财务管理英文-小企业案例sb09
财务管理案例解析(英文版)(doc 29页)(正式版)
The case study ofSony corporation Members of our group:童士卫财务管理0201 012002019106唐虎财务管理0201 012002019105王小夏财务管理0201 012002019126季春蕾财务管理0202 012002019214张亚茹财务管理0201 012002019131任课老师: 夏新平完成时间: 2005年1月28日一.Background information of Sony1. Sony is founded on May 7, 1946 with the Headquarters Tokyo and Japan.2. Its corporate strategies are becoming a “knowledge-emergent enterprise in the broadband network era”.①Evidenced by recent improvements in network infrastructure,the broadband environment has begun to expand at a rapid pace.②In preparation for the arrival of the full-scale broadband era,Sony is pursuing its vision of creating a Ubiquitous “Value”Network (UVN).3. Its development aspect expanded from the first magnetic taperecorder in1950, to the first "QUALIA" products in 2003, during these years with representative products in each decade: 60th—first tape recorder and transistor70th--video cassette player and headphone stereo Walkman80th--CD player and camcorder90th--high-density disc and DVD playerIn the 21th century-- EL Display and optical disc二. The main operations of the corporation are:①②③④⑤⑥三. The main structure of its sales income1. First is the Electronics:The Electronics segment consists of the following categories: Audio, Video, Televisions, Information and Communications, Semiconductors, Components and Other.The graph shows the information about this: The income is decreasing2. Second is the Game:Game console and software business is conducted by Sony Computer Entertainment Inc.We can see the information from the graph: the income is also decreasing3. Third is the Music:Music business is conducted by Sony Music Entertainment Inc. (SMEI) and Sony Music Entertainment (Japan) Inc. (SMEJ).The graph is showing the basic information: The income is decreasing4. Fourth is the Picture:Motion pictures, television and other businesses are conducted by Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc. (SPE).And also the basic information is from the Graph: The income is increasing5. Fifth is the financial service:The Financial Services segment includes Sony Life Insurance Co. Ltd. Sony Assurance Inc., Sony Bank Inc. and Sony Finance International. Inc.As graph of right show the operating information: The income is increasing6. Sixth is other operating:The Other segment includes an Internet-related business, So-net, which is conducted by Sony Communication Network Corporation, an in-House information system services business, an IC card business and other businesses.With the information in the right graph: The income is increasingThe major Products of Sony①AudioHome audio, portable audio, car audio, and car navigation systems②VideoVideo cameras, digital still cameras, video decks, and DVD-Video players/recorders, and Digital-broadcasting receiving systems③TelevisionsCRT-based televisions, projection televisions, PDP televisions, LCD televisions, projector for computers and display for computers④Information and communicationsPC, printer system, portable information PC, broadcast and professional use audio/video/monitors and other professional-use equipment⑤SemiconductorsLCD, CCD and other semiconductors⑥Electronic componentsOptical pickups, batteries, audio/video/data recording media, and data recording systems四.Sales and Operating Revenue by Geographic Information1. The main market of course is the USA2. It is expand the Europe and other country market ,while decrease theUSA and Japan market ,While seems flat in total market .3. We can conclude Sony is facing a worldwide competition.4. It is changing its business from traditional area to the new area,especially the entertainment market.5. It also need find new market, for example the Asian market, and bringnew product with technology.This is the Segment Information of its sales income6. Developing trend AnalysisFactors which may affect Sony’s fi nancial performance include the following:①market conditions, including general economic conditions, levels ofconsumer spending, foreign exchange fluctuations②Sony’s ability to continue to implement personnel reduction and otherbusiness reorganization activities③Sony’s ability to implement its network strategy, and implementsuccessful sales and distribution strategies in the light of the Internet and other technological developments④Sony’s ability to devote sufficient resources to research anddevelopment⑤Sony’s ability to prioritize capital expenditures, and the success Sony’sjoint ventures and alliances.⑥Risks and uncertainties also include the impact of any future events withmaterial unforeseen impacts.7.The basic financial ratios of Sony from year 2002 to 2004From the above analysis and the table, we can see that:①The liquidity ratio and Acid-test ratio are in a year by year up-trend ,butcombining receivable turnover and inventory turnover, the increase is mainly because of the increase of accounts receivable and the decrease of current liability.②The company accounts receivable turnover and inventory turnover are inup-trend ,this shows that Sony do well in accounts receivable and inventory, so its debt-repay ability and profit abilities will be in advantages.③Its debt ratio is decreasing year by year, so we can see that Sony will have a low financial leverage, its financial environment will be good for its operating④Also, from analysis of the table, Sony’s consolidated sales, operating income, income before taxes, and net income are expected to decrease compared with the fiscal year ended March 31, 2004. While we assume that the yen for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2005 will strengthen against the U.S. dollar and will weaken against the euro⑤Sony’s investments are comprised of debt and equity securities accounted for under both the cost and equity method of accounting. If it has been determined that an investment has sustained an other-than-temporary decline in its value, the investment is written down to its fair value by a charge toearnings.五.Analysis of Sony’s abilitiesThe ability to meet the obligation1.①. From the current ratio, we see that the situation is not good for Sony corporation. Because the median current ratio for the industry is 2.1, but those of Sony is less than this obviously.②. But if we look at the quick ratio, we will find it’s very good: the industry median quick ratio is 1.1, and those of Sony are very near to it.This is because Sony has not as much inventories as other corporations. Then we can see that the ability of Sony to meet short-term obligations is good.For long-term obligations①. The debt ratios are lager than 50%, which indicates that Sony borrows alarge amount of money. Its evidenced by the increasing amount of interest payment.②. Its interest coverage ratios are obviously less than the median of that forthe industry which is 4.0.Then we can see that Sony’s ability to meet the long-term obligationsis not good.2. Assets management analysisFirst, the receivable turnovers are obviously less than the median of 8.1for the industry, which tells us that Sony’s receivables are considerably slower in turning over than is typical for the industry.Second, the inventory turnovers are higher than the median of 3.3 for the industry, which shows Sony has a good inventory management. This is because that inventory is a small portion of assetsThird, the total asset turnovers are obviously less than the median of 1.66 for the industry. So it is clear that Sony generates less sales revenue per dollar of asset investment than does the industry.So Sony’s assets management is not good enough3. Profitability analysis①Sony’s gross profit margin is above the median of 23.8 percent for theindustry, indicating that it is relatively more effective at producing and selling products above cost.②But comparing to the median ROI value of 7.8% and the median ROEvalue of 14.04%, those of Sony are very poor. And this means that it employs more assets and equity to generate a dollar of profit than does the typical firm in the industry.4. Accounts receivable securitization programIn the United States of America, Sony set up an accounts receivable securitization program whereby Sony can sell interests in up to $900 million of eligible trade accounts receivable, as defined. Through this program, Sony can securitize and sell a percentage of undivided interest in that pool of receivables to several multi-seller commercial paper conduits owned and operated by banks. Sony can sell receivables in which the agreed upon original due dates are no more than 90 days. after the invoice dates. The value assigned to undivided interests retained in securitized trade receivables is based on the relative fair values of the interest retained and sold in the securitization. Sony has assumed that the fair value of the retained interest is equivalent to its carrying value as the receivables are short-term in nature, high quality and have appropriate reserves for bad debt incidence. There was no sale of receivables for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2003. Losses from these transactions were insignificant.5. EPS attributable to common stock:Reconciliation of the differences between basic and diluted EPS for the years ended March 31, 2002, 2003 and 2004 is as follows:As discussed in Note 2, the earnings allocated to the subsidiary tracking stock are determined based on the subsidiary tracking stockholders’economic interest.The statutory retained earnings of SCN (the subsidiary tracking stock entity as discussed in Note 15) available for dividends to the shareholders were ¥209 million as of March 31, 2002, which decreased by ¥374 million during the year ended March 31, 2002 after the date of issuance. The accumulated losses of SCN were ¥779 million and ¥1,764 million ($17 million) as of March 31, 2003and 2004, respectively.For the year ended March 31, 2002, 75,201 thousand shares of potential common stock upon the conversion of convertible bonds were excluded from the computation of diluted EPS due to their anti-dilutive effect. 