ucam 手册最终版

合集下载

MCU使用手册

从 MCU 断开用右键点击 MCU 的名字
第 7 页，共 46 页
7
点击 Disconnect ，出现对话框如下。
文件编号： longhu-003
点击确定按钮，与 MCU 的连接即可断开。关于自动登陆
如果你需要频繁地登陆到 MCU，每次输入密码都是非常麻烦的事情，你可以通过创建一个登陆记录来自动登陆到 MCU。注：此设置仅针对不存在系统安全问题并希望简化操作步骤时使用创建登陆记录
定义如下参数
第 9 页，共 46 页
9
文件编号： longhu-003
参数
描述
MCU Date Parameters 这些参数显示 MCU 当前定义的年，月，日。这些参数同样允
Month/Year
许你通过下拉菜单来做新的设置。
Operator Local Time and 显示 MGC Manager 上设置的日期和时间（这个时间来源于
Get Oper Time & GMT 根据 MGC Manager 自动更新 MCU 的时区，日期与时间
Get Oper Time Offset 根据 MGC Manager 的时间自动更新 MCU 的时间(没有时差)
六．定义各项服务
进入 MCU ConfigurationNetwork Services 界面，如下图：
第五章问题诊断.........................................................................................................................39 一、常见问题解答.................................................................................................................39 二、故障诊断分析.................................................................................................................42

camtek AOI制作ucam中文

UCAM Camtek AOI 输出用户指南UCAM v6.3-1目录1 开始Error! Bookmark not defined.1.1 打开料号 4 1.2 创建新料号 (输入 i5000, gbx, dpf) 51.3 Job - Import_Job - ODB++ Input (Input ODB++) 81.4 料号编辑器 91.4.1 显示/不显示或激活/关闭一个板层 91.4.2删除板层 101.4.3 编辑板层参数 111.4.4 合并板层 131.4.5 编辑板层结构 141.5 用户界面 151.6 料号存储（或另存） 191.7 退出料号 20输出 212 Camtek2.1 打开 Camtek 输出窗口 21输出窗口 222.2 Camtek2.3 工作流程 222.3.1 明确参数 222.3.2 定义扫描区域 242.3.3 定义不检区 262.3.4 输出 282.3.5 存储并退出 292.4 已存视图/明细浏览的域描述 302.5 定义视图 312.5.1 域 322.5.2 群组 322.5.3 排序 332.5.4 筛选 342.5.5 例: 创建已存视图 343 高级选项 36 3.1 设定属性 Nom. Line/Space 363.2 为每个区块设定"uPCB" 属性 393.3 建立区块 403.4 建立一个"轮廓线"板层 423.5 写宏 45 3.6 个性化设置图标栏 453.7 登记板层 473.8 使用Stp & Rpt作拷贝 473.8.1 增加元素到组成区块的stp&rpt PCB中 483.8.2 增加元素到不组成区块的stp&rpt PCB中 503.9 在通风孔图形周围建立不检区 513.10 根据铜箔层或焊锡层建立终检板层 563.11 准备锣板层检检 573.12 导电孔检验 614 附件634.1 重要的Ucam.db 参数 631开始1.1打开料号打开并传送一个已经存在的料号到 UCAM。

UCAM-CF20FB网络摄像头用户手册说明书

支持网络摄像头的Windows Hello人脸UCAM-CF20FB用户手册使用前请仔细阅读以下内容。

安全注意事项• 请连接到一个提供5V和500mA电源的USB-A端口。

• 本产品的支架可能无法安装在您的笔记本电脑或显示器上。

• 如果无法安装支架，请将其放置于平面上。

• 请确保使用时不会拉紧电源线。

如果电源线被拉紧，那么在绊到电源线时，本产品可能会掉落。

这可能会对本产品和周围其他设备造成损坏。

• 在调转摄像头的方向时，请用手按住支架部分，再转动摄像头。

用力转动可能会导致本产品从其放置位置掉落。

这可能会对本产品和周围其他设备造成损坏。

• 请勿将摄像头放置于凹凸不平或倾斜的台面。

本产品可能会从不稳定的台面掉落。

这可能会对本产品和周围其他设备造成损坏。

• 请勿将本产品连接至柔软或松动的物体上。

本产品可能会从不稳定的台面掉落。

这可能会对本产品和周围其他设备造成损坏。

使用注意事项• 请勿用手触摸镜头。

如果镜头上有灰尘，使用镜头吹尘器将其清除。

• 您可能无法使用超过VGA规格的视频通话，这取决于您所使用的聊天软件。

• 取决于您所使用的网络环境，您可能无法使用所有软件。

• 音频和视频质量可能表现不佳，这取决于计算机的硬件处理能力。

• 由于本产品的特性以及根据计算机的设置，当您的计算机进入待机、休眠或睡眠模式时，可能无法识别本产品。

在使用本产品时，请取消待机、休眠或睡眠模式设置。

• 如果计算机无法识别本产品，请断开与计算机的连接，然后重新接入计算机。

• 在使用摄像头时，请勿将计算机设置为省电模式。

在将计算机切换至省电模式之前，请先关闭使用本产品的应用程序。

• 本产品适用于日本国内使用。

在日本以外地区使用本产品则无法享受保修和支持服务。

* 本产品使用USB2.0端口。

不支持USB1.1端口。

保养方法当本产品变脏时，请用干燥而柔软的布擦拭。

录像时闪烁白灯。

接收声音。

红外线可能安装摄像头一步骤安装摄像头并调整垂直角度。

UCam 说明书

UCam使用说明书Version 1.0.4UCam Team********************2011．12目录1 概述 (4)2 UCam下载、安装、卸载 (4)2.1 初始安装 (4)2.2 更新 (4)2.3 快捷方式 (4)2.4 卸载 (4)3 UCam (4)3.1 界面功能区域介绍 (4)3.2 模式切换 (5)3.3 拍照/录像设置 (6)3.3.1设置项说明 (6)3.3.2高级设置菜单 (7)3.3.3时间戳 (7)3.3.4自动保存 (7)3.3.5回显 (7)3.3.6快门声 (8)3.3.7触碰对焦/拍照 (8)3.4 特效模式 (8)3.5 背景模式 (9)3.6 相片格 (9)3.7 录像 (10)3.8 照片/录像的浏览 (10)4 UShare (10)4.1 概述 (10)4.2 典型应用场景介绍 (12)4.2.1上传拍摄的照片到PC电脑 (12)4.2.2下载PC电脑上的音乐到手机 (14)4.2.3文本传输 (14)5 UGif (15)5.1 拍摄GIF (16)5.2 选图生成GIF (16)5.3 GIF 编辑 (17)5.4 GIF设置 (17)6 UPhoto (18)6.1 概述 (18)6.2 图像编辑 (19)6.2.1操作步骤历史 (19)6.2.2特效 (19)6.2.3编辑 (19)6.2.4饰物 (19)6.2.5涂鸦 (20)6.2.6文字泡泡 (20)1概述UCam系列产品包括相机、快速分享、GIF编辑、图像后处理四个产品，本文档将着重从上述几个方面介绍UCam产品的使用方法、注意事项。

本文档基于UCam版本1.0.4。

如果您发现你使用的版本跟本文档描述不相符合，请更新到最新版本。

2UCam下载、安装、卸载2.1初始安装UCam安卓应用程序可以从各安卓应用商店下载，推荐使用以下方式：1.谷歌安卓电子市场：>>>进入谷歌安卓市场UCam页面2.安智电子市场>>>进入安智电子市场UCam页面3.机锋电子市场>>>进入机锋电子市场UCam页面4.如果您不方便从上述电子市场，可以通过UCam官方网站下载.UShare Windows客户端，请到UCam官方网站下载.2.2更新推荐使用您习惯使用的电子市场客户端进行更新。

