企业融资优序融资外文文献翻译中英文

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研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献

研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献在研究中小企业融资问题时，寻找相关的英文文献是获取国际经验和最佳实践的重要途径。

以下是一些值得参考的英文文献，涵盖了中小企业融资的理论背景、现状分析、政策建议以及案例研究等方面。

“Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Global Perspective”, by P.K. Agarwal, A.K. Dixit, and J.C. Garmaise. This book provides an comprehensive overview of the issues and challenges related to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. It presents an analytical framework for understanding the different dimensions of SME financing and outlines best practices and policy recommendations for improving access to finance for these businesses.“The Financing of SMEs: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence”, by R. E. Cull, L. P. Ciccantelli, and J. Valentin. This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on the financing challenges faced by SMEs, exploring the various factors that influence their access to finance,including information asymmetries, lack of collateral, and limited access to formal financial markets. The paper also presents empirical evidence on the impact of different financing strategies on SME performance and outlines policy recommendations for addressing these challenges.“The Role of Microfinance in SME Finance: A Review of the Literature”, by S. Hossain, M.A. Iftekhar, and N. Choudhury. This paper focuses on the role of microfinance in financing SMEs and explores the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance as a financing option for SMEs. It also outlines the potential for microfinance to play a greater role in supporting SME development in emerging markets and provides policy recommendations for achieving this objective.“The Political Economy of SME Finance: Evidence fromCross-Country Data”, by D.J. Mullen and J.R. Roberts. This paper examines the political economy of SME finance, exploring the relationship between government policies, market institutions, and SME financing constraints. Usingcross-country data, the paper finds evidence that government policies can have a significant impact on SME access to finance and that countries with better market institutions are more successful in supporting SME development. The paper provides policy recommendations for improving SME financing in different political and institutional settings.“Financing SMEs in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India”, by S. Bhattacharya, S. Ghosh, and R. Panda. This case study explores the financing challenges faced by SMEs in India and identifies the factors that limit their access to finance, including government policies, market institutions, and cultural traditions. It also presents an in-depth analysis of the various financing options available to SMEs in India, such as informal credit markets, microfinance institutions, and banks, and outlines policy recommendations for enhancing access to finance for these businesses.这些文献提供了对中小企业融资问题的多维度理解，并提供了实用的政策建议和案例研究，有助于更好地解决中小企业的融资需求。

中小企业的融资问题外文翻译（可编辑）

中小企业的融资问题外文翻译外文翻译the Financing problems of Small and medium sized enterprisesMaterial Source: ////0>. Author: ModiglianiA thriving SME sector is crucial to spurring growth and reducing poverty in developing and transition economies. But financial institutions often avoid small and medium sized enterprises, sensing?understandably?that the transaction costs of financing them will be excessively high. What Small and medium sized enterprises need is not to be left without access to capital, but approached on a new model that combines early-stage equity investment and performance-enhancing technical assistance, writes Bert van deer Avert, CEO of Small Enterprise Assistance Funds SEAF. This US- and Dutch-based NGO manages a network of 14 commercially driven investment funds worldwide with total assets of $140 million, and has developed a unique “equity plus assistance” approach to Small and medium sized enterprises investing.Small and medium sized enterprises Sara widely credited with generating the highest rates of revenue and employment growth in virtually all economies. In transition and developing countries open to foreign direct investment, they also tend to pay disproportionately more in taxesand social security contributions than either their larger and smaller counterparts. Larger enterprises, especially multinationals, often find a way to reduce their tax obligations through transfer pricing, royalty payments, and negotiated tax holidays. Microenterprises, on the other hand, often fall in the informal sector, neither paying taxes nor making social security contributions.Yet if Small and medium sized enterprises constitute a critical dimension of growth and development and are often well positioned to achieve high revenue and profit growth, why have private and public financing institutions alike tended to avoid investing in them?The reasons are multiple and, for the most part, understandable. For private investors, the amount of work required to invest relatively small sums into several SMEs seems unattractive compared to the work needed to support fewer investments in larger companies. Moreover, investing in local Small and medium sized enterprises also often involves working with entrepreneurs who are less familiar with conventional financing relationships, business practices, and the English language than principals of larger firms. Accordingly, most private capital would much prefer to invest in a few large-asset There are broader issues to be considered as well, including the lack of transparency in local legal systems and governments that make investing in these countries difficult at best. enterprises in fields such as pharmaceuticals,telecommunications or privatized industry rather than in smaller companies with relatively few assets, low capitalization and a perceived greater vulnerability to market conditions. Public development institutions can also encounter high administrative costs in making small and medium sized enterprises investments. These can be coupled with perceptions that local Small and medium sized enterprises entrepreneurs may not be trustworthy, and that working with them might bring fewer visibly “developmental” benefits than targeting more poverty-focused fields such as microfinance Local commercial banks too are often biased in favor of large corporate borrowers with considerable assets. This has meant that even the lines of credit local banks receive from development institutions for on-lending to Small and medium sized enterprises are often under-utilized. Small and medium sized enterprises entrepreneurs’ lack of experience in accounting and other areas of financial documentation make it difficult for banks or other potential sources to assess their creditworthiness and cash flows, again hindering the provision of financing. Combined, these factors have largely left what should be the most dynamic sector of the economy in developing countries lacking the capital it needs to realize its potential.SEAF believes that the investment levels it takes, coupled with its focused efforts on increase value after investments, and allows it to invest at relatively attractive multiples. This offers an array ofpotential exit possibilities. By contrast, many conventional Emerging market private equity investors have had disappointing records in achieving exits over the last four years. SEAF’s approach to early-stage investing in SMEs thus may one day be seen as one of the more appropriate means of investing in developing countries. In the meantime, SEAF is achieving its developmental objectives by rapidly increasing the revenues, productivity, and employment growth of its investee Small and medium sized enterprises.The financial sector infrastructure will need to change to accommodate the substantial financing requirements of new activities and industries. Going forward, while financial institutions would need to transform to remain innovative and responsive to demands of their customers, efforts need to be directed to facilitate financing by non-banks for high-risk ventures. These include financing for knowledge-intensive and technology-intensive start-up enterprises where only ideas intangible collateral are principal assets. As such, these knowledge-intensive and technology-intensive enterprises will need alternative forms of financing to complement traditional financing sources. These alternative modes of financing include among others, venture capital and credit enhancements such as financial guarantee insurance and agriculture insurance.The financial infrastructure that supports Small and medium sizedenterprises in Serbia is undeveloped. Up to now, small and medium sized enterprises and entrepreneurs have financed their operations out of their own resources because financial markets in Serbia were isolated and lacked the support of international financial institutions. The local financial sector in the former Yugoslavia was designed to support large scale, socially owned enterprises ? otherwise known as the “Pillars of Development.” B anks, especially large-scale socially owned banks, had a redistributive function imposed on them by the state, and they dealt solely with large-scale, socially owned enterprises. In addition, the Fund for Development of the Republic of Serbia disbursed its funds to the same target group. Capacity to repay the banks or the Fund was not a criterion for credit approval.Economists have not always fully appreciated the importance of a healthy financial system for economic growth or the role of financial conditions in short-term economic dynamicsAs a matter of intellectual history, the reason is not difficult to understandDuring the first few decades after World War II, economic theorists emphasized the development of general equilibrium models of the economy with complete markets; that is, in their analyses, economists generally abstracted from market "frictions" such as imperfect information or transaction costsBut without such frictions, financial markets have little reason to existFor example, with complete markets and if we ignore taxes, we know that whether acorporation finances itself by debt or equity is irrelevant the Modigliani-Miller theorem.The former economic and political system did not support the development of financial instruments for Small and medium sized enterprises. Cooperation with SMEs focused on a few selected companies, while sole traders were almost completely excluded from credit transactions with the banking sector. SME owners and citizens completely lost their trust in the banks and channeled their savings into the grey economy, to banks abroad, or kept their savings at home. Only payments effected through the National Payment Bureau functioned properly for Small and medium sized enterprises.译文中小企业的融资问题资源来源:////. 作者:詹姆斯?沃尔芬森中小企业的蓬勃发展对促进经济增长,减少发展中国家的贫穷和经济转型具有重要意义。

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献Title: Financing Channels for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: A Comparative Analysis of Chinese and English LiteratureIntroduction:Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in driving economic growth, job creation, and innovation. However, they often face challenges in accessing finance due to limited assets, credit history, and information transparency. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing existing literature in both Chinese and English.1. Overview of SME Financing Channels:1.1 Bank Loans:Traditional bank loans are a common financing option for SMEs. They offer advantages such as long-term repayment periods, lower interest rates, and established banking relationships. However, obtaining bank loans may be challenging for SMEs with insufficient collateral or creditworthiness.1.2 Venture Capital and Private Equity:Venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) attract external investments in exchange for equity stakes. These financing channels are particularly suitable for high-growth potential SMEs. VC/PE investors often provide not only financial resources but also expertise and networks to support SMEs' growth. However, SMEs may face challenges in meeting the stringent criteria required by VC/PE firms, limiting accessibility.1.3 Angel Investment:Angel investors are wealthy individuals who provide early-stage funding to SMEs. They are often interested in innovative and high-potential ventures. Angel investments can bridge the funding gap during a company's initial stages, but SMEs need to actively seek out and convince potential angel investors to secure funding.1.4 Government Grants and Subsidies:Governments offer grants and subsidies to support SMEs' business development and innovation. These resources play a pivotal role in ensuring SMEs' survival and growth. However, the application process can be cumbersome, and the competition for these funds is usually high.1.5 Crowdfunding:Crowdfunding platforms allow SMEs to raise capital from a large poolof individual investors. This channel provides opportunities for SMEs to showcase their products or services and engage directly with potential customers. However, the success of crowdfunding campaigns depends on effective marketing strategies and compelling narratives.2. Comparative Analysis:2.1 Chinese Literature on SME Financing Channels:In Chinese literature, research on SME financing channels focuses on the unique challenges faced by Chinese SMEs, such as information asymmetry, high collateral requirements, and insufficient financial transparency. Studiesemphasize the importance of government policies, bank loans, and alternative financing channels like venture capital and private equity.2.2 English Literature on SME Financing Channels:English literature encompasses a broader range of financing channels and their implications for SMEs worldwide. It highlights the significance of business angel investment, crowdfunding, trade credit, factoring, and peer-to-peer lending. The literature also emphasizes the role of financial technology (fintech) in expanding SMEs' access to finance.3. Recommendations for SMEs:3.1 Enhancing Financial Literacy:SMEs should invest in improving their financial literacy to understand different financing options and strategies. This knowledge will help them position themselves more effectively when seeking external funding.3.2 Diversifying Funding Sources:To mitigate financing risks, SMEs should explore multiple channels simultaneously. A diversified funding portfolio can help SMEs access different sources of capital while reducing dependence on a single channel.3.3 Building Relationships:Developing relationships with banks, investors, and relevant stakeholders is crucial for SMEs seeking financing. Strong networks and connections can provide valuable support and increase the likelihood of securing funding.Conclusion:Access to appropriate financing channels is crucial for the growth and development of SMEs. This analysis of financing channels for SMEs, comparing Chinese and English literature, highlights the diverse options available. By understanding the strengths and limitations of each channel, SMEs can make informed decisions and adopt strategies that align with their unique business requirements. Governments, financial institutions, and other stakeholders should continue to collaborate in creating an enabling environment that facilitates SMEs' access to finance.。

股权融资论文中英文资料外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译文献Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstractThis article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are some concise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ preference to equity fund.Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually a nalyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betr ay to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference toequity fundAccording to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is the turn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund co st. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listed companies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies andpreference to equity fundStatic Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost offinancial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower conve rtibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincide with the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small ch ange in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which haveexcellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equityfundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstandin g shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than the average level of all the listed companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes offinancing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。

