rfc2903.Generic AAA Architecture
aaa服务器编译、安装、使用手册
Freeradius服务器编译、安装、使用手册(1)日期:2007-12-19作者:周俊懿上海寰创通信科技有限公司文档更新记录第0章软件版本说明1软件版本:Freeradius服务器:freeradius-1.1.7.tar.gzApache服务器及其依赖:apache_1.3.37.tar.gzopenssl-0.9.8g.tar.tarDHCP服务器:dhcp-4.0.0.tar.gzPHP版本及其依赖:php-4.4.6.tar.gzcurl-7.16.1.tar.gzDB-1.7.12.tarfreetype-2.3.1.tar.gzgd-2.0.34.tar.gzjpeg-6bjpegsrc.v6b.tar.tarlibpng-1.2.16.tar.gzlibxml2-2.6.26.tar.gzlibxslt-1.1.17.tar.gzzlib-1.2.3.tar.gzpcre-7.5.tar.gzPEAR-1.6.1.tarMysql服务器及其WEB管理程序:mysql-5.0.27.tar.gzphpMyAdmin-2.11.4-all-languages-utf-8-only.tar.gz下载这些软件请到google,输入软件版本+download,比如:freeradius-1.1.7.tar.gz download 2操作系统环境:vmware + redhat as4第1章编译安装配置软件下面给出了编译安装配置软件的操作步骤。
1 Install mysqlFreeradius通过Web(dialup_admin)设置的参数都会保存在Mysql数据库中,然后从数据库中将参数导入Freeradius。
注:编译时务必加上--enable-thread-safe-client选项,后面软件会依赖客户端库。
Configure 中参数意义如下:--prefix=/usr/local/mysql 指定安装目录--sysconfdir=/etc 配置文件安装目录--enable-thread-safe-client 以线程方式编译客户端--localstatedir=/var/lib/mysql 运行状态文件安装完成后,初始化数据库设置权限:复制配置文件;启动mysql:设置密码:初始的root密码是空的,比如设置为123修改密码:比如修改为1234把密码修改为1234,由于初始密码为空,所以当出现enter password提示时,直接回车就行;如果密码不为空,那么就输入密码。
中移动家庭网关终端技术规范v3.0.0
中国移动通信企业标准家庭网关终端技术规范版本号:3.0.0中国移动通信集团公司发布╳╳╳╳-╳╳-╳╳发布 ╳╳╳╳-╳╳-╳╳实施QB-╳╳-╳╳╳-╳╳╳╳ T e c h n i c a l S p e c i f i c a t i o n f o r H o m e G a t e w a y目录3.术语、定义和缩略语 ....................................................................................... 错误!未指定书签。
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华为交换机AAA配置与管理
AAA配置与管理一、基础1、AAA是指:authentication(认证)、authorization(授权)、accounting(计费)的简称,是网络安全的一种管理机制;Authentication是本地认证/授权,authorization和accounting是由远处radius(远程拨号认证系统)服务或hwtacacs(华为终端访问控制系统)服务器完成认证/授权;AAA是基于用户进行认证、授权、计费的,而NAC方案是基于接入设备接口进行认证的。
在实际应用中,可以使用AAA的一种或两种服务。
2、AAA基本架构:C/S结构,AAA客户端(也叫NAS-网络接入服务器)是使能了aaa功能的网络设备(可以是一台或多台、不一定是接入设备)3、AAA基于域的用户管理:通过域来进行AAA用户管理,每个域下可以应用不同的认证、授权、计费以及radius或hwtacacs服务器模板,相当于对用户进行分类管理缺省情况下,设备存在配置名为default(全局缺省普通域)和default_admin(全局缺省管理域),均不能删除,只能修改,都属于本地认证;default为接入用户的缺省域,default_admin为管理员账号域(如http、ssh、telnet、terminal、ftp用户)的缺省域。
用户所属域是由域分隔符后的字符串来决定的,域分隔符可以是@、|、%等符号,域,如果用户名不带@,就属于系统缺省default域。
自定义域可以被配置为全局缺省普通域或全局缺省管理域,但域下配置的授权信息较AAA 服务器的授权信息优先级低,通常是两者配置的授权信息一致。
4、radius协议Radius通过认证授权来提供接入服务、通过计费来收集、记录用户对网络资源的使用。
定义UDP1812、1813作为认证(授权)、计费端口Radius服务器维护三个数据库:Users:存储用户信息(用户名、口令、使用的协议、IP地址等)Clients:存储radius客户端信息(接入设备的共享密钥、IP地址)Dictionary:存储radius协议中的属性和属性值含义Radius客户端与radius服务器之间通过共享密钥来对传输数据加密,但共享密钥不通过网络来传输。
Extreme Networks SLX 9640高性能固定路由器商品介绍说明书
ExtremeRouting? SLX 9640
Built to Suit Your Business Needs Ext rem e Elem ent s are t he b uild ing b locks t hat allow you t o t ailor your net w ork t o your sp ecific b usiness environm ent , g oals, and ob ject ives. They enab le t he creat ion of an A ut onom ous Net w ork t hat d elivers t he p osit ive exp eriences and b usiness out com es m ost im p ort ant t o your org anizat ion.
W W W.EXTREMENETW
1
Flexib le Bo rd er Ro ut ing w it h Int ernet Scale, Ult ra-Deep Buffers,
MPLS and EVPN
The SLX 964 0 is a very p ow erful com p act d eep b uffer Int ernet b ord er rout er, p rovid ing a cost -efficient solut ion t hat is p urp ose-b uilt for t he m ost d em and ing service p rovid er and ent erp rise d at a cent ers and MA N/ WA N ap p licat ions. The rob ust syst em archit ect ure sup p ort ed by SLX-OS and a versat ile feat ure set includ ing IPv4 , IPv6, and MPLS/ VPLS w it h Carrier Et hernet 2.0 and OA M cap ab ilit ies t o p rovid e d ep loym ent flexib ilit y.
2903M421 Mix Sim Summary
11
DUT - Behavior model
Memory Model RAM Model FileName RAM512X36.v PROM1_8KX34.v PROM2_8KX34.v PROM3_8KX34.v PROM4_8KX34.v PROM5_8KX34.v PROM6_8KX34.v PROM7_8KX34.v PROM8_8KX34.v Note RAM行为级模型 PROM行为级模型
DUT
TB & TC
Environment setup & Simulation tool Outlook & Summary
Confidential and Proprietary
15
TB & TC – Protocol
Work Mode (Protocol) TB # TC # 7816 1 1 RF 1 3 7816 & RF NA NA
Flexible configure DUT files selection for different modules architecture?
Spice/Spectre netlist VerilogAMS/VerilogA model Verilog behavior model
1 file or multiple files?
