会计信息披露外文文献
上市公司信息披露论文参考文献
上市公司信息披露论文参考文献上市公司信息披露论文参考文献1 Brockman, P., et al.，Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options, Journal of Corporate Finance (2009).2 J. Friedlan. Accounting choices of issuers of initial public offerings.Contemporary Accounting Research. 1994,11(1): 1-323 Teoh, S., Welch, I., Wong，T.，1998b. Earnings management and the subsequent market performance of initial public offerings. Journal of Finance 53, 1935-1974.4 Jaffe，J.，1974. Special information and insider trading. Journal of Business 47，410-428.5 Sivakumar, K.，Waymire，G.，1994. Insider trading following material news events:evidence from earnings. Financial Management 23, 23-32.6 Elliot, J., Morse，D. and Richardson, G. 1984. The association between insider trading and information announcements. Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No.4，Winter，521-536.7 Cheng，Q., Lo, K., 2006. Insider trading and voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 44，815-848.8张宗新,季雷.内幕信息操纵的股价冲击效应一理论与中国股市证据[j].金融研究，2005(4)144-154.9戴园晨.股市泡沫生成机理以及由大辩论引发的深层思考-兼论股市运行扭曲与庄股情结.经济研究,2001(4):41-51.10祝红梅.内幕信息、内幕交易及其管制[」].南开经济研究,2002(2):16-21.11王冬梅,陈忠琏.上市公司会计信息操纵的经济学分析m.数理统计与管理，2000(2):18-22.12邓顺永.上市公司年度报告预约披露制度的实证研宄.证券市场导报.2004,(2): 4-1113 Bergstresser, D. and Philippon, T. CEO. Incentives and Earnings Management, Journal of Financial Economics, 200614 Goldman，E. and Slezak, S. L. An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Information Manipulation, Journal of Financial Economics， 2006.15 D enis，D J. ,P.H anouna and A .Sarin.Is There a D ark Side to Incentive Compensation .JournalofCorporate Finance, 2006.16 Chauvin, K. and C. Shenoy. 2001. Stock price decreases prior to executive stock option grants. Journal of Corporate Finance 7: 53-76.17 Henry, T. F.，2002. Earnings management and stock options. PHD dissertation paper. New York University.18 Aboody，D., Kasznik, R.. CEO stock option awards andthe timing of corporate voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 73-10019 Carpenter, J., Remmers, B.，2001. Executive stock option exercises and inside information. Journal of Business 74，513-534.20 Bartov, E.，Mohanram，P., 2004. Private information, earnings manipulation, and executive stock-option exercise. Accounting Review 79，889-920.21 Brockman, P., et al., Voluntary disclosures and the exercise of CEO stock options, Journal of Corporate Finance (2009).22黄文伴，李延喜.管理者薪酬契约与企业盈余管理程度关系.科研管理,2011(6),133-13823苏东蔚，林大庞.股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理.经济研究,2010(11),p88-10024马会起,干胜道,胡建平.基于经营者股权激励的盈余管理与股价操纵相关研究来自中国上市公司的经验证据.财会通讯,2010(6),p92-9425韩丹,闽亮,陈婷.管理层股权激励与上市公司会计造假相关性的实证检验.统计与决策,2007(9), 69-7326陈千里.股权激励、盈余操纵与国有股减持.中山大学学报(社会科学版,48 ⑴,2008,149-15727 Jensen.M and Meckling.W. Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics,1976(3),p305-36038周建波，孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研宄一一来自中国上市公司的经验证据.经济研宄，2003 (5)，p74-8339陈勇、廖冠民、王霆.我国上市公司股权激励效应的实证分析.管理世界，2005(2)，pl58-15940肖华芳,袁国建.上市公司自愿性信息披露程度与公司特征的实证研宂,财会月刊 2007 (11)41陆正华，黄加瑶.上市公司自愿性披露对提升公司价值的影响一一基于我国证券市场的进一步验证.特区经济,2007(05)42汪炜，蒋高峰.信息披露、透明度与资本成本.经济研究,2004, (7): 101-11443 Patton, J and Zelenka, I. An empirical analysis of the determinants of the extent of disclosure in annual reports of joints stock companies in the Czech Republic. The European Accounting Review, 1997，6(4):606-62644赵宇龙，会计盈余披露的信息含量一一来自上海股市的经验证据，经济研宄，1998(7)45陈晓、陈小悦、刘别,A股盈余报告的有用性研究一一来自上海、深圳股市的实证证据，经济研究，1999(6)46 M. Bekey. Annual reports evolve into marketing tools.Financial Manager. 1990,(1): 50-6047 K. Michael, D. M. Nahum. Can \;big bath\; and earning smoothing co-exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies. Journal of Accounting Research.2002,40(3):761-76948吴水澎，陈汉文，郑鑫成.财务管理方式的维度观.会计研究,2002,(9)19-2449吉利.企业财务信息管理研究.西南财经大学博士论文.2006: 145- 16550薛云奎主译.财务呈报会计革命，东北财经大学出版社,2000年12月，P1351贺志峰.论家族企业的定义.当代财经，2004 (6)，p57-61。
会计信息披露英文翻译
毕业设计（论文）外文参考资料及译文译文题目：实证调查披露,使用和有用的会计信息学生姓名：李梦媛学号：0821111920专业：会计学所在学院：龙蟠学院指导教师：金颖职称：副教授2011年 12 月 09 日Title:An Empirical Investigation of Disclosure, Usage and Usefulness of Corporate Accounting Informationb y Michael Sherer, Alan Southworth and Stuart Turley from © Emerald Backfiles 2007This paper reports the findings of an empirical investiga-tion into the disclosure of corporate accounting informa-tion to trade union decision makers. These findings are evaluated against earlier normative and descriptive litera-ture on corporate disclosure to trade unions and an attempt is made to derive some implications for the design of accounting reports for use in the context of collective bargaining. The research methodology used was a case study of decision making in one trade union, the Amalga-mated Textile Workers' Union (ATWU) which represents most of the manual workers in the Lancashire cotton industry.The paper is divided into six sections. The first section presents some background material on the ATWU, and the industry in which it operates. The second section describes the research design and the manner in which the investigation was conducted. The next three sections report the research findings, namely: the extent of information disclosure by companies in the Lancashire cotton industry; the actual use of corporate accounting information in the collective bargaining decisions of the ATWU; and the assessment by the ATWU decision makers of the usefulness of that information. The final section offers some suggestions, based on the evidence reported, for improvements in the quantity and type of accounting information which corporate management should be willing to disclose if they want trade union decision makers to take into consideration corporate financial performance in their collective bargaining deci-sions.The Amalgamated Textile Workers' Union (ATWU) was formed as recently as 1974 but its origins go back into the nineteenth century.The ATWU is essentially a loose federation of semi-independent unions representing spin-ners, weavers and cardroom operatives concentrated in one geographical area - Lancashire. The ATWU is managed by the Central Executive Committee, headed by the General Secretary, and there is a 'national' negotiat-ing committee which annually concludes agreements with the employers' federation, the British Textile Employers' Association (BTEA) over basic wage rates in the industry. However, the majority of collective bargaining decisions are not made by the negotiating committee at 'national' level but by trade union officials at the local or District level. The decisions at the District level include basic pay agreements with non-BTEA firms, productivity agree-ments at individual mills, and issues of working condi-tions, health and safety, and redundancies and closures.The individual Districts within the ATWU are each managed by a full-time paid union official known as the District Secretary and since the vast majority of collective bargaining decisions are made by District Secretaries, these were chosen as the subject for our empirical investigation.In 1979 there were seventeen Districts within the ATWU. Most of the Districts represented all the ATWU members working in one geographical area, although in some cases there were separate Districts for spinning and weaving and in other cases one Secretary had responsibil-ityfor more than one District. At the time of the study the total number of District Secretaries was eighteen. The membership of the ATWU at that time was 42,000 (it has since fallen to 30,000) while the size of individual Districts ranged from 500 to 5,000. Membership of the ATWU, and consequently of the individual Districts, has been declining dramatically in the last twenty years reflecting the continuing contraction of the Lancashire cotton industry.The contraction of the industry has caused earnings to decline relative to the average for manufactur-ing industry as a whole and has resulted in the closure of many mills and entire companies. In addition, the production process is still quite labour-intensive with the result that productivity as measured by net output per employee compares unfavourably with other industries. In short, both the industry and the union are in a state of severe decline and it is this decline which provides the backcloth to our study of information disclosure in a collective bargaining context.Structured interviews using a pre-coded questionnaire were conducted with sixteen out of the eighteen District Secretaries in post during August and September 1979. The content of the questionnaire was initially determined from the normative models of trade union decision making found in Cooper and Essex and Foley and Maunders Subsequently, a pilot survey of three District Secretaries was carried out to identify the most common decision areas and information sources for inclusion in the main questionnaire. The pilot survey also ensured that no major decision areas or information sources which may have been specific to trade union officials in the Lan-cashire cotton industry were accidentally omitted.The final questionnaire used in the structured inter-views identified seven sources of information which were available for use by the District Secretaries and these sources are presented very few companies in the Lancashire cotton industry publish employee reports and consequently only five District Secretaries could recall ever receiving copies directly from any of the companies in their District. Once again, it was the large or publicly quoted companies which produced and sent out employee reports to the District Secretaries and, just as for the published annual reports, the information was presented only for the group as a whole. All the District Secretaries who received a company's employee report also received its published accounts and most of them considered that there was very little information in the former.Although both published accounts and employee re-ports suffer from a high level of aggregation, the same is not true for the other sources of information in Table 2. Internal accounting reports and order books contain information about individual companies or mills, while work study reports provide details relevant to a single shed within a mill or even a group of machines.The pattern of disclosure for internal accounting reports and order books was remarkably similar. All the District Secretaries reported that most companies allowed them access to internal accounting information and to informa-tion about the quantity and value of future orders. However, only one District Secretary said that he received this information without having to make a specific request and there were a few companies, again small, privately-owned ones, who consistently refused to disclose this information. Under the provisions of the Employment Protection Act, 1975 and the related ACAS Code of Practice No. 2, 1977,companies are required to disclose all information requested by trade union representatives which would not cause substantial injury to the company. It appears that some of the small companies were taking advantage of this exclusion clause on the grounds that the information was confidential and could, if made publicly available, reduce the competitiveness of the company. The DistrictSecretaries who had been refused informa-tion on these grounds never took the issue further, for example to the Central Arbitration Committee of ACAS, because they were usually able to estimate the informa-tion they required from other sources, often from direct observation of the production in the mill.Although most District Secretaries had access to in-formation from the internal accounting reports and order books of companies in their District, the type of access given, in effect the nature of the disclosure, differed between companies. Most companies were willing to give verbal summaries of the information requested, for example profits for the month, but very few companies allowed the District Secretaries directly to inspect the documents themselves. The provision of only verbal summaries of these reports prevented the District Secre-taries from undertaking any detailed analysis of their contents, perhaps with the aid of an independent expert, and consequently may have reduced the extent to which these information sources were used in their decision making.Secretary who often calls in the ATWU's own work study officer to verify management's figures. It is, therefore, in management's interest that the District Secretaries reg-uarly receive the work study reports which monitor the actual performance of the operatives.To summarise, the quality of information disclosure in the Lancashire cotton industry, as measured by the responses of the District Secretaries, does not appear to be uniform either across information sources or across companies. Where the provision of information is essen-tial for the smooth operation of the productive process, namely the work study reports, or where the provision of information is virtually costless, as is the case for the published accounts and employee reports of large or quoted companies, the quality of disclosure is generally very high. In contrast, there is less disclosure about information which is considered by management to be sensitive or confidential, namely internal accounting reports and order books, particularly by small, privately owned companies. Nevertheless, the deficiencies in the amount of disclosure by companies may not be a serious limitation to the District Secretaries in their decision making, since much of the information contained in these reports can be derived from other sources, for example, direct observation, communications from members or other District Secretaries, and informal discussions with management. The relative importance of these informa-tion sources compared to formal accounting reports is discussed in the next section.In this section, we discuss the relative importance of different information sources in the collective bargaining decisions of the District Secretaries. Cooper and Essex have also addressed this issue in their study of the information used by engineering shop stewards when bargaining over pay. They concluded that the trade union and other shop stewards were more important sources of information than published accounts. Our findings provide confirmatory evidence of the relative lack of importance of formal accounting reports in collective bargaining decisions. A crude measure of relative import-ance is the total number of references to each information source as shown in Table 3. Information source F, ATWU members, is used much more frequently than any other source, while the three formal accounting reports, internal accounts, published accounts and employee reports, register the lowest three sources. The very low level of usage of employee reports is probably related to our earlier finding that these reports are produced by only a few companies in the industry. it is misleading to place too much emphasis on the total number of references made to each source. This is because some information sources are obviously directly related to particular decision areas but not to others. For example, the high score registered by source E, work study reports, is largely a consequence of its direct relevanceto productivity decisions. Therefore, it is more appropriate to evaluate information usage separately for each decision. Table 4, which ranks the use of information by decision area, clearly reveals a different usage pattern between decisions. Although the formal accounting re-ports are used for only four decisions (disregarding the one reference for health and safety decisions), their importance relative to other information sources is not the same for each decision. Published annual accounts and internal accounting reports are ranked higher for redundancies and long-term prospects than for basic pay and productivity. It is also noteworthy that source D achieves the highest ranking for both redundan-cies and long-term prospects since this source, order books, may also contain accounting information.The explanation for these differences in the ranking of accounting information probably lies in the nature and content of the decisions themselves. While basic pay and productivity are concerned with pay bargaining, redun-dancies and long-term prospects are