小额信贷扶贫资金【外文翻译】
小额信贷的承诺【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文The microfinance promiseMaterial Source: Wharton Financial Istitution Author: Jonathan Morduch About one billion people globally live in households with per capita incomes of under one dollar per day. The policymakers and practitioners who have been trying to improve the lives of that billion face an uphill battle. Reports of bureaucratic sprawl and unchecked corruption abound. And many now believe that government assistance to the poor often creates dependency and disincentives that make matters worse, not better.Moreover, despite decades of aid,communities and families appear to be increasingly fractured, offering a fragile foundation on which to build.Amid the dispiriting news, excitement is building about a set of unusual financial institutions prospering in distant corners of the world-especially Bolivia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. The hope is that much poverty can be alleviated-and that economic and social structures can be transformed fundamentally-by providing financial services to low-income households. These institutions, united under the banner of microfinance, share a commitment to serving clients that have been excluded from the formal banking sector. Almost all of the borrowers do so to finance self-employment activities, and many start by taking loans as small as $75, repaid over several months or a year. Only a few programs require borrowers to put up collateral, enabling would-be entrepreneurs with few assets to escape positions as poorly paid wage laborers or farmers.Some of the programs serve just a handful of borrowers while others serve millions. In the past two decades, a diverse assortment of new programs has been set ur, in Africa. Asia. Latin Ainerica, Canada,and roughly 300 U.S. sites from New York Sari Diego (The Economist,1997). Globally, there are now about 8 to 10 million llouseholds served by microfinance programs, and some practitioners are pushing to expand to 100 million poor households by 2005.As James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, has been quick to point out, helping 100 million households means that as many as 500-600 million poor people could benefit. Increasing activity in the United States can be expected as banks turn tomicrofinance encouraged by new teeth added to the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (Timothy O'Brien 1998).The programs point to innovations like "group-lending" contracts and new attitudes about subsidies as the keys to their successes. Group-lending contracts effectively make a borrower's neighbors co-signers to loans, mitigating problems created by informational asymmetries between lender and borrower.Neighbors now have incentives to monitor each other and to exclude risky borrowers from participation, promoting repayments even in the absence of collateral requirements.The contracts have caught the attention of economic theorists, and they have brought global recognition to the group-lending model of Bangladesh's Grameen Bank.The lack of public discord is striking.Microfinance appears to offer a "winwin" solution, where both financial institutions and poor clients profit. The first installment of a recent five-part series in the San Francisco Examiner, for example, begins with stories about four women helped by microfinance: a textile distributor in Ahmedabad, India; a street vendor in Cairo, Egypt; an artist in Albuquerque, New Mexico; and a furniture maker in Northern California.The story continues: From ancient slums and impoverished villages in the developing world to the tired inner cities and frayed suburbs of America's economic fringes, these and millions of other women are all part of a revolution. Some might call it a capitalist revolution . . . As little as $25 or $50 in the developing world,perhaps $500 or $5000 in the United States,these microloans make huge differences in people's lives . Many Third World bankers are finding that lending to the poor is not just a good thing to do but is also profitable(Brill ，1999).Advocates who lean left highlight the "bottom-up" aspects, attention to community,focus on women, and, most importantly,the aim to help the underserved.It is no coincidence that the rise of inicrofinance parallels the rise of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in policy circles and the newfound attention to "social capital" by academics (e.g.,Robert Putnam ，1993). Those who lean right highlight the prospect of alleviating poverty while providing incentives to work, the nongovernmental leadership,the use of mechanisms disciplined by market forces, and the general suspicion of ongoing subsidization.There are good reasons for excitementabout the promise of microfinance,especially given the political context, but there are also good reasons for caution. Alleviating poverty through banking is an old idea with a checkered past.Poverty alleviation through the provision of subsidized credit was a centerpiece of many countries' development strategies from the early 1950s through the 1980s, but these experiences were nearly all disasters. Loan repayment rates often dropped well below 50 percent; costs of subsidies ballooned;and much credit was diverted to the politically powerful, away from the intended recipients (Dale Adams, Douglas Graham, and J. D. von Pischke ，1984).What is new? Although very few programs require collateral, the major new programs report loan repayment rates that are in almost all cases above 95 percent. The programs have also proven able to reach poor individuals, particularly women, that