外文翻译--高成长型企业寻求融资中对优序融资和负债能力的考虑

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文：Pecking order and debt capacity considerations for high-growthcompanies seeking financingThis paper examines incremental financing decisions within high-growth businesses. A large longitudinal dataset, free of survivorship bias, to cover financing events of high-growth businesses for up to 8 years is analyzed. The empirical evidence shows that profitable businesses prefer to finance investments with retained earnings, even if they have unused debt capacity. External equity is particularly important for unprofitable businesses with high debt levels, limited cash flows, high risk of failure or significant investments in intangible assets. These findings are consistent with the extended pecking order theory controlling for constraints imposed by debt capacity. It suggests that new equity issues are particularly important to allow high-growth businesses to grow beyond their debt capacity.Although few in number, high-growth businesses contribute disproportionately to employment and wealth creation in an economy(Storey 1994).This makes organizational growth a central area of research in entrepreneurship and a major policy concern. Proper financial management, including raising suitable financing, is one of the key factors shaping high-growth companies (Nicholls-Nixon 2005).The purpose of this paper is to offer an insight into the discrete financing decisions taken within high-growth businesses. Information asymmetries are thought to be particularly severe in this setting (Frank and Goyal 2003), causing a substantial wedge between the costs of internal and external (debt and equity) financing (Carpenter and Petersen 2002a).We therefore focus on the pecking order theory to explain the financing choices of high-growth companies. The pecking order theory predicts the existence of a financing hierarchy, where business managers avoid the cost of externalfinancing if possible. As a result, they will first prefer to use internal funds, then debt and finally outside equity as a last resort to finance investments (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984).The impact of company characteristics on financial decision-making may vary according to the research setting (Harris and Raviv 1991).It is therefore important to test financial theories in settings where our knowledge is limited to determine the generalizability of the theories across different settings (Cassar 2004).Although high-growth companies are subject to the same market forces as any other company, studying the financing decisions of high-growth companies is germane for a number of reasons. First, a recent stream in the finance and growth literature discusses the importance of external equity from private equity investors, like venture capitalists and business angels in the financing of high-growth businesses(e.g., Baum and Silverman 2004;Davila et al.2003).Conversely, it is assumed that bank debt is an unsuitable source of financing, especially for innovative entrepreneurial companies (e.g., Audretsch and Lehmann 2002;Carpenter and Petersen 2002b;Gompers and Lerner 2001).Most studies in entrepreneurial finance have therefore focused on private equity financing, ignoring other potentially important sources of financing such as retained earnings and debt financing(Eckhardt et al.2006).In contrast to most contributions on the financing of high-growth companies, we do not limit ourselves to external equity financing, but empirically consider a diverse range of financing choices, covering internally generated funds, bank financing and new equity. Second, some small business managers may never consider the use of outside debt or equity financing (Howorth 2001).Most high-growth companies, however, have considerable outside financing needs. Internal finance is often insufficient to finance high growth (Michaelas et al.1999;Gompers 1995).Hence, we may expect financial decision-makers in high-growth businesses to at least consider a broader range of financing alternatives compared to those in ’’Mom and Pop’’businesses .By studying incremental financing decisions, our research addresses a number of drawbacks of previous research focusing on capital structure. First, traditional capital structure research does not distinguish between internal financing and external equityfinancing. However, this distinction may be particularly important in our setting characterized by high informational asymmetry (de Haan and Hinloopen2003).For example, an informationally opaque company with sufficient internal funds should be more likely to finance investments internally and hence should be less likely to attract additional external equity finance. Second, a company’s capital structure is the aggregate of its past financing decisions. Therefore, capital structure research generally masks information on the timing of the financing acquired. The characteristics of a business change as it grows, which affects the availability and suitability of different financing options(Berger and Udell 1998;Gompers 1995).For example, as a company grows it may invest more in tangible assets, which can serve as collateral and make more and heaper bank financing available. It can also become more profitable, making internally generated funds available. It is therefore important to take into account the dynamic nature of company characterisics and financing choices. Further, while most studies research financing choices of quoted companies (Fama and French 2005; Frank and Goyal 2003; de Haan and Hinloopen 2003; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999; Helwege and Liang 1996),we focus on financing choices of predominantly unquoted companies. Quoted companies have, however, more financing options due to lower information asymmetries (Berger and Udell 1998; Harris and Raviv 1991).This may lead to different financing strategies for quoted and unquoted companies.From a methodological perspective, the lack of longitudinal studies in entrepreneurship research has been described as a major weakness (Davidsson and Wiklund 1999).Our study analyses the incremental financing decisions of companies over a period of up to 8 years, during which all companies in our sample have grown extensively. We include start-ups, failed and merged companies, if they have grown considerably after start-up or before disappearing as independent entities. This implies that our study does not suffer from survivorship bias.In perfect financial markets, businesses will always find sufficient and suitable financing for value-creating investments (Modigliani and Miller 1958).Hence, financing decisions are irrelevant, and internal finance and external debt and equityfinancing are perfect substitutes. Real-world financial markets, however, are not perfect, and market imperfections cause financing decisions to matter for business development and firm value. Unsuitable financing decisions may have serious consequences, such as limited potential for future business expansion(Nicholls-Nixon 2005),financial distress(Carpenter and Petersen 2002b)or even business failure (Michaelas et al.1999).It is well established in the finance literature that market imperfections cause a considerable wedge between the costs of internal finance and outside financing (see Colombo and Grilli 2007; Carpenter and Petersen 2002a; Berger and Udell 1998).Asymmetric information is probably one of the most important reasons why outside funds are thought to be substantially more costly compared to internal funds(Berger and Udell 1998). Informational asymmetry entails that while business managers have private information about the value of assets in place and future growth options, outside investors can merely estimate these values.Faced with the risk of adverse selection, outside investors will demand a ‘‘lemons’’premium for the securities offered by the business (Akerlof 1970).The more risky the security, the higher the premium will be, as risk exacerbates the effects of information asymmetry (Myers 1984).As a result, companies prefer to finance new investments with retained earnings, which are not subject to asymmetric information problems. When internal funds are insufficient to meet the financing needs, managers will turn to more costly outside funds. In this situation companies are expected to issue the safest securities first as these will suffer less from information asymmetries and hence be subject to lower premiums (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984).This implies managers will first raise debt financing and only consider new equity as a last resort. The resulting financing hierarchy is often referred to as a pecking order and is one of the most influential theories in the financial literature (Frank and Goyal 2003).In this paper the focus is on the pecking order theory as a framework to understand incremental financing decisions. Consequently, this research is in line with prior studies, such as Helwege and Liang (1996); Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Frank and Goyal(2003),which focus on the financing choices of quoted Americancompanies. Their direct tests of the two main tenets of the pecking order model—i.e.,(1)companies prefer to finance new investments with retained earnings and(2)external equity is only issued as a last resort if outside funds are needed—have offered inconclusive and even contradictory results, however.Helwege and Liang(1996),studying a panel of US companies that conducted an IPO in 1983,find that the probability of obtaining outside funds is not related to a shortfall in internally generated funds, which is in contrast with predictions of the pecking order theory. However, consistent with pecking order predictions, they find that firms with a cash surplus avoid outside financing. Finally, firms accessing the capital market do not follow a pecking order when choosing the type of security to offer. Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999), however, draw a different picture of the predictive power of the pecking order model. Based on a sample of 157 US firms that traded continuously between 1971 and 1989, they conclude that ‘‘the pecking order theory is an excellent first-order descriptor of corporate financing behavior, at least in our sample of mature corporations’’(Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999, p.242).Frank and Goyal 2003) show that for a more elaborate sample of publicly quoted US companies, the greatest support for the pecking order theory is found among large firms. Smaller firms, which are expected to be more likely to be subject to information asymmetries, do not seem to follow a pecking order. Additionally, the pecking order theory prediction that high-growth companies will end up with high debt ratios because of their large financing needs is questioned (Fama and French 2005).Barclay et al.(2006)demonstrate that high-growth ventures consistently use less debt financing.Despite contradictory empirical findings, the motivation behind our choice of the pecking order as the main theoretical framework is clear-cut. Particularly, small and high-growth companies are subject to significant information asymmetries (Frank and Goyal 2003; Carpenter and Petersen 2002a), causing a substantial wedge between the costs of internal and external financing (Carpenter and Petersen 2002a). Consequently, based on theoretical grounds one would expect the pecking order theory to be particularly useful to explain financing behavior in our sample of mostly unquotedhigh-growth companies. As a result, we expect these firms to prefer internally generated funds over external funds if possible. This suggests that in profitable businesses internally generated funds will gradually replace outside debt and equity financing. Hence, inside and outside funds are substitutes.Our results are consistent with the extended pecking order theory, taking into account constraints due to limited debt capacity. More profitable companies prefer to finance investments internally. Companies using internal finance stockpile debt capacity and do not attract debt financing. Companies with excessive leverage and lower cash flow ratios are more likely to issue outside equity financing. It is striking that stockholders’equity is negative in more than 20%of the companies in the year prior to getting external equity. Companies issuing external equity may therefore be unable to attract more debt financing given the excessive leverage and difficulty to support additional debt-related payments. Businesses with a high risk of failure are more likely to issue new equity. Finally, companies that invest more heavily in intangible assets are more likely to attract additional external equity.Together these results indicate that retained earnings will gradually replace outside financing when possible. Bank debt is primarily used by low risk businesses, while external equity is used by high risk businesses. These findings are consistent with prior research focusing on financial decisions in private equity versus non-private equity backed firms in Belgium (Baeyens and Manigart 2005).External equity is particularly important for unprofitable companies, companies investing more heavily in intangible assets, companies with high debt levels and limited cash flows or businesses subject to high risks of failure. Consequently, external equity is crucial as it allows some high-growth businesses to undertake investments and grow beyond their debt capacity.Source: Tom R.Vanacker and Sophie Manigart, 2008. “Pecking order and debt capacity considerations for high-growth companies seeking financ ing”.Small Business Economics, vol.35.no. 1, pp.53-69.译文：高成长型企业寻求融资中对优序融资和负债能力的考虑本文探讨高成长型企业的增量融资决策。

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献，我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源，其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。

