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C H A P T E R 19Macroeconomic Policy and Coordination under FloatingExchange Rates浮动汇率下的宏观经济政策和协调A s the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates began to show signs of strain in the late 1960s, many economists recommended that countries allow currency values to be determined freely in the foreign exchange market. When the governments of the industrialized countries adopted floating exchange rates early in 1973, they viewed their step as a temporary emergency measure and were not consciously following the advice of the economists then advocating a permanent floating-rate system. So far, however, it has proved impossible to put the fixed-rate system back together again: The dollar exchange rates of the industrialized countries have continued to float since 1973.The advocates of floating saw ft as a way out of the conflicts between internal and external balance that often arose under the rigid Bretton Woods exchange rates. By the mid-1980s, however, economists and policymakers had become more skeptical about the benefits of an international monetary system based on floating rates. Some critics describe the post-1973 currency arrangements as an international monetary "nonsystem,"a freefor- all in which national macroeconomic policies are frequently at odds. Many observers now think that the current exchange rate system is badly in need of reform. Why has the performance of floating rates been so disappointing, and what direction should reform of the current system take? In this chapter our models of fixed and floating exchange rates are applied to examine the recent performance of floating rates and to compare the macroeconomic policy problems of different exchange rate regimes.Case for Floating Exchange RatesAs international currency crises of increasing scope and frequency erupted in the late 1960s, most economists began advocating greater flexibility of exchange rates. Many argued that a system of floating exchange rates (one in which central banks did not intervene in the foreign exchange market to fix rates) would not only automatically ensure exchange rate flexibility but would also produce several other benefits for the world economy. The case for floating exchange rates rested on three major claims:1. Monetary policy autonomy. If central banks were no longer obliged to intervene in currency markets to fix exchange rates, governments would be able to use monetary policy to reach internal and external balance. Furthermore, no country would be forced to import inflation (or deflation) from abroad.2. Symmetry. Under a system of floating rates the inherent asymmetries of Bretton Woods would disappear and the United States would no longer be able to set world monetary conditions all by itself. At the same time, the United States would have the same opportunity as other countries to influence its exchange rate against foreign currencies.3. Exchange rates as automatic stabilizers. Even in the absence of an active monetary policy, the swift adjustment of market-determined exchange rates would help countriesmaintain internal and external balance in the face of changes in aggregate demand. The long and agonizing periods of speculation preceding exchange rate realignments under the Bretton Woods rules would not occur under floating.Monetary Policy AutonomyUnder the Bretton Woods fixed-rate system, countries other than the United States had little scope to use monetary policy to attain internal and external balance. Monetary policy was weakened by the mechanism of offsetting capital flows (discussed in Chapter 17). A central bank purchase of domestic assets, for example, would put temporary downward pressure on the domestic interest rate and cause the domestic currency to weaken in the foreign exchange market. The exchange rate then had to be propped up through central bank sales of official foreign reserves. Pressure on the interest and exchange rates disappeared, however, only when official reserve losses had driven the domestic money supply back down to its original level. Thus, in the closing years of fixed exchange rates, central banks imposed increasingly stringent restrictions on international payments to keep control over their money supplies. These restrictions were only partially successful in strengthening monetary policy, and they had the damaging side effect of distorting international trade.Advocates of floating rates pointed out that removal of the obligation to peg currency values would restore monetary control to central banks. If, for example, the central bank faced unemployment and wished to expand its money supply in response, there would no longer be any legal barrier to the currency depreciation this would cause. As in the analysis of Chapter 16, the currency depreciation would reduce unemployment by lowering the relative price of domestic products and increasing world demand for them. Similarly, the central bank of an overheated economy could cool down activity by contracting the money supply without worrying that undesired reserve inflows would undermine its stabilization effort. Enhanced control over monetary policy would allow countries to dismantle their distorting barriers to international payments.Advocates of floating also argued that floating rates would allow each country to choose its own desired long-run inflation rate rather than passively importing the inflation rate established abroad. We saw in the last chapter that a country faced with a rise in the foreign price level will be thrown out of balance and ultimately will import the foreign inflation if it holds its exchange rate fixed: By the end of the 1960s many countries felt that they were importing inflation from the United States. By revaluing its currency—that is, by lowering the domestic currency price of foreign currency—a country can insulate itself completely from an inflationary increase in foreign prices, and so remain in internal and external balance. One of the most telling arguments in favor of floating rates was their ability, in theory, to bring about automatically exchange rate changes that insulate economies from ongoing foreign inflation.The mechanism behind this insulation is purchasing power parity (Chapter 15). Recall that when all changes in the world economy are monetary, PPP holds true in the long run: Exchange rates eventually move to offset exactly national differences in inflation. If U.S. monetary growth leads to a long-run doubling of the U.S. price level, while Germany's price level remains constant, PPP predicts that the long-run DM price of the dollar will be halved. This nominal exchange rate change leaves the real exchange rate between thedollar and DM unchanged and thus maintains Germany's internal and external balance. In other words, the long-run exchange rate change predicted by PPP is exactly the change that insulates Germany from U.S. inflation.A money-induced increase in U.S. prices also causes an immediate appreciation of foreign currencies against the dollar when the exchange rate floats. In the short run, the size of this appreciation can differ from what PPP predicts, but the foreign exchange speculators who might have mounted an attack on fixed dollar exchange rates speed the adjustment of floating rates. Since they know foreign currencies will appreciate according to PPP in the long run, they act on their expectations and push exchange rates in the direction of their long-run levels.Countries operating under the Bretton Woods rules were forced to choose between matching U.S. inflation to hold their dollar exchange rates fixed or deliberately revaluing their currencies in proportion to the rise in U.S. prices. Under floating, however, the foreign exchange market automatically brings about the exchange rate changes that shield countries from U.S. inflation. Since this outcome does not require any government policy decisions, the revaluation crises that occurred under fixed exchange rates are avoided.1SymmetryThe second argument put forward by the advocates of floating was that abandonment of the Bretton Woods system would remove the asymmetries that caused so much international disagreement in the 1960s and early 1970s. There were two main asymmetries, both the result of the dollar's central role in the international monetary system. First, because central banks pegged their currencies to the dollar and accumulated dollars as international reserves, the U.S. Federal Reserve played the leading role in determining the world money supply and central banks abroad had little scope to determine their own domestic money supplies. Second, any foreign country could devalue its currency against the dollar in conditions of "fundamental disequilibrium," but the system's rules did not give the United States the option of devaluing against foreign currencies. Thus, when the dollar was at last devalued in December 1971, it was only after a long and economically disruptive period of multilateral negotiation.A system of floating exchange rates, its proponents argued, would do away with these asymmetries. Since countries would no longer peg dollar exchange rates or need to hold dollar reserves for this purpose, each would be in a position to guide monetary conditions at home. For the same reason, the United States would not face any special obstacle to altering its exchange rate through monetary or fiscal policies. All countries' exchange rates would be determined symmetrically by the foreign exchange market, not by government decisions.2Exchange Rates as Automatic Stabilizers1Countries can also avoid importing undesired deflation by floating, since the analysis above goes through, in reverse, for a fall in the foreign price level.2The symmetry argument is not an argument against fixed-rate systems in general, but an argument against the specific type of fixed-exchange rate system that broke down in the early 1970s. As we saw in Chapter 17, a fixed-rate system based on a gold standard can be completely symmetric. The creation of an artificial reserve asset, the SDR, in the late 1960s was an attempt to attain the symmetry of a gold standard without the other drawbacks of that system.The third argument in favor of floating rates concerned their ability, theoretically, to promote swift and relatively painless adjustment to certain types of economic changes. One such change, previously discussed, is foreign inflation. Figure 19-1, which uses the DD-AA model presented in Chapter 16, examines another type of change by comparing the economy's response under a fixed and a floating exchange rate to a temporary fall in foreign demand for its exports.A fall in demand for the home country's exports reduces aggregate demand for every level of the exchange rate, E, and so shifts the DD schedule leftward from DD] to DD2. (Recall that the DD schedule shows exchange rate and output pairs for which aggregate demand equals aggregate output.) Figure 19-la shows how this shift affects the economy's equilibrium when the exchange rate floats. Because the demand shift is assumed to be temporary, it does not change the long-run expected exchange rate and so does not move the asset market equilibrium schedule A A1. (Recall that the/\/\ schedule shows exchange rate and output pairs at which the foreign exchange market and the domestic money market are in equilibrium.) The economy's short-run equilibrium is therefore at point 2; compared with the initial equilibrium at point 1, the currency depreciates (E rises) and output falls. Why does the exchange rate rise from El to E21 As demand and output fall, reducing the transactions demand for money, the home interest rate must also decline to keep the money market in equilibrium. This fall in the home interest rate causes the domestic currency to depreciate in the foreign exchange market, and the exchange rate therefore rises from El to E2.The effect of the same export demand disturbance under a fixed exchange rate is shown in Figure 19-1 b. Since the central bank must prevent the currency depreciation that occurs under a floating rate, it buys domestic money with foreign currency, an action that contracts the money supply and shifts AAl left to AA2. The new short-run equilibrium of the economy under a fixed exchange rate is at point 3, where output equals Y3. Figure 19-1 shows that output actually falls more under a fixed rate than under a floating rate, dropping all the way to K3 rather than Y2. In other words, the movement of the floating exchange rate stabilizes the economy by reducing the shock's effect on employment relative to its effect under a fixed rate. Currency depreciation in the floating rate case makes domestic goods and services cheaper when the demand for them falls, partially offsetting the initial reduction in demand. In addition to reducing the departure from internal balance caused by the fall in export demand, the depreciation reduces the current account deficit that occurs under fixed rates by making domestic products more competitive in international markets.We have considered the case of a transitory fall in export demand, but even stronger conclusions can be drawn when there is a permanent fall in export demand. In this case, the expected exchange rate Ee also rises and AA shifts upward as a result. A permanent shock causes a greater depreciation than a temporary one, and the movement of the exchange rate therefore cushions domestic output more when the shock is permanent. Under the Bretton Woods system, a fall in export demand such as the one shown in Figure 19-lb would, if permanent, have led to a situation of "fundamental disequilibrium" calling for a devaluation of the currency or a long period of domestic unemployment as export prices fell. Uncertainty about the government's intentions would have encouraged speculative capital outflows, further worsening the situation by depleting central bankreserves and contracting the domestic money supply at a time of unemployment. Advocates of floating rates pointed out that the foreign exchange market wouldautomatically bring about the required real currency depreciation through a movement in the nominal exchange rate. This exchange rate change would reduce or eliminate the need to push the price level down through unemployment, and because it would occurimmediately there would be no risk of speculative disruption, as there would be under a fixed rate.The Case Against Floating Exchange RatesThe experience with floating exchange rates between the world wars had left many doubts about how they would function in practice if the Bretton Woods rules were scrapped. Some economists were skeptical of the claims advanced by the advocates of floating and predicted instead that floating rates would have adverse consequences for the world economy. The case against floating rates rested on five main arguments:1. Discipline. Central banks freed from the obligation to fix their exchange rates might embark on inflationary policies. In other words, the "discipline" imposed on individual countries by a fixed rate would be lost.2. Destabilizing speculation and money market disturbances. Speculation on changes in exchange rates could lead to instability in foreign exchange markets, and this instability, in turn, might have