斯洛文尼亚后私有化时代的管理层持股与公司业绩[文献翻译]

斯洛文尼亚后私有化时代的管理层持股与公司业绩
[文献翻译]
Managerial Ownership and Corporate
Performance in Slovenian Post-Privatization Period
Abstract
While Slovenian post-privatization period has been characterized by a decline in the ownership of the non-managerial owners (employees), managers have been increasing their control. Moreover, given that the optimal ownership stake (as stated by the managers) in the year 2002 exceeded their actual share by 10.8 percentage points, we expect the managers to continue consolidating their ownership also in the future. The aim of our paper is to describe the main trends in the ownership of Slovenian corporations in the post-privatization period and to provide an answer to the basic economic question: what is the influence of the ongoing consolidation of managerial ownership on the performance of Slovenian firms. The empirical analysis testing this relationship is based on a panel of 182 Slovenian firms in the period 1995-99 and does not provide relevant evidence on positive effects of the increasing managerial control on the performance of Slovenian firms. If any, positive incentive effect is observed only in the firms with managers’ holdings exceeding 10-percent, only with regards to firm financial performance (but not total factor productivity) and only in firms that are not listed on the capital market. Furthermore, the negative effect of the current gap between the optimal and actual managerial ownership seems to prevail over any positive incentive effect arising out of managerial ownership.
Introduction
The increasing managerial ownership, apart from the reduction in the ownership of State-controlled funds and employees, represent one of the main features that characterize the ownership changes in the Slovenian post-privatization period. Most prominent are the increases in managerial stakes in non-listed firms, in which the transfer of ownership realizes at relatively low prices and mostly remain publicly undisclosed. Moreover, given that Slovenian managers still claim to be unsatisfied
with their current ownership stakes (at the end of 2002 the optimal ownership stake of an average Slovenian manager exceeded his actual ownership stake by 10.8 percentage points), we expect the observed trends in the evolution of the ownership and control of Slovenian corporations to continue in the same direction also the future. The accumulation of ownership in the hands of managers is further motivated by the relatively low transparency of the ownership transfers in Slovenia. In any case, it is not the aim of this paper to discuss the fairness of the observed redistribution of the privatized capital, neither to deal with the importance of such redistribution for the preservation of the domestic ownership，but rather to provide an answer to the basic economic question, namely to determine the impact of the observed increases in the managerial ownership on the performance of Slovenian firms.
We start in the second section with an overview of the managerial ownership as a corporate governance mechanism in the developed market economies. Third section provides further evidence on the role of the managerial and insider ownership in transition economies and especially in Slovenia (section 4). Fifth section states the main hypotheses on the influence of the managerial ownership on firm performance in Slovenia. The main empirical models underlying the analysis of the relation between managerial ownership and firm economic efficiency and financial performance are presented in the sixth section. The last section states the main empirical results and concludes.
Managerial ownership as a corporate governance mechanism
Blockholdings represent one of the main factors of distinction between the insider (Continental European) and outsider (Anglo-Saxon) systems of corporate governance. While the ownership and control structure of most of the corporations listed in the United Kingdom and in the United States still mostly reflect the typical Berle and Means corporation and the market for corporate control one of the main mechanisms alleviating the conflict of interests between the managers (agents) and owners (principal), large blockholders in the Continental Europe gain control over their agents through concentrating their ownership and voting rights. In any case, blockholders can be found in the outsider governance system as well. For example,
half of the firms listed on the New York and NASDAQ Stock Exchanges on average have three shareholders with at least 5 percent ownership blocks. However, on the contrary to the Continental Europe, institutional investors or board members hold most of these blocks. While the former usually stay passive and don’ t intervene in the firms’decision-making, managers normally hold between 20 and 40 percent of the voting rights and decisively participate in the governance and consequently influence the performance of the firms they own (Becht, 2001; Holderness and Sheehan, 2001). Similarly, for a sample of 4200 USA listed corporations Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) report 21 percent average managerial stakes; since 1935 the share of capital held by the managers increased by approximately 8 percentage points. Other empirical studies confirm that, upon the practice of board remunerations with shares and stock options, managerial ownership characterizes most of the USA corporations. Moreover, managerial blockholdings can be found in Europe as well; board members of the firms listed on the London Stock Exchange for example represent the second most important group of blockholders and, as such, on average hold 11 percent of the voting rights, among which about 65 percent is held by chief executives (Goergen and Reeneboog,2001).
The influence of managerial ownership on firms’value is related to the perspective that firms’value depends on the distribution of ownership between managers and other owners, first underlined by the Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Within this contest and the so-called ‘incentive argument’, giving managers corporate shares makes them behave like shareholders. In an extreme case (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), we would have a firm with a single owner-manager and the agency costs reduced to the relationship between the owner-manager and its creditors，that is no equity-related agency costs. The outstanding performance of the firms with 100% ownership has been recently confirmed by Mueller, E. and Spitz, A. (2002); they argue that the outstanding performance might not only be due to incentives but also due to other, psychological reasons. The theory of the entrepreneurship further promotes the idea that managers, which are also blockholders, better perceive new business opportunities; as such, this