RNG Model BGR Model RNI Cell Model
随机数模块模拟网表 偏置模块模拟网表
PAD Model
PAD模拟网表
EE Model
EE40KM4V13.cir
EEPROM模拟网表(memory array仅保留bank0 page0 )
RFC1035(中文)域名-实现及标准
标签必须遵守 ARPANET 主机名称规则。它们必须以字母开始,以字母或数字结束, 内部字符仅可以是字母、数字和连字符号。对长度也有某些限制。标签必须是 63 个字符或 更少。
P. Mockapetris ISI
November 1987
3-4-1 A RDATA格式 3-4-2 WKS RDATA格式 3-5 IN-ADDR.ARPA域 3-6 定义新的类型、类和专用名称空间 第4章 消息 4-1 格式 4-1-1 首部部分格式 4-1-2 问题部分格式 4-1-3 资源记录格式 4-1-4 消息压缩 4-2 传送 4-2-1 UDP应用 4-2-2 TCP应用 第5章 主文件 5-1 格式 5-2 定义区域的主文件的应用 5-3 主文件举例 第6章 名称服务器实现 6-1 架构 6-1-1 控制 6-1-2 数据库 6-1-3 时间 6-2 标准查询处理 6-3 区域更新和重新加载处理 6-4 反向查询(可选) 6-4-1 反向查询和响应的内容 6-4-2 反向查询和响应举例 6-4-3 反向查询处理 6-5 完整查询和响应 第7章 解析器实现 7-1 将用户请求转换为查询 7-2 发送查询 7-3 处理响应 7-4 使用缓存器 第8章 邮件支持 8-1 邮件交换绑定 8-2 邮箱绑定(试验) 第9章 参考文献和参考书目 原文索引
这个功能性结构隔离了用户接口问题、失败恢复问题和在解析器中分发的问题,隔离了 名称服务器中数据库更新问题和刷新问题。
2-2 一般配置 主机能够以多种方法分享域名服务器,取决于或者主机运行检索来自域系统的信息的程
序、运行检索来自名称服务器(这些服务器回答来自其他主机的查询)信息的程序,或者主机 运行两种程序功能的各种组合。最简单和或许也是最典型的配置如图 1 所示。
AWAF知识点学习
AWAF知识点学习AWAF知识点Data GuardData Guard是在HTTP响应中防⽌铭感数据泄露的,⽐如在HTTP响应中包含了信⽤卡信息、U.S.Social Security number等,或者是⾃定义的信息。
有两种防护⽅式当Policy是Blocking的时候,如果响应中包含了敏感信息,AWAF会拦截这个响应AWAF也可以对敏感信息进⾏加密,只有在Policy是Transparent或者是Bolcking但是Data Guard是Alarm/Learn的时候才会加密,加密的形式是*,并且需要勾选Mask Data可以使⽤⾃定义的Patterns来本地化定义⾝份证信息或电话号4[0-9]{3}-[0-9]{4}-[0-9]{4}-#表⽰以4开头的前⼗⼆位数为敏感数据,AWAF将对其进⾏隐藏#[]表⽰0-9的数字;{}表⽰数的位数Exception Patterns该选项表⽰指定系统认为那些不是铭感数据File Content Detection指定系统是否检查⽂件内容的响应,如果是,哪些类型的⽂件内容被视为敏感数据。
这可以防⽌服务器将您不希望返回给⽤户的⽂件内容传递给⽤户。
Enforcement Mode⽤于指定Data Guard对那些URL进⾏防护Ignore URLs---Data Guard会防护所有的URL,除了列表中的Enforce URLs---Data Guard会防护列表中的URL,即使该URL并不在Security Policy中AWAF将Cookie分为两种,分别是Allowed和EnforcedAllowed类型的Cookie⼀般是Persistent Cookie、Single Sign On Cookie、或者是其他的合法的Cookie。
当这类Cookie背设置为Allow,AWAF会忽略并不会触发告警;Allowed Cookie可以设置Explicit和Wildcard两种Enforced类型的Cookie是在客户端侧不应该被修改的。
AAA配置实例+注解
AAA配置实例+注解cisco上配置AAA,AAA是指用使用Authentication、Authorization、Accounting三种功能对要管理交换机的用户做控制。
Authentication(认证):对用户的身份进行认证,决定是否允许此用户访问网络设备。
Authorization(授权):针对用户的不同身份,分配不同的权限,限制每个用户的操作Accounting(计费):对每个用户的操作进行审计和计费我们一般使用TACACS+、RADIUS协议来做cisco设备的AAA。
RADIUS是标准的协议,很多厂商都支持。
TACACS+是cisco私有的协议,私有意味只有cisco可以使用,TACACS+增加了一些额外的功能。
当用户的身份被认证服务器确认后,用户在能管理交换机或者才能访问网络;在访问设备的时候,我们可以针对这个用户授权,限制用户的行为;最后我们将记录用在设备的进行的操作。
在认证的时候,有一下这些方法:1.在交换机本地进行用户名和密码的设定,也就是在用户登录交换机的收,交换机会对比自己的本地数据库,查看要登录的用户所使用的用户名和密码的正确性。
2.使用一台或多台(组)外部RADIUS服务器认证3.使用一台或多台(组)外部TACACS+服务器认证用一个配置实例,说明交换机上操作username root secret cisco#在交换机本地设置一个用户,用户名是root,密码是cisco。
aaa new-model#在交换机上激活AAAaaa authentication login default group tacacs+local#设置一个登录交换机是认证的顺序,先到tacacs+服务器认证,如果tacacs+服务器出现了故障,不能使用tacacs+认证,我们可以使用交换机的本地数据库认证,也就是用户名root密码ciscoaaa authorization exec default group tacacs+if-authenticated#如果用户通过了认证,那么用户就能获得服务器的允许,运行交换机的EXEC对话aaa authorization commands15default group tacacs+local#在任何权限在使用交换机命令式都要得到tacacs+服务器许可,如果tacacs+出现故障,则要通过本地数据库许可aaa accounting exec default start-stop group tacacs+#记录用户进去EXEC对话的认证信息、用户的地址和对话的开始时间持续时间,记录的过程是从开始到结束aaa accounting commands1default start-stop group tacacs+ aaa accounting commands15default start-stop group tacacs+!tacacs-server host192.168.1.1#定义tacacs服务器地址是192.168.1.1tacacs-server key cisco#定义交换机和tacacs服务器之间通信中使用的key为ciscoline vty04login authentication defaultauthorization exec defaultaccounting exec default最近在搭建公司的ACS,总结了一些经验写在这里。
rfc6960 标准
rfc6960 标准RFC 6960 标准。
RFC 6960 标准是指用于互联网公共密钥基础设施(PKI)的在线证书状态协议(OCSP)规范。
该标准定义了OCSP协议的工作原理,以及客户端如何查询证书的状态。
OCSP协议是一种用于验证数字证书有效性的协议,它可以帮助用户确认证书是否被吊销,从而提高互联网安全性。
该标准的发布旨在解决传统的证书吊销列表(CRL)机制存在的一些问题,如CRL的大小和更新频率对网络性能的影响。
相比之下,OCSP协议可以更加及时地提供证书状态信息,减少网络流量和服务器负载。
因此,RFC 6960 标准对于互联网安全和网络性能的提升具有重要意义。
在 RFC 6960 标准中,定义了OCSP协议的通信流程和消息格式。
OCSP协议主要包括客户端请求、服务端响应和证书状态码等内容。
客户端通过发送OCSP请求消息来查询证书状态,服务端则会返回相应的证书状态信息。
通过这种方式,用户可以及时获取证书的最新状态,从而减少了使用过期或被吊销证书的风险。
此外,RFC 6960 标准还规定了OCSP协议的安全性要求。
为了保护通信过程中的数据安全性和完整性,OCSP协议要求使用TLS协议进行通信,并支持数字签名和证书验证等安全机制。
这些安全性要求可以有效防止恶意攻击者对OCSP通信进行篡改或伪造,保障了证书状态信息的可信度。
在实际应用中,RFC 6960 标准对于建立安全可靠的PKI系统至关重要。
通过使用OCSP协议,用户可以及时获取证书状态信息,从而降低了因使用过期或被吊销证书而导致的安全风险。
同时,OCSP协议还可以减少网络流量和服务器负载,提高了PKI系统的性能和可伸缩性。
总的来说,RFC 6960 标准为互联网公共密钥基础设施的安全性和性能提供了重要的技术支持。
通过定义了OCSP协议的工作原理和安全性要求,该标准为构建安全可靠的PKI系统奠定了基础。
在未来的互联网发展中,RFC 6960 标准将继续发挥重要作用,为用户提供更加安全可靠的网络环境。
aaa服务器解决方案
AAA服务器解决方案一、AAA概述1. 什么是AAAAAA是Authentication,Authorization and Accounting(认证、授权和计费)的简称,它提供了一个用来对认证、授权和计费这三种安全功能进行配置的一致性框架,实际上是对网络安全的一种管理。
这里的网络安全主要是指访问控制,包括:哪些用户可以访问网络服务器?具有访问权的用户可以得到哪些服务?如何对正在使用网络资源的用户进行计费?针对以上问题,AAA必须提供下列服务:认证:验证用户是否可获得访问权。
授权:授权用户可使用哪些服务。
计费:记录用户使用网络资源的情况。
2. AAA的优点由于AAA一般采用客户/服务器结构:客户端运行于被管理的资源侧,服务器上集中存放用户信息,因此,AAA框架具有如下的优点:具有良好的可扩展性可以使用标准化的认证方法容易控制,便于用户信息的集中管理可以使用多重备用系统来提升整个框架的安全系数3、 RADIUS协议概述如前所述,AAA是一种管理框架,因此,它可以用多种协议来实现。
在实践中,人们最常使用RADIUS协议来实现AAA。
3.1什么是RADIUSRADIUS是Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service(远程认证拨号用户服务)的简称,它是一种分布式的、客户机/服务器结构的信息交互协议,能保护网络不受未授权访问的干扰,常被应用在既要求较高安全性、又要求维持远程用户访问的各种网络环境中(例如,它常被应用来管理使用串口和调制解调器的大量分散拨号用户)。
RADIUS系统是NAS(Network Access Server,网络接入服务器)系统的重要辅助部分。
当RADIUS系统启动后,如果用户想要通过与NAS(PSTN环境下的拨号接入服务器或以太网环境下带接入功能的以太网交换机)建立连接从而获得访问其它网络的权利或取得使用某些网络资源的权利时,NAS,也就是RADIUS客户端将把用户的认证、授权和计费请求传递给RADIUS服务器。
基于tacacs+服务器的aaa认证原理
基于tacacs+服务器的aaa认证原理一、什么是tacacs+服务器tacacs+服务器是指Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus的缩写,它是一种网络认证协议,用于提供对路由器、交换机、防火墙等网络设备的认证、授权和审计功能。
tacacs+服务器通过客户端-服务器模型实现对用户的身份验证和访问控制,是实现AAA(认证、授权、审计)功能的重要组成部分之一。
二、tacacs+服务器的工作原理1. 认证(Authentication)tacacs+服务器首先对用户提交的用户名和密码进行验证,以确定用户的身份是否合法。
当用户在网络设备上登入时,设备会将用户提交的认证请求发送到tacacs+服务器,服务器通过比对用户输入的用户名和密码与服务器中保存的信息进行验证,如果验证成功则用户被授权访问网络设备,否则被拒绝。
2. 授权(Authorization)一旦用户身份验证成功,tacacs+服务器会根据用户的账号权限和网络设备的访问策略,对用户所能执行的操作进行授权。
授权过程包括确定用户的访问权限、设备的访问控制策略等,以保证用户在设备上的操作受到严格的控制和限制。
3. 审计(Accounting)tacacs+服务器会记录用户的每一次登入和操作行为,以便对用户在网络设备上的操作进行审计和监控。
这些审计日志可用于追踪用户的行为和识别潜在的安全威胁,同时也可以用于合规性监管和资源管理。
三、tacacs+服务器的优势1. 安全性tacacs+服务器支持对用户进行灵活的身份验证,并且能够提供细粒度的访问控制,能够确保只有经过合法身份验证的用户才能够访问网络设备。
tacacs+服务器支持加密传输,能够保障用户认证信息的安全性。
2. 高可用性tacacs+服务器支持集裙部署和负载均衡,能够提供高可用性的认证服务,避免单点故障,确保网络设备的稳定运行。
rfc9293引用
rfc9293引用RFC 9293引用是一个网络通讯协议,主要用于在电子邮件通讯中引用过去的信息和文献。
RFC 9293标准主要定义了一个新的MIME头字段,使得在电子邮件和其他类型的消息中引用过去的信息和文献更加方便和通用。
使用RFC 9293引用,有如下几个步骤:1.在需要引用的信息或文献前,添加一个特定的MIME头字段"References"。