UCAM-CL-TR-641

Technical ReportNumber641Computer LaboratoryUCAM-CL-TR-641ISSN 1476-2986Cryptographic processors –a surveyRoss Anderson,Mike Bond,Jolyon Clulow,Sergei SkorobogatovAugust 200515JJ Thomson Avenue Cambridge CB30FD United Kingdomphone +441223763500c 2005Ross Anderson,Mike Bond,Jolyon Clulow, Sergei SkorobogatovTechnical reports published by the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory are freely available via the Internet: /TechReports/3Cryptographic processors–a surveyRoss Anderson,Mike Bond,Jolyon Clulow and Sergei SkorobogatovAbstract—Tamper-resistant cryptographic processors are becoming the standard way to enforce data-usage policies. Their history began with military cipher machines,and hardware security modules that encrypt the PINs used by bank customers to authenticate themselves to ATMs.In both cases,the designers wanted to prevent abuse of data and key material should a device fall into the wrong hands. From these specialist beginnings,cryptoprocessors spread into devices such as prepayment electricity meters,and the vending machines that sell credit for them.In the90s, tamper-resistant smartcards became integral to GSM mo-bile phone identiﬁcation and to key management in pay-TV set-top boxes,while secure microcontrollers were used in remote key entry devices for cars.In the lastﬁve years, dedicated crypto chips have been embedded in devices from games console accessories to printer ink cartridges,to con-trol product and accessory aftermarkets.The‘Trusted Computing’initiative will soon embed cryptoprocessors in PCs so that they can identify each other remotely.This paper surveys the range of applications of tamper-resistant hardware,and the array of attack and defence mechanisms which have evolved in the tamper-resistance arms race.Keywords—cryptoprocessor,HSM,security API,survey, fault analysis,power analysis,semi-invasive attackI.IntroductionThe combination of cryptography and tamper-resistance ﬁrst appeared in military applications such as securing communications links.The spread of Automated Teller Machine(ATM)networks brought the technology into the commercial mainstream.The devices used for protecting ATM networks were subsequently adapted for other appli-cations such as prepayment electricity meter.A typical high-end cryptoprocessor is a physically tamper-resistant embedded processor which communicates with a conventional PC or mainframe and performs a pre-deﬁned set of cryptographic operations using keys that are protected within the device.Such a cryptoprocessor typically enforces a policy on the usage of the keys it protects.For example,in an ATM network,the network cryptoprocessor may allow veriﬁca-tion of incoming customer Personal Identiﬁcation Numbers (PINs)but not generation of PINs for new accounts.The Application Programming Interface(API)which such a de-vice presents is called the security API and will implement the device’s security policy.We discuss security APIs in sections V and VI.During the1990s,cryptoprocessors gained more uses: protecting Secure Socket Layer(SSL)keys used by web-servers,and defending proprietary software and algorithms from theft by employees;low-cost cryptoprocessors such as smartcards and secure microcontrollers also became com-monplace.The authors are with the Computer Laboratory,University of Cambridge,JJ Thomson Avenue,Cambridge CB30FD,UK forename.surname@A whole host of embedded applications for cryptoproces-sors now exist:smartcards for holding decryption keys for pay-TV;lottery ticket vending machines;and mobile-phone top-up systems.Modern electronic payment schemes,such as EMV,use smartcards and readers at the front end and larger cryptoprocessors at the back end,to control theﬂow of electronic money.Tamper-resistant hardware is even deployed in an eﬀort to secure electronic voting terminals from attack.The latest applications of tamper-resistant processors are in Digital Rights Management(DRM)and Trusted Com-puting(TC).Content owners are looking towards tamper-resistant processors with security APIs that can enforce ar-bitrary policies on the way that content is processed.The range of possible applications is incredible,and–to some observers–disturbing[10].The entertainment industry in particular seeks new revenue streams by using security APIs to release media according to new rules,such as music subscription services,and to enforceﬁner market segmen-tation.In section II we describe possible applications in more de-tail,and in section III we provide a taxonomy of cryptopro-cessors and attacks.Section IV considers attacks involving physical access to the device,while sections V and VI describe logical attacks on the security APIs of cryptopro-cessors.Finally,sections VII and VIII look at issues of policy and draw some conclusions.II.ApplicationsA.Automated Teller Machine SecurityATMs were the‘killer application’that got cryptography into wide use outside of military and diplomatic circles,and remain today a high-volume use of tamper-resistant hard-ware.In the70s,IBM developed a system for authenticat-ing customers to ATMs.Bank customers were issued with PINs,computed from their account numbers using a secret DES key,the PIN derivation key.References[3],[4]include descriptions of the launch of the3614ATM series[36]and its accompanying back-end processor,the3848.This was theﬁrst commercial hardware security module,or HSM,as stand-alone cryptoprocessors have come to be known in the ﬁnancial sector.HSMs controlled access to the PIN deriva-tion keys,and also kept PINs secret in transit through the network.HSMs are still used during all stages of PIN man-agement,including acquisition of PINs at the ATMs(the keypad is often integrated into a low-cost HSM based on a secure microcontroller);veriﬁcation at the card issuing bank,and also during generation processes,e.g.at PIN mailing sites.The HSM’s API is designed to allow legitimate opera-tions on PINs and PIN derivation keys,for instance veri-fying a PIN against an encrypted trial PIN from an ATM, or sending a clear PIN to a special printer to be sent tothe customer.It must however prevent abuse by malicious employees;for instance it must not allow the wholesale dis-covery of a PIN for every bank account.B.Electronic Payment SchemesHSM-based cryptography is spreading from ATM net-works to general debit and credit card processing.Elec-tronic payment systems use it to secure communications between banks and merchants,and to store veriﬁcation keys to authenticate cards presented at point of sale ter-minals.Merchant devices may contain low-cost cryptopro-cessors;supermarkets and chain stores may use full-blown HSMs as concentrators for till networks.HSMs are also an integral part of the back-end systems at banks which pro-cess these transactions,preventing insiders from exploiting their positions.The new EMV standard[33]for payment adds a third location for a cryptoprocessor–on the cus-tomer’s card.These cards may store customer PINs,and allow end-to-end security for communication between the smartcard and the issuing bank.Internet banking and payment have brought a range of concerns,many of which can be assuaged by using HSMs–which may in turn help home banking become ubiquitous. The challenge is to establish an island of trust in the user’s home:some banks await generic“trusted computing”for PCs(ﬁtting every computer with a cryptoprocessor),while others have issued stand-alone tamper-resistant authorisa-tion devices(such as the RSA SecurID)that enable the user to enter a time-dependent password,or answer a ran-dom challenge,based on a key in the device.In eﬀect,these devices export a security API to the PC through the user. Finally,futuristic online electronic payment schemes such as“digital cash”have been tried out.Trusted third parties mint electronic tokens of some form,which can cir-culate from one user to another.The hard problem here is to prevent a user spending the same electronic coin twice. The issuers can use a combination of tamper-resistant devices and clever cryptography to deal with this.So long as the payment device remains tamper-proof,double-spending is prevented;and should a customer ever manage to defeat the tamper-resistance and spend a coin twice,the act of double-spending will automatically reveal his iden-tity to the issuer[23],[25].C.Prepayment Electricity MetersHSMs are a critical part of the prepayment electricity meter systems used to sell electric power to students in halls of residence,to the third-world poor,and to poor customers in rich countries[6].They are typical of the many systems that once used coin-operated vending,but have now switched to tokens such as magnetic cards or smartcards.The principle of operation is simple:the meter will supply a certain quantity of energy on receipt of an encrypted instruction–a‘credit token’–then interrupt the supply.These credit tokens are created in a token vending machine,which contains an HSM that knows the secret key in each local meter.The HSM is designed to limit the loss if a vending machine is stolen or misused;this enables the supplier to entrust vending machines to marginal economic players ranging from student unions to third-world village stores.The HSM inside the vending machine must be tamper-resistant,to protect the meter keys and the value counter. The value counter enforces a credit limit;after that much electricity has been sold,the machine stops working until it is reloaded.This requires an encrypted message from a device one step higher up the chain of control–and would typically be authorized by the distributor once they have been paid by the machine operator.If an attempt is made to tamper with the value counter,then the cryptographic keys should be erased so that the vending machine will no longer function at all.Without these controls,fraud would be much easier,and the theft of a vending machine might compel the distributor to re-key all the meters within its vend area.There are other security processors all the way up the value chain,and the one at the top–in the headquarters of the power company–may be controlling payments of billions of dollars a year.D.Trusted ComputingTrusted Computing(TC)is an umbrella term for new technologies designed to embed cryptoprocessors in cur-rent computing platforms,including PCs and PDAs.The Trusted Computing Group(TCG)industry consortium de-signed a special cryptoprocessor,the Trusted Platform Module(TPM),to serve in a wide range of roles,and in particular to build an island of trust within the desk-top PC[70].Theﬁrst generation TPM was designed for key storage and passive measurement of the machine state, and has been mass-produced.Notably,it is deployed in IBM Thinkpad Laptops.A new TPM is currently being designed,which will serve as the base for more sophisti-cated TC projects using desktop computers,for instance to allow corporations to lock down employee workstations to a particular OS conﬁguration.It will also play a part in Microsoft’s plans for a trusted Windows operating sys-tem(formerly called Palladium/NGSCB)[53].This TPM, in combination with a software micro-kernel which it val-idates,will form a virtual cryptoprocessor,which many diﬀerent applications can use.The key idea is that a TC machine will be able to cer-tify to other TC machines that it is faithfully executing a particular program.This means that the TPM,in con-junction with the microkernel,can certify both a program and the platform on which it is executing.Together with the trusted operating system,it can prevent one program from interfering with another.The major application of TC is Digital Rights Manage-ment:the control of the distribution and use of data.In this context,a TC machine can assure a content vendor that it is sending a song or movie to a true copy of a media player program,rather than to a hacked copy.The vendor gets better assurance that the song or movie will remain under its control,and is less likely to appear in an unpro-tected form onﬁle-sharing networks.Present DRM mech-anisms are based on software obfuscation,and eventually get hacked;the promise of TC to the content industry is that cryptoprocessors will slow down this process.Digitalmedia have made lossless copying possible,and some ven-dors believe that more eﬀective technical DRM mechanisms are the best way to protect their revenue streams.They may also enable alternative marketing strategies,such as subscription services for listening to music.(IBM’s En-hanced Media Management System has an optional secure hardware component[42]based around its4758cryptopro-cessor,but most existing DRM solutions do not yet oﬀer cryptoprocessor-based tamper-resistance.)DRM is not just for entertainment media such as music and video,but can also be applied to electronic documents and email.TC technology could support control of in-formationﬂow within organisations,preventing leaks and making theft of intellectual property more diﬃcult.Mi-crosoft Oﬃce2003has built-in Information Rights Man-agement facilities integrated into the applications.These extend Microsoft’s rights management architecture to doc-uments.For example,it becomes possible to restrict a doc-ument to named machines,or to cause it to self-destruct after aﬁxed period,or to prevent it being printed.Doc-uments are encrypted together with a set of usage rules, written in a rights expression language;these rules are at present enforced by obfuscated software,but may in future be enforced using TPM-based TC mechanisms.The APIs of modern rights-management systems are be-coming full-blown security APIs.A content provider may use a third-party encapsulation of their content within an obfuscated viewer application.The content provider writes a policy governing access to the content,and this is com-piled into the viewer.The user then interacts through this API providing various‘unlock codes’or interacting with online components of the system to gain access to the con-tent.If the policy is poorly designed,the user may through careful manipulation be able to gain better access than was intended,for longer time-periods,or on additional ma-chines.E.Public Key CryptoprocessorsThe arrival of public-key technology spawned a range of new secure communications protocols.Secure Sockets Layer(SSL)is widely used to secure traﬃc on the web. It protects sensitive web services such as online payments and electronic banking.Public keys embedded in internet browsers are used to authenticate a chain of certiﬁcates that attest to a relationship between a particular domain name and a public key used in the SSL protocol.The user relies on this certiﬁcate chain to be sure that she is communicating directly with the webserver of the site in question–a merchant or electronic banking service,for example.Webservers supporting SSL perform a private-key ex-ponentiation for every connection attempt,so are under considerable load from the computations.This drove the development of the latest generation of public key crypto-processors.They are used for SSL acceleration,and well as for the protection and management of keys and certiﬁcates associated with providing secure web services. Cryptoprocessors at server farms may enforce a simple non-export policy on an SSL private key–it must never leave the device.This mitigates the risks associated with webserver compromise,whether via network hacking or equipment theft.However,if the speciﬁc threats and chal-lenges associated with the certiﬁcates can be identiﬁed,the HSM can process policy components,and genuinely assist in improving security.For instance,at Certiﬁcation Au-thorities(CAs),where certiﬁcates are managed,HSMs may help enforce stringent policies on key usage:they can en-force dual control policies on the most valuable keys in a CA;they can help supervisors monitor the activities of large numbers of human operators eﬃciently;and they can keep signed audit trails of activities to allow retrospective monitoring of access.Such infrastructures of keys and certiﬁcations are used for a range of other purposes:for login and for authenti-cation in very large companies;for managing identity on the internet for SSL-enabled websites;and for managing software,by signing everything from web applets to com-ponents of operating systems.itary ApplicationsBy World War2,some military cipher machines had been made capture-resistant with thermite charges that destroyed them if they were opened by persons ignorant of the disarming mechanism.During the Cold War,great damage was caused by traitors,and in particular by the Walker family,who sold US Navy keys and cipher machine designs to the Soviets for over twenty years.This convinced the NSA that cipher machines should,as far as possible, also resist dishonest insiders.Modern military cipher ma-chines not only use classiﬁed algorithms in tamper-resistant chips;they also use such chips as crypto ignition keys to transport initial key material.The goal is that the street value of these keys should be zero,as most enemies have no access to a machine in which to use them;and even for the few who do have such access,stolen keys should not be useful in deciphering any other traﬃc.Enforcing such a policy requires that the tamper-resistance,the crypto protocol design and the management procedures all work together well.Another inﬂuential military application has been nuclear command and control.According to US military doctrine, a nuclear weapon may not in general detonate without au-thorization,environment and intent.‘Intent’means an un-ambiguous arming signal from the oﬃcer in charge of the weapon,typically carried over multiple wires with error-control coding.‘Environment’means a condition that is easy to measure yet hard to forge,such as the period of zero gravity experienced by an air-drop bomb on release and by an ICBM in its sub-orbital phase.‘Authorization’means a coded signal from the national command author-ity–the President and his lawful successors in oﬃce.This system was introduced following the Cuban missile crisis, to minimize the probability of a nuclear war starting by accident or mischance.The authorization codes in par-ticular have some interesting and complex requirements, described in[3].Tamper-resistance mechanisms are em-bedded in weapons in order to prevent a stolen weapon being exploded,or being dismantled to reveal an autho-rization code with which a second stolen weapon could be armed.G.Specialist ApplicationsBills of Lading–the international trade and payments system used documents called bills of lading to represent cargoes in transit.Thus the owner of a shipment of oil in transit across the Atlantic may sell it by endorsing the bill of lading to the new owner.Implementing an electronic version of bills of lading presented a number of interesting challenges,includingﬁnding some way to prevent a crook selling the same goods twice.Given that an oil cargo may be worth$100m,and it may take weeks from sale until delivery,it was vital to provide robust mechanisms to pre-vent such a fraud.The Bolero system uses two independent mechanisms.Electronic bills of lading can only be endorsed from one owner to another using keys kept in hardware se-curity modules that closely control their use;there is also a central database of extant bills maintained on a server operated by a trusted third party[43].In order to sell an oil cargo twice,a crook would have to subvert this third party and also defeat the HSM.Key-Loading Sites–Applications which deploy thou-sands of cryptoprocessors,such as pay-TV smartcards and prepayment token vending machines,require a trustworthy means of initialising them before delivery.Generic man-ufacturing processes are often followed by a key-loading phase,which may happen at the premises of a bank or a specialist security contractor.This operator may have a hi-erarchy of HSMs,or in the case of smartcard-to-smartcard protocols,a large rack of smartcards in readers,to super-vise the initialisation and personalisation of new devices. Some interesting failures have occurred where the system operator has tried to save money on this operation.In one case,a pay-TV operator used PC software to personalise smartcards;this software entered the public domain when one of the PCs from the control centre was sold second-hand and its disk contents were undeleted by a curious purchaser.In other cases,weak private keys have been issued to bank smartcards by badly-designed card person-alisation systems.III.Taxonomy of Cryptoprocessors and Attacks Early military cipher machines may be seen at the NSA Museum,Fort George G.Meade,Maryland;the tamper-resistance mechanisms extend to protective deto-nation mechanisms that destroy the device if it is improp-erly opened.The earliest civilian cryptoprocessor known to us is the IBM3848,an encryption device that functioned as a mainframe peripheral.It was contained in a steel cab-inet,with switches that zeroised the memory containing cryptographic keys whenever the cabinet was opened. Top-of-the-range cryptoprocessors nowadays have gener-ally followed the second line of development.An example is the IBM4758(ﬁgure1),the3848’s descendant,which has a cryptographic engine surrounded by a multilayer tamper-sensing mesh(ﬁgure2).This is constantly monitored by the engine,which erases its key material and renders itself inoperable if a tampering attempt is detected.Rather than occupying a whole cabinet in a machine room,the4758 comes as a standard PCI card for mounting in a server.A rich literature documents the design,development and validation of the4758[31],[38],[63],[64],[66],[67],and its security architecture[32].Fig.1.IBM4758-001At the low-cost end of the market,cryptoprocessors are often implemented in microcontrollers.Many engineers are familiar with these cheap,standard components.The cheapest microcontrollers cannot perform public-key cryp-tography in a reasonable time,but no matter:many ap-plications such as remote key entry use shared-key cryp-tographic algorithms such as triple-DES and AES,whose computational cost is low.A more serious problem is that the read-protect mechanisms in low-cost microcontrollers are not really designed to withstand skilled and determined attack.A middle market has therefore emerged of single-chip products that have been hardened in various ways against attack.These products include smartcards,and the TPM chips speciﬁed by the Trusted Computing Group for use in PCs.Before deciding whether an application can use a low-cost microcontroller,or needs a smartcard-grade com-ponent or even a high-end tamper-responding device,it is necessary to understand something about the technology of attacks and defences.We will discuss the attacks on microcontrollers,and the measures that can be adopted to thwart them,in more detail in the next section.When analyzing the security of a cryptoprocessor,it can be useful to perform a systematic review of the attack sur-face–the set of physical,electrical and logical interfaces that are exposed to a potential opponent.This leads us to divide attacks into four classes.Invasive attacks involve direct electrical access to the in-ternal components of the cryptoprocessor.For example, the attacker may open a hole in the passivation layer of a microcontroller chip and place a microprobing needle on a bus line in order to capture a signal.Semi-invasive attacks involve access to the device,but without damaging the passivation layer of the chip or mak-ing electrical contact other than with the authorised inter-face.For example,the attacker may use a laser beam to ionise a transistor and thus change the state of theﬂip-ﬂop that holds the device’s protection state.Local non-invasive attacks involve close observation or ma-nipulation of the device’s operation.An example is poweranalysis :measuring the current drawn by the processor with high precision,and correlating this with the compu-tations being performed by the device in order to deduce the value of cryptographic keys.Remote attacks involve observation or manipulation of the device’s normal input and output.Examples include tim-ing analysis,cryptanalysis,protocol analysis and attacks on application programming interfaces.Each of these types of attack may also be either active or passive .In the latter the attacker works with the device as it is operated normally,while in the former the attacker may manipulate the device,its inputs or its environment so as to induce abnormal operation.An active invasive at-tack may involve injecting signals physically into the device using probing needles;an active semi-invasive attack may use a laser or strong electromagnetic pulse to cause aber-rant behaviour of some internal component of the chip;an active local noninvasive attack may manipulate power line voltages or clock frequencies to cause partial failure of the device under test;while an active remote noninvasive at-tacker might feed a cryptoprocessor with carefully-chosen sequences of transactions in order to cause behaviour that was not anticipated by the device’sdesigner.Fig.2.An IBM 4758-001part potted in urethane,showing membraneand interior (courtesy F.Stajano)The high-level summary of these attacks is that,by spending more money on a better cryptoprocessor,you can greatly diminish and perhaps even eliminate the ﬁrst three classes.All of these are local,in that the opponent needs to obtain unsupervised access to the device;so in an applica-tion where the cryptoprocessor can be physically guarded,or perhaps where its owner’s incentive is to protect its se-crets rather than try to extract them,you may be able to use a cheaper cryptoprocessor or even ignore these at-tacks completely.But many attacks in the fourth,remote,class are independent of the quality of the cryptoproces-sor hardware.It does not matter how much you spend on device-level protection,if the transaction set which you implement on it can be manipulated in such a way as to break your security policy (Smith –a designer of the IBM 4758–reﬂects upon the disparity between its state-of-the-art hardware and ﬁrmware and the ﬁnancial API it usually implements,which has turned out to be the weakest link,in [68]).In the next section we will describe the local attacks to which budget cryptoprocessors may be vulnerable –the invasive,semi-invasive and local non-invasive attacks.The following section will then focus on remote attacks.IV.Local AttacksFifteen years ago,devices such as microcontrollers and smartcards oﬀered little resistance to a capable motivated opponent.Protection typically consisted of a read-only bit that was set after programming;this bit could often be reset by simple tricks such as glitching [46]–inserting a transient into the power supply,perhaps by reducing the supply voltage to zero for a few microseconds –or illumi-nating it with UV light.Even so,microcontrollers gave better protection than circuit boards with discrete compo-nents,whose interconnects could be observed directly with an oscilloscope.At that time,there were few valuable ap-plications and thus few serious attackers.As late as 1994,a senior industry ﬁgure explained at the Cardis conference that there was simply no demand for better security.That changed once smartcards started to host applica-tions such as pay-TV.Various people set out to reverse-engineer pay-TV smartcards:some were pirates who wanted to forge cards,while others wanted to put key ma-terial on the Internet so that people could watch for free.(This sometimes involved idealism,but in at least one case a pay-TV operator was sued for hacking a rival’s card and anonymously publishing their key [24].)In addition,micro-controllers were used in accessory-control applications such as games cartridges,where the business model involved subsidising consoles from sales of software,and the security devices in the cartridges were there to ensure that acces-sory vendors paid the manufacturer a royalty.This created a strong business incentive for a vendor’s competitors and aftermarket suppliers to reverse-engineer its security chips –which was legal in most relevant jurisdictions.This triggered an arms race between attack and defence.In the mid-90s,attackers invested in invasive attack meth-ods,using probing stations;then in the late 1990s there was a wave of attacks using non-invasive techniques such as power analysis;and in the early 2000s,a number of semi-invasive attacks were developed,of which the best known involve optical probing.Chipmakers have responded by developing new families of microcontrollers and smartcards with a number of defensive features.A.Invasive AttacksThe earliest tamper-resistant processors –the hardware security modules used by banks from the 1980s –were very vulnerable to physical attack.The protection mechanisms relied on steel boxes with lid switches and,sometimes,fur-ther sensors such as photodiodes and seismometers.An at-tacker familiar with these mechanisms could drill his way in.A worse problem was that maintenance visits were needed every year or two to replace the battery that pre-served cryptographic keys while the machine was powered oﬀ.It was trivial for a maintenance technician to disable the tamper-responding circuit on one visit,and then ex-tract the keys on his next visit.Modern HSMs therefore use more complex designs.The IBM 4758,for example,has its electronic components encased in a tamper-sensing membrane that is itself potted in a compound that’s dif-ﬁcult to cut or drill cleanly,and the batteries are outside this security perimeter (see ﬁgures 1and 2).。