negative effects on countries' internal and external balances. Further,disturbances to the home money market could be more disruptive under floating thanunder a fixed rate.3. Injury to international trade and investment. Floating rates would make relative international prices more unpredictable and thus injure international trade and investment.4. Uncoordinated economic policies. If the Bretton Woods rules on exchange rate adjustment were abandoned, the door would be opened to competitive currency practices harmful to the world economy. As happened during the interwar years, countries might adopt policies without considering their possible beggar-thy-neighbor aspects. All countries would suffer as a result.5. The illusion of greater autonomy. Floating exchange rates would not really give countries more policy autonomy. Changes in exchange rates would have such pervasive macroeconomic effects that central banks would feel compelled to intervene heavily in foreign exchange markets even without a formal commitment to peg. Thus, floating would increase the uncertainty in the economy without really giving macroeconomic policy greater freedom.DisciplineProponents of floating rates argue they give governments more freedom in the use of monetary policy. Some critics of floating rates believed that floating rates would lead to license rather than liberty: Freed of the need to worry about losses of foreign reserves, governments might embark on overexpansionary fiscal or monetary policies, falling into the inflation bias trap discussed in Chapter 16 (p. XXX). Factors ranging from political objectives (such as stimulating the economy in time to win an election) to simple incompetence might set off an inflationary spiral. In the minds of those who made the discipline argument, the German hyperinflation of the 1920s epitomized the kind of monetary instability that floating rates might allow.The pro-floaters' response to the discipline criticism was that a floating exchange rate would bottle up inflationary disturbances within the country whose government was misbehaving; it would then be up to its voters, if they wished, to elect a government with better policies. The Bretton Woods arrangements ended up imposing relatively little discipline on the United States, which certainly contributed to the acceleration of worldwide inflation in the late 1960s. Unless a sacrosanct link between currencies and a commodity such as gold were at the center of a system of fixed rates, the system would remain susceptible to human tampering. As discussed in Chapter 17, however, commodity-based monetary standards suffer from difficulties that make them undesirable in practice.Destabilizing Speculation and Money Market DisturbancesAn additional concern arising out of the experience of the interwar period was the possibility that speculation in currency markets might fuel wide gyrations in exchange rates. If foreign exchange traders saw that a currency was depreciating, it was argued, they might sell the currency in the expectation of future depreciation regardless of the currency's longer-term prospects; and as more traders jumped on the bandwagon by selling the currency the expectations of depreciation would be realized. Suchdestabilizing speculation would tend to accentuate the fluctuations around the exchange rate's long-run value that would occur normally as a result of unexpected economic disturbances. Aside from interfering with international trade, destabilizing sales of a weak currency might encourage expectations of future inflation and set off a domestic wage-price spiral that would encourage further depreciation. Countries could be caught in a "vicious circle" of depreciation and inflation that might be difficult to escape. Advocates of floating rates questioned whether destabilizing speculators could stay in business. Anyone who persisted in selling a currency after it had depreciated below its longrun value or in buying a currency after it had appreciated above its long-run value was bound to lose money over the long term. Destabilizing speculators would thus be driven from the market, the pro-floaters argued, and the field would be left to speculators who had avoided long-term losses by speeding the adjustment of exchange rates toward their longrun values.Proponents of floating also pointed out that capital flows could behave in a destabilizing manner under fixed rates. An unexpected central bank reserve loss might set up expectations of a devaluation and spark a reserve hemorrhage as speculators dumped domestic currency assets. Such capital flight might actually force an unnecessary devaluation if government measures to restore confidence proved insufficient.A more telling argument against floating rates is that they make the economy more vulnerable to shocks coming from the domestic money market. Figure 19-2 uses theDD-AA model to illustrate this point. The figure shows the effect on the economy of a rise in real domestic money demand (that is, a rise in the real balances people desire to hold at each level of the interest rate and income) under a floating exchange rate. Because a lower level of income is now needed (given E) for people to be content to hold the available real money supply, A A1 shifts leftward to AA2: Income falls from Y] to Y2 as thecurrency appreciates from E1 to E2. The rise in money demand works exactly like a fall in the money supply, and if it is permanent it will lead eventually to a fall in the home price level.Under a fixed exchange rate, however, the change in money demand does not affect the economy at all. To prevent the home currency from appreciating, the central bank buys foreign reserves with domestic money until the real money supply rises by an amount equal to the rise in real money demand. This intervention has the effect of keeping AA[ in its original position, preventing any change in output or the price level.A fixed exchange rate therefore automatically prevents instability in the domestic money market from affecting the economy. This is a powerful argument in favor of fixed rates if most of the shocks that buffet the economy come from the home money market (that is, if they result from shifts in AA). But as we saw in the previous section, fixing the exchange rate will worsen macroeconomic performance on average if output market shocks (that is, shocks involving shifts in DD) predominate.Injury to International Trade and InvestmentCritics of floating also charged that the inherent variability of floating exchange rates would injure international trade and investment. Fluctuating currencies make importers more uncertain about the prices they will have to pay for goods in the future and make exporters more uncertain about the prices they will receive. This uncertainty, it was claimed, would make it costlier to engage in international trade, and as a result trade volumes—and with them the gains countries realize through trade—would shrink. Similarly, greater uncertainty about the payoffs on investments might interfere with productive international capital flows.Supporters of floating countered that international traders could avoid exchange rate risk through transactions in the forward exchange market (see Chapter 13), which would grow in scope and efficiency in a floating-rate world. The skeptics replied that forward exchange markets would be expensive to use and that it was doubtful that forward transactions could be used to cover all exchange-rate risks.At a more general level, opponents of floating rates feared that the usefulness of each country's money as a guide to rational planning and calculation would be reduced. A currency becomes less useful as a unit of account if its purchasing power over imports becomes less predictable. Uncoordinated Economic PoliciesSome defenders of the Bretton Woods system thought that its rules had helped promote orderly international trade by outlawing the competitive currency depreciations that occurred during the Great Depression. With countries once again free to alter their exchange rates at will, they argued, history might repeat itself. Countries might again follow self-serving macroeconomic policies that hurt all countries and, in the end, helped none. In rebuttal, the pro-floaters replied that the Bretton Woods rules for exchange rate adjustment were cumbersome.In addition, the rules were inequitable because, in practice, it was deficit countries that came under pressure to adopt restrictive macroeconomic policies or devalue. Thefixed-rate system had "solved" the problem of international cooperation on monetary policy only by giving the United States a dominant position that it ultimately abused.The Illusion of Greater AutonomyA final line of criticism held that the policy autonomy promised by the advocates of floating rates was, in part, illusory. True, a floating rate could in theory shut out foreign inflation over the long haul and allow central banks to set their money supplies as they pleased. But, it was argued, the exchange rate is such an important macroeconomic variable that policymakers would find themselves unable to take domestic monetary policy measures without considering their effects on the exchange rate.Particularly important to this view was the role of the exchange rate in the domestic inflation process. A currency depreciation that raised import prices might induce workers to demand higher wages to maintain their customary standard of living. Higher wage settlements would then feed into final goods prices, fueling price level inflation and further wage hikes. In addition, currency depreciation would immediately raise the prices of imported goods used in the production of domestic output. Therefore, floating rates could be expected to quicken the pace at which the price level responded to increases in the money supply. While floating rates implied greater central bank control over the nominal money supply, M s, they did not necessarily imply correspondingly greater control over the policy instrument that affects employment and other real economic variables, the real money supply, M S IP. The response of domestic prices to exchange rate changes would be particularly rapid in economies where imports make up a large share of the domestic consumption basket: In such countries, currency changes have significant effects on the purchasing power of workers' wages.The skeptics also maintained that the insulating properties of a floating rate are very limited. They conceded that the exchange rate would adjust eventually to offset foreign price inflation due to excessive monetary growth. In a world of sticky prices, however, countries are nonetheless buffeted by foreign monetary developments, which affect real interest rates and real exchange rates in the short run. Further, there is no reason, even in theory, why one country's fiscal policies cannot have repercussions abroad.Critics of floating thus argued that its potential benefits had been oversold relative toits costs. Macroeconomic policymakers would continue to labor under the constraint of avoiding excessive exchange rate fluctuations. But by abandoning fixed rates, they would have forgone the benefits for world trade and investment of predictable currency values. CASE STUDYExchange Rate Experience Between the Oil Shocks, 1973-1980 Which group was right, the advocates of floating rates or the critics? In this Case Study and the next we survey the experience with floating exchange rates since 1973 in an attempt to answer this question. To avoid future disappointment, however, it is best to state up front that, as is often the case in economics, the data do not lead to a clear verdict. Although a number of predictions made by the critics of floating were borne out by subsequent events, it is also unclear whether a regime of fixed exchange rates would have survived the series of economic storms that has shaken the world economy since 1973. The First Oil Shock and Its Effects, I973-I975As the industrialized countries' exchange rates were allowed to float in March 1973, an official group representing all IMF members was preparing plans to restore world monetary order. Formed in the fall of 1972, this group, called the Committee of Twenty, had been assigned the job of designing a new system of fixed exchange rates free of the asymmetries of Bretton Woods. By the time the committee issued its final "Outline of Reform" in July 1974, however, an upheaval in the world petroleum market had made an early return to fixed exchange rates unthinkable.Energy Prices and the 1974-1975 Recession.In October 1973 war broke out between Israel and the Arab countries. To protest support of Israel by the United States and the Netherlands, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an international cartel including most large oil producers, imposed an embargo on oil shipments to those two countries. Fearing more general disruptions in oil shipments, buyers bid up market oil prices as they tried to build precautionary inventories. Encouraged by these developments in the oil market, OPEC countries began raising the price they charged to their main customers, the large oil companies. By March 1974 the oil price had quadrupled from its prewar price of $3 per barrel to $ 12 per barrel.The massive increase in the price of oil raised the energy prices paid by consumers and the operating costs of energy-using firms and also fed into the prices of nonenergy petroleum products, such as plastics. To understand the impact of these price increases, think of them as a large tax on oil importers imposed by the oil producers of OPEC. The oil shock had the same macroeconomic effect as a simultaneous increase in consumer and business taxes: Consumption and investment slowed down everywhere, and the world economy was thrown into recession. The current account balances of oil-importing countries worsened.The Acceleration of Inflation. The model we developed in Chapters 13 through 17 predicts that inflation tends to rise in booms and fall in recessions. As the world went into deep recession in 1974, however, inflation accelerated in most countries. Table 19-1 shows how inflation in the seven largest industrial countries spurted upward in that year. In a number of these countries inflation rates came close to doubling even though unemployment was rising.What happened? An important contributing factor was the oil shock itself: By directly raising the prices of petroleum products and the costs of energy-using industries, the increase in the oil price caused price levels to jump upward. Further, the worldwide inflationary pressures that had built up since the end of the 1960s had become entrenched in the wage-setting process and were continuing to contribute to inflation in spite of the deteriorating employment picture. The same inflationary expectations that were driving new wage contracts were also putting additional upward pressure on commodity prices as speculators built up stocks of commodities whose prices they expected to rise.Finally, the oil crisis, as luck would have it, was not the only supply shock troubling the world economy at the time. From 1972 on, a coincidence of adverse supply disturbances pushed farm prices upward and thus contributed to the general inflation.。

