法学专业外文翻译

法学专业外文翻译

题目论环境犯罪的立法完善

专业法学

系别历史文化与法学系

A Graduated Punishment Approach to

Environmental Crimes

Susan F. Mandiberg and Michael Faure

I. INTRODUCTION

Why do we have environmental crimes? What social harms are we addressing, and what interests are we vindicating through use of the criminal sanction? The answer to these questions is not found in traditional criminal law principles. This is because environmental interests and values do not enjoy an absolute protection in the law. Unlike theft or homicide, for example, which may cause personal benefits only to the criminal, most polluting activities generate substantial societal benefits as well as environmental costs. Thus, environmental law in many countries is aimed largely at an administrative control of pollution, usually through licensing and permitting systems. Environmental criminal statutes largely function to help ensure that control.

The interweaving of administrative and criminal law has been pronounced from the beginning of modern environmental crimes in the mid-twentieth century. Then, as now, environmental criminal law focused on

punishing the lack of a permit or the violation of permit or other regulatory requirements and conditions. However, although this administrative dependence of environmental criminal law may have been the general starting point, European commentators have increasingly pointed to serious weaknesses in this approach. For one thing, if the role of the criminal law is restricted to punishing administrative disobedience, other types of pollution may go unpunished, thus limiting the ability of the criminal law to protect ecological values. In addition, unlike the situation with traditional crimes, administrators (not legislators) decide what is and is not criminal. This critique of the absolute administrative dependence of environmental criminal law has had its effects on European legislation and on international conventions.5 As a result, one can now increasingly notice the use of other models of environmental crimes, models that are less dependent on administrative law.

The goal of this paper is to examine and advocate for approaches to environmental crimes in addition to the punishment of disobedience to administrative rules and decisions. We acknowledge that an effective environmental criminal scheme must include administrative-disobedience crimes. For one thing, disobedience to at least some administrative decisions is a serious matter. For another, such offenses are easiest to prove6 and thus provide a mechanism for punishing some environmental malfeasance that cannot be otherwise addressed.7 Nevertheless, actual harm to the environment—and the threat of such

harm—is more serious than mere administrative disobedience. When

the government can prove that someone has both acted unlawfully and has caused or threatened such harm, an effective system should have crimes in place to address the situation. In addition, in circumstances of extreme environmental harm, it is important to include a crime that does not require the government to prove any disobedience to administrative rules and decisions. Finally, the authorized punishments for offenses on this continuum of environmental criminal statutes should be graduated according to the seriousness of the social harms at issue.

II. FOUR MODELS OF CRIMINALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL

HARM

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Criminal statutes address specific social harms. The act element of a criminal statute articulates the social harm at which the crime is directed. The mental-state element articulates the attitude a defendant must have had toward the social harm in order to be criminally culpable.13 While mental state is a crucial element in determining criminal liability, the analysis in this article focuses exclusively on the act element of environmental crimes.

Focusing on the act element in a 1995 article, Michael Faure and Marjolein Visser proposed and examined four models of environmental crimes. First is Abstract Endangerment, a model criminalizing disobedience to administrative rules and requirements perse . Second is

Concrete Endangerment Crimes with Administrative Predicates (“Concrete Endangerment”).

Concrete Endangerment crimes involve behavior that both violates regulatory law and poses a threat of harm to the environment; thus, on the surface, at least, these crimes target two social harms. Crimes in the third model, Serious Environmental Pollution, punish very serious environmental harm even if the activity at issue was not otherwise unlawful; these appear to be aimed at preventing or punishing only harm to the environment itself. The fourth model, Vague Statutes, covers statutes that establish a general duty of care. The present analysis explores the first three of these models in more detail, but it also expands upon the framework. This is because, upon further consideration, we are convinced that it is useful to add an additional model for crimes that involve both an administrative predicate and actual environmental harm. We label this model Concrete Harm and refer to it as Model IV. We do not address the Vague Statutes Model.

A. Model I: Abstract Endangerment

Offenses following the Abstract Endangerment Model do not punish environmental pollution. Instead, their role is to enforce prior administrative decisions, and so they punish the failure of a regulated entity to adhere to administrative dictates concerning environmental regulations. In essence, the Abstract Endangerment Model merely adds criminal law to the enforcement mechanisms available to ensure compliance with monitoring, paperwork, licensing, and other rules meant

to regulate pollution producing activities. The criminal provision normally contains a general statement that anyone who violates the provisions of the act or of the regulations, licenses, or permits issued to implement it will be punished with a specific sanction. Included in this group are statutes that make it a crime to engage in specified activities without a required license or operating permit. The criminal law typically applies in these kinds of cases as soon as the administrative provision has been violated, even if no actual harm or threat of harm to the environment occurs.