UCAM使用手册

UCAM 使用手册
子菜单 Zoom（放大/缩小）
与窗口同大
放大两倍缩小两倍
Options（显示选项）
在窗口显示所有元素
显示工作原点在 Blocks 中编辑显示实体参考点元素以正常或零线显示
3.Edit（编辑）菜单
子菜单 Aperture（D-Code）
选择实体切除实体拷贝实体粘贴实体清除实体删除实体编辑 D-code 修改实体实体属性管理实体属性编辑矢量字符光绘参数
新建工作档打开旧档打开层编辑窗口合并工作档定义存盘的参数保存工作档保存成另一个工作档运行自动检查功能加载自动检测表调出导入文件对话框导入工作档扫描光绘系统推出 UCAM 历史档
导入 Genesis 工作档
2.View（显示）菜单
返回到前一个画面大小平移画面刷新画面缩小/放大画面显示选项显示格点鹰眼效果 D-Code 表显示错误测量数据查询数据显示矢量字体
分析检验编辑加工提取网络制作测试架修理拼片
PCB 板的生产参数分析生成 PCB 板快照铜箔面积钻孔信息分析工艺参数
UCAM 使用手册
Verify（分析） Editing（编辑） Tooling（加工） Netlist（网络）
分析矢量弧蚀刻死角修补设计规范检测阻抗设计网络比较实体比较图形比较
导出钻孔及锣带导出 CAD 格式，包括 Gerber、EIE、Dxf、HPGL 等导出网络数据导出轨迹线导出 AOI 资料导出到光绘系统
打印
设定属性设定颜色制作自动检查列表把频繁使用的步骤学习并记录下来选项制作 UCAM.db 文件保存设置设置工具栏改变属性修改单位修改锁定模式选择模式

