德国银行要命的十分钟
世界成功学专家教材
数量 1+1 1+1
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奥里森·马登
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成功的品质
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一生的资本
拿破仑希尔
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思考致富（附《思考致富行动指南》）
戴尔卡耐基
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戴尔卡耐基成功之道全书（配CD）
奥格·曼迪诺
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羊皮卷 世界上最伟大的推销员（配CD）
马库斯·白金汉
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现在，发现你的优势 首先，打破一切常规
沃特斯塔
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大客户的开发与服务 开源节流
温州新机电器集团秘训 温州泰昌电力集团秘训
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德意志银行十分钟的悲剧不要让流程吞噬责任
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综合英语教程第三册课文译文加课后翻译2
综合英语教程第三册课文译文加课后翻译2第三册课文参考译文Unit 1Text 1我的父亲----来自一位著名男演员的女儿的叙述埃米·米特福德我并不真正了解父亲，他不是个很容易相处的人。
我觉得他比较以自我为中心, 还有一点虚荣, 有时候还会让人觉得有距离感。
公众们肯定都认为他很随和,其实在家的时候他基本上都是独处,不怎么跟我们交流的。
我小的时候父亲很少在家的，因为那时几乎没有什么关于他的记忆。
他对家庭生活一直是有一些生疏。
对他来说，工作总是放在第一位，而且记忆中他总是在外地演戏或是排练。
他喜欢别人找他签名，也喜欢被别人认出的感觉。
他获得过几个奖项，并为此感到骄傲。
记得在他获得大不列颠影帝奖时，我们必须到白金汉宫去领取奖牌。
那真是令人难以置信的无趣。
还有其他数以百计的人拿同样的奖项，所以你得一直坐在那等好几个小时。
每当有人来拜访我们家时，父亲总爱把他的奖项拿出来炫耀。
我上过公立学校，但是因为缺乏学习兴趣并且总是缺课，被勒令退学了。
最主要的是我一点也不想去那上学，因为这样我就和我的朋友们分开了。
把我送到那个学校读书他一定很高兴，但事实上到最后这一切只是浪费钱而已。
我想我一定让他感到非常失望。
后来我也试着做过几份工作但是都不能安心长久地做下去，然后我意识到我真正想做的是生活在乡村，并且，这也是我现在做的事情。
作为一家人，无论是情感上还是空间上我们都有距离。
这些日子我们很少见到彼此。
我和父亲的性格大相径庭。
我的兴趣一直都在乡村，而他则喜欢书和音乐，尤其是歌剧，这恰恰是我所讨厌的。
如果他们来看我,他们的衣着也完全不适合在乡村穿—貂皮大衣和漂亮的但不适合在田间走长路的小皮鞋。
父亲对我的婚姻更是完全反对。
他一直希望我和我的丈夫分开。
我想我丈夫出身太卑微了。
而父亲一定是想让我嫁给一个有名望的人，但结果并不能使他如愿。
而且事情往往就是这样。
我们夫妇俩并不打算要孩子，但是我的父亲总是不停地谈论着他想抱孙子。
十分钟的悲剧(银行监事长)
关于“十分钟的悲剧”的心得体会德国国家发展银行在短短的10分钟内、以3亿欧元的悲剧，创造出了“德国最愚蠢的银行”，事件中的每一个人，都让我们有一种似曾相识的感觉，对照每一个当事人，他们就像在我们身边，甚至于说他们就像是我们自己，我们也许没有造成如此严重的后果，没有被作为让大众反省剖析的反面教材，但我们实在应该为自己的侥幸感到后怕和惭愧，更应该去深入的反思：如何在金融创新日益活跃、市场竞争不断加剧的背景下，在我们打造流程银行、品牌银行的实践中筑牢银行内部控制的风险防线。
内部控制是银行的生命线，但内部控制不仅是流程设计和岗位设置。
这一事件中，我们不能说德国国家发展银行的业务流程和岗位设置不够严谨、不够审慎，正如媒体评论时所说，只要当中有一个人认真负责一点，那么这场悲剧就不会发生。
事件中的当事人正因为没有“负责一点”，竟然让如此巨大的风险交易，从上帝的指缝间通过了层层防线。
在我们的工作实践中普遍存在只要按岗位职责办事，就是履职尽责的认识，这种认识必将遗祸于银行的内部控制和持续经营。
银行经营风险的特殊性要求我们必须有更高层次的责任心和使命感，按职责和流程办事只是岗位设置的最低要求。
银行的日常工作中，不论是规范化管理还是流程再造，都会存在一定的缺陷和接口缝隙，这就需要我们必须有更高层次的责任心和对潜在风险的高度敏感性，要有对大局负责的使命感，主动负责，敢于质疑，敢于对影响企业经营的重大风险说“不”，这才是真正的履职尽责、爱岗敬业。
作为一家地方银行，XX市商业银行在内控建设方面要做的工作还很多，我们既要根据国家法律法规进一步加强内控制度建设，完善内控体系，强化内控管理和内控的科学性、有效性；更要加强对全员内控意识的培训，增强全员的责任意识、风险意识和主人翁意识，让每一个人充分理解履职尽责、爱岗敬业的涵义，树立主动负责、勇于负责的使命感和责任心。
之所以酿成十分钟的悲剧，除了操作人员责任心因素以外，还有一个重要的原因就是银行内部信息沟通和传递环节不畅，导致内控失效。
An Anatomy of the Crude Oil Pricing System
An Anatomy of the Crude Oil PricingSystemBassam Fattouh1WPM 40January 20111 Bassam Fattouh is the Director of the Oil and Middle East Programme at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies; Research Fellow at St Antony‟s College, Oxford University; and Professor of Finance and Management at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. I would like to express my gratitude to Argus for supplying me with much of the data that underlie this research. I would also like to thank Platts for providing me with the data for Figure 21 and CME Group for providing me with the data for Figure 13. The paper has benefited greatly from the helpful comments of Robert Mabro and Christopher Allsopp and many commentators who preferred to remain anonymous but whose comments provided a major source of information for this study. The paper also benefited from the comments received in seminars at the Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK, ENI, Milan and Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford. Finally, I would like to thank those individuals who have given their time for face-to-face and/or phone interviews and have been willing to share their views and expertise. Any remaining errors are my own.The contents of this paper are the authors’ sole responsibility. They do not necessarily represent the views of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies or any of itsmembers.Copyright © 2011Oxford Institute for Energy Studies(Registered Charity, No. 286084)This publication may be reproduced in part for educational or non-profit purposes without special permission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgment of the source is made. No use of this publication may be made for resale or for any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing from the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.ISBN978-1-907555-20-6ContentsSummary Report (6)1. Introduction (11)2. Historical Background to the International Oil Pricing System (14)The Era of the Posted Price (14)The Pricing System Shaken but Not Broken (14)The Emergence of the OPEC Administered Pricing System (15)The Consolidation of the OPEC Administered Pricing System (16)The Genesis of the Crude Oil Market (17)The Collapse of the OPEC Administered Pricing System (18)3. The Market-Related Oil Pricing System and Formulae Pricing (20)Spot Markets, Long-Term Contracts and Formula Pricing (20)Benchmarks in Formulae Pricing (24)4. Oil Price Reporting Agencies and the Price Discovery Process (30)5. The Brent Market and Its Layers (36)The Physical Base of North Sea (37)The Layers and Financial Instruments of the Brent Market (39)Data Issues (39)The Forward Brent (40)The Brent Futures Market (43)The Exchange for Physicals (44)The Dated Brent/BFOE (45)The Contract for Differences (CFDs) (45)OTC Derivatives (48)The Process of Oil Price Identification