HAZOP危险与可操作性讲课文档
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participate. • HAZOP is an excellent well-proven method for studying large
plant in a specific manner.
7
第7页，共28页。
Weakness of HAZOP
• HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a tendency for boredom for analysts.
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
PICA PICA PICA PICA PICA
PICA
• It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although the technique should be amenable to human error application.
• HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore omits many scenarios.
18. Volatile impurities in feed
Reagent release in RV1
Reagent release in RV1
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
5
第5页，共28页。
HAZOP Team
HAZOP studies are carried out using a `brainstorming' approach by a team, chaired and coordinated by a qualified person experienced in HAZOPs:
• HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive and flexible. • It gives good identification of cause and excellent identification of
critical deviations. • The use of keywords is effective and the whole group is able to
HAZOP Steps
• These guide words are applied to flow, temperature, pressure, liquid level and composition.
• Deviation of these variables from normal operation is considered
HAZOP危险与可操作性
第1页，共28页。
优选HAZOP危险与可操作性
第2页，共28页。
Loss Prevention
The major formalized techniques are:
– Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) – Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) – Failure mode-and-effect analysis (FMEA) – Safety indexes – Safety audit
Consider check valve at pump discharge
Consider high level alarm shutoff at feed
NO Same as less
第14页，共28页。
HAZOP Table - pressure
Pressure
Less 9. Break in nitrogen or flare line
Action
LIA
Estimate release quantity
LIA
Estimate release quantity
LIA
V1 protection
LIA
What external event
cause tank rupture
More 5. Too much truck unload
Overfill
Deviation Reagent release Reagent release Reagent release Reagent release
Consequences Potential fire Potential fire Potential fire Potential fire
Safe guard
Equipment & Valve FV Flow control valve T Tank P Pump PV Pressure control valve RV Relief valve V Valve
Instrument
L Level
T Temperature
P Pressure
F Flow
I
• Team Leader • Team Secretary • Process Engineer • Mechanical Engineer • Commissioning/Operations • Engineer/Manager • Instrument Engineer
第6页，共28页。
Strength of HAZOP
8
第8页，共28页。
NONE /No REVERSE MORE
LESS
As Well As
PART OF
Other than
Guide Words
e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure; valve closed
or jammed :
Opposite, e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump
• Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation • Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam, electricity, cooling water
• Provision for maintenance.
15. V7 closed
16. Overfill tank
Reagent release via RV1
Reagent release via RV1
Reagent release via RV1
Truck unload
17. Temperature of inlet higher than normal
第10页，共28页。
第11页，共28页。
HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM
TITLE :
LINE 1 :
DEVIATION
CAUSES
HAZOP Study Form
Sheet 1 of
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING PROVISIONS
ACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Reverse flow from process
Overfill
Reagent release via
LIA
RV1
Reagent release via
LIA
RV1
Does RV1 allow for liquid release?
Consider high level alarm shutoff
PICA PICA PICA
Consider independent PLA
Consider vacuum break valve
Consider PAL
Tank not designed for vacuum
More 13. PICA fails, closing PV1
14. PV1 fails closed
Hazard control systems and produces recommendations for any necessary modifications. The overall result is a reduction in both hazards and potential operational problems
10. Lose nitrogen
Reagent release Tank implode
11. PV2 fails closed
12. PICA fails, closing PV2
Tank implodes Tank implodes
Potential fire Reagent release Reagent release Reagent release
12
第12页，共28页。
Storage Tank
To atmosphere
Nitrogen H
RV-1
PV-2
PICA
To flare PV-1
V-8 V-7
V-5 From tank
trucks
V-1
Storage Tank
H
TIA
H
LIA
L
V-2 V-3
PI
FICA
L
To process
V-4 FV-1
failure
Quantitative increase, e.g., MORE FLOW, Temp,
Quantitative increase, e.g., LESS FLOW, Temp,
. Qualitative increase, e.g. impurity
Qualitative decrease, Change in composition high or low
Indicator
C Controller
A Alarm
第13页，共28页。
HAZOP Table - level
Level Less
Cause
1. Rupture discharge line
2. V3 open or broken
3. V1 open or broken
4. Tank rupture
concentration of mixturctor or other location ; feed change.
Nothing of the intent happen, completely different occurs
9
第9页，共28页。
第3页，共28页。
What is HAZOP?
• Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard and OPerating problems
• A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help provoke thoughts about the way deviations from the intended operating conditions can lead to hazardous situations or operability problems
• The consequences of these deviations on the process is then assessed.
• The measures needed to correct these consequences are then established
This process enables a comprehensive evaluation of
• HAZOP is basically for safety • Considerable engineering insight is involved
第4页，共28页。
HAZOP Study
HAZOP study are applied during :
• Normal operation
• Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading, reduced output, plant start-up and shut-down
plant in a specific manner.
7
第7页，共28页。
Weakness of HAZOP
• HAZOP is very time consuming and can be laborious with a tendency for boredom for analysts.
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
PICA PICA PICA PICA PICA
PICA
• It tends to be hardware-oriented and process-oriented, although the technique should be amenable to human error application.