theory somehow complements the incentive theory since it provides an explanation to the positive effect of the managerial ownership in the firms with relatively dispersed ownership structure. Bull (1989) for example finds that, due to this ‘entrepreneur effect’, firms perform better after management buy-outs; when they become owners, managers concentrate on the maximization of the cash flows (rather that on the mere maximization of the current profits as before). On the other hand, upon increasing their ownership and voting stakes, managers also gain the opportunity to expropriate some corporate funds on their own behalf and on the expense of the minority shareholders, namely to gain some ‘private benefits of control’. According to Barclay and Holderness (1991), private benefits of control are one of the main reasons for the existence of blockholders in the world. If the desire to obtain these benefits overrules the incentive effect, managerial ownership could actually reduce firms’value (‘the entrenchment effect’). Excessive managerial ownership can furthermore reduce the probability of a successful takeover and lead to ‘positional conflicts’(Stulz, 1988). Holderness and Sheehan (1988) report firms with majority managrial ownership pay higher compensation to their managers than firms where the majority of the shares are in the ownership of outside owners.
Upon the influence of the stated effects, empirical studies mostly evidence a non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and firms’performance. Mork, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that firm performance (measured with the Tobin Q) rises as the managerial ownership increases up to 5%, falls up to the 25% level and then slightly rises again.McConnell and Servaes for 1173 (1976) and 1093 (1986) firms listed on he NYSE and AMEX find a similar relation (even when controlling for the firms’ size, industry and outliers); the performance rises up to 37% of the shares, decreases between 37 and 50%, while afterwards the relation becomes less clear. Similarly, Hubbard and Palia (1999) also report a quadratic form of the relation between ownership and performance with the maximum at 58%, while for a sample of smaller firms in Germany, Mueller and Spitz (2002) report a positive effect of managerial ownership up to an 80 percent level.
Again, other authors (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) argue that there is no
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value since the ownership structure is an endogenous outcome of competitive selection in which various cost advantages and disadvantages are balanced to arrive at an equilibrium organization of t he firm. Moreover, managers’ ownership is not exogenous, but rather an endogenous variable determined by different variables reflecting the business environment, firm characteristics, differences in the managerial contracting environment and, most importantly, the firm performance itself (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Cho, 1987). Empirical studies based on a framework of simultaneous equations, which take into account the endogeneity of the managerial ownership (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Mueller and Spitz, 2002) find no strong support to the assumption that managerial ownership positively effects firm performance.
Managers and insider ownership in transition economies Privatization in the majority of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries creates a new group of owners, the inside owners. Insider distribution and employee buy-outs have in fact represented the main privatization method in 12 out of 22 CEE countries and the second most important privatization method in other 4 countries (EBRD, 1998). Slovenian Privatization Law (1992) introduces the internal distribution and buy out as one of the methods of ownership transformation; at the conclusion of privatization, inside owners (managers, employees, former employees and their relatives) in fact gained the majority stake in 802 firms (61.3 percent of firms in the process of ownership transformation) employing 45.7 percent of employees and (only) 22.9 percent of all the capital.
At any rate, insider ownership in Slovenia and in other transition countries (see Wright, 2002; Kalmi, 2001) has been declining, partly to the benefit of increased managerial ownership. According to Wright et al. (2002), the persistence of employee ownership is mainly determined by employees feeling like owners and consequently, by the ways through which insider ownership has been obtained; non-owners interests and hence lower efficiency of inside ownership are most evident in the firms where shares were distributed to the employees for free and in the firms with complete absence of any outside shareholder control. For Russian firms for example, Wright et
al. (2002) observe a non significant effect of inside ownership on firm restructuring and on the reduction of the excess employment, while the latter is being preserved in the firms with relatively higher managerial ownership; the reluctance of managers to dismiss employees in firms under their control is, according to the authors, the reflection of the managers’ effort to gain support from the employees and h ence preserve and further strengthen their privileged position (private benefits of control). Firms with higher managerial ownership are further characterized by lower managerial turnover and lower efficiency with respect to the firms with prevalent insider or outsider ownership. The inefficiency of managerial ownership in Russian firms, corruption, political motives and incentives to expropriate private benefits of control have been reported as related to managerial ownership also by other studies (e.g. Boycko et al., 1994 and 1996).
On the other hand, an alternative group of theoretical models sees the insider ownership as an obvious transitory phase, which takes into account political limitations and hence ensures the acceptability and success of privatizations on a long term (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). For the examples of Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia Walsh and Whelan (2001) show that political limitations, arising out of the firms’ position on the markets (that is the orientation towards Western or Eastern markets) mostly influenced the choice between the State, insider and outsider ownership in privatization. The authors claim that, rather than a political distortion leading to firm inefficiency, these decisions were guided by the search for publicly acceptable solutions, leading towards long-term success. On the other hand, the often cited study by Frydman et al. (1999) reports strong positive effects of privatization on firm performance only in the outsider-dominated firms, while no such effect is reported for the firms in the inside ownership. The study further finds that the impact of a given privatization method varies according to the chosen measure of firm performance and confirms the endogeneity of the firm ownership structure. The latter fact has been observed also in Slovenia; empirical research confirms that insiders have ended up owning better performing firms (Smith et al., 1997; Simoneti et al., 2003a).
Source:Marko Simoneti and Aleksandra Gregoric,2004. 〝Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance in Slovenian Post-Privatization Period〞. Finance Working Paper. April, pp.5-7.
译文：
斯洛文尼亚后私有化时代的治理层持股与公司业绩
摘要
斯洛文尼亚私营化后期差不多具有以下特点：非治理所有者〔雇员〕的所有权下降，治理者提高操纵力。