in the Brent Market (50)6. The US Benchmarks (52)The Physical Base for US Benchmarks (52)The Layers and Financial Instruments of WTI (55)The Price Discovery Process in the US Market (56)WTI: The Broken Benchmark? (58)7. The Dubai-Oman Market (61)The Physical Base of Dubai and Oman (61)The Financial Layers of Dubai (62)The Price Discovery Process in the Dubai Market (64)Oman and its Financial Layers: A New Benchmark in the Making? (66)8. Assessment and Evaluation (70)Physical Liquidity of Benchmarks (70)Shifts in Global Oil Demand Dynamics and Benchmarks (71)The Nature of Players and the Oil Price Formation Process (73)The Linkages between Physical Benchmarks and Financial Layers (74)Adjustments in Price Differentials versus Price Levels (74)Transparency and Accuracy of Information (76)9. Conclusions (78)References (81)List of FiguresFigure 1: Price Differentials of Various Types of Saudi Arabia‟s Crude Oil to Asia in $/Barrel (21)Figure 2: Differentials of Term Prices between Saudi Arabia Light and Iran Light Destined to Asia (FOB) (In US cents) (23)Figure 3: Difference in Term Prices for Various Crude Oil Grades to the US Gulf (Delivered) and Asia (FOB) (24)Figure 4: Price Differential between Dated Brent and BWAVE ($/Barrel) (26)Figure 5: Price Differential between WTI and ASCI ($/Barrel) (ASCI Price=0) (26)Figure 6: Brent Production by Company (cargoes per year), 2007 (37)Figure 7: Falling output of BFO (38)Figure 8: Trading Volume and Number of Participants in the 21-Day BFOE Market (42)Figure 9: Average Daily Volume and Open Interest of ICE Brent Futures Contract (44)Figure 10: Pricing basis of Dated Brent Deals (1986-1991); Percentage of Total Deals (45)Figure 11: Reported Trade on North Sea CFDs (b/d) (46)Figure 12: US PADDS (52)Figure 13: Monthly averages of volumes traded of the Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures Contract (55)Figure 14:Liquidity at Different Segments of the Futures Curve (October 19, 2010) (56)Figure 15: Spot Market Traded Volumes (b/d) (April 2009 Trade Month) (57)Figure 16: Spread between WTI 12-weeks Ahead and prompt WTI ($/Barrel) (59)Figure 17: WTI-BRENT Price Differential ($/Barrel) (60)Figure 18: Dubai and Oman Crude Production Estimates (thousand barrels per day) (62)Figure 19: Spread Deals as a Percentage of Total Number of Dubai Deals (63)Figure 20: Oman-Dubai Spread ($/Barrel) (64)Figure 21: Dubai Partials Jan 2008 - Nov 2010 (65)Figure 22: daily Volume of Traded DME Oman Crude Oil Futures Contract (67)Figure 23: Volume and Open Interest of the October 2010 Futures Contracts (Traded During Month of August) (68)Figure 24: OECD and Non-OECD Oil Demand Dynamics (71)Figure 25: Change in Oil Trade Flow Dynamics (72)Figure 26: The North Sea Dated differential to Ice Brent during the French Strike (76)Summary ReportThe view that crude oil has acquired the characteristics of financial assets such as stocks or bonds has gained wide acceptance among many observers. However, the nature of …financialisation‟ and its implications are not yet clear. Discussions and analyses of …financialisation‟ of oil markets have partly been subsumed within analyses of the relation between finance and commodity indices which include crude oil. The elements that have attracted most attention have been outcomes: correlations between levels, returns, and volatility of commodity and financial indices. However, a full understanding of the degree of interaction between oil and finance requires, in addition, an analysis of interactions, causations and processes such as the investment and trading strategies of distinct types of financial participants; the financing mechanisms and the degree of leverage supporting those strategies; the structure of oil derivatives markets; and most importantly the mechanisms that link the financial and physical layers of the oil market.Unlike a pure financial asset, the crude oil market also has a …phy sical‟ dimension that should anchor prices in oil market fundamentals: crude oil is consumed, stored and widely traded with millions of barrels being bought and sold every day at prices agreed by transacting parties. Thus, in principle, prices in the futures market through the process of arbitrage should eventually converge to the so-called …spot‟ prices in the physical markets. The argument then goes that since physical trades are transacted at spot prices, these prices should reflect existing supply-demand conditions.In the oil market, however, the story is more complex. T he …current‟ market fundamentals are never known with certainty. The flow of data about oil market fundamentals is not instantaneous and is often subject to major revisions which make the most recent available data highly unreliable. Furthermore, though many oil prices are observed on screens and reported through a variety of channels, it is important to explain what these different prices refer to. Thus, although the futures price often converges to a …spot‟ price, one should aim to analyse the process of convergence and understand what the …spot‟ price in the context of the oil market really means.Unfortunately, little attention has been devoted to such issues and the processes of price discovery in oil markets and the drivers of oil prices in the short-run remain under-researched. While this topic is linked to the current debate on the role of speculation versus fundamentals