上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料

本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献出处：Abor J; Bokpin A. Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policy. Studies in Economics and Finance. 2015; 27(3):180-194.Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policyAbor J; Bokpin AAbstractPurpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Design/methodology/approach - This issue is tested with a sample of 34 emerging market countries covering a 17-year period, 1990-2006. Fixed effects panel model is employed in our estimation. Findings - A significantly negative relationship between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy is found. There are, however, insignificant effects of the various measures of corporate finance namely, financial leverage, external financing, and debt maturity on dividend payout policy. Profitability and stock market capitalization are also identified as important in influencing dividend payout policy. Profitable firms are more likely to support high dividend payments to shareholders. However, firms in relatively well-developed markets tend to exhibit low dividend payout policy. Originality/value - The main value of the paper is in respect of the fact that it uses a large dataset from emerging market countries. The results generally support existing literature on investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy.Keywords: International; Dividends; Corporate finance;1. IntroductionThe impact of investment and financing decisions on firm value has been the focus of extensive research since [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the "separation principle". The theory asserts that in a perfect capital market, the value of the firm is independent of the manner in which its productive assets are financed. In fact someauthors like [12] Barnes et al.(1981) support their view. However, others have contrasted the findings of the earlier studies suggesting that investment, financing, and dividend policy are related ([30] Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; [46] McCabe, 1979;[5] Anderson, 1983). This is predicated on the assumption that Modigliani and Miller's ideal world does not exist. Financial markets are not perfect given taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and uncertain inflation in the market place. According to [13] Bier man and Hass (1983), management usually addresses the dividend target payout level in the context of forecasting the firm's sources and use of funds. Considering prospective investment opportunities and the internal cash generation potential of the firm, both capital structure and dividend policy are chosen to ensure that sufficient funds are available to undertake all desirable investments without using new equity ([14] Black, 1976). But what constitutes a "desirable" investment? If it is one that has an expected return greater than the cost of funds that finance it, and if the cost of retained earnings is different from the cost of new equity capital, then dividend policy, capital structure, and investment strategy are necessarily jointly determined ([15] Black and Schools, 1974).Dividend payout policy is an important corporate issue and may be closely related to, and interacts with, most of the financial and investment decisions firms make. A proper understanding of dividend policy is critical for many other areas such as asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, and capital budgeting ([2] Allen and Michael, 1995). Firms' dividend decisions could also be influenced by their profit level, risk, and size. Though dividend policy has been identified as a major corporate decision faced by management, it remains one of the puzzles in corporate finance ([52] Obi, 2001). There has been emerging consensus that there is no single explanation of dividends. [19] Brook et al.(1998) agree that, there is no reason to believe that corporate dividend policy is driven by a single goal.Attention of empirical research has been at ascertaining the relationship between investment opportunities, corporate financing and dividend payout ([54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991; [6] Aviation and Booth, 2003). However, these findings have failed toestablish any clear link concerning this issue. Most of these studies tend to focus on developed markets. Little is, however, known about how investment opportunities and corporate finance influence dividend payout policy of emerging markets. This present study contributes to the extant literature by focusing on emerging markets. Firms in emerging markets tend to exhibit different dividend behavior from those of developed markets like the US. This may be a result of the differences in levels of efficiency and institutional arrangements between developed markets and emerging markets. It is, therefore, useful to improve our understanding of the issue from an emerging market perspective.The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout. The contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it considers a large-scale dataset covering 34 emerging market countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the literature on dividend policy. It also reviews the existing literature on the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study and also details the model specification used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 includes the discussion of the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Overview of literatureSince the publication of the dividend irrelevance theory by [47] Miller and Modigliani (1961), a lot of studies have been conducted in the area of determinants of dividend payout the world over. The dividend irrelevance theory is possible in a perfect and efficient market where stockholders are perfectly rational and there are no taxes and transaction costs. The theory, however, pointed out the importance of investment as being the main issue. Miller and Modigliani framework has thus formed the foundation of subsequent work on dividends and payout policy in general. Their framework is rich enough to encompass both dividends and repurchase, as the only determinant of a firm's value is its investment policy ([3] Allen and Michael, 2002). It is arguably said a company's overriding goal is to maximize shareholder wealth ([18]Berkley and Myers, 1996; [16] Block and Hart, 2000), but to [16] Block and Hart (2000) this concept is not a simple task as management cannot directly influence the price of a share but can only act in a manner consistent with the desires of investors. In the view of [61] Woods and Randall (1989), shareholder wealth is generally accepted as the aggregate market value of the common shares, which in turn is assumed to be the present value of the cash flows which will accrue to shareholders, discounted at their required rate of return on equity. These cash flows include dividend and perhaps more importantly capital appreciation except for its high volatility. Firms must, therefore, make important decisions over and over again about how much cash the firm should give back to its shareholders and probably what form it should take.Black (1976) observed that the harder we look at the dividends picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just do not fit together. This attests to the much controversy that surrounds dividend policy. The dividend puzzle revolves around figuring out why companies pay dividends and investors pay attention to dividend. To [18] Berkley and Myers (1996), dividend policy is seen as a trade-off between retaining earnings on one hand and paying out cash and issuing new shares on the other. The theoretical principles underlying the dividend policy of firms range from information asymmetries, tax-adjusted theory to behavioral factors. The information asymmetries encompass several aspects, including the agency cost, free cash flow hypothesis, and signaling models.Tax-adjusted models presume that investors require and secure higher expected returns on shares of dividend-paying stocks. The consequence of tax adjusted theory is the division of investors into dividend tax clientele and the clientele effect is responsible for the alterations in portfolio composition ([49] Modigliani, 1982). To [45] Marsalis and Truman (1988), investors with differing tax liabilities will not be uniform in their ideal firm dividend policy. They conclude that as tax liability increases, the dividend payment decreases while earnings reinvestment increases and vice versa.Shareholders typically face the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in the face of separation of ownership and control. The problem of information asymmetry is evident in conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. It holds that insiders such as managers have more information about the firm's cash flow than the providers of the funds. Agency costs are lower in firms with high managerial ownership stakes because of better alignment of shareholder and managerial control ([39] Jensen and Heckling, 1976) and also in firms with large block shareholders that are better able to monitor managerial activities ([57] Heifer and Vishnu, 1986). [27] Fame and Jensen (1983) argue that agency problems can be resolved by the payment of large dividend to shareholders.According to the free cash flow model, [37] Jensen (1986) explains that finance available after financing all positive net present value projects can result in conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Clearly, dividends and debt interest payment decrease the free cash flow available to managers to invest in marginal net present value projects and manager perquisite consumption. Firms with higher levels of cash flow should have higher dividend payout and/or higher leverage.The signaling theory suggests that corporate dividend policy used as a means of putting quality message across has a lower cost than other alternatives ([48] Miller and Rock, 1985; [8] Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This was developed initially for the labor market but its usefulness has been felt in the financial markets. [7] Aero (1970) defines signaling effect as a unique and specific signaling equilibrium in which a job seeker signals his/her quality to a prospective employer. The signaling theory suggests that dividends are used to signal managements' private information regarding the future earnings of the firm. Investors often see announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as managers' forecast of future earnings changes ([34] Healy and Pileup, 1988). Dividends are used in signaling the future prospects, and dividends are paid even if there is profitable investment opportunity ([11] Baker et al., 1985; [54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991).2.1 Investment opportunities and dividend payoutThe investment opportunities available to the firm constitute an important component of market value. The investment opportunity set of a firm affects the way the firm is viewed by managers, owners, investors, and creditors ([43] Caliper and Tremble, 2001). The literature has given considerable attention in recent years to examining the association between investment opportunity set and corporate policy choices, including financing, dividend, and compensation policies ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992;[29] Giver and Giver, 1993; [41] Caliper and Tremble, 1999; [40] Jones and Sharma, 2001; [1] Abbott, 2001). According to [40] Jones (2001), investment opportunity set represents a firm's investment or growth options but to [51] Myers (1977) its value depends on the discretional expenditures of managers. [51] Myers (1977) further explains investment opportunity as a yet-to-be realized potentially profitable project that a firm can exploit for economic rents. Thus, this represents the component of the firm's value resulting from options to make future investments ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992).Growth opportunities are also represented by the relative fraction of firm value that is accounted for by assets in place (plant, equipment, and other tangible assets), and that the lower the fraction of firm value represented by assets in place, the higher the growth opportunities ([32] Gull and Kelley, 1999). [43] Caliper and Tremble (2001) suggest that, the conventional notion of investment opportunity set is of new capital expenditure made to introduce a new product or expand production of an existing product. This may include an option to make expenditure to reduce costs during a corporate restructuring. An investment opportunity has been measured in various ways by various writers. These include market to book value of equity ([21] Collins and Kithara, 1989; [20] Chung and Charoenwong, 1991), book to market value of assets ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992), and Tobin's q ([58] Skinner, 1993).Existing literature suggests a relationship between investment opportunities and dividend policy. [59] Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with high investment opportunity set are likely to pursue a low dividend payout policy, since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources ([29] Giverand Giver, 1993). [40] Jones (2001), extending and modifying the work of [29] Giver and Gaver (1993), found out that high growth firms were associated with significantly lower dividend yields. [32] Gul and Kealey (1999) also found a negative relationship between growth options and dividends. [1] Abbott (2001) argues that firms that experienced an investment opportunity set expansion (decrease) generally reduced (increase) their dividend payout policy. Others support the fact that firms with higher market-to-book value tend to have good investment opportunities, and would retain more funds to finance such investment, thus recording lower dividend payout ratios ([56] Rozeff, 1982; [44] Lloyd et al. , 1985; [22] Collins et al. , 1996; [4] Amidu and Abor, 2006). [55] Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2001) also validated the fact that firms in high investment opportunity set group are "PE valued" whilst firms in low investment opportunity set are "dividend yield valued". This implies that for firms in low investment opportunity set, dividends are of greater relevance than earnings whilst the opposite is true for firms in high investment opportunity set. Using market-to-book ratio as proxy for investment opportunity set, [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), however, found a positive relationship between market-to-book value ratio and dividend payments, suggesting that firms with higher investment opportunities rather pay higher dividends.2.2 Corporate finance and dividend payoutThe financing choice of firms is perhaps the most researched area in finance in the past decades following the seminal article of [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) raising the issue of the relationship between a firms choice of finance and its value. Recently, there are still increasing research and new evidence being sought for the relevance or otherwise of the theory started by Modigliani and Miller. The theorem hinges on the principle of perfect capital markets. This asserts that firm value is completely independent of how its productive assets are financed. Subsequent researches have suggested a relationship between choice of financing and firm value even though some researchers corroborated the findings of Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory ([26] Fama, 1974; [54] Pruitt and Gitman, 1991). However, studiesby [5] Anderson (1983), [53] Peterson and Benesh (1983) have proved that in the "real world" market imperfections effectively prohibit the independence of firm's investment and financing decisions. This market imperfection is primarily coming from the fact that there are taxes, transaction cost, information asymmetry, and bankruptcy cost. This indicates a relationship between the choice of financing and firm value.Financial leverage is said to play an important role in reducing agency costs arising from shareholder-manager conflict and is believed to play a vital role of monitoring managers ([39] Jensen and Meckling, 1976; [37] Jensen, 1986; [60] Stulz, 1988). [28] Farinha (2003) contends that debt is likely to influence dividend decisions because of debt covenants and related restrictions that may be imposed by debtholders. Also, firms with high financial leverage and implied financial risk tend to avoid paying high dividends, so they can accommodate risk associated with the use of debt finance. [56] Rozeff (1982), [25] Easterbrook (1984) and [22] Collins et al. (1996) extending the agency theory observe that firms pay dividend and raise capital simultaneously. In the view of [25] Easterbrook (1984), increasing dividends raises the probability that additional capital will have to be raised externally on a periodic basis. This view is also shared by [31] Green et al. (1993) who argue that dividend payout levels are not totally decided after a firm's financing has been made. [35] Higgins (1972) suggests that firms' dividend payout ratio could be negatively influenced by their need for finance. Thus, dividend decision is taken alongside financing decisions. [36] Higgins (1981) shows a direct link between growth and financing needs, in that rapidly growing firms have external financing need because working capital needs normally exceed the incremental cash flows from new sales. [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003) support the fact that financial constraints can affect dividend decisions, therefore, firms with relatively less debt have greater financial slack and are more likely to pay and maintain their dividends.3. Data and econometric method3.1 Data and variable constructionThis study examines the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on the dividend payout policy of emerging market firms. Our dataset is composed of accounting and market data for a large sample of publicly traded firms in 34 emerging market countries over the period 1990-2006. These countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. This information is obtained through the Corporate Vulnerability Utility of the International Monetary Fund. The corporate vulnerability utility provides indicators for surveillance of the corporate sector and it relies on accounting data from Worldscope and market data mainly from Datastream.The dependent variable, dividend payout is defined as the ratio of dividend to capital. Dividend is total cash dividend paid to equity and preferred shareholders. The independent variables include investment opportunity set and corporate finance. We also control for profitability, risk, market capitalization, and two other macroeconomic variables: inflation rate and log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a measure of the country's income level.In terms of the independent variables, Tobin's q is used as a proxy for investment opportunity set. Three measures of corporate finance are used. These are; financial leverage (the ratio of debt to equity), external finance (the ratio of external finance to total finance), and debt maturity (the ratio of short-term debt to total debt).In terms of the control variables, profitability is measured as return on assets. Profitability is considered as the primary indicator of the firm's capacity to declare and pay dividends. [11] Baker et al. (1985) find that a major determinant of dividend payment is the anticipated level of future earnings. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) also report that current and past years' profits are important in influencing dividend payments. Others such as [38] Jensen et al. (1992), [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), and [4] Amidu and Abor (2006) find evidence of a positive association betweenprofitability and dividend payouts. [10] Baker (1989) finds that an important reason cited by firms for not paying dividends is "poor earnings". Similarly, [23] DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that a significant proportion of firms with losses over a five year period, tend to omit their dividends entirely. A positive relationship should exist between profitability and dividend payout.Risk is defined using the O-Score, which is a measure of probability of default. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) find that risk is a major determinant of firms' dividend policy. Firms which have higher risk profiles are more likely to maintain lower dividend payout policy compared with those with lower risk profiles. Using ßvalue of a firm as a measure of its market risk, [56] Rozeff (1982), [44] Lloyd et al. (1985), and [22] Collins et al. (1996) found a significantly negative relationship between ßand dividend payout. Their findings suggest that firms having a higher level of market risk will pursue lower dividend payout policy. [24] D'Souza (1999) also suggests that risk is significantly and negatively related with firms' dividend payout. We expect risk to be negatively related to dividend payout.We control for size of the market. This is defined as ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Size of the market is used as a proxy for capital market access. Firms with better access to the capital market should be able to pay higher dividends ([6] Aivazian and Booth, 2003). It is expected that a positive relationship will exist between market capitalization and dividend payout policy.We also control for two macroeconomic variables: inflation and GDP per capita. Inflation is the inflation rate. GDP per capita is log of GDP per capita and is included as a measure of the country's income level.3.2 Model specificationWe estimate the following panel data regression model: Equation 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where subscript i and t represent the country and time, respectively. Y is a measure of dividend payout. Invt is a measure of investment opportunity set. Fin are measures of corporate finance variables including, financialleverage, external finance, and debt maturity. X are the control variables and include profitability, risk, stock market capitalization, inflation, and GDP per capita. μ is the error term. Using this model, it is possible to investigate the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout policy.3.3 Estimation issuesThis study adopts a panel data method given that it allows for broader set of data points. Therefore, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. Also, panel data can control for individual heterogeneity due to hidden factors, which, if neglected in time-series or cross section estimations leads to biased results ([9] Baltagi, 2005). The panel regression equation differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression by the double subscript attached to each variable. The general form of the model can be written as: Equation 2 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where α is a scalar, ßis KX 1 and X it is the it th observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that the μit follow a one-way error component model: Equation 3 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where μi is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservable individual-specific effect that is not included in the regression model. The term V it represents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual countries and time. It can be thought of as the usual disturbance in the regression. The choice of the model estimation whether random effects or fixed effects will depend on the underlying assumptions. In a random effect model, μi and V it are random with known disturbances. In the fixed effects model, the μi are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic with V it independent and identically distributed, i.e. νit∼iid (0,σν2 ). The explanatory variables X it are assumed independent of the V it for all i and t . We use the [62] Hausman (1978) specification test in choosing the appropriate model. We report the results of the Hausman specification test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.].4. Empirical results4.1 Descriptive statisticsTable I [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. The sample covers 34 emerging countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. It reports the mean and standard deviation of all the variables used in the study as well as the number of observations over the sample period. The mean value for the dependent variable (dividend payout) is 0.32, implying that across the sample countries the average dividend payout is 32 percent. There is, however, a variation in the dependent variable across the countries over the time period as shown by standard deviation of 0.49 with a minimum and maximum dividend payout of 0.00 and 3.93, respectively.The mean investment opportunity set measured by the Tobin's q is 1.05 with a variation of 0.52. All the countries have positive investment opportunities with minimum and maximum values of 0.06 and 5.01, respectively. Financial leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio has a mean value of 1.17 and has a standard deviation of 127.58. External finance registers an average value of -0.01 over the period with a standard deviation of 5.27. Debt maturity has a mean figure of 0.58, indicating that short-term debt accounts for 58 percent of total debt. Profitability defined in terms of return on assets also registers an average value of 6.66 percent. The standard deviation is also shown as 5.37. Risk shows a mean value of -3.37. Stock market capitalization to GDP has a mean value of 49.74 percent. The minimum and maximum values for this variable are 0.00 and 528.49, respectively, with a variation of 66.52. The average inflation rate and GDP per capita are 2.61 and 8.04 percent, respectively (Figure 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]).4.2 Correlation analysisWe test for possible degree of multi-collinearity among the regressors by including a correlation matrix of the variables in Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. Dividend payout shows significantly positive correlations with debt maturity, profitability, and GDP per capita. Investment opportunity set exhibits significantly negative correlations with financial leverage, inflation, and GDP per capita, but shows significantly positive correlations with external finance, debt maturity, profitability,and market capitalization. There is a significant but negative correlation between financial leverage and profitability and a positive correlation between financial leverage and risk. External finance shows significant and positive correlations with profitability and inflation but a negative correlation with GDP per capita. Debt maturity is significantly and negatively correlated with GDP per capita. There are significant and negative correlations between profitability and risk, market capitalization, as well as GDP per capita. However, we found positive correlation between profitability and inflation. There are statistically and significant positive correlations between risk and market capitalization, and GDP per capita. Market capitalization is also positively correlated with GDP per capita. Overall, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that multi-collinearity is not a potential problem in the regression models.4.3 Panel regression resultsBoth fixed and random effects specifications of the model were estimated. After which the [62] Hausman (1978) test was conducted to determine the appropriate specification. We report the results of the Hausman test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. The test statistics are all significant at 1 percent, implying that the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects. The Hausman specification test suggests we reject the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients are not systematic.The results indicate a statistically significant but negative relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payout ratio. It could be inferred that firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to exhibit low dividend payout ratio. In other words, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to pursue a low dividend payout ratio since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources. Paying low dividends means that such firms could retain enough funds to finance their future growth and investments.[29] Gaver and Gaver (1993) note that firms with high growth potential or investment opportunity set are expected to pay low dividends, since investment and dividends are。