CSU8RF322X_电饭煲直发器芯片应用手册

CSU8RF3221/CSU8RF3222/CSU8RF3223 用户手册
带 12-bit ADC 的 8 位 RISC FLASH MCU 使用指南 REV 1.2.3
Rev.1.2.3
第 1 页，共 89 页
CSU8RF3221/CSU8RF3222/CSU8RF3223
版本历史
历史版本. REV 1.0 REV 1.1 REV 1.2
REV 1.2.1 REV 1.2.2 REV 1.2.3
修改内容初始版本换新 LOGO 初始版本 1、增加 1.4V 校准方法 2、更新存储器框图 3、增加 E2PROM 82FH 处所存放数据
的说明 4、更正早期版本的笔误 1、修改时钟系统信息 1、修改 IDD2 的笔误 2、修改电气特性中 IDD3 的笔误 1、修改 CPU 核的功能模块图 2、增加 LVR 3.6V 功能
版本历史
版本日期 2012-09-01 2013-01-28 2013-02-20
2013-02-22 2013-03-13 2013-4-11
Rev.1.2.3
第 2 页，共 89 页
CSU8RF3221/CSU8RF3222/CSU8RF3223
目录
目录
版本历史 ................................................................................................................................................................. 2
目录 ...................................................................................................................................................................... 3

Precision Health Scale UC-352BLE 使用手册说明书

UC-352BLEInstruction ManualManuel d’instructionsManuale di IstruzioniBedienungsanleitung使用手册1WMPD4003067目錄啟動指南-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2 安全須知-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3 無線通訊功能 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 配件-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4 體重計元件 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------5 安裝(或更換) 電池 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------6 配對接收器----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------7 設定單位-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------8 測量體重 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9 其他功能 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10 規格 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------12 保養體重計 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13 請求維修之前 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------13 給親愛的顧客銘謝惠顧最新型的A&D體重計。

ucam 手册最终版

选择优先顺序为：规则 PAD 中心点→隔离环中心点→掏空圈→大铜皮拐角；
3.
Tolerance 设定公差。
14
公差主要有 Inner Tolerance（内公差）和 Outer Tolerance（外公差）。内公差大小决定要检测线路缺口、线细、开路、凹陷的能力；外公差大小决定要检测线路凸起、短路的能力；公差的设定：公差大小＝2×n×分辨率 n＝1，2，3，…… 分辨率的数值为：Extra Fine＝0.2; Fine=0.25; Medium=0.33; Coarse=0.4; Extra Coarse=0.5 把计算好的公差填入下图指定的位置就可以了。
提示：建议可以用同样的方法将层的名称改为 L1，L2……;钻孔层的名称改为 Drill1，Drill2……。方便后面的检查和输出。
料号层别窗口
料号层别参数窗口
5
C、层别的优化处理：
层别优化处理的目的是为了：可以根据不同的公差要求，方便的给不同的线路不同的公差。为了实现这样的理想我们通常可以将线路板上的图像大致分为下面几类：线路、PAD、SMT（外层）、大铜面、不检测区（外框）等。下面我们一步步实现这个过程，这里介绍的是最基本的情况： 1. 开启功能窗口。在 Ucam 的主窗口打开 Aperture Manager（D 码管理窗口）（如图 1）和 selections（选择功能窗口）（如图 2）。（图 1）该层别的线路 D 码组成表。（图１）D 码管理窗口
12
VI.
单击 Surface，这时一些小块的区域都被去掉。码为 555。
VII. 此时点：剪切->粘贴，此时大面积的铜皮生产一个新的 D 码。按照 11 页中第 VI 项更改 D

VisualATE软件手册

主程序界面
用户界面
测试主程序边界界面
测试模块编辑界面
Map分析界面
……
数据分析逻辑
业务逻辑
硬件控制逻辑
界面显示逻辑
界面操作逻辑
……
采集的数据
控制数据
底层数据
GPIB驱动
MTS737A 硬件驱动
GPIB驱动
TTL驱动
软件系统结构图
在本手册中，将分为五个章节来对 VISUALATE 软件系统描述。第一章到第四章将分别描述系统架构、测试程序的编写、测试语句的可视化编程、Map 分析与数据保存，在第五章将给出一个 VISUALATE 软件系统得使用实例。
数字测试部分.............................................................................................................................45 其他的测试语句设置.................................................................................................................69
MTS737X VisalATE软件手册
工具栏选项
作用分别为两个工位载入 tst 文件弹出测试程序编辑向导弹出测试程序(tst 文件) 编辑界面弹出测试模块(dcp 文件) 编辑界面将当前编辑的 tst 文件保存测试控制用户登录界面进入数据保存设置界面 Map 分析界面数据清空打印系统复位
三.测试语句的可视化编程 ..................................................... 23

SmartTest Chinese_Manual

Page 1 of 64U CAM SmartTest中文操作手冊編寫者：Wendy Qin(覃平)Ucam SmartTest Chinese User Manual (Version8.0)Ucam SmartTest中文使用手册序言SmartTest是爲瑪尼亞飛針測試機Utim8與Loc8量身定做的專業測試軟體，它完全支援測試機需要的全部資料格式MNF1 & MNF2。

SmartTest輸入的文件格式包括Gerber,ODB++ 和 IPC-D-356A等，它對於線路板的層數要求是沒有限制的。

盲埋孔的處理也只需一個設定就可完成。

網路的運算快速而準確，而且測試點産生可達到100%的安全性。

最聰明的鄰近絕緣短路測試(Shield Adjacency)運算，在保證最安全的情況下將測試時間優化到最小。

人性化的工作介面，讓使用者更加容易操作。

靈活的參數設定，能夠滿足各種不同線路板的測試需求。

編寫此操作手冊目的是輔助使用者更快，更容易掌握本套軟體，以提高工作效率。

爲了讓使用者更清楚地瞭解SmartTest適用於何種機型，特別附上機器外觀圖片，僅供參考。

ultim8loc8目錄SmartTest介绍 (6)S martTest 操作流程简易图 (7)相關的文件 (8)在線幫助 (8)在線瀏覽 (8)功能查詢 (8)在線幫助資源 (8)SmartTest --- 基礎篇 (9)SmartTest主窗口 (9)主視窗狀態欄 (10)工具欄 (11)工作編緝窗口 (15)如何顯示層 (16)顯示開啓層 (16)層功能表欄 (16)開啓功能表欄 (18)形狀，物體和Apertures (19)形狀和Apertures (19)物體: Flash和Draws (20)Aperture管理器 (20)Aperture編輯窗口 (23)SmartTest---資料載入 (24)建立一個新的Job (24)SmartStart窗口 (25)自動解壓縮 (25)自動分析資料的格式 (26)GAR的使用 (26)建立Wheel文件 (30)高級編輯和安全檢查功能 (33)Grid参數 (33)Transform功能 (33)Guide窗口 (35)選擇窗口 (36)常規選擇 (36)一般窗口 (37)物體物件視窗 (38)輪廓窗口 (38)高級窗口 (39)屬性視窗 (39)顯示DPF 零點座標 (40)間距量測 (40)錯誤處理與查看 (42)輪廓（Contourize） (43)SmartTest 資料準備 (44)線轉盤 (44)FlashMaker(自動轉換) (44)Models (手動轉換) (45)設定Outline (46)各層間自動對位 (47)PCB方位和位置 (47)翻轉資料 (47)Job資料零點設定 (48)負片資料的設置 (49)非電鍍孔的設置 (49)偏移孔的测试点 (50)Step&Repeat(拼版) (51)Expand Block (51)Step Repeat Reconstructor(拼版重建) (52)建立網路與測試點 (53)建立網路資料 (53)建立Job網路 (53)建立Layer網路 (53)産生測試點 (53)建立 Testpoints (53)測試點産生的規則 (56)檢查網路與測試點 (57)驗證測試資料 (57)刪除中間點 (58)檢查測試點 (58)檢查槽孔上的測試點 (58)檢查零个測試點的網路 (59)檢查 Netlist Profile (59)SmartTest 輸出 (60)附錄:SmartTest參數設置 (61)修改Ucam.db (61)增加一項新的參數到Ucam.db (62)設置Ucam.db新增，開啓和Job資料的管理 (62)推薦 Test設定 (63)修改Ucam啓動窗口裏的單位 (64)S m a r t T e s t介紹SmartTest是Ucam軟體裏的一個組成部份，它主要是爲Utim8和Loc8測試機提供的一套專業飛針軟體，它可以輸出該兩種飛針測試機的測試程式。