《国际经济学》(全套课件218P)

国际经济学
1998年9月，美国突然要求所有来自中国的木质包装和木质铺垫材料必须附有中国出入境检验检疫机关出具的证书，证明木质包装经过热处理、熏蒸处理或防腐处理，违规货物将整批禁止入境，这使我国1／3以上的对美出口受到影响。
第二年，欧盟也仿效美国的做法，宣布对从中国离境产品的木质包装采取紧急措施，实施新的检疫标准，以防止带有天牛虫的木质包装箱进入欧洲。据当时的估算，仅欧盟的这一决定就至少影响中国 70多亿美元的对欧出口贸易。
国际经济学
碳关税——美国为保护其国内企业针对发展中
国家采取的措施将会是又一个主要的趋势。
国际经济学
第六章贸易保护政策：关税
关税是历史上最重要的一类贸易保护政策，通过本章的学习，你可以了解：
关税的概念、种类和征收方式小国关税效应、大国关税效应最优关税率、有效保护率关税的总体均衡分析
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生产者剩余
品和市场（保护关税）。
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（二）关税的种类
1、依据征税商品的流向
进口关税：对进口商品课征的关税；
出口关税：对出口商品课征的关税；
过境关税：对途经本国关境，运往他国的外国商品课征的关税。
获得财政收入和保护国内生产；
有时出于干预市场的目的，会选择一些关系到国民生活的敏感商品征收关税。
获取良好的国际政治与经济环境
一国贸易政策的选择必须考虑到国际政治经济环境的影响。
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国际贸易政策的类型
自由贸易政策
自由贸易政策是指国家对贸易行为不加任何干预，使商品自由进出口，在国际市场上自由竞争。
保护贸易政策