优序融资理论外文文献翻译

文献信息：文献标题：Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory（西班牙企业的融资偏好：优序融资理论的实证研究）国外作者：Javier Sánchez-Vidal，Juan Francisco Martín-Ugedo文献出处：《Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting》, 2005, 25(4):341-355字数统计：英文2111单词，11535字符；中文3840汉字外文文献：Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on thePecking Order TheoryAbstract This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show that the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally, we observe that firms finance their funds flow deficits with long term debt.Keywords:capital structure, pecking order theoryIntroductionA prime contribution on information asymmetry in capital structure theory is the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Myers and Majluf observe that the empirical evidence is not consistent with a financial policy that is determined by a trade-off of the advantages and disadvantages of market imperfections, mainly taxes, costs offinancial distress, and agency costs. Rather, companies’ financial policies seem to be better explained by the behaviour described by Donaldson (1961).He establishes a hierarchy described by company preference for internal funds over external funds; in the case of external funds, a company prefers debt first, then hybrid instruments like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues. This hierarchy, broadly characterized as pecking order theory, indicates that companies do not make financing decisions with the aim of achieving optimal leverage.Although they tend to be taken as the same thing, the pecking order theory and the Myers and Majluf (1984) model are not strictly speaking the same. The pecking order theory i s merely a description of companies’ financing policy, while the Myers and Majluf work represents the first model that attempts to describe this behaviour from a theoretical point of view, based on the presence of information asymmetry. Moreover, the Myers and Majluf (1984)model assumes listed companies and markets where equity is issued through firm commitments, such as the American market, not for markets where the predominant flotation method is rights offerings, such as Spain and most other countries.The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the pecking order theory in the Spanish market. The analysis takes two directions. First, we examine the evolution of the three largest accounting sources of funding for a company—retained earnings, equity issues and debt—using a model based on Watson and Wilson (2002).Second, we study the role of long-term debt in making up financing deficits, following the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999).There are several features which distinguish the Spanish financial system from the American one. Probably the main difference affecting the pecking order is the flotation method in equity issues. Equity securities are issued in a wide variety of ways, mainly firm commitments underwritten offers and rights issues. The relative importance of these methods depends on the issuing firm’s country. In the United States rights offerings have declined in frequency, having virtually disappeared by 1980.In Spain, rights prevail. This difference may play an important role in the hierarchy described by the pecking order theory. In addition: (a)debt financing isprimarily raised privately in Spanish firms, thus banks play a very important role; and(b)the Spanish capital market is less developed than the American securities market, having lower capitalization and smaller transaction volumes. Although several papers have already examined the capital structure of Spanish firms, most of them have analyzed the effect of different variables on leverage. However, there is little evidence focusing on pecking order and no study employing the Watson and Wilson (2002) methodology.The results show that small and medium-sized companies behave consistently with predictions of the pecking order theory. When we divide the sample into subsamples on the basis of growth and the level of leverage, we see that high-growth companies base their growth on retained earnings, and firms with very high and very low debt ratios tend to converge towards more moderate debt ratios. Estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation shows that fund deficits are met by the use of long-term debt.The pecking order theory: Theoretical base and empirical evidence The pecking order theory describes a hierarchy in companies’ financial policy as follows: (1)Firms prefer to finance their investments with funds internally generated, namely, retained earnings and depreciation expenses; (2)firms base the dividend payout ratios on the future investment opportunity set and their expected cash flows;(3)payout ratios tend to be sticky in the short term, so in some years internally generated flows will be enough for financing company needs and in some years not;(4)funds obtained in years of financial surpluses, after payment of dividends and financing, are directed to finance short-term financial investments or to reduce debt. When there is a financial deficit, firms will seek external finance: first debt, then hybrid securities like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues.To explain this behaviour Myers and Majluf (1984) construct a model of information asymmetry assuming that firm managers act on behalf of current shareholders. If companies have enough financial slack, they will carry out allinvestments that have a positive net present value. If external funds are needed to finance new investments, the market will interpret equity issues as evidence that company shares are overvalued and thus issue announcement will have a negative impact on the share price.Thus, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, if the company does not have enough funds to finance new investments, it will issue equity only when there are very profitable investments that can neither be postponed nor financed through debt, or when managers believe that the stock is overvalued enough that shareholders will be disposed to tolerate the market penalty. The information asymmetry may cause current shareholders to renounce positive net present value investment projects in order to avoid a drop in share price due to the issue of equity, thereby creating an underinvestment problem. To avoid these results, it seems reasonable that companies will implement financing policies that allow them the capacity to finance investments and avoid external financing.However, the Myers and Majluf model (1984) has some limitations. The first is that it applies to markets like the American market where shares are offered mainly through firm commitment underwritings and not through rights issues, which is the flotation method that prevails in most other markets. In an underwritten firm commitment, shares are offered simultaneously to the public at large. Thus, if shares are overvalued, there will be a wealth transfer from new to current shareholders. In rights offerings, current shareholders enjoy priority in the purchase of new shares, which minimizes the possibility of wealth transfers. Therefore, the Myers and Majluf (1984) argument that equity issue is the last choice in firms’ financing policies has little currency in markets where rights issues are the prevalent method of equity issue.Another limitation of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that it is generally intended to describe listed companies, leaving the rest, mainly the small and medium-sized enterprises(SME),out of the explanation. Because of this, authors since then have tried to explain the pecking order theory using alternative arguments appropriate to non-listed SME companies.A major problem in SME financing, especially in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, islimited access to capital markets (a finance gap) (Holmes and Kent,1991).Financing choices for SME are thus usually reduced to retained earnings and bank loans. This finance gap can be divided into two components: a supply gap, because of limited availability of funds or higher cost, and a knowledge gap, because of limited knowledge about all the possibilities of external finance and a lack of awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of debt. As a consequence of these two components of the finance gap, the main long-term source of finance will be internal financing and, if necessary, bank loans.Another factor that may play a part in the hierarchy of firm choices is the motivation to retain control of the firm (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998).As we have noted, in a firm commitment offering stock is sold at one time to the general public; thus, current shareholders’ relative ownership of firm, as well as their control of the company may be diminished with new share offerings. Such a control problem may arise also in rights issues, but to a lesser extent, because current shareholders may have limited funds to invest in the first place or may want to diversify their investments, so they might not purchase additional shares to maintain their ownership percentage. As a result of all of this, the current shareholders would also be reluctant to issue equity.These factors mentioned above imply a similar hierarchy to the one described by Myers and Majluf (1984); that is, the company would make use of retained earnings in the first place, then debt (bank loans) and, finally, equity issues.Various authors have tried to test the empirical implications of the pecking order theory. Next, we briefly summarize some of them. Watson and Wilson(2002)use a descriptive model in the British market and confirm the pecking order theory, especially for closely-held companies(companies whose ownership is very concentrated and whose manager is usually the main owner).Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)and Frank and Goyal(2003)study the way companies finance their flow of funds deficits. The former authors find evidence to support the pecking order theory; the latter find evidence of a target debt ratio. Mato(1990),in the Spanish market, studies financing flow of fund deficits, using anaccounting identity that includes share issues. He finds that companies tend not to use equity issues, but finance their needs primarily with debt. He also observes that debt and internal finance are mutually substitutable.Fama and French(2002)use structural equations that regress leverage and dividend payout as dependent variables on several explanatory variables from the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. They find no conclusive evidence in support of one specific theory.Lo′pez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias(2000)use Manova analysis to examine the relationship between variables proposed by the pecking order theory and financial constraints in the Spanish market. They find that the significance of internal finance varies according to company size. Saa′-Requejo(1996)uses a nested model with binary variables for Spanish companies to test the choice between internal or external finance and between equity and debt. He finds that companies care about whether the funds are raised publicly or privately and suffer from similar financial constraints, whether they are holding companies or not.Finally, Holmes and Kent(1991)and Ang and Jung(1992)use mail surveys to try to discern typical company financing policies. Both authors find that company managers follow a hierarchy of funding choices similar to the one described by the pecking order theory. Holmes and Kent(1991)find a stricter pecking order in place at SME than at larger companies.In short, many authors have tried to test the pecking order theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.ConclusionsWe have examined several empirical implications of the pecking order theory for a sample of 1,566 Spanish companies partitioned by size, growth, and previous debt level over 1994–2000.The pecking order theory states that firms follow a hierarchy when financing investments. Companies prefer internal funds to external funds; in case of externalfunds firms prefer debt first, with equity issues being their last choice. Given that Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument is not valid in explaining this h ierarchy in markets like the Spanish where rights issues prevail, a finance gap and the motivation to retain control could help to explain such a hierarchy in these markets.For the whole sample, we find that retained earnings and debt have similar coefficients, higher than the equity issues coefficient, providing evidence of the duality of retained earnings and debt noted by Holmes and Kent(1991).In the case of different subsamples, small and medium-sized firms do seem to follow the pecking order predictions; the retained earnings coefficient exceeds the debt coefficient, which in turn exceeds the equity issues coefficient. Such results could be explained by a finance gap or by the motivation to retain control.Analysis of subsamples based on firms’ growth and previous debt level shows that these factors are very important in determining companies’ financing policies. High-growth companies resort to retained earnings, and then to debt, and finally to equity issues. That is, these firms follow the pecking order theory. Low-growth firms by contrast take a more balanced approach to financing. Analysis of high-leverage and low-leverage firms indicates these companies move towards more moderate debt levels.Finally, estimation of a flow of funds deficit equation reveals that companies tend to fund their financing deficits mainly with long-term debt.中文译文：西班牙企业的融资偏好：优序融资理论的实证研究摘要本文通过使用1994年—2000年西班牙市场的的1566家企业的固定样本数据分析优序融资理论的实证影响。