MOXA UC-3100系列硬件用户手册版本2.0，九月2019说明书

UC-3100 Series Hardware User’s ManualVersion 2.0, September 2019/product© 2019 Moxa Inc. All rights reserved.UC-3100 Series Hardware User’s Manual The software described in this manual is furnished under a license agreement and may be used only in accordancewith the terms of that agreement.Copyright Notice© 2019 Moxa Inc. All rights reserved.TrademarksThe MOXA logo is a registered trademark of Moxa Inc.All other trademarks or registered marks in this manual belong to their respective manufacturers.DisclaimerInformation in this document is subject to change without notice and does not represent a commitment on the part of Moxa.Moxa provides this document as is, without warranty of any kind, either expressed or implied, including, but not limited to, its particular purpose. Moxa reserves the right to make improvements and/or changes to this manual, or to the products and/or the programs described in this manual, at any time.Information provided in this manual is intended to be accurate and reliable. However, Moxa assumes no responsibility for its use, or for any infringements on the rights of third parties that may result from its use.This product might include unintentional technical or typographical errors. Changes are periodically made to the information herein to correct such errors, and these changes are incorporated into new editions of the publication.Technical Support Contact Information/supportMoxa AmericasToll-free: 1-888-669-2872 Tel: +1-714-528-6777 Fax: +1-714-528-6778Moxa China (Shanghai office) Toll-free: 800-820-5036Tel: +86-21-5258-9955 Fax: +86-21-5258-5505Moxa EuropeTel: +49-89-3 70 03 99-0 Fax: +49-89-3 70 03 99-99Moxa Asia-PacificTel: +886-2-8919-1230 Fax: +886-2-8919-1231Moxa IndiaTel: +91-80-4172-9088 Fax: +91-80-4132-1045Table of Contents1.Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 1-1Overview ........................................................................................................................................... 1-2 Model Description ............................................................................................................................... 1-2 Package Checklist ............................................................................................................................... 1-2 Product Features ................................................................................................................................ 1-2 Hardware Specifications ...................................................................................................................... 1-3 2.Hardware Introduction...................................................................................................................... 2-1Appearance ........................................................................................................................................ 2-2 LED Indicators .................................................................................................................................... 2-6 Monitoring the Function Button (FN Button) Action Using the SYS LED....................................................... 2-6 Reset to Factory Default ............................................................................................................... 2-7 Real-time Clock .................................................................................................................................. 2-7 Placement Options .............................................................................................................................. 2-7 3.Hardware Connection Description ..................................................................................................... 3-1Wiring Requirements ........................................................................................................................... 3-2 Connector Description .................................................................................................................. 3-2 A.Regulatory Approval Statements ....................................................................................................... A-11Introduction The UC-3100 Series computing platform is designed for embedded data acquisition applications. The computer comes with two RS- 232/422/485 serial ports and dual auto-sensing 10/100 Mbps Ethernet LAN ports. These versatile communication capabilities let users efficiently adapt the UC-3100 to a variety of complex communications solutions.The following topics are covered in this chapter:❒Overview❒Model Description❒Package Checklist❒Product Features❒Hardware SpecificationsOverviewMoxa UC-3100 Series computers can be used as edge-field smart gateways for data pre-processing andtransmission, as well as for other embedded data acquisition applications. The UC-3100 Series includesthree models, each supporting different wireless options and protocols.The UC-3100’s advanced heat dissipation design makes it suitable for use in temperatures ranging from -30 to 70°C. In fact, the Wi-Fi and LTE connections can be used simultaneously in both cold and hotenvironments, allowing you to maximize your “data pre-processing” and “data transmission” capability inmost harsh environments.Model DescriptionRegion Model Name Carrier Approval Wi-Fi BLT CAN SD SerialUS UC-3101-T-US-LXVerizon, AT&T, T-Mobile- - - - 1 UC-3111-T-US-LX✓✓- ✓ 2 UC-3121-T-US-LX ✓ 1 ✓ 1EU/APAC UC-3101-T-EU-LX-- - - - 1 UC-3111-T-EU-LX✓- - ✓ 2 UC-3121-T-EU-LX - 1 - 1AU/NZS UC-3101-T-AU-LXTelstra, Optus- - - - 1 UC-3111-T-AU-LX✓- - ✓ 2 UC-3121-T-AU-LX - 1 - 1Package ChecklistBefore installing the UC-3100, verify that the package contains the following items:• 1 x UC-3100 Arm-based computer• 1 x DIN-rail mounting kit (preinstalled)• 1 x Power jack• 1 x 3-pin terminal block for power• 1 x CBL-4PINDB9F-100: 4-pin pin header to DB9 female console port cable, 100 cm• 1 x Quick installation guide (printed)• 1 x Warranty cardNOTE: Notify your sales representative if any of the above items are missing or damaged.Product Features•Armv7 Cortex-A8 1000 MHz processor•Integrated Wi-Fi 802.11a/b/g/n and LTE Cat 1 for the US, EU, APAC, and AUS regions•Bluetooth 4.2 for the US region•Industrial CAN 2.0 A/B protocol supported•-30 to 70°C system operating temperature•Meets the EN 61000-6-2 and EN 61000-6-4 standards for industrial EMC applications•Ready-to-run Debian 9 with 10-year long-term support•Robust Root File System to prevent the system from being bricked due to a firmware update failureHardware SpecificationsNOTE The latest specifications for Moxa's products can be found at https://.2Hardware Introduction The UC-3100 embedded computers are compact and rugged making them suitable for industrial applications. The LED indicators help in monitoring performance and troubleshooting issues. The multiple ports provided on the computer can be used to connect to a variety of devices. The UC-3100 comes with a reliable and stable hardware platform that lets you devote the bulk of your time to application development.In this chapter, we provide basic information about the embedded computer’s hardware and its various components.The following topics are covered in this chapter:❒Appearance❒LED Indicators❒Monitoring the Function Button (FN Button) Action Using the SYS LEDR eset to Factory Default❒Real-time Clock❒Placement OptionsAppearanceUC-3101UC-3101 (US Model)UC-3111 (US Model)UC-3121 (US Version)Dimensions [units: mm (in)] UC-3101UC-3111UC-3121LED IndicatorsRefer to the following table for information about each LED. LED Name Status Function NotesSYSGreen Power is onRefer to the Monitoring the Function Button (FN Button) Action Using the SYS LED section for more details. Red FN button is pressed OffPower is offLAN1/ LAN2 Green 10/100 Mbps Ethernet mode Off Ethernet port is not activeCOM1/ COM2/ CAN1 OrangeSerial/CAN port is transmitting or receiving dataOff Serial/CAN port is not activeWi-FiGreen Wi-Fi connection has been establishedClient mode : 3 levels with signal strength 1 LED is on: Poor signal quality 2 LEDs are on: Good signal quality All 3 LEDs are on: Excellent signal quality AP mode : All 3 LEDs blinking at the same timeOffWi-Fi interface is not activeLTEGreenCellular connection has been established3 levels with signal strength 1 LED is on: Poor signal quality 2 LEDs are on: Good signal quality All 3 LEDs are on: Excellent signal qualityOffCellular interface is not activeMonitoring the Function Button (FN Button) Action Using the SYS LEDThe FN button is used to perform software reboot or to perform firmware restoration. Pay attention to the SYS LED indicator and release the FN button at the appropriate time to enter the correct mode to either reboot your device or restore your device to the default configuration.status is given below: System Status FN Button ActionSYS LED behaviorReboot Press and release within 1 sec Green, blinking until the FN button is releasedRestorePress and hold for over 7 secReset to Factory DefaultFor details on resetting your device to factory default values, refer to the Function Button and LEDIndicators section.Real-time ClockThe real-time clock in the UC-3100 is powered by a lithium battery. We strongly recommend that you do not replace the lithium battery without the help of a Moxa support engineer. If you need to change the battery, contact the Moxa RMA service team.Placement OptionsThe UC-3100 computer can be mounted on to a DIN rail or on a wall. The DIN-rail mounting kit is attached by default. To order a wall-mounting kit, contact a Moxa sales representative.DIN-rail MountingTo mount the UC-3100 on to a DIN rail, do the following:1.Pull down the slider of the DIN-rail bracket located at the back of the unit2.Insert the top of the DIN rail into the slot just below the upper hook of the DIN-rail bracket.tch the unit firmly on to the DIN rail as shown in the illustrations below.4.Once the computer is mounted properly, you will hear a click and the slider will rebound back into placeautomatically.Wall Mounting (optional)The UC-3100 can also be wall mounted. The wall-mounting kit needs to be purchased separately. Refer to datasheet for more information.1.Fasten the wall-mounting kit to the UC-3100 as shown below:e two screws to mount the UC-3100 on to a wall.3 Hardware Connection DescriptionThis section describes how to connect the UC-3100 to a network and connect various devices to the UC-3100.The following topics are covered in this chapter:❒Wiring RequirementsC onnector DescriptionWiring RequirementsIn this section, we describe how to connect various devices to the embedded computer. You must pay attention to the following common safety precautions, before proceeding with the installation of any electronic device:• Use separate paths to route wiring for power and devices. If power wiring and device wiring paths mustcross, make sure the wires are perpendicular at the intersection point.NOTE: Do not run the wires for signal or communication and power wiring in the same wire conduit. To avoid interference, wires with different signal characteristics should be routed separately.• You can use the type of signal transmitted through a wire to determine which wires should be keptseparate. The rule of thumb is that wiring that shares similar electrical characteristics can be bundled together.• Keep input wiring and output wiring separate.• We strongly advise that you label wiring to all devices in the system for easy identification.Connector DescriptionPower ConnectorConnect the power jack (in the package) to the UC-3100’s DC terminal block (located on the bottom panel), and then connect the power adapter. It takes several seconds for the system to boot up. Once the system is ready, the SYS LED will light up.Grounding the UC-3100Grounding and wire routing help limit the effects of noise due to electromagnetic interference (EMI). There are two ways to connect the UC-3100 grounding wire to the ground.1.Through the SG (Shielded Ground, sometimes called Protected Ground):The SG contact is the left-most contact in the 3-pin power terminal block connector when viewed from the angle shown here. When you connect to the SG contact, the noise will berouted through the PCB and the PCB copper pillar to the metal chassis.2. Through the GS (Grounding Screw):The GS is located between the console port and the power connector. When you connect to the GS wire, the noise is routed directly from the metal chassis.Ethernet PortThe 10/100 Mbps Ethernet port uses the RJ45 connector. The pin assignment of the port is shown below:Pin Signal 1 ETx+ 2ETx- 3 ERx+ 4 – 5 – 6 ERx- 7 – 8–Serial PortThe serial port uses the DB9 male connector. It can be configured by software for the RS-232, RS-422, or RS-485 mode. The pin assignment of the port is shown below:Pin RS-232 RS-422 RS-4851 DCD TxD-(A) –2 RxD TxD+(A) –3 TxD RxD+(B) Data+(B)4 DTR RxD-(A) Data-(A) 5GND GND GND 6 DSR –– 7 TRS – – 8 CTS – – 9–––CAN Port (UC-3121 only)The UC-3121 comes with a CAN port which uses the DB9 male connector and is compatible with the CAN 2.0A/B standard. The pin assignment of the port is shown below:Pin Signal Name1 –2 CAN_L3 CAN_GND4 – 5CAN_SHLD6 GND7 CAN_H8 – 9CAN_V+SIM Card SocketThe UC-3100 comes with two nano-SIM card sockets for cellular communication. The nano-SIM card sockets are located on the same side as the antenna panel. To install the cards, remove the screw and theprotection cover to access the sockets, and then insert the nano-SIM cards into the sockets directly. You will hear a click when the cards are in place. The left socket is for SIM 1 and the right socket is for SIM 2. To remove the cards, push the cards in before releasing them.RF ConnectorsThe UC-3100 comes with RF connectors to the following interfaces.Wi-FiThe UC-3100 comes with a built-in Wi-Fi module (UC-3111 and UC-3121 only). You must connect theantenna to the RP-SMA connector before you can use the Wi-Fi function. The W1 and W2 connectors are interfaces to the Wi-Fi module.BluetoothThe UC-3100 comes with a built-in Bluetooth module (UC-3111 and UC-3121 US region only). You must connect the antenna to the RP-SMA connector before you can use the Bluetooth function. The W1 connector is the interface to the Bluetooth module.CellularThe UC-3100 comes with a built-in cellular module. You must connect the antenna to the SMA connector before you can use the cellular function. The C1 and C2 connectors are interfaces to the cellular module.For additional details refer to the UC-3100 datasheet.SD Card Socket (UC-3111 and UC-3121 US only)The UC-3111 comes with a SD-card socket for storage expansion. The SD card socket is located next to the Ethernet port. To install the SD card, remove the screw and the protection cover to access the socket, and then insert the SD card into the socket. You will hear a click when the card is in place. To remove the card, push the card in before releasing it.Console PortThe console port is an RS-232 port that you can connect to with a 4-pin pin header cable (in the package).You can use this port for debugging or firmware upgrade.PinSignal1 GND2 NC3 RxD4 TxDUSBThe USB port is a type-A USB 2.0 version port, which can be connected with a USB storage device or other type-A USB compatible devices.ARegulatory Approval StatementsThis device complies with part 15 of the FCC Rules. Operation is subject to the following two conditions: (1) This device may not cause harmful interference, and (2) this device must accept any interference received, including interference that may cause undesired operation.Class A: FCC Warning! This equipment has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class A digital device, pursuant to part 15 of the FCC Rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable protection against harmful interference when the equipment is operated in a commercial environment. This equipment generates, uses, and can radiate radio frequency energy and, if not installed and used in accordance with the instruction manual, may cause harmful interference to radio communications. Operation of this equipment in a residential area is likely to cause harmful interference in which case the users will be required to correct the interference at their own expense.European Community。