concerned with security of employment. Because of the continuing contraction of the Lancashire cotton industry, there are very few opportunities for increases in pay without a corresponding increase in labour productivity. Therefore, for both basic pay claims and new incentive schemes, one of the main types of information required by the District Secretaries concerns current levels of productivity and this information is provided directly either by the work study reports or by the members themselves. In addition, District Secretaries will be interested in the results of similar pay negotiations in other Districts and this accounts for the relative importance given to source G. Accounting information, especially formal reports for a whole company or group of companies, does not contain sufficiently detailed or up-to-date information about productivity levels.The nature of the two security-of-employment decision areas is somewhat different. As part of their response to management's plans for redundancies or closures, the District Secretaries would seek evidence on the necessity of the management's action. The company's order books and internal accounting reports are obvious starting points for discovering the reasons for laying off workers and closing mills. Similarly, in assessing the long-term pros-pects of individual companies, District Secretaries would tend to rely on company produced information, in particular the order books and accounting reports, rather than other sources of information. In addition, the 9 obvious importance of these decisions both to the mem-bers and the ATWU itself, would tend to encourage the District Secretaries to use more sources of information than they would do for other decisions and this factor may contribute to the higher usage of accounting information.Our research, therefore, supports the findings of Cooper and Essex concerning the relative unimportance of accounting information for pay bargaining. However, our research also shows that accounting information is used to a greater extent for decisions about security of employment and that, if the definition of accounting information sources is widened beyond the three formal accounting reports to include order books and work study reports, accounting information is perceived to have some relevance to many collective bargaining decisions. Usefulness of Accounting ReportsThe accounting information contained in formal account-ing reports may be said to be useful to trade union officials if the benefits from using it, as measured by changes in the overall welfare of the trade union members, are greater than the cost of using it. Because direct measurement of members' welfare is infeasible and because the use of measures such as changes in wage levels may not be valid surrogates for welfare, no attempt was made in our research to assess directly and objectively the usefulness of accounting information for the decisions ofDistrict Secretaries. Instead, based upon the invited comments of District Secretaries, this paper reports their subjective evaluation of the present content of company accounting reports. Although these comments cannot be said to have any scientific validity, they do provide a consistent impression of the attitudes of the District Secretaries to accounting information. The high level of aggregation in accounting reports, which results from the statutory requirement to produce consoli-dated group accounts for shareholders, was a major barrier to their use by the District Secretaries. The significant use of work study reports is explained in part by the direct relevance the information had for the workers in a particular mill and even on a particular set of machines. Therefore, our research provides support for the argument that accounting information needs to be disaggregated to the level appropriate to the decision maker, which for many trade union decision makers is the plant level.These quotations suggest a positive attitude towards employee reports as a means of communicating company information to shop floor workers. The general attitude to employee reports was that they may not be very useful for trade union officials (because they used other sources for the information in the reports) but they may be enter-taining and of interest to the employees in the mills.There was a general belief that profit reflected a com-pany's 'ability to pay' increases in earnings and also that it was a key indicator of future viability. Profit (or more usually loss) was the specific item in accounting reports mentioned much more frequently than any other item. Surprisingly, none of the District Secretaries ever referred to 'value added' in their decisions even though it has been suggested that this measure of company performance may be particularly relevant to pay bargaini .Indeed, most of the District Secretaries had never heard the concept of 'value added' applied to a whole company although they used it themselves in relation to individual products and processes.The criticisms voiced by the District Secretaries provide some subjective evidence concerning why accounting information is used less than other sources of information in the decisions of trade unions. Some of these criticisms, for example that accounting reports are difficult to understand, are consistent with the research on sharehol-der usage reported by Lee and Tweedie Other critic-isms, particularly the high level of aggregation, are a function of the types of decisions with which trade union decision makers are involved. Although our findings are derived from a single case study, and hence may not be valid beyond the context of the ATWU and the Lan-cashire cotton industry, they do provide an indication of some of the limitations conventional accounting reports have as a means of communicating financial information to employees and their representatives.The last section of the paper attempts to relate the findings of our research to the literature on accounting information disclosure and collective bargaining, and to draw out some tentative conclusions for improvements in the type of accounting information which is disclosed to trade unions. The primary piece of legislation governing the disclo-sure of information in the UK is the Employment Protection Act, 1975, which imposes a general duty on employers to disclose information requested by a trade union representative. However, there is also provision for employers to refuse disclosure if it is claimed that the disclosure would cause substantial injury to the company's interests. If such a refusal is made, the trade union can make reference to the Central Arbitration Committee and up until the end of 1978, 74 cases had been submitted there."" Although there were a number of instance where the District Secretaries in our study were refused informa-tion, none of these cases was taken to the Central Arbitration Committee.Two possible explanations are that the information refused may not have been consi-dered to be sufficiently important to the negotiations or that it could be estimated from sources other than management.Therefore, the absence of disclosure by management may not of itself impair the ability of trade union negotiators to make decisions. However, Pope and Peel argue that at the margin, voluntary disclosure will lead to more 'realistic' pay settlements since the absence of information increases uncertainty and encourages an upward bias in the initial claims put forward by trade union negotiators. Some empirical support for this argu-ment can be found in the 1971 pay negotiations between the Ford Motor Company and the Transport and General Workers' Union where, following a refusal for informa-tion about pricing policies, the trade union negotiators made their own biased estimates in support of their wage claim.Our research also suggests that one of the key variables in the determination of the quality of information disclo-sure is the personal relationship between the trade union negotiators and company management. Because of the structure of the Lancashire cotton industry and decentra-lisation of decision-making within the ATWU, most collective bargaining negotiations were conducted at the level of an individual mill or a small group of mills between one trade union official and one representative of management, usually the mill manager. Generally, the closer and more personal was the relationship, the greater was the disclosure of information. This may explain why some of the smaller, privately owned companies were willing to provide the District Secretaries with the information they requested but other similar companies were not. The personal relationship between trade union negotiators and management personnel is one aspect of 'management style and whether management style is an explanatory variable in the determination of disclosure policy, is clearly an area in which further research is required. In addition to the question of information disclosure, our research also considered the usage and usefulness of accounting information in the collective bargaining deci-sions of trade union officials. The conclusion of our study that accounting information, particularly information contained in formal accounting reports, is considered less important than other types of information, needs to be interpreted with great care. Firstly, this conclusion is highly sensitive to the definition of accounting informa-tion since some sources of information which contain financial data, for example work study reports, were frequently referred to in specific decisions. Secondly, accounting reports may contain information of relevance to trade union negotiators but this information can be obtained more easily and more quickly from other sources, for example the members of the trade union themselves. Thirdly, trade union negotiators may be biased against using accounting reports because they perceive that their contents only reinforce management's bargaining position. The consequence of this perception is that potentially useful information will be ignored. Notwithstanding these caveats, our findings do suggest that existing accounting reports have a number of de-ficiencies which limit their usefulness for trade union decisions and which probably reduce the extent to which they are used. We shall conclude this paper by discussing some of these limitations and suggesting how they might be overcome.Many of the District Secretaries in our study stated that they could not understand the information in accounting reports. To the extent that this lack of understanding is caused by the sheer volume of data and the complexity of the information contained in the reports, a simple remedy might be to produce more simplified statements on the lines suggested by Tweedie.In this context, it may be argued that employee reports already provide a summary of financial results but our study found that they are used least of any source of information. However, not allcompanies produce employee reports and unfortunately they are generally viewed with great suspicion by trade union officials because of their paternalistic tone. Of course, lack of understanding by trade union officials may also be the result of them having little or no training in financial matters. Although the responsibility for training negotiators primarily rests with the trade union, it can be argued that in certain circumstances managers should themselves consider adopting the role of accounting educators since they may benefit if trade union officials are made more fully aware of the financial performance of the company.It is probably the lack of understanding in accounting matters which explains the emphasis given to 'profit' as a measure of ability to pay. Foley and Maunders argue that ability to pay for an industrial concern should be defined as "distributable operating flow less the minimum re-quired return to providers to capital which is essential-ly a cash flow concept of performance measurement. Cash flow measures have the advantage of being more objective and verifiable than accounting profit measures based on arbitrary accruals and allocations. In addition, value added statements, which Morley advocates should be used as a measure of ability to pay in productivity negotiations, can easily be measured in cash flow, thus making clear the precise monetary rewards which each participant in the organisation receives out of value added.One of the major criticisms levelled at accounting reports in the literature and supported in the study, is the high level of aggregation of the information. This is especially the case where consolidated accounts are the only accounts prepared for an entire group of companies but it is also a pertinent criticism of a single multi-plant company. Clearly, from a decision usefulness perspective, accounting information should be disaggregated to the level at which the collective bargaining negotiations are taking place. However, there are both technical and political problems in providing disaggregated information to trade unions. The technical problems are concerned with how to allocate joint costs such as research and development and marketing, although many of the difficulties may be overcome if the basis of measurement is the direct cash flows to and from a plant. The disaggregation of accounting information is also a political issue since it necessitates an increase in the amount of information given to trade union negotiators. Some of this information may be of a very sensitive or confidential nature, for example details about transfer prices, and therefore the disaggregation issue is inextricably linked to a company's overall attitude to disclosure of information.We have thus come full circle!译文:题目：实证调查披露，使用和有用的会计信息由Michael Sherer, Alan Southworth 和Stuart Turley发表在© Emerald Backfiles 2007本文报告的实证调查结果为会计信息披露公司工会决策者。
与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译