原创研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献

原创研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献Original Research: English Literature to be Considered for Financing Small and Medium-sized EnterprisesIntroduction:In recent years, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have become the driving force behind innovation, economic growth, and job creation. However, one of the major challenges faced by SMEs is accessing adequate financing options to support their growth and sustainability. This article aims to explore and analyze the various English literature sources that can be consulted for valuable insights into financing options for SMEs.1. The Importance of Financing for SMEs:Financing is crucial for SMEs as it provides the necessary capital for investment, expansion, research and development, and meeting working capital requirements. Access to financing enables SMEs to enhance their productivity, compete in the market, and contribute to economic development.2. Challenges Faced by SMEs in Accessing Financing:SMEs often encounter obstacles when seeking financing. These challenges include limited collateral, lack of credit history, information asymmetry, and risk aversion by lenders. To overcome these hurdles, it is essential to refer to relevant English literature that addresses these issues and provides potential solutions.3. English Literature Sources for SME Financing:a. Academic Journals: Academic journals such as "Journal of Small Business Finance" and "Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice" publish research articles that explore various aspects of SME financing. These articles discuss topics like crowdfunding, venture capital, angel investing, and government programs that support SMEs' financial needs.b. Research Reports: Research reports from reputable organizations like the World Bank, International Finance Corporation (IFC), and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provide valuable insights into the financing landscape for SMEs. These reports analyze trends, challenges, and best practices in SME financing across different countries and regions.c. Case Studies: Case studies published by universities, business schools, and financial institutions offer practical examples of successful financing strategies adopted by SMEs. These case studies highlight the specific steps taken to secure financing, including negotiations with banks, alternative lending options, and leveraging relationships with stakeholders.d. Government Publications: Government publications, such as white papers and policy documents, outline the initiatives and programs available to support SME financing. These publications provide a comprehensive overview of the various financing schemes, tax incentives, and grants offered by governments to assist SMEs in their financial endeavors.4. Key Themes in English Literature:a. Alternative Financing: English literature emphasizes the emergence of alternative financing options for SMEs. This includes peer-to-peer lendingplatforms, crowdfunding, and business incubators that connect SMEs with potential investors.b. Digital Innovation: The impact of digital innovation on SME financing is a widely discussed topic. English literature explores how fintech solutions, blockchain technology, and online platforms have revolutionized access to funding for SMEs.c. Government Support: Many articles underscore the importance of government support in facilitating SME financing. English literature examines policy frameworks, loan guarantee programs, and financial assistance schemes implemented by governments to alleviate the financing challenges faced by SMEs.5. Conclusion:Accessing appropriate financing options is crucial for the growth and sustainability of SMEs. Exploring and analyzing relevant English literature sources is essential for SME owners, managers, and policymakers to make informed decisions regarding financing strategies. By drawing upon academic journals, research reports, case studies, and government publications, stakeholders can be equipped with valuable insights and best practices to support SME financing needs. Continuous research and understanding of the English literature in this field will contribute to the development of effective financing ecosystems for SMEs.。

小微企业融资外文文献翻译

企业营运资金管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Effects Of Working Capital Management On Sme ProfitabilityThe corporate finance literature has traditionally focused on the study of long-term financial decisions. Researchers have particularly offered studies analyzing investments, capital structure, dividends or company valuation, among other topics. But the investment that firms make in short-term assets, and the resources used with maturities of under one year, represent the main share of items on a firm’s balance sheet. In fact, in our sample the current assets of small and medium-sized Spanish firms represent 69.48 percent of their assets, and at the same time their current liabilities represent more than 52.82 percent of their liabilities.Working capital management is important because of its effects on the firm’s profitability and risk, and consequently its value (Smith, 1980). On the one hand, maintaining high inventory levels reduces the cost of possible interruptions in the production process, or of loss of business due to the scarcity of products, reducessupply costs, and protects against price fluctuations, among other advantages (Blinder and Manccini, 1991). On the other, granting trade credit favors the firm’s sales in various ways. Trade credit can act as an effective price cut (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner,1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1997), incentivizes customers to acquire merchandise at times of low demand (Emery, 1987), allows customers to check that the merchandise they receive is as agreed (quantity and quality) and to ensure that the services contracted are carried out (Smith, 1987), and helps firms to strengthen long-term relationships with their customers (Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). However, firms that invest heavily in inventory and trade credit can suffer reduced profitability. Thus,the greater the investment in current assets, the lower the risk, but also the lower the profitability obtained.On the other hand, trade credit is a spontaneous source of financing that reduces the amount required to finance the sums tied up in the inventory and customer accounts. But we should bear in mind that financing from suppliers can have a very high implicit cost if early payment discounts are available. In fact the opportunity cost may exceed 20 percent, depending on the discount percentage and the discount period granted (Wilner,2000; Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999). In this respect, previous studies have analyzed the high cost of trade credit, and find that firms finance themselves with seller credit when they do not have other more economic sources of financing available (Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1997).Decisions about how much to invest in the customer and inventory accounts, and how much credit to accept from suppliers, are reflected in the firm’s cash conve rsion cycle, which represents the average number of days between the date when the firm must start paying its suppliers and the date when it begins to collect payments from its customers. Some previous studies have used this measure to analyze whether shortening the cash conversion cycle has positive or negative effects on the firm’s profitability.Specifically, Shin and Soenen (1998) analyze the relation between the cash conversion cycle and profitability for a sample of firms listed on the US stock exchange during the period 1974-1994. Their results show that reducing the cash conversion cycle to a reasonable extent increases firms’ profitability. More recently,Deloof (2003) analyzes a sample of large Belgian firms during the period 1992-1996. His results confirm that Belgian firms can improve their profitability by reducing the number of days accounts receivable are outstanding and reducing inventories. Moreover, he finds that less profitable firms wait longer to pay their bills.These previous studies have focused their analysis on larger firms. However, the management of current assets and liabilities is particularly important in the case of small and medium-sized companies. Most of these companies’ assets are in the form of current assets. Also, current liabilities are one of their main sources of external finance in view of their difficulties in obtaining funding in the long-term capital markets(Petersen and Rajan, 1997) and the financing constraints that they face (Whited, 1992; Fazzari and Petersen, 1993). In this respect, Elliehausen and Woken (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Danielson and Scott (2000) show that small and medium-sized US firms use vendor financing when they have run out of debt. Thus, efficient working capital management is particularly important for smaller companies (Peel and Wilson,1996).In this context, the objective of the current work is to provide empirical evidence about the effects of working capital management on profitability for a panel made up of 8,872 SMEs during the period 1996-2002. This work contributes to the literature in two ways. First, no previous such evidence exists for the case of SMEs. We use a sample of Spanish SMEs that operate within the so-called continental model, which is characterized by its less developed capital markets (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), and by the fact that most resources are channeled through financial intermediaries (Pampillón, 2000). All this suggests that Spanish SMEs have fewer alternative sources of external finance available, which makes them more dependent on short-term finance in general, and on trade credit in particular. As Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) suggest, firms operating in countries with more developed banking systems grant more trade credit to their customers, and at the same time they receive more finance from their own suppliers. The second contribution is that, unlike the previous studies by Shin and Soenen (1998) and Deloof (2003), in the current work we have conducted tests robust to the possible presence ofendogeneity problems. The aim is to ensure that the relationships found in the analysis carried out are due to the effects of the cash conversion cycle on corporate profitability and not vice versa.Our findings suggest that managers can create value by reducing their firm’s number of days accounts receivable and inventories. Similarly, shortening the cash conversion cycle also improves the firm’s profitability.We obtained the data used in this study from the AMADEUS database. This database was developed by Bureau van Dijk, and contains financial and economic data on European companies.The sample comprises small and medium-sized firms from Spain. The selection of SMEs was carried out according to the requirements established by the European Commission’s recommendation 96/280/CE of 3 April, 1996, on the definition of small and medium-sized firms. Specifically, we selected those firms meeting the following criteria for at least three years: a) have fewer than 250 employees; b) turn over less than €40 million; and c) possess less than €27 million of total assets.In addition to the application of those selection criteria, we applied a series of filters. Thus, we eliminated the observations of firms with anomalies in their accounts, such as negative values in their assets, current assets, fixed assets, liabilities, current liabilities, capital, depreciation, or interest paid. We removed observations of entry items from the balance sheet and profit and loss account exhibiting signs that were contrary to reasonable expectations. Finally, we eliminated 1 percent of the extreme values presented by several variables. As a result of applying these filters, we ended up with a sample of 38,464 observations.In order to introduce the effect of the economic cycle on the levels invested in working capital, we obtained information about the annual GDP growth in Spain from Eurostat.In order to analyze the effects of working capital management on the firm’s profitability, we used the return on assets (ROA) as the dependent variable. We defined this variable as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to assets.With regards to the independent variables, we measured working capitalmanagement by using the number of days accounts receivable, number of days of inventory and number of days accounts payable. In this respect, number of days accounts receivable (AR) is calculated as 365 ×[accounts receivable/sales]. This variable represents the average number of days that the firm takes to collect payments from its customers. The higher the value, the higher its investment in accounts receivable.We calculated the number of days of inventory (INV) as 365 ×[inventories/purchases]. This variable reflects the average number of days of stock held by the firm. Longer storage times represent a greater investment in inventory for a particular level of operations.The number of days accounts payable (AP) reflects the average time it takes firms to pay their suppliers. We calculated this as 365 × [accounts payable/purchases]. The higher the value, the longer firms take to settle their payment commitments to their suppliers.Considering these three periods jointly, we estimated the cash conversion cycle(CCC). This variable is calculated as the number of days accounts receivable plus thenumber of days of inventory minus the number of days accounts payable. The longerthe cash conversion cycle, the greater the net investment in current assets, and hence the greater the need for financing of current assets.Together with these variables, we introduced as control variables the size of the firm, the growth in its sales, and its leverage. We measured the size (SIZE) as the logarithm of assets, the sales growth (SGROW) as (Sales1 –Sales0)/Sales0, the leverage(DEBT) as the ratio of debt to liabilities. Dellof (2003) in his study of large Belgian firms also considered the ratio of fixed financial assets to total assets as a control variable. For some firms in his study such assets are a significant part of total assets.However our study focuses on SMEs whose fixed financial assets are less important. In fact, companies in our sample invest little in fixed financial assets (a mean of 3.92 percent, but a median of 0.05 percent). Nevertheless, the results remain unaltered whenwe include this variable.Furthermore, and since good economic conditions tend to be reflected in a firm’sprofitability, we controlled for the evolution of the economic cycle using the variable GDPGR, which measures the annual GDP growth.Current assets and liabilities have a series of distinct characteristics according to the sector of activity in which the firm operates. Thus, Table I reports the return on assets and number of days accounts receivable, days of inventory, and days accounts payable by sector of activity. The mining industry and services sector are the two sectors with the highest return on their assets, with a value of 10 percent. Firms that are dedicated to agriculture, trade (wholesale or retail), transport and public services, are some way behind at 7 percent.With regard to the average periods by sector, we find, as we would expect, that the firms dedicated to the retail trade, with an average period of 38 days, take least time to collect payments from their customers. Construction sector firms grant their customers the longest period in which to pay –more than 145 days. Next, we find mining sector firms, with a number of days accounts receivable of 116 days. We also find that inventory is stored longest in agriculture, while stocks are stored least in the transport and public services sector. In relation to the number of days accounts payable, retailers (56 days) followed by wholesalers (77 days) pay their suppliers earliest. Firms are much slower in the construction and mining sectors, taking more than 140 days on average to pay their suppliers. However, as we have mentioned, these firms also grant their own customers the most time to pay them. Considering all the average periods together, we note that the cash conversion cycle is negative in only one sector – that of transport and public services. This is explained by the short storage times habitual in this sector. In this respect, agricultural and manufacturing firms take the longest time to generate cash (95 and 96 days, respectively), and hence need the most resources to finance their operational funding requirements.Table II offers descriptive statistics about the variables used for the sample as a whole. These are generally small firms, with mean assets of more than €6 milli on; their return on assets is around 8 percent; their number of days accounts receivable is around 96 days; and their number of days accounts payable is very similar: around 97 days. Together with this, the sample firms have seen their sales grow by almost 13percent annually on average, and 24.74 percent of their liabilities is taken up by debt. In the period analyzed (1996-2002) the GDP has grown at an average rate of 3.66 percent in Spain.Source: Pedro Juan García-Teruel and Pedro Martínez-Solano ,2006.“Effects of Working Capital Management on SME Profitability” .International Journal of Managerial Finance ,vol. 3, issue 2, April,pages 164-167.译文：营运资金管理对中小企业的盈利能力的影响公司理财著作历来把注意力集中在了长期财务决策研究，研究者详细的提供了投资决策分析、资本结构、股利分配或公司估值等主题的研究，但是企业投资形成的短期资产和以一年内到期方式使用的资源，表现为公司资产负债表的有关下昂目的主要部分。