• HAZOP does not identify all causes of deviations and therefore omits many scenarios.
18. Volatile impurities in feed
Reagent release in RV1
Reagent release in RV1
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
Tank rupture if RV1 fails
5
第5页，共28页。
HAZOP Team
HAZOP studies are carried out using a `brainstorming' approach by a team, chaired and coordinated by a qualified person experienced in HAZOPs:
• HAZOP is a systematic, reasonably comprehensive and flexible. • It gives good identification of cause and excellent identification of
critical deviations. • The use of keywords is effective and the whole group is able to
HAZOP Steps
• These guide words are applied to flow, temperature, pressure, liquid level and composition.
• Deviation of these variables from normal operation is considered
HAZOP危险与可操作性
第1页，共28页。
优选HAZOP危险与可操作性
第2页，共28页。
Loss Prevention
The major formalized techniques are:
– Hazards and Operability (HAZOP) – Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) – Failure mode-and-effect analysis (FMEA) – Safety indexes – Safety audit
Consider check valve at pump discharge
Consider high level alarm shutoff at feed
NO Same as less
第14页，共28页。
HAZOP Table - pressure
Pressure
Less 9. Break in nitrogen or flare line
Action
LIA
Estimate release quantity
LIA
Estimate release quantity
LIA
V1 protection
LIA
What external event
cause tank rupture
More 5. Too much truck unload
Overfill
Deviation Reagent release Reagent release Reagent release Reagent release
Consequences Potential fire Potential fire Potential fire Potential fire
Safe guard
Equipment & Valve FV Flow control valve T Tank P Pump PV Pressure control valve RV Relief valve V Valve
Instrument
L Level
T Temperature
P Pressure
F Flow
I
• Team Leader • Team Secretary • Process Engineer • Mechanical Engineer • Commissioning/Operations • Engineer/Manager • Instrument Engineer
第6页，共28页。
Strength of HAZOP
8
第8页，共28页。
NONE /No REVERSE MORE
LESS
As Well As
PART OF
Other than
Guide Words
e.g., NO FLOW caused by blockage; pump failure; valve closed
or jammed :
Opposite, e.g., REVERSE FLOW caused by pump
• Suitability of plant materials, equipment and instrumentation • Provision for failure of plant services, e. g . steam, electricity, cooling water
• Provision for maintenance.
15. V7 closed
16. Overfill tank
Reagent release via RV1
Reagent release via RV1
Reagent release via RV1
Truck unload
17. Temperature of inlet higher than normal
第10页，共28页。
第11页，共28页。
HAZOP STUDY REPORT FORM
TITLE :
LINE 1 :
DEVIATION
CAUSES
HAZOP Study Form
Sheet 1 of
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING PROVISIONS
ACTIONS, QUESTIONS OR RECOMMENDATIONS
6. Reverse flow from process
Overfill
Reagent release via
LIA
RV1
Reagent release via
LIA
RV1
Does RV1 allow for liquid release?
Consider high level alarm shutoff
PICA PICA PICA
Consider independent PLA
Consider vacuum break valve
Consider PAL
Tank not designed for vacuum
More 13. PICA fails, closing PV1
14. PV1 fails closed
Hazard control systems and produces recommendations for any necessary modifications. The overall result is a reduction in both hazards and potential operational problems
10. Lose nitrogen
Reagent release Tank implode
11. PV2 fails closed
12. PICA fails, closing PV2
Tank implodes Tank implodes
Potential fire Reagent release Reagent release Reagent release
12
第12页，共28页。
Storage Tank
To atmosphere
Nitrogen H
RV-1
PV-2
PICA
To flare PV-1
V-8 V-7
V-5 From tank
trucks
V-1
Storage Tank
H
TIA
H
LIA
L
V-2 V-3
PI
FICA
L
To process
V-4 FV-1
failure
Quantitative increase, e.g., MORE FLOW, Temp,
Quantitative increase, e.g., LESS FLOW, Temp,
. Qualitative increase, e.g. impurity
Qualitative decrease, Change in composition high or low
Indicator
C Controller
A Alarm
第13页，共28页。
HAZOP Table - level
Level Less
Cause
1. Rupture discharge line
2. V3 open or broken
3. V1 open or broken
4. Tank rupture
concentration of mixturctor or other location ; feed change.
Nothing of the intent happen, completely different occurs
9
第9页，共28页。
第3页，共28页。
What is HAZOP?
• Systematic technique to IDENTIFY potential HAZard and OPerating problems
• A qualitative technique based on “guide-words” to help provoke thoughts about the way deviations from the intended operating conditions can lead to hazardous situations or operability problems
• The consequences of these deviations on the process is then assessed.
• The measures needed to correct these consequences are then established
This process enables a comprehensive evaluation of
• HAZOP is basically for safety • Considerable engineering insight is involved
第4页，共28页。
HAZOP Study
HAZOP study are applied during :
• Normal operation
• Foreseeable changes in operation, e.g. upgrading, reduced output, plant start-up and shut-down