国际经济学第八章

第十一页，共二十一页，2022年，8月28日
一、关税同盟的静态效应
□ 贸易创造效应
■ 由于关税同盟内实行自由贸易后，产品从成本较高的国内生产转往成本较低的成员国生产，从成员国的进口量增加，新的贸易得以“创造”
■ 第一由于成员国之间相互取消关税，成员国由原先生产并消费本国的高成本、
高价格产品，转向购买成员国的低价格产品，从而使消费者节省开支，增加福利。
关税同盟的扩大出口效应：图形
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图118/—174/2关02税3 同盟的扩大出口效应
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三、关税同盟的动态效应
□市场扩大效应（或规模经济效应）
□关税同盟的建立促进了成员国企业之间的竞争
□ 关税同盟的建立有利于吸引外资
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图8—2贸易转移效应
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贸易创造与贸易转移的综合分析
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图8—3 贸易创造与贸易转移的综合分析
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一定的商品进口量的增加，还会带来出口的增加，对于一个希望参加关税同盟的国家（特别是小国）而言，它的加入往往并非看准该关税同盟能给它带来多少进口的好处，更多的是看重其产品的出口市场。

第一章国际经济学教案导论(可编辑修改word版)

一、国际经济学的含义第一章绪论第一节国际经济学的产生与发展研究开放条件下的生产、交换行为以及价格、货币和宏观政策。

由国际贸易经济学和国际货币经济学组成。

（研究世界范围内商品、服务和资本的生产、分配和消费活动的学科）二、国际经济学的产生1、家政学：家庭是经济行为的基本单位，追求在收入既定情况下的福利最大化。

家政学――家庭―――收入既定福利最大2、微观经济学：微观经济学以企业为经济活动中心，研究企业在资源既定的条件下获得最大的利润，消费者在收入既定的条件下获得最大的效用。