上市公司股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

上市公司股权融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstract ：This article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are someconcise suggestions be given to rectify the companie s’ preference to equity fund. Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Many researchers usually analyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed com panies’ financial activities betray to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference to equity fund According to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is theturn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and u sing fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculation, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listedcompanies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then their position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies and preference to equity fund Static Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies’ value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincidewith the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which have excellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM,Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financial distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equity fundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally high er than the average level of all thelisted companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevance to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes of financing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.译文：中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要：本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

中小企业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Financing of SMEsJan Bartholdy, Cesario MateusOriginally Published in“Financing of SMEs”.London business review.AbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking OrderTheory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financialintermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers.Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view offinancial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier maybe able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangibleassets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the e xpected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, thatproposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。

未来的中小企业融资毕业论文外文翻译

Future of SME financeBackground – the environment for SME finance has changedFuture economic recovery will depend on the possibility of Crafts, Trades and SMEs to exploit their potential for growth and employment creation.SMEs make a major contribution to growth and employment in the EU and are at the heart of the Lisbon Strategy, whose main objective is to turn Europe into the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. However, the ability of SMEs to grow depends highly on their potential to invest in restructuring, innovation and qualification. All of these investments need capital and therefore access to finance.Against this background the consistently repeated complaint of SMEs about their problems regarding access to finance is a highly relevant constraint that endangers the economic recovery of Europe.Changes in the finance sector influence the behavior of credit institutes towards Crafts, Trades and SMEs. Recent and ongoing developments in the banking sector add to the concerns of SMEs and will further endanger their access to finance. The main changes in the banking sector which influence SME finance are:•Globalization and internationalization have increased the competition and the profit orientation in the sector;•worsening of the economic situations in some institutes (burst of the ITC bubble, insolvencies) strengthen the focus on profitability further;•Mergers and restructuring created larger structures and many local branches, which had direct and personalized contacts with small enterprises, were closed;•up-coming implementation of new capital adequacy rules (Basel II) will also change SME business of the credit sector and will increase its administrative costs;•Stricter interpretation of State-Aide Rules by the European Commission eliminates the support of banks by public guarantees; many of the effected banks are very active in SME finance.All these changes result in a higher sensitivity for risks and profits in the finance sector.The changes in the finance sector affect the accessibility of SMEs to finance.Higher risk awareness in the credit sector, a stronger focus on profitability and the ongoing restructuring in the finance sector change the framework for SME financeand influence the accessibility of SMEs to finance. The most important changes are: •In order to make the higher risk awareness operational, the credit sector introduces new rating systems and instruments for credit scoring;•Risk assessment of SMEs by banks will force the enterprises to present more and better quality information on their businesses;•Banks will try to pass through their additional costs for implementing and running the new capital regulations (Basel II) to their business clients;•due to the increase of competition on interest rates, the bank sector demands more and higher fees for its services (administration of accounts, payments systems, etc.), which are not only additional costs for SMEs but also limit their liquidity;•Small enterprises will lose their personal relationship with decision-makers in local branches –the credit application process will become more formal and anonymous and will probably lose longer;•the credit sector will lose more and more its “public function” to provide access to finance for a wide range of economic actors, which it has in a number of countries, in order to support and facilitate economic growth; the profitability of lending becomes the main focus of private credit institutions.All of these developments will make access to finance for SMEs even more difficult and / or will increase the cost of external finance. Business start-ups and SMEs, which want to enter new markets, may especially suffer from shortages regarding finance. A European Code of Conduct between Banks and SMEs would have allowed at least more transparency in the relations between Banks and SMEs and UEAPME regrets that the bank sector was not able to agree on such a commitment.Towards an encompassing policy approach to improve the access of Crafts, Trades and SMEs to financeAll analyses show that credits and loans will stay the main source of finance for the SME sector in Europe. Access to finance was always a main concern for SMEs, but the recent developments in the finance sector worsen the situation even more. Shortage of finance is already a relevant factor, which hinders economic recovery in Europe. Many SMEs are not able to finance their needs for investment.Therefore, UEAPME expects the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to strengthen their efforts to improve the framework conditions for SME finance. Europe’s Crafts, Trades and SMEs ask for an encompassing policyapproach, which includes not only the conditions for SMEs’ access to lending, but will also strengthen their capacity for internal finance and their access to external risk capital.From UEAPME’s point of view such an encompassing approach should be based on three guiding principles:•Risk-sharing between private investors, financial institutes, SMEs and public sector;•Increase of transparency of SMEs towards their external investors and lenders;•improving the regulatory environment for SME finance.Based on these principles and against the background of the changing environment for SME finance, UEAPME proposes policy measures in the following areas:1. New Capital Requirement Directive: SME friendly implementation of Basel IIDue to intensive lobbying activities, UEAPME, together with other Business Associations in Europe, has achieved some improvements in favour of SMEs regarding the new Basel Agreement on regulatory capital (Basel II). The final agreement from the Basel Committee contains a much more realistic approach toward the real risk situation of SME lending for the finance market and will allow the necessary room for adaptations, which respect the different regional traditions and institutional structures.However, the new regulatory system will influence the relations between Banks and SMEs and it will depend very much on the way it will be implemented into European law, whether Basel II becomes burdensome for SMEs and if it will reduce access to finance for them.The new Capital Accord form the Basel Committee gives the financial market authorities and herewith the European Institutions, a lot of flexibility. In about 70 areas they have room to adapt the Accord to their specific needs when implementing it into EU law. Some of them will have important effects on the costs and the accessibility of finance for SMEs.UEAPME expects therefore from the new European Commission and the new European Parliament:•The implementation of the new Capital Requirement Directive will be costlyfor the Finance Sector (up to 30 Billion Euro till 2006) and its clients will have to pay for it. Therefore, the implementation – especially for smaller banks, which are often very active in SME finance –has to be carried out with as little administrative burdensome as possible (reporting obligations, statistics, etc.).•The European Regulators must recognize traditional instruments for collaterals (guarantees, etc.) as far as possible.•The European Commission and later the Member States should take over the recommendations from the European Parliament with regard to granularity, access to retail portfolio, maturity, partial use, adaptation of thresholds, etc., which will ease the burden on SME finance.2. SMEs need transparent rating proceduresDue to higher risk awareness of the finance sector and the needs of Basel II, many SMEs will be confronted for the first time with internal rating procedures or credit scoring systems by their banks. The bank will require more and better quality information from their clients and will assess them in a new way. Both up-coming developments are already causing increasing uncertainty amongst SMEs.In order to reduce this uncertainty and to allow SMEs to understand the principles of the new risk assessment, UEAPME demands transparent rating procedures –rating procedures may not become a “Black Box” for SMEs:•The bank should communicate the relevant criteria affecting the rating of SMEs.•The bank should inform SMEs about its assessment in order to allow SMEs to improve.The negotiations on a European Code of Conduct between Banks and SMEs , which would have included a self-commitment for transparent rating procedures by Banks, failed. Therefore, UEAPME expects from the new European Commission and the new European Parliament support for:•binding rules in the framework of the new Capital Adequacy Directive, which ensure the transparency of rating procedures and credit scoring systems for SMEs;•Elaboration of national Codes of Conduct in order to improve the relations between Banks and SMEs and to support the adaptation of SMEs to the new financial environment.3. SMEs need an extension of credit guarantee systems with a special focus on Micro-LendingBusiness start-ups, the transfer of businesses and innovative fast growth SMEs also depended in the past very often on public support to get access to finance. Increasing risk awareness by banks and the stricter interpretation of State Aid Rules will further increase the need for public support.Already now, there are credit guarantee schemes in many countries on the limit of their capacity and too many investment projects cannot be realized by SMEs.Experiences show that Public money, spent for supporting credit guarantees systems, is a very efficient instrument and has a much higher multiplying effect than other instruments. One Euro form the European Investment Funds can stimulate 30 Euro investments in SMEs (for venture capital funds the relation is only 1:2).Therefore, UEAPME expects the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to support:•The extension of funds for national credit guarantees schemes in the framework of the new Multi-Annual Programmed for Enterprises;•The development of new instruments for securitizations of SME portfolios;•The recognition of existing and well functioning credit guarantees schemes as collateral;•More flexibility within the European Instruments, because of national differences in the situation of SME finance;•The development of credit guarantees schemes in the new Member States;•The development of an SBIC-like scheme in the Member States to close the equity gap (0.2 – 2.5 Mio Euro, according to the expert meeting on PACE on April 27 in Luxemburg).•the development of a financial support scheme to encourage the internalizations of SMEs (currently there is no scheme available at EU level: termination of JOP, fading out of JEV).4. SMEs need company and income taxation systems, which strengthen their capacity for self-financingMany EU Member States have company and income taxation systems with negative incentives to build-up capital within the company by re-investing their profits. This is especially true for companies, which have to pay income taxes. Already in the past tax-regimes was one of the reasons for the higher dependence ofEurope’s SMEs on bank lending. In future, the result of rating will also depend on the amount of capital in the company; the high dependence on lending will influence the access to lending. This is a vicious cycle, which has to be broken.Even though company and income taxation falls under the competence of Member States, UEAPME asks the new European Commission and the new European Parliament to publicly support tax-reforms, which will strengthen the capacity of Crafts, Trades and SME for self-financing. Thereby, a special focus on non-corporate companies is needed.5. Risk Capital – equity financingExternal equity financing does not have a real tradition in the SME sector. On the one hand, small enterprises and family business in general have traditionally not been very open towards external equity financing and are not used to informing transparently about their business.On the other hand, many investors of venture capital and similar forms of equity finance are very reluctant regarding investing their funds in smaller companies, which is more costly than investing bigger amounts in larger companies. Furthermore it is much more difficult to set out of such investments in smaller companies.Even though equity financing will never become the main source of financing for SMEs, it is an important instrument for highly innovative start-ups and fast growing companies and it has therefore to be further developed. UEAPME sees three pillars for such an approach where policy support is needed:Availability of venture capital•The Member States should review their taxation systems in order to create incentives to invest private money in all forms of venture capital.•Guarantee instruments for equity financing should be further developed.Improve the conditions for investing venture capital into SMEs•The development of secondary markets for venture capital investments in SMEs should be supported.•Accounting Standards for SMEs should be revised in order to ease transparent exchange of information between investor and owner-manager.Owner-managers must become more aware about the need for transparency towards investors•SME owners will have to realise that in future access to external finance (venture capital or lending) will depend much more on a transparent and openexchange of information about the situation and the perspectives of their companies.•In order to fulfil the new needs for transparency, SMEs will have to use new information instruments (business plans, financial reporting, etc.) and new management instruments (risk-management, financial management, etc.).题目：未来的中小企业融资背景：中小企业融资已经改变未来的经济复苏将取决于生产工艺提升的可能性、贸易和中小企业利用其潜在的经济增长和创造就业。

