优序融资理论外文文献翻译

文献信息：
文献标题：Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the Pecking Order Theory（西班牙企业的融资偏好：优序融资理论的实证研究）国外作者：Javier Sánchez-Vidal，Juan Francisco Martín-Ugedo
文献出处：《Review of Quantitative Finance & Accounting》, 2005, 25(4):341-355
字数统计：英文2111单词，11535字符；中文3840汉字
外文文献：
Financing Preferences of Spanish Firms: Evidence on the
Pecking Order Theory
Abstract This paper analyses some of the empirical implications of the pecking order theory in the Spanish market using a panel data analysis of 1,566 firms over 1994–2000. The results show that the pecking order theory holds for most subsamples analyzed, particularly for the small and medium-sized enterprises and for the high-growth and highly leveraged companies. It is also shown that both the more and the less leveraged firms tend to converge towards more balanced capital structures. Finally, we observe that firms finance their funds flow deficits with long term debt.
Keywords:capital structure, pecking order theory
Introduction
A prime contribution on information asymmetry in capital structure theory is the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Myers and Majluf observe that the empirical evidence is not consistent with a financial policy that is determined by a trade-off of the advantages and disadvantages of market imperfections, mainly taxes, costs of
financial distress, and agency costs. Rather, companies’ financial policies seem to be better explained by the behaviour described by Donaldson (1961).He establishes a hierarchy described by company preference for internal funds over external funds; in the case of external funds, a company prefers debt first, then hybrid instruments like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues. This hierarchy, broadly characterized as pecking order theory, indicates that companies do not make financing decisions with the aim of achieving optimal leverage.
Although they tend to be taken as the same thing, the pecking order theory and the Myers and Majluf (1984) model are not strictly speaking the same. The pecking order theory i s merely a description of companies’ financing policy, while the Myers and Majluf work represents the first model that attempts to describe this behaviour from a theoretical point of view, based on the presence of information asymmetry. Moreover, the Myers and Majluf (1984)model assumes listed companies and markets where equity is issued through firm commitments, such as the American market, not for markets where the predominant flotation method is rights offerings, such as Spain and most other countries.
The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the pecking order theory in the Spanish market. The analysis takes two directions. First, we examine the evolution of the three largest accounting sources of funding for a company—retained earnings, equity issues and debt—using a model based on Watson and Wilson (2002).Second, we study the role of long-term debt in making up financing deficits, following the flow of funds deficit equation of Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999).
There are several features which distinguish the Spanish financial system from the American one. Probably the main difference affecting the pecking order is the flotation method in equity issues. Equity securities are issued in a wide variety of ways, mainly firm commitments underwritten offers and rights issues. The relative importance of these methods depends on the issuing firm’s country. In the United States rights offerings have declined in frequency, having virtually disappeared by 1980.In Spain, rights prevail. This difference may play an important role in the hierarchy described by the pecking order theory. In addition: (a)debt financing is
primarily raised privately in Spanish firms, thus banks play a very important role; and(b)the Spanish capital market is less developed than the American securities market, having lower capitalization and smaller transaction volumes. Although several papers have already examined the capital structure of Spanish firms, most of them have analyzed the effect of different variables on leverage. However, there is little evidence focusing on pecking order and no study employing the Watson and Wilson (2002) methodology.
The results show that small and medium-sized companies behave consistently with predictions of the pecking order theory. When we divide the sample into subsamples on the basis of growth and the level of leverage, we see that high-growth companies base their growth on retained earnings, and firms with very high and very low debt ratios tend to converge towards more moderate debt ratios. Estimation of the flow of funds deficit equation shows that fund deficits are met by the use of long-term debt.
The pecking order theory: Theoretical base and empirical evidence The pecking order theory describes a hierarchy in companies’ financial policy as follows: (1)Firms prefer to finance their investments with funds internally generated, namely, retained earnings and depreciation expenses; (2)firms base the dividend payout ratios on the future investment opportunity set and their expected cash flows;
(3)payout ratios tend to be sticky in the short term, so in some years internally generated flows will be enough for financing company needs and in some years not;
(4)funds obtained in years of financial surpluses, after payment of dividends and financing, are directed to finance short-term financial investments or to reduce debt. When there is a financial deficit, firms will seek external finance: first debt, then hybrid securities like convertible bonds, and finally equity issues.
To explain this behaviour Myers and Majluf (1984) construct a model of information asymmetry assuming that firm managers act on behalf of current shareholders. If companies have enough financial slack, they will carry out all
investments that have a positive net present value. If external funds are needed to finance new investments, the market will interpret equity issues as evidence that company shares are overvalued and thus issue announcement will have a negative impact on the share price.
Thus, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that, if the company does not have enough funds to finance new investments, it will issue equity only when there are very profitable investments that can neither be postponed nor financed through debt, or when managers believe that the stock is overvalued enough that shareholders will be disposed to tolerate the market penalty. The information asymmetry may cause current shareholders to renounce positive net present value investment projects in order to avoid a drop in share price due to the issue of equity, thereby creating an underinvestment problem. To avoid these results, it seems reasonable that companies will implement financing policies that allow them the capacity to finance investments and avoid external financing.