If the criminal provision requires or presumes environmental harm or the threat of such harm, the statute is not of the Abstract Endangerment variety.

Although Abstract Endangerment crimes focus on vindicating administrative values, punishing the administrative violation indirectly furthers ecological values in two ways. First, an entity that follows administrative rules is less likely to harm the environment. More to the point, if administrative rules are followed, the regulatory agency can monitor the entity’s operations to ensure that harm is less likely to occur.

Nevertheless, although environmental values are implicated by

Abstract Endangerment crimes, the overlap with such values is incomplete. For one thing, an entity in compliance with all administrative rules can still cause environmental “harm.” Consider that, for each parameter—

air, water, soil— the administrative agency will set a baseline of “acceptable”

contact between a pollutant and the environment. This baseline will reflect a compromise among such considerations as the pollutant’s

effect on the environment, society’s need for the polluting activity, and the existence (and cost) of technology that can mitigate the damage. Thus, compliance with the baseline does not mean a lack of environmental “harm.” However,

the disconnect between administrative and environmental values can

go the other way as well. That is, an entity that violates

administrative rules may not be causing environmental harm. Take, for example, an entity that transports hazardous waste without the required paperwork.

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This violation harms administrative norms first and foremost. But there is no emission, and thus no environmental harm: as regards environmental values, the crime is inchoate. Regardless of which aspect of the disconnect one views, the failure of Abstract Endangerment crimes to focus on an activity’s impact on the environment makes this model less than

completely effective in protecting ecological values.

B. Model II: Concrete Endangerment Crimes with Administrative Predicates

The second model is that of Concrete Endangerment Crimes with Administrative Predicates (“Concrete Endangerment”). As with the first model, the activity in question must take place in an unlawful way by engaging in the activity without a required permit or other

authorization or by violating conditions in a statute, regulation, or permit.51 However, the characteristic of unlawfulness may be integrated

in different ways. Some of the crimes in this model include as an element the fact of violating regulatory law. Others provide the defense that the activity was authorized.53 Even though the legal technique is different, the unlawfulness of the discharge remains a factor in criminality.

C. Model III: Concrete Harm Crimes with Administrative Predicates

The third model is Concrete Harm Crimes with Administrative

Predicates (“Concrete Harm”). As noted above, this model has b een added to Faure’s and Visser’s original approach. Statutes fitting this model are similar to Concrete Endangerment crimes in that they require proof that the actor violated an administrative rule. However, these crimes go beyond threats and require proof of actual environmental harm.

The identification of crimes fitting Model III can be tricky, as it depends upon the definition of “environmental harm.” As we will show

in Part 1 of this section, some statutory definitions focus on the environment directly, but others adopt an anthropocentric definition of “environmental harm.” These latter seem based on the premise that emissions or releases that threaten or harm human health, safety, or

other interests must of necessity also harm the environment. To the extent that this interpretation is accurate, the “knowing endangerment” provisions of the CWA and RCRA are examples of Model III crimes. In

addition, Europe provides a number of examples of Concrete Harm crimes.

Because we are working toward a graduated punishment approach to environmental crimes, it makes sense to us to differentiate Concrete Harm statutes from the crimes in Model II. Concrete Harm crimes require proof of actual harm, and so it is logical for such statutes to impose higher penalties than those requiring merely a threat of harm. When the government can prove both an administrative violation and actual environmental harm, the authorization and imposition of increased punishment would be expected to further the vindication of environmental values through increased deterrence and retribution.105 However, Concrete Harm statutes run into conceptual and proof problems that can frustrate these goals. For one thing, the concept of environmental “harm” is difficult to define. A second problem invol ves causation. We will explore these in turn.

1. Defining Environmental “Harm”

A traditional way of measuring environmental harm is to look through the lens of harm to human beings instead of focusing on the environment itself. One variation focuses on threats to human health or safety. A second variation is to focus on harm to private property. A final way to

look through the lens of harm to human beings is to measure financial costs other than damage to property itself. At first, it may not be clear that statutes such as these vindicate environmental values at all. After all, the threat or existence of environmental harm is not an element of the crime—these results are not even mentioned. And yet, these statutes are part of environmental protection schemes. Their placement within such schemes leads to the conclusion that harm to humans is used as a surrogate measure for harm to the environment: if the pollution is extreme enough to threaten human interests, the environment must of necessity also be threatened.