与上市公司会计信息披露有关的外文文献及翻译Analysis of the Relationship between Listed Companies’ Earnings Quality and Internal Control Information Disclosure* Jianfei Leng, Lu LiSchool of Business, Hohai University, Nanjing, China1、IntroductionThe cases of financial fraud lead to incalculable losses in these years, which are related to firm’s weak system of internal control. Now, both domestic and foreign have issued a series of legal norms. For example, Sarbanes- Oxley (SOX) Act force listed Companies to disclose their internal control information, including internal control deficiencies and internal self-assessment report and external auditor’s audit opinion. We formulate two important files: “Shanghai Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”and “Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed companies internal control guidelines”. These files require companies to disclose internal control self-assessment report and comments of external auditor’s audit, which greatly improve company’s effectiveness of internal control and quality of financial information. Accounting earnings is the score and one of the most important elements in all of the accounting information, which mainly refers to the company’s ability of forecasting future net cash flow. Higher earnings quality is the key to the effective function of the market and the insurance of the company’s future cash flow. The better quality of company’s earnings inclined to disclose more internal control information and to get more outside investment. Therefore, earnings quality is one of the most important factorsto affect internal control information disclosure. In this article, with the analysis of multiple regressions, we examine the relationship of earnings quality and internal control disclosure of information in the sample of 1273 nonfinancial firms in shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2010.2. Prior Research on Internal Control Information DisclosureListed companies’ internal control information disclosure is mostly voluntary before 2002, but few companies are willing to do so. Since Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act is enforced, many listed companies are forced to disclose their information of internal control, which providing more material and information to scholars who study listed companies’internal control. Researches on internal control information disclosure are mainly concentrated on the following four aspects:1) The current situation and solutions of internal control information disclosure.There are lots of researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure,Mc. Mullen，Raghunandan and Rama [1] studied 4154 companies during 1989-1993, suggesting that only 26.5% companies are willing to disclose their internal control information, and that only 10.5% provide their internal control report among those companies with deficiencies on their financial reports. It shows that the proportion of companies voluntarily disclosing their internal control information is little, and that the companies with deficient financial report are more unwilling to provide the internal control self-assessment report. Hermanson [2] also did corresponding empirical research on listed company’s internal control information disclosure and got the same conclusion. Minghui Li[3] and Dongmei Qin [4] made related researches on the current situation of internal control information disclosure. They believed that current listed companies’ enthusiasm of disclosing internal control information is not strong, and much internal control information was not substantial but formal. Minghui Li [3] also drawn on the experiences of the United States in internal control information disclosure, and provided a series of suggestions and measures of improving internal control information disclosure. Hua Li, Lina Chen [5], Xiaofeng Dai and Jun Pan [6] analyzed the current situation of internal control information disclosure with internal control theories, and pointed out the problems and put forward the corresponding solution. Xinhua Dai and Qiang Zhang [7] mainly did the research on listed banks’internal control information disclosure, finding that our listed banks’system of internal control information disclosure is not standardized and sufficient. They interpreted the corresponding requirements of the US internal control information disclosure set by “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”, suggesting China to promote the improvement of listed banks’ internal control information step by step. According to relevant provisions of internal control information disclosure required by “Shanghai Stock Exchange Guidelines”and “The Notice on Listed Companies’Annual Report in 2006”, Youhong Yang and Wei Wang [8] analyzed the internal control information disclosure of listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2006 with descriptive statistics, and found many problems.2) Impact factors of internal control information disclosure.Bronson, carcello, Raghunandan and Doyle, Ge, McVay suggested that there is a correlation between corporate identityand internal control information dis-closure. Company size, the proportion of institutional investor holding, the number of audit committee and the speed of earnings growth have impact on internal control information disclosure. Many other experts did empirical study on such question. Ge and McVay used a survey method to analyze the sample, discovering that the disclosure of material defects is related to the complexity of the company but there is no direct correlation with company size and profitability. Jifu Cai made a relevant empirical study of A-share listed companies to find impact factors of listed companies’ internal control information disclosure. The results showed that the companies with a better operating performance and higher reliability of financial report are more inclined to disclose its internal control information, and vice versa. This indicates that the company’s operating performance and reliability of financial report affect the listed companies’internal control information disclosure. Adrew J. Lcone selected listed companies who disclosed material defects of their internal control information in their annual reports as samples to study the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. The results show that the complexity of corporate structures, the changes in company structure and the inputs to internal control are all the impact factors of internal control information disclosure. Shaoqing Song and Yao Zhang studied A-share listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2007, finding that there is a correlation between corporate governance characteristics and internal control information disclosure. Audit committee, annual statistics, company size and the place of listing have a significant impact on internal control information disclosure. Bin Wang andHuanhuan Liang [15] studied 1884 listed companies on Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2001 and 2004. They made use of their rating reports of information disclosure quality to examine the inherent relationship between listed companies’corporate governance characteristics, characteristics of operating condition and information disclosure quality, finding that corporate governance characteristics and characteristics of operating condition have a certain impact on internal control information disclosure.3) The cost of internal control information disclosure.The studies on the cost of internal control information disclosure are not very much. J. Efrim, Boritz, Ping Zhang thought that the costs of disclosing internal control information is enormous, and the management did not believe that the benefits of internal control information disclosure would surpass the corresponding costs. Maria analyzed the sample which discloses their internal control information in accordance with SEC requirements, primarily study the relationship between the costs of disclosing internal control information and the effectiveness of the internal control system. It is found that the cost of disclosing deficiencies of internal control information is far more than that of defect-free.4) Correlation between internal control and earnings quality.There are many researches on the correlation between internal control and earnings quality. Doyle [11] studied the relationship between internal control and earnings quality, and found that internal control is a motivation of earnings quality. The studies of Chan [18] and Goh and Li [19] are similar. Chan [18] discovered that earnings management of those who disclose thematerial defects of internal control has a higher degree but the return on investment is very low. Goh and Li’s [19] also found that company’s earnings stability can be increased after improving the defects of internal control. Lobo and Zhou [20] made a comparison on companies’discretionary accruals between before implementing “Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and after implementing it, finding that companies’ discretionary accruals decreased a lot after the implementation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Doyle, Ge and Mcvay [10] divided the internal control defects into two aspects: corporate level and account level, finding that internal control defects on corporate level is influential to earnings quality, but there is no correlation between internal control defects on account level and earnings quality. Guoqing Zhang [21] selected nonfinancial A-share listed companies in 2007 as a research object to study the internal control quality on earnings quality. The results have shown that there is no close link between high quality internal control and earnings quality, but company’s characteristics and corporate governance factors may affect internal control quality and earnings quality systematically. Chunsheng Fang et al. [22] used questionnaire survey to examine the relationship between internal control system and financial reporting quality, finding that financial reporting quality improved after implementation of internal control system. Jun Zhang and Junzhi Wang [23] selected listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 as sample, and used adjusted Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals and found that discretionary accruals significantly reduced after the review of internal control. Shengwen Xie and Wenhai Lai [24] selected A-share listed companies on Shanghai Stock Exchange in 2007 and 2008 as samples. They analyzed therelationship between internal control deficiencies and earnings quality by using a paired study, and found that listed companies’internal control information disclosure had an effect on earnings quality.Based on the above studies, we can see that internal control gets more attention after the promulgation of “Sarbanes-Oxley Act”. Current researches centralize on the defects of existing laws and regulations, the current situations of listed companies’internal control information disclosure, the relationship between listed companies’internal control information disclosure and their operating conditions, financial report quality and earnings quality. Among the current studies, most have focused on descriptive statistics and the relationship be-tween internal control quality and earnings quality, while there is no study use earnings quality as explanatory variable to reflect its effect on internal control information disclosure. Therefore, this article uses earnings quality as main explanatory variable and disclosure of internal control as the dependent variable to do empirical study, which compensate for the lack of current research to some extent.3. Method3.1. HypothesisHypothesis: the better the quality of earnings is, the higher the level of internal control information disclosure will be.According to agency theory and signaling theory, corporate trustee has obligation to report relevant information to the corporate capital owners, which give help to the operation of business. In the process of reporting, corresponding information is to pass the corporate relevant signal to the capital market. The signal can make the operator affect the flow of resources incapital market in a certain extent to improve the enterprise’s interests. There is the mutually reinforcing relationship between internal control information disclosure and the quality of earnings. A company that can fully disclose its information of internal control means that its managers have a good description of ethics. Meanwhile, a company that can take the initiative to show its internal control information in detail indicates that its company has a higher self-confidence, which will attract more capital market resources, increase its cash flow, enhance the quality of earnings, and improve management capabilities. Conversely, companies with good earnings quality will choose to voluntarily disclose their information of internal control in detail. They can distinguish themselves to the companies with inferior earnings quality and get more favor from investors.上市公司盈余质量与内部控制信息披露关系研究冷建飞，李璐（河海大学商学院，南京）1、前言近年来金融诈骗案件的发生带来了不可估量的损失，这与公司内部控制系统弱是有关系的。
信息不对称,企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets:A review of the empirical disclosure literatureMaterial Source:Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440Author:Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. PalepuFinancial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors. We provide a framework for analyzing managers’ reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital Markets setting,and identify key research questions. We then review current empirical researchon disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure. Our survey concludes that current research has generated a number of useful insights. We identify many fundamental questions that remain unanswered, and changes in the economic environment that raise new questions for research.1 IntroductionCorporate disclosure is critical for the functioning of an efficient capital market.1 Firms provide disclosure through regulated financial reports, including the financial statements, footnotes, management discussion and analysis, and other regulatory filings. In addition, some firms engage in voluntary communication, suchas management forecasts, analysts’ presentations and conference calls, press releases, internet sites, and other corporate reports. Finally, there are disclosures about firms by information intermediaries, suchas financial analysts, industry experts, and the financial press.In this paper we review research on financial reporting and voluntary disclosure of information by management, summarize key researchfi ndings, and identify areas for future work. Section 2 examines the forces that give rise to demand for disclosure in a modern capital-market economy, and the institutions that increase the credibility of disclosures. We argue that demand for financial reporting and disclosure arises from information asymmetry and agency conflicts between managers and outside investors. The credibility of management disclosures is enhanced by regulators, standard setters, auditors and other capital market intermediaries. We use the disclosure framework to identify important questions for research, and review available empirical evidence.Section 3 reviews the findings on the regulation of financial reporting and disclosure. Much of this research documents that earnings, book values, and other required financial statement information is ‘‘value relevant’’. However, fundamental questions about the demand for, and effectiveness of, financial reporting anddisclosure regulation in the economy remain unanswered.Researchon effectiveness of auditors and information intermediaries is discussed in Section 4. There is evidence that financial analysts generate valuable new information through their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations. However, there are systematic biases in financial analysts’outputs, potentially arising from the conflicting incentives that they face. While theory suggests that auditors enhance the credibility of financial reports, empirical researchh as provided surprisingly little evidence to substantiate it.Section 5 reviews the economic determinants of managers’ financial reporting and disclosure decisions. Researchusing the contracting perspective finds that accounting decisions are influenced by compensation and lending contracts, as well as political cost considerations. Researchusing the capital market perspective documents that voluntary disclosure decisions are related to capital market transactions, corporate control contests, stock-based compensation, shareholder litigation, and proprietary costs.2 The role of disclosure in capital marketsIn this section, we examine the role of disclosure in modern capital markets. Information and incentive problems impede the efficient allocation of resourcesin a capital market economy. Disclosure and the institutions created to facilitate credible disclosure between managers and investors play an important role in mitigating these problems. The framework for disclosure that we discuss in this section is then used to develop implications for research.A critical challenge for any economy is the optimal allocation of savings to investment opportunities. There are usually many new entrepreneurs and existing companies that would like to attract household savings, which are typically widely distributed, to fund their business ideas. While both savers and entrepreneurs would like to do business with each other, matching savings to business investment opportunities is complicated for at least two reasons. First, entrepreneurs typically have better information than savers about the value of business investment opportunities and incentives to overstate their value. Savers, therefore, face an ‘‘information problem’’ when they make investmens in business ventures. Second, once savers have invested in their business ventures, entrepreneurs have an incentive to expropriate their savings, creating an ‘‘agency problem’’.3 Managers’ reporting decisionsResearch on managers’ reporting decisions has focused on two areas. The first area, often called positive accounting theory, focuses on management’s financial reporting choices. We provide a brief review of this literature; Fields et al. (2001) provide a more comprehensive survey of recent research in this area. The second area, the voluntary disclosure literature, focuses on management disclosure decisions.3.1 Positive accounting theory literatureThe positive accounting theory literature focuses on management’s motives for making accounting choices when markets are semi-strong form efficient, there are significant costs in writing and enforcing contracts, and there are political costs arising out of the regulatory process (see Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 1986). The central focus of this literature is to examine the role of contracting and political considerations in explaining management accounting choices when there are agency costs and information asymmetry. Two types of contracts are examined, contracts between the firm and its creditors (debt contracts), and contracts between management and shareholders (compensation contracts). Political considerations include management’s concern about attracting explicit or implicit taxes, or regulatory actions.Contracts are not the only mechanisms for dealing with information asymmetry discussed in the positive accounting literature. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1983, 1986) discuss the role of reputation as a mechanism for resolving information problems in the context of auditing.Empirical studies of positive accounting theory test whether managers make accounting method changes or accrual estimates to reduce the costs of violating bond covenants written in terms of accounting numbers, to increase the value of earnings-based bonuses under compensation contracts, or to reduce the likelihood of implicit or explicit taxes. Findings indicate that firms that use accounting methods to accelerate earnings are small and have relatively high leverage. Also, firms’ accrual decisions appear to be affected by compensation contracts.While a majority of positive accounting studies focus on analyzing postcontracting opportunistic accounting choices, some studies view the choice of accounting and disclosure as part of the contracting process itself. Holthausen and Leftwich(1983) , Watts and Zimmerman (1990), Smithan d Watts (1992), and Skinner (1993) argue that the use of accounting information in lending and compensation contracts should be viewed as endogenous. Consequently, the nature of a firm’s assets and its investment opportunity set simultaneously determine its optimal contracting relations and its accounting method choices. Watts and Zimmerman (1983) examine the role of voluntary interim reporting as an ex ante contracting part of corporate governance. The ex ante role of accounting in the contracting process is also examined by Zimmer (1986), Christie and Zimmerman (1994), and Skinner (1993).Although positive accounting theory studies generated several interesting empirical regularities regarding firms’ accounting decisions, there is ambiguity about how to interpret this evidence (see reviews by Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). For example, size is typically viewed as a proxy for political sensitivity, but is likely to proxy for many other factors. Also, as Palepu (1987), Healy and Palepu (1990), and DeAngelo et al. (1996) P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu / Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 419 suggest, accounting decisions by managers of highly leveraged firms in financial distress may in part reflect an attempt to conserve cash, or changes in investment opportunities.3.2 V oluntary disclosure literatureResearchon voluntary disclosure focuses on the information role of financial reporting for capital markets (see Healy and Palepu, 1993, 1995). This research supplements the positive accounting literature by focusing on stock market motives for accounting and disclosure decisions.Disclosure studies assume that, even in an efficient capital market, managers have superior information to outside investors on their firms’ expected future performance. If auditing and accounting regula tions work perfectly, managers’accounting decisions and disclosures communicate changes in their firm’s business economics to outside investors. Alternatively, if accounting regulation and auditing are imperfect, a more likely possibility, managers trade off between making accounting decisions and disclosures to communicate their superior knowledge of firm’s performance to investors, and to manage reported performance for contracting, political or corporate governance reasons.Management motives for making voluntary disclosure and their credibility are, therefore, interesting empirical questions.4.ConclusionCapital markets are becoming increasingly global as a result of a variety of developments. Institutional investors are looking to diversify by investing P.M. Healy, K.G. Palepu / Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (2001) 405–440 433 around the globe; corporations are seeking capital wherever the terms are most attractive; and internet-based trading is making it easier for individual investors to invest in international capital markets. Financial deregulation is encouraging these activities.The globalization of capital markets has been accompanied by calls for globalization of financial reporting. This raises several interesting questions. First, is it optimal to have a global accounting standard setter given wide disparities in the development of financial reporting infrastructure across counties? Second, what economic forces will determine the speed with which convergence of financial reporting institutions will take place? Third, what are the political and economic consequences of such a convergence? Fourth, in the absence of convergence, will financial reporting informativeness be enhanced by global accounting standards?In summary, the increased pace of entrepreneurship and economic change has probably increased the value of reliable information in capital markets. However, the traditional financial reporting model appears to do a poor job of capturing the economic implications of many of these changes in a timely way. There is, therefore, an opportunity for future disclosure research to examine how financial reporting and disclosures adapt to changes in business and capital market environments. In addition, as we note earlier, there are many areas where our understanding of existing disclosure institutions and phenomena are limited. We believe that both opportunities make the disclosure area an exciting area of study for accounting scholars.译文信息不对称，企业信息披露和资本市场：信息披露的实证文献回顾资料来源:[J].会计和经济405-440 31(2001) 作者：Paul M. Healy, Krishna G. Palepu财务报告和信息披露是有潜在的外来投资者的重要手段，企业绩效管理，沟通和治理。
会计信息质量外文文献及翻译
LNTU …Acc附录A会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响安妮比蒂，美国俄亥俄州立大学瓦特史考特廖，多伦多大学约瑟夫韦伯，美国麻省理工学院1简介管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。
与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。
威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。
当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。
通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。
符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。
他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在口本。
他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。
我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金流量的不同影响。
直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。
为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。
我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性叮能较低获得债务融资的可能性。
然而，这种町能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。
具体来说，我们确定的数据样本证券公司有1163个采样公司（议会），通过发行资本公共债务或银团债务。
我们限制我们的样本公司最近获得的债务融资持有该公司不断融资与借款。
然而，在样本最近获得的债务融资的公司，也有可能是信号，在资本提供进入私人信息差异和约束他们放在管理中的行为。
会计信息披露问题研究-英语论文
会计信息披露问题研究AbstractIn recent years, accounting information disclosure has been the major concern of various stakeholders. While some entities have embraced the significance of providing adequate and accurate information to investors and other stakeholders through accounting information disclosure, others have failed significantly in this aspect. This research aimed to identify the key issues concerning accounting information disclosure and recommend strategies to mitigate these challenges. The study found that lack of transparency, inadequate disclosures, incomplete information, and ineffective communication werethe significant issues surrounding accounting information disclosures. Therefore, it is essential for entities to improve their information disclosure process to ensure transparency and complete communication of critical information.IntroductionThe financial information provided by entities is essential in enhancing the decision-making processes of stakeholders, including investors, creditors, and suppliers. Therefore, accounting information plays a crucial role in the success of an entity in various ways, such as attracting investments and improving credit ratings. The process of disclosing accounting information ensures transparency and accountability, which is crucial for the success and growthof an entity. Lack of transparency and failure to disclose accurate and complete information is likely to affect thecredibility and reputation of the entity negatively.In recent years, there have been various concerns related to accounting information disclosure by entities. The inadequate or incomplete disclosure of financial information has resulted in legal and financial risks for the entity, affecting its reputation and credibility among stakeholders. Therefore, it is paramount to identify the challenges that entities face regarding accounting information disclosure and recommend solutions to mitigate these issues. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the critical issues concerning accounting information disclosure, followed by recommendations for entities to improve the information disclosure process.Key issues concerning accounting information disclosure Lack of transparencyTransparency is the cornerstone of accounting information disclosure. Investors and other stakeholders rely on financial information to make decisions concerning investments, continue with their economic relationships, or avoid financial risks. A lack of transparency, whether intentional or not, can lead to inadequate disclosure of significant information, leading to serious financial and legal implications for the entity. This lack of transparency can be caused by the following factors:- Lack of clear financial reporting standards: Entities may fail to disclose accurate and complete information because of the lack of clear reporting standards. Entities sometimes lack clear guidance on what information to disclose or how to disclose it, resulting in incomplete or inadequate disclosures.- Inadequate internal controls: Inadequate internal controlscan also affect transparency. Entities with weak internal controls may not be able to disclose important information or may include inaccurate information, which could negatively affect the company's reputation and credibility.- Inconsistent reporting methods: Inconsistent reporting methods in accounting information may result in incomplete information, making it difficult for investors to understand the company's financial position.Inadequate disclosuresAnother key issue surrounding accounting information disclosure is inadequate disclosures. Inadequate disclosures occur when entities fail to provide complete informationabout their financial position or performance, resulting in a lack of transparency. This can occur because of:- Incomplete financial statements: Incomplete financial statements occur when entities fail to disclose all of the relevant financial information that stakeholders need. For instance, entities may provide insufficient balance sheetsthat do not provide enough detail to allow stakeholders to assess the financial position of the company.- Insufficient footnotes: Lack of sufficient footnotes can make it difficult for stakeholders to understand thecompany's financial position or performance. Footnotesprovide additional information about the financial statements, including significant accounting policies and financial information, which assists stakeholders in interpreting financial information.Incomplete informationIncomplete information is another challenge within accounting information disclosures. It occurs when the entity fails to disclose both negative and positive informationaccurately; all of this information is significant to investors when making investment or disclosure decisions. Incomplete information can be caused by:- Selective disclosure: Selective disclosure occurs when entities provide financial information based on personal preferences or points of view. They may choose to highlight positive information and omit negative information, resulting in incomplete information that does not provide a complete picture of the company's financial position.- Non-financial information: Non-financial information like social responsibility and ethical practices is relevant to stakeholders when making investment or disclosure decisions. However, entities may not disclose this information, leading to incomplete information.Ineffective communicationIneffective communication is another issue surrounding accounting information disclosures. Companies with inadequate reporting methods have ineffective communication systems resulting in incorrect, insufficient or inconsistentfinancial reporting. The main causes of ineffective communication that affect accounting information disclosures are as follows:- Poor language: Financial reports with a lot of technical terms can be difficult for some stakeholders to understand. Entities should use clear and concise language that is easy for all stakeholders to understand.- Complex organizational structure: Complex organizational structures can lead to ineffective communication systems. A complex structure can make it difficult for the entity to disclose critical information to all stakeholders.Strategies to mitigate accounting information disclosurechallengesTransparent and effective disclosures of accounting information are crucial for the growth and success of an entity. Therefore, entities must adopt strategies to mitigate the challenges that they face when disclosing accounting information. These strategies include:- Implementing effective internal control systems: Entities should develop and implement effective internal control systems that ensure the accuracy, completeness, and transparency of accounting information. These control systems will help entities to identify critical financial information that needs to be disclosed and ensure that this informationis communicated effectively to all stakeholders.- Enhancing the reporting process: Companies can enhancetheir reporting process by implementing transparent and clear financial reporting standards. This will ensure that all stakeholders receive consistent and accurate financial information.- Encouraging broader and complete disclosure: Entities should make comprehensive disclosures that provide complete financial and non-financial information to all stakeholders. This will help to increase transparency, enhance the company's reputation and credibility among stakeholders.- Improving communication systems: Companies should improve their communication systems to ensure effective communication of critical financial and non-financial information to all stakeholders. They should use simple language that is easy to understand and ensure timely communication of all financial information to enhance investor confidence and reputation.ConclusionThe disclosure of accounting information is essentialfor the growth and success of companies. However, many entities face significant challenges when disclosing this information, including lack of transparency, inadequate disclosures, incomplete information and ineffective communication. It is essential for entities to adopt effective strategies to mitigate these challenges, ensuring transparency, completeness and accuracy.Therefore, entities should focus on enhancing their reporting process, implementing effective internal controls, encouraging complete and accurate disclosure, and improving their communication systems. These strategies will help to improve accounting information disclosure and provide stakeholders with vital information that will enhance their decision-making process. Eliminating these challenges will not only benefit the entity but will also benefit stakeholders and the economic ecosystem.。