44,603 thousand shares of potential common stock upon the conversion of ¥250,000 million convertible bond issued dated December 18, 2003 were excluded from the computation of the number of weighted-average shares for diluted EPSPotential common stock upon the exercise of warrants and stock acquisition rights, which were excluded from the computation of diluted EPS since they have an exercise price in excess of the average market value of Sony’s common stock during the fiscal year, were 2,665 thousandshares, 4,141 thousand shares, and 6,796 thousand shares for the years ended March 31, 2002, 2003 and 2004, respectively.Warrants and stock acquisition rights of subsidiary tracking stock for the years ended March 31, 2002,2003 and 2004, which have a potentially dilutive effect by decreasing net income allocated to common stock, were excluded from the computation of diluted EPS since they did not have a dilutive effectStock options issued by affiliated companies accounted for under the equity method for the years endedMarch 31, 2002, 2003 and 2004, which have a potentially dilutive effect by decreasing net income allocated to common stock, were excluded from the computation of diluted EPS since such stock options did not have a dilutive effect.On October 1, 2002, Sony implemented a share exchange as a result of which Aiwa became a wholly-owned subsidiary. As a result of this share exchange, Sony issued 2,502 thousand shares. The shares were included in the computation of basic and diluted EPS.6. P/E ratioLet’s see the three year’s data of P/E RatioWe can see that the P/E ratios are large, and if we invest on it, we will need many years to get back our money. So it’s not good to invest on it. 六. Do Pont analysis1. Here I’d like to analysis the effects of all kinds of items, such as ‘Return oftotal assets’ and ‘Equity multiplier’, to ROE.Then, based on thecontributions of the items, we try to find ways to improve the ROE.At the first glance of the table, you will obverse there is so great difference between the ROE of 2002 and the other two year. ---So I decide to analysis that one for example the decrease of the ROE in year 2002 is primarily because of the decrease of other income, increase of costs and expenses and other expenses.Let us go to the “income statement” to see the details------From the ‘income statement’ behind,(1)we can see that the decrease of ‘other income’ is primarily because of the decreaseof ‘foreign exchange gain’ and decrease of ‘marketable security and security sales’.The news behind has shown that the foreign exchange rate has changed so much that the foreign exchange risk is so high ,and the economics in Japanese has fallen down.It is may be one of the reasons of the decrease of ‘foreign exchange gain’中新网香港1月23日消息:尽管亚洲国家对日元继续贬值表示关注,但美国财政部长奥尼尔与日本财务大臣盐川正十郎进行会谈后表态,外汇汇率应由市场决定。
财务管理财务分析中英文对照外文翻译文献
覆盖大量的可供选择的债券工具。由于债券市场的改革,出现了由企业发行的可供选择形式的债券工具。在第15章中,向你介绍了三种工具。我们然后致力于第一章提出的由企业负债发行的最具流动性的可供选择企业债券,企业首次发行的资产有价证券。
(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
附录A
财务管理和财务分析作为财务学科中应用工具。本书的写作目的在于交流基本的财务管理和财务分析。本书用于那些有能力的财务初学者了解财务决策和企业如何做出财务决策。
通过对本书的学习,你将了解我们是如何理解财务的。我们所说的财务决策作为公司所做决策的一部分,不是一个被分离出来的功能。财务决策的做出协调了企业会计部、市场部和生产部。
1财务管理与分析的介绍
财务是经济学原理的应用的概念,用于商业决策和问题的解决。财务被认为有三部分组成:财务管理,投资,和金融机构:
■财务管理有时被称为公司理财或者企业理财。财务的范围就企业单位的财务决策的重要性划分的。财务管理决策包括保持现金流平衡,延长信用,获得其他公司借款,银行的借款和发行股票和基金。
覆盖项目租赁和项目资金融资。我们提供深度的项目租赁的内容在本书的第27章,阐明项目租赁的利弊,你在本书中会频繁的看到和专业的项目资金融资。项目融资的增长十分重要不仅对企业而言,对为了追求发展基础设施的国家也十分的重要。在第28章,本书提供了便于理解项目融资的基本原理。
早期介绍衍生工具。衍生工具(期货、交换物、期权)在理财中发挥着重要作用。在第4章向你介绍这些工具。而衍生工具被看作是复杂的工具,通过介绍将让你明确它们的基础投资工具特征。在早期介绍的衍生工具时,你可以接受那些评估隐含期权带来的困难(第9章)那些在资本预算中隐含的期权(第14章),以及如何运用隐含期权来减少成本及负债(第15章)。
财务管理英文-小企业案例sb10
Page SB101
CAPITAL BUDGETING IN THE SMALL FIRM
he allocation of capital in small firms is as important as it is in large ones. In fact, given their lack of access to the capital markets, it is often more important in the small firm, because the funds necessary to correct a mistake may not be available. Also, large firms allocate capital to numerous projects, so a mistake on one can be offset by successes with others. Small firms do not have this luxury. In spite of the importance of capital expenditures to small business, studies of the way decisions are made generally suggest that many small firms use “back-of-the-envelope” analysis, or perhaps no analysis at all. For example, the Graham and Harvey study cited in the Chapter 10 box entitled “Techniques Firms Use to Evaluate Corporate Projects” points out that small firms are more likely to use simple rules such as payback, whereas large firms are more likely to rely on NPV and/or IRR. These findings confirm earlier results found by L. R. Runyon. Several years ago, Runyon studied 214 firms with net worths ranging from $500,000 to $1,000,000. He found that almost 70 percent relied upon payback or some other questionable criteria. Only 14 percent used a discounted cash flow analysis, and about 9 percent indicated that they used no formal analysis at all. Studies of larger firms, on the other hand, generally find that most analyze capital budgeting decisions using discounted cash flow techniques. We are left with a puzzle. Capital budgeting is clearly important to small firms, yet these firms do not use the tools that have been developed to improve these decisions. Why does this situation exist? One argument is that managers of small firms are simply not well trained; they are unsophisticated. This argument suggests that the managers would use the more sophisticated techniques if they understood them better. Another argument relates to the fact that management talent is a scarce resource in small firms. That is, even if the managers were exceptionally sophisticated, perhaps demands on them are such that they simply cannot take the time to use elaborate techniques to analyze proposed projects. In other words, small-business managers may be capable of doing careful discounted cash flow analysis, but it would be irrational for them to allocate the time required for such an analysis. A third argument relates to the cost of analyzing capital projects. To some extent, these costs are fixed; the costs of analysis may be larger for bigger projects, but not by much. To the extent that these costs are indeed fixed, it may not be economical to incur them if the project itself is relatively small. This argument suggests that small firms with small projects may in some cases be making the sensible decision when they rely on management’s “gut feeling.”
财务管理英文版166页PPT文档
Basket Wonders Statement of Earnings (in thousands) for Year Ending December 31, 2019a
Ⅰ.Primary Types of Financial Statements
Balance Sheet
A summary of a firm’s financial position on a given date that shows total assets = total liabilities + owners’ equity.
Examples of External Uses of Statement Analysis
Trade Creditors -- Focus on the liquidity of the firm. Bondholders -- Focus on the long-term cash flow of
Basket Wonders Balance Sheet (thousands) Dec. 31, 2019a
Cash and C.E.
$
a. How the firm stands on
90 Acct. Rec.c
a specific date.
394 Inventories
b. What BW owned.
16
Other Accrued Liab. d 100
Current Liab. e $ 500
Long-Term Debt f
530
Shareholders’ Equity
Com. Stock ($1 par) g
200
Add Pd in Capital g
财务管理制度(中英文对照)
财务管理制度(中英文对照)Financial Management System一、概述Overview财务管理制度是企业为了规范和管理财务活动而建立的一套制度和规范。
它的目的是确保企业的财务活动得到合理的安排和有效的控制,以最大程度地实现财务目标。
下面是本公司财务管理制度的具体内容。
The financial management system is a set of rules and regulations established by a company to regulate and manage financial activities. Its purpose is to ensure that financial activities are properly organized and effectively controlled to maximize financial goals. The following is the specific content of the financial management system in our company.二、财务核算Financial Accounting1. 制度概述1. System Overview本公司财务核算制度由财务部门负责执行。
所有财务活动必须按照国家法律法规和会计准则进行核算和报告。
The financial accounting system in our company is implemented by the finance department. All financial activities must comply with national laws and regulations as well as accounting standards for accounting and reporting.2. 财务报表2. Financial Statements按照国家相关规定和会计准则,财务部门将每年编制并及时发布财务报表,包括资产负债表、利润表和现金流量表等。
财务管理案例LAURENTIANBAKERIES英文版.doc
LAURENTIAN BAKERIESThe decision-maker must make a recommendation on a large expansion project. Discounted cash flow analysis is required.In late May, 1995, Danielle Knowles, vice-president of operations for Laurentian Bakeries Inc., was preparing a cap ital expenditure proposal to expand the company’s frozen pizza plant in Winnipeg Manitoba. If the opportunity to expand into the U.S. frozen pizza market was taken, the company would need extra capacity. A detailed analysis, including a net present value calculation, was required by the company’s Capital Allocation Policy for all capital expenditures in order to ensure that projects were both profitable and consistent with corporate strategies.COMPANY BACKGROUHDEstablished in 1984, Laurentian Bakeries Inc. (Laurentian) manufactured a variety of frozen baked food products at plants in Winnipeg (pizzas), Toronto (cakes) and Montreal (pies). While each plant operated as a profit center, they shared a common sales force located at the company’ head office in Montreal. Although the Toronto plant was responsible for over 40% of corporate revenues in fiscal 1994, and the other plants was accounted for about 30% each, all three divisions contributed equally to profits. The company enjoyed strong competitive positions in all three markets and it was the low cost producer in the pizza market. Income Statements and Balance Sheets for the 1993 to 1995 fiscal years are in Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively.Laurentian sold most of its products to large grocery chains, and in fact, supplying several Canadian chains with private label brand pizzas generated much of the sales growth. Other sales were made to institutional food services.The company’s success was, in part, the product of its management’s philosophies. The corners tone of Laurentian’s operations was its including a commitment to a business strategy promoting continuous improvement; for example all employees were empowered to think about and make suggestions for ways of reducing waste. As Danielle Knowles saw it: “Co ntinuous improvement is a way of life at Lauremtian.” Also, the company was known for its above –average consideration for the human resource and environmental impact of its business decisions. These philosophies drove all policy-making, including those policies governing capital allocation. Danielle KnowlesDanielle Knowles’s career, which spanned 13 years in the food industry, had included positions in other functional areas such as marketing and finance. She had received an undergraduate degree in mecha nical engineering from Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, and a master of business administration from the Western Business School.THE PIZZA INDUSTRYMajor segments in