However, the Myers and Majluf model (1984) has some limitations. The first is that it applies to markets like the American market where shares are offered mainly through firm commitment underwritings and not through rights issues, which is the flotation method that prevails in most other markets. In an underwritten firm commitment, shares are offered simultaneously to the public at large. Thus, if shares are overvalued, there will be a wealth transfer from new to current shareholders. In rights offerings, current shareholders enjoy priority in the purchase of new shares, which minimizes the possibility of wealth transfers. Therefore, the Myers and Majluf (1984) argument that equity issue is the last choice in firms’ financing policies has little currency in markets where rights issues are the prevalent method of equity issue.
Another limitation of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model is that it is generally intended to describe listed companies, leaving the rest, mainly the small and medium-sized enterprises(SME),out of the explanation. Because of this, authors since then have tried to explain the pecking order theory using alternative arguments appropriate to non-listed SME companies.
A major problem in SME financing, especially in non-Anglo-Saxon countries, is
limited access to capital markets (a finance gap) (Holmes and Kent,1991).Financing choices for SME are thus usually reduced to retained earnings and bank loans. This finance gap can be divided into two components: a supply gap, because of limited availability of funds or higher cost, and a knowledge gap, because of limited knowledge about all the possibilities of external finance and a lack of awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of debt. As a consequence of these two components of the finance gap, the main long-term source of finance will be internal financing and, if necessary, bank loans.
Another factor that may play a part in the hierarchy of firm choices is the motivation to retain control of the firm (Holmes and Kent, 1991; Hamilton and Fox, 1998).As we have noted, in a firm commitment offering stock is sold at one time to the general public; thus, current shareholders’ relative ownership of firm, as well as their control of the company may be diminished with new share offerings. Such a control problem may arise also in rights issues, but to a lesser extent, because current shareholders may have limited funds to invest in the first place or may want to diversify their investments, so they might not purchase additional shares to maintain their ownership percentage. As a result of all of this, the current shareholders would also be reluctant to issue equity.
These factors mentioned above imply a similar hierarchy to the one described by Myers and Majluf (1984); that is, the company would make use of retained earnings in the first place, then debt (bank loans) and, finally, equity issues.
Various authors have tried to test the empirical implications of the pecking order theory. Next, we briefly summarize some of them. Watson and Wilson(2002)use a descriptive model in the British market and confirm the pecking order theory, especially for closely-held companies(companies whose ownership is very concentrated and whose manager is usually the main owner).
Shyam-Sunder and Myers(1999)and Frank and Goyal(2003)study the way companies finance their flow of funds deficits. The former authors find evidence to support the pecking order theory; the latter find evidence of a target debt ratio. Mato(1990),in the Spanish market, studies financing flow of fund deficits, using an
accounting identity that includes share issues. He finds that companies tend not to use equity issues, but finance their needs primarily with debt. He also observes that debt and internal finance are mutually substitutable.
Fama and French(2002)use structural equations that regress leverage and dividend payout as dependent variables on several explanatory variables from the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. They find no conclusive evidence in support of one specific theory.
Lo′pez-Gracia and Aybar-Arias(2000)use Manova analysis to examine the relationship between variables proposed by the pecking order theory and financial constraints in the Spanish market. They find that the significance of internal finance varies according to company size. Saa′-Requejo(1996)uses a nested model with binary variables for Spanish companies to test the choice between internal or external finance and between equity and debt. He finds that companies care about whether the funds are raised publicly or privately and suffer from similar financial constraints, whether they are holding companies or not.
Finally, Holmes and Kent(1991)and Ang and Jung(1992)use mail surveys to try to discern typical company financing policies. Both authors find that company managers follow a hierarchy of funding choices similar to the one described by the pecking order theory. Holmes and Kent(1991)find a stricter pecking order in place at SME than at larger companies.
In short, many authors have tried to test the pecking order theory, but the evidence is not conclusive.
Conclusions
We have examined several empirical implications of the pecking order theory for a sample of 1,566 Spanish companies partitioned by size, growth, and previous debt level over 1994–2000.
The pecking order theory states that firms follow a hierarchy when financing investments. Companies prefer internal funds to external funds; in case of external
funds firms prefer debt first, with equity issues being their last choice. Given that Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument is not valid in explaining this h ierarchy in markets like the Spanish where rights issues prevail, a finance gap and the motivation to retain control could help to explain such a hierarchy in these markets.
For the whole sample, we find that retained earnings and debt have similar coefficients, higher than the equity issues coefficient, providing evidence of the duality of retained earnings and debt noted by Holmes and Kent(1991).In the case of different subsamples, small and medium-sized firms do seem to follow the pecking order predictions; the retained earnings coefficient exceeds the debt coefficient, which in turn exceeds the equity issues coefficient. Such results could be explained by a finance gap or by the motivation to retain control.
Analysis of subsamples based on firms’ growth and previous debt level shows that these factors are very important in determining companies’ financing policies. High-growth companies resort to retained earnings, and then to debt, and finally to equity issues. That is, these firms follow the pecking order theory. Low-growth firms by contrast take a more balanced approach to financing. Analysis of high-leverage and low-leverage firms indicates these companies move towards more moderate debt levels.
Finally, estimation of a flow of funds deficit equation reveals that companies tend to fund their financing deficits mainly with long-term debt.
中文译文：
西班牙企业的融资偏好：优序融资理论的实证研究
摘要本文通过使用1994年—2000年西班牙市场的的1566家企业的固定样本数据分析优序融资理论的实证影响。

