三年级人教版英语上学期句型转换专项提升练习

（财经文章—译中对照—Michael原创）你将在股市的一片大
好声中付出高昂代价
YOU PAY A VERY HIGH PRICE IN THE STOCK MARKET FOR
A CHEERY CONSENSUS
你将在股市的一片大好声中付出高昂代价
by Warren E. Buffett
作者沃伦.巴菲特
Forbes, Vol. 124, No. 3, August 6, 1979, 24-26 by permission of the author. 《福布斯》第124卷第3号，1979年8月6日出版，第24-26页。

经作者授权发表
Pension fund managers continue to make investment decision with their eyes firmly fixed on the
rear-view mirror.
退休基金经理人仍在如此作着投资的决策，就象眼睛死盯着倒车镜开车一样。

This generals-fighting-the-last-war approach has proven costly in the past and will likely prove equally costly this time around.
这种方法好比让将军们去打最后一打仗，过去的事实已经证明这样的代价是沉重的，现在很可能也是如此。

Stocks now sell at levels that should produce long-term returns far superior to bonds.
以目前股票的价格水平看，将来产生的长期回报会远大于债券。

Yet pension managers, usually encouraged by corporate sponsors they must necessarily please (“whose bread I eat, his song I sing”), are pouring funds in record proportions into bonds.
然而，基金经理们有必要也必须符合机构赞助商的心意（俗话说“拿人钱财、替人消灾”），在赞助商一再怂恿下，基金经理把资金
源源不断地投到债券上，从资金比例上看创下了有史以来最高记录。

Meanwhile, orders for stocks are being placed with an eyedropper.
与此同时，股票定单则少得可怜，简直就象滴眼药水一样。

Parkinson—of Parkinson’s Law fame—might conclude that the enthusiasm of professionals for stocks varies proportionately with the recent pleasure derived from ownership.
帕金森—因创造帕金森定律而出名—可能得出这一结论，业内人士对股票的热情会随着对近来股东权益的满足感的变化而相应变化。

This always was the way John Q. Public was expected to behave.
普通民众估计通常都是这种反应，
John Q. Expert seems similarly afflicted.
股票行家好象也一样受此折磨。

Here’s the record.
有历史记载如下。

In 1972, when the Dow earned $67.11 or 11% on beginning book value of 607, it closed the year selling at 1020 and pension managers couldn’t buy stocks fast enough.
1972年，道琼斯股票在原始票面价值607美元基础上每股赢利67.11美元（即上涨11%），道指年
终报收1020点，此时基金经理们想尽快买进股票都来不及。

Purchases of equities in 1972 were 105% of net funds available (i.e., bonds were sold), a record except for the 122% of the even more buoyant prior year.
1972年，股票的申购量为净有效基金的105%（就是说出售债券来购入股票），创下了一项仅次于前一年的记录，而1971年的涨势更盛，股票的申购量为净有效基金的122%。

This two-year stampede increased the equity portion of total pension assets from 61% to 74%--an
all-time record which coincided nicely with a record high price for the Dow.
这两年的资金涌入使得退休金总资产中股票比例从61%上升到74%--它与道指所创下的记录都是空前的，并且两者刚好吻合。

The more investment managers paid for stocks, the better they felt about them.
随着投资经理们增加在股票上投入，他们感到越发得意。

And then the market went into a tail-spin in 1973-74.
然而在接下来的1973年至1974年，市场迅速滑坡。

Although the Dow earned $99.04 in 1974, or 14% on beginning book value of 690, it finished the year selling at 616.
虽然道琼斯股票在1974年每股赢利99.04美元，在原始票面价值690美元基础上上涨了14%，而道指年终仅报收616点。

A bargain?
这个价格够低吗？
Alas, such bargain prices produced panic rather than purchases; only 21% of net investable funds went into equities that year, a 25-year record low.
唉！这样的低价造成的是恐慌却没有带来股票的购进。