the pizza market were frozen pizza, deli-fresh chilled pizza, restaurant pizza and take-out pizza. Of these four, restaurant and take-out were the largest. While these segments consisted of thousands of small-owned establishments, a few large North American chains, which included Domino’s, Pizza Hut and Little Caesar’s, dominated.Although 12 firms manufactured frozen pizzas in Canada, the five largest firms, including Laurentian, accounted for 95% of production. McCain Foods was the market leader with 44% market share, while Laurentian had 21%. Per capita consumption of frozen products in Canada was one-third of the level in U.S. where retail prices were lower.ECONOMIC CONDITIONSThe North American economy had enjoyed strong growth since 1993, after having suffered a severe recession for the two previous years. Interest rates bottomed-out in mid-1994, after which the U.S. Federal Reserve slowly increased rates until early 1995 in an attempt to fight inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, North American inflation was expected to average 3% to 5%annually for the foreseeable future. The Ban k of Canada followed the U.S. Federal Reserve’s lead and increased interest rates, in part to protect the Canadian dollar’s value relative to the value of the U.S. dollar. The result was a North American growth rate of gross domestic product that was showing signs of slowing down.LAURRENTIAN’S PROJECT REVIEW PROCESSAll capital projects at Laurentian were subject to review based on the company’s Capital Allocation Policy. The latest policy, which had been developed in 1989 when the company began considering factors other than simply the calculated net present value for project evaluation, was strictly enforced and managers evaluated each year partially by their division’s return on investment. The purpose of the policy was to reinforce the management philosophies by achieving certain objectives: that all projects be consistent with business strategies, support continuous improvement, consider the human resource and environmental impact, and provide a sufficient return on investment.Prior to the approval of any capital allocation, each operating division was required to develop both a Strategic and an Operating Plan. The Strategic Plan had to identify and quantify either inefficiencies or lost opportunities and establish targets for their elimination, include a three-year plan of capital requirements, link capital spending to business strategies and continuous improvement effort, and achieve the company-wide hurdle rates.The first year of the Strategic Plan became the Annual Operating Plan. This was supported by a detailed list of proposed capital projects which became the basis for capital allocation. In addition to meeting all Strategic Plan criteria, the Operating Plan had to identify major continuous improvement initiatives and budget for the associated benefits, as well as develop a training plan identifying specific training objectives for the year.These criteria were used by head office to keep the behavior of divisional managers consistent with corporate objectives. For example, the requirement to develop a training plan as part of the operational plan forced managers to be efficient with employee training and to keep continuous improvement as the ultimate objective.All proposed projects were submitted on an Authorization for Expenditure (AFE) Form for review and approval (see Exhibit 3). The AFE had to present the project’s linkage to the business strategies. In addition, it had to include specific details of economics and engineering, involvement and empowerment, human resource, and the environment. This requirement ensured that projects had been carefully thought through by forcing managers to list the items purchased, the employeesinvolved in the project, the employees adversely affected by the project, and the effect of the project on the environment.Approval of a capital expenditure proposal was contingent on three requirements which are illustrated in Exhibit 4. The first of these requirements was the operating division’s demonstrated commitment to continuous improvement (C.I.), the criteria of which are described in Exhibit 5. The second requirement was that all projects of more than $300,000 be included in the Strategic Plan. The final requirement was that for projects greater than $1 million, the operating division had to achieve its profit target. However, if a project failed to meet any of these requirements, there was a mechanism through which emergency funds might be allocated subject to the corporate executive committee’s review and approval. If the project was less than $1 million and it m et all three requirements, only divisional review and approval was necessary. Otherwise, approval was needed from the executive committee.The proposed Winnipeg plant project was considered a class 2 project as the expenditures were meant to increase capacity for existing products or to establish a facility for new products. Capital projects could fall into one of three other classes: cost reduction (Class 1); equipment or facility replacement (Class 3); or other necessary expenditures for R&D, product improvements, quality control and concurrence with legal, government, health, safety or insurance requirements including pollution control (Class 4). A project spending audit was required for all expenditures; however, a savings audit was also needed if the project was considered either 1 or 2. Each class of project had a different hurdle rate reflecting different levels of risk. Class 1 projects were considered the most risky and had a hurdle rate of 20%. Class 2 and Class 3 projects had hurdle rates of 18% and 15%, respectively.Knowles was responsible for developing the Winnipeg division’s Capital Plan and completing all AFE forms.WINNIPEG PLANT’S EXPANSION OPTIONSLaurentian had manufactured frozen pizzas at the Toronto plant until 1992. However, after the company became the sole supplier of private-label frozen pizzas for a large grocery chain and was forced to secure additional capacity, it acquired the Winnipeg frozen pizza plant from a competitor.A program of regular maintenance and equipment replacement made the new plant the low cost producer in the industry, with an operating margin that averaged 15%.The plan, with its proven commitment to continuous improvement, had successfully met its profit objective for the past three years. After the shortage o f capacity had been identified as the plant’s largest source of lost opportunity, management was eager to rectify this problem as targeted for in the Strategic Plan. Because the facility had also included the proposed plant expansion in its Strategic Plan, it met all three requirements for consideration of approval for a capital project. Annual sales had matched plant capacity of 10.9 million frozen pizzas when Lauentian concluded that opportunities similar to those in Canada existed in the U.S. An opportunity surfaced whereby Laurentian could have an exclusive arrangement to supply a large U.S.-based grocery chain with its private-label-brand frozen pizzas beginning in April, 1996. As a result of this arrangement, frozen pizza sales would increase rapidly, adding 2.2 million units in fiscal 1996, another 1.8 million units in fiscal 1997, and then 1.3 million additional units to reach a total of 5.3 millionadditional units by fiscal 1998. However, the terms of the agreement would only provide Laurentian with guaranteed sales of half this amount. Knowles expected that there was a 50% chance that the grocery chain would order only the guaranteed amount. Laurentian sold frozen pizzas to its customers for $1.7 in 1995 and prices were expected to increase just enough to keep pace with inflation. Production costs were expected to increase at a similar rate.Laurentian had considered, but rejected, three other alternatives to increase its frozen pizza capacity. First, the acquisition of a competitor’s facility in Can ada had been rejected because the equipment would not satisfy the immediate capacity needs nor achieve the cost reduction possible with expansion of the Winnipeg plant. Second, the acquisition of a competitor in the U.S. had been rejected because the available plant would require a capital infusion double that required in Winnipeg. As well, there were risks that the product quality would be inferior. Last, the expansion of the Toronto cake plant had been rejected as it would require a capital outlay similar to that in the second alternative. The only remaining alternative was the expansion of the Winnipeg plant. By keeping the frozen pizza in Winnipeg, Laurentian could better exploit economies of scale and assure consistently high product quality.The ProposalThe expansion proposal, which would require six months to complete, would recommend four main expenditures: expanding the existing building in Winnipeg by 60% would cost $1.3 million; adding a spiral freezer, $1.6 million; installing a new high speed pizza processing line, $1.3 million; and acquiring additional warehouse space, $600,000. Including $400,000 for contingency needs, the total cash outlay for the project would be $5.2 million. The equipment was expected to be useful for 10 years, at which point its salvage value would be zero.The land on which the Winnipeg plant was built valued at 250,000 and no additional land would be necessary for the project. While the expansion would not require Laurentian to increase the size of the plant’s administra tive staff, Knowles wondered what portion, if any, of the $223,000 in fixed salaries should be included when evaluating the project. Likewise, she estimated that it cost Laurentian approximately $40,000 in sales staff time and expanses to secure the U.S. contract that had created the need for extra capacity. Last, net working capital needs would increase with additional sales. Working capital was the sum of inventory and accounts receivable less accounts payable, all of which were a function of sales. Knowles estimated, however, that the new high-speed line would allow the company to cut two days from average inventory age.Added to the benefit derived from increased sales, the project would reduce production costs in two ways. First, the new high-speed line would reduce plant-wide unit cost by $0.009, though only 70% of this increased efficiency would be realized in the first year. There was an equal chance, however, that only 50% of these savings could