have been difficult to reach through alternative approaches.Nowhere is this more striking than in Bangladesh, a predominantly Muslim country traditionally viewed as culturally conservative and male-dominated.The programs there together serve close to five million borrowers, the vast majority of whom are women, and, in addition to providing loans, some of the programs also offer education on health issues, gender roles, and legal rights.The new programs also break from the past by eschewing heavy government involvement and by paying close attention to the incentives that drive efficient performance.But things are happening fast-and getting much faster. In 1997, a high profile consortium of policymakers,charitable foundations, and practitioners started a drive to raise over $20 billion for microfinance start-ups in the next ten years (Microcredit Summit Report ，1997).Most of those funds are being mobilized and channeled to new, untested institutions, and existing resources are being reallocated from traditional poverty alleviation programs to microfinance.With donor funding pouring in,practitioners have limited incentives to step back and question exactly how and where monies will be best spent.The promise of microfinance was founded on innovation: new management structures, new contracts,and new attitudes. The leading programs came about by trial and error.Once the mechanisms worked reasonably well, standardization and replication became top priorities, with continued innovation only around the edges.As a result, most programs are not optimally designed nor necessarily offering the most desirable financial products.While the group-lending contract is the most celebrated innovation in microfinance,all programs use a variety of other innovations that may well be as important, especially various forms of dynamic incentives and repayment schedules. In this sense, economic theory on inicrofinance (which focuses nearly exclusively on group contracts) is also ahead of the evidence.A portion of donor money would be well spent quantifying the roles of these overlapping mechanisms and supporting efforts to determine less expensive combinations of mechanisms to serve poor clients in varying contexts. New management structures, like the stripped-down structure of Bangladesh's Association for Social Advancement, may allow sharp costcutting.New products, like the flexible savings plan of Bangladesh's Safesave,may provide an alternative route to financial sustainability while helping poor households. The enduring lesson of microfinance is that mechanisms matter:the full promise of microfinance can only be realized by returning to the early commitments to experimentation,innovation, and evaluation.The microfinance movement has made inroads around the world. In the process, poor households are being given hope and the possibility to improve their lives through their own labor.But the "win-win" rhetoric promising poverty alleviation with profits has moved far ahead of the evidence, and even the most fundamental claims remain unsubstantiated.Even if the current enthusiasms ebb,the movement has demonstrated the importance of thinking creatively about mechanism design, and it is forcing economists to rethink much received wisdom about the nature of poverty,markets, and institutional innovation. In the end, this may prove to be the most important legacy of the movement.In particular, the movement has shown that, despite high transactions costs and no collateral, in some cases it is possible to lend profitably to low-income households. The experiences have shown as well that many relatively poor households can save in quantity when given attractive saving vehicles; this suggests that one way to address the borrowing constraints faced by poor households may be to address saving constraints instead of addressing just the credit side. But the experiences have also confirmed how difficult it is to create new institutions, even those that are ultimately profitable. In Bolivia,Bangladesh, and Indonesia it took strong leadership and special legal accommodations.Elsewhere, it has taken persistent prodding by donors and microfinance advocates. Demonstration effects and subsidized experimentation have also been integral.The microfinance movement has also lifted the profile of NGOs. While government failures become increasingly evident, NGOs have had the energy,dedication, and financial resources to pursue required legislative changes and institutional experimentation. Increasingly,NGOs can be expected to take over social tasks once the exclusive domain of state ministries, and international organizationslike the World Bank are adapting accordingly.This is all new, but some received wisdom holds. Most important, all else the same it remains far more costly to lend small amounts of money to many people than to lend large amounts to a few. As a result, the programs are highly cost-sensitive, and most rely on subsidies. Initiating a serious discussion about next steps necessitates first facing up to the exaggerated claims for financial performance that have characterized some leaders in the movement.If the movement plans not to abandon the promise of substantial poverty alleviation through finance, it must make hard choices. One avenue is to take another hard look at management structures and mechanism design in order to lower costs while maintaining outreach. Doing so will be far from simple,and it is hard to imagine substantial progress without a second major wave of innovation. Donors can contribute by encouraging further experimentation and evaluation, rather than just