋中的小阴谋。

至少我个人不大相信,斯大林能得到大规模的长期信贷,我相信苏联政府可能终于像它在30年代做过的那样,对于进行国际经济交流是可取的这一点,只是口头上说说而已。

相反,我认为苏联对外贸易可能大部分限制在苏联自己的安全领域之内,包括德国占领区,而以冷眼看待各国间实行一般经济合作的原则。

h. 至于文化合作,苏联同样只是口头上说说,譬如加深各国人民之间的文化交流是可取的,在实践决不会做出任何可能削弱苏联各民族的安全的解释。

政策在这方面的实际表现,将只限于有人陪伴正式访问,和参加仪式、集会这样一些库在无谓的方式,以及吃过量的伏特加酒和发表冗长的讲话,但并不产生长久性的效果。

i.除此之外,苏联同各个外交国家的官方关系,将采取可以称之为“正确”的路线极力维护苏联及其领导人的威望,一丝不苟的注意国际礼仪(这同良好的礼仪背道而驰)。

……第五部分从美国政策的角度映作出的实际推论。

……总结起来说,我们面对着一个政治力量,狂热的支持他的方式的国家,以及损害我国在国际上的权威。

这个政治力量可以支配世界上最伟大的民族之一的精力和世界上最富庶的国家之一的资讯,并且它是身后强大的俄罗斯民族主义潮流孕育出来的。

此外,他还有一个精巧的、涉及面广的组织机构,用以在外国发挥它的影响,这个机构具有惊人的灵活性和多种技能,管理它的人对于地下工作方法的经验和技巧大概是史无前例的。

最后,这个政治力量在他作出基本反映是似乎是不去考虑真实情况的。

对他来讲,关于人类社会的大量客观事实,并不像我们那样,是经常用来检验和修改人们看法的尺度,而是从一只摸彩的布袋中武断地、有倾向的拿出个别事实以支持既定的看法。

这肯定不是一幅令人愉快的图景。

如何对付这个力量的问题无疑是我国外交所曾面临的最巨大的任务。

他应该是我们的政治参谋班子在目前这个时刻进行工作的出发点。

要以像解决战时重大战略问题一样的彻底精神和慎重态度,必要时还要在计划工作方面做出同样大的努力,来处理这个问题。

我不能在这里试图提出全部答案,但我愿表白我的信心,这个问题是我们有能力解决的,而且不必通过一场全面的军事冲突来解决。

为了证明我的这一信念,我愿提出一些比较令人鼓舞的看法。

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