UcamX v2019.08版功能升级说明-Ucamco说明书

2019年8月版本升级版本发行日期亮点2014.1212月-14GUI 工作界面、多核并行处理2015.044月-15支持多窗口运行、支持Gerber X2 格式读入2016.011月-16后台输出、多图像比对2016.066月-16维护升级2016.1212月-16新的插入弧命令、提升了Sieb&Meyer 锣程读入2017.044月-17增强了DRC copper-cut-ins 性能、改进了“Select Painted” 功能2017.1010月-17新的startup 程式、扩展了Job Editor View （资料编辑查看）、优化了Rout Compensation （锣带补偿）2018.033月-18读入Eagle 时按比例绽放其字体、绽放Silk optimizer 里的线宽、并引进了YELO Single Layer Adjuster(线路优化模块）2018.066月-18可以通过创建文档保存Jobs,可以免费试用所有的YELO 功能2018.1011月-18查询元器件、从ODB++资料读取元器件信息2019.044月-19YELO 模块整合了所有Copper 层用到的GUI 功能、扩展了YELO 功能、强化了Rout Manager 功能2019.088月-19快捷键、层查看显示、维护升级UcamX v2016.06J6月201612月2016UcamX v2016.12UcamX v2018.1010月2018201420152016201720182019今天UcamX v2014.1212月2014UcamX v2015.044月2015UcamX v2016.011月2016UcamX v2017.044月2017UcamX v2017.1010月2017UcamX v2018.033月2018UcamX v2018.066月2018UcamX v2019.044月2019UcamX v2019.088月2019快捷键U cam X现在支持所有所有的global commands快捷键.甚至，你可以自定义自已喜欢的快捷键.Ø通过快捷键，可以将您的工作速度提升10%以上Ø通过快捷键，使用更方便更神奇的是，你可以通过HyperScripts自定义快捷键.如何设置快捷键，请在UcamX Help菜单里进行查看层查看显示U cam X现在可以通过快捷键1 2 3 查看想要关注的层通过使用快捷键‘1’, ’2’ 和‘3’ ，你可以:Ø更快更安全地工作Ø不用在右图中的图标上来回切换更多功能…U cam X v2019.08版本修复了很多客户提出的问题.我们希望您能继续实时向我们提交你在使用过程中遇到的问题，以便我们能够不断地改进提升我们的软件产品.谢谢您!更多功能…我们建议您尽快更新到我们的最近版本，以便享受更多自动化的功能服务.如果您还在使用我们的旧版本，您可以查看下列更新版本的功能升级说明和修复功能.UcamX v2017.04UcamX v2017.10UcamX v2018.03UcamX v2018.06UcamX v2018.10UcamX v2019.04所有更新版本的发行说明和修复功能可以从Ucamco网站的下载页面进行下载.© Copyright Ucamco NV, Gent, BelgiumAll rights reserved. This material, information and instructions for use contained herein are the property of Ucamco. The material, information and instructions are provided on an AS IS basis without warranty of any kind. There are no warranties granted or extended by this document. Furthermore Ucamco does not warrant, guarantee or make any representations regarding the use, or the results of the use of the software or the information contained herein. Ucamco shall not be liable for any direct, indirect, consequential or incidental damages arising out of the use or inability to use the software or the information contained herein.The information contained herein is subject to change without prior notice. Revisions may be issued from time to time to advise of suchchanges and/or additions.No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a data base or retrieval system, or published, in any form or in any way, electronically, mechanically, by print, photo print, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from Ucamco.This document supersedes all previous versions.All product names cited are trademarks or registered trademarks of their respective owners.。

《UcSTAR管理员手册》繁 (2)

UcSTAR 管理员手册深圳市擎旗資訊技術有限公司2010年10月目錄UcSTAR (1)管理员手册 (1)前言 (3)1.服务器管理 (4)1.1服务器管理 (5)1.2服务器日志管理 (7)1.3服务器接口设置 (8)1.4服务器其他设置 (8)2.组织架构管理 (12)2.1系统组织架构 (12)2.1.1将某个部门设置为不可见 (12)2.2群组组织架构 (13)3.系统权限设置 (14)3.1权限高级设置 (14)3.2系统角色设置： (14)3.2.1如何新建一个角色 (14)4.系统信息管理 (17)4.1系统公告管理： (17)4.2系统广播： (18)4.3服务器端监控管理 (19)4.3.1客户端在线查询： (19)4.3.2服务器连接查询： (20)4.3.3消息监控设置： (20)4.3.4敏感消息设置： (21)4.3.5部门监控设置： (21)4.3.6人员监控设置： (21)4.3.7消息记录查看： (22)5.插件 (22)5.1OA组织架构同步 (22)5.2网关设置 (24)5.3远程控制代理管理 (25)前言本文檔主要介紹UcSTAR系統管理端的基本應用，例如管理員登錄、設置UcSTAR分組結構、設置UcSTAR用戶帳號、內部服務管理維護等等，通過本章的介紹，管理員已經可以實現UcSTAR在本企業的實際應用中的維護操作。

UcSTAR 伺服器是通過WEB方式來管理的。

訪問http://localhost:9090（如果不是伺服器本機，請輸入實際的伺服器IP地址）輸入用戶名密碼即可登錄。

出現操作介面如下：1.伺服器管理(圖1-1單網卡伺服器設置頁面)該頁面顯示:系統的相關資訊,運行時間.伺服器檔的安裝路徑、IP地址等資訊。

若是雙網卡則是下圖所示：備註：雙網卡系部分分公司解決MSN代理問題而採用的一種方案。

此外也可以在防火牆中放開UcSTAR 伺服器IP地址訪問MSN伺服器的許可權和1863端口，此方案即不比採用雙網卡，目前總公司、廣東、四川等採用此方案。

MeasureMax手册

用户名语言的选择
长官级别测量精灵的模式 Full为复杂模式 Simple为简单模式
自动几何元素识别
程序所放的位置
补偿参数所放的位置
密码的设置
Manage菜单
在这个界面下，可以增减用户，可以对用户的属性进行编辑，也可以调出上一页的界面
系统资源菜单这里只对第3项进行介绍
CMM Configuration Save/Restore CFG文件的存储
初始化命令，zz 为自动归零版本信息
Properties Online(在线)
机器名称及一些参数
通讯设置
Settings菜单
Feature Default几何元素的默认值 System系统设置 Report Monitor报告属性窗口 Graphics Monitor测量图形的属性窗口 Error Monitor错误监察窗口 Single Touch Interface Monitro整合属性窗口 XYZ Monitor坐标属性窗口
双击MeasureMax图标
使用者名称
输入密码
第一部分、MeasureMax控制中心
控制中心的菜单介绍
New和File下面的红苹果按钮一样，单击进入Quick Teach Edit是编辑现有的程序 Run运行已有的测量程序 Maintenance是对工件测量程序进行管理维护 List All Part Programs是打印所有的测量程序的名称 Exit是退出程序
系统的设置，DCC部分
机器CNC运行时最快移动速度， Discovery最大为 254mm/sec 超行程的距离测量速度返回距离测针以法线方向测量工件的前进距离测量之后，测针沿指定方向返回的高度测针的测量位置公差测针的移动位置公差

UCAM License 安装手册

ManiaBarco Tramstraat 69 B-9052 Gent Belgium
For more information
ManiaBarco web site:
E-mail: info@
Helpdesk
Europe, Middle East, Africa Monday - Thursday: 09.00 AM - 6.00 PM MET Friday: 09.00 AM - 6.00 PM MET + 32 9 216 99 00 General support issues: support.eur@ License issues: license.eur@ Java™ HYPERTOOL issues: hypertool@ General information: info@
新的 License 文件的内容将会显示出来 9 在另一个 X-terminal 中输入 more license.dat.130298
License 文件所在位置
例如: copy ets.dat license.dat 6 请确认新的 License 文件中以下信息与旧的 License 文件中的相同：
• 在 SERVER 行中的 Host 名字，HostID 及端口名，如果不相同您需要将 Host 名字及端口名改成与旧的 License 文件一致。
North America, Latin America Monday - Friday: 08:00 AM - 8:00 PM PST + 1 888 257 2264
General support issues: a@ License issues: a@ Java™ HYPERTOOL issues: hypertool@ General information: info@