in the determination of the oil price, it goes beyond the existing debates which have recently dominated policy agendas. This report offers a fresh and deeper perspective on the current debate by identifying the various layers relevant to the price formation process and by examining and analysing the links between the financial and physical layers in the oil market, which lie at the heart of the current international oil pricing system.The adoption of the market-related pricing system by many oil exporters in 1986-1988 opened a new chapter in the history of oil price formation. It represented a shift from a system in which prices were first administered by the large multinational oil companies in the 1950s and 1960s and then by OPEC for the period 1973-1988 to a system in which prices are set by …markets‟. First adopted by the Mexican national oil company PEMEX in 1986, the market-related pricing system received wide acceptance among most oil-exporting countries. By 1988, it became and still is the main method for pricing crude oil in international trade after a short experimentation with a products-related pricing system in the shape of the netback pricing regime in the period 1986-1987. The oil market was ready for such a transition. The end of the concession system and the waves of nationalisation which disrupted oil supplies to multinational oil compan ies established the basis of arm‟s-length deals and exchange outside the vertically and horizontally integrated multinational companies. The emergence of many suppliers outside OPEC and many buyers further increased the prevalence of such arm‟s-length deals. This led to the development of a complex structure of interlinked oil markets which consist of spot and also physical forwards, futures, options and other derivative markets referred to as paper markets. Technological innovations which made electronic trading possible revolutionised these markets by allowing 24-hour trading from any place in theworld. It also opened access to a wider set of market participants and allowed the development of a large number of trading instruments both on regulated exchanges and over the counter.Physical delivery of crude oil is organised either through the spot (cash) market or through long-term contracts. The spot market is used by transacting parties to buy and sell crude oil not covered by long term contractual arrangements and applies often to one-off transactions. Given the logistics of transporting oil, spot cargoes for immediate delivery are rare. Instead, there is an important element of forwardness in spot transactions. The parties can either agree on the price at the time of agreement, in which case the sport transaction becomes closer to a …forward‟ contract. More often though, transacting parties link the pricing of an oil cargo to the time of loading.Long-term contracts are negotiated bilaterally between buyers and sellers for the delivery of a series of oil shipments over a specified period of time, usually one or two years. They specify among other things, the volumes of crude oil to be delivered, the delivery schedule, the actions to be taken in case of default, and above all the method that should be used in calculating the price of an oil shipment. Price agreements are usually concluded on the method of formula pricing which links the price of a cargo in long-term contracts to a market (spot) price. Formula pricing has become the basis of the oil pricing system. Formula pricing has two main advantages. Crude oil is not a homogenous commodity. There are various types of internationally traded crude oil with different qualities and characteristics which have a bearing on refining yields. Thus, different crudes fetch different prices. Given the large variety of crude oils, the price of a particular type is usually set at a discount or at a premium to marker or reference prices, often referred to as benchmarks. The differentials are adjusted periodically to reflect differences in the quality of crudes as well as the relative demand and supply of the various types of crudes. Another advantage of formula pricing is that it increases pricing flexibility. When there is a lag between the date at which a cargo is bought and the date of arrival at its destination, there is a price risk. Transacting parties usually share this risk through the pricing formula. Agreements are often made for the date of pricing to occur around the delivery date.At the heart of formulae pricing is the identification of the price of key …physical‟ benchmarks, such as West Texas Intermediate (WTI), Dated Brent and Dubai-Oman. The benchmark crudes are a central feature of the oil pricing system and are used by oil companies and traders to price cargoes under long-term contracts or in spot market transactions; by futures exchanges for the settlement of their financial contracts; by banks and companies for the settlement of derivative instruments such as swap contracts; and by governments for taxation purposes.Few features of these physical benchmarks stand out. Markets with relatively low volumes of production such as WTI, Brent, and Dubai set the price for markets with higher volumes of production elsewhere in the world. Despite the high level of volumes of production in the Gulf, these markets remain illiquid: there is limited spot trading in these markets, no forwards or swaps (apart