actually be achieved. Second, “other” savings totaling $138,000 per year would also result from the new line and would increase each year at the rate of inflation.Each year, a capital cost allowance (CCA), akin to depreciation, would be deducted from operating income as a result of the capital expenditure. This deduction, in turn, would reduce the amount of corporate tax paid by Laurentian. In the event that the company did not have positive earnings in any year, the CCA deduction could be transferred to a subsequent year. However, corporate earnings were projected to be positive for the foreseeable future. Knowles compiled the eligibleCCA deduction for 10 years (see Exhibit 6). For the purpose of her analysis, she assumed that all cash flows would occur at the appropriate year-end.Three areas of environmental concern had to be addressed in the proposal to ensure both conformity with Laurentian policy and compliance with regulatory bodies and local by-laws. First, design and installation of sanitary drain systems, including re-routing of existing drains, would improve sanitation practices of effluent/wastewater discharge. Second, the provision of water-flow recording meters would quantify water volumes consumed in manufacturing and help to reduce its usage. Last, the refrigeration plant would use ammonia as the coolant as opposed to chloro-fluro-carbons. These initiatives were considered sufficient to satisfy the criteria of the Capital Allocation Policy.THE DECISIONKnowles believed that the project was consistent with the company’s business strategy since it would ensure that the Winnipeg plant continued to be the low cost producer of frozen pizzas in Canada. However, she knew that her analysis must consider all factors, including the project’s net present value. The plant’s capital allocation review committee would be following the procedures set out in the company’s Capital Allocation Policy as the basis for reviewing her recommendation. Knowles considered the implications if the project did not provide sufficient benefit to cover the Class 2 hurdle rate of 18%. Entering the U.S. grocery chains market was a tremendous opportunity and she considered what other business could result from Laurentian’s increased presence. She also wondered if the hurdle rate for a project that was meant to increase capacity for an existing product should be similar to the company’s cost of capital, since the risk of the project should be similar to the overall risk of the firm. She knew that Laurentian’s board of directors established a target capital structure that included 40% debt. She also reviewed the current Canadian market bond yields, which are listed in Exhibit 7. The spread between Government of Canada bonds and those of corporations with bond ratings of BBB, such as Laurentian, had recently been about 200 basis points (2%) for most long-term maturities. Finally, she discovered that Laurentian’s stock beta was 0.85, and that, historically, the Toronto stock market returns outperformed long-term government bonds by about 6% annually.EXHIBIT 1INCOME STATEMENTFor The Year Ending March 31($ millions)1993 1994 1995Revenues $91.2 95.8 101.5Cost of goods sold 27.4 28.7 30.5Gross income 63.8 67.1 71.0Operating expenses 52.0 55.0 58.4Operating income 11.8 12.1 12.6Interest 0.9 1.0 1.6Income before tax 10.9 11.1 11.0Income tax 4.2 4.3 4.2Net income 6.7 6.8 6.8EXHIBIT 2BALANCE SHEETFor The Year Ending March 31($ millions)1993 1994 1995Assets:Cash $6.2 9.4 13.1Accounts Receivable 11.3 11.8 12.5Inventory 6.2 6.6 7.0Prepaid expenses 0.3 0.6 2.2Other current 0.9 0.9Total current 24.0 29.3 35.7Fixed assets: 35.3 36.1 36.4 TOTAL 59.3 65.4 72.1 Liabilities and Shareholder’s Equity:Accounts payable 7.5 7.9 8.3Other payable 0.7 1.3 2.2Total current 8.2 9.2 10.5 Long-term debt 16.8 20.4 24.3 Shareholder’s equity 34.3 35.8 37.3 TOTAL 59.3 65.4 72.1AUTHORIZATION FOR EXPENDITURE FORMCAPITAL EXPENDITURE APPROVAL PROCESSBUSINESS REVIEW CRITERIAUsed to Assess Divisional Commitment to Continuous ImprovementSafety● Lost time accidents per 200,000 employee hours workedProduct Quality● Number of customer complaintsFinancial● Return of investmentLost Sales● Market share % - where data availableManufacturing Effectiveness● People cost (total compensation $ including fringe) as a percentage of new sales● Plant scrap (kg) as a percentage of total production (kg)Managerial Effectiveness/Employee Empowerment● Employee survey● Training provided vs. Training planned● Number of employee grievancesSanitation● Sanitation audit ratingsOther Continuous Improvement Measurements● Number of continuous improvement projects directed against identified piles of waste/lostopportunity completed and in-progressEXHIBIT 6ELIGIBLE CCA DEDUCTIONYear Deduction1996$434,0001997$768,0001998$593,0001999$461,0002000$361,0002001$286,0002002$229,0002003$185,0002004$152,0002005$1731,000EXHIBIT 7MARKET INTEREST RATESON MAY 18,19961-Year Government of Canada Bond 7.37% 5-Year Government of Canada Bond 7.66% 10-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.06% 20-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.30% 30-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.35%。
财务管理案例英语
Introduction英[ɔn'tεəriəu]是加拿大最大的单一型专业化退休金体系the Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan,is called “OTPP” for short , It has developed rapidly in recent years. No pain without pain,they must have tried their best to get the good grade. There are the ways of its success:The first one:the clear positioning and it distinguish itself from others It has its groups to invest ,low cost and benefit the humans Meanwhile ,it has come into the market beyond pension 1、定位清晰做出特色The second one: long-term investment and Scientific configuration英[kən,fɪgə'reɪʃ(ə)n; -gjʊ-]配置;结构;长期投资科学配置The third one: It attches to the importance of innovation and reformation 3、注重改革和创新遍接受的,可用于国际间债权债务结算的各种支付手段。
它必须具备三个特点:可支付性(必须以外国货币表示的资产)、可获得性(必须是在国外能够得到补偿的债权)和可换性(必须是可以自由兑换为其他支付手段的外币资产)。
Narrowly speaking,it referred to one country’s all assets which can be expressed by currency. It is widely accepted and can be used for Bond debt settlement nationally. It usually has three features:payable ,available and replaceableAbout Canadian foreign exchange有外汇管制。
中小企业财务管理 外文文献翻译
文献出处:Kilonzo JM, Ouma D. Financial Management Practices on growth of Small and Medium Enterprises: A case of Manufacturing Enterprises in Nairobi County, Kenya[J]. IOSR Journal of Business and Management, 2015, 17(8): 65-71第一部分为译文,第二部分为原文。
默认格式:中文五号宋体,英文五号Times New Roma,行间距1.5倍。
中小企业财务管理实践:肯尼亚内罗毕县制造业企业案例摘要:中小企业对国内经济社会发展做出了重要贡献。
本研究的目的是确定中小企业采用的财务管理做法及其对增长的影响程度。
本研究的具体目标是确定营运资金管理实践,投资实践,财务计划实践,会计信息系统,财务报告和分析实践对中小企业增长的影响。
内罗毕县记录显示,该县有五万多家小微企业。
肯尼亚制造业协会1999年的基线研究报告(KAM 2009)在肯尼亚记录了745家活跃的制造业中小企业,在内罗毕县有410人。
使用向中小型企业的业主/经理管理的问卷调查,从41家中小企业收集了主要数据。
使用简单的随机抽样技术来选择中小企业。
使用描述性和推论统计分析数据。
研究确定,75%的中小企业出售其产品现金,82%保持现金限额,92%有手动库存登记,35%的企业投资长期资产,45%的企业用内部资金进行商业融资。
55%没有正式的会计制度,74%的会计师没有合格的会计师准备财务报表。
在财务管理实践中,工业化部应引入中小企业能力建设方案。
关键词:中小企业(SME),财务管理实务,内罗毕县中小企业为任何国家的经济和社会发展做出重要贡献。
据国际劳工组织(2008年),日本约有80%的劳动力和德国的50%的工人在中小企业工作。
对于发展中国家,中小企业对乌干达(20%),肯尼亚(19.5%)和尼日利亚(24.5%)的国内生产总值做出了重大贡献。
财务管理英语案例研究
财务管理英语案例研究在当今全球化的商业环境中,财务管理的重要性日益凸显。
掌握财务管理的知识和技能,对于企业的生存和发展至关重要。
而英语作为国际商务交流的通用语言,在财务管理领域也有着广泛的应用。
本文将通过几个实际案例,探讨财务管理英语在企业决策、资金管理、投资分析等方面的应用。
一、案例一:跨国企业的资金筹集某跨国公司_____计划在全球范围内扩大生产规模,需要筹集大量资金。
公司的财务团队面临着多种选择,包括发行债券、增发股票、银行贷款等。
在进行决策时,他们需要对不同融资方式的成本、风险、对公司控制权的影响等因素进行深入分析。
首先,财务团队用英语与国际投资银行进行沟通,了解债券市场的行情和利率走势。
他们通过专业的财务英语术语,如“coupon rate”(票面利率)、“yield to maturity”(到期收益率)等,准确地评估债券融资的成本和潜在收益。
同时,对于增发股票,他们与证券交易所和投资者进行交流,用英语阐述公司的发展战略和财务状况,以吸引潜在的股东。
在这个过程中,诸如“earnings per share”(每股收益)、“priceearnings ratio”(市盈率)等词汇频繁出现。
在考虑银行贷款时,财务团队与多家国际银行进行谈判,用英语讨论贷款额度、利率、还款期限等关键条款。
“interest rate spread”(利率差)、“loan covenant”(贷款契约)等术语在谈判中起着重要的作用。
通过对各种融资方式的全面分析和比较,公司最终选择了最适合自身情况的融资方案,成功筹集到所需资金,为企业的发展提供了有力的支持。
二、案例二:投资项目的评估一家科技企业_____正在考虑投资一个新的研发项目。
该项目预计需要大量的前期投入,但未来可能带来丰厚的回报。
财务部门需要对这个投资项目进行评估,以确定其可行性。
财务人员首先用英语收集了相关的市场数据和行业报告,了解该领域的发展趋势和竞争态势。
财务管理英文-小企业案例sb21
I
A third problem is that as the firm grows, the family may be unable to provide the financial resources necessary to support that growth. If external funds are needed, they will generally be more difficult to obtain in a private, closely held business. Perhaps an even more serious problem is that, since the family’s entire wealth is tied up in a single business, the family holds an undiversified portfolio. As was explained in Chapter 5, diversification reduces a portfolio’s risk. Thus, the goals of maintaining control and reducing risk through diversification are in conflict. Again, a public offering would allow family members to sell some of their stock and to diversify their own personal portfolios. Both the diversification motive and family members’ liquidity needs often indicate that a business’s ownership structure should be changed. There is, however, another alternative besides going public — that of selling the business outright to another company or of merging it into a larger firm. This alternative is often overlooked by owners of closely held businesses, because it frequently means an immediate and complete loss of control. Selling out deserves special consideration, however, because it can often produce far greater value than can be achieved in a public offering. With the sale of the business, the family gives up control, yet that control is what makes the firm more valuable in a merger than in a public offering. Merger premiums for public companies often range from 50 to 70 percent over the market price. Therefore, a company worth $10 million in the public market might be acquired for a price of $15 to $17 million in a merger. In contrast, initial public offerings (IPOs) are normally made at below-market prices. Furthermore, if the owners sell a significant amount of their stock in the IPO, the market will take that as a signal that the company’s future is dim, and the price will be depressed even more. What are the disadvantages to a merger? An obvious disadvantage is the loss of control. Also, family members risk losing employment in the firm. In such a case, however, they will have additional wealth to sustain them while they seek other opportunities. The owners of a closely held family business must consider the costs and benefits of continuing to be closely held versus either going public or being acquired in a merger. Of the three alternatives, the merger alternative is likely to provide the greatest benefits to the family members.