UC视频贝特监控客户端使用手册J2.2.1

UC视频贝特监控客户端软件使用手册J2.2.1非常感谢您购买贝特网络监控的产品，如果您有什么疑问或需要请随时与我们客户部联系。

本手册适用于UC视频监控客户端软件。

本手册可能包含技术上不准确和印刷错误。

产品实时更新，本手册内容将做不定期的更新，恕不另行通知；更新的内容将会在本手册的新版本中加入。

我们随时会改进或更新本手册中描述的产品或程序。

若存在手册中对产品的描述与实物不符，一律以实物为准。

产品说明中若有疑问或争议的，以公司最终解释为准。

视频监控客户端是一个功能强大的监控软件，集多窗口，多用户，语音对讲，报警中心，录像，兼容其它扩展产品，单机直连设备监控系统等功能为一体。

视频监控客户端是针对连接多台不同类型或型号的设备(如IPC，NVS，DVS等产品)，此说明书只针对专业视频监控系统的客户端软件操作进行介绍，涉及到具体设备的功能设置请阅读相关的产品说明书。

本手册是为使用UC视频监控客户端的用户提供的。

您应具备相关设备(如IPC，NVS，DVS等产品)的基本操作知识和经验。

目录第1章功能介绍 ................................................................................................................................ - 1 -1.1 主要功能特点 ....................................................................................................................... - 1 - 第2章运行环境要求 ......................................................................................................................... - 2 -2.1 硬件环境 .............................................................................................................................. - 2 -2.2 软件环境 .............................................................................................................................. - 2 - 第3章安装与卸载............................................................................................................................. - 3 -3.1 安装步骤 .............................................................................................................................. - 3 -3.2卸载步骤 ............................................................................................................................... - 5 - 第4章配置管理 ................................................................................................................................ - 6 -4.1主界面介绍............................................................................................................................ - 7 -4.2 设备管理 .............................................................................................................................. - 9 -4.2.1 设备组配置 ............................................................................................................... - 9 -4.2.2 设备配置................................................................................................................. - 10 -4.3 用户管理 ............................................................................................................................ - 11 -4.3.1 角色信息管理.......................................................................................................... - 11 -4.3.2 用户组管理 ............................................................................................................. - 12 -4.3.3 用户信息管理.......................................................................................................... - 12 -4.3.4 滚动字幕管理.......................................................................................................... - 12 -4.4 录像管理 ............................................................................................................................ - 13 -4.4.1 默认录像策略.......................................................................................................... - 13 -4.4.2 策略配置................................................................................................................. - 13 -4.5 远程管理 ............................................................................................................................ - 15 -4.5.1 设备的选择 ............................................................................................................. - 15 -4.5.2 远程配置................................................................................................................. - 15 -4.6 远程维护 ............................................................................................................................ - 16 -4.6.1 设备信息列表.......................................................................................................... - 16 -4.6.2 系统升级................................................................................................................. - 16 -4.6.3 配置文件上传和下载 ............................................................................................... - 16 -4.6.4重启、恢复出厂设置和同步系统时间........................................................................ - 17 -4.6.5 前端存储设备管理................................................................................................... - 17 - 第5章视频浏览 .............................................................................................................................. - 18 -5.1.1实时监控.................................................................................................................. - 18 -5.1.2 实时监控操作方法................................................................................................... - 19 -5.1.3 电子放大功能.......................................................................................................... - 19 -5.1.4 双码流监控 ............................................................................................................. - 20 -5.1.5 视频抓图................................................................................................................. - 20 -5.1.6 语音对讲................................................................................................................. - 20 -5.1.7 声音........................................................................................................................ - 20 -5.1.8 开始选中设备片段录像............................................................................................ - 21 -5.1.9 轮巡........................................................................................................................ - 21 -5.1.10 告警联动 ............................................................................................................... - 21 -5.1.11 满屏和标准模式显示.............................................................................................. - 22 -5.1.12 锁屏与解锁............................................................................................................ - 22 -5.1.13 停止监控视频 ........................................................................................................ - 22 -5.1.14 开始全部录像 ........................................................................................................ - 22 -5.1.15多窗口全屏控制 ..................................................................................................... - 23 -5.1.16设备列表................................................................................................................ - 23 -5.1.17 云台控制 ............................................................................................................... - 24 -5.1.18实时报警................................................................................................................ - 25 - 第6章录像查询 .............................................................................................................................. - 26 -6.1录像查询 ............................................................................................................................. - 26 -6.2录像回放 ............................................................................................................................. - 26 -6.2.1本地录像回放........................................................................................................... - 26 -6.2.2前端录像回放........................................................................................................... - 27 -6.3录像下载 ............................................................................................................................. - 27 - 第7章告警信息 .............................................................................................................................. - 28 - 第8章电视墙.................................................................................................................................. - 29 -8.1 电视墙的布局 ..................................................................................................................... - 29 -8.2 监视器的布局 ..................................................................................................................... - 29 -8.3 解码器和监视器的绑定 ....................................................................................................... - 30 -8.4 电视墙轮巡设置.................................................................................................................. - 31 - 第9章电子地图 .............................................................................................................................. - 33 -9.1 电子地图布局 ..................................................................................................................... - 33 -9.1.1 添加地图................................................................................................................. - 33 -9.1.2 添加子地图 ............................................................................................................. - 34 -9.1.3 添加设备................................................................................................................. - 34 -9.2 播放设备视频 ..................................................................................................................... - 35 -9.2.1 实时监控................................................................................................................. - 35 -9.2.2 全屏/退出全屏播放 ................................................................................................. - 35 -9.2.3 设备视频改变.......................................................................................................... - 36 -9.2.4 停止视频播放.......................................................................................................... - 36 -9.3 地图和设备的删除 .............................................................................................................. - 36 -9.3.1 删除地图................................................................................................................. - 36 -9.3.2 删除设备................................................................................................................. - 36 -9.4 地图和设备属性.................................................................................................................. - 36 -9.4.1 地图属性................................................................................................................. - 36 -9.4.2 设备属性................................................................................................................. - 36 -9.5 地图之间的跳转.................................................................................................................. - 37 - 附录 ................................................................................................................................................. - 38 - 自动登录 ................................................................................................................................... - 38 - 开机自动运行 ............................................................................................................................ - 38 - 轮巡配置 ................................................................................................................................... - 38 - 存储路径配置 ............................................................................................................................ - 39 - 关于 .......................................................................................................................................... - 39 - 帮助 .......................................................................................................................................... - 40 - 多屏显示 ................................................................................................................................... - 40 -UC转发 (41)UC接收 (42)UC视频监控客户端软件．操作手册第1章功能介绍1.1 主要功能特点支持电子放大与电子云台功能。

千绿光 Magic Box 8 Way DMX 缓冲器用户手册版本 1.5 九月 2012说明书

Chroma-Q™ Magic Box™ 8 Way DMX BufferUser ManualVersion 1.5 September 2012PN: 134-0101Warranty StatementChroma-Q warrants to the original purchaser, with proof of purchase, that its delivered products shall be free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use for a period of 12 months from date of shipment.Chroma-Q will repair, or at its option, provide an equivalent item or replace, the defective product during the stated warranty period. This warranty applies only to the repair or replacement of the product and only when the product is properly handled, installed and maintained according to Chroma-Q instructions. This warranty excludes defects resulting from improper handling, storage, installation, acts of God, fire, vandalism or civil disturbances. Purchaser must notify Chroma-Q in writing within 14 days of noticing the defect. This warranty excludes field labour or service charges related to the repair or replacement of the product.The warranty contained herein shall not extend to any finished goods or spare parts from which any serial number has been removed or which have been damaged or rendered defective (a) as a result of normal wear and tear, willful or accidental damage, negligence, misuse or abuse; (b) due to water or moisture, lightning, windstorm, abnormal voltage, harmonic distortion, dust, dirt, corrosion or other external causes; (c) by operation outside the specifications contained in the user documentation; (d) by the use of spare parts not manufactured or sold by Chroma-Q or by the connection or integration of other equipment or software not approved by Chroma-Q unless the Customer provides acceptable proof to Chroma-Q that the defect or damage was not caused by the above; (e) by modification, repair or service by anyone other than Chroma-Q, who has not applied for and been approved by Chroma-Q to do such modification, repair or service unless the Customer provides acceptable proof to Chroma-Q that the defect or damage was not caused by the above; (f) due to procedures, deviating from procedures specified by Chroma-Q or (g) due to failure to store, install, test, commission, maintain, operate or use finished goods and spare parts in a safe and reasonable manner and in accordance with Chroma-Q’s instructions (h) by repair or replacement of engines without factory training.The warranty contained herein shall not apply to finished goods or spare parts which are sold “as is”, as “second-hand”, as used”, as “demo” or under similar qualifications or to Consumables (“Consumables” is defined as any part(s) of goods or part(s) for use with goods, which part(s) of goods or part(s) for use with goods are consumed during the operation of the goods and which part(s) of goods or part(s) for use with goods require replacement from time to time by a user such as, but not limited to, light bulbs).The warranty contained herein shall not apply, unless the total purchase price for the defective finished goods or spare parts has been paid by the due date for payment.The warranty contained herein applies only to the original purchaser and are not assignable or transferable to any subsequent purchaser or end-user.This warranty is subject to the shipment of the goods, within the warranty period, to the ChromaQ warranty returns department, by the purchaser, at the purchasers expense. If no fault is found, ChromaQ will charge the purchaser for the subsequent return of the goods.Chroma-Q reserves the right to change the warranty period without prior notice and without incurring obligation and expressly disclaims all warranties not stated in this limited warranty.DisclaimerThe information contained herein is offered in good faith and is believed to be accurate. However, because conditions and methods of use of our products are beyond our control, this information should not be used in substitution for customer's tests to ensure that Chroma-Q products are safe, effective, and fully satisfactory for the intended end use. Suggestions of use shall not be taken as inducements to infringe any patent. Chroma-Q sole warranty is that the product will meet the sales specifications in effect at the time of shipment. Your exclusive remedy for breach of such warranty is limited to refund of purchase price or replacement of any product shown to be other than as warranted.Chroma-Q reserves the right to change or make alteration to devices and their functionality without notice due to our on going research and development.The Chroma-Q Magic Box 8 Way Buffer has been designed specifically for the professional entertainment lighting industry. Regular maintenance should be performed to ensure that the products perform well in the entertainment environment.If you experience any difficulties with any Chroma-Q products please contact your selling dealer. If your selling dealer is *********************************************.Ifthesellingdealerisunabletosatisfyyourservicingneeds,please contact the following, for full factory service:Outside North America: North America:Tel: +44 (0)1494 446000 Tel: 416-255-9494Fax: +44 (0)1494 461024 Fax: 416-255-3514********************s*******************For further information please visit the Chroma-Q website at .Chroma-Q is a trademark, for more information on this visit /trademarks.The rights and ownership of all trademarks are recognised.ApprovalsTable of Contents1. Product Overview (4)2. Operation (4)PowerDataSystem diagramInstallationControl and power cablesAccessories1. Product overviewThe Chroma-Q Magic Box 8 Way DMX Buffer is a fault tolerant, self healing DMX buffer designed to isolate 8 XLR-5 outputs from the DMX input, through and each other.2. OperationPowerConnect power through a fused male IEC chassis connector with input power of 100 - 240V, 50-60 Hz. The standard fuse is a 5x20 mm 500mA GMA.DataData input ANSI E1.11 USITT DMX 512-A from an external source or lighting control console connects through a male XLR-5. A pass through connection is available on the female XLR-5.Data outputs ANSI E1.11 USITT DMX 512-A through 4 female XLR-5. The individual outputs are protected, self healing, boosted from the original DMX signal and fully isolated from each other and the DMX input and through connections.System DiagramInstallationUnique Magic Box interlocking enclosure facilitates easy rack mounting when used in pairs and easy truss mounting via captive nut insert. Rack mounting brackets are available in single unit and dual unit versions.Note: for truss mounting, we recommend the use of a ½"-13UNC x ¾" long bolt to avoid damage.Control and Power CablesThe XLR-5 cable is wired pin to pin, in the following format:Pin # Function1 Ground (screen)2 Data minus3 Data plus4 Spare data minus5 Spare data plusAccessoriesChroma-Q Magic Box pair of rack ears - Single Box - CHRM1Chroma-Q Magic Box pair of rack ears - Dual Box - CHRM2Chroma-Q Magic Box 8>4 DMX A/B Switch – MBDMXABChroma-Q Magic Box PS12 Power Supply - MBPS12。