此外，考虑到2002年最正确所有权股份超过了他们实际配额10.8个百分点，我们期望治理者今后连续巩固他们的所有权。

这篇文章旨在描述在私有化后期斯洛文尼亚公司所有权的要紧趋势，为差不多经济问题提供答案：治理者所有权的连续巩固对斯洛文尼亚公司效益有什么阻碍？测试那个关系的体会分析是在1995-1999年时期的182个斯洛文尼亚公司进行，没有提供相关的证据证明治理操纵增加对斯洛文尼亚公司效益的积极阻碍。

假设要有的话，积极的鼓舞阻碍只产生在拥有治理者所持股份超过百分之十的公司，仅仅关于公司金融能力〔而不是全要素生产率〕，和在资本市场没有上市的公司。

此外，当前存在在最正确所有权和实际所有权之间缺口的负面阻碍看起来超过由治理所有权引起的任何积极鼓舞阻碍。

简介
治理层持股的增长除了国有控股资金和雇员所有权的减少，代表了斯洛文尼亚后私有化时期所有权改变要紧特点之一。

最显著的是非上市公司治理股份的增加，所有权转让以相当低价和非公布形式实现。

此外，斯洛文尼亚治理者仍旧对现行所有权分配不中意〔到2002年末，斯洛文尼亚治理者平均最正确所有权股份超过实际所有权股份10.8个百分点〕。

我们推测斯洛文尼亚公司所有权和控股的演变趋势将以同样的方向连续，同时在今后也会如此。

在斯洛文尼亚所有权转移的低透亮度将推动治理者手中所有权的积存。

不管如何，这篇文章的目的不是讨论调查。

私有资产的重新分配的公平性，既没有解决国有股份保留再分配的重要性，也没有提供差不多经济问题的答案，也确实是决定了治理层持股增长对斯
洛文尼亚公司业绩的阻碍。

我们在第二部分开始治理层持股的概述，作为发达市场经济中的公司治理机制。

第三部分提供了关于经济转型中治理层和内部人持股作用的进一步证据，专门在斯洛文尼亚〔第四部分〕。

第五部分阐述了在斯洛文尼亚治理层持股对公司业绩阻碍的要紧假设。

第六部分展现了分析治理层持股和公司经济效益、财务状况之间关系的要紧实证模型。

最后一部分阐述了要紧的实证结果和结论。

治理层持股作为公司治理机制
股份制代表内部〔欧洲大陆〕和外部〔盎格鲁撒克逊〕的公司治理制度区别的要紧因素之一。

尽管大部分在英国和美国上市的公司的所有权和操纵权结构仍旧要紧反映了典型的伯利和米恩斯公司，市场作为公司操纵权的要紧机制之一减轻了经理人〔代理人〕和所有者〔托付人〕之间的利益冲突，在欧洲大陆，大股东通过集中过他们的所有权和投票权获得对其代理者的操纵。