财务管理会计案例培训课件英文版
Product-Level Activity
Organizationsustaining Activity
Customer-Level Activity
Identifying Activity to Include
Activity Cost Pool is a “bucket” in
Factory equipment depreciation
$300,000
Percent consumed by customer orders 20%
$ 60,000
Assigning Costs to Activity Cost Pools
Using the total costs and percentage consumption of overhead, costs are assigned to activity pools.
and then to products.
Departmental Overhead Rates
Indirect
Stage One:
Labor
Costs assigned
to pools
Cost pools
Department 1
Indirect Materials
Department 2
Other Overhead
Activity Based Costing
Departmental Overhead Rates
Plantwide Overhead
Rate
Overhead Allocation
Plantwide Overhead Rate
财务管理英文版(PPT 60页)
13-3
Proposed Project Data
Julie Miller is evaluating a new project for her firm, Basket Wonders (BW).
She has determined that the after-tax cash flows for the project will be
$40,000 = $10,000(.909) + $12,000(.826) + $15,000(.751) + $10,000(.683) + $ 7,000(.621)
$40,000 = $9,090 + $9,912 + $11,265 + $6,830 + $4,347
= $41,444 [Rate is too low!!]
$1,444 $4,603
X
$1,444
.05 = $4,603
13-15
IRR Solution (Interpolate)
X .05
.10 $41,444 IRR $40,000 .15 $36,841
$1,444 $4,603
X
$1,444
.05 = $4,603
13-16
IRR Solution (Interpolate)
13-13
IRR Solution (Try 15%)
$40,000 = $10,000(PVIF15%,1) + $12,000(PVIF15%,2) + $15,000(PVIF15%,3) + $10,000(PVIF15%,4) + $ 7,000(PVIF15%,5)
财务管理案例(LAURENTIANBAKERIES)(英文版)
LAURENTIAN BAKERIESThe decision-maker must make a recommendation on a large expansion project. Discounted cash flow analysis is required.In late May, 1995, Danielle Knowles, vice-president of operations for Laurentian Bakeries Inc., was preparing a capital expenditure proposal to expand the company’s frozen pizza plant in Winnipeg Manitoba. If the opportunity to expand into the U.S. frozen pizza market was taken, the company would need extra capacity. A detailed analysis, including a net present value calculation, was required by the company’s Capital Allocation Policy for all capital expenditures in order to ensure that projects were both profitable and consistent with corporate strategies.COMPANY BACKGROUHDEstablished in 1984, Laurentian Bakeries Inc. (Laurentian) manufactured a variety of frozen baked food products at plants in Winnipeg (pizzas), Toronto (cakes) and Montreal (pies). While each plant operated as a profit center, they shared a common sales force located at the company’ head office in Montreal. Although the Toronto plant was responsible for over 40% of corporate revenues in fiscal 1994, and the other plants was accounted for about 30% each, all three divisions contributed equally to profits. The company enjoyed strong competitive positions in all three markets and it was the low cost producer in the pizza market. Income Statements and Balance Sheets for the 1993 to 1995 fiscal years are in Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively.Laurentian sold most of its products to large grocery chains, and in fact, supplying several Canadian chains with private label brand pizzas generated much of the sales growth. Other sales were made to institutional food services.The company’s success was, in part, the product of its management’s philosophies. The corn erstone of Laurentian’s operations was its including a commitment to a business strategy promoting continuous improvement; for example all employees were empowered to think about and make suggestions for ways of reducing waste. As Danielle Knowles saw it: “Continuous improvement is a way of life at Lauremtian.” Also, the company was known for its above –average consideration for the human resource and environmental impact of its business decisions. These philosophies drove all policy-making, including those policies governing capital allocation. Danielle KnowlesDanielle Knowles’s career, which spanned 13 years in the food industry, had included positions in other functional areas such as marketing and finance. She had received an undergraduate degree in me chanical engineering from Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, and a master of business administration from the Western Business School.THE PIZZA INDUSTRYMajor segments in the pizza market were frozen pizza, deli-fresh chilled pizza, restaurant pizza and take-out pizza. Of these four, restaurant and take-out were the largest. While these segments consisted of thousands of small-owned establishments, a few large North American chains, which included Domino’s, Pizza Hut and Little Caesar’s, dominated.Although 12 firms manufactured frozen pizzas in Canada, the five largest firms, including Laurentian, accounted for 95% of production. McCain Foods was the market leader with 44% market share, while Laurentian had 21%. Per capita consumption of frozen products in Canada was one-third of the level in U.S. where retail prices were lower.ECONOMIC CONDITIONSThe North American economy had enjoyed strong growth since 1993, after having suffered a severe recession for the two previous years. Interest rates bottomed-out in mid-1994, after which the U.S. Federal Reserve slowly increased rates until early 1995 in an attempt to fight inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, North American inflation was expected to average 3% to 5%annually for the foreseeable future. The Bank of Canada followed the U.S. Federal Reserve’s lead and increased interest rates, in part to protect the Canadian dollar’s value relative to the value of the U.S. dollar. The result was a North American growth rate of gross domestic product that was showing signs of slowing down.LAURRENTIAN’S PROJECT REVIEW PROCESSAll capital projects at Laurentian were subject to review based on the company’s Capital Allocation Policy. The latest policy, which had been developed in 1989 when the company began considering factors other than simply the calculated net present value for project evaluation, was strictly enforced and managers evaluated each year partially by their division’s return on investment. The purpose of the policy was to reinforce the management philosophies by achieving certain objectives: that all projects be consistent with business strategies, support continuous improvement, consider the human resource and environmental impact, and provide a sufficient return on investment.Prior to the approval of any capital allocation, each operating division was required to develop both a Strategic and an Operating Plan. The Strategic Plan had to identify and quantify either inefficiencies or lost opportunities and establish targets for their elimination, include a three-year plan of capital requirements, link capital spending to business strategies and continuous improvement effort, and achieve the company-wide hurdle rates.The first year of the Strategic Plan became the Annual Operating Plan. This was supported by a detailed list of proposed capital projects which became the basis for capital allocation. In addition to meeting all Strategic Plan criteria, the Operating Plan had to identify major continuous improvement initiatives and budget for the associated benefits, as well as develop a training plan identifying specific training objectives for the year.These criteria were used by head office to keep the behavior of divisional managers consistent with corporate objectives. For example, the requirement to develop a training plan as part of the operational plan forced managers to be efficient with employee training and to keep continuous improvement as the ultimate objective.All proposed projects were submitted on an Authorization for Expenditure (AFE) Form for review and approval (see Exhibit 3). The AFE had to present the project’s linkage to the business strategies. In addition, it had to include specific details of economics and engineering, involvement and empowerment, human resource, and the environment. This requirement ensured that projects had been carefully thought through by forcing managers to list the items purchased, the employeesinvolved in the project, the employees adversely affected by the project, and the effect of the project on the environment.Approval of a capital expenditure proposal was contingent on three requirements which are illustrated in Exhibit 4. The first of these requirements was the operating division’s demonstrated commitment to continuous improvement (C.I.), the criteria of which are described in Exhibit 5. The second requirement was that all projects of more than $300,000 be included in the Strategic Plan. The final requirement was that for projects greater than $1 million, the operating division had to achieve its profit target. However, if a project failed to meet any of these requirements, there was a mechanism through which emergency funds might be allocated subject to the corporate executive committee’s review and approval. If the project was less than $1 million and i t met all three requirements, only divisional review and approval was necessary. Otherwise, approval was needed from the executive committee.The proposed Winnipeg plant project was considered a class 2 project as the expenditures were meant to increase capacity for existing products or to establish a facility for new products. Capital projects could fall into one of three other classes: cost reduction (Class 1); equipment or facility replacement (Class 3); or other necessary expenditures for R&D, product improvements, quality control and concurrence with legal, government, health, safety or insurance requirements including pollution control (Class 4). A project spending audit was required for all expenditures; however, a savings audit was also needed if the project was considered either 1 or 2. Each class of project had a different hurdle rate reflecting different levels of risk. Class 1 projects were considered the most risky and had a hurdle rate of 20%. Class 2 and Class 3 projects had hurdle rates of 18% and 15%, respectively.Knowles was responsible for developing the Winnipeg division’s Capital Plan and completing all AFE forms.WINNIPEG PLANT’S EXPANSION OPTIONSLaurentian had manufactured frozen pizzas at the Toronto plant until 1992. However, after the company became the sole supplier of private-label frozen pizzas for a large grocery chain and was forced to secure additional capacity, it acquired the Winnipeg frozen pizza plant from a competitor.A program of regular maintenance and equipment replacement made the new plant the low cost producer in the industry, with an operating margin that averaged 15%.The plan, with its proven commitment to continuous improvement, had successfully met its profit objective for the past three years. After the shortage of capacity had been identified as the plant’s largest source of lost opportunity, management was eager to rectify this problem as targeted for in the Strategic Plan. Because the facility had also included the proposed plant expansion in its Strategic Plan, it met all three requirements for consideration of approval for a capital project. Annual sales had matched plant capacity of 10.9 million frozen pizzas when Lauentian concluded that opportunities similar to those in Canada existed in the U.S. An opportunity surfaced whereby Laurentian could have an exclusive arrangement to supply a large U.S.