There are drawbacks to this surrogate approach. One obvious problem is that environmental damage might occur far from populated areas and thus remain outside the

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scope of statutes that define harm in human terms. However, there is another, more serious drawback. Consider, for instance, the act of draining a wetland and filling it with soil or rocks. Elimination of wetlands may endanger human health and safety in the long term, for example by changing hydrological patterns, contributing to flooding, and so forth. However, eliminating a wetland does not present the type of short-term danger that occurs, say, in a Bhopal-type situation where toxic chemicals are emitted into the ambient air. If harm to human health, safety, and property is viewed only in the short term, the actor who fills the wetland cannot be prosecuted for a Concrete Harm or

Serious Environmental Harm crime; even a Concrete Endangerment crime is off limits if the threat is viewed in the short term. But this result seems wrong. Environmental harm has, in fact, occurred, as eliminating the wetland certainly has dire short-term consequences for the flora and fauna in the ecosystem. If we are to use the criminal sanction to address this situation through anything other than Abstract Endangerment crimes, we will have to articulate what we mean by harm to the environment without using human values as a surrogate.

A legislature that wants to address a full spectrum of environmental harm must articulate a standard that reflects purely environmental values. The statute must require proof of something more than mere contact between a pollutant and the environment; otherwise, it would be functionally no different from the “presumed harm” variety of the Concrete

Endangerment Model. But what’s more? And how can a legislature define what may be

ineffable without violating the principle of legality?

Examples do exist of criminal statutes that attempt to go beyond an anthropocentric focus. Some speak in terms of environmental “harm” or “damage” or authorize differences in

sanctions based on degrees of “harm.”

Others require proof of “pollution.” Still others punish negative changes to the existing environment. While such provisions are laudable for their focus on environmental values, they leave it to either the

fact finder or appellate case law to make the notion of harm (or “damage,” “suitability,” “detriment,” or even “pollution”) more concrete. The same problem may exist even in provisions that appear at first glance to be quite clear. One German statute, for instance, punishes any actor in a protected natural area who unlawfully “mines or extracts mineral resources or other soil components; makes excavations or heaps, creates, alters or removes bodies of water; drains moors, swamps, marshes or other wetlands; clears a forest; [or] damages or removes plants of a specially protected species….”; however this provision adds that the activity must “thereby interfere not insubstantially” with the interest in question,

making the definition less useful than it might have been.

Open-ended definitions of environmental harm may be attractive to legislators, but they also create problems. One problem arises if the statute allows the fact finder to equate “harm” with any negative change in the quality of water, air, or soil no matter how minor. This is because any contact between a pollutant and the environment is likely to cause some minor negative change in the latter. Such an

interpretation of “harm” conflates Model II, involving a threat of “harm”and Model III, which requires actual “harm.” A coherent environmental criminal scheme should guide fact finders in distinguishing between these degrees of seriousness.

2. The Issue of Causation

Concrete harm crimes require the prosecution to prove that the defendant’s behavior

caused environmental harm, however that is defined. Serious Environmental Harm crimes—some of those in Model IV, to be discussed below—carry the same requirement.

Proving causation is not particularly difficult in the case of a single polluting event that results in clear damage. However, the requirement could present a challenge to prosecutors in other situations, reducing the number of cases in which these result-defined crimes are useful as tools of environmental protection.

Causation problems are likely to be common in prosecutions requiring proof of actual harm. This is because in many situations a defendant may be able to show that one or more

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additional actors independently emitted pollutants into the same water, soil, or air, either previously, simultaneously, or subsequently to the defendant’s own actions. Of course, similar

causation problems also arise in the context of traditional crimes with result elements, most notably in the prosecution of homicides. This being so, any jurisdiction with a developed criminal law will have worked out solutions to at least the most common of these problems, and there is likely to be informative scholarly material on any issues still outstanding. The main challenge for pollution crimes is to translate the

existing solutions from the vocabulary of homicide (or assault, or other more traditional result-defined crimes) to that of environmental harm.

It is valid to ask whether there is really a need to undertake the task of developing a body of causation law in the context of environmental crimes. Why not be content to use Abstract and Concrete Endangerment crimes, which do not require proof that the defendant caused a concrete result? The answer is related to our suggestion of a graduated punishment approach, discussed in Section III. Under such an approach, Concrete Harm crimes would be punished more severely than Abstract or Concrete Endangerment crimes (and Serious Environmental Harm crimes might carry even more severe punishment). Where proof of causation is difficult or impossible, conviction for the lower offense would have to suffice. In cases in which such proof could be made out, however, the more serious crime more accurately reflects the defendant’s behavior. Any scheme tha t lacks offenses requiring actual harm conflates the seriousness of different degrees of criminality.