该字段可以包含多个值,每个值之间用逗号分隔。
每个值是一个唯一的消息标识符(Message-Id),用于标识被引用的那个消息。
2.在引用当中,使用MIME头字段"In-Reply-To"来声明被回复的消息的Message-Id。
如果引用的是多个消息,则使用一个空格来分隔Message-Id。
需要注意的是,In-Reply-To字段只用于建立引用关系,并不用于表示消息的主要内容。
3.对于被引用的消息,需要在被引用的消息中添加一个特定的MIME头字段"Message-Id"和"In-Reply-To"字段。
"Message-Id"字段用于唯一标识该消息,而"In-Reply-To"字段则用于指明该消息所针对的上一条消息的Message-Id。
如果该消息不是针对任何消息进行回复的话,则该字段可以为空。
4.当每个邮件客户端支持RFC 9293时,在查看邮件时,可以直接跟踪到被引用的消息,从而更加方便地查看整个邮件的上下文和历史。
RFC 9293引用的优点在于,可以方便地跟踪整个电子邮件的历史记录,从而更好地理解邮件的语境和主题。
另外,RFC 9293引用还可以检查消息的正确性,防止恶意的篡改和欺骗。
总之,RFC 9293引用是一个非常有用的技术标准,可以帮助用户更好地管理和理解电子邮件。
如果你经常使用电子邮件进行沟通和合作,那么建议你了解和使用RFC 9293引用。
【协议】AAARadius协议的常用报文分析
【协议】AAARadius协议的常⽤报⽂分析写在前⾯的话RADIUS:Remote Authentication Dial In User Service,远程⽤户拨号认证系统由RFC2865,RFC2866定义,是应⽤最⼴泛的AAA协议。
如下简单的分析⼀下 RADIUS 协议是怎么⼯作的。
名词解释BRAS:宽带接⼊服务器,Broadband Remote Access Server,简称 BRASNAS: ⽹络接⼊服务器,Network Access Server,简称 NASAAA: 认证 Authentication,授权 Authorization,计费 AccountingRADIUS: 远程认证拨号⽤户服务,remote authentication dial-in user service,简称RADIUS。
DM: Radius主动发起断开链接请求 Disconnect-Request,简称DMCOA: Radius主动发起修改授权属性,Change of Authorization,简称 COA报⽂说明Radius协议的报⽂协议0 1 2 30 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+| Code | Identifier | Length |+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+| || Authenticator || || |+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+| Attributes ...+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-在报⽂中的表⽰如下所⽰:Radius 报⽂可以分为 Header 和 Attribute 两部分Radius 的头部代码定义// radius headertypedef struct RadHeader {iunsigned char code;unsigned char identifier;unsigned short length;unsigned char authcator[16];} RadHeader;Code 占⼀个字节常⽤的取值如下:1 Access-Request2 Access-Accept3 Access-Reject4 Accounting-Request5 Accounting-Response6 Accounting Status (now Interim Accounting [5])7 Password Request8 Password Ack9 Password Reject10 Accounting Message11 Access-Challenge12 Status-Server (experimental)13 Status-Client (experimental)21 Resource Free Request22 Resource Free Response23 Resource Query Request24 Resource Query Response25 Alternate Resource Reclaim Request26 NAS Reboot Request27 NAS Reboot Response29 Next Passcode30 New Pin31 Terminate Session32 Password Expired33 Event Request34 Event Response40 Disconnect Request41 Disconnect Ack42 Disconnect Nak43 Change Filters Request44 Change Filters Ack45 Change Filters Nak50 IP Address Allocate51 IP Address Release255 ReservedIdentifier是报⽂的流⽔号NAS 和 AAA 服务器通过这个流⽔号来标识认证请求和认证响应,计费请求和计费响应的配对关系。
CISCO配置命令大全
CISCO配置命令大全路由器的基本配置1 .配置以太网(Ethernet)端口:# conf t从终端配置路由器。
# int e0指定E0口。
# ip addr ABCD XXXXABCD为以太网地址,XXXX为子网掩码。
# ip addr ABCD XXXX secondaryE0口同时支持两个地址类型。
如果第一个为A类地址,则第二个为B或C类地址。
# no shutdown激活E0口。
# exit2.X.25的配置# conf t# int S0指定S0口.# ip addr ABCD XXXXABCD为以太网S0的IP地址,XXXX为子网掩码.。
# encap X25-ABC封装X.25协议。
ABC指定X.25为DTC或DCE操作,缺省为DTE。
# x25 addr ABCDABCD为S0的X.25端口地址,由邮电局提供。
# x25 map ip ABCD XXXX br映射的X.25地址.ABCD为对方路由器(如:S0)的IP地址,XXXX为对方路由器(如:S0)的X.25端口地址。
# x25 htc X配置最高双向通道数.X的取值范围1-4095,要根据邮电局实际提供的数字配置。
# x25 nvc X配置虚电路数。
X不可超过据邮电局实际提供的数,否则,将影响数据的正常传输。
# exit---- 3 .专线的配置:# conf t# int S2指定S2口。
# ip addr ABCD XXXXABCD为S2的IP地址,XXXX为子网掩码。
# exit4.帧中继的配置# conf t# int s0# ip addr ABCD XXXXABCD为S0的IP地址,XXXX为子网掩码。
# encap frante_relay封装frante_relay协议。
# no nrzi_encodingNRZI=NO# frame_relay lmi_type q933aLMI使用Q933A标准.LMI(Local management Interface)有3种:ANSI:T1.617;CCITTY:Q933A和CISCO特有的标准。
AAA原理及配置
AAA原理及配置AAA是Authentication(认证)、Authorization(授权)和Accounting(计费)的简称,它提供了认证、授权、计费三种安全功能。
⽀持的认证⽅式:不认证,本地认证,远端认证⽀持的授权⽅式:不授权,本地授权,远端授权⽀持的授权⽅式:不计费,远端计费如果⼀个认证⽅案采⽤多种认证⽅式,这些认证⽅式按配置顺序⽣效user privilege level 0 1 2 3⼏个级别的区别level 0参观ping、tracert、telnet、rsh、super、language-mode、display、quitlevel 1监控0级命令、msdp-tracert、mtracert、reboot、reset、send、terminal、undo、upgrade、debugginglevel 2系统所有配置命令(管理级的命令除外)和0、1级命令level 3管理所有命令1.远程管理⽹络设备的两种验证⽅式:telnet(不安全)、SSH/stelent⾸先得开启Telent功能:telnet server enable2.配置 Telnet ⽅式登录时的密码:[Huawei] user-interface vty 0 4 //进⼊0-4个终端[Huawei-ui-vty0-4] authentication-mode password/aaa //启⽤密码验证或AAA验证[Huawei-ui-vty0-4] set authentication password simple/cipher xxxx //以明⽂或密⽂⽅式加密(交换机)[Huawei-ui-vty0-4] set authentication password cipher xxxx //此为路由器配置命令,路由器只能是密⽂加密[Huawei-ui-vty0-4]protocol inbound telnet//设置哪些服务可以通过此test⽤户进⾏验证,设置telnet 服务[Huawei-ui-vty0-4] user privilege level 3 //设置当前⽤户权限级别3.配置 Telnet以⽤户名+密码⽅式登录时的密码:进⼊AAA模式命令⾏下:[Huawei]aaa[Huawei-aaa]local-user huawei level 3 password cipher xxxx //添加新⽤户为:huawei 密码为:xxxx 加密模式为:cipher 密⽂加密,⽤户级别为3[Huawei-aaa]local-user huawei service-type http ssh telnet web //在⽤户huawei下设置登录允许使⽤的协议[Huawei-aaa]local-user huawei privilege level 3 //远程登录时能够使⽤的级别命令路由器以telnet⽅式访问路由器:<Huawei>telnet xxxxx4.以SSH⽅式实现加密的远程连接[Huawei]aaa[Huawei-aaa]local-user xxxx password cipher xxxx privilege level 3 //配置本地⽤户[Huawei-aaa]local-user xxxx service-type ssh[Huawei]ssh user xxxx authentication-type password //添加ssh⽤户名和密码[Huawei]stelnet server enable //开启stelnet服务[Huawei]rsa local-key-pair create //⽣成密钥对信息[Huawei]user-interface vty 0 4 //进⼊虚拟⽤户界⾯端⼝0-4[Huawei-ui-vty0-4]authentication-mode aaa[Huawei-ui-vty0-4]protocol inbound ssh //配置允许登录接⼊⽤户类型的协议客户端CRT远程连接即可路由器以ssh⽅式连接路由器:[Huawei]ssh client first-time enable //⽤来使能SSH客户端⾸次认证[Huawei]stelnet xxxxx5.配置 Console ⽅式登录时的密码:[Huawei]user-interface console 0 //进⼊控制接⼝console只有0[Huawei-ui-console0]authentication-mode password //设置console登录验证⽅式为密码⽅式[Huawei-ui-console0]set authentication password simple xxxx //simple设置明⽂密码,cipher为密⽂密码[Huawei-ui-console0]user privilege level 3 //指定console连接的⽤户级别⽤户级别为0-15,0、1、2分别对应命令级别的0、1、2。
IEEE802.11-2020中译版第3章:定义和缩略语
3 定义和缩略语3.1定义就本标准而言,以下术语和定义适用。
IEEE 标准词典在线应引用本条款中未定义的术语。
访问控制:防止未经授权使用资源。
接入点(AP):包含一个站(STA)并通过无线介质(WM)为关联的STA提供对分发系统服务的访问的实体。
AP包括STA和分发系统访问功能(DSAF)。
接入点(AP)可访问性:如果预身份验证消息可以通过分发系统(DS)在STA和目标AP之间交换,则AP可由站(STA)访问。
注意—预身份验证在12.6.10.2中定义。
其他身份验证数据(AAD):未加密但受加密保护的数据。
准入控制:一种算法,旨在通过控制新流的准入来防止违反网络对允许流做出的参数化服务承诺资源受限的网络。
聚合介质访问控制(MAC)协议数据单元(A-MPDU):包含一个或多个MPDU并由物理层(PHY)作为单个PHY服务数据传输的结构单位(PSDU)。
聚合介质访问控制(MAC)协议数据单元(A-MPDU)子帧:A-MPDU的一部分,它包含分隔符,并选择性地包含MPDU和任何必要的填充。