replication and adherence to a narrow set of "best practices" based on existing programs.The other path is to reopen the conversation on ways that ongoing subsidies can benefit both clients and institutions. The movement has shown some successes in coupling efficient operations with subsidized resources, and these lessons can be expanded. Some observers speculate that if subsidies are pulled and costs cannot be reduced, as many as 95 percent of current programs will eventually have to close shop. The remaining 5 percent will be drawn from among the larger programs, and they will help fill gaps in financial markets.But, extrapolating from current experience,the typical clients of these financially sustainable programs will be less poor than those in the typical program focused sharply on poverty alleviation.No one argues seriously that financebased programs will be the answer for truly destitute households, but the promise remains that microfinance may be an important aid for households that are not destitute but still remain considerably below poverty lines. The tension is that the scale of lending to this group is not likely to permit the scale economies available to programs focused on households just above poverty lines.Subsidizing may yield greater social benefits than costs here, and a framework for integrating competing arguments.This prospect is exciting, especially given the dearth of appealing alternatives,but the promise of microfinance should be kept in context. Even in the best of circumstances, credit from microfinance programs helps fund selfemployment activities that most often supplement income for borrowers ratherthan drive fundamental shifts in employment patterns. It rarely generates new jobs for others, and success has been especially limited in regions with highly seasonal income patterns and low population densities. The best evidence to date suggests that making a real dent in poverty rates will require increasing overall levels of economic growth and employment generation.Microfinance may be able to help some households take advantage of those processes,but nothing so far suggests that it will ever drive them.Still, by forging ahead in the face of skepticism, microfinance programs now provide promise for millions of households.Even critics have been inspired by this success. The time is right for assessing next steps with candor-and better evidence.译文小额信贷的承诺资料来源: 沃顿金融金融作者：Jonathan Morduch 全球大约有10亿人在家庭人均收入每天少于一美元的情况下生活。
小额贷款外文翻译文献
文献信息文献标题：An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities （小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究）文献作者：Jonathan Kimmitt， Mariarosa Scarlata，Dimo Dimov文献出处：《Venture Capital》 ,2016,18(3):257–276字数统计：英文3661单词，21609字符；中文6504汉字外文文献An empirical investigation of the interplay between microcredit, institutional context, and entrepreneurial capabilities Abstract Understanding under which conditions microcredit is used by new, growing ventures is becoming increasingly pertinent to scholars. This paper investigates the interplay of the use of microcredit with entrepreneurial capabilities and the moderating role of institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa. Our findings show that higher constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities are associated with higher use of microcredit. In addition, we find that new, growing ventures use microcredit more where either economic or political institutions are less developed. Our findings suggest the importance of the existence of some type of institutional strength that must be in place to form the basis for microcredit activity. This allows for speculation as to whether microcredit works as the literature currently assumes.KEYWORDS: Capabilities; entrepreneurial finance; institutions; microfinance1.IntroductionEntrepreneurial activity is strongly influenced by the context it is embedded in (Baumol 1990, 1993; Autio and Acs 2010; Welter 2011). Particularly in emerging markets, entrepreneurs face a number of challenges, such as the mixed success ofinnovation (Bradley et al. 2012), weak institutions (Acemoglu 2003), and low human capital levels (Acs and Virgill 2010). One particular challenge for these entrepreneurs is access to finance (Honohan 2007) which can lead them into “poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996), ultimately undermining their ability to freely choose among options (Gries and Naudé 2011) and pursue the goals they value (Alkire 2005). A financial sector that is well developed, on the contrary, would give them the instrumental capability to more adequately participate in economic exchange (Sen 1999; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007).To respond to funding challenges that particularly characterize developing economies, the provision of microfinance to entrepreneurs has been regarded as an important part of the strategy through which livelihoods could be improved (Mair and Marti 2006; Peredo and Mclean 2006; Khavul 2010). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) pursue profit-making strategies that facilitate and support the ongoing activity of capital provision to entrepreneurs while also trying to extend their services and drive outreach (Morduch 1999; Fernando 2006). By providing microcredit, savings, insurance, and retirement plans, individuals are able to obtain capital which can be used to finance the creation and the survival of new ventures (Campbell 2010; Khavul 2010). As such, microcredit allows entrepreneurs to build assets and economic resources, while creating employment opportunities and services for local communities (Helms 2006). This can ultimately have an effect on individuals’ capabilities and the contexts entrepreneurs operate in (Mair and Marti 2009).Current debates in the microcredit and microfinance literature have focused on the dynamics through which microcredit is deployed, particularly to women, as well as its effectiveness (cfr. among others Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Milanov, Justo, and Bradley 2015; Chliova, Brinckmann, and Rosenbusch 2015), how microfinance institutions function (cfr. among others, Morduch 1999; Armendariz and Morduch 2007) as well as their level of sustainability (cfr. among others, Gonzalez-Vega 1994; Morduch 2000), and their ability to shape the context they operate in (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013). Research has also indicated that institutional quality determines theperformance of MFIs in periods of financial crisis (Silva and Chávez 2015) and that institutions influence how entrepreneurial finance is channeled to entrepreneurs in developing economies (Eid 2005). However, Beck (2007) and McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) indicate that small and medium-sized businesses, often called “missing middle,” offer high returns on investments in these contexts. Yet, they remain underserved financially and overlooked by researchers. We also know that empirical access to finance is a critical issue for firms in developing economies and microcredit is a particular type of high-risk debt which may not always be sought after (Hulme 2000; George 2005).In addition, if context shapes entrepreneurship and sets the boundaries for entrepreneurial action (Welter 2011), it is not clear (a) whether ventures using microcredit are those whose capabilities are constrained the most by the environment they operate in and (b) under which institutional conditions these ventures actually use microfinance to fund their business needs. The question about when and where entrepreneurs decide to pursue or forgo the option of using microfinance loans still remains unanswered (Khavul 2010). In this paper, we ask the following question: How do formal institutions shape the use of microcredit by firms with varying entrepreneurial capabilities? To answer these questions, our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit by firms in sub-Saharan Africa, characterized as a context with a high level of constrained capabilities. Often viewed as institutionally homogenous (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), we highlight the institutional heterogeneity of this context and the varying capabilities associated with it. We test predictions using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey, the Economic Freedom of the World Report index (2011), as well as the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2008). Our findings indicate that microcredit is indeed used in areas where individuals’ entrepreneurial capabilities are more constrained. At the same time, in these contexts, microcredit tends to be mostly used where there is either a well-developed market or a well-functioning political–judicial system which guarantee a minimal“rule of game”. It is only under those institutional conditions that firms, constrained by their capabilities, are prone to/can use microcredit to financetheir business activities.2.Theoretical backgroundSen’s (1999, 2005) “capabilities approach” introduced the notion that development should be conceptualized as freedoms, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their ability to act. Because individuals have ideas about the type of lives they want to live, they act in accordance with such aims (Sen 1999). Following the capabilities approach, antecedents and consequences of individual circumstances can be highlighted using non-monetary indicators: Capability constraints need to be understood with respect to the individual’s freedom, i.e., how and why individuals are able or constrained in their abilities to do or to be (Alkire 2005). In the capabilities approach, a person’s freedom refers to the genuine opportunity to realize whatever it is that they are trying to achieve (Alkire 2005). This, in turn, determines“what they do” (Anand et al. 2009). Building on Sen’s (1999) argument, Nambiar (2013) further reports that capabilities are synonymous with individuals feeling constrained or enabled by their immediate circumstances, whereas Robeyns (2005), Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) indicate that it is an individual’s environment which creates heterogeneities in capabilities. Severely restricted capabilities are therefore associated with an inability to act in accordance with ones’ aims.Prior work shows that context is particularly important in shaping entrepreneurial capabilities: By setting boundaries, it can be the space for the emergence of opportunities while also placing limitations upon them (Welter 2011; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013). Context influences enterprising activities at the intersection of different levels of analysis, situating theories, and empirical patterns within their natural settings (Zahra, Wright, and Abdelgawad 2014). Evans (2002) and Sen (1999), among others, indicate that the institutional context indeed influences capability development. Both Sen (2005) and Nussbaum (2000) explain that expanding individual freedoms are central to advancing capabilities; this expansion is guided by institutional frameworks. The proposition here is thatinstitutional development impacts freedoms, such as those related to economic opportunities, property, finance, and