This section has addressed a model in which the government must

prove both an administrative violation and actual harm to the environment. While there are challenges involved in proving harm and causation, more severe punishment might accompany convictions in which these challenges have been met. But what if the government can prove both harm and causation but no administrative violation? Should compliance with administrative requirements shield polluters from the

worst types of environmental damage? The next section addresses that issue.

D. Model IV: Serious Environmental Pollution: Eliminating the Administrative Link

This model, which we will call “Serious Environmental Pollution”

for ease of reference, aims to punish very serious pollution regardless of whether there is any underlying regulatory violation. In fact, statutes following this model impose criminal sanctions despite the defendant having obeyed license or permit conditions or other regulatory laws. To put it differently, in this model following the conditions of a license cannot constitute a defense: the “permit shield” does not apply. Thus, this model differs from Model III.

The administrative link is broken for a reason: crimes following

this model are based on the assumption that the environmental harm at issue is of a magnitude beyond that contemplated by the administrative rules with which the entity complied. Crimes following this model are relatively rare. However, as the examples to come show, they do exist. The existing crimes vary in the way they eliminate the link to administrative rules. Some eliminate the “permit shield.” Others eliminate the “unlawfulness” element from the crime’s definition. A third variation is the use of traditional crimes, as opposed to specifically environmental criminal provisions. The remainder of this section will describe those variations, followed by a general discussion of implications accompanying these distinctions.

FROM:Susan F. Mandiberg,Michael Faure.

A Graduated Punishment Approach to Environmental Crimes[J].

Columbia Journal of Environmental Law,Vol.34,2009.

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环境犯罪的分级惩罚模型构想

[美]苏珊?曼迪伯格 [比利时]迈克?福尔

一、导语

我们为什么要规范环境犯罪? 制裁犯罪时，我们应对的是哪些社会危害，又在维护什么利益? 在传统刑法中这些问题是无法找到答案的。这是因为环境利益和价值并未受到法律的绝对保护。与那些只可能给罪犯带来个人利益的罪行(比如盗窃或杀人)不同，大多数污染环境的活动既产生巨大的社会效益，也付出巨大的环境代价。因此，许多国家环境法的主要目标是对污染进行行政控制，通常以许可和审批制度实现，环境刑法的主要作用就是帮助实现这类控制。

自从20世纪中期现代环境犯罪出现后，行政法和刑法的交织就一直很明显。环境刑法主要对缺少许可违反许可或其他行政规制要求和条件的行为进行处罚，一直都依赖于行政法这种模式有严重缺陷: 首先，如果刑法的功能被限定在处罚行政性的违法行为，其他类型的污染就可能不会得到处罚，这就限制了刑法保护生态价值的功能。其次，与传统刑法的情形不同，行政官员(而非立法者)变成了决定罪与非罪的主体本文旨在考察各类环境犯罪模型，而不限于上述仅违反行政规定的模型。我们认识到，一个有效的环境刑法体系必须包含违反行政法的罪名。但是，对环境的实际损害以及损害威胁比单纯的行政违法更为严重。此外，在极其严重的环境损害情况下，很有必要纳入一项罪名，该罪无须公诉机关证明行为人有违反行政规则和行政裁决的行为。最后，对于这一环境刑法体系中的罪名对应的刑罚，应当根据其社会危害的严重程度，进行分级。

二、损害环境行为的四种归罪模式

刑法中的行为要件表明了犯罪指向的社会危害。而主观状态要件指的是被告人要承担刑事责任所必须具备的对此种社会危害的态度。虽然主观状态在决定刑事责任时是一个关键要件，但本文只针对环境犯罪的行为要件进行分析。

迈克?福尔和马乔兰?维萨在1995年的一篇文章( How to Punish Environmental

Pollution Some Reflections on Various Models of Criminalization of Environmental Harm)中以行为要件为重点，在欧洲一些做法的基础上提出并考察了四种环境犯罪模型，即“抽象致害”具体致害、“严重环境污染”与“模糊立法”本文作者抱着探究福尔和维萨的分析在今日是否仍具有可行性的目的，细致地考察了福尔和维萨的前三种模式，并从两方面修改了他们的框架: 首先，有必要增加一个模型，不妨称之为“具体损害”模式，作为模式四。其次，我们从他们二人的体系中删去了“模糊立法” 模式。在福尔和维萨那篇描述性的文章中纳入它是很重要的，因为至少两个欧洲法域采用了它。然而，这个模型不但受到了严重的批评，而且在我们看来，其并不能为一种综合性的环境犯罪模型提供额外价值。