微观经济学着重探讨生产什么、为谁生产、如何生产。

3、宏观经济学：研究国民经济，对一个国家的经济总量（如经济增长、就业等）进行分析。

宏观经济的目标包括经济增长、充分就业、稳定物价和国际收支平衡。

4、国际经济学随着历史的发展，国家间的经济往来日益频繁，彼此经济关系日益紧密，国家于是成为国际经济往来和活动的主体，出现了各种国际经济往来的形式，国际经济因而产生。

为了探讨国际经济关系的内在联系，就有必要产生独立的经济学分支学科，即国际经济学。

国际经济学是西方经济学的一般理论在国际经济中的延伸和应用，是西方经济学的分支学科。

国际经济学的两大特征（1）国际交易不同于国内交易。

国际交易中普遍存在对贸易和要素流动的自然的和人为的阻碍。

如，劳动力和资本在国家间的流动性远远低于其在一国之内自由流动的程度；关税和非关税壁垒在一国之内一般是不存在的；各国使用不同的货币，使得国际交易远比国内交易复杂得多。

（2）国际经济关系发生在各个独立的经济实体之间。

各国政府制定政策考虑的往往是本国的福利和稳定，而非全世界的福利和稳定，因此往往导致在一国看来是最佳的选择，而在世界范围内看并非最佳；此外，经济间的连锁机制使得一国的经济政策，如财政政策和货币政策，不仅会影响着本国的资源配置，同时还会影响他国的资源配置。

三、国际经济学的发展1、国际贸易理论的发展（1）古典贸易理论：斯密的绝对优势理论、李嘉图的比较优势理论（2）新古典贸易理论：国际贸易理论的标准模型、H-O 模型（3）当代贸易理论：打破了已往的“规模收益不变和完全竞争”的基本假设，研究重点由国家间的差异转向市场结构和厂商行为方面，着重研究不完全竞争市场下国际贸易的新特点以及贸易政策。

国际经济学

国际经济学绪论国际经济学是建立在经济学基本理论基础上的经济学的分支科学。

它是研究经济资源或稀缺资源在世界范围内的最优分配，以及在此过程中发生的经济活动和经济关系的科学。

即国际经济学是以国际经济关系为其研究对象。

它的研究目的就是要解释各个国家或地区之间经济联系的内在机制。

国际经济学定义国际经济学研究现代国家和地区之间经济的相互依存与相互影响及其内在机制，分析一国与世界其他国家间商品、生产要素的流向和直接影响这个流向的国内外政策，以及这些政策对某个国家的福利所产生的影响。

国际经济学的内容国际经济学的微观部分和宏观部分被分别称之为国际贸易理论和国际金融理论。

国际贸易理论旨在说明贸易的起因与利益，以及贸易政策的影响及依据，它主要涉及的主要内容包括贸易纯理论、贸易政策以及贸易与经济增长之间关系等。

国际金融理论则主要说明国际经济活动（如商品、服务贸易和资本国际流动）在各国国民收入中的作用，以及各种国内经济活动对国际经济关系的影响。

即包括外汇理论与政策、国际收支调整理论与政策及国际货币制度等。

国际经济学的范围1、微观国际经济理论：古典国际经济理论、现代国际经济理论；2、宏观国际经济理论：国际贸易政策、国际收支调整理论、内外平衡政策3、生产要素的国际流动：国际间的资本流动（国际间接资本流动和国际直接资本流动）、国际间的劳动力流动；4、国际经济协调：国际间贸易关系协调、国际间金融关系协调、国际间税收关系协调、国际经济一体化；本次课程的内容组成国际贸易理论与政策国际金融理论与政策国际经济学与西方经济学的区别西方经济学研究的是资源的流动和管理机制；可以分为微观经济学和宏观经济学；国际经济学研究的是国际格局下的的资源配置问题。

它分为微观国际经济理论（国际贸易理论）：主要讨论世界范围内的资源配置问题。

宏观国际经济理论（国际金融理论）：主要讨论在国际格局下资源利用的决定因素及其国际传递机制。

第一篇国际贸易理论与政策国际贸易与微观经济学的区别国际贸易理论与微观经济学之间存在着内在联系。

(完整word版)国际经济学(第四版)

国际经济学名词：1、国际经济学：是经济的一般理论在国际经济范围中的延伸和应用,是以经济学的一般理论为基础来研究国际经济活动与国际经济关系的经济学分支学科，是整个经济学体系的有机组成部分.主要研究对象有国际贸易理论与政策、国际收支、外汇理论、生产要素的国际流动、跨国公司、经济发展、经济一体化、开放经济的宏观调节、经济全球化与国际经济秩序研究等.2、绝对利益：在某一种商品上，一个经济在劳动生产率上占有绝对优势,或其生产所耗费的劳动成本绝对低于另一经济，若各个经济都从事自己占有绝对优势商品的生产，继而进行交换，那么双方都可以通过交换得到绝对的利益，从而整个世界也可以获得分工的好处.3、比较利益：甲国在生产任何产品时成本均低于乙国，劳动生产率均高于乙国，处于绝对优势，两个国家间进行贸易的可能性依然存在,因为两国劳动生产率之间的差距,并不是在任何产品上都一样。

这样，处于绝对优势的国家集中生产本国国内具有最大优势的产品,处于绝对劣势的国家停止生产在本国国内处于最大劣势的产品，通过自由交换，双方都可节约社会劳动，增加产品的消费。

世界也因而增加产量，提高劳动生产率。

4、国际分工：即各国之间的劳动分工,生产的国际专业化.它是国际贸易的基础,是社会分工从国内向国外延伸的结果。

各国对于分工方式的选择以及分工的变化，反映了彼此之间经济发展水平的差异及各国经济联系的程度。

主要有产业间、产业内、垂直、水平以及不同要素密集度之间的分工等类型.5、贸易乘数:在开放的条件下，对外贸易的增长可以使国民经济成倍增加，对外贸易乘数研究一国对外贸易与国民收入、就业之间的互相影响，描述了在开放经济体系内部出口促进经济增长的动态过程。