from Dubai), and no liquid futures market since crude export contracts include destination and resale restrictions which limit trading options. While the volume of production is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of a benchmark, it is a necessary conditio n for a benchmark‟s success. As markets become thinner and thinner, the price discovery process becomes more difficult. Oil price reporting agencies cannot observe enough genuine arms-length deals. Furthermore, in thin markets, the danger of squeezes and distortions increases and as a result prices could then become less informative and more volatile thereby distorting consumption and production decisions. So far the low and continuous decline in the physical base of existing benchmarks has been counteracted by including additional crude streams in an assessed benchmark. This had the effect of reducing the chance of squeezes as these alternative crudes could be used for delivery against the contract. Although such short-term solutions have been successful in alleviating the problem of squeezes, observers should not be distracted from some key questions: What are the conditions necessary for the emergence of successful benchmarks in the most physically liquid market? Would a shift to assessingprice in these markets improve the price discovery process? Such key questions remain heavily under-researched in the energy literature and do not feature in the consumer-producer dialogue.The emergence of the non-OECD as the main source of growth in global oil demand will only increase the importance of such questions. One of the most important shifts in oil market dynamics in recent years has been the shift in oil trade flows to Asia: this may have long-term implications on pricing benchmarks. Questions are already being raised whether Dubai still constitutes an appropriate benchmark for pricing crude oil exports to Asia given its thin physical base or whether new benchmarks are needed to reflect more accurately the recent shift in trade flows and the rise in prominence of the Asian consumer.Unlike the futures market where prices are observable in real time, the reported prices of physical benchmarks are …identified‟ or …assessed‟ prices. Assessments are needed in opaque markets such as crude oil where physical transactions concluded between parties cannot be directly observed by outsiders. Assessments are also needed in illiquid markets where there are not enough representative deals or where no transactions are concluded. These assessments are carried out by oil pricing reporting agencies (PRAs), the two most important of which are Platts and Argus. While PRAs have been an integral part of the oil pricing system, especially since the shift to the market-related pricing system in 1986, their role has recently been attracting considerable attention. In the G20 summit in Korea in November 2010, the G20 leaders called for a more detailed analysis on …how the oil spot market prices are assessed by oil price reporting agencies and how this affects the transparency and functioning of oil markets‟. In its latest report in No vember 2010, IOSCO points that …the core concern with respect to price reporting agencies is the extent to which the reported data accurately refle cts the cash market in question‟. PRAs do not only act as …a mirror to the trade‟. In their attempt to identify the price that reflects accurately the market value of an oil barrel, PRAs enter into the decision-making territory which can influence market structure. What they choose to do is influenced by market participants and market structure while they in turn influence the trading strategies of the various participants. New markets and contracts may emerge to hedge the risks arising from some PRAs‟ decisions. To evaluate the role of PRAs in the oil market, it is important to look at three inter-related dimensions: the methodology used in indentifying the oil price; the accuracy of price assessments; and the internal measures that PRAs implement to protect the integrity and ensure an efficient assessment process. There is a fundamental difference in the methodology and in the philosophy underlying the price assessment process between the various PRAs. As a result, different agencies may produce different prices for the same benchmark. This raises the issue of which method produces a more accurate price assessment. Given that assessed prices underlie long-term contracts, spot transactions and derivatives instruments, even small differences in price assessments between PRAs have important impl ications on exporters‟ revenues and financial flows between parties in financial contracts. In the last two decades or so, many financial layers (paper markets) have emerged around crude oil benchmarks. They include the forward market (in Brent and Dubai), swaps, futures, and options. Some of the instruments such as futures and options are traded on regulated exchanges such as ICE and CME Group, while other instruments, such as swaps, options and forward contracts, are traded bilaterally over the counter (OTC). Nevertheless, these financial layers are highly interlinked through the process of arbitrage and the development of instruments that links the various layers together. Over the years, these markets have grown in terms of size, liquidity, sophistication and have attracted a diverse set of