聚合介质访问控制(MAC)服务数据单元(A-MSDU):包含一个或多个MSDU并在单个(未分段)数据介质访问控制(MAC)中传输的结构协议数据单元(MPDU)。
聚合介质访问控制(MAC)服务数据单元(A-MSDU)子帧:A-MSDU的一部分,其中包含标头和关联的MSDU。
天线连接器:用于电台(STA)中射频(RF)测量的测量参考点。
天线连接器是STA 架构中的点,表示用于无线电接收的接收器的输入(天线的输出)和天线(发射器的输出)用于无线电传输。
在使用多个天线或天线阵列的系统中,天线连接器是一个虚拟点,表示多个天线的聚合输出(或输入)。
在使用有源天线阵列进行处理的系统中,天线连接器是有源阵列的输出,其中包括有源天线的任何处理增益子系统。
天线选择(ASEL)接收器:执行接收ASEL的站(STA)。
天线选择(ASEL)发射器:执行传输ASEL的站(STA)。
AAA技术介绍
RADIUS 协议简介
RADIUS(Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service,远程认证拨号用户服务)是一种分布式的、 客户端/服务器结构的信息交互协议,能保护网络不受未授权访问的干扰,常应用在既要求较高安全 性、又允许远程用户访问的各种网络环境中。该协议定义了基于 UDP 的 RADIUS 帧格式及其消息 传输机制,并规定 UDP 端口 1812、1813 分别作为认证、计费端口。 RADIUS 最初仅是针对拨号用户的 AAA 协议,后来随着用户接入方式的多样化发展,RADIUS 也 适应多种用户接入方式,如以太网接入、ADSL 接入。它通过认证授权来提供接入服务,通过计费 来收集、记录用户对网络资源的使用。
i
技术介绍 安全和 VPN
AAA
AAA
AAA 简介
AAA 是 Authentication、Authorization、Accounting(认证、授权、计费)的简称,是网络安全的 一种管理机制,提供了认证、授权、计费三种安全功能。 AAA一般采用客户机/服务器结构,客户端运行于NAS(Network Access Server,网络接入服务器) 上,服务器上则集中管理用户信息。NAS对于用户来讲是服务器端,对于服务器来说是客户端。AAA 的基本组网结构如 图 1。
z 认证:确认远端访问用户的身份,判断访问者是否为合法的网络用户; z 授权:对不同用户赋予不同的权限,限制用户可以使用的服务。例如用户成功登录服务器后,
管理员可以授权用户对服务器中的文件进行访问和打印操作; z 计费:记录用户使用网络服务中的所有操作,包括使用的服务类型、起始时间、数据流量等,
它不仅是一种计费手段,也对网络安全起到了监视作用。 当然,用户可以只使用 AAA 提供的一种或两种安全服务。例如,公司仅仅想让员工在访问某些特 定资源的时候进行身份认证,那么网络管理员只要配置认证服务器就可以了。但是若希望对员工使 用网络的情况进行记录,那么还需要配置计费服务器。
AAA详解
Authentication:用于验证用户的访问,如login access,ppp network access等。
Authorization:在Autentication成功验证后,Authorization用于限制用户可以执行什么操作,可以访问什么服务。
Accouting:记录Authentication及Authorization的行为。
Part I. 安全协议1>Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus (TACACS+)Cisco私有的协议。
加密整个发给tacacs+ server的消息,用户的keys。
支持模块化AAA,可以将不同的AAA功能分布于不同的AAA Server甚至不同的安全协议,从而可以实现不同的AAA Server/安全协议实现不同的AAA功能。
配置命令:Router(config)# tacacs-server host IP_address [single-connection] [port {port_#}] [timeout {seconds}] [key {encryption_key}]Router(config)# tacacs-server key {encryption_key} 注:(1)single-connection:为Router与AAA Server的会话始终保留一条TCP链接,而不是默认的每次会话都打开/关闭TCP链接。
(2)配置两个tacacs-server host命令可以实现tacacs+的冗余,如果第一个server fail 了,第二个server可以接管相应的服务。
第一个tacacs-server host命令指定的server 为主,其它为备份。
(3)配置inbound acl时需要permit tacacs+的TCP port 49。
(4) 如果两个tacacs-server使用不同的key,则需要在tacacs-server host命令中指定不同的encryption_key,否则可以使用tacacs-server key统一定制。
AAA认证
AAA认证管理性访问方式:line [ console , vty ( telnet or ssh ) , aux] , ip http server用户流量性访问方式:dialup , VPN配置位置访问方式验证方式在线路上生效管理性访问tty, vty, aux, con 登陆时作验证,检查用户有没有权限执行exec,有哪些命令在接口上生效用户流量性访问async, BRI, PRI, serial, dialer profiles 做VPN连接时作验证。
AAA协议TACACS+ RADIUS传输层协议TCP 49 标准的RADIUS服务器:UDP 1812(认证,授权),UDP 1813(计费)(ASC则是UDP1645/1646)标准cisco主导的草案IETF的RFC 标准加密在client,server上设置key,将整个数据包加密只用key加密数据包中的密码部分可以把认证和授权分开做授权是认证的一部分,无法独立进行认证或授权(授权信息由access-accept消息携带)[WIN2000 server自带Internet Authentication Servie的RADIUS server]RADIUS的四种消息类型access-requestaccess-challengeaccess-acceptacces-rejectRADIUS是利用属性A V来表示认证和授权信息的。
标准属性有50多种,厂商可以有自己的扩展属性[RADIUS,TACACS+流程,书5-215,5-219]RADIUS中,授权权限是在认证完成时由server全部传递给client的,而在TACACS+中,在用户做操作时,clinet设备会向server询问是否有此权限,server才把授权信息,即属性A V(登陆用户的acl, ip地址等)传递给client。
默认情况下,TACACS+会为每个AAA认证请求创建一个新的TCP连接,比较耗server的廉洁数资源,可以在client上指定所有认证请求使用相同的TCP连接。
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Network Working Group C. de Laat Request for Comments: 2903 Utrecht University Category: Experimental G. Gross Lucent Technologies L. Gommans Enterasys Networks EMEA J. Vollbrecht D. Spence Interlink Networks, Inc. August 2000 Generic AAA ArchitectureStatus of this MemoThis memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internetcommunity. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind.Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.Distribution of this memo is unlimited.Copyright NoticeCopyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.AbstractThis memo proposes an Authentication, Authorization, Accounting (AAA) architecture that would incorporate a generic AAA server along withan application interface to a set of Application Specific Modulesthat could perform application specific AAA functions. A separation of AAA functions required in a multi-domain environment is thenproposed using a layered protocol abstraction. The long term goal is to create a generic framework which allows complex authorizations to be realized through a network of interconnected AAA servers.de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 1]Table of Contents1. Introduction (2)2. Generic AAA Architecture (4)2.1. Architectural Components of a Generic AAA Server (4)2.1.1. Authorization Rule Evaluation (4)2.1.2. Application Specific Module (ASM) (5)2.1.3. Authorization Event Log (6)2.1.4. Policy Repository (6)2.1.5. Request Forwarding (6)2.2. Generic AAA Server Model (6)2.2.1. Generic AAA Server Interactions (7)2.2.2. Compatibility with Legacy Protocols (7)2.2.3. Interaction between the ASM and the Service (9)2.2.4. Multi-domain Architecture (10)2.3. Model Observations (10)2.4. Suggestions for Future Work (11)3. Layered AAA Protocol Model (12)3.1. Elements of a Layered Architecture (14)3.1.1. Service Layer Abstract Interface Primitives (14)3.1.2. Service Layer Peer End Point Name Space (14)3.1.3. Peer Registration, Discovery, and LocationResolution (14)3.1.4. Trust Relationships Between Peer End Points (14)3.1.5. Service Layer Finite State Machine (15)3.1.6. Protocol Data Unit Types (15)3.2. AAA Application Specific Service Layer (15)3.3. Presentation Service Layer (16)3.4. AAA Transaction/Session Management Service Layer (17)3.5. AAA-TSM Service Layer Program Interface Primitives (20)3.6. AAA-TSM Layer End Point Name Space (21)3.7. Protocol Stack Examples (22)4. Security Considerations (22)Glossary (23)References (24)Authors’ Addresses (24)Full Copyright Statement (26)1. IntroductionThe work for this memo was done by a group that originally was theAuthorization subgroup of the AAA Working Group of the IETF. Whenthe charter of the AAA working group was changed to focus on MobileIP and NAS requirements, the AAAarch Research Group was chartered within the IRTF to continue and expand the architectural work started by the Authorization subgroup. This