(一)模型一: 抽象致害(Abstract Endangerment)

“抽象致害”模型对受法规约束却未能遵从环境行政命令的单位进行惩罚。从本质上来说，抽象致害模型只是将刑法算作一种强制机制，以保证检查、文书、许可及其他意在规范污染排放活动的规则得到遵守。这类刑法条文通常会规定: 任何违反刑法规定，或违反刑法的配套行政规定执照、许可证者，都应受到制裁。相反，取得并遵守许可证，以此证明其遵守行政规定的单位，有时能获得一种“许可证庇护”( perm it shield)，它能保护单位不受刑法或其他强制措施的制裁。

“抽象致害”模型体现在多数将无照或无证作业作为归罪目标的立法中。一旦立法中的行政性规定被违反，这类案件通常就能适用刑法，即使没有发生对环境的损害或损

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害威胁。

虽然“抽象致害”模型旨在维护行政性价值，对行政违法行为的惩罚却也在两方面间接地促进了环境价值。首先，获得了法定许可并遵守了文书、监督、检查等要求的单位显示出其遵守行政规则的意愿; 这样的单位也很可能遵从那些与防止环境损害联系更紧密的规则。其次，更为重要的是，如果行政规则得到遵守，行政机关就能监督这些单位的运转，以保证发生损害的可能性减小。

然而，虽然环境价值也通过“抽象致害”模型体现出来，但并不是与其完全一致。一方面，遵守了所有行政规则的单位仍然可能导致环境“损害”行政机关会为污染物与环境间的接触设定一个“可接受”的底线。这一底线往往反映出基于以下考虑作出的妥协: 如污染物对环境的影响社会对污染活动的需求以及用于减轻损害的技术是否存在( 及其成本多少) 因此，即使某个设施在底线以内排放污染物，它遵从其他行政规则也不等于它不产生任何环境损害相反，违反了行政规则的实体可能并不产生环境损害。以一个运输危险废物但不具备法定文书的单位为例，这种违规行为首先损害了行政规范，但如果没有排放，就没有环境损害。无论从哪方面来看，抽象致害模型都不注重活动对环境的影响。结果是，它们在保护这些价值时并非完全有效。

(二)模型二: 具体致害(Concrete Endangerment)

第二种模型“具体致害”与第一种模型的相同之处在于，其所涉及的活动必须以非法方式进行:或者无法定批准，或者违反法律、行政法规或许可证规定的条件。不过，该模型与第一种模型不同，因为这类罪名或者推定，或者要求证据证

明，该非法活动产生了对环境损害的威胁。这一要件使该模型比模型一更能维护环境价值所有的“具体致害”罪名都涉及对环境的损害威胁，不过这一模型仍分为两类。第一类可称为“推定致害”。这一类别的立法假设，一定量污染物与环境的非法接触必然导致至少一定程度的损害威胁，它将这种接触本身定为犯罪。第二类为“证实致害”这类立法规定，要有确切证据证明，除了非法排放这一单纯事实外，环境受到了威胁。

(三)模型三: 具体损害(Concrete Harm)

如上所述，这一模型增添进了福尔和维萨原先的模型。符合这一模型的立法与“具体致害”类犯罪立法类似，因为它们都要求证明行为人违反了行政规则。不过，这一模型超越了对“威胁” 这一要件的要求，它要求证明实际环境损害。

要确定哪些犯罪符合模型三是有难度的，因为这有赖于“环境损害”的定义。正如我们将指出的那样，一些立法直接针对环境进行定义，但另一些则对“环境损害”采用了以人类为中心的思路。后者似乎建立在这样的前提上: 威胁、损害人类健康、安全或其他利益的排放行为也必然损害环境。若这一理解是准确的，那么CWA和RCRA的“故意致害”条款就是模型三的范例。此外，欧洲也有一些“具体损害”型犯罪立法的例子当公诉机关能证明既有行政违法行为，又有实际环境损害时，便会预期制定、施加更重的刑罚，通过更大的威慑和报复以增进对环境价值的维护。不过，“具体损害”类立法面临概念上和证据上的问题，可能会使上述目标受阻。一个问题是环境“损害”的概念难以定义，另一个问题涉及因果关系。我们将逐一来探讨这些问题。