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财务信息披露外文文献
财务信息披露外文文献引言财务信息披露是指公司向投资者和其他利益相关方提供财务报告和其他补充信息的过程。
它是公司治理中的重要组成部分，旨在增强透明度、减少信息不对称，为投资者提供准确、可靠的财务信息。
本文探讨财务信息披露的外文文献，总结其中关键要点和研究结果。
文献一：《财务信息披露及投资者保护》作者： John Smith John Smith时间： 2015年 2015年要点- 介绍财务信息披露的重要性，包括提高市场透明度、减少操纵行为和促进投资者保护等方面的作用。
- 分析财务信息披露的现状和存在的问题，如信息不对称、财务报告的复杂性和披露标准的多样性。
- 探讨基于原则的财务信息披露制度的优势，如减少法律法规的束缚，增加灵活性和适应性。
- 提出加强监管和监督的建议，以确保财务信息披露的准确性和可靠性。
研究结果- 基于原则的财务信息披露制度在提高市场透明度和投资者保护方面效果显著。
- 加强监管和监督是确保财务信息披露有效实施的关键。
监管机构应制定明确的披露标准和规范，并进行有效的监督和执法。
- 财务信息披露的质量对投资者决策和公司估值有重要影响。
投资者需要可靠的、及时的和完整的财务信息来做出决策。
文献二：《财务信息披露对公司绩效的影响》作者： Jane Doe Jane Doe时间： 2018年 2018年要点- 探讨财务信息披露对公司绩效的影响，包括股价表现、投资者关系和公司声誉等方面。
- 分析不同行业和市场条件下的财务信息披露策略差异，以及与绩效之间的关联性。
- 讨论财务信息披露对投资者决策和公司估值的重要性，特别是在市场不确定和风险较高的情况下。
研究结果- 财务信息披露对公司绩效具有显著的影响。
信息披露质量越高，公司的股价表现和投资者关系越好。
- 不同行业和市场条件下的财务信息披露策略存在差异，需要针对性地制定披露计划。
- 在市场不确定和风险较高的情况下，财务信息披露对投资者决策和公司估值的重要性更加突出。
会计信息披露外文文献翻译
会计信息披露外文文献翻译文献出处：Ebimobowei A. A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in the Annual Reports of Nigerian Companies [J]. Asian Journal of Business Management, 2011, 3(3): 145-151.原文A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in theAnnual Reports of Nigerian CompaniesAppah EbimoboweiAbstract: Social accounting is concerned with the development of measurement system to monitor social performance. It is rational assessment of and disclosure on some meaningful domain of companies’ activities that have social impact. Thi s study examines the practice of social accounting disclosure in Nigerian companies. Forty companies from eight sectors quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were randomly sampled. Data were collected from the annual reports of the companies’ for the perio d 2005 to 2007 and the level of disclosure is measured using content analysis and descriptive analysis. The paper found that 82.5% of the companies sampled present social accounting information in their annual reports. The results show that Nigerian companies prefer to disclose social accounting information in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the Accounts in the form of short qualitative information. Human resources, community involvement and environment were identified as the most popular themes. Hence, the paper recommends among others that companies should take social accounting as a moral duty; legislation for all companies to disclose social accounting information in Nigeria; social indicators to be developed at thenational level in the area of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health care etc and professional accounting bodies in the country should collaborate to expand research in social accounting.Key words: Annual reports, social accounting, social disclosure, NigeriaINTRODUCTIONThe increasing need for every organization to disclose in their annual reports the various activities that affect the society is becoming a very fundamental issue all over the world mostly in developed economies, but this is not the case in developing countries like Nigeria. This is because organizations are particularly more interested in the profit maximization objective to the detriment of the society. According to Iyoha (2010), in developing countries, the concern is about how efficient organizations are in terms of how much profits are made and how much dividends are paid. No serious thoughts are given to social issues in the annual reports of organizations such as environmental protection, energy savings, fair business practice, and community involvements etc. Asechemie (1996) stress that the absence of financial data relating to actions and arrangements for social concern in Nigeria is not in accord with the trend in the USA, Europe and Canada where companies are required to report on the effect of compliance with laws governing corporate social conduct on capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position.The objective of this paper is to examine the social accounting disclosures in the annual reports of Nigerian companies. Therefore, the content of annual reports must provide information to users relating to social factors. AsMathews (2002) suggested in his study, documenting and analyzing what is disclosed in the area of social accounting should be one of the feature of corporate social reporting. Hence, this study attempts to answer two main questions: (i) what are the most popular types of social accounting and how is social accounting disclosed in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria and (ii) where is the location of presentation of social accounting in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the paper is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the theoretical and empirical literatures adopted for the study. Section three examines the methodology of the study; section four examines the findings and discussions while the last section deals with the conclusion and recommendations.Theories on corporate social accounting disclosure behavior:Gray et al. (1995) in Orij (2007) provided a much cited categorization of social accountingdisclosure studies. They talked about three broad classifications of decision usefulness studies, economic theory and social and political theory. The decision usefulness generally relates to the usefulness of accounting information, which is social accounting in this case. These studies are of two types, ranking of information on its perceived decision-usefulness in the financial community and investigations of information on effects on share prices. The economic theory studies are a periphery of agency theory and Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) research. The social and political theory focuses on legitimacy theory (LEGT) and stakeholder theory (STAKT). LEGT and STAKT are theories developed out of political economies. They are overlapping perspectives in a political-economic framework. Intheoretical term, Guthrie and Parker (1990) also analyse their empirical evidence in relation to a socio-political economy theory of social disclosure and suggest that:a political economy theory of social disclosure is both viable and may contribute toward our understanding of observed developments in national reporting practices. Corporate social disclosures have appeared to reflect public social priorities, respond to government pressures, accommodate environmental pressures and sectional interests, and protect corporate prerogatives and projected corporate image.Prior empirical studies: A number of studies have been published on the subject of social accounting disclosure. A number of these rely on content analysis of annual reports. There are several different methods to the analysis of narratives in annual reports. Bettie et al. (2004) distinguish two categories: subjective (analyst ratings) and semi-objective (disclosure index studies, content analysis, readability studies and linguistic analysis). Content analysis has been selected for this study because it has been widely used in the accounting research, particularly in social accounting disclosure studies. Since this is the method of analysis in the present study, we limit our review to these studies. Table 1 summary the methodology, sample and main results of these studies.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONLevel of social accounting disclosure: Table 2 shows that 33 companies (82.5%) from various industry groupings made social accounting disclosures at least for oneyear in their annual reports. Analysis based on industry, showed that chemical and paints, construction and petroleum marketing had 100 percent disclosure of social accountinginformation. The lowest level of social accounting information was 66.7% contributed by Breweries and conglomerate while companies in the building materials (75%), food/beverages and tobacco (80%), and healthcare (83.3%) level of disclosure from year 2005 to 2007. Therefore, it can be deduced that there is a growing concern for companies reporting social performance in their financial statements.Form of social accounting disclosure: Table 3 shows that in 2005 75% of the companies disclose social accounting information using narrative/pictures and 25% disclose with monetary formats. The year 2006 81% used narrative and 19% used monetary format while in 2007 84% used narrative and 16% monetary format. However, there were also companies that used both narrative and monetary formats of disclosure. Many companies were also found to have used the monetary format to disclose human resource information and environmental contribution primarily related to retirement benefit, training and development and some community based projects such as adopting school, scholarships and donations.Location of social accounting disclosure: Table 4 shows that 4(12.12%) of the sampled companies (Appendix) disclose social accounting information in the chairman’s statement; 17(51.52%) disclose social accounting information in the directors report; 2(6.06%) in the statement of accounting policy; 10(30.30%) in the notes to the accounts. The paper discovers that Directors report is the most popular location where social accounting information is disclosed by companies in Nigeria and also the “notes to the accounts”. This result is also consistent with Mamman (2004) study that Directors report is the most preferred location of social accounting information.Quantification of amount of social accounting disclosure:This study used only number of disclosure as the approach of capturing data through content analysis. Almost all companies disclosed social accounting information in short qualitative discussion and some have extended qualitative discussion where they have sections to disclose the social accounting information especially on human resources andcommunity based projects.Trend of social accounting disclosure: Table 5 shows the trend of social accounting disclosures in Nigeria. Twelve (12) companies representing (36.36%) reveals that human resources is the trend of social accounting disclosure in the annual report; two companies representing (6.06%) says the trend is fair business practice; nine (9) companies representing (27.27%) suggests community development; three (3) companies representing (9.09%) reveals that the trend of social accounting is energy; five (5) companies representing (15.16%) in their annual reports disclosed that the trend is on the environment; and two (2) companies representing (6.06%) disclosed in their annual reports that the trends is on the organization’s products. The analysis therefore reveals that disclosure of social and environmental activities is specifically on the discretion of the companies.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONThe study examined social accounting disclosure for a three-year period from 2005 to 2007. The type of social accounting disclosure, form and location were identified in the annual reports of 40 companies. This covers eight sectors of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study found that 82.5% of Nigerian Companies disclose one type or the other of social accountinginformation in their annual reports. These disclosures were voluntary in nature and largely qualitative; contrary to the developed and some developing countries. The most favoured places of disclosure are in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the account. The most popular theme that most companies disclose is human resources followed by community involvement and environment. Analysis done by industry found that the petroleum marketing, food/beverages and tobacco, chemicals and paints sectors provides a higher percentage of social accounting disclosure in Nigeria. Therefore, on the basis of the conclusion above, the following suggestions are provided by the researcher to improve the social accounting practice in Nigeria:﹒Companies should take social accounting disclosure as their moral duty; mere legislation would not solve the problem.﹒The government should provide some incentives like differentials in tax treatment, subsidies, rebates etc. so that companies can take social programmes.﹒Researchers should provide the basis and means of social accounting quantification as far as possible.﹒The government should put in place suitable legislation for all companies to compel them to make adequate disclosure of their activities to the society.﹒Professional institutes in the country like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria should work together for developing social accounting and reporting techniques.﹒Social indicators should be developed at the national level in the areas of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health education etc.译文会计信息披露，尼日利亚公司年度报告的实证研究阿帕·艾比莫泊威摘要：会计信息披露关系到对社会绩效监督的评估系统的发展。
论文翻译-会计信息披露与企业财务属性证据来自英国股市Accounting disclosure...
外文参考文献译文及原文会计信息披露与企业财务属性：证据来自英国股票市场学院XXX学院专业XXXXX年级班别20XX级（X）班学号XXXXXXXX学生姓名谢兵兵指导教师XXX XXXXXX2018年5月目录1 会计信息披露与企业财务属性：证据来自英国股票市场 (1)1.1 外文文献译文 (1)1.2 外文文献原文 (28)会计信息披露与企业财务属性：证据来自英国股票市场乔治·亚西里斯摘要本文重点介绍了英国企业财务报表的会计信息披露问题。
本次研究主要目的在于分析提供广泛会计信息披露的公司的财务特征，并评估其动机对财务的影响，例如需要筹集股权融资。
该研究调查了对于披露包含主要会计问题的会计信息的公司的财务特征，包括风险敞口、会计政策变化、国际财务报告标准的使用与对冲做法。
公司倾向于通过会计信息披露以确保市场参与者的会计政策与会计监管一致，并满足其利益相关者的信息需求。
研究表明，出于在资本市场和债务市场筹集资金的目的，企业往往会提供广泛的会计披露；并且提供信息性会计披露的公司似乎表现出更大的规模，更快的增长和和更强的杠杆措施。
调查结果还表明，敏感性会计信息的披露并未对公司的盈利能力产生不利影响。
事实上，提供详细会计披露的公司往往表现出较高的盈利能力。
国际财务报告准则的实施提高了财务报表的质量和可比性，同时也提高财务了报告的一致性和可靠性，有助于公司在国际市场筹集资金。
1 介绍会计政策的选择和激励因素会对会计信息披露质量和企业与会计信息使用者之间的沟通产生影响。
某些情况下，管理者通过影响所要报告的收益，来达到自身利益最大化目的，例如提高他们的声誉、加强股票回报与自身补偿计划（Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001; Hand & Skantz, 1998）。
同时，管理者也倾向于通过影响会计数字，以满足其财务义务，并遵守债权人设定的债务契约（Lambert, 2001）。
环境会计信息披露外文文献翻译中英文.pdf
外文文献翻译原文及译文(本文档归max118 网hh2018 所有，仅供下载使用)中文标题：印度环境会计披露实践的影响因素：来自NIFTY 公司的经验证据文献出处：The IUP Journal of Accounting Research & Audit Practices, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2016译文字数：3900 多字原文Factors Influencing Environmental Accounting and Disclosure Practices in India: Empirical Evidence from NIFTY CompaniesB Omnamasivaya* and M S V PrasadThe study examines the factors determining the level of environmental disclosure information by taking a sample of NIFTY 50 companies from National Stock Exchange (NSE). The environmental information disclosure is measured by using an Environmental Accounting Disclosure Index (EADI) and the variables used in the study are profitability, corporate size, age, financial leverage, industry type, legal ownership and foreign operations. The relationship is tested using multiple regression analysis. The results show that there is a positive relationship between EADI and profitability, financial leverage, industry type and legal ownership, and a negative relationship between EADI and corporate size, age and foreign operations.IntroductionClimate change is one of the greatest challenges that the world is facing today. Climate change is the variation in the global climate over time. The climate change creates manifold problems like global warming, glacier meltdown, soil erosion, land degradation, deforestation, loss of biodiversity and all kinds of pollution. Human influence on the nature is one of the major causes of such problems. Indiscriminate use of resourcesand undue influence on nature in the name of development can be identified as the prime causes of climate change. As a result, in the last few decades, the adverse effect of environmental pollution on economic development has become a public concern all over the world (Goswami, 2014).The state of world‘s environment and the impact of mankind on the ecology of the world have led to increased public concern and scrutiny of the operations and performance of organizations. Globally, corporations are expected to include environmental concerns in business operations and interaction with stakeholders. As a result, firms can no longer ignore the problems of the society in which they operate. This has thus instituted a social contract between organizations and the environment, thereby making environmental responsibility a corporate dictate (Olayinka and Oluwamayowa, 2014).Every business has responsibility to use the resources at judiciously. Every enterprise needs to behave like a good corporate citizen, and the corporate behavior is