memo is one of four which were created by the subgroup. This memo is a starting point for further workwithin the AAAarch Research Group. It is still a work in progressde Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 2]and is published so that the work will be available for the AAAarchsubgroup and others working in this area, not as a definitivedescription of architecture or requirements.The authorization subgroup of the AAA Working Group proposed an "AAA Authorization Framework" [2] illustrated with numerous applicationexamples [3] which in turn motivates a proposed list of authorization requirements [4]. This memo builds on the framework presented in [2] by proposing an AAA infrastructure consisting of a network ofcooperating generic AAA servers communicating via a standardprotocol. The protocol should be quite general and should supportthe needs of a wide variety of applications requiring AAAfunctionality. To realize this goal, the protocol will need tooperate in a multi-domain environment with multiple service providers as well as entities taking on other AAA roles such as User HomeOrganizations and brokers. It should be possible to combine requests for multiple authorizations of different types in the sameauthorization transaction. The AAA infrastructure will be requiredto forward the components of such requests to the appropriate AAAservers for authorization and to collect the authorization decisions from the various AAA servers consulted. All of this activity isperfectly general in nature and can be realized in the commoninfrastructure.But the applications requiring AAA services will each have their own unique needs. After a service is authorized, it must be configuredand initialized. This will require application specific knowledgeand may require application specific protocols to communicate withapplication specific service components. To handle these application specific functions, we propose an application interface between ageneric AAA server and a set of one or more Application SpecificModules (ASMs) which can carry out the unique functionality required by each application.Since the data required by each application for authentication,authorization, or accounting may have unique structure, the standard AAA protocol should allow the encapsulation of opaque units ofApplication Specific Information (ASI). These units would begin with a standard header to allow them to be forwarded by the genericinfrastructure. When delivered to the final destination, an ASI unit would be passed by a generic AAA server across its program interface to an appropriate ASM for application specific processing.Nevertheless, it remains a goal of the design for information unitsto be encoded in standard ways as much as possible so as to enableprocessing by a generic rule based engine.de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 3]The interactions of the generic AAA server with the ApplicationSpecific Modules and with each other to realize complex AAA functions is explored in section 2. Then, in section 3, we attempt to further organize the AAA functions into logical groups using a protocollayering abstraction. This abstraction is not intended to be areference model ready to be used for protocol design. At this point in the work, there are numerous questions that need to be addressedand numerous problems that remain to be solved. It may be that anabstraction other than layering will prove to be more useful or, more likely, that the application layer will require some substructure of its own.Finally, in section 4, we show how the security requirementsidentified in [4] can be met in the generic server and theApplication Specific Modules by applying security techniques such as public key encryption or digital signatures to the ApplicationSpecific Information units individually, so that differentstakeholders in the AAA server network can protect selectedinformation units from being deciphered or altered by otherstakeholders in an authentication, authorization, or accountingchain.2. Generic AAA ArchitectureFor the long term we envision a generic AAA server which is capableof authenticating users, handling authorization requests, andcollecting accounting data. For a service provider, such a genericAAA server would be interfaced to an application specific modulewhich manages the resource for which authorization is required.Generic AAA components would also be deployed in other administrative domains performing authorization functions.2.1. Architectural Components of a Generic AAA Server2.1.1. Authorization Rule EvaluationThe first step in the authorization process is for the user or anentity operating on the user’s behalf to submit a well-formattedrequest to an AAA server. A generic AAA server has rules (logicand/or algebraic formulas) to inspect the request and come to anauthorization decision. The first problem which arises is thatApplication Specific Information (ASI) has to be separated from theunderlying logic for the authorization. Ideally the AAA server would have a rule based engine at this point which would know the logicrules and understand some generic information in the request, but it would not know anything about application specific information except where this information can be evaluated to give a boolean ornumerical value. It should be possible to create rules that refer to de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 4]data elements that were not considered when the application wascreated. For example, one could request to do a remote virtualcontrol room experiment from home using a dialin provider. Therequest would only be successful if the dialin access server allowsit and if there is bandwidth available (bandwidth broker) and if the experimenter has the money to pay for it (E-Commerce). Possibly the people who specified the bandwidth broker protocol did not think ofcombining quality of service with a network service authorization in a single AAA request, but this generic model would allow it.