军事英语翻译竞赛

军事英语翻译竞赛试题

I．汉译英题：

陆军是中国人民解放军的重要组成部分，主要担负陆地作战任务。由步兵（摩托化步兵、机械化步兵）、装甲兵（坦克兵）、炮兵、防空兵、陆军航空兵、工程兵、防化兵、通信兵等兵种及电子对抗兵、侦察兵、测绘兵等专业兵组成。按其担负的任务又分为野战机动部队、海防部队、边防部队、警卫警备部队等。

新中国成立初期，人民解放军陆军以步兵为主。经过几十年建设，陆续建立和加强炮兵、装甲兵、工程兵、通信兵等兵种和部队。1985年组建合成的陆军集团军，将装甲兵部队的全部，炮兵、高炮部队的大部及部分野战工兵编入集团军序列。集团军内特种兵的数量第一次超过了步兵。每个集团军都有数十个技术兵种，一百多种专业，专业兵种分队约占部分队数量的80%，专业技术兵员约占总员额的70%。集团军的火力、突击力、机动力、防护力和快速反应能力都有较大提高，能在上级编成内或独立遂行战役作战任务。

1987年5月，中央军委决定组建陆军航空兵，人民解放军一个新兴兵种从此诞生，加入到了陆军编制序列。今天的陆军航空兵已经拥有多种机种和机型，技术精湛的特级飞行员和能飞4种气象的全天候飞行员占飞行员总数70%以上。这表明中国人民解放军陆军开始由地面向空中扩展，由单一平面作战向多维立体作战转变。

21世纪的中国陆军，在进一步加强机械化的同时，信息化建设迈开了大步。电子信息装备的数字化、综合化、一体化、保密和抗干扰能力有所提高，利用、控制电磁频谱和及时、准确地遂行各种电子信息支援保障任务的能力得到加强。（608字）

II．英译汉题：

Information, the Growing Role in War

What does information dominance mean? Taken separately, the terms “information” and “dominance” seem easily definable. Together, however, they form a complex concept, as the latter term implies a form of hostile interaction. In the context of adversarial relations, the simplest, and most accurate definition of information dominance holds that it consists of “knowing everything about an adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about oneself.”The concept of dominance also implies that such an advantage “matters”, that it decisively enhances one’s own strength while debilitating one’s opponent.

The leading philosophers of strategic thought offer mixed views about the importance of information. Sun Tzu held effecting war-winning surprise attacks. Clausewitz, on the other hand, found that “friction” and the “fog of war” rendered the influence of superior information negligible. This debate remains unresolved today,

with adherents of each view found within and across national and service boundaries.

The historical record, both ancient and modern, provides support for both views. For example, Hannibal’s skillful use of signal mirrors during the Second Punic War kept him apprised of Roman movements, enabling him continually to spring decisive tactical surprises on his enemies. Yet Xenophon chronicles the saga of a Greek mercenary force --- trapped leaderless deep inside the Persian Empire and knowing only that the Black Sea lay far to the north and west --- which nevertheless fought its way to freedom. In the modern era, the outgunned Royal Air Force prevailed in the Battle of Britain thanks largely to its informational advantages over the Luftwaffe. However, in Vietnam, American ground forces operating in a sea of better-informed enemies, consistently won tactical victories.

Why has the role of information in warfare proved so mixed? Because, throughout history, while knowing more has often provided the necessary conditions for achieving startling victories, information dominance alone has rarely generated sufficient conditions for winning. Thus, the multitude of surrounding Persian forces failed against Xenophon’s hoplites because they couldn’t cope with the Greek phalanx.

As the foregoing examples imply, information dominance has, to some degree, hovered in the wings of warfare’s stage. However, recent indicators suggest its readiness to assume a major role in shaping the course and determining the outcomes of wars to come. This breakthrough stems from the increased size of the operational battlefield, which is the result of both the increasing accuracy and destructiveness of weaponry, and emerging ability to coordinate and control complex maneuvers, along with logistical support, over great distances. Just as the introduction orders written on paper a few thousand years ago transformed warfare by expanding a commander’s possible campaign and battle moves, so computerization, in its effects on information processing and precision-guided weaponry, will create its own revolution in war-fighting. Indeed, the new paradigm for conflict implies that information dominance will win wars, as the uninformed may lose the very ability to fight. The recent Gulf War may prove a harbinger of this form of warfare.

In the war to liberate Kuwait, U. S. forces enjoyed almost complete information dominance, and a form of “control warfare” emerged. At the tactical level, the Iraqis seldom knew the origin or strength of the forces attacking them. At the operational level, almost no capability for cohesive large-unit maneuver and combat remained after the first hours of the ground campaign. Unlike traditional blitzkrieg doctrine, which calls for penetrations and flanking attacks along the lines of what Liddell Hart called “the expanding torrent,” this campaign “end ran” around an entire field army, harkening more to the classic Mongol campaigns of the 13th century than to the fall of France in 1940. In General Colin Powell’s words, the Iraqi army was “cut off and killed.” His phrase conjures up the image of the opponent as a “living” system.

In sum, the foregoing argues that information dominance has always “mattered,”but that a variety of factors have now converged to enable it to fulfill its potential to achieve overarching effects in the realm of conflict. Finally, it is crucial to note that the exercise of information dominance in crisis and war will depend upon developing