other basic services (Stiglitz 1998; Nussbaum 2000), and this impacts capability development. On the one hand, as Robeyns (2005) reports, the capabilities of entrepreneurs require appreciating that there are heterogeneities in their abilities to achieve their aims. On the other hand, institutional failure can increase transaction costs which limit the appropriability of entrepreneurial rents, reducing the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities and leading to suppression of entrepreneurial activity (Baker, Gedajlovic, and Lubatkin 2005).The development of financial institutions, which provide adequate financial services, is categorized by Sen (1999) as an instrumental capability. Contexts where financial institutions are underdeveloped contribute to the creation of“poverty traps” (Berthelemy and Varoudakis 1996) as it reduces the perceived attractiveness of entrepreneurial opportunities. This, in turn, hinders the ability of individuals to adequately participate in economic exchange and overall capabilities (Sen 1999). Microcredit developed in contexts characterized by limited access to resources (Peredo and Chrisman 2006) as a solution for individuals who are constrained by the environment, which inhibits the pursuit of lucrative opportunities (Sen 2005). As such, microcredit acts as a means toward the expansion of entrepreneurs’ capabilities (Ansari, Munir, and Gregg 2012) who can incrementally improve their capabilities of achieving small-scale solutions to macro social problems (Moyo 2009). This leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis:Hypothesis 1. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where capabilities are constrained.Hypothesis 2. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where economic institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 3. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit where political-judicial institutions are less developed.Hypothesis 4. New ventures are more likely to use microcredit in environments characterized by high constrained capabilities where economic institutions are more(less) developed and political-judicial institutions less (more) developed.3.MethodologyTo test our hypotheses, we used data by the World Bank through its annual Enterprise Survey. We focused on countries in sub-Saharan Africa since this has been consistently depicted as one of the areas with seriously restricted capabilities. In particular, the World Bank (2012) reports an increase in sub-Saharan urban population by 114% between 1990 and 2009, and an increase in people living with less than $1 a day by 183%; also, the average life expectancy at birth results to be 52.5 years, compared with 71.5 years for North Africa and 69.2 years for the world. Still, the prevalence of HIV for people aged 15–49 is nearly 7 times the world’s average (World Bank 2012).Twenty-seven sub-Saharan countries were included in the survey. The enterprise surveys collect firm level information on the business environment, how it is perceived by individual firms, how it changes over time, and the various constraints to firm performance and growth (World Bank 2011). Firm-level data are available from 2002; however, since data prior to 2006 were collected by different units within the World Bank and employed different survey questions for different countries, our analysis focuses on data collected from 2006. In addition, the enterprise survey is addressed to operating businesses that employ a minimum of five employees; this eliminates most of the subsistence-driven and self-employment forms of entrepreneurship, something that Karnani (2007) has defined as “misguiding” in that the focus on subsistence entrepreneurship does not help us in understanding and/or explaining economic development. Similarly, Mead and Liedholm (1998) have shown that within an African context, small and medium-sized enterprises generate significantly more jobs than larger scale enterprises yet remain chronically underfunded. By concentrating on ventures with five or more employees, we are able to focus on the“missing middle” of the microfinance sector which have the greatest potential for driving economic growth and is consistently under-researched (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002). To date, this is a group of entrepreneurs who havereceived sparse attention within the microfinance literature, which has heavily focused on microfinance institutions themselves rather than on recipients of their services (cfr. among others, Mair and Marti 2006; Moss, Neubam, and Meyskens 2015; Silva and Chávez 2015).For what concerns our conceptualization of entrepreneurship as new ventures, consistent with prior research in both developed and developing countries, we limited our analysis to those firms that were not part of larger firms and were less than 10 years old (Benson 2001; Fadahunsi and Rosa 2002; Reuber and Fischer 2002; Barnir, Gallaugher, and Auger 2003; Park and Bae 2004; Bhagavatula et al. 2010). Based on these parameters, our sample size for analysis was 5255 of the 16847 firms in the original Enterprise Survey data set.4.Discussion, limitations, and future researchScholars have consistently linked entrepreneurial activity with economic growth. However, in developing countries, individuals often lack the capabilities to access the market and obtain capital to fund new business opportunities. Acknowledging these challenges, microcredit developed to provide small amount of loans to allow such individuals to efficiently engage in economic exchange and build their ventures, thus making