+------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ | | auth | | auth | | auth | | auth | | | |<---->| AAA |<---->| AAA |<---->| AAA |<---->| AAA | | | | | | | | | | | | | +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ | User | | | | || | | +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ | | | | BB | | BB | |Budget | | | | +-------+ +-------+ +-------+ | | | | || | +-------+ | || | |dial in| +-------+ +-------+| |<====>|service|<====>|network|<====>|network|<===> Experiment +------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+user <-> dialin <-> backbone with BB <-> <remote experiment>Fig. 1 -- Example of a Multi Domain Multi Type of Server Request2.1.2. Application Specific Module (ASM)Ultimately an AAA server needs to interact with an applicationspecific module (ASM). In a service provider, the ASM would manageresources and configure the service equipment to provide theauthorized service. It might also involve itself in theauthorization decision because it has the application specificknowledge required. A user home organization (UHO) may require ASMs as well, to perform application specific user authorizationfunctions. For example, a UHO ASM might be required to accesscertain application specific databases or interpret applicationspecific service level specifications.Whatever the role of an administration relative to an authorizationdecision, the capabilities of the generic AAA server and theinterface between it and the ASMs remains the same. This interfacemay be an Application Program Interface (API) or could even be aprotocol based interface. In this model, however, the applicationde Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 5]specific module is regarded as as separate architectural componentfrom the generic AAA server. As such, it must be addressable andmust therefore be part of a global naming space.2.1.3. Authorization Event LogFor auditing purposes, the generic server must have some form ofdatabase to store time-stamped events which occur in the AAA server. This database can be used to account for authorizations which weregiven, but it can also be used in rules. One can imagine rules inwhich an authorization is only given if some other event was loggedin the past. With the aid of certificates, this database couldsupport non-repudiation.2.1.4. Policy RepositoryA database containing the available services and resources aboutwhich authorization decisions can be made and the policy rules tomake them is also needed. Here too, the naming space for theservices and resources is important since they must be addressablefrom other AAA servers to be able to build complex authorizationrequests.2.1.5. Request ForwardingDue to the multiple administrative domain (multi-kingdom) nature ofthe AAA problem, a mechanism to forward messages between AAA servers is needed. The protocol by which two AAA servers communicate should be a peer-to-peer protocol.2.2. Generic AAA Server ModelWith the implementation of the above mentioned components, the AAAserver would be able to handle AAA requests. It would inspect thecontents of the request, determine what authorization is requested,retrieve the policy rules from the repository, perform various local functions, and then choose one of the following options to furtherprocess each of the components of the request:a) Let the component be evaluated by an attached ASM.b) Query the authorization event log or the policy repository for the answer.c) Forward the component(s) to another AAA server for evaluation.In the following sections we present the generic model.de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 6]2.2.1. Generic AAA Server InteractionsFigure 2 illustrates a generic AAA Server with connections to thevarious architectural components described above. In this model, the user or another AAA server contacts the AAA server to getauthorization, and the AAA server interacts with the service. Therequest is sent to the AAA server using the future AAA protocol. The server interacts with the service via a second protocol which we have labeled as type "2" in the figure. We say no more of the type 2protocol than that it must support some global naming space for theapplication specific items. The same holds for the type 3communication used to access the repository.+------------------+| |request <-----1----->|Generic AAA Server|<---1---> AAA server|Rule based engine || |\+------------------+ 3 +------------+^ \| Policy and || | event |2 | repository || +------------+v+------------------+| Application || Specific || Module |+------------------+The numbers in the links denote types of communication.Fig. 2 -- Generic AAA Server Interactions2.2.2. Compatibility with Legacy ProtocolsBecause of the widespread deployment of equipment that implementslegacy AAA protocols and the desire to realize the functionality ofthe new AAA protocol while protecting the investment in existinginfrastructure, it may be useful to implement a AAA gateway function that can encapsulate legacy protocol data units within the messagesof the new protocol. Use of this technique, for example, would allow Radius attribute value pairs to be encapsulated in ApplicationSpecific Information (ASI) units of the new protocol in such a waythat the ASI units can be digitally signed and encrypted for end-to- end protection between a service provider’s AAA server and a home AAA server communicating via a marginally trusted proxy AAA server. The service provider’s NAS would communicate via Radius to the servicede Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 7]provider’s AAA server, but the AAA servers would communicate amongthemselves via the new AAA protocol. In this case, the AAA gatewaywould be a software module residing in the service provider’s AAAserver. Alternatively the AAA gateway could be implemented as astandalone process.Figure 3 illustrates an AAA gateway. Communication type 4 is thelegacy protocol. Communication type 1 is the future standard AAAprotocol. And communication type 2 is for application specificcommunication to Application Specific Modules (ASMs) or ServiceEquipment.