公式为：dY＝［l/（dM/dY)] dX。

（2003)6、一价定律：在完全竞争的市场上，相同的交易产品或金融资产经过汇率调整后，在世界范围内其交易成本一定是相等的。

这个定律在经济中是通过诸如购买力平价、利息平价、远期汇率等经济关系表现出来的.7、贸易创造与贸易转移:关税同盟成员国产品从生产成本较高的国内生产转向成本较低的关税同盟中贸易对象国生产，本国从贸易对象国进口的一种过程和现象。

《国际经济学》复习资料全

一、客观部分：（单项选择、多项选择、不定项选择、判断）（一）、选择部分1、甲国生产一单位酒需40个劳动力，生产一单位布需30个劳动力，乙国生产一单位酒需20个劳动力，生产一单位布需10个劳动力，则根据比较优势理论（ A ）A.甲国专业生产酒，乙国专业生产布B.甲国专业生产酒和布C.甲国专业生产布，乙国专业生产酒D.乙国专业生产酒和布★考核知识点:相对技术差异论附1.1.1（考核知识点解释）：即使一国处于绝对技术优势地位，另一国处于绝对技术劣势地位，只要存在价格差或机会成本的差别，就存在国际分工和贸易的基础和动力。

“两利相权取其重，两弊相权取其轻”。

2、假设一国的边际储蓄倾向为0.2，边际进口倾向为0.1，且最初该国的国际收支处于平衡状态，该国出口增加100万美元将使国际收支出现（ C ）万美元的顺差。

A.100B.33.3C.66.7D.50★考核知识点:国际收支调整的乘数论附1.1.2（考核知识点解释）：若出口增加ΔＸ，会引起贸易差额扩大。

但由于出口增加在乘数作用下会引起收入提高，进而使得进口增加，所以出口扩大引起的贸易差额的扩大被收入增加所引起的进口增加部分地抵消，导致贸易差额的扩大小于出口的增加，但是出口增加确实由于乘数作用导致了国民收入的增加和贸易顺差的扩大，其影响程度则取决于乘数中s与m的大小。

ΔＸ－m/(s+m)* ΔＸ＝66.73、如果一国进口竞争部门和出口部门各有一种特定要素，而劳动力是共同要素，则进口关税一定会（ A ）A.提高进口竞争部门特定要素所有者的实际收入B.提高出口部门特定要素所有者的实际收入C.降低两部门共同要素劳动力的实际收入D.同时提高进口竞争部门和出口部门特定要素所有者的实际收入★考核知识点:特定要素模型附1.1.3（考核知识点解释）：国际贸易会导致出口部门特定要素的实际收入上升，进口部门特定要素的实际收入下降，可自由流动的共同要素实际收入变动不确定，取决于其消费结构。

国际经济学第2章(Helen)

David Ricardo,1772-1823
13
(一）概述
涵义：两国都能生产同样两种产品的条件下，其中一国在两种产品生产上的劳动生产率均高于另一国，该国可以专门生产优势较大的产品，处于劣势地位的另一国可以专门生产劣势较小的产品；通过国际分工与贸易，双方仍可从国际贸易中获利。两利相权取其重，两弊相权取其轻。由David Ricardo（1772-1823）提出。英国工业革命深入发展时期的经济学家，1817年出版了主要著作《政治经济学和赋税原理》，提出了比较成本理论。
25
（2）赫克歇尔——俄林定理（Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem）
在各国生产要素存量一定的情况下，一国将生产和出口密集使用其丰裕要素的产品，进口密集使用其稀缺要素的产品。推理过程：
国际贸易商品的价格差
生产产品的成本差别
生产要素的价格不同
假定中国和美国生产同种产品的技术相同，生产布需要2单位资本和5单位劳动。中国每单位资本和劳动的价格分别为 6美元和1美元，而美国则分别为3美元和4美元，结果中国每单位布的成本为2x6＋5x1＝17 美元，而美国为2x3＋5x4＝26 美元。
毛呢产量 2.7单位
所需劳动 190人/年
4
交换后： (假定英国以1单位毛呢交换葡萄牙1单位葡萄酒) 酒消费量毛呢消费量英 1单位 1.7单位葡 1.375单位 1单位而分工前：
英葡
酒消费量 1单位 1单位
毛呢消费量 1单位 1单位
5
（二）具体内容 1、理论分析的假定条件
（1）生产过程中只投入一种生产要素——劳动力；（2）世界上只有两个国家——中国和美国；（3）这两个国家都能生产两种产品——小麦和布；（4）劳动力在一国范围内各部门间自由流动；（5）劳动力在部门间转移时机会成本不变；（6）生产要素在两国之间不能流动；（7）两国经济资源都充分利用；（8）贸易平衡；

国际经济学第12章-84页精选文档

投资于本国金融市场，每单位本国货币到期本利之和为：
1＋（1×i）
投资于外国金融市场，每单位本国货币到期时的本利之和为（以外币表示）：
1/e＋（1/e×i*）=1/e×（1+i*）
假定一年期满时的汇率为ef，则投资于国外的本利之和（以本币表示）为：
1/e×（1+i*）× ef= ef/e×（1＋i*）
购买力平价有两种形式：绝对购买力平价和相对购买力平价。前者解释某一时点上汇率决定的基础，后者解释某一时段上汇率变动的原因。
（1）理论的假定前提购买力平价理论暗含如下假定：①市场完全竞争，商品是同质的；②商品价格具有完全弹性，市场要素的变化均能及时反映到商品价格的变化上；③不考虑运输成本、保险及关税等交易成本。在这些前提假定下，由于国际商品套购行为的存在， “一价定律”（Law of One Price）成立。
即：
ρ＋ ρ i*=i－i*， ρ与 i*都为分数，两者的乘积为“二阶小量”，只要不出现大幅度的货币贬值或高通货膨胀故，可省略ρ i*，故可得到：
ρ≈ i－i* 这就是抛补利率平价的一般形式。
（二）抛补利率平价的经济含义
汇率的远期升贴水率等于两国货币利率差。如果本国利率高于外国利率，本币在远期贬值，本国利率低于外国利率，本币在远期将升值。即远期差价是由各国利率差异决定的，并且高利率货币在外汇市场上表现为贴水，低利率货币在外汇市场上表现为升水。
抛补的利率平价是指在金融市场发达完善的情况下，投资者将套利与掉
期业务结合起来进行，利用两国利率之差在即期外汇市场和远期外汇市场同
时进行反向操作来套取利差的做法。大量的掉期业务的结果是低利率货币的
现汇汇率下浮，期汇汇率上浮；而高利率货币的现汇汇率上浮，期汇汇率下