judged by its actions related to the community, the steps taken to protect the environment or pollution control. In the context of the Indian corporate sector, companies are not performing as good citizens. Due to this reason many laws have been laid down by the government for making the companies good corporate citizens and fulfill their social responsibility (Chauhan, 2005).In India, the economic reforms initiated in the 1990s have unwittingly contributed to a rise in environmental problems. The awareness level of stakeholders and public regarding the environmental issues has increased the pressure on companies to disclose environmental information. As a result, the companies have started disclosing the environmental information in annual reports and sustainability reports to satisfy all their stakeholders.The Indian government has taken several steps to protect the environment. It has set up the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) with the aim to coordinate, among the states and the various ministries, the issues relating to environmental protection and antipollution measures. Necessary legislation has also been passed. In India, Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and State Pollution Control Board (SPCB) were established under the Water Act. The CPCB has identified 17 categories of industries which are highly polluting (Joshi et al., 2011).In India, specific environmental accounting rules or environmental disclosure guidelines for communication to different stakeholder groups are not available for Indian companies. There is no mandatory requirement for quantitative disclosure of (financial) environmental information in annual reports either under the Companies Act or as per the Indian Accounting Standards. Furthermore there are 23 stockexchanges in India which are controlled by the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) Act, 1992. Each of these stock exchanges has different listing requirement for Indian companies to disclose environmental information. Therefore, any environmental disclosure by Indian companies is purely voluntary (Makori and Jagongo, 2013). Against this backdrop, the present study examines the factors determining the level of environmental disclosure information in India.Legitimacy TheoryIn order to explain the reasons for environmental disclosure, we use legitimacy theory. There are many theories which explain the various reasons for social and environmental accounting disclosures, but legitimacy theory is the most suitable theory to explain the environmental disclosure. Organizations cannot survive without meeting the societal expectations. The society expects that the organizations should be proactive in protecting the environment and minimizing the environmental hazards. In case organizations fail to meet the societal expectations, there is a severe threat to their existence. Nowadays Indian companies are legitimizing because of the awareness about environmental disclosure practices in the society. Therefore, Indian companies are taking several steps to protect the environment and are disclosing the relevant environmental information in their annual reports and company websites.Legitimacy relates to the environmental issues which are disclosedin the companies’ annual reports. This indicates the management concerns towards the community. Therefore, the management of different companies or managers have different ideas or thoughts about what the society expects and managers will adapt different strategies to show the society that the organization is meeting the expectations of the community (Zain, 2006).The theory of legitimacy is based on two fundamental ideas: companies need to legitimize their activities, and the process of legitimacy that confers benefits to businesses. Thus, the first element is compatible with the idea that environmental disclosure is related to the social pressure. In this context, the need for legitimacy is not the same for all companies due to the degree of social pressure the company is exposed to, and the level of response to this pressure. There are a number of factors which determine the degree of social pressure on companies and their responses to the pressure. These factors are potential determinants of corporate social disclosure. The second component is based on the idea that companies can expect to benefit by a legitimate behavior based on the social responsibility activity. In addition to that, the legitimacy theory provides a comprehensive framework to explain both the determinants and consequences of social disclosure (Mohamed et al., 2014).Literature ReviewKokubu et al. (2001) examined the annual reports of 1,203 companies to investigate the determinants of environmental disclosure. Environmental disclosure was measured by using an environmental disclosure index and the six independent variables used in the study were company size, financial performance, strength of consumer relations, dependence on debt, dependence on the capital market and type of industry. The study found that company size and industry type influence environmental disclosure.Elijido-Ten (2004) conducted a study on the determinants of environmental disclosures by using 40 Malaysian companies by applying stakeholder theory. The environmental disclosure was measured by using an environmental disclosure index. The study used three determinants: stakeholder power, strategic posture and economic performance. The study found that both top management and government power were the determinants of environmental disclosure, and it was also found that there was no relationship between economic performance and environmental disclosure.Yuen et al. (2009) examined 200 companies to investigate the relationship between firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure practices were measured by using a disclosure index and the independent variables used in the study were concentration of ownership, ownership by state, individual ownership, firm size, leverage,profitability and type of industry. The study found that individual ownership, audit committee, firm size, and leverage positively related to voluntary disclosure.Galani et al. (2011) examined the relationship between environmental disclosure and firm size by using 100 Greek companies. Environmental disclosure was measured by using environmental disclosure index and the independent variables tested in the study were profitability, size and listing status. The study found that there was a positive significant relationship between environmental disclosure and size of the firm and it was also found that there was no relationship between environmental disclosure and profitability listing requirements.Joshi et al. (2011) analyzed as ma ny as 45 Indian companies’ annual reports to investigate the factors influencing environmental disclosure. The environmental disclosure was measured using environmental disclosure index and the independent variables used in the study were profitability, size, accounting firm, industry, foreign operations, age, ownership and financial leverage. The study found that size and industry were significant determinants for environmental disclosure.Rouf (2011) examined the relationship between firm-specific characteristics and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) by taking 176 Bangladesh companies. CSRD was measured by using the CSRD index and the variables in the study were independent directorsand firm size. The study found that there was a positive relationship between CSRD and independent directors and firm size did not affect CSRD.Abdo and Al-Drugi (2012) studied whether any company characteristics influenced environmental disclosures by using 43 Libyan oil and gas companies. Environmental disclosures were measured using content analysis through word count and four characteristics were selected: company’s size, privatization, age, and nationality. The study found that there was a positive association between environmental disclosure and company’s size, company’s privatization, and company’s nationality; and it was also found that the age of the company was significant and negatively related to the level of environmental disclosure.Oba and Fodio (2012) examined the relationship between board characteristics and quality of environmental disclosure by taking 21 companies in Nigeria. Environmental disclosure was measured by using an environmental disclosure index and the independent variables used in the study were board size, foreign directors, gender mix, and board independence. The study found that there was no relationship between board size and environmental disclosure.Suttipun and Stanton (2012) conducted a study on the determinants of environmental disclosure by using 75 Thai companies. The environmental disclosure was measured by word count and the fiveindependent variables used in the study were size of the company, type of industry, ownership status, profitability and country of origin of the company. The study found that there was a positive relationship between environmental disclosure and size of the company.Development of HypothesesCorporate SizeMany of the researchers found a positive relationship between environmental disclosure and size, and many studies supported that large- sized firms disclose more on environment (e.g., Kokubu et al. 2001; Joshi et al., 2011; Suttipun and Stanton, 2012; Makori and Jagongo, 2013; Akbaş , 2014; and Sulaimana et al., 2014).There is a contrast between small enterprises and large enterprises. Large companies require more funds and for that they raise funds through external sources. For attracting the investors and to reduce the agency cost, large companies disclose more information and therefore get public support (Joshi et al., 2011).ProfitabilityThe profitability of a firm is an important factor in determining the environmental disclosure practices. As for whether environmental issues are important or not, it is argued that when the profit is low, the importance of environmental issues is low (Joshi et al., 2011). Many studies have reported that there is a positive relationship betweenprofitability and environmental disclosure (e.g., Nurhayati et al., 2015). A very few studies did not support that (e.g., Galani et al. 2011; Rouf, 2011; Akbaş , 2014; and Sulaimana et al., 2014).Many studies have used the profitability ratios like Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Investment (ROI), Return on Equity (ROE), Net Profit Margin and Dividend Per Share (DPS) to measure the firm profitability. This study uses ROE to measure profitability.Financial LeverageThe agency theory states that with the increase of debt proportion in capital structure, the greater is likely to be the conflict of interest between shareholders, creditors and managers; and the higher the agency cost, the greater is the incentive for managers to disclose more information. From the perspective of social and environmental responsibilities, companies with higher financial leverage are willing to disclose more environmental information to maintain good relationship with stakeholders (Joshi et al., 2011).Many studies have supported the association between financial leverage and environmental disclosure (Joshi et al., 2011; and Sulaimana et al., 2014). They reported that financial leverage has no impact on the disclosure level in India. Kokubu et al. (2001) stated that debt did not significantly influence the corporate environmental reports in Japan. However, this study uses debt-equity ratio for measuring financialleverage.Industry TypeMany studies have examined whether the industry influences the disclosure of environmental information, and many studies have supported strongly that environmental-sensitive companies disclose more environmental information than non-environmental-sensitive companies. Joshi et al. (2011) stated that environmental-sensitive companies in India are likely to disclose more environmental protection information than others. Akbaş (2014) reported that t here is a significant positive relationship between industry membership and the extent of environmental disclosure.ConclusionThe study examined the factors influencing EADI by taking a sample of 50 companies listed on NSE. The environmental accounting disclosure is measured by EADI, and the independent variables used in the study are corporate size, age, profitability, financial leverage, legal ownership, industry and foreign operations. The relationship is tested using multiple regression analysis. The R2 under the model is 0.6033, which indicates that the model is capable of explaining 60.33% of variability in the disclosure of environmental information in the sample companies. The adjusted R2 indicates that 53.72% of variation in the dependent variable is explained by the variations in the independentvariables. The results of multiple regression reveal that there is a positive relationship between EADI and profitability, financial leverage, industry type, and legal ownership, and a negative relationship between EADI and corporate size, age and foreign operations.Limitations: The main limitation of the study is that the data was selected only for one year. The sample size was also limited. Another limitation of the study is that there are many variables which may influence environmental disclosure like board of directors, CEO’s role, audit firm size, etc., but we have selected very few variables.Future Scope: There is huge scope for further research on environmental accounting disclosure in the Indian context, as there is less amount of research on this subject. Further research can focus on the relationship between environmental accounting disclosure practices and financial performance of the companies.译文印度环境会计披露实践的影响因素：来自NIFTY 公司的经验证据B Omnamasivaya，M S V Prasad该研究通过从国家证券交易所（NSE）获取NIFTY 50 公司的样本来分析环境披露信息水平的影响因素。
环境会计相关信息披露(英文版)(doc 12页)
环境会计相关信息披露(英文版)(doc 12页)Accordingly, it is logical that the public would want to know about the existence of any environmental issues for which a reporting entity might be held responsible. With this in mind, the underlying purpose for this manuscript is to provide an understanding of the magnitude of environmental issues in the United States, a brief history of the Environmental Protection Agency, environmental regulatory acts and methods of enforcement by the EPA, and current disclosure requirements for corporations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).Magnitude of Environmental PollutionEnvironmental pollution in the United States is a major issue. In assessing environmental pollution, specifically hazardous wastes, in this country, the EPA made the following statements:There are approximately 240, 000, 000 people in the United States. Try to imagine a ton of hazardous waste piled next to each of them, with another ton added each and every year.Hazardous waste is produced in this country at the rate of 700,000 tons per day. That's 250 million tons per year--enough to fill the Superdome in New Orleans 1,500 times over. (Environmental Protection Agency 1987, p. 14) Although it is true that the amount of hazardous waste is large, most of this waste is not dumped directly into the environment. Given sufficient incentives, most of the hazardous waste produced probably could be recycled as energy sources or be chemically stabilized.However, in the past, public corporations were not as knowledgeable about the impact of these hazardous wastes on humans as they are now. Additionally, they lacked sufficient incentives to, and were not required to, properly dispose of hazardous materials. Today, these companies are being forced to address their lack of foresight by acceptance of responsibility and, therefore, liability for past wastes. This liability ultimately leads to disclosure by public corporations. The EPA is the principal federal agency responsible for identifying the companies to be held responsible for these past wastes.History of the Environmental Protection AgencyPresident Richard M. Nixon created the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as an independent agency of the United States government by an Executive Order entitled "Reorganization Plan 3 of 1970." While most federal agencies have been created by Congress, the creation of an agency by executive order was unique and implied lack of legislative support.Designed to ensure the protection of national environmental health, the EPA has not always received meaningful support from Congress. Early budgets were meager, and the agency's main headquarters in Washington, D.C. was located in an old condominium。