players both physical and financial. These markets have become central for market participants wishing to hedge their risk and to bet on oil price movements. Equally important, these financial layers have become central to the oil price identification process.At the early stages of the current pricing system, linking prices to benchmarks in formulae pricing provided producers and consumers with a sense of comfort that the price is grounded in the physical dimension of the market. This implicitly assumes that the process of identifying the price of benchmarks can be isolated from financial layers. However, this is far from reality. The analysis in this report shows that the different layers of the oil market form a complex web of links, all of which play a role in the price discovery process. The information derived from financial layers is essential for identifying the pricelevel of the benchmark. In the Brent market, the oil price in the forward market is sometimes priced as a differential to the price of the Brent futures contract using the Exchange for Physicals (EFP) market. The price of Dated Brent or North Sea Dated in turn is priced as a differential to the forward market through the market of Contract for Differences (CFDs), another swaps market. Given the limited number of physical transactions and hence the limited amount of deals that can be observed by oil reporting agencies, the value of Dubai, the main benchmark used for pricing crude oil exports to East Asia, is often assessed by using the value of differentials in the very liquid OTC Dubai/Brent swaps market. Thus, one could argue that without these financial layers it would not be possible to …discover‟ or …identify‟ oil prices in the current oil pricing system. In effect, crude oil prices are jointly or co-determined in both layers, depending on differences in timing, location and quality of crude oil.Since physical benchmarks constitute the pricing basis of the large majority of physical transactions, some observers claim that derivatives instruments such as futures, forwards, options and swaps derive their value from the price of these physical benchmarks, i.e., the prices of these physical benchmarks drive the prices in paper markets. However, this is a gross over-simplification and does not accurately reflect the process of crude oil price formation. The issue of whether the paper market drives the physical or the other way around is difficult to construct theoretically and test empirically and requires further research.The report also calls for broadening the empirical research to include the trading strategies of physical players. In recent years, the futures markets have attracted a wide range of financial players including swap dealers, pension funds, hedge funds, index investors, technical traders, and high net worth individuals. There are concerns that these financial players and their trading strategies could move the oil price away from the …true‟ underlying funda mentals. The fact remains however that the participants in many of the OTC markets such as forward markets and CFDs which are central to the price discovery process are mainly …physical‟ and include entities suc h as refineries, oil companies, downstream consumers, physical traders, and market makers. Financial players such as pension funds and index investors have limited presence in many of these markets. Thus, any analysis limited to non-commercial participants in the futures market and their role in the oil price formation process is incomplete and also potentially misleading.The report also makes the distinction between trade in price differentials and trade in price levels. It shows that trades in the levels of the oil price rarely take place in the layers surrounding the physical benchmarks. We postulate that the price level of the main crude oil benchmarks is set in the futures markets; the financial layers such as swaps and forwards set the price differentials depending on quality, location and timing. These differentials are then used by oil reporting agencies to identify the price level of a physical benchmark. If the price in the futures market becomes detached from the underlying benchmark, the differentials adjust to correct for this divergence through a web of highly interlinked and efficient markets. Thus, our analysis reveals that the level of the crude oil price, which consumers, producers and their governments are most concerned with, is not the most relevant feature in the current pricing system. Instead, the identification of price differentials and the adjustments in these differentials in the various layers underlie the basis of the current crude oil pricing system. By trading differentials, market participants limit their exposure to the risks of time, location grade and volume. Unfortunately, this fact has received little attention and the issue of whether price differentials between different markets showed strong signs of adjustment in the 2008-2009 price cycle has not yet received due attention in the empirical literature.But this leaves us with a fundamental question: what determines the price level of a certain benchmark in the first place? The pricing system reflects how the oil market functions: if price levels are set in the futures market and if market participants in these markets attach more weight to future fundamentals rather