国际经济学解析

《国际经济学》课程期末复习资料《国际经济学》课程讲稿章节目录：第一章绪论一、国际经济学的研究对象二、国际经济学理论的发展三、国际经济学课程的主要内容四、学习国际经济学的方法第二章古典国际贸易理论（重点）一、比较利益理论——绝对技术差异论二、比较利益理论——相对技术差异论三、比较利益理论——要素禀赋论四、比较利益理论的进一步发展第三章现代国际贸易理论（难点）一、规模经济与差异产品国际贸易理论二、相互倾销国际贸易理论三、外部规模经济与国际贸易四、重叠需求贸易理论五、产业内贸易与产业间贸易的衡量第四章国际贸易与利益分配（重点）一、国际贸易的福利分析二、生产要素价格和收入的短期变动三、生产要素价格的均等化第五章动态国际贸易理论一、生产要素的增长与国际贸易（重点）二、技术转移与国际贸易三、需求变动与国际贸易四、国际贸易与经济增长第六章对外贸易政策（重点）一、关税及其影响二、进口配额及其影响三、出口补贴及其福利影响四、倾销与反倾销五、其它非关税壁垒措施六、保护贸易理论第七章战略性贸易政策一、最佳关税论二、战略性贸易政策第八章国际经济一体化组织一、国际经济一体化组织的形式二、关税同盟理论（重点）三、国际经济一体化组织的实践第九章国际卡特尔的理论与实践（不考）一、垄断与贸易利益二、国际卡特尔理论三、国际卡特尔的实践第十章发展中国家的贸易政策与工业化一、发展中国家及其经济贸易现状二、扩大初级产品出口与稳定价格三、发展中国家贸易与经济发展战略（重点）第十一章国际贸易体系一、关税与贸易总协定的产生二、关税与贸易总协定的宗旨和基本原则三、关税与贸易总协定的多边贸易谈判四、世界贸易组织第十二章外汇与外汇市场一、外汇及汇率二、外汇市场三、汇率制度第十三章国际收支一、国际收支的概念二、国际收支的内容三、国际收支的平衡与失衡第十四章国际收支调整的弹性论（重点）一、马歇尔—勒纳条件二、货币贬值的时滞与J曲线效应三、现实世界的弹性估计四、弹性论的缺陷五、弹性论的一般均衡分析第十五章国际收支的收入调整论（重点和难点）一、乘数论二、吸收论第十六章国际收支调整的货币理论（重点和难点）一、价格—铸币流动机制二、固定汇率下国际收支调整的货币分析三、浮动汇率下的国际收支调整第十七章开放经济条件下的宏观经济政策（重点）一、政府宏观经济政策目标二、米德的内外均衡理论三、蒙代尔的政策搭配理论四、固定汇率制下财政政策和货币政策的作用效果五、浮动汇率制下财政政策和货币政策的作用效果六、固定汇率制与浮动汇率制对经济的稳定作用第十八章发展中国家的融资、债务和金融市场的开放（不考）一、发展中国家金融体制的特征二、发展中国家的引进外资及其债务危机三、发展中国家的金融危机第十九章国际资本流动（不考）一、资本流动纯理论：间接投资二、国际直接投资与跨国公司三、商品流动与资本流动的关系四、中国的外资引进第二十章劳动力的国际流动（不考）一、劳动力的国际流动概况二、劳动力流动的影响三、中国的人才外流问题一、客观部分：（单项选择、多项选择、不定项选择、判断）（一）、选择部分考核知识点:相对技术差异论参见讲稿章节：2-1附1.1.1（考核知识点解释）：即使一国处于绝对技术优势地位，另一国处于绝对技术劣势地位，只要存在价格差或机会成本的差别，就存在国际分工和贸易的基础和动力。

国际经济学第1章-精选文档38页

机会成本：为生产一单位某一产品所必需放弃的其他产品的产出数量—— 如X的机会成本为：-△Y/△X或 |dy/dx|
Y
O
X
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生产可能性曲线的三种情形
Y
Y
Y
O
O
XO
X
机会成本（-△Y/ △X ）递增、不变与递减
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X
16
商品市场均衡
取决于市场上商品相对价格
来自专业化的利益
相对价格不变条件下，由于生产专业化而获得的额外利益
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Y
c
F
E
O
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第三节：国际贸易的起因
完全竞争的世界
国际贸易
相对价格差
供给或需求差异
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没有贸易的假想世界
在完全竞争世界里，国际贸易建立在相对价格差基础上相对价格差建立在两国的生产可能性曲线或社会无差异曲线形状
A国X的过剩供给曲线与B国X的过剩需求曲线的交点即位X的国际均衡价格，位于贸易前两国的相对价格水平提供曲线
埃奇沃思与马歇尔提出米德给出了正式的严格的推导
贸易提供曲线表示在各种不同的贸易条件（或国际相对价格）下，一国为换取一定的进口商品而愿意为此提供的出口商品数量之间的各种可能组合。也就是一国愿意进行贸易时的各种贸易条件。
微观经济学原理是研究国际贸易相关问题的理论基础
实证分析与规范分析
(positive analysis)实证分析解决——是什么 (normative analysis)规范分析解决——应该是什么国际经济学中，较多采用实证分析而较少采用规范分析

国际经济学1-2章课件笔记

国际经济学（一）提取自陈爱贞老师的课件BY Clark绪论•主要参考文献:萨尔瓦多:《国际经济学》(第9版),清华大学出版社2008年.凯伯:《国际经济学》(第8版),机械工业出版社2002年.海闻等：《国际贸易》，格致出版社2003年。

•主要相关杂志：《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《世界经济》、《中国工业经济》、《国际贸易问题》、《American Economic Review》、《Journal of International Economics》、《International Economic Review》、《Journal of International Management》。

•主要统计年鉴：《中华人民共和国海关统计年鉴》、《中国统计年鉴》、《世界统计年鉴》、《国际统计年鉴》《中国对外经济统计年鉴》（2006年起改为《中国贸易外经统计年鉴》）、《中国对外经济贸易年鉴》。

•获取相关资料的网站：厦门大学图书馆中文和外文资料库、人大经济论坛、中华人民共和国商务部、中国经济学教育科研网。

•国际贸易分类标准（SITC）与国内使用的进出口商品分类标准（HS）不同，使用时需要统一口径。

•授课内容安排•第1章序言•第2章•第3章•第4章•第5章•第6章•第8章•第9章•第10章•第11章第1章序言•本章结构•开放条件下国际经济学的重要性•国际经济学是关于什么的学科•当前国际经济学的主要内容•当前国际经济面临的问题•当前中国对外贸易的主要问题开放条件下国际经济学的重要性•全球出口总额占全球GDP的比重从1993年的19％上升到2005年的28.8％。