1(对环境“损害”进行定义

衡量环境损害的一种传统方式是透视人类遭受的损害，而非考察环境本身受到的影响。一种方法是考察人类健康。安全受到的威胁，另一种是关注私有财产遭受的损害，还有一种是衡量经济代价而非财产损害本身。乍看上去，可能看不出这类

立法能维护环境价值。毕竟，它们甚至提都没提到环境损害或其威胁。但它们仍然是环境保护体制的一部分。它们在这一体制中所处的位置使我们得出这样的结论:人类所受损害。这一衡量标准是“环境所受损害”的替代标准;若污染严重到足以威胁人类利益，环境也必然受到威胁。

这一替代标准有些缺陷。一个明显的问题是，环境损失可能发生于离人口聚集地较

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远的地方，因而超出了那些从人类角度定义“损害”的立法的调整范围。不过，还有一个更为严重的缺陷。例如，考虑一下排干湿地并向其填塞泥土或石块的行为。湿地的消减可能会对人类健康及安全造成长远危害，如改变水文模式、引起洪水泛滥。不过，清除湿地短期内并不会造成危害。若只从短期来看待人类健康。安全与财产所受的损害，那么填塞湿地的行为人不能以“具体损害”或“严重环境损害”类罪名遭到起诉，甚至“具体致害”类罪名也无法限制。但事实上发生了环境损害，因为清除湿地必定给当地生态系统中的动植物群落带来严重后果。

立法机关必须制定一个纯粹反映环境价值的标准。这种立法必须要求证明发生了比污染物接触环境更严重的事情，否则它在功能上便与“具体致害”中的“推定致害”没有差别。但还需要些什么? 立法机关又怎样才能在不违反合法性原则的情况下，定义那些难以用语言表达的东西?

确实存在一些试图摆脱以人类为中心的标准的例子。例如，CWA要求美国国家环境保护局 (EPA)列举出有毒污染物，并为每一种都制定排污限额; 污染物对水生生物的影响是这些规定采用的标准之一另一种以行政标准为中心的模式是在刑法中定义环境损害。例如，立法机关可以依据以下因素来调整刑事制裁的严厉程度: 涉案物质的毒性; 污染物与空气水的接触是仅有风险还是已成事实; 动植物群落或人类受到影响是仅有风险还是已成事实; 违法行为的严重性。不过，还有另一些更为

抽象的模式，它们确实更关注环境价值，这一点值得肯定，但它们仍留待事实调查人或上诉判例去具体确定“损害”的定义对“环境损害”的开放式定义也许会很吸引立法者，但它们也带来了问题。若立法允许事实调查人将“损害”等同于水、空气或土壤质量的任何负面变化(不管多么微小)，就会出现问题。这是因为污染物与环境的任何接触都有可能导致后者微小的负面变化。这就将关于损害威胁的模型二与关于实际损害的模型三混在了一起。

2(因果关系问题

“具体损害”型罪名要求公诉方证明被告人的行为导致了环境损害(无论怎样定义)。在单个污染事件立即导致明显损失的案件中，证明因果关系并非特别困难然而，在其他情况下，这一要求可能对公诉人构成挑战。

因果关系问题往往普遍存在于要求证明实际损害的起诉中。一个问题是，某个污染事件的影响可能在很多年里都不明显，以致妨碍起诉。另一个问题是，被告人也许可以证明，一个或多个其他行为人独立地将污染物排放入同一河流。土壤或空气，或者比被告人早，或者比被告人晚，或者与被告人同时。当然，类似的多因问题在传统结果犯的背景下也会出现，最明显的就是杀人罪不过，即便假设将杀人罪(或企图伤害罪，或是其他更传统的罪名)背景下的解决方案移植到环境犯罪中，许多情况下要证明因果关系也会很难。

是否有必要在环境犯罪的背景下制定因果关系法?为何不满足于使用无须证明被告人造成具体损害结果的“抽象致害”及“具体致害”模型?答案与我们所提议的分级惩罚模式有关。在这种模式下，“具体损害”型犯罪将受到比“抽象致害”或“具体致害”型犯罪严厉得多的刑罚(“严重环境损害”型犯罪所受刑罚甚至可能更为严厉)。在很难或不可能证明因果关系的情况下，只能认定较轻的罪名。但是，在可以证明因果关系的案件中，更重的罪名能更精确地反映被告人的行为。若