than current fundamentals and/or if market participants expect limited feedbacks from both thesupply and demand side in response to oil price changes, these expectations will be reflected in the different layers and will ultimately be reflected in the assessed spot price of a certain benchmark.The current oil pricing system has survived for almost a quarter of a century, longer than the OPEC administered system. While some of the details have changed, such as Saudi Arabia‟s decision to replace Dated Brent with Brent futures in pricing its exports to Europe and the more recent move to replace WTI with Argus Sour Crude Index (ASCI) in pricing its exports to the US, these changes are rather cosmetic. The fundamentals of the current pricing system have remained the same since the mid 1980s: the price of oil is set by the …market‟ with PRAs making use of various methodologies to reflect the market price in their assessments and making use of information in the financial layers surrounding the global benchmarks. In the light of the 2008-2009 price swings, the oil pricing system has received some criticism reflecting the unease that some observers feel with the current system. Although alternative pricing systems could be devised such as bringing back the administered pricing system or calling for producers to assume a greater responsibility in the method of price formation by removing destination restrictions on their exports, or allowing their crudes to be auctioned, the reality remains that the main market players such as oil companies, refineries, oil exporting countries, physical traders and financial players have no interest in rocking the boat. Market players and governments get very concerned about oil price behaviour and its global and local impacts, but so far have showed much less interest in the pricing system and market structure that signalled such price behaviour in the first place.1.IntroductionThe adoption of the market-related pricing system by many oil exporters in 1986-1988 opened a new chapter in the history of oil price formation. It represented a shift from a system in which prices were first administered by the large multinational oil companies in the 1950s and 1960s and then by OPEC for the period 1973-1988 to a system in which prices are se t by …markets‟. But what is really meant by the …market price‟ or the …spot price‟ of crude oil?The concept of the …market price‟ of oil associated with the current pricing regime has often been surrounded with confusion. Crude oil is not a homogenous commodity. There are various types of internationally traded crude oil with different qualities and characteristics which have a bearing on refining yields. Thus, different crudes fetch different prices. In the current system, the prices of these crudes are usually set at a discount or a premium to a benchmark or reference price according to their quality and their relative supply and demand. However, this raises a series of questions. How are these price differentials set? More importantly, how is the price of the benchmark or reference crude determined?A simple answer to the latter question would be …the market‟ and the forces of supply and demand for these benchmark crudes. But this raises additional questions. What are the main features of the spot physical markets for these benchmarks? Do these markets have enough liquidity to ensure an efficient price discovery process? What are the roles of the various financial layers such as the futures markets and other derivatives-based instruments that have emerged around the physical benchmarks? Do these financial layers enhance or hamper the price discovery function? Does the distinction between the different layers of the market matter or have the different layers become so inter-linked that the distinction is no longer meaningful? And if the distinction does matter, what do prices in different markets reflect? It is clear from all these questions tha t the concept of …market price‟ needs to be defined more precisely. The argument that the market determines the oil price has little explanatory power.The above questions have assumed special importance in the last few years. The sharp swings in oil prices and the marked increase in volatility during the latest 2008-2009 price cycle have raised concerns about the impact of financial layers and financial investors on oil price behaviour.2 Some observers in the oil industry and in academic institutions attribute the recent behaviour in prices to structural transformations in the oil market. According to this view, the boom in oil prices can be explained in terms of tightened market fundamentals, rigidities in the oil industry due to long periods of underinvestment, and structural changes in the behaviour of key players such as non-OPEC suppliers, OPEC members, and non-OECD consumers.3On the other hand, other observers consider that the changes in fundamentals or even in expectations, have not been sufficiently dramatic to justify the extreme cycles in oil prices over the period 2008-2009. Instead, the oil market is seen as having been distorted by substantial and volatile flows of financial investments in deregulated or poorly regulated crude oil derivatives instruments.4The view that crude oil has acquired the characteristics of financial assets such as stocks or bonds has gained wide acceptance among many