在任何情形下，在治理制度之外也能够发觉大股东。

例如，在纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克交易所上市的公司中有一半平均有三个股东至少持有5%的所有权份额。

然而，欧洲大陆的情形却是相反的，机构投资者或者董事会成员持有这些份额的大部分。

尽管前者通常停留在被动状态，不干预公司的决策，治理人员通常持有20%至40%的表决权，果断地参与治理，从而阻碍他们自己的公司的业绩〔拜克特，2001；霍尔德内斯和希恩，2001〕。

同样地，霍尔德内斯，库洛内尔和希恩〔1999〕关于美国的4200家样本上市公司报告了平均有21%的治理股份；自1935年以来，治理人员的资本占有率增加了约8个百分点。

其他的实证研究证实，通过股票和股票期权的董事会酬劳实践，高管持股成为美国大多数公司的特点。

此外，在欧洲也能够发觉股份制。

以伦敦证券交易所上市的公司为例，董事会成员代表了大股东的第二个最重要的群体，因此，平均持有11%的投票权，其中，约有65%被行政总裁持有〔乔耿和瑞纳伯格，2001〕。

治理层持股对企业价值的阻碍与远期企业价值有关，取决于治理者和其他所有者之间的所有权分配，首次由伯利和米恩斯(1932)，詹森和麦考林(1976〕提出。

在这篇名为〝鼓舞评论〞的文章中，给治理人员公司的股份使他们成为股东履行责任。

在一个特例中〔詹森和麦考林，1976〕，我们会有一个只有独立治理者的公司，代理成本简化为独立治理者与债权人之间的关系，这就不需要股权相关代理费用。

穆勒，E.和斯皮茨，A.〔2002〕最近已证实100%控股权的公司杰
出业绩；他们认为杰出的业绩可能不仅是由于鼓舞机制，或许还由于其它缘故，如心理缘故。

创业学的理论，进一步促进了治理人员也是大股东的思想，能使他们更好地感知新的商业机会；因此，本理论补充了某种鼓舞理论，因为它为在所有权相对分散的公司的治理层持股的积极成效结构提供了一个说明。

以伯尔〔1989〕为例说明，由于〝企业家效应〞，在治理层收购后公司会有更好的业绩；当他们成为所有者，治理者用心于现金流最大化〔而不是像往常一样仅仅是当前利润上的最大化〕。

另一方面，一旦增加他们的所有权和参加表决的股份，治理者也会代表他们自己，牺牲掉小股东而获得争取公司基金的机会，也确实是获得一些〝操纵权私有收益〞。

依照巴克莱和霍尔德内斯〔1991〕，操纵权私有利益是世界大股东存在的要紧理由之一。

假如期望获得这些利益没有产生鼓舞效益的期望，治理层持股可能实际上减少了企业的价值〔〝治理防备效益〞〕。

过多的治理所有权能够进一步减少成功收购的可能性，并导致〝定位冲突〞〔斯图尔兹，1988〕。

霍尔德内斯和希恩〔1988〕指出，拥有多数治理所有权的公司支付治理者更高的赔偿，在外部拥有者所有权中股东占大多数的公司情形那么相反。

由于上述效应的阻碍，实证研究的大多数证明了治理层持股与公司业绩之间的是一种非单调关系。

莫克，施莱佛和维什尼〔1988〕发觉，当治理层持股上升至5%时公司业绩会〔以托宾Q衡量〕增长，治理持股下降至25%的水平常公司业绩会有小幅增长。

麦康奈尔和瑟维斯在纽约证券交易所和美国证券交易所上市的1173家〔1976〕和1093家〔1986〕公司中发觉一个相似的关系〔即使操纵企业的规模，业务和其他〕；治理层持股上升到股份的37%，公司业绩跌幅介乎37%和50%之间，而这以后的关系就变得不太清清晰。