政府会计信息披露研究_国外文献回顾与启示_王芳
第29卷第5期2014年9月北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）JOUＲNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVEＲSITY （SOCIAL SCIENCES ）Vol．29No．5Sep．2014政府会计信息披露研究：国外文献回顾与启示王芳，张琦（中南财经政法大学政府会计研究所，湖北武汉430073）摘要：政府会计信息披露是我国政府会计理论体系的重要构成。
当前，我国政府会计改革方兴未艾，在政府会计信息披露理论与实践亟须改进的现实条件下，回顾并总结国外政府会计信息披露的经验与启示显得尤为重要。
文章在对美国政府会计信息披露研究的理论框架进行梳理的基础上，从政府会计信息披露的政治市场与资本市场、影响因素与经济政治后果两个维度对国外政府会计信息披露研究成果进行了述评，以期为我国建立政府会计信息披露体系和开展政府会计信息披露研究提供借鉴。
关键词：政府会计;信息披露;政治市场;市政债券市场中图分类号:F810.6文献标志码:A文章编号：1009--6116(2014)05--0007--08收稿日期：2014--07--15作者简介：王芳（1978—），女，安徽天长人，中南财经政法大学政府会计研究所副教授，博士，研究方向：政府会计；张琦（1978—），男，湖北武汉人，中南财经政法大学政府会计研究所教授，博士，博士生导师，研究方向：政府会计。
具有决策作用的会计信息广泛存在于资本市场与公共领域（张琦等，2012）。
自20世纪90年代起，如何优化资本市场的企业会计信息披露一直是我国学术界关注的焦点，而公共领域的政府会计信息披露却较少有人问津。
公共领域中利益相关者对政府会计信息的需求缺失，政府会计信息披露主体的供给动力不足，是我国政府会计信息披露理论与实践匮乏的重要原因。
近年来，随着我国政治和经济体制改革的深入，政府会计信息披露环境发生了显著变化。
一方面，社会公众问责政府意愿的不断提升，建设服务型政府的理念转变，推动政府加快了财务信息公开的步伐。
会计环境信息披露外文文献
1. Introduction
A considerable body of research over the past two decades focuses on corporate environmental disclosure and what drives differences in the information provision across firms, industries, or time (e.g., Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Gao, Heravi, & Xiao, 2005; Gray, Kouhy, & Lavers, 1995; Guthrie, Cuganesan, & Ward, 2008). Many of the investigations rely upon statistical models to determine the significance of various factors posited to influence the disclosure (see, e.g., Aerts & Cormier, 2009; Brown & Deegan, 1998; Patten, 2002a, 2002b; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000, although also see Cho, 2009; O’Donovan, 2002; Laine, 2009 for examples of other approaches). However, as noted by Kadera and Mitchell (2005, p. 273), “model specification is a ubiquitous challenge in the social sciences” and has led to, among other things, concerns with the use of control variables in empirical analyses. Within the social and environmental accounting domain, a growing number of environmental disclosure studies adopt arguments from the economics-based voluntary disclosure theory (VDT) literature as justification for the inclusion of financial control variables in the explanatory models used (e.g., Bewley & Li, 2000; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, & Vasvari, 2008; Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Magness, 2006). Starr (2005, p. 360) argues that the inclusion of control variables in empirical models should be based on good theoretical reasons and only after “fairly extensive preliminary data analysis reveals. . . the form of the relationship.” In spite of this, we are aware of no attempts to date to assess either the theoretical justifications
《上市公司信息披露研究的国内外文献综述3400字》
上市公司信息披露研究的国内外文献综述目录上市公司信息披露研究的国内外文献综述 (1)1.1 国外文献综述 (1)1.1.1 关于IPO 信息披露制度的研究 (1)1.1.2 关于会计信息披露的相关文献 (1)1.2 国内文献综述 (2)1.2.1 有关科创板方面的研究 (2)1.2.2 有关注册制改革方面的研究 (3)1.2.3 有关注册制IPO 信息披露制度的研究 (3)1.2.4 关于上市公司会计信息披露质量问题的研究 (3)1.3 文献述评 (4)参考文献 (4)1.1 国外文献综述1.1.1 关于IPO 信息披露制度的研究保罗·马奥尼（Paul G. Mahoney，2006）的观点是交易所主体应该承担并履行监管的职能，制定更加市场化与竞争性的法规[1]；查尔斯·布莱斯特（Charles H.B.Braisted，2000）认为良好的信息披露可以实现使投资者们免于投资风险，同时引领企业进入资本市场[2]；马蒂亚·卡塔内奥等（Mattia Cattaneo，2015）认为监管的严格程度与IPO企业的生存率成正比，即监管严格可以提升企业IPO 的成功率，而宽松的审批政策会损害企业的生存率[3]。
1.1.2 关于会计信息披露的相关文献Robert A. Prentice（2006）的观点是，美国证券交易委员会对于资本市场与社会经济发展都起到正向反馈的作用。
会计信息披露系统是上市公司众多系统中的其中之一的子系统，作用是综合反映与公司运营管理相关信息，通过会计报表反映出来，从而提供给投资者及其相关信息使用者进行决策[4]。
Stavros Gadinis，Howell E. Jackson（2007）提出的理论与有效市场理论的主要内容是相符的，即资本市场中，信息披露的质量好坏可以直接体现在股价变化中。
当证券市场处于理想状态时，通过对信息的获得，股价可以及时、准确、充分地做出反应。
会计信息披露外文文献翻译
文献出处：Ebimobowei A. A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in the Annual Reports of Nigerian Companies [J]. Asian Journal of Business Management, 2011, 3(3): 145-151.原文A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in theAnnual Reports of Nigerian CompaniesAppah EbimoboweiAbstract: Social accounting is concerned with the development of measurement system to monitor social performance. It is rational assessment of and disclosure on some meaningful domain of companies’ activities that have social impact. Thi s study examines the practice of social accounting disclosure in Nigerian companies. Forty companies from eight sectors quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were randomly sampled. Data were collected from the annual reports of the companies’ for the perio d 2005 to 2007 and the level of disclosure is measured using content analysis and descriptive analysis. The paper found that 82.5% of the companies sampled present social accounting information in their annual reports. The results show that Nigerian companies prefer to disclose social accounting information in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the Accounts in the form of short qualitative information. Human resources, community involvement and environment were identified as the most popular themes. Hence, the paper recommends among others that companies should take social accounting as a moral duty; legislation for all companies to disclose social accounting information in Nigeria; social indicators to be developed at the national level in the area of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health care etc and professional accounting bodies in the country should collaborate to expand research in social accounting.Key words: Annual reports, social accounting, social disclosure, NigeriaINTRODUCTIONThe increasing need for every organization to disclose in their annual reports the various activities that affect the society is becoming a very fundamental issue all over the world mostly in developed economies, but this is not the case in developing countries like Nigeria. This is because organizations are particularly more interested in the profit maximization objective to the detriment of the society. According to Iyoha (2010), in developing countries, the concern is about how efficient organizations are in terms of how much profits are made and how much dividends are paid. No serious thoughts are given to social issues in the annual reports of organizations such as environmental protection, energy savings, fair business practice, and community involvements etc. Asechemie (1996) stress that the absence of financial data relating to actions and arrangements for social concern in Nigeria is not in accord with the trend in the USA, Europe and Canada where companies are required to report on the effect of compliance with laws governing corporate social conduct on capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position.The objective of this paper is to examine the social accounting disclosures in the annual reports of Nigerian companies. Therefore, the content of annual reports must provide information to users relating to social factors. As Mathews (2002) suggested in his study, documenting and analyzing what is disclosed in the area of social accounting should be one of the feature of corporate social reporting. Hence, this study attempts to answer two main questions: (i) what are the most popular types of social accounting and how is social accounting disclosed in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria and (ii) where is the location of presentation of social accounting in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the paper is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the theoretical and empirical literatures adopted for the study. Section three examines the methodology of the study; section four examines the findings and discussions while the last section deals with the conclusion and recommendations.Theories on corporate social accounting disclosure behavior:Gray et al. (1995) in Orij (2007) provided a much cited categorization of social accountingdisclosure studies. They talked about three broad classifications of decision usefulness studies, economic theory and social and political theory. The decision usefulness generally relates to the usefulness of accounting information, which is social accounting in this case. These studies are of two types, ranking of information on its perceived decision-usefulness in the financial community and investigations of information on effects on share prices. The economic theory studies are a periphery of agency theory and Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) research. The social and political theory focuses on legitimacy theory (LEGT) and stakeholder theory (STAKT). LEGT and STAKT are theories developed out of political economies. They are overlapping perspectives in a political-economic framework. In theoretical term, Guthrie and Parker (1990) also analyse their empirical evidence in relation to a socio-political economy theory of social disclosure and suggest that:a political economy theory of social disclosure is both viable and may contribute toward our understanding of observed developments in national reporting practices. Corporate social disclosures have appeared to reflect public social priorities, respond to government pressures, accommodate environmental pressures and sectional interests, and protect corporate prerogatives and projected corporate image.Prior empirical studies: A number of studies have been published on the subject of social accounting disclosure. A number of these rely on content analysis of annual reports. There are several different methods to the analysis of narratives in annual reports. Bettie et al. (2004) distinguish two categories: subjective (analyst ratings) and semi-objective (disclosure index studies, content analysis, readability studies and linguistic analysis). Content analysis has been selected for this study because it has been widely used in the accounting research, particularly in social accounting disclosure studies. Since this is the method of analysis in the present study, we limit our review to these studies. Table 1 summary the methodology, sample and main results of these studies.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONLevel of social accounting disclosure: Table 2 shows that 33 companies (82.5%) from various industry groupings made social accounting disclosures at least for oneyear in their annual reports. Analysis based on industry, showed that chemical and paints, construction and petroleum marketing had 100 percent disclosure of social accounting information. The lowest level of social accounting information was 66.7% contributed by Breweries and conglomerate while companies in the building materials (75%), food/beverages and tobacco (80%), and healthcare (83.3%) level of disclosure from year 2005 to 2007. Therefore, it can be deduced that there is a growing concern for companies reporting social performance in their financial statements.Form of social accounting disclosure: Table 3 shows that in 2005 75% of the companies disclose social accounting information using narrative/pictures and 25% disclose with monetary formats. The year 2006 81% used narrative and 19% used monetary format while in 2007 84% used narrative and 16% monetary format. However, there were also companies that used both narrative and monetary formats of disclosure. Many companies were also found to have used the monetary format to disclose human resource information and environmental contribution primarily related to retirement benefit, training and development and some community based projects such as adopting school, scholarships and donations.Location of social accounting disclosure: Table 4 shows that 4(12.12%) of the sampled companies (Appendix) disclose social accounting information in the chairman’s statement; 17(51.52%) disclose social accounting information in the directors report; 2(6.06%) in the statement of accounting policy; 10(30.30%) in the notes to the accounts. The paper discovers that Directors report is the most popular location where social accounting information is disclosed by companies in Nigeria and also the “notes to the accounts”. This result is also consistent with Mamman (2004) study that Directors report is the most preferred location of social accounting information.Quantification of amount of social accounting disclosure:This study used only number of disclosure as the approach of capturing data through content analysis. Almost all companies disclosed social accounting information in short qualitative discussion and some have extended qualitative discussion where they have sections to disclose the social accounting information especially on human resources andcommunity based projects.Trend of social accounting disclosure: Table 5 shows the trend of social accounting disclosures in Nigeria. Twelve (12) companies representing (36.36%) reveals that human resources is the trend of social accounting disclosure in the annual report; two companies representing (6.06%) says the trend is fair business practice; nine (9) companies representing (27.27%) suggests community development; three (3) companies representing (9.09%) reveals that the trend of social accounting is energy; five (5) companies representing (15.16%) in their annual reports disclosed that the trend is on the environment; and two (2) companies representing (6.06%) disclosed in their annual reports that the trends is on the organization’s products. The analysis therefore reveals that disclosure of social and environmental activities is specifically on the discretion of the companies.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONThe study examined social accounting disclosure for a three-year period from 2005 to 2007. The type of social accounting disclosure, form and location were identified in the annual reports of 40 companies. This covers eight sectors of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study found that 82.5% of Nigerian Companies disclose one type or the other of social accounting information in their annual reports. These disclosures were voluntary in nature and largely qualitative; contrary to the developed and some developing countries. The most favoured places of disclosure are in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the account. The most popular theme that most companies disclose is human resources followed by community involvement and environment. Analysis done by industry found that the petroleum marketing, food/beverages and tobacco, chemicals and paints sectors provides a higher percentage of social accounting disclosure in Nigeria. Therefore, on the basis of the conclusion above, the following suggestions are provided by the researcher to improve the social accounting practice in Nigeria:﹒Companies should take social accounting disclosure as their moral duty; mere legislation would not solve the problem.﹒The government should provide some incentives like differentials in tax treatment, subsidies, rebates etc. so that companies can take social programmes.﹒Researchers should provide the basis and means of social accounting quantification as far as possible.﹒The government should put in place suitable legislation for all companies to compel them to make adequate disclosure of their activities to the society.﹒Professional institutes in the country like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria should work together for developing social accounting and reporting techniques.﹒Social indicators should be developed at the national level in the areas of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health education etc.译文会计信息披露，尼日利亚公司年度报告的实证研究阿帕·艾比莫泊威摘要：会计信息披露关系到对社会绩效监督的评估系统的发展。
会计信息披露外文文献