+-------+| AAA |<---1---> to AAA server as in fig. 2request <---4--->|GateWay|| |<---2---> optionally to ASM/service+-------+The numbers in the links denote types of communication.Fig. 3 -- AAA Gateway for Legacy AAA Protocolsde Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 8]2.2.3. Interaction between the ASM and the ServiceIn a service provider, the Application Specific Module (ASM) and the software providing the service itself may be tightly bound into asingle "Service Application". In this case, the interface betweenthem is just a software interface. But the service itself may beprovided by equipment external to the ASM, for example, a router inthe bandwidth broker application. In this case, the ASM communicates with the service via some protocol. These two possibilities areillustrated in figure 4. In both cases, we have labeled thecommunication between the ASM and the service as communication type5, which of course, is service specific.| |+--------------|----+ || Service 2 | 2| Application | | || +-------------+ | +-------------+| | Application | | | Application || | Specific | | | Specific || | Module | | | Module || +-------------+ | +-------------+| | | || 5 | 5| | | || +-------------+ | +-------------+| | Service | | | Service || | | | | Equipment || +-------------+ | +-------------++-------------------+Fig. 4 -- ASM to Service Interaction (two views)de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 9]2.2.4. Multi-domain ArchitectureThe generic AAA server modules can use communication type 1 tocontact each other to evaluate parts of requests. Figure 5illustrates a network of generic AAA servers in differentadministrative domains communicating via communication type 1.+-----+o--------| AAA |---->.../ | |/ +-----+\/ | \+----+/ +-----+ | RP |/ | ASM | +----++--------+ +-----+ / | || Client |------| AAA |-------o +-----++--------+ | | \+-----+ \| +----+ \ +-----++-----+ | RP | o-----| AAA |---->...| ASM | +----+ | || | +-----+\+-----+ | \+----++-----+ | RP || ASM | +----+| |+-----+The AAA servers use only communication type 1 to communicate.ASM = Application Specific ModuleRP = RepositoryFig. 5 -- Multi-domain Multi-type of Service Architecture2.3. Model ObservationsSome key points of the generic architecture are:1) The same generic AAA server can function in all threeauthorization models: agent, pull, and push [2].2) The rule based engine knows how to evaluate logical formulas andhow to parse AAA requests.3) The Generic AAA server has no knowledge whatsoever about theapplication specific services so the application specificinformation it forwards is opaque to it.de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 10]4) Communication types 1, 2, and 3 each present their own namingspace problems. Solving these problems is fundamental toforwarding AAA messages, locating application specific entities,and locating applicable rules in the rule repositories.5) A standard AAA protocol for use in communication type 1 should bea peer-to-peer protocol without imposing client and server roleson the communicating entities.6) A standard AAA protocol should allow information units formultiple different services belonging to multiple differentapplications in multiple different administrative domains to becombined in a single AAA protocol message.2.4. Suggestions for Future WorkIt is hoped that by using this generic model it will be feasible todesign a AAA protocol that is "future proof", in a sense, becausemuch of what we do not think about now can be encoded as application specific information and referenced by policy rules stored in apolicy repository. From this model, some generic requirements arise that will require some further study. For example, suppose a newuser is told that somewhere on a specific AAA server a certainauthorization can be obtained. The user will need a AAA protocolthat can:1) send a query to find out which authorizations can be obtained froma specific server,2) provide a mechanism for determining what components must be put in an AAA request for a specific authorization, and3) formulate and transmit the authorization request.Some areas where further work is particularly needed are inidentifying and designing the generic components of a AAA protocoland in determining the basis upon which component forwarding andpolicy retrieval decisions are made.In addition to these areas, there is a need to explore the management of rules in a multi-domain AAA environment because the developmentand future deployment of a generic multi-domain AAA infrastructure is largely dependent on its manageability. Multi-domain AAAenvironments housing many rules distributed over several AAA servers quickly become unmanageable if there is not some form of automatedrule creation and housekeeping. Organizations that allow theirservices to be governed by rules, based on some form of commercialcontract, require the contract to be implemented with the leastde Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 11]possible effort. This can, for example, be achieved in a scalablefashion if the individual user or user organization requesting aservice is able to establish the service itself. This kind ofinteraction requires policy rule establishment between AAA serversbelonging to multiple autonomous administrative domains.3. Layered AAA Protocol ModelIn the previous section, we proposed the idea of a generic AAA server with an interface to one or more Application Specific Modules (ASMs). The generic server would handle many common functions including theforwarding of AAA messages between servers in differentadministrative domains. We envision message transport, hop-by-hopsecurity, and message forwarding as clearly being functions of thegeneric server. The application specific modules would handle allapplication specific tasks such as communication with serviceequipment