observers but is disputed by others.5Many empirical papers2 For a comprehensive overview, see Fattouh (2009).3 See, for instance, IMF (2008), World Economic Outlook (October), Washington: International Monetary Fund; Commodity Futures Trading Commission (2008), Interagency Task Force on Commodity Markets Interim Report on Crude Oil; Killian and Murphy (2010).4 See, for instance, the Testimony of Michael Greenberger before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on Excessive Speculation: Position Limits and Exemptions,5 August 2009. Greenberger provides an extensive list of studies that are in favour of the speculation view.5 See, for instance, Yergin (2009). Yergin argues that the excessive …daily trading has helped turn oil into something new -- not only a physical commodity critical to the security and economic viability of nations but also a financial asset, part of that great instantaneous exchange of stocks, bonds, currencies, and everything else that makes up the world's financial portfolio‟.。
德国最愚蠢的银行引发的思考
企业内部控制制度设计-----“德国最愚蠢的银行”引发企业内控思考“德国最愚蠢的银行”引发企业内控思考案例简述及分析2008年9月15日上午十点整，雷曼兄弟公司向法院申请破产保护，消息瞬间通过电视、广播和网络传遍地球的各个角落。
令人匪夷所思的是，十分钟后德国国家发展银行居然按照外汇掉期协议的交易，通过计算机自动付款系统，向雷曼兄弟公司转入了3亿欧元。
毫无疑问，3亿欧元将是“肉包子打狗——有去无回”。
与该事件相关的人员有十多位，上到董事长，下到操作员，他们都是企业经过严格筛选的精兵强将，可悲的是，几乎在同一时间，每个人都开了点小差，加在一起就创造出了“德国最愚蠢的银行”。
在该事件中，假如制度设计合理、即使每个人都开了小差，钱也出不去。
倘若每个人都是灵活机动的人，即使制度再不合理，钱也出不去。
对于如此硕大的企业靠人们的机动灵活，虽然能避开3亿欧元事件，但总有一天会发生比3欧亿元更愚蠢的事情。
如果企业有风险预警等内控机制或许该事件就不会发生了，归根究底还是制度有缺陷呀！企业内控五要素的建立及运用COSO由控制环境、风险评估、控制活动、信息沟通、监督五要素构成，coso 是一个较为理想的内部框架，通过理解和贯彻该框架要求，梳理管理流程、规范管理，对实现提升整体管理水平，继而实现增强企业的竞争实力，提高企业的经济效益，实现公司利益最大化的目标有重要意义。
1、完善企业的控制环境(1)坚持诚信和树立道德价值观。
无论是企业最高管理层还是其它成员都应当做保持诚信行为和拥有道德底线。
例如：不盲目追求不切实际的目标，以致形成不必要的压力。
企业制定收入指标应符合企业实际情况结合当年行业环境制定指标，好高骛远或大跃进，反而激发销售造假行为。
(2)完善人才管理机制。
制定正式或非正式的职务说明书，逐项分析并规定各工作岗位所须具备的知识和技能。
制定恰当的员工工作标准和道德标准，将该标准作为考核员工的依据，使员工清楚自己的晋升渠道，以此激励员工更加努力地为企业服务。
德国近代史[1]
![德国近代史[1]](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/fadcb347e518964bcf847c4c.png)
4、转折：事件：斯大林格勒战役 时间：1942-7----1943-2
斯大林格勒会战，又称斯大林格勒保卫战，是二 战中前苏联卫国战争的主要转折点，是第二次 世界大战的转折点，也是人类历史上最为血腥 和规模最大的战役之一。轴心国一方在这场战 役中损失了其在东线战场四分之一的兵力，并 从此一蹶不振直至最终溃败。对苏联一方而言， 这场战役的胜利标志着收复沦陷领土的开始， 最终迎来1945年5月对纳粹德国的最后胜利。举 世瞩目的斯大林格勒战役是第二次世界大战中 规模空前的一次会战，这次战役历时160天左右， 苏德双方投入战斗的兵力达200万以上。战役以 德军的彻底失败而告终。
第一次世界大战结束时，以战胜国英、法、美、 日、意等为一方和以战败的德国为另一方，于 1919年6月28日在巴黎西南凡尔赛宫签订了《凡 尔赛和约》，即《巴黎和约》，全称《协约和参 战各国对德和约》。是结束第一次世界大战的帝 国主义条约。1920年1月20日生效。 主要内容：德国将阿尔萨斯-洛林交还法国， 萨尔谋矿归法国；德国的殖民地由英、法、日等 国瓜分；德国向美、英、法等国支付巨额赔款； 德国承认奥地利独立；限制德国军备，并规定莱 茵河以东50公里为非军事区。
德意志邦联 1815-1866
• 1815年反法战争胜利后， 在“德意志神圣罗马帝国” 废墟上站起来的是松散的 “德意志邦联”，由38个 邦国组成，由普鲁士和奥 地利共同支配，此时德意 志依然分裂。 • 就在这一年，在萨克森， 一个小男孩出生了，他就 是日后大名鼎鼎的俾斯麦。
10分钟的悲剧
首席执行官乌尔里 首席执行官乌 奇施罗德：我知道 施 今天要按照协议約 定转帐， 定转帐，至于是否 撤销这笔巨額交易， 撤销这笔巨額交易， 应该让董事会讨论 決定。 決定。
董事长保卢斯：我们还沒有得到风险评估报告， 董事长保卢 我们还沒有得到风险评估报告， 无法及时做出正确的決策。 无法及时做出正确的決策。
转帐风波曝光后，德国社会舆论哗然 转帐风波曝光后，德国社会舆论哗然。销量最大的 舆论哗 片报》 18日 版的标题 标题中 《图片报》在9月18日头版的标题中，指責德国国 家发展银行是迄今“德国最愚蠢的银行” 家发展银行是迄今“德国最愚蠢的银行”。
法律事务所的调查员先后询问了银行各个部门的数 法律事务 十名职员，几天后，他们向国会和财 十名职员，几天后，他们向国会和财政部递交了一 份调查报告。报告并不复杂深奧，只是记载 份调查报告。报告并不复杂深奧，只是记载了被询 问人员在这十分钟內忙了些什么 问人员在这十分钟內忙了些什么——
结算部经理德尔布呂克： 结算部经理德尔布呂克：今天是协定规定的交易日 我沒有接到停止交易的指令 子，我沒有接到停止交易的指令，那就按照原计划 转帐吧。 转帐吧。
结算部自动付款系统操作员曼斯坦因：德尔布呂克 算部自动付款系统操作员曼斯坦因： 执也沒问就做了。
国际业务部副经理伊梅尔曼：忙于其他事情，沒有 国际业务部副经理伊梅尔曼：忙于其他事情， 时间去关心雷曼兄弟公司的消息。 时间去关心雷曼兄弟公司的消息。
负责处理与雷曼兄弟公司业务的高级经理希特霍芬： 负责处理与雷曼兄弟公司业务的高级经理希特霍芬： 高级经理希特霍芬 我让我的部属有权限上网流览新聞， 我让我的部属有权限上网流览新聞，一旦有雷曼兄 弟公司的消息就立即报告， 弟公司的消息就立即报告，現在我要去客戶那开一 个重要会议了。 个重要会议了。
《货币战争》读后感
《货币战争》读后感导读: 《货币战争》读后感（一）一个对金融一窍不通的人，显然是从一开始就被深深震撼住了。
书中出现了众多的金融领域的专业术语，尽管初读起来有些晦涩难懂，但作者仍凭借较通俗的语言将其展现在读者面前，这一点难能可贵。
相信这不仅是诚意上的问题，也是技术上的问题。
本书最大的特点就是作者不以一名学者的身份，从专业领域对历史上出现的各种经济现象进行阐述与分析。
下面来浅谈一下我对此书的感受。
可以说，之前在历史课上学到的和生活中了解到的很多东西，在一定程度上跟这本书所描述的状况有很大出入。
这也就是我不仅仅是被银行家们的高超手法所震撼的原因。
例如说，当年美国的南北内战及林肯总统随后遭到不明人士暗杀，原先的教科书采取了全面地和抽象地论述大的原则和意义，对林肯为解放美国黑奴所作出的贡献给予肯定，并且描绘了当时美国的社会情况：北部和南部在经济结构上存在很大不同，双方就是否废除奴隶制展开了激烈的争辩，联邦地位岌岌可危，随时可能四分五裂。
这样看来，一切似乎都能解释清楚。
战争爆发的原因是南北双方的利益不能得到很好协调的结果，而林肯也理所当然地被不遗余力维护奴隶制的南方狂热分子所枪杀。
然而事实并非如此，至少在书中所描述的是另外一番触目惊心的景象。
银行家们策动了这场战争并大发一笔横财，虽然林肯以较圆满的方式结束了内战，并且发行了无任何金银实物作抵押的“林肯绿币”来抵制向银行家们借高利贷，但他最后仍被恼羞成怒的银行家们及众多利益集团联手策划从历史中抹除。
也就是说，发生在美国本土最大规模战争的南北内战，其真凶竟是以罗斯柴尔德家族为首的国际银行家。
而战争的根本原因也并非如外界传言般简单，说到底是经济利益纠纷，而非单纯的政治利益纠纷。
通读此书，发现作者介绍的不仅仅是各种金融术语以及冗杂操作流程，还有那些层出不穷的经济危机、经济事件。
更多的是将整一个人类文明的近代历史以货币的形式串联起来。
从滑铁卢战役开始罗斯柴尔德家族掌握了英国的经济命脉，到1997 年的亚洲金融风暴泰铢的大幅度贬值。
二十五分钟等于二十五万美元
二十五分钟等于二十五万美元美国的“超级推销大王”法兰克·贝德佳，在三十多年的保险推销生涯中，以其艰辛的奋斗历程和辉煌的业绩，赢得了“保险行销教父”的称号。
在保险推销中，贝德佳十分重视语言的艺术，他认为：“交易的成功，往往是口才的产物。
”尤其是在推销的关键环节——面谈中，推销员谈话的好坏，将直接影响到客户最终是否购买你的保险。
有一次，贝德佳凭着良好的口才，仅用了短短的25分钟，就谈成了一笔25万美元的保险。
这笔交易在美国保险业界有口皆碑，堪称贝德佳的经典之作。
那天，贝德佳从朋友处获悉，纽约一位名叫布斯的制造业巨商为了拓展业务，向银行申请了25万美元的贷款。
但银行开出一个条件，要求他必须同时投保同等数额的保险。
贝德佳迅速与布斯先生取得了联系，并约定次日上午10点45分见面。
为了谈成这笔25万美元的保险，贝德佳做好了充分准备。
他打了个电话给纽约最负盛名的健康咨询中心，替他的准客户布斯先生预定好了11点30分的健康检查时间。
第二天，10点45分，贝德佳准时到达布斯先生的办公室。
“您好，布斯先生。
”“您好，贝德佳先生，请坐。
”布斯打过招呼后，摆出一副等他说话的样子。
但贝德佳没有说话，采取等客户先开口的策略。
“贝德佳先生，麻烦你特意到这儿来，真不好意思，恐怕你会浪费时间而毫无收获。
”布斯先生指着桌上的一叠保险企划书和申请书说，“你看，纽约主要的保险公司都把我这儿当成战场了。
我已经打算在纽约三大保险公司中选一家投保。
当然，贝德佳先生，如果你仍想介绍贵公司的服务，请留下你的保险企划书，也许两三个星期后，我才会决定投保哪一家公司。
不过，坦白地说，我认为我们这样见面是彼此浪费时间而已……”“布斯先生，如果您是我的兄弟，我实在等不及想告诉您一些坦白的话。
”贝德佳表情诚恳地说，这是他最常对客户说的一句话。
谈话一开始，布斯先生就明显地流露出了不合作的态度，此时，若不迅速采取措施，谈话就很难进行下去。
贝德佳及时地抛出这句他最常对客户说的话，目的是为了通过积极主动地给客户当参谋，作有益的服务，使客户产生一种亲切感，从而建立起客户的信心，有兴趣继续谈下去。
读不完的书的读后感5篇
读不完的书的读后感5篇读后感可以帮助我们更好地理解作品中的冲突和发展，深入剖析故事情节，读后感可以是对小说中主要情感线索的分析和反思，下面是作者为您分享的读不完的书的读后感精选5篇，感谢您的参阅。
读不完的书的读后感篇1假期里，老师推荐我们读了一本有趣的书，名叫《永远讲不完的故事》。
这本书里的故事情节曲折动人，想象力丰富，是一本充满魔力和幻想的书。