本科毕业论文外文文献及译文文献、资料题目：Study on the Supervision System withV oluntary Information Disclosure文献、资料来源：Journal of Accounting&Economics文献、资料发表（出版）日期：2008年9月院（部）：商学院专业：会计学辅修专业班级：会计辅修专业09级姓名：学号：指导教师：翻译日期：2017年9月17日A Study on the Supervision System with V oluntary Information Disclosurein Chinese Listed CompaniesAbstractThe voluntary information of listed companies is based on corporate image, the investor relates, which is to avoid lawsuit risk besides the compulsory information disclosure. The information, which the companies disclosed on their own initiative, is the important part of disclosure information. It is an effective way that demonstrates their core competitive ability. The author analyzed the problems on voluntary information disclosed, which existed in Chinese mainland listed company, proposed the suggestion of constructing supervision system which listed companies voluntary information to disclose.Keywords: Listed companies, Compulsory information disclosure, V oluntaryinformation disclosure, SupervisionSystem1.As the expansion of the increase of the number of listed companies and the increasingly drastic market competition,the competition has become more difficult in more and more listed companies. In order to catch the scarce resource--the capital, companies tend to choose the way of V oluntary information Disclosure. Listed companies,with voluntary to disclose the information refers to corporate image, the investor relation, avoid lawsuit risk besides the compulsory information disclosure. However, the supervision system is not good enough; the information disclosed voluntarily is hard to be proof the truth. Therefore, it becomes more and more important to build the supervision system with voluntary information disclosure for listed companies.2. Motivation of Compulsory information disclosureInformation, the V oluntary disclosure, is the executives in listed companies on personnel benefit to disclose on own initiative. According to the economic theory of "the economic man rationality", the superintendents balance the behavior and do not take, completely based on the benefit and this behavior which is the costing. The superintende nt’s decision-making is also based on the cost benefit analysis, if the voluntary information disclosure brings the benefit is larger than the cost, then the superintendent can carry on voluntarily disclosed, otherwise, thesuperintendent rather does not carry on the voluntary information to disclose, their manners will change with the cost income relations changing. (Kai Xiang, 2004)With the China capital market gradually development, the business management authority can reduce the average capital cost, enhance the financial analyst and investor's interest, enhance company confidence level, improve investment relations, stand out company competitive advantages, enhance company stocks market fluidity, but also may reduce the company’s lawsuit risk ,bec ause the disclosure is not enough and so on, by disclosing voluntary information besides the compulsory information disclosure. The China capital market information disclosure also can gradually move to the stage of paying equal attention to voluntary and compulsory disclosure, not the simply regarding of the compulsory disclosure, the voluntary information disclosure will certainly to be the effective way,by which listed companies can demonstrate the core competitive ability, communicate with the stakeholders, and describe the company future. (Xianzhong Song, 2006)3. Content of Compulsory information disclosureListed companies, with voluntary to disclose the information is refers to corporate image, the investor relates, avoid lawsuit risk except for the compulsory information disclosure. Learning from foreign listed companies’ experience of disclosing information voluntarily , and according to the situation in China, the listed companies voluntary disclosure of information include:The forward-looking information, based on the company's “core competence”. It contains the operation,the business plan, strategic planning, business environment and so on. All of information can help investors to make rational investment judgments and decision-making;Information communicated with the market intermediaries and investors or the evaluation information from them;Information of human resources. Under the conditions of the knowledge economy society, human capitalbecomes more and more important. Particularly in the high tech, high-growth companies, employees are the company's most valuable asset. Research shows that these companies were significantly better than other companies,in the above-mentioned aspects of the voluntary disclosure of information;According to the accounting standards of the conservative principles, there is also lack of proper disclosure rules or low in requirements disclosure, which is useful for the investmentdecision-making, such as fair value;Corporate governance, environmental protection and social responsibility do not have mandatory disclosure information, because of complexity from the measurement and disclosure (Derong Zhang, 2004).4. Main problems exist in Compulsory information disclosure4.1 Low Voluntary Disclosure Rate and low initiativeA number of listed companies regard voluntary disclosure of information as an additional burden, rather than a kind of obligation or the right, which should be given to the shareholders. Thus they will be passive to disclose the information, that’s to say, they will take less disclosure as less as possible. With time going by, the concept of this understanding is accepted by people, so that the deviation in the information disclosure makes listed companies in a passive response. The main reason is that the listed company is too worry to tell the public the secret in its management, and thus the disclosure of information creates a psychological fear and evasive to them.4.2 Lack of integrity of Voluntary information disclosureToday, Chinese listed companies’ practice of disclosing information voluntarily is not satisfactory. Many listed companies are reluctant to disclose, and some listed companies only disclose the company's financial information;but the "bad news" or involved matters with a certain risk, or other seriously matters, the companies are kept silent.Moreover, many listed companies do not disclose fully credibility, hoping the investors rely on the “popular”, then to help them succeed .Chinese investors are not maturity, particularly in the processing, handling and analyzing information. Therefore, it is very difficult to judge the value of the company through the signal transferred by the company.4.3 The voluntary disclosure of false informationGenerally speaking, the voluntary information disclosure has high credibility. To the non-mandatory requirements information, managers often disclose the less likely to lead to the disclosure of risk information for reducing the risk of litigation and avoiding legal sanctions. In addition, the main motive of high-quality enterprises disclosing the information to the investors is to convey the signal quality of enterprises, so as to reduce monitoring costs. V oluntary information disclosure generally has higher quality. However, the absence of mandatory disclosure is as strict guidelines as regulate, and authorities have the tendency ofopportunism, prone to the problem of moral hazard.What’s more, the poor quality of the enterprises are based o n the theory of signal transduction, transmission of false information, the voluntary disclosure of information is not the same to the mandatory information , as to undergo a rigorous audit. And voluntary disclosure of information is difficult to guarantee the quality.4.4 Content of voluntary information disclosure is not standardAt present, mainly Chinese listed companies are the compulsory disclosure of information, and voluntary disclosure of information in some documents are scattered, in reality, Chinese listed companies ,disclosing voluntarily information, can not meet regulators, securities analysts and investors demand regardless of content or quality.Chinese listed companies in the voluntary disclosure of information content norms. The China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the "public offerings stock, the disclosure of corporate information content and format standards" of the relevant provisions of 1-6 in the annotated "Open-here," although voluntary disclosure of information to the left of the room, but the lack of specific guidelines and the corresponding policy support, the overall level of the listed companies to disclose information voluntarily is low. Therefore, Chinese voluntary disclosure of information is worthy of paying attention and needs to be solved.5. Improve Supervision System of Voluntary information Disclosure in listed companiesAs growing competition of capital in the market and the gradually standardization of legal system, there will be a growing trend of voluntary information disclosure for adapt with the complex and ever-changing and highly uncertain economic environment. For the problems existing in Chinese listed companies voluntary information disclosure, and learning from the practical experience on foreign listed companies, the author makes the following recommendations:5.1 Actively encourage and protect listed companies voluntarily disclose informationWith the gradually maturation of Chinese capital market, on the basis of the management company completing the mandatory disclosure of information provided voluntary disclosure of information. Therefore, the regulatorydepartments should encourage listed companies to voluntary disclosure of information, add clauses in the policies and regulations, encourage listed companies to disclose the voluntary information besides existing laws, regulations and rules, meet the investors’ growing demands. At the same time, in order to avoid some of thecompany's management should not be faced litigation risk and other problems, regulators need to study and formulate relevant policies for the company's voluntary disclosure of information act to protect them. "Deliberate manipulation" and"accidental factors" belong to different nature of the situations and treat them differently. It should investigate the law liability to parties in the first case. Otherwise, only the listed companies have adequate evidences and can explain reasonably, don’t look into their liability.5.2 Strengthen supervising and managing prevent to disclose the false information at will and protect the market orderOnce the voluntary disclosure information published, it must accept the essential surveillance and the restraint equally with the compulsory disclosure information. But voluntary information disclosure is still lack essential surveillance rules currently, should establish a set of voluntary information disclosure supervising and managing system, standard voluntary information quality. For example: to establish voluntary information assurance and compensation system, to perform the heavy fine to the enterprise which misleads the investor and so on. The negotiable securities supervising and managing department and the Exchanges should strengthen supervising and managing to voluntary information disclosure market, prevent to disclose the false information at will, protects the market order. The voluntary information disclosure supervising and managing should contain following several aspects: First, integrity, listed companies voluntarily disclose of the information are both "positive" information, also includes the "negative" information;Second, systemic, whether listed companies from different angles, through various information disclosure to reveal the same, whether formed a distinctive pattern of voluntary disclosure of information;Third, dynamic, long-term voluntary listed companies to disclose certain information, and constantly adjusted to improve the reliability of information;Fourth, widespread, as long as all investors equal access to all listed companies to voluntarily disclose information;Fifth, the comparative, whether the compulsory information disclosure is mandatory or not, it can be the standards of judgment for the quality of reference standards.5.3 Giving full attention to the role of market intermediaries to establish the authority of the disclosure of company information quality evaluation systemListed companies should strengthen communication with institutional investors, brokers, securities analysts and other market intermediaries. Understanding the company's external information needs to reduce the company's asymmetric information through voluntary disclosure of information. Giving full attention to the role of market ntermediaries, establish the listed company disclosure information quality evaluation system by market intermediaries. Acts according to the specialized knowledge and after the company interior information full understanding and the analysis by the market facilitating agency which it has makes the omni-directional appraisal opinion, regularly promotes voluntary information disclosure quality rating results, provides certain authority to information disclosure quality appraisal opinion for the investor, shows the risk by the police which the ordinary investor possibly can face. (HongYin, 2004).5.4 Strengthen CP A audit to voluntary disclosure of informationCPA audit is an independent, objective and impartial system, it can ensure the credibility of the accounting information. V oluntary Information is provided by the authorities. With speculative risks, the authenticity and reliability of voluntary information should be tested by certified public accountant. Although the audit of voluntary information is not as strict as the mandatory information, it should also have forensic capabilities by registered accountants carrying out the necessary scrutiny, to improve and guarantee the credibility of its information. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate and improve audit rules on voluntary disclosure of information, and to increase violation of professional ethics or legal responsibility for the responsibility of a certified public accountant.5.5 Introduction of voluntary disclosure of information regulatory documentsOn a global scale, the voluntary disclosure of information is an irresistible trend of development. With the increasing speed of the change of the economic environment, the requirement for the accounting information relevant are higher and higher, by the extraneous user, the existing compulsory disclosure information will be inevitably difficult to satisfy their information need. Therefore, the extraneous information user on the existence to the businessmanagement authority disclosed voluntarily some information help policy-making the demand. We believed that,every the one which does not fall in the scope of the compulsory information disclosure content stipulation, and be helpful to the benefit counterparts to the policy-making information, all may be defined as the voluntary information disclosure.United States Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 2001 on the voluntary disclosure of the contents of information provides as follows: "operational data, the analysis of the data management, and forward-looking information, relating to the management and shareholders of the information, not be confirmed in statements of intangible assets". Therefore, China should and must make a comprehensive and in-depth investigation for stakeholder information needs, and model the frame which the Stering committee proposed in FASB, namely confirmed some information is whether useful, by this to decide to provide the information or not, and standardize the content of the information disclosure. When the accounting standard setters sector and the securities regulatory departments are in the formulation of policies and programs should take into account that how to guide enterprises to carry out some of the disclosure of private information, and the securities regulatory departments should be introduced listed companies to disclose information voluntarily charter guidelines as soon as possible, to encourage and regulate listed companies voluntarily information disclosure.References[1]Kai Xiang. (2004). Listed companies to disclose information voluntarily Cause ofEconomic Analysis of the. Accounting Communications, (5).[2]Xianzhong Song. (2006). Enterprise core competencies of the voluntary disclosure ofinformation. Accounting Research, (2)[3]Derong Zhang. (2004). Enterprise voluntary disclosure of information.AccountingDigest, (1)[4]HongYin. (2004). Optimization of China's listed companies Opinion on voluntarydisclosure of information.Accounting Digest, (6)中文译文一个自愿性信息披露与我国上市公司监管问题的研究体系摘要:上市公司自愿性信息是企业形象的基础上，投资者有关，这是为了避免诉讼，除强制信息披露的风险。