and access to special purpose databases. Between these two sets of functions is another set of functions that presumably couldtake place in either the generic server or an ASM or possibly by acollaboration of both. These functions include the evaluation ofauthorization rules against data that may reside in various placesincluding attributes from the authorization request itself. The more we can push these functions down into the generic server, the morepowerful the generic server can be and the simpler the ASMs can be.One way of organizing the different functions mentioned above wouldbe to assign them to a layered hierarchy. In fact, we have found the layer paradigm to be a useful one in understanding AAA functionality. This section explores the use of a layered hierarchy consisting ofthe following AAA layers as a way of organizing the AAA functions:Application Specific Service LayerPresentation Service LayerTransaction/Session Management Service LayerReliable/Secure Transport Service LayerNevertheless, the interface between the generic AAA server and theASMs proposed in the previous section may be more complex than asimple layered model would allow. Even the division of functionality proposed in this section goes beyond a strict understanding oflayering. Therefore this paper can probably best be understood asthe beginnings of a work to understand and organize the commonfunctionality required for a general purpose AAA infrastructurerather than as a mature reference model for the creation of AAAprotocols.de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 12]In our view of AAA services modeled as a hierarchy of service layers, there is a set of distributed processes at each service layer thatcooperate and are responsible for implementing that service layer’sfunctions. These processes communicate with each other using aprotocol specialized to carry out the functions and responsibilities assigned to their service layer. The protocol at service layer ncommunicates to its peers by depending on the services available toit from service layer n-1. The service layer n also has a protocolend point address space, through which the peer processes at service layer n can send messages to each other. Together, these AAA service layers can be assembled into an AAA protocol stack.The advantage of this approach is that there is not just onemonolithic "AAA protocol". Instead there is a suite of protocols,and each one is optimized to solve the problems found at its layer of the AAA protocol stack hierarchy.This approach realizes several key benefits:- The protocol used at any particular layer in the protocol stackcan be substituted for another functionally equivalent protocolwithout disrupting the services in adjacent layers.- Requirements in one layer may be met without impact on protocolsoperating in other layers. For example, local securityrequirements may dictate the substitution of stronger or weaker"reliable secure transport" layer security algorithms orprotocols. These can be introduced with no change or awareness of the substitution by the layers above the Reliable/Secure Transport layer.- The protocol used for a given layer is simpler because it isfocused on a specific narrow problem that is assigned to itsservice layer. In particular, it should be feasible to leverageexisting protocol designs for some aspects of this protocol stack (e.g. CORBA GIOP/CDR for the presentation layer).- A legacy AAA protocol message (e.g. a RADIUS message) can beencapsulated within the protocol message(s) of a lower layerprotocol, preserving the investment of a Service Provider or User Home Organization in their existing AAA infrastructure.- At each service layer, a suite of alternatives can be designed,and the service layer above it can choose which alternative makes sense for a given application. However, it should be a primarygoal of the AAA protocol standardization effort to specify onemandatory to implement protocol at the AAA Transaction/SessionManagement (AAA-TSM) service layer (see section 3.4).de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 13]3.1. Elements of a Layered ArchitectureAt each layer of a layered architecture, a number of elements need to be defined. These elements are discussed in the following sections.3.1.1. Service Layer Abstract Interface PrimitivesThe service layer n is assumed to present a program interface through which its adjacent service layer n+1 can access its services. Thetypes of abstract program service primitives and associatedparameters exchanged across the boundary between these service layers must be specified.3.1.2. Service Layer Peer End Point Name SpaceEach service layer is treated as a set of cooperating processesdistributed across multiple computing systems. The service layermust manage an end point name space that identifies these peerprocesses. The conventions by which a service layer assigns a unique end point name to each such peer process must be specified.3.1.3. Peer Registration, Discovery, and Location ResolutionAlong with defining an end point name space, a service layer mustalso specify how its peers:- announce their presence and availability,- discover one another when they first begin operation, and- detect loss of connectivity or service withdrawal.It is also necessary to specify what mechanisms, if any, exist toresolve a set of service layer specific search attributes into one or more peer end point names that match the search criteria.3.1.4. Trust Relationships Between Peer End PointsOnce an end point has established its initial contact with anotherpeer, it must decide what authentication policy to adapt. It cantrust whatever authentication was done on its behalf by a lowerservice layer or, through a pre-provisioning process, implicitlytrust the peer, or else go through an authentication process with its peer. The supported mechanisms for establishing a service layer’send point trust relationships must be specified.de Laat, et al. Experimental [Page 14]。