它是德国著名儿童文学作家米切尔·恩德创作的一部童话小说。
这本书主要讲述了一个名叫巴斯蒂安的小男孩，在上学的路上，遭到了同学们的攻击，他躲进了一家旧书店。
在那里，他意外发现了一本美丽诱人的奇书——《永远讲不完的故事》。
一种不可抗拒的魔力在吸引着他。
幻想王国告急，虚无吞噬着一切，天真女皇病情严重，必须请一个人间的孩子来给他起一个新名字，幻想王国和天真女皇才能得救。
她把这个任务交给了大草原上的一个小男孩——阿特莱尤，并将她的象征奥林送给了他。
善良、勇敢的阿特莱尤不顾艰难险阻，和他的好朋友福龙一往无前地去寻找人间的孩子——巴斯蒂安，把他带到了幻想王国。
为天真女皇起了一个新名字——月亮仙子，成为了幻想王国和天真女皇的拯救者，受到了幻想王国所有生灵的尊重。
天真女皇为了感谢他，就让他实现在幻想王国里的所有愿望，直到他自己找到真正的愿望为止。
巴斯蒂安在幻想王国里的愿望一一实现了，幻想王国隆重的欢迎和接待使他乐而忘返，虚荣心与日俱增，使他走上歧途，赶走了朋友，甚至欲取天真女皇而代之，想要成为幻想王国的皇帝。
巴斯蒂安把朋友的劝告当成嫉妒，决心一意孤行。
结果他们之间展开了一场激战，巴斯蒂安挥剑刺伤了阿特莱尤。
悔改之心引导他来到变化楼，这才意识到“行你所愿”四个字并不意味着任意胡为，而是应该行真善美的愿望。
在阿伊欧拉夫人的关怀下，他重新体验到母爱的温暖，善良的本性终于苏醒过来。
在阿特莱尤的帮助下，巴斯蒂安能知错改错，终于喝到了生命之水并带着生命之水回到了父亲身边。
书中告诫我们幻想王国和现实世界是一样的，对真善美的愿望是永无止境的，幻想也要出自于善良。
一个20岁的交易员在几分钟内，如何让百年历史的巴林银行倒闭的
一个20岁的交易员在几分钟内，如何让百年历史的巴林银行倒闭的上个世纪的1995年2月26日，拥有233年历史的英国巴林银行申请资产清理，在3月6日，荷兰国际集团以1英镑的象征性价格收购了巴林银行，从此，巴林银行彻底倒闭。
全世界的目光都投向了伦敦，一个拥有两百多年历史的银行怎么瞬间就倒闭了呢？这时候不得不提起一个人，一个是只有28岁的毛头小子尼克里森。
一个20多岁的小伙子能让一间两百多年历史的银行倒闭，其中有着什么样惊心动魄的故事？巴林银行先来看看巴林银行是一间什么样的银行，它的倒闭为什么会聚集了全世界的目光。
巴林银行成立于1763年，业务范围主要是企业融资、银行业务、证券经纪、资产管理、代管个人资产等等一些业务，不过不发放普通客户存款业务。
它的实力到底有多强，开挖著名的巴拿马运河的贷款是巴林银行提供的；1803年，美国从法国手中购买的路易斯安那州所用资金是巴林银行提供的；英国皇室的业务是由巴林银行办理的，因此巴林家族先后获得了五个世袭的爵位，一时间名声大噪。
错误账号“88888”1992年，二十多对的里森被称为期货与期权方面的专家，被巴林总部派新加坡成立期货与期权交易部门。
由于在期货交易过程中可能会出现错误，所以银行会有一个“错误账号”来处理这里交易中出现的错误。
巴林将这个“错误账号”命名“99905”。
针对新加坡的业务巴林银行又设立了一个“88888”的“错误账号”，据说“8”是里森取自于“8”在中国文化中代表吉利的意思。
后来“88888”的账号搁置不用，不过并没有消除，这是这一个被忽略的账号，称为了里森一切错误的掩饰品。
故事的源头1992年7月17日，里森的一个手下错误的将买进20手日经指数期货合约错误的将其卖出。
同时里森最好的一个朋友——乔治，错误的将里森要求卖出的100手期货全部买进。
为了掩饰手下和保住朋友，里森将全部错误都计入了被人忽略的“88888”错误账号。
不过，里森确实不愧是被称为期货与期权结算的专家，在短短一一年时间里，就将错误账号“88888”里的600万亏损转为略有盈余。
哲理故事｜德意志银行十分钟的悲剧
哲理故事｜德意志银行十分钟的悲剧哲理的故事2008年9月15日上午10：00，拥有158年历史的美国第四大投资银行——雷曼兄弟公司向法院申请破产保护，消息转瞬间通过电视、广播和网络传遍地球的各个角落。
令人匪夷所思的是，在如此明朗的情况下，德国国家发展银行在当天的10：10，居然按照外汇如期协议的交易，通过计算机自动付款系统，向雷曼即将冻结的银行账户转入了5亿欧元。
毫无疑问，5亿欧元将是肉包子打狗有去无回。
转账风波曝光后，德国社会各界大为震惊，舆论哗然。
因为此前一天，有关雷曼破产的消息已经满天飞，德国国家发展银行应该知道交易的巨大风险，并事先做好防范措施才对。
人们不禁要问，短短10分钟里，德国国家发展银行内部到底发生了什么事情，从而导致如此愚蠢的低级错误?一家法律事务所受财政部的委托，带着这个问题进驻银行进行全面调查。
法律事务所的调查员先后询问了银行各个部门的数十名职员，几天后，他们向国会和财政部递交了一份调查报告，调查报告并不复杂深奥，只是一一记载了被询问人员在这10分钟内忙了些什么。
首席执行官乌尔里奇·施罗德：我知道今天要按照协议预先的约定转账，至于是否撤销这笔巨额交易，应该让董事会开会讨论决定。
董事长保卢斯：我们还没有得到风险评估报告，无法及时做出正确的决策。
董事会秘书史里芬：我打电话给国际业务部催要风险评估报告，可那里总是占线，我想还是隔一会儿再打吧。
国际业务部经理克鲁克：星期五晚上准备带上全家人去听音乐会，我得提前打电话预订门票。
国际业务部副经理伊梅尔曼：忙于其他事情，没有时间去关心雷曼的消息。
负责处理与雷曼业务的高级经理希特霍芬：我让文员上网浏览新闻，一旦有雷曼的消息就立即报告，现在我要去休息室喝杯咖啡了。
文员施特鲁克：1 0：03，我在网上看到了雷曼向法院申请破产保护的新闻，马上就跑到希特霍芬的办公室，可是他不在，我就写了张便条放在办公桌上，他回来后会看到的。
结算部经理德尔布吕克：今天是协议规定的交易日子，我没有接到停止交易的指令，那就按照原计划转账吧。
中考作文素材： 走在钟表上的人们
中考作文素材：走在钟表上的人们走在钟表上的人们有个中国人第一次到德国出差，在法兰克福火车站下车后，走出候车大厅，这时他看到了这样一幕：一位出站的客人刚走到便道旁放下手提袋，马路上飞驰的车流中便有一辆奔驰车正好拐上便道停在他身边。
两人握手、上车，这个接站过程不过8秒钟。
这个中国人看呆了：时间竟是这样准确无误。
在展览会开会期间，这位中国人在吃早餐的路上碰见了一位正巧也去参会的德国熟人，就和他打招呼：“你真早啊！”没想到德国人一本正经地回答：“不早了，我7点30分起床，用20分钟做体操，10分钟洗漱，早餐吃了15分钟，现在用了15分钟走到会场，8点30分正好能进去。
”这位中国人听得惊讶极了，就故意问：“那你何必不再早点进场呢？”德国人耸耸肩：“展览会定的8点30分才让进场，我只好根据这个时间来安排了。
”这位中国人听完这番话后，平生第一次也计算了一下自己吃早餐用多少时间。
几位中国人参加了德国一家着名公司在汉诺威举行的新闻发布会。
会议开始了，公司总裁的第一句话就说：会议要开一个小时。
总裁讲了20分钟下去了，这是会场上的中国客人好奇了，窃窃私语：还有8个负责人呢，别说一个小时，就是两个小时也不够！可接下来，每个发言的人都恰好讲了5分钟，这样，8个人全部发完言，正好一个小时。
分析：时间是世间所有资源中最宝贵的，时间就是生命，它是有限的。
正是精确的时间观点，造就了德国人的严谨和工作的高效。
延伸阅读：其他优秀素材两篇见证诚信妻子从国外留学归来的这天下午，我和5岁的小女儿在一家酒店为她洗尘。
久别相逢，双方的话语滔滔不绝。
自然是妻子唱主角，一张嘴巴就像百灵鸟唱歌似的，尽夸国外的所见所闻，连女儿插嘴的机会都没有。
酒足饭饱买完单后，妻子又提议安步当车回家，我笑着答应。
饭后散步已成了我的习惯。
于是，我们双双牵着小女儿上路了。
穿过繁华大道，登上一座十字路口的天桥，只见一个身高不足l米的孩子1浑身颤抖地蹲在桥头上，面前摊着一张旧报纸，上面整齐地摆着二十多把简陋的猪鬃刷、刮皮器，整个小摊值不了30元钱。
扬善惩恶的“好撒玛利亚人法
由于他们对一名休克的老人熟视无睹，致使病人没有得到及时救治而身亡……倡导“救死扶伤”公德事件发生在德国埃森市一家银行的自动柜员机大堂，一名82岁的老年人在提款期间突然休克，晕倒在地，生命垂危。
这天是礼拜日，大堂内没有职员值班。
尽管前后有4名顾客经过，但全都没有施以援手。
有的甚至从倒地的老者身上跨过，走到自动柜员机前面继续提款。
20分钟后进来的第5位顾客报警求助，但由于延误救援，老人送院后不治身亡。
埃森市警方认为事态严重，性质恶劣，决定立即追捕这4名见死不救的旁观者，起诉他们违反“好撒玛利亚人法”。
德国《基本法》第二条明确提出，“人人有生存权”，公民在必要情况下有义务提供急救。
《德国刑法典》第323条 C项规定，“无视提供协助的责任”是违法的。
在意外事故、公共危险、陷于困境或其他意外情况发生时，若有人需要救助，而在场人员具备施救条件，尤其是施救行为对自身无重大德国刑法实际上规定了一条“见死不救罪”，在很多领域都适用。
例如，在德国驾校，首先要上急救课，通过考核确认掌握了紧急救助知识之后才能获取驾驶执照，目的就是为了在紧急情况下可以为别人施救。
司机驾驶过程中发现路边有人出了车祸，必须停下来施救。
如果不知道如何急救，就得打电话报警。
倘若扬长而去，事后有人举报，肯定要吃官司。
对于德国医生来说，“见死不救”将成为一条罪状。
急救分为一般状态和有生命危险两大类，紧急状态下医生有权力也有义务为患者实施急救。
治病救人是第一要务，即使在飞机或火车上，也可以建议驾驶员就近着陆或停车。
“无论任何情况遇到病人都要施救”，已经成为支撑德国医生职业的道德基础。
其中有一条规定十分明确：在8小时工作时间之内，如果病人不同意，医生不能自作主张进行医治；但8小时之外遇到病人，要随时随地进行救助，在病人无人担保的情况下，医生将自动成为“担保人”，肩负救人和监护的双重责任。
在德国，只有医德合格才能获得医生“执照”。
医学院校非常重视医德医风教育，不断加以强化。
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結算部經理德爾布呂克：今天是協定規定的 交易日子，我沒有接到停止交易的指令，那 就按照原計劃轉帳吧。
結算部自動付款系統操作員曼斯坦因： 德爾布呂克讓我執行轉帳操作，我什麼 也沒問就做了。
信貸部經理莫德爾：但是我相信希特霍芬和其他職員的專業素 養，一定不會犯低級錯誤，而且這非我職 責範圍，因此也沒必要提醒他們。
國際業務部副經理伊梅爾曼：忙於其他 事情，沒有時間去關心雷曼兄弟公司的 消息。
負責處理與雷曼兄弟公司業務高級經理希特 霍芬：我讓我的部屬有權限上網流覽新聞， 一旦有雷曼兄弟公司的消息就立即報告，現 在我要去客戶那開一個重要會議了。
職員施特魯克：10點03分，我在網上看到了 雷曼兄弟公司向法院申請破產保護的新聞， 馬上就跑到希特霍芬的辦公室，可是他不在， 我就寫了張便條放在辦公桌上，也發了簡訊 到他手機，他應該會看到的。
實際上，只要當中有一個人認真思考主動 一下，那麼這場悲劇就不會發生。導致一 場悲劇，短短十分鐘就已足夠。
十分鐘的悲劇
2008年9月15日上午10點，擁有158年歷史的 美國第四大投資銀行雷曼兄弟公司向法院申
請破產保護，消息瞬間傳遍全球各個角落。
令人匪夷所思的是，如此明朗的情況下，德國 國家發展銀行（KFW）10點10分，居然按照外 匯swap協定的交易，通過電腦自動付款系統， 向雷曼兄弟公司即將凍結的銀行帳戶轉入了3 億歐元。毫無疑問，3億歐元將是肉包子打狗 有去無回。
公關部經理貝克：雷曼兄弟公司破產已經 是鐵錚錚的事實了，我想跟烏爾里奇· 施羅 德談談這件事，但上午要會見幾個克羅地 亞客人，等下午再找他也不遲，反正不差 這幾個小時。
德國經濟評論家哈恩說，在這家銀行，上 到董事長，下到一般職員，沒有一個人是 愚蠢的。可悲的是，幾乎在同一時間，每 個人加在一起就創造出了『德國最愚蠢的 銀行』。
轉帳風波曝光後，德國社會輿論譁然。銷量 最大的《圖片報》在9月18日頭版的標題中， 指責德國國家發展銀行是迄今“德國最愚蠢 的銀行”。
法律事務所的調查員，先後詢問了銀行各個 部門數十名職員，幾天後，他們向國會和財 政部遞交了一份調查報告。報告並不複雜深 奧，只是記載了被詢問人員在這十分鐘內忙 了些什麼——
首席執行官烏爾裏奇· 施羅德：我知道今天要 按照協議約定轉帳，至於是否撤銷這筆巨額 交易，應該讓董事會討論決定。
董事長保盧斯：我們還沒有得到風險評估 報告，無法及時做出正確的決策。
董事會秘書史里芬：我打電話給國際業務 部催促風險評估報告，可那裡總是占線， 我想還是隔一會兒再打吧。
國際業務部經理克魯克：星期五準備出國 參加seminar和報告，我得專心處理一些報 告方面的連絡工作。