-based grocery chain with its private-label-brand frozen pizzas beginning in April, 1996. As a result of this arrangement, frozen pizza sales would increase rapidly, adding 2.2 million units in fiscal 1996, another 1.8 million units in fiscal 1997, and then 1.3 million additional units to reach a total of 5.3 millionadditional units by fiscal 1998. However, the terms of the agreement would only provide Laurentian with guaranteed sales of half this amount. Knowles expected that there was a 50% chance that the grocery chain would order only the guaranteed amount. Laurentian sold frozen pizzas to its customers for $1.7 in 1995 and prices were expected to increase just enough to keep pace with inflation. Production costs were expected to increase at a similar rate.Laurentian had considered, but rejected, three other alternatives to increase its frozen pizza capacity. First, the acquisition of a competitor’s facil ity in Canada had been rejected because the equipment would not satisfy the immediate capacity needs nor achieve the cost reduction possible with expansion of the Winnipeg plant. Second, the acquisition of a competitor in the U.S. had been rejected because the available plant would require a capital infusion double that required in Winnipeg. As well, there were risks that the product quality would be inferior. Last, the expansion of the Toronto cake plant had been rejected as it would require a capital outlay similar to that in the second alternative. The only remaining alternative was the expansion of the Winnipeg plant. By keeping the frozen pizza in Winnipeg, Laurentian could better exploit economies of scale and assure consistently high product quality.The ProposalThe expansion proposal, which would require six months to complete, would recommend four main expenditures: expanding the existing building in Winnipeg by 60% would cost $1.3 million; adding a spiral freezer, $1.6 million; installing a new high speed pizza processing line, $1.3 million; and acquiring additional warehouse space, $600,000. Including $400,000 for contingency needs, the total cash outlay for the project would be $5.2 million. The equipment was expected to be useful for 10 years, at which point its salvage value would be zero.The land on which the Winnipeg plant was built valued at 250,000 and no additional land would be necessary for the project. While the expansion would not require Laurentian to increase the size of the plant’s administrative staff, Knowles wondered what portion, if any, of the $223,000 in fixed salaries should be included when evaluating the project. Likewise, she estimated that it cost Laurentian approximately $40,000 in sales staff time and expanses to secure the U.S. contract that had created the need for extra capacity. Last, net working capital needs would increase with additional sales. Working capital was the sum of inventory and accounts receivable less accounts payable, all of which were a function of sales. Knowles estimated, however, that the new high-speed line would allow the company to cut two days from average inventory age.Added to the benefit derived from increased sales, the project would reduce production costs in two ways. First, the new high-speed line would reduce plant-wide unit cost by $0.009, though only 70% of this increased efficiency would be realized in the first year. There was an equal chance, however, that only 50% of these savings could actually be achieved. Second, “other” savings totaling $138,000 per year would also result from the new line and would increase each year at the rate of inflation.Each year, a capital cost allowance (CCA), akin to depreciation, would be deducted from operating income as a result of the capital expenditure. This deduction, in turn, would reduce the amount of corporate tax paid by Laurentian. In the event that the company did not have positive earnings in any year, the CCA deduction could be transferred to a subsequent year. However, corporate earnings were projected to be positive for the foreseeable future. Knowles compiled the eligibleCCA deduction for 10 years (see Exhibit 6). For the purpose of her analysis, she assumed that all cash flows would occur at the appropriate year-end.Three areas of environmental concern had to be addressed in the proposal to ensure both conformity with Laurentian policy and compliance with regulatory bodies and local by-laws. First, design and installation of sanitary drain systems, including re-routing of existing drains, would improve sanitation practices of effluent/wastewater discharge. Second, the provision of water-flow recording meters would quantify water volumes consumed in manufacturing and help to reduce its usage. Last, the refrigeration plant would use ammonia as the coolant as opposed to chloro-fluro-carbons. These initiatives were considered sufficient to satisfy the criteria of the Capital Allocation Policy.THE DECISIONKnowles believed that the project was consistent with the company’s business strategy since it would ensure that the Winnipeg plant continued to be the low cost producer of frozen pizzas in Canada. However, she knew that her analysis must consider all factors, including the project’s net present value. The plant’s capital allocation review committee would be following the procedures set out in the company’s Capital Allocation Policy as the basis for reviewing her recommendation. Knowles considered the implications if the project did not provide sufficient benefit to cover the Class 2 hurdle rate of 18%. Entering the U.S. grocery chains market was a tremendous opportunity and she considered what other business could result from Laurentian’s increased presence. She also wondered if the hurdle rate for a project that was meant to increase capacity for an existing product should be similar to the company’s cost of capital, since the risk of the project should be similar to the overall risk of the firm. She knew that Laurentian’s board of directors established a target capital structure that included 40% debt. She also reviewed the current Canadian market bond yields, which are listed in Exhibit 7. The spread between Government of Canada bonds and those of corporations with bond ratings of BBB, such as Laurentian, had recently been about 200 basis points (2%) for most long-term maturities. Finally, she discovered that Laurentian’s stock beta was 0.85, and that, historically, the Toronto stock market returns outperformed long-term government bonds by about 6% annually.EXHIBIT 1INCOME STATEMENTFor The Year Ending March 31($ millions)1993 1994 1995Revenues $91.2 95.8 101.5Cost of goods sold 27.4 28.7 30.5Gross income 63.8 67.1 71.0Operating expenses 52.0 55.0 58.4Operating income 11.8 12.1 12.6Interest 0.9 1.0 1.6Income before tax 10.9 11.1 11.0Income tax 4.2 4.3 4.2Net income 6.7 6.8 6.8EXHIBIT 2BALANCE SHEETFor The Year Ending March 31($ millions)1993 1994 1995Assets:Cash $6.2 9.4 13.1Accounts Receivable 11.3 11.8 12.5Inventory 6.2 6.6 7.0Prepaid expenses 0.3 0.6 2.2Other current 0.9 0.9Total current 24.0 29.3 35.7Fixed assets: 35.3 36.1 36.4 TOTAL 59.3 65.4 72.1 Liabilities and Shareholder’s Equity:Accounts payable 7.5 7.9 8.3Other payable 0.7 1.3 2.2Total current 8.2 9.2 10.5 Long-term debt 16.8 20.4 24.3 Shareholder’s equity 34.3 35.8 37.3 TOTAL 59.3 65.4 72.1AUTHORIZATION FOR EXPENDITURE FORMCAPITAL EXPENDITURE APPROVAL PROCESSBUSINESS REVIEW CRITERIAUsed to Assess Divisional Commitment to Continuous ImprovementSafety● Lost time accidents per 200,000 employee hours workedProduct Quality● Number of customer complaintsFinancial● Return of investmentLost Sales● Market share % - where data availableManufacturing Effectiveness● People cost (total compensation $ including fringe) as a percentage of new sales● Plant scrap (kg) as a percentage of total production (kg)Managerial Effectiveness/Employee Empowerment● Employee survey● Training provided vs. Training planned● Number of employee grievancesSanitation● Sanitation audit ratingsOther Continuous Improvement Measurements● Number of continuous improvement projects directed against identified piles of waste/lostopportunity completed and in-progressEXHIBIT 6ELIGIBLE CCA DEDUCTIONYear Deduction1996$434,0001997$768,0001998$593,0001999$461,0002000$361,0002001$286,0002002$229,0002003$185,0002004$152,0002005$1731,000EXHIBIT 7MARKET INTEREST RATESON MAY 18,19961-Year Government of Canada Bond 7.37% 5-Year Government of Canada Bond 7.66% 10-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.06% 20-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.30% 30-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.35%。
财务管理案例(LAURENTIAN BAKERIES)(共10页)
LAURENTIAN BAKERIESThe decision-maker must make a recommendation on a large expansion project. Discounted cash flow analysis is required.In late May, 1995, Danielle Knowles, vice-president of operations for Laurentian Bakeries Inc., was preparing a capital expenditure proposal to expand the company’s frozen pizza plant in Winnipeg Manitoba. If the opportunity to expand into the U.S. frozen pizza market was taken, the company would need extra capacity. A detailed analysis, including a net present value calculation, was required by the company’s Capital Allocation Policy for all capital expenditures in order to ensure that projects were both profitable and consistent with corporate strategies.COMPANY BACKGROUHDEstablished in 1984, Laurentian Bakeries Inc. (Laurentian) manufactured a variety of frozen baked food products at plants in Winnipeg (pizzas), Toronto (cakes) and Montreal (pies). While each plant operated as a profit center, they shared a common sales force located at the company’ head office in Montreal. Although the Toronto plant was responsible for over 40% of corporate revenues in fiscal 1994, and the other plants was accounted for about 30% each, all three divisions contributed equally to profits. The company enjoyed strong competitive positions in all three markets and it was the low cost producer in the pizza market. Income Statements and Balance Sheets for the 1993 to 1995 fiscal years are in Exhibits 1 and 2, respectively. Laurentian sold most of its products to large grocery chains, and in fact, supplying several Canadian chains with private label brand pizzas generated much of the sales growth. Other sales were made to institutional food services.The company’s success was, in part, the product of its management’s philosophies. The cornerstone of Laurentian’s operations was its including a commitment to a business strategy promoting continuous improvement; for example all employees were empowered to think about and make suggestions for ways of reducing waste. As Danielle Knowles saw it: “Continuous improvement is a way of life at Lauremtian.