•据海关统计，自2002年中国正式加入WTO以来，中国对外贸易增长速度连续六年保持在20%以上，进出口规模翻了两番。

•中国海关总署发布的统计数据表明，2007年，中国外贸进出口总额达2.1738万亿美元（2007年中国GDP为2.466万亿美元）；2008年，中国外贸进出口总额为2.5616万亿美元；2009年，2.2073万亿美元（2009年中国GDP为4.9093亿美元）.•联合国贸发会议2008年公布的《世界投资报告》表明，2007年，国际直接投资流量1.83万亿美元。

《国际经济学》(中文)教案-安徽财经大学(可编辑修改word版)

参考文献
【１】薛敬孝、佟家栋、李坤望主编：《国际经济学》，（北京）高等教育出版社，2000年版。
【２】华民著：《国际经济学》，（上海）复旦大学出版社，1998年版。
【３】［美］保罗·克鲁格曼、茅瑞斯·奥伯斯法尔德著：《国际经济学》，
（北京）中国人民大学出版社，1998年版。
课外作业及要求
1.李嘉图模型的基本结构。
重点难点及其处理
重点：
1.长、短期下关于生产要素流动性的假设，特定要素的含义。
2.特定要素模型。
3.商品价格变化对可自由流动要素与特定要素实际收入的影响。
4.短期内国际贸易对贸易国要素收入分配格局的影响。难点：
1.特定要素模型与要素禀赋模型的区别。
2.存在特定要素情况下的要素最佳配置、要素价格决定。
3.重叠需求理论的图示说明。
4.技术变化与技术差异。
5.维农的产品生命周期理论与技术变化。
6.产品生命周期理论的图示说明。
7.重叠需求理论与产品生命周期理论对国际贸易理论的贡献。
后记
内容
（标题）
第七章规模经济、不完全竞争与国际贸易
课时
３
教学目的及要求
本章的教学目的是，要求学生了解新贸易理论的研究角度、理论基础，了解规模经济的含义及规模经济在国际贸易中的重要性。重点掌握的内容包括外部规模经济在国际贸易中的决定作用、内部规模经济与不完全竞争市场结构下的产业内贸易形态，以及规模经济下的贸易利益的表现。在掌握基本理论的基础上，要求学生对新贸易理论与比较优势理论之间的区别有清醒的认识。在知识应用方面，要求学生能够根据市场结构的特点来分析、结实国际贸易中的一些新现象。
课外作业及要求
1.短期与特定要素的含义。
2.特定要素模型的假设与均衡解。

国际经济学第一章

19
整理ppt
20
❖ 类似E点的均衡点，不止一个，而有无限多个，所有这些点连成一条曲线，即契约线（图中没有显示出来）。在契约线上，任何一点都表示生产要素得到了充分利用，并且所有生产者都实现了利润最大化。
❖ 根据契约线上所有各点对应的X、Y的产出组合，可在图1— 2中绘制出表示X和Y各种可能组合的一条曲线，这条曲线就是生产可能性边界。它描述了一国的供给条件，即在一国的技术、要素总量和某一个产品（比如Y）的产出水平即定的情况下，另一产品（X）的最大产出或供应能力。
整理ppt
7
❖ 7.国际政策的协调国际经济学中一个重要问题是如何在不同国家的国际贸易和货币政策形成一种和谐.
❖ 8.国际资本市场国际资本市场的风险: ❖货币贬值 ❖违约
整理ppt
8
BACK
国际经济学:贸易与货币
❖ 国际贸易主要分析国际经济中的实物交易。
❖ 国际金融分析集中在国际经济的货币方面，就是金融交易比如购买外币。
整理ppt
32
（2）国际均衡价格
Px/Py
出口供给曲线（XS）表示当国际市场价格高于一国的均衡价格时，该国的出口价格与出口数量之间的关系。
Px/Py
A国过剩供给曲线
1
O (a)
X
O
(b)
图1-11
整理ppt
Xp-XC
33
进口需求曲线（import demand curve）
Px/Py
B、贸易对进口国消费者和生产者的效应
❖ 贸易后，消费者福利有何变化？ ❖ 贸易后，生产者福利有何变化？
整理ppt
44
P
PA Pw
0
S

国际经济学(董虹)

对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院研究生课程班期末考试试卷《国际经济学》授课教师：董虹课程班代码：学号：姓名：成绩：一、名词解释（每题5分，共35分）1.里昂惕夫之谜里昂惕夫运用投入产出分析法，对1947年美国出口行业和进口竞争行业的资本存量和工人数值进行了比较，却得出了相反的结论：美国出口的是劳动密集型产品，进口的是资本密集型产品。

2.贫困化增长当一国由于某种原因（一般总是单一要素供给的极大增长）使传统出口商品的出口规模极大增长，其结果是不仅导致该国贸易条件的严重恶化，该国国民福利水平绝对下降。

贫困化增长发生的前提有三：一是该国的商品出口在世界市场上占有较大份额；二是该国生产能力的增长主要集中在出口部门；三是国际市场对这种商品的需求弹性较低。

显然，对于一个发展国的开放经济来说，这三个条件是基本符合的，因而更加需要警惕出现经济的贫困化增长。

之所以发生贫困化增长，其原因在于技术进步或要素积累增加所导致的实际产出的增加有可能使价格贸易条件不利于正在增长的国家。

而且价格贸易条件恶化所造成的损失会超过产出增加所带来的收益，最终使该国的境况不如从前。

3.倾销倾销，是指一国（地区）的生产商或出口商以低于其国市场价格或低于成本价格将其商品抛售到另一国（地区）市场的行为。

对倾销的调查和确定，由对外贸易经济合作部负责。

是与政府对出口的建立制度相联系的。

倾销被视为一种不正当的竞争手段，为WTO所禁止，因此反倾销也成为各国保护本国市场，扶持本国企业强有力的借口和理由。

4.贸易创造效应所谓贸易创造，是指由于国际经济一体化组织成员国之间相互取消了关税和与关税具有同等效力的其他措施，造成了他们相互之间贸易规模的扩大和福利水平的提高。

贸易创造效应是指，由于关税同盟取消关税，成员国由原来自己生产并消费的高成本、高价格产品，转向购买成员国低成本、低价格的产品，从而使消费者节省开支，提高福利；提高生产效率，降低生产成本。

5.国际收支平衡表国际收支平衡表是反映一定时期一国同外国的全部经济往来的收支流量表。