哲学之后的艺术

So any branch of philosophy which dealt with ‘beauty’ and thus, taste, was inevitably duty bound to discuss art as well. Out of this ‘habit’ grew the notion that there was a conceptual connection between art and aesthetics, which is

not true.

因此，凡是涉及“美”以及趣味的任何哲学分支都不可避免地要讨论艺术。这种“习惯”滋生出了这样一种观念，即艺术与美学之间具有一种概念上的联系，但

这并不是事实。

When objects are presented within the context of art (and until recently objects always have been used ) they are as eligible for aesthetic consideration as are any objects in the world, and an aesthetic consideration

of an objects existing in the realm of art means that the object’s existence or functioning in an art context is irrelevant to the aesthetic judgement.

当客体被陈示于艺术语境中时(直到现在客体仍然被利用)，它们就与世界中的

其它事物一样适合于审美观照，而艺术领域中存在的对客体的审美观照意味着

客体在艺术语境中的存在或作用与审美判断之间没有任何关系。

Exactly why they don’t comment on the conceptual element in works of art is precisely because formalist art by virtue its resemblance to earlier works of art.

他们对艺术作品中的观念因素不作评论的根本原因，恰恰就在于形式主义艺术

所以成为艺术不过是因为它貌似于以往的艺术作品。

But such an a priori concept of the nature of art ( as separate from analytically framed art propositions or ‘work’ which I will discuss later ) makes it， indeed, a priori: impossible to question the nature of art . And this questioning of the nature of art is a very important concept in understanding the function of art.

艺术本质的这样一种先验的概念(不同于分析性结构的艺术命题或“作品” ，容下文讨论)，实际上使之成为一种先验的臆测：即不可能追问艺术的本质。这种对艺术本质的追问，是理解艺术作用的十分重要的概念。

Works of art are analytic propositions, That is, if viewed within their context-as art- they provide no information what-so-ever about any matter of fact. A work of art is a tautology in that it is a presentation of the artist’s intention, that is,

he is saying that a particular work of art is art, which means, is a definition of art. Thus, that it is art is true a priori ( which is what Judd means when he states that “if someone calls it art, it’s art” ).

艺术作品是分析的命题。也就是说，如果艺术作品在自身的语境中被作为艺术

加以审视，那它们就不会提供关于事实的任何信息。艺术作品是一种语义重复，因为它是艺术家意图的一种陈现，也就是说，艺术家是在说那件特殊的艺术作

品是艺术，意指是对艺术的一种界定。因此，这是艺术的说法就是一种真正的

先验存在(贾德说“如果有人称之为艺术，那就是艺术”时，就是这个意思)

To repeat, what art has in common with logic and mathematics is that it is a tautology, i.e., the ‘art idea’ ( or ‘work’ ) and art are the same and can be appreciated as art without going outside the context of art for verification.

艺术与逻辑和数学的共同之处，就在于它是一种语义重复，即是说，“艺术思想” (或“作品”)和艺术是同一回事。它可以作为艺术被人欣赏而无需在艺术语境之外求得证实。

Thus, as Ayer has stated:“There are no absolutely certain empirical propositions. It is only tautologies that are certain. Empirical questions are one and all hypotheses, which may be confirmed or discredited in actual sense-experience. And the propositions in which we record the observations that verify these hypotheses are themselves hypotheses which are subject to the test of further sense-experience. Thus there is no final proposition. ”

因此，正如艾尔所说：不存在什么绝对肯定的经验命题。只有语义重复是肯定的。经验问题是彻头彻尾的假设，它在实际的知觉经验中可以被证实也可以被

怀疑。我们记录用来验证这些假设的观察方法时所采用的命题，本身就是假设．它还要受到进一步的知觉经验的验证。所以并不存在最后的命题.

Forms of art that can be considered synthetic propositions are verifiable by

the world, that is to say, to understand these propositions one must leave the tautological-like framework of art and consider ‘outside’ information, But to consider it as art it is necessary to ignore this same outside information, because outside information ( experiential qualities, to note ) has its own intrinsic worth. And to comprehend this worth ones does not need a state of

‘art condition’.

因为艺术的形式可以被视为综合的命题，它要得到天地万物的验证，也就是说，要理解这些命题，就必须离开貌似语义重复的艺术框架而考虑“外在的”信息。

但是，要将它视为艺术，就有必要无视这种外在的信息，因为外在的信息(注意，这里指的是经验的特性)有它自己内在的价值。要理解这种价值，并不需要一种“艺术状态”的状态。

Art indeed exists for its own sake.

艺术实际上是为自己而存在。