哈伯德和普利亚〔1999〕也报告了当治理层持股高达58%时持股和业绩之间的二次型关系。

而米勒和施皮茨〔2002〕在德国的小公司抽样调查中报告了治理层持股达到80%水平常的积极效应。

同样，其他作者〔例如，德姆塞茨和莱恩，1985〕认为，治理层持股与企业价值之间没有任何关系，因为所有权结构是内源性竞争选择的结果，其中不同成本的利弊平稳以达到公司均衡结构。

此外，治理者的所有权不是外生的，而是一个由反映商业环境，企业特点，治理缔约环境差异的不同变量决定的内生变量，最重要的是公司业绩本身〔德姆塞茨和莱恩，1985；町，1987〕。

实证研究以联立方程的框架为基础，其中考虑到了治理持股的内生性〔阿格拉瓦和科诺波尔，1996；哈伯德和怕利啊，1999；米勒和施皮茨，2002〕，治理层持股对公司业绩
有积极阻碍的假设并没有找到强有力的支持。

在转轨经济中的治理者和内部所有权
在欧洲中东部的多数国家，私有化制造了一个新的所有者组群，也确实是内部治理者。

在欧洲中东部22个国家中的12个中内部分配和雇员全面收购实际上差不多代表了要紧的私有化方式，在其他4个国家成为次重要的私有化方式〔欧洲复兴开发银，1998〕。

斯洛文尼亚私有法〔1992〕介绍了内部分配和全面收购作为所有权转型的方式之一；私有化的结果，内部所有者〔治理者，雇员，前雇员和他们的亲戚〕在802家公司〔在所有权转型的过程中百61.3%的公司〕实际上获得了大多是股份，雇佣45.7%的雇员和22.9%的资产。

不管如何，在斯洛文尼亚和其他转型中的国家〔见莱特, 2002；卡尔米, 2001〕内部所有者的所有权差不多下降，一定程度上有利于治理所有权的增加。

依照莱特以及其他人〔2002〕，雇员所有权的连续要紧由雇员的感受决定，因此，另外通过这种方式获得内部所有者的所有权；非所有者利益，因此内部所有者的所有权的低效率在股份免费分配给雇员的公司和缺乏外部股东操纵的公司最明显。

例如俄罗斯的公司，莱特以及其他人〔2002〕观看到在进行改组和裁员的公司内部所有权没有庞大成效，然而裁员在相对高水平治理所有权的公司被保留；治理者不愿在他们治理时解雇雇员。

依照作者，治理者努力从雇员那儿获得支持，保持和加强他们的特权地位〔私人利益的操纵〕。

相关于普遍内部所有者所有权和外部所有者所有权的公司，高度治理所有权的公司以低治理营业额和低效率为特点。

经报告，俄罗斯公司的治理所有权的无效率，腐败，政治动机和鼓舞没收私有操纵利益，与治理所有权有关，其他研究者也证实〔例如伯斯勾等，1994和1996〕。

另一方面，理论模型的可变组看作为内部所有者所有权作的一个明显的转型时期，考虑政治限制，因此确保私有化在长时期的可同意性与成功〔德瓦特里庞和罗兰, 1995〕。

例如保加利亚，匈牙利，斯洛伐克，斯洛文尼亚〔沃尔什和蕙兰，2001〕说明政治限制来自于市场上公司地位的上升〔定向为西部和东部市场〕对国家，内部所有者所有权和外部所有者所有权在私有化上的选择的要紧阻碍。

做着声称，并非政治扭曲导致公司的无效率，而是对公众可同意的法案研究引导了这些决策，引领走向长期成功。

另一方面，弗雷德曼等人〔1999〕经常引证的研究报道了私有化在公司效益上表达的积极阻碍，这只显现在外部所有者操纵的
公司，然而报道指出在内部所有权的公司没有那个阻碍。

那个研究进一步发觉了给定的私有化方式依照公司选定的措施而改变所产生的阻碍，确定公司所有权结构的内生性。

在斯洛文尼亚也观看到后者的事实；体会研究证实内部所有者差不多终止拥有更好执行力的公司〔史密斯等人1997；西蒙奈特等人，2003〕。

出处:[斯洛文尼亚]马科尔西蒙奈特和亚历山大格莱乔瑞克，«斯洛文尼亚后私有化时代的治理层持股与公司业绩»,财务工作文件.2004(4):5-7.。