结果表明优序融资理论适用于大多数次级样本分析，特别是中小型企业与高成长和高杠杆比率的企业。

它还表明，较大或较小杠杆作用的企业往往更倾向于保持一个平衡的资本结构。

最后，我们注意到企业用长期债务来弥补资金赤字的问题。

关键词：资本结构，融资顺序理论
引言
一个关于信息不对称的资本结构理论的主要贡献是梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年）提出的模型。

梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫观察到实证结果与财政政策不一致，它取决于如何权衡不完善市场的利弊，主要是因为存在税收、财务危机的成本和代理成本。

相反，企业的财务政策似乎能够由唐纳森（1961年）提出的行为解释说更好地说明。

他建立了一个企业相对于外部资金更偏好内部资金的的融资顺序；在需要外部融资的情况下，企业更倾向于债务融资，然后是类似可转换债券的混合工具，最后才是股权融资。

这个顺序扩展了优序融资理论应用的范围，并指出企业做融资决策并不是以获得最佳财务杠杆为目的的。

虽然优序融资理论与梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)的模型不严格来说是一样的，它们往往被视为相同。

优序融资理论只是描述企业的融资政策，而梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫的工作是第一个建立了试图以信息不对称的存在为基础并从理论的角度来解释这种行为的模型。

此外，梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)的模型假设前提为上市公司和通过承诺包销发行股票的市场，如美国市场，而不是通过配股发行股票的市场，如西班牙和其他大多数国家的市场。