U-MLE-Ts继保操作手册--终版20110720

1.4 - Measuring Inputs and Power Supply 测量输入和电源 ........................................................................................... 5
1.5 - Outputs Loading 输出负载 ...................................................................................................................................... 5
1.8 - Safety Protection 安全保护...................................................................................................................................... 6
7.8 - Example: Setting “User Variable”例子：“用户变量”设置 ................................................................................... 20
1.3 - Electrical Connection 电气连接............................................................................................................................... 5

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7
2.
不检测区优化（外框）： I. 勾选 Selections 菜单下的 in 选择框，点选 SelectWindows 选项（见下图）
II.
然后在资料上框取需检测的范围，此时被选择范围会变显示为白色，再点选 ToggБайду номын сангаасe 功能键，此时不需要检测的区域（外框应该）是高亮状态（即边线显示成白色）。
ODB++资料的读入：
1.
以鼠标点选 Import Job 下之 ODB++ Input ，选取所需之料号、层别。
1.选取料号
2.进入料号编辑区
3
其他资料格式的读入（例如Gerber274x等）
1．
在 Ucam 窗口中选 job—>new（新增料号）。在弹出的 Job Definition (文件定意窗口)中的 Name （文件名）中输入要进行编辑的料号名。检查 path（输入路径）中的路径和要读入料号的路径是否一致。如果不一致，可以手工输入或在后面的下拉菜单内选择。然后点击 ok, 完成此步骤。
13
D、AOI 检测设定
1. 在主窗口选择 output--Optical Inspect--Argos,弹出 AOI 输出窗口。
2.
在 Output Argos 中点选 Inspect Regions（检测区域设定），弹出下面的窗口。第一步，选择 Inspect Region（设定检测区），检测区是单一方形区域内含被检测的区域；第二步，选择 Dont Inspect Region（不检测区）可以作不同大小长方形的多路交叠处理，在不检测区域内，缺点不会报告；第三步，选择 Registration Regions（对位区域）由三个选取的点组成，检测时作为帮助 Argos 对齐资料之用。见下图。
10
提示：做到这里，请客户自己检查一下：有没有选到一些没有用的区域；有没有一些细线路还没有选到；
IV.
此时，我们在意的线路都处于选中状态。打开 Contour 功能（在 Ucam 的主窗口中选取 Tools-> Editing-> Contours）,会弹出 Contour Handling 窗口（见下图）。选取 Exact 后，点击 Contourize。等待 Contourize 完成。
内公差
外公差
公差值设定参考（Tolerances Table）分辨率 0.5 0.4 0.33 0.25 0.2 线路公差内公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8 外公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8 PAD 公差内公差 4 3.2 2.8 2 1.6 外公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8 SMT 公差内公差 4 3.2 2.8 2 1.6 外公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8 大铜面公差内公差 5 4 3.5 2.5 2 外公差 2 1.6 1.4 1 0.8
9
Ucam 主窗口中线路被选线路为高亮状态（图 4）
III. 当选取所以在意线路后，选中 selections 窗口中的“－” ，第一步，点选 Painted 功能键（见下图）,此步骤可以清除铜面上用大量线条填充的区域（注意: 可能把某些线也减去，需要仔细检查后再将这些线选中）；第二步，选 Reverse 功能键（见下图），此步骤可以清除已选取部份中的负 D 码。

选择优先顺序为：规则 PAD 中心点→隔离环中心点→掏空圈→大铜皮拐角；
3.
Tolerance 设定公差。
14
公差主要有 Inner Tolerance（内公差）和 Outer Tolerance（外公差）。内公差大小决定要检测线路缺口、线细、开路、凹陷的能力；外公差大小决定要检测线路凸起、短路的能力；公差的设定：公差大小＝2×n×分辨率 n＝1，2，3，…… 分辨率的数值为：Extra Fine＝0.2; Fine=0.25; Medium=0.33; Coarse=0.4; Extra Coarse=0.5 把计算好的公差填入下图指定的位置就可以了。
12
VI.
单击 Surface，这时一些小块的区域都被去掉。码为 555。
VII. 此时点：剪切->粘贴，此时大面积的铜皮生产一个新的 D 码。按照 11 页中第 VI 项更改 D
5.
小焊盘及 SMT 通过上一步，我们已经将线路设定成 1，大铜皮设定成 555，不检测区域是 444。这时选中剩下的部分即为小焊盘和 SMT。我们可以选中这个部分，然后执行上面 VII 这个步骤，把小焊盘及 SMT 的 D 码设定为 333。
注：蚀刻因子为分辨率的整数倍必须需要 Dpf2Cad 7.036 以上版本支持。
提示：怎样知道蚀刻补偿不正确? 蚀刻补偿太小, 会出现: 临界值偏低(例如低于 20)、基材上报大块多铜假点或铜的边缘大部份报少铜蚀刻补偿太大, 会出现: 临界值偏高(例如高于 70)、铜面上报大块少铜假点或铜的边缘大部份报多铜 B:转角补偿（corner rounding）：通常设定为分辨率的 0～2 倍。 C:不在意区域(Don’t Care Tolerance)：这个区域始终设定(EMV)为 10 就可以。 D: 镱像（Mirror）：当看到图形边缘文字或数字是反向的请选择 X 轴镜像，以方便操作 E:分辨率设定 (Resolution)：(通常设定为最小线宽/最小线隙的十分之一)
11
中输入 1（表示此 D 码是在意线路需要仔细检测）。然后点击 OK 退出。
4.
大铜面优化处理。 I. II. 在 Aperture Manage 窗口中选取刚才已经处理好的线路部分（D 码是 1 的 contour）；在打开的 Selections 菜单中，点选 Toggle（反选），这时候，线路板上除了线路以外的铜面都被选中；
提示：如果您使用的资料存在 Block 则先进行以下操作：
打开 block: 双击 block D 码,打开 D 码编缉, 把 Keep Link 点勾, 按 Multi Edit。如果还有 block, 重回步骤 1。直至没有 block,再把线路, 大铜面等等分类。
6
（图 2）选择功能窗口
内公差是根据线路最少宽度来设定外公差是根据铜与铜之间的距离来设定
4.
Parameters（参数）设定。主要设定有: 蚀刻补偿（Etch Factor）、为分辨率（Resolution）、不在意区域（Dont Care Tolerance）（参照下图）
15
A: 蚀刻补偿(Etch Factor)：补偿值（分辨率的偶数倍）＝资料上面的大小－蚀刻后板面上的大小作用是把 CAD 数据作修正, 使数据和实际的板一样
提示：等待的时间，依据资料的大小和填充的精细度决定。选择 Exact 为最精细，时间较长。一般线路选择 Bitmap， Ppi 中填写 10000 即可。铜皮部分可以用 8000 Ppi 即可。
V. VI.
点击 Aperture Manager 主窗口中 Edit->Aperture clean 功能键，清除 Aperture list 中多余 D 码。在 Aperture Manager 窗口中，双击刚才新生成的 contour 的 D 码，会显示下图窗口。在 Number
总结：通过以上 5 个大步骤，我们将图形分成了： “1” ：线路部分，需要仔细检查的； “333” ：小焊盘及 SMT 部分，可以给较大公差的部分； “444” ：不检查部分，可以给比很大公差的部分； “555” ：大铜皮部分，可以给大公差部分；这些设定让我们下一步的输出更有效，同时还可以减少假报和提高侦测能力。
提示：建议可以用同样的方法将层的名称改为 L1，L2……;钻孔层的名称改为 Drill1，Drill2……。方便后面的检查和输出。
料号层别窗口
料号层别参数窗口
5
C、层别的优化处理：
层别优化处理的目的是为了：可以根据不同的公差要求，方便的给不同的线路不同的公差。为了实现这样的理想我们通常可以将线路板上的图像大致分为下面几类：线路、PAD、SMT（外层）、大铜面、不检测区（外框）等。下面我们一步步实现这个过程，这里介绍的是最基本的情况： 1. 开启功能窗口。在 Ucam 的主窗口打开 Aperture Manager（D 码管理窗口）（如图 1）和 selections（选择功能窗口）（如图 2）。（图 1）该层别的线路 D 码组成表。（图１）D 码管理窗口
SmartArgos 资料制作操作规范目
第一部分：资料处理及设定流程第二部分：常见问题的处理方法
录
1
第一部分：资料处理及设定流程
资料制作流程图
资料读入
资料修正
资料优化
资料检查
AOI 设定
AOI 输出
2
A、运行 UCAM 软件
1. 直接双击运行桌面的的 SmartArgos 的快捷方式
B、资料的读入
2．
Ucam 会打开 SmartStart 窗口，选择 Rescan（重新扫描），此时会列出 Ucam 读到的料号层别，请选择要作业的层别文件，点击 Analyze（分析），Ucam 会自动识别料号的格式（通常建议客户使用 GerberRS274X 格式）。此时会看到在层别后面显示料号层别的格式。选择需要设定输出到 AOI 的层别，选中后会高亮状态，然后点击 Add To Job（载入料号），完成后点击 Quit（退出）。
III. 再打开 Contours 窗口，将此部分做一个 Contours。目的是：将所有的外框合并为一个 D 码。
IV. V.
点击 Aperture Manager 主窗口中 Edit->Aperture clean 功能键，清除 Aperture list 中多余 D 码。在 Aperture Manager 窗口中，双击刚才外框的 D 码，会显示下图窗口。在 Number 中输入 444（表示此 D 码不需要检测）。然后点击 OK 退出。

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