中英文外文文献翻译中小企业的融资困境研究

本科毕业设计（论文）中英文对照翻译(此文档为word格式,下载后您可任意修改编辑!)作者：Groot M期刊：International Business Research，第5卷，第2期，pp:31-41 原文The research of financing difficulty in SMES作者：Groot M1. IntroductionThe principles of the European Union funding of SME have gradually emerged and are constantly analyzed for improvement.Unfulfilled or only partially achieved expectations to the property less, deviations from the model for better or worse, complaints, problems, deficiencies noticed in the comparison, all of them are challenges needed to be met by training operations that EU experts will bring out. Given the political interest which European structures manifested in this direction, this process will undoubtedly continue, because it allows better management of financial resources and an increase with large positive effects. Furthermore, access to finance is the most important factor promoting employment, growth and innovation in SME in Europe. Given the size of the Structural Funds, the European Commission tried not to leave to chance the "right to know". The research period focused in this paper encompasses the years 2007 - 2009. (Note 1) The research methodology used was based on document analysis, secondary data analysis and statistical analysis. The analysis of levels of funding granted through different EU financial instruments has been conducted on basis of statistical analysis of financial information from European Commission budget. 2. Structural and Cohesion Financing Sources for SME According to the Guidelines on financing of small and medium enterprises, funding may be made by calling the internal sources (equity capital) and / or external funding sources (http://www.finantare.ro/ghid-finantari.html). The internal funding sources are:* Contributions of the owners or associated members. * Resources generated by the company's activity (retaining profit). Internal funding sources have some advantages, such as preserving the independence and financial autonomy, because it creates no additional binding (interest, guarantees), or maintaining borrowing capacity, being a reliable mean of financial support of the enterprise's needs. They also bear disadvantages because the owners have fewer funds to invest in other more profitable activities than the activity which generated the financial overflow (alternative cost). External financing sources of SME include: loans, grants, and capital market instruments. The needed borrowing is obtained by the analysis of the evolution indicators of costs that are generated by the SME development. This need should be determined from the planning stage of development. Depending on the characteristics of this necessary, one develops the company's financing policy. External financing is necessary if the SME does not have sufficient internal resources to cover the investments necessary for the planned activities. Regardless of the country, it is intended to facilitate access of SME to external financing sources, especially venture capital, micro-loans, financial mezzanine, and the development of a stimulating legal and business environment. Attracting capital is one of the conditions necessary for both establishing a successful business (especially SME) and for ensuring its development. The use of own resources or loans is often insufficient for start-up firmsor those with strong growth potential. Investors hesitate to invest in start-up companies because of high transaction costs and because the returns do not compensate for risk. Therefore, these companies usually seek a venture capital, which may provide the amounts necessary for entering the market and developing faster. The venture capital is essential for the innovative SME' financing and for the assurance of the best investment opportunities. However, in Europe, venture capital market is fragmented, which affects cross-border investments and growth potential of venture capital funds and reduces the level of investment. Therefore, given the need to improve SME' access to financing (and especially for the innovative ones), the European Commission established facilitating cross-border investments as one of the main objectives, and initiated some measures to overcome regulatory and tax obstacles at EU and each Member State level. To become competitive, European venture capital markets wish to increase their efficiency and profitability, and a way to achieve this goal is by extending the benefits of a single venture capital market to facilitate cross-border transactions. The European Commission will evaluate the options for the introduction of a private placement regime to facilitate cross-border investments to stimulate the development of venture capital funds in Europe and will assist Member States to promote programs which stimulate investments.Regarding financial mezzanine, this is a hybrid financing instrumentthat combines features of equity and loan and increases the possibilities of companies' financial option. In fact, financial mezzanine can be an important complementary source of financing firms. The most important instruments of mezzanine financing include private placement instruments (private mezzanine) and capital market instruments (public mezzanine).Mezzanine capital is an appropriate solution especially when the requirements for financing may not be covered by traditional loans. Hybrid forms of financing can be employed also in less dynamic periods (e.g. maturity phase) to optimize the financial mix. Cases of refinancing are also suitable for using mezzanine capital. In these stages of the business, financial mezzanine is an attractive option for companies with positive cash flows and developing perspectives to attract additional funds. Mezzanine financing is inappropriate for restructuring, because in these phases capital flows are volatile and more difficult to predict. Further, financial mezzanine is not recommended for companies with an unstable position on the market and negative forecasts of development, with a high debt rate and accounting and financial weaknesses.The mezzanine financial instruments are little used now, compared with traditional financial loans, but amid a trend of change and rapid evolution of financial markets, where the survival and development of the companies will require substantial resources, it is estimated that this formof financing will grow significantly.3. Current Scenarios for Financing SME The increasing attention paid in the last decade to SME in most countries of the world, as a result of the recognition of their major contribution to economic development and generating new jobs in the economy, is reflected in the development of various public financing schemes. There are two significantly different concepts at the basis of their design and operation: 1. Financing schemes for SME based on governmental economic policies, which aim to achieve certain economic and social objectives by financing with priority some certain categories of firms. Adherents of this approach are the Japanese, who are currently preferentially financing through a variety of public schemes, small businesses which develop strongly and with great potential for job creation (Klein et al., 2003).2. Financing schemes for SME focused on market requirements, which aim to provide financial resources, but under the same or very close conditions to the market conditions. The main concern is to avoid causing distortions in market competition, which might advantage certain categories of firms. These schemes, which forecast modest subsidies to SME financing costs, have a less sensitive role in stimulating them. In Europe, there are especially in Germany and the UK approaches based largely on this model, while in the period 2007-2009, the previous approach was predominantly used.Romanian SME' requirements consider the types of investment needed during the development of their commercial activities, the risks related to investments which will be financed, and the factors to be considered when selecting a funding source. In choosing the source of funding for SME several aspects should be carefully considered: what kind of source of funding is best suited to the business' objectives, what financing size can meet the needs of the business and its own assessment of the company, which will be made in order to assess the ability of the business, to have access to financing and to repay it. When the financing source is chosen, the following factors should be taken into account (Nicolescu &Nicolescu, 2008). 4. An Outline of Financing SME in Romania In Romania, public schemes which promote SME financing can be divided mainly into four categories (Figure 1). Financing schemes by grants provide, under certain conditions, grants for SME. Generally, these grants address companies from certain economic sectors or areas of the country. Most often, there are financed investments in equipment and, more rarely, in capital. The basic principle of providing grants is financial co-participation, which implies the allocation by the SME of a part of the funds necessary for the whole project at a clearly stated minimum level. Such schemes were operationalized through some foundations (CRIMM, FIMAN) or governmental agencies (the National Agency of Small and Medium Enterprises, the National Agency for Regional Development, theNational Employment Agency) and ministries (Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, etc.).EU Structural Funds are managed by the European Commission and have as destination financing the structural aid measures at communitarian level, in order to promote the regions with delays in development, reconversion of areas affected by industrial decline, combating long-term unemployment, and promoting the employability of young people or rural development. If one considers that Romania would benefit by 2013 from structural funds of about 28-30 billion Euros from the EU, it is of great importance to known the level of the Romanian SME connected with the accessing of these forms of financing.5. Concluding DiscussionConsidering the results presented above, one can identify and outline areas where the following priority actions are recommended: 1. Gradual establishment of a system of guarantee funds for financing entrepreneurs at national and regional level. 2. Significant reduction of the amount of guarantees and fees required by banks in lending in accord with the EU practices. 3. Simplifying procedures for obtaining credit. 4. Interest subsidy on loans to SME, at least in certain sectors with competitive advantages and for certain groups (youth, disabled persons, etc.). 5. Developing a national training program for entrepreneurs in order toaccess structural funds based on the principle of public - private partnership. 6. Providing adequate grace period on loans for investment. It is also necessary to give credits for investment for a longer period of time, at least 5-7 years. These two measures would facilitate a comprehensive and rapid development of SME. 7. Transforming a state bank in a development bank (investments) for SME.译文中小企业的融资困境研究作者：格鲁特1.引言欧盟中小企业融资的原则问题已经显现出来并需要不断地进行分析改进。