本文的目的是为优序融资理论在西班牙市场的体现提供证据。

分析从两个方向展开。

首先，我们基于沃森和威尔逊（2002年)的模型考察了企业三个最大资金来源的演变——留存收益、股权融资和债务融资。

其次，通过夏恩·桑德和梅
叶斯（1999年）的方程计算出来资金赤字，我们研究了长期债务在弥补资金赤字中的作用。

西班牙金融体系与美国相比有几个不同的特点。

影响啄食顺序的主要差异可能是在股权融资中的配股问题。

发行权益性证券的方式多种多样，主要有承诺包销和配股。

这些方法的相对重要性取决于发行企业的国家。

美国配股的频率有所下降，到1980年后几乎消失。

在西班牙，配股却很流行。

这种差异可能在优序融资理论描述的顺序中起了重要作用。

此外：（a)西班牙的私人企业主要采用债务融资，因此，银行发挥着非常重要的作用；（b)西班牙的资本市场与美国证券市场相比欠发达，资本化程度较低，成交量也较小。

虽然一些文章已研究了西班牙企业的资本结构，其中大部分已经分析了不同变量对杠杆的作用。

然而，很少有证据关注啄食顺序，也没有运用沃森和威尔逊（2002年)的方法进行的研究。

结果表明，中小型企业的行为与优序融资理论的预测是一致。

当我们基于成长速度和杠杆水平分出的二次抽查样本，我们看到，高成长型企业以留存收益的增长为基础，具有极高或极低负债比率的企业会倾向于适度负债。

资金流动的估算公式得出赤字的结果显示长期债务弥补资金赤字。

优序融资理论：理论基础与实证研究
优序融资理论描述的企业融资顺序如下：（1)企业更偏好用企业内部产生的资金，即留存收益和折旧费用来进行投资；（2)企业股息支付率的确定是以未来投资机会和预期现金流量为基础的；（3)股息支付率在短期内趋于一定，所以在一些年度企业内部产生的现金流量能够满足资金需要，而在另一些年度内则不够；（4)获得多年资金盈余，是在支付股息和用于短期投资或减轻债务的融资费用后的。

当企业出现赤字，便会寻求外部融资，首先是借款，然后是像可转换债券的混合债券，最后才是股权融资。

要解释这种行为，梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)构建了一个信息不对称模型，这个模型假定企业管理者代表现有股东。

如果企业有足够多的资金，他们将进行所有净现值为正的投资。

如果需要利用外来资金进行新的投资，市场会以发行股票为证据认为该企业股票被高估，因此发行公告将对股价产生负面影响。

因此，梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)认为，如果没有足够的资金用于新的投
资，企业只有在非常有利可图且该投资既不能推迟也不能通过债务融资解决的情况下，或当管理者认为股价被高估，以至于股东将倾向于容忍市场处罚时，才会发行股票。

信息不对称可能导致现有股东放弃净现值为正的投资项目，以避免因股价下跌，从而造成投资不足。

为了避免这些结果，企业在他们融资能力之内执行融资政策，避免外部融资似乎很合理。

但是，梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年）的模型也有一定的局限性。

首先，它适用于像美国这样的股票市场，发行股票主要通过承诺包销，而不是通过在大多数其他市场普遍存在的方法——配股。

在承诺包销的情况下，股份同时向广大公众发售。

因此，如果股票被高估，将会有财富从新股东转移到现有股东的身上。

在配股时，现有股东享有优先购买权，这样可以最大限度地减少财富转移的可能性。

因此，梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年）认为，发行股票在企业的融资政策中是最后的选择，而在货币市场上发行股票是股权融资的普遍做法。

另一个梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年）模型的局限性在于，它通常是用于描述上市公司，但是对于剩下的大多数中小型企业没有给出解释。