当年只有21%的净有效基金进入股市，创造了25年来的最低记录。

The proportion of equities held by private noninsured pension plans fell to 54% of net assets, a full 20 point-drop from the level deemed appropriate when the Dow was 400 points higher.
未参保退休金计划的私有基金中投资股票的比例降到了净资产的54%，比道指在400点以上所应有的水平整整低了20个百分点。

By 1976 the courage of pension managers rose in tandem with the price level, and 56% of available funds was committee to stocks.
直到1976年，随着价格水平的上升，基金经理的信心才相应提升，
56%的有效基金投入股市。

The Dow that year averaged close to 1000, a level then about 25% above book value.
当年道指平均了接近1000点，并达到高出票面价值25个百分点的水平。

In 1978 stocks were valued far more reasonably, with the Dow selling below book value most of the time.
1978年，人们更加理性地评估股票价值，多数情况下,道琼斯股票以低于票面价值出售。

Yet a new low of 9% of net funds was invested in equities during the year.
然而，当年仅有9%的净基金投入股市，又创下一项新低。

The first quarter of 1979 continued at very close to the same level.
1979年第一季度继续在几乎是同一水平线上徘徊。

By these actions pension managers, in record-setting manner, are voting for purchase of bonds—at
interest of 9% to 10%--and against purchase of American equities at prices aggregating book value or less.
受这些因素影响，基金经理赞成购买利率在9%-10%的债券，反对小于等于整体票面价值的美国股票，这种方式正在创造记录。

But these same pension managers probably would concede that those American equities, in aggregate and over the longer term, would earn about 13% (the average in recent years) on book value.
但是，同样是这些基金经理，他们也许不得不承认，那些整体股票和长期股票在票面价值上会赢利约13%（近些年的平均数）。

And, overwhelmingly, the managers of their corporate sponsors would agree.
那么毋庸质疑，他们的机构赞助商的经理们也会同意的。

Many corporate managers, in fact, exhibit a bit of
schizophrenia regarding equities.
事实上，许多机构赞助商的经理们一提到股票，他们就表现出思维混乱的状态。

They consider their own stocks to be screamingly attractive.
他们相信，他们的股票会倍受追捧，一路飙升。

But, concomitantly, they stamp approval on pension policies rejecting purchases of common stocks in general.
但是，另一方面，他们一般来说支持基金策略，反对购买股票。

And the boss, while wearing his acquisition hat, will scorn investment in similar companies at book value.
而老板一贯反对投资那些票面价值相似的公司。

Can his own talents be so unique that he is justified both in paying 200 cents on the dollar for a business if he can get his hands on it, and in rejecting it as an unwise pension investment at 100 cents on the dollar if it must be left to be run by his companions at the Business Roundtable?
一方面他如果能轻松应对，他可以为一笔生意付出相对高价，另一方面对于一个他认为不算明智的退休金投资，如果它必须拿到商业谈判中费力解决，他宁愿放弃。

他有这个非凡才智来证明这两种决定都是正确的吗？
A simple Pavlovian response may be the major cause of this puzzling behavior.
这种迷茫表现的主要原因可能仅仅是一个的巴甫洛夫式反应。

During the last decade stocks have produced pain—both for corporate sponsors and for the investment managers the sponsors hire.
在过去的十年间，对于机构赞助商以及他们聘用的投资经理人而言，股市给他们带去的是痛苦。

Neither group wishes to return to the scene of the accident.
两者都不愿重温恶梦。

But the pain as not been produced because business has performed badly, but rather because stocks have underperformed business.
但是，造成痛苦的原因不是因为糟糕的经济形势，而是因为股市行情比经济形势更差劲儿。

Such underperformance cannot prevail indefinitely, any more than could the earlier over-performance of stocks versus business that lured pension money into equities at high prices.
这种不佳表现总有一天要占上风的，就象以前股市表现好于经济形势时，能吸引退休基金争相高位入市一样。