融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献中英文资料外文翻译附录1：（原文）The Determinants of the Leasing of Small Companies1, international for small and medium-sized companies were discussedAt the beginning of the 20th century, appear with ford motor as a representative of the mass production methods, people believed in the enterprise of large-scale business is the trend of The Times. But last of the twentieth century ago in economics leading view also think big enterprise is efficient, the scale become the pronoun of efficiency, enterprise's economic development of large-scale become direction. Yet the century in the 1970s, a kind of traditional ideas beganchallenged. In 1973, the British scholar schumacher (E.F.S chumacher) published a small is a good book. Quickly and has caused a great echo. The author thinks that the western countries specialization, large-scale production pattern looks is solved "production problem", but actually is an illusion. This mode of production caused economic inefficiency, environmental pollution, resource exhaustion, and fostered many social problems. Therefore, must choose again a development pattern or way. Schumacher pointed out the development of large-scale and automation error, advocated the development of small and medium-sized intermediate technology. He thinks. To make the society "enduring" development, must go miniaturization, among the development of roads, especially to the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and "intermediate technology". British prime minister Tony Blair also put forward by 2005 to the development of small businesses of British construction become heaven ".2, small and medium-sized enterprises in China's economy contributionSmall and medium-sized enterprises is an important means of technical innovation. Before world war ii, the century with different since the 1960s and 1970s gradually arisen on information technology and biotechnology as the core of the new technology revolution is mainly in small and medium-sized enterprises, and at least in lots of small and medium-sized enterprises tody develops. In the middle of the century ago, rich economies in the proportion ofsmall and medium-sized enterprises has been declining trend; In the middle of the century especially after the 1960s and 1970s, and small and medium-sized enterprises and started mass development (see Storey, D.J., 1994). This suggests that small and medium-sized enterprise is to adapt to this new trend of technological progress. According to statistics, so far, small and medium-sized enterprises in China has more than 800 thousand, accounts for the enterprise 99% of all. In since 1960s of rapid economic growth, industrial output value of new 76% above is created by small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprise output and realize profits tax have accounted for 60% of the national respectively and 407., in recent years in the total export, small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for about 60 percent. "no doubt, small and medium-sized enterprises has become the new growth point of boosting the national economy, promoting China's economic boom is the main driving force of uplink. About smes in the country's economy, the importance of roughly boils down to:First, provide employment opportunity, absorbing surplus labor force. Compared with large enterprises and small and medium sized enterprises are using more labor-intensive technology, so the development of small and medium-sized enterprises can help alleviate current employment pressure. In fact, although small and medium-sized enterprise role far more than that, but it is small and medium-sized enterprises of this feature, to medium and small-sized enterprisesfor people increasingly attention. Our country the industry and commerce registration of small and medium-sized enterprises, more than 1,500 million, accounts for the total enterprises ninety-nine percent, to be town provides seventy-five percent of the jobs.Second, create the mainstay of GDP. According to the above information: small and medium-sized enterprises in the national industrial output account for about 60, realize profits tax of up to 40%. Table 3-1 for our independent accounting industrial enterprises in 1995-2000 some data, including various types of enterprise of gross industrial output and the proportion of total assets, value added of industry and the proportion of total assets and profit tax amount to total assets ratio (namely fund LiShuiLv). We can find that, regardless of in the output value on the proportions still in proportion of small and medium-sized enterprises are superior to large enterprises. This shows that every unit fund of small and medium-sized enterprises than large enterprise creates more social wealth. But, in addition to 2000, small and medium-sized enterprises outside the capital LiShuiLv below large enterprises. So, in proportion with capital value LiShuiLv appears between some contradictions. Because the latter reflects the former distribution relationship, this is because of hard to get the bank low-interest loans to small and medium-sized enterprises to use capital interest of proportion of those enterprises.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economydevelopment to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.3. Move investment demandBritish lease experts, the bott who specially in the world on the lease yearbook of literary theory and the effect. He said: "in fact, some governments are shifting in full-scale lease to stimulate domestic investment. They moved to increase employment desire from an" '. He in investigating the German and British examples. Conclusion: lease industry in ensuring the role of main domestic investment was profound. Governments also encourage leasing company for capital equipment finance to expand exports, in order to improve their producers in the international market competition in position. Lease financing are able to expand domestic demand, increase employment in plays a unique role, reason mainly has two sides, the first, the financing lease of the equipment suppliedwhatever is located where requires some personnel, this undoubtedly will increase employment; Second, governments for lease provides preferential tax reduced leasing companies and enterprise's financing cost, thus make many enterprises want to use lease form to carry on an investment, investment increase is apparent.4 our experienceOur country economy in the 1990s, has maintained a strong growth momentum. During this decade, there are eight years is the Clinton administration office. China's President economic commission chairman is 2001 Nobel Prize winner Joseph. SiDiGeLiCi as he died, but also by the Nobel Prize winner, lemon, the author of the article George gram rove lady janet "Aaron, which are both as a new Keynesian representative figures, they advocate information asymmetry theory that completely on market economic regulation is not solve all problems. As a free economy does not guarantee during the trade information symmetry, causing some areas of adverse selection (vicious circle) and moral hazard (credit crisis), this shows that our country was inclined to conditionally government intervention and control the market. Our country government to use tax and interest rate leverage to regulate the market, with investment policy caused investment direction. These again and lease have internal relations. Our so-called tuyuhun equipment leasing the financing lease of by the financing involving rates, strong city in the policy has led to $rising interest rates to leasebring the opportunity of the development. Our tax on rental industry has certain preferential, while rental industry is more relying on talent advantage and control the ownership of the lease objects legal status, make full use of our country to encourage investment preferential policies, and designed the system "lease", such as: "leveraged lease", "tax leasing", etc in accord with the government encourages investment direction lease modes, enlarged policy efforts, promote the economic development of our country. From our lease data can be found in a decade ago our lease permeability (leasing forehead occupies equipment investment proportion) is 32%, lease the forehead is $120 billion, after 10 years (1999), the leasing of statistical data, the lease 34.4% permeability is the forehead is 2260 billion dollars. Lease lease frontal doubled. Its economic permeability (rental amount of GDP) 30% of the proportion of GDP of China accounts for almost a third. Lease with the China economic double forehead, but no major permeability changes show that lease is not omnipotent, just a economic levers, from our own experience, lease for economic development in the ability to move around." Lease has so magical function, it mainly in the operation of the real rights and use "separation" concept in action, property and rights separation gave lease activities to enlarge government control of the will, become market between government and market between effective macro-control measures. From since 9/11, our country and take several rate cuts and tax adjustment policy, as well as expand access to war, lay particular stresson government input control economy components.Lease financing background is socialized production developed market economy development to a higher level, industrial products, developed countries and its relative surplus of industrial capital seek and develop new market, therefore in the investigation of its function and advantages, cannot be separated from the historical background. Only understand this historical background, can answer financing lease why produced in the 1950s and to worldwide development, rather than creating and developing in other time periods. Financing lease improved social reproduction pace, acceleration of capital goods circulation and consumption, drive investment demand and the fellowship demand expanded. Eventually have a promotion aggregate demand growth, and thus to promote full employment and economic development.附录2：（译文）小型公司融资租赁的决定因素l、国际对中小型公司的探讨20世纪初，出现以福特汽车为代表的大规模生产方式，人们相信企业的大规模经营是大势所趋。

创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献

创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Entrepreneurial FinancingThe financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacerbating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup financing niche:At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem..This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice VCs often hold convertible preferred equity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.These questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to w hich Barry refers. By directly revealing the project’s quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the VC. By contrast, if quality were signaled—the traditional solution to the adverse selection problem—costly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more information to convey.In otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. The two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.The first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive in entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. The “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. Yet,for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. With such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to pool at nearly any cost. As the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneurs—and thus to serve as a credible signal—tend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. Costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.As testament to the empirical importance of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, Fried and Hans characterize the VC funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. This due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. The majority of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.The second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-like) financial contracts. The intuition behind this link is simple. By definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. High-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to screen out bad projects. In effect, high-powered contracts make the VC bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. Therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.To summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venturecapital markets.Following the path-breaking empirical work of Saar, a theoretical literature on VC contract design emerged. One common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. A second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. For example, VCs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project risk or exit strategy.In part, the literature’s relia nce on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. It is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presence of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. Conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of publicly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders’ incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and Lukin study a similar environment but split the firm’s claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public trading. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial finance markets since the assumption that drives their results—losses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelasticdemand—has no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1 with probability πτ, where τ∈{G, B} is an indicator of project quality, and λ< 1 otherwise.Funded projects have expected value Vi = πτ 1 + (1 − πτ)λ. It is assumed thatλ< K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.Entrepreneurs have reservation value V; that is, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value V or higher. In a model of mature firm financing, V is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. Such an interpretation is valid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. The key difference is one of magnitude. Compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters.The net present value of projects, Vτ−V − K, is assumed to satisfyEVG − V − K ≥0 ≥EV B − V − K. (1) Equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” The net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. Finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfyθ(EG − V − K) + (1 −θ)(EB − V − K) ≥0, (2) where θis the proportion of good projects in the economy. Because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.One source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. This investor may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. Consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that canevaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes high-powered contracts in equilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor of funding all projects. Such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good entrepreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s ∈{G, B} withPr{s = G | entrepreneur is bad} = Pr{s = B | entrepreneur is good} =ε(3) The unconditional probability of a good signal is θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε, so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) entrepreneurs before a goo d one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the VC for both capital contribution K and expected evaluation costs C= C/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing instead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs’ contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts consideredarbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance markets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC market.Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signaling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. For example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. Then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. But to the extent that the pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.Information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. This model may shed light on the usage of unit IPOs, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularly small, risky offerings. The inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. The logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motivate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.Finally, the model’s conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. A connection between information acquisition incentives and the shape of the security exists independently of the contract’s origins. One could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raisingmoney from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. The more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general partner’s information acquisition incentives.Source: Chris Yung. Entrepreneurial Financing And Costly Due Diligence. The Financial Review, 2009(44),pp137-149.译文：创业融资由于缺乏融资的信用记录以及所经营公司存在的风险性，初创企业的融资通常情况下都需要很高的逆向选择成本。

课题_民营企业融资问题研究外文文献

民营企业融资问题研究外文文献Economic reform and the opening of policies is changing China for the common good. Among those to benefit are transnational corporations who have been making large-scale investments in China. But some of these influential conglomerates and companies are becoming a little uneasy. A recent report warned such foreign business giants were building monopolies here.After a year of investigation, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce's Fair Trade Bureau published a report entitled "The Competition-restricting Behavior of Multinational Companies in China and Countermeasures." The report gave specifics, such as Microsoft's operating system software and Tetra Pak's packaging materials each holding a 95 per cent share of the Chinese market. Eastman Kodak, which formerly held more than 50 per cent of China's roll film market, is expected to further consolidate its dominance after taking 20 per cent of its sole major Chinese rival, Lucky Film Corp.According to the report, some transnational companies have been using their dominant roles in technology, brand recognition and capital and management to suppress competitors and maximize profits from the Chinese mainland. For example, on the eve of the release of WPS97 - a set of computer programmes developed by a Chinese company - a multinational hurriedly brought forward its version of the same product at much lower prices. To ensure dominance, some multinationals had carried out sweeping mergers and acquisitions to absorb their major competitors. This report lists a number of industries where free competition may be threatened by multinationals, including software, photosensitive material, mobile phones, cameras, tires and soft packaging.From above mentioned report, we should not jump to such a conclusion that the Chinese anti-monopoly law is only directed against the multinational corporations. But no doubt, this report has shown grave concern of Chinese Government over the foreign invested giants in the domestic markets. China's admission to the WTO and the further opening up of Chinese markets to the outside world means more and more transnational corporations will enter the Chinese markets. In addition to the high-level technologies, abundant financial resources, world famous trademarks and strong sales networks, the multinational corporations can also rely on various supports from their parent corporations. In market competition, they can quickly acquire dominant positions, even monopolies.In order to prevent transnational corporations both from monopolizing Chinese markets and from abusing market dominant positions, China urgently needs to adopt an anti-monopoly law. Since the anti-monopoly law targets also the abusing of dominant positions, such a law will serve as an important tool for China to check the influence of the transnational corporations. In my opinion, this report should be regarded as a push for Chinese anti-monopoly legislation.Because of its concern about negative influences of the multinational corporations upon competition, the Chinese Government promulgated "The Provisional Rules on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors" last year.Article 19 stipulates that "if any merger with and acquisition of a domestic enterprise involves any of the following circumstances," the investors shall submit a report thereon to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC): (1) the business turnover in the China market of a party to the merger or acquisition in the current year exceeds 1.5 billion yuan (US$181 million); (2) the aggregate number of mergers and acquisitions of domestic enterprises in the relevant industry in China within one year exceeds ten; (3) the share of the Chinese market of a party to the merger or acquisition has reached 20 per cent; or (4) the merger or acquisition will result in the share of the Chinese market of a party to the merger or acquisition reaching 25 per cent. Even if no circumstances set out in the previous paragraph exist, MOFCOM or SAIC may still require any foreign investors to submit a report, after any competing domestic enterprise, relevant authority or industrial association so requests, and MOFCOM or SAIC believes that the merger or acquisition by foreign investors involves an enormous market share, or there exists any other major factors which may substantially influence market competition, the national economy and people's livelihoodor the economic security of the state. "A party to the merger or acquisition" referred above shall include any affiliates of the foreign investor.According to Article 20, if any merger with or acquisition of domestic enterprises by a foreign investor involves any of the circumstances set out in Article 19 "hereof, and, according to MOFCOM and SAIC, may result in excessive concentration so as to jeopardize fair competition and harm consumers' interests, MOFCOM and SAIC shall, within 90 days from the date on which all the documents submitted are received, jointly or, upon consultation, solely summon the relevant departments, institutions, enterprises and other interested parties to a hearing, before deciding whether or not to grant the approval in accordance with the law."The implement of Article 20 needs detailed rules, for example for interpreting "excessive concentration" or "fair competition'. Due to the lack of such details, the Provisional Rules on Mergers have not been used in concrete cases to date.Obviously, the Provisional Rules on Mergers is aimed to control the market power caused by transnational corporations in Chinese markets. But in my opinion, the Rules, directed against only foreign investors, have no vitality, because it could be regarded as a discriminative treatment, and such treatment flies in the face of WTO principles.Also the economic globalization and the wave of transnational movements in terms of capitals and technologies, the nationalities of a lot of corporations seem unclear - sometimes even difficult to be identified.Of course, in view of the stronger financial forces and higher techniques of the transnational corporations compared with the national enterprises, it is necessary for the government to control merger and acquisitions by foreign investors so as to prohibit abusive activities by foreign enterprises with dominant positions in the Chinese markets.For this purpose, the best way is to establish and implement an effective antitrust law in order to provide a free and fair competitive environment to all enterprises, no matter if they are private or public, foreign or domestic.It has been proved that almost any monopoly, either private or administrative, either by domestic enterprises or by multinational corporations, should not be deemed right.I am confident that not only the Chinese people, but also both domestic and foreign-invested businesses, will benefit from China's futureanti-monopoly legislation.The creation of the anti-monopoly law was put on the legislative agenda at the 10th NPC in its five-year tenure, which ends in March 2008.(The author Wang Xiaoye is a researcher at the Institute of Legal Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.)。

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