〞Also, the company was known for its above –average consideration for the human resource and environmental impact of its business decisions. These philosophies drove all policy-making, including those policies governing capital allocation. Danielle KnowlesDanielle Knowles’s career, which spanned 13 years in the food industry, had included p ositions in other functional areas such as marketing and finance. She had received an undergraduate degree in mechanical engineering from Queen’s University in Kingston, Ontario, and a master of business administration from the Western Business School.THE PIZZA INDUSTRYMajor segments in the pizza market were frozen pizza, deli-fresh chilled pizza, restaurant pizza and take-out pizza. Of these four, restaurant and take-out were the largest. While these segments consisted of thousands of small-owned establishments, a few large North American chains, which included Domino’s, Pizza Hut and Little Caesar’s, dominated.Although 12 firms manufactured frozen pizzas in Canada, the five largest firms, including Laurentian, accounted for 95% of production. McCain Foods was the market leader with 44% market share, while Laurentian had 21%. Per capita consumption of frozen products in Canada was one-third of the level in U.S. where retail prices were lower.ECONOMIC CONDITIONSThe North American economy had enjoyed strong growth since 1993, after having suffered a severe recession for the two previous years. Interest rates bottomed-out in mid-1994, after which the U.S. Federal Reserve slowly increased rates until early 1995 in an attempt to fight inflationary pressures. Nevertheless, North American inflation was expected to average 3% to 5%annually for the foreseeable future. The Bank of Canada followed the U.S. Federal Reserve’s lead and increased interest rates, in part to protect the Canadian dollar’s value relative to the value of the U.S. dollar. The result was a North American growth rate of gross domestic product that was showing signs of slowing down.LAURRENTIAN’S PROJECT REVIEW PROCESSAll capital projects at Laurentian were subject to review based on the company’s Capital Allocation Policy. The latest policy, which had been developed in 1989 when the company began considering factors other than simply the calculated net present value for project evaluation, was strictly enforced and managers evaluated each year p artially by their division’s return on investment. The purpose of the policy was to reinforce the management philosophies by achieving certain objectives: that all projects be consistent with business strategies, support continuous improvement, consider the human resource and environmental impact, and provide a sufficient return on investment.Prior to the approval of any capital allocation, each operating division was required to develop both a Strategic and an Operating Plan. The Strategic Plan had to identify and quantify either inefficiencies or lost opportunities and establish targets for their elimination, include a three-year plan of capital requirements, link capital spending to business strategies and continuous improvement effort, and achieve the company-wide hurdle rates.The first year of the Strategic Plan became the Annual Operating Plan. This was supported by a detailed list of proposed capital projects which became the basis for capital allocation. In addition to meeting all Strategic Plan criteria, the Operating Plan had to identify major continuous improvement initiatives and budget for the associated benefits, as well as develop a training plan identifying specific training objectives for the year.These criteria were used by head office to keep the behavior of divisional managers consistent with corporate objectives. For example, the requirement to develop a training plan as part of the operational plan forced managers to be efficient with employee training and to keep continuous improvement as the ultimate objective.All proposed projects were submitted on an Authorization for Expenditure (AFE) Form for review and approval (see Exhibit 3). The AFE had to present the project’s linkage to the business strategies. In addition, it had to include specific details of economics and engineering, involvement and empowerment, human resource, and the environment. This requirement ensured that projects had been carefully thought through by forcing managers to list the items purchased, the employees involved in the project, the employees adversely affected by the project, and the effect of the project on the environment.Approval of a capital expenditure proposal was contingent on three requirements which are illustrated in Exhibit 4. The first of these re quirements was the operating division’s demonstrated commitment to continuous improvement (C.I.), the criteria of which are described in Exhibit 5. The second requirement was that all projects of more than $300,000 be included in the Strategic Plan. The final requirement was that for projects greater than $1 million, the operating division had to achieve its profit target. However, if a project failed to meet any of these requirements, there was a mechanism through which emergency funds might be allocated subject to the corporate executive committee’s review and approval. If the project was less than $1 million and it met all three requirements, only divisional review and approval was necessary. Otherwise, approval was needed from the executive committee.The proposed Winnipeg plant project was considered a class 2 project as the expenditures were meant to increase capacity for existing products or to establish a facility for new products. Capital projects could fall into one of three other classes: cost reduction (Class 1); equipment or facility replacement (Class 3); or other necessary expenditures for R&D, product improvements, quality control and concurrence with legal, government, health, safety or insurance requirements including pollution control (Class 4). A project spending audit was required for all expenditures; however, a savings audit was also needed if the project was considered either 1 or 2. Each class of project had a different hurdle rate reflecting different levels of risk. Class 1 projects were considered the most risky and had a hurdle rate of 20%. Class 2 and Class 3 projects had hurdle rates of 18% and 15%, respectively.Knowles was responsible for developing the Winnipeg division’s Capital Plan and completing all AFE forms.WINNIPEG PLANT’S EXPANSION OPTIONSLaurentian had manufactured frozen pizzas at the Toronto plant until 1992. However, after the company became the sole supplier of private-label frozen pizzas for a large grocery chain and was forced to secure additional capacity, it acquired the Winnipeg frozen pizza plant from a competitor. A program of regular maintenance and equipment replacement made the new plant the low cost producer in the industry, with an operating margin that averaged 15%.The plan, with its proven commitment to continuous improvement, had successfully met its profit objective for the past three years. After the shortage of capacity had been identified as the plant’s largest source of lost opportunity, management was eager to rectify this problem as targeted for in the Strategic Plan. Because the facility had also included the proposed plant expansion in its Strategic Plan, it met all three requirements for consideration of approval for a capital project. Annual sales had matched plant capacity of 10.9 million frozen pizzas when Lauentian concluded that opportunities similar to those in Canada existed in the U.S. An opportunity surfaced whereby Laurentian could have an exclusive arrangement to supply a large U.S.-based grocery chain with its private-label-brand frozen pizzas beginning in April, 1996. As a result of this arrangement, frozen pizza sales would increase rapidly, adding 2.2 million units in fiscal 1996, another 1.8 million units in fiscal 1997, and then 1.3 million additional units to reach a total of 5.3 million additional units by fiscal 1998. However, the terms of the agreement would only provide Laurentian with guaranteed sales of half this amount. Knowles expected that there was a 50% chance that the grocery chain would order only the guaranteed amount. Laurentian sold frozen pizzas to its customers for $1.7 in 1995 and prices were expected to increase just enough to keep pace with inflation. Production costs were expected to increase at a similar rate.Laurentian had considered, but rejected, three other alternatives to increase its frozen pizza capacity. First, the acquisition of a competitor’s facility in Canada had been rejected because the equipment would not satisfy the immediate capacity needs nor achieve the cost reduction possible with expansion of the Winnipeg plant. Second, the acquisition of a competitor in the U.S. had been rejected because the available plant would require a capital infusion double that required in Winnipeg. As well, there were risks that the product quality would be inferior. Last, the expansion of the Toronto cake plant had been rejected as it would require a capital outlay similar to that in the second alternative. The only remaining alternative was the expansion of the Winnipeg plant. By keeping the frozen pizza in Winnipeg, Laurentian could better exploit economies of scale and assure consistently high product quality.The ProposalThe expansion proposal, which would require six months to complete, would recommend four main expenditures: expanding the existing building in Winnipeg by 60% would cost $1.3 million; adding a spiral freezer, $1.6 million; installing a new high speed pizza processing line, $1.3 million; and acquiring additional warehouse space, $600,000. Including $400,000 for contingency needs, the total cash outlay for the project would be $5.2 million. The equipment was expected to be useful for 10 years, at which point its salvage value would be zero.The land on which the Winnipeg plant was built valued at 250,000 and no additional land would be necessary for the project. While the expansion would not require Laurentian to increase the size of the plant’s administrative staff, Knowles wondered what portion, if any, of the $223,000 in fixed salaries should be included when evaluating the project. Likewise, she estimated that it cost