正因为如此，从那时起学者们试图用合适的非上市中小企业来解释优序融资理论。

中小企业融资的一个主要问题，特别是在非盎格鲁撒克逊国家，进入资本市场是有限制的（资金缺口）（福尔摩斯和肯特，1991年）。

因此，中小企业的融资选择通常只有通过留存收益和银行借款。

这个资金缺口可分为两部分：一个是供应缺口，由于资金有限或成本较高，和知识缺乏，因为熟悉外部融资的方式是有限的以及对于债务融资的优缺点缺乏认识。

资金缺口的这两部分造成的后果：主要的长期资金来源将是内部资金，如果有必要，才会向银行借款。

另一个因素在企业选择融资顺序中可能起重要作用的是保留控制权的动机（福尔摩斯和肯特，1991年；汉密尔顿和福克斯，1998年）。

正如我们已经注意到了发行股票时采用承诺包销，同一时间向社会大众发售，因此，目前的股东拥有相对坚挺的所有权和控制权可能会阻碍新股的发行。

这样的控制问题也可能出现在配股方面，但在较小的程度，因为目前的股东可能首先只拥有有限的资金进行投资或可能要分散投资，所以他们不会购买额外股份以维持其持股比例。

由于上述原因，目前的股东也不愿意发行股票。

上述所提到的这些因素影响着由梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年）所描述的类
似的融资顺序，也就是说，企业将首先利用留存收益，然后债务融资（银行借款)，最后才是股权融资。

各作者试图验证优序融资理论的实证影响。

接下来，我们简要地概括了其中的一部分。

沃森和威尔逊（2002年）在英国市场使用描述模型，确认了优序融资理论在其中的应用，特别是密切持有的企业（企业的所有权非常集中，其管理者通常是主要的所有者）。

希亚姆-破甲和梅叶斯（1999年）与法兰克和宫娅（2003年）研究企业采取何种方式弥补赤字。

前者发现支持优序融资理论的证据，后者找到目标负债比率的证据。

马托（1990年）在西班牙市场使用会计恒等式研究弥补赤字的资金流的融资方式，其中包括发行股票。

他认为，企业往往不使用股权融资，他们的资金来源以债务融资为主。

他还指出，债务融资和内部融资是可以相互替代的。

法玛和弗伦奇（2002年）运用了结构方程，它基于优序融资理论和权衡理论中提出的自变量将回归杠杆和派息作为因变量。

他们没有发现一个确凿证据支持其中一种具体理论。

罗皮斯-格雷西亚和艾巴-阿里亚斯（2000年）利用多变量方差研究优序融资理论和在西班牙市场的财务约束下提出的两者变量之间的关系。

他们发现，内部融资的重要性根据企业规模的不同而有所不同。

萨阿-雷克霍（1996年）使用二元变量嵌套模型来测试西班牙企业内部或外部融资之间的选择与股权融资和债务融资之间的选择。

他认为，企业关心筹集的资金是公开还是私下，是否受到类似的财务限制，是否控股。

最后，福尔摩斯和肯特（1991年）和安格和荣格（1992年）通过使用邮件调查来试图辨别典型企业的融资政策。

两位学者都发现，企业管理者选择遵循一个类似优序融资理论所描述的融资顺序。

福尔摩斯和肯特（1991年）发现中小企业比大型的企业更严格地遵循优序融资顺序。

总之，许多学者试图验证优序融资理论，但证据不确凿。

结论
我们已通过对1566家不同大小、不同成长阶段和超过1994-2000年以前的债务水平的西班牙企业的研究验证了优序融资理论的实证影响。

优序融资理论认为企业融资时通常遵循一个顺序。

相对外部资金，企业更偏好内部资金；在需要外部融资的情况下，企业首先偏好债务融资，而股权融资是最后的选择。

鉴于梅叶斯和梅吉拉夫（1984年)的论点在像西班牙这种市场解释融资顺序是无效的，配股盛行、资金缺口、保留控制权的动机也许可以有助于解释这些市场上的融资顺序。

对于整个样本，我们发现，留存收益和债务也有类似的系数，比股权系数高，是由福尔摩斯和肯特（1991年）提供的留存收益和债务的二元性证据指出的。

在不同的次级样本中，中小型企业似乎确实遵循优序融资理论的预测；留存收益系数系数超过了债务系数，从而超过了股权系数。

这样的结果可以用资金缺口或保留控制权的动机来解释。

基于企业的成长和以前债务水平的次级样本分析显示，这些因素在决定企业融资政策时是非常重要的。

高成长型企业采取留存收益，然后债务融资，最后股权融资的顺序。

也就是说，这些企业遵循优序融资理论。

相比之下低成长的企业则采取更平衡的方式融资。

针对高杠杆率和低杠杆率企业的分析表明，这些企业倾向更稳健的债务水平。

最后，赤字的资金流估计方程显示，企业往往倾向于用长期债务弥补资金赤字。