Laurentian approximately $40,000 in sales staff time and expanses to secure the U.S. contract that had created the need for extra capacity. Last, net working capital needs would increase with additional sales. Working capital was the sum of inventory and accounts receivable less accounts payable, all of which were a function of sales. Knowles estimated, however, that the new high-speed line would allow the company to cut two days from average inventory age. Added to the benefit derived from increased sales, the project would reduce production costs in two ways. First, the new high-speed line would reduce plant-wide unit cost by $0.009, though only 70% of this increased efficiency would be realized in the first year. There was an equal chance, however, that only 50% of these savings could actually be achieved. Second, “other〞savings totaling $138,000 per year would also result from the new line and would increase each year at the rate of inflation.Each year, a capital cost allowance (CCA), akin to depreciation, would be deducted from operating income as a result of the capital expenditure. This deduction, in turn, would reduce the amount of corporate tax paid by Laurentian. In the event that the company did not have positive earnings in any year, the CCA deduction could be transferred to a subsequent year. However, corporate earnings were projected to be positive for the foreseeable future. Knowles compiled the eligible CCA deduction for 10 years (see Exhibit 6). For the purpose of her analysis, she assumed that all cash flows would occur at the appropriate year-end.Three areas of environmental concern had to be addressed in the proposal to ensure both conformity with Laurentian policy and compliance with regulatory bodies and local by-laws. First, design and installation of sanitary drain systems, including re-routing of existing drains, would improve sanitation practices of effluent/wastewater discharge. Second, the provision of water-flow recording meters would quantify water volumes consumed in manufacturing and help toreduce its usage. Last, the refrigeration plant would use ammonia as the coolant as opposed to chloro-fluro-carbons. These initiatives were considered sufficient to satisfy the criteria of the Capital Allocation Policy.THE DECISIONKnowles believed that the project was consistent with the company’s business strategy since it would ensure that the Winnipeg plant continued to be the low cost producer of frozen pizzas in Canada. However, she knew that her analysis mu st consider all factors, including the project’s net present value. The plant’s capital allocation review committee would be following the procedures set out in the company’s Capital Allocation Policy as the basis for reviewing her recommendation. Knowles considered the implications if the project did not provide sufficient benefit to cover the Class 2 hurdle rate of 18%. Entering the U.S. grocery chains market was a tremendous opportunity and she considered what other business could result from Laurentian’s increased presence. She also wondered if the hurdle rate for a project that was meant to increase capacity for an existing product should be similar to the company’s cost of capital, since the risk of the project should be similar to the overall risk of the firm. She knew that Laurentian’s board of directors established a target capital structure that included 40% debt. She also reviewed the current Canadian market bond yields, which are listed in Exhibit 7. The spread between Government of Canada bonds and those of corporations with bond ratings of BBB, such as Laurentian, had recently been about 200 basis points (2%) for most long-term maturities. Finally, she discovered that Laurentian’s stock beta was 0.85, and that, historically, the Toronto stock market returns outperformed long-term government bonds by about 6% annually.INCOME STATEMENTFor The Year Ending March 31($ millions)1993 1994 1995Cost of goods sold 27.4 28.7Operating expenses 52.0 55.0Interest 0.9Income taxEXHIBIT 2BALANCE SHEETFor The Year Ending March 31($ millions)1993 1994 1995 Assets:Other currentFixed assets: 36.1Liabilities and Shareholder’s Equity:Other payable 0.7 1.3Shareholder’s equityAUTHORIZATION FOR EXPENDITURE FORMCAPITAL EXPENDITURE APPROVAL PROCESSBUSINESS REVIEW CRITERIAUsed to Assess Divisional Commitment to Continuous ImprovementSafety● Lost time accidents per 200,000 employee hours workedProduct Quality● Number of customer complaintsFinancial● Return of investmentLost Sales● Market share % - where data availableManufacturing Effectiveness● People cost (total compensation $ including fringe) as a percentage of new sales● Plant scrap (kg) as a percentage of total production (kg)Managerial Effectiveness/Employee Empowerment● Employee survey● Training provided vs. Training planned● Number of employee grievancesSanitation● Sanitation audit ratingsOther Continuous Improvement Measurements● Number of continuous improvement projects directed against identified piles of waste/lostopportunity completed and in-progressEXHIBIT 6ELIGIBLE CCA DEDUCTIONYear Deduction1996$434,0001997$768,0001998$593,0001999$461,0002000$361,0002001$286,0002002$229,0002003$185,0002004$152,0002005$1731,000EXHIBIT 7MARKET INTEREST RATESON MAY 18,19961-Year Government of Canada Bond 7.37% 5-Year Government of Canada Bond 7.66% 10-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.06% 20-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.30% 30-Year Government of Canada Bond 8.35%内容总结。
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THE COST OF EQUITY CAPITAL FOR SMALL FIRMS
he three equity cost-estimating techniques discussed in Chapter 9 (DCF, Bond-Yield-plus-Risk-Premium, and CAPM) have serious limitations when applied to small firms. Consider ˆ first the constant growth model, ks D1/P0 g. Imagine a small, rapidly growing firm, such as Bio-Technology General (BTG), which will not in the foreseeable future pay dividends. For firms like this, the constant growth model is simply not applicable. In fact, it is difficult to imagine any dividend model that would be of practical benefit for such a firm because of the difficulty of estimating dividends and growth rates. The second method, which calls for adding a risk premium of 3 to 5 percent to the firm’s cost of debt, can be used for some small firms, but problems arise if the firm does not have a publicly traded bond outstanding. BTG, for example, has no public debt outstanding, so we would have trouble using the bondyield-plus-risk-premium approach for BTG. The third approach, the CAPM, is often not usable, because if the firm’s stock is not publicly traded, then we cannot calculate its beta. For the privately owned firm, we might use the “pure play” CAPM technique (discussed in Web Appendix 9B), which involves finding a publicly owned firm in the same line of business, estimating that firm’s beta, and then using that beta as a replacement for one of the small businesses in question. To illustrate the pure play approach, again consider BTG. The firm is not publicly traded, so we cannot estimate its beta. However, data are available on more established firms, such as Genentech and Genetic Industries, so we could use their betas as representative of the biological and genetic engineering industry. Of course, these firms’ betas would have to be subjectively modified to reflect their larger sizes and more established positions, as well as to take account of the differences in the nature of their products and their capital structures as compared to those of BTG. Still, as long as there are public companies in similar lines of business available for comparison, their betas can be used to help estimate the cost of capital of a firm whose equity is not publicly traded. Note also that a “liquidity premium” as discussed in Chapter 4 would also have to be added to reflect the illiquidity of the small, nonpublic firm’s sst of equity capital is ke D1/[P0(1 F)]. The higher the flotation cost, the higher the cost of external equity. How big is F? Looking at the estimates presented in the Chapter 9 Industry Practice box entitled “How Much Does It Cost to Raise External Capital?,” we see that small debt and equity issues have considerably higher flotation costs than large issues. For example, a non-IPO issue of common stock that raises more than $200 million in capital would have a flotation cost of about 3.5 percent. For a firm that is expected to provide a constant 15 percent dividend yield (that is, D1/P0 15%), the cost of equity would be 15%/(1 0.04), or 15.6 percent. However, a similar but smaller firm that raises less than $10 million would have a flotation cost of about 13 percent, which would result in a flotation-adjusted cost of equity capital of 15%/(1 0.13) 17.2 percent, or 1.6 percentage points higher. This differential would be even larger if an IPO were involved. Therefore, it is clear that a small firm would have to earn considerably more on the same project than a large firm. Small firms are therefore at a substantial disadvantage because of flotation cost effects. THE SMALL-FIRM EFFECT A number of researchers have observed that portfolios of small firms’ stocks have earned higher average returns than portfolios of large firms’ stocks; this is called the “small-firm effect.” For example, over the time period 1926–1999, Ibbotson Associates finds that the average yearly return for the smallest stocks on the NYSE has been 17.6 percent. By contrast, over the same time period the largest NYSE stocks have had an average yearly return of 13.3 percent. On the surface it would seem to be advantageous to the small firm to provide average returns in the stock market that are higher than those of large firms. In reality, however, these higher returns suggest that smaller firms have a higher cost of equity capital. What can explain the higher cost of capital for smaller firms? It may be argued that the stocks of smaller firms are riskier and less liquid than the stocks of larger firms, and this accounts for the differences in returns. Indeed, most academic research finds that both standard deviations of yearly returns and betas are higher for smaller firms than they are for larger firms. However, the returns for small firms are often still larger even after adjusting for the effects of their higher risks as reflected in their beta coefficients. In this regard, the small-firm effect is inconsistent with the CAPM. Some researchers have attempted to address this issue by including firm size as a predictor in their asset pricing models. For example, in Chapter 5 we mentioned that the multi-factor models recently developed by Fama and French include firm size as a key factor in explaining stock market returns.