wider economic contributions (Mcmullen 2011). However, entrepreneurship researchers have argued that contextual factors, both at the individual and institutional level, augment entrepreneurial activity (Baumol 1990; Estrin, Korostelevab, and Mickiewiczc 2013).This paper highlights the contextual conditions under which new, growing ventures use microcredit. These ventures are classified as the“missing middle” and have been overlooked by mainstream academic research and practitioners’ work, where a focus has been on individuals receiving microcredit for subsistence purposes and/or to develop micro-enterprises (Beck 2007). Yet, we know that microcredit developed as a solution to offer individuals the necessary financial instruments that would enable building entrepreneurial capabilities by developing new businesses. As such, this “missing middle” represents smaller firms within developing economiesthat have limited financial options even though they may offer returns on investments in these contexts (McKenzie and Woodruff 2008) and potentially provide much more significant economic externalities in terms of job and wealth creation (Karnani 2007). Although the term “missing middle” has been used for some time, there is very little research on this group of firms even though they are becoming a more prominent part of the microfinance picture and have a more significant economic impact than their micro counterparts (Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013).Because sub-Saharan Africa is a region characterized by high constraints to individual capabilities and little attention has been paid to heterogeneity of capabilities across the continent (Rivera-Santos et al. 2015), our empirical analysis focuses on the use of microcredit in“missing middle” ventures in such countries. Specifically, we examine the degree to which microcredit is utilized by new ventures as a function of the country’s institutional environment, measured as the development of economic and political institutions, and of the degree of constraints to a firm’s capabilities, measured by the fruitfulness of the commercial environment. We then argue that microcredit is more likely to be used by those ventures that have higher restrictions to their capabilities only when there is some institutional arrangement, either at an economic or political–judicial level that sets “the rules of the game.”Our empirical results suggest that microcredit is indeed used by these new, missing middle ventures in contexts that present challenges both at the firm and institutional level of analysis. The identification of a positive effect between the use of microcredit and the constraints to entrepreneurial capabilities reinforces Sen’s (1999) view and the notion that microcredit facilitates access to capital for those entrepreneurs that operate in regions with the most restricted capabilities. However, our results also show this happens only when there are appropriate supporting institutional mechanisms, further suggesting that contextual features of the institutional environment shape microfinance activity. Particularly, the use of microcredit by the“missing middle” increases in contexts characterized by restricted capabilities and either (a) well (less) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions or (b) less (well) developed economic (political–judicial) institutions. Theunderdevelopment of economic institutions can prevent entrepreneurs from forming contracts, ultimately increasing business uncertainty and compounding their ability to create wealth (Seelos and Mair 2007). This is theoretically consistent with the Mair and Marti (2009) argument who assert that MFIs act as institutional entrepreneurs in contexts of institutional weakness left open by underdeveloped economic institutions. Similarly, contexts where political–judicial institutions are characterized by high levels of corruption raise the fundamental threat of rent and asset expropriation, generating uncertainty in the business environment. This uncertainty undermines entrepreneurial aspirations of individuals and has a stronger effect on new ventures than on established ones (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In such contexts, institutions in charge of transferring resources to one party to another, and designed to serve on behalf of the government or the people (including, thus, the government itself ), may not be answerable to their principals.However, our results also do show that we should consider the interaction between development of economic and political institutions to fully understand the use of microcredit by new, growing firms and that heterogeneity of capabilities drives such relationship. Particularly, microcredit may help shape institutional contexts characterized by heterogeneous capabilities, but foundational institutional support is needed in order to tackle such capability problems. Whereas prior work (Mair and Marti 2006; Mair, Marti, and Ventresca 2012; Khavul, Chavez, and Bruton 2013) has indicated that microcredit is used in contexts where only economic institutions are to be developed, our work shows that there must be some formal institutional political framework in place for entrepreneurs to use microcredit in such contexts. Without it, the developmental role of microcredit may be overstated.At the same time, we also show that microcredit is used in contexts where there is development of economic institutions. Yet, we identify that the use of microcredit is to be found in contexts with stronger economic institutions and weak political ones. It is precisely this interaction between developed economic institutions and underdevelopment of political ones that the literature has not addressed this far. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw the distinction between extractive and inclusiveinstitutions, arguing that extractive contexts (e.g., autocratic rule/weak governance) can have strong economic institutions. However, because these are less open politically, they may deter potentially novel businesses that spur economic growth. If microcredit is utilized by capability-constrained firms in potentially extractive contexts, this suggests that the entrepreneurial activity being stimulated, even within the “missing middle”, may be less productive for economic development (Baumol 1990). Our work, therefore, highlights the institutional conditions within which microcredit is used to fund the development of new entrepreneurial opportunities: if less favorable political contexts may lead entrepreneurs to capture opportunities which are less conducive to the overall development of the economy, the impact of microcredit in these nations may be somehow minimalistic. Conversely, in more politically inclusive economies, microcredit may help spur the creation of more competitive and innovative markets which can help diversify markets beyond the basic services (e.g., food goods, provisions) often provided (Banerjee 2007). As such, the relationship between the nature of the institutional environment and the type of business opportunity pursued in the microfinance industry would be an interesting avenue for further study. Indeed, further study needs to dig deeper into the role of informal institutions in this process.Overall, this encourages us to consider whether the relationship between microcredit, entrepreneurship, and capabilities works as the literature currently assumes – microcredit is used by entrepreneurs in the most resource constrained environments where only economic institutions are to be shaped. As such, our findings suggest a more complex picture than extant research currently suggests and contribute to a better understanding of the use of microcredit at the level of the firm receiving it (Silva and Chávez 2015), with a need to consider institutional heterogeneities both within and across developing countries (Roth and Kostova 2003) and the interaction between a complex constellation of factors of institutions and capabilities (Nambiar 2013). It is therefore of key importance for future work to understand the dynamics through which microcredit is developed in contexts characterized by political institutional weakness. From a political perspective, mostresearch has focused on the role of regulation in the microfinance sector (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2011) without considering the other aspects of political institutions we have theorized, and empirically identified, here. This would help scholars and practitioners alike in gaining a better understanding how microcredit works in varying political environments.From a policy perspective, our findings which suggest that new ventures need some level of institutional support to be able to pursue and fulfill their entrepreneurial aspirations, something that has strong implications given the recent political upheaval in North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa. In post-conflict contexts, often characterized by the lowest level of capability development, and where political institutions (or economic ones) are still in the process of being redefined and shaped, the intervention of MFIs may be of key importance in stimulating entrepreneurial activity and the economy in some of the most challenging contexts. Emerging evidence suggests that many nations in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond are developing the appropriate institutions through which financial institutions can stimulate the private sector (Naudé 2010). Microcredit could be an appropriate tool for augmenting entrepreneurial activity in those environments where individuals lack the basic individual and institutional infrastructure to fulfill their aspirations. As such, the ability of entrepreneurs to have access to improved instrumental capabilities is likely to be shaped by how varying institutional arrangements support them, determining where investors see scalable operations and therefore the diversity of financial services at the disposal of entrepreneurs.Aside from the contribution and further reflection that our results stimulate, there are limitations to our study that need to be considered in any further extrapolation from our results. First, the study was cross sectional in nature and, as such, cannot make a reliable inference on the direction of the interplay between the effectiveness of the provision of microcredit on capabilities or on the institutional development over time. The nature of our data enabled us to study only the use of microcredit as a function of capability constraints, but a promising and much needed extension of the work concerns the reverse relationship, i.e., how the use of microcredit helps inimproving entrepreneurial capabilities. Second, while large-scale data are difficult to collect on this topic, the availability of the enterprise survey has enabled us to throw a glimpse at the use of microcredit across a large group of African countries. At the same time, as is true for any secondary data set, the data offer limited insight into the conditions and rationale under which microcredit was (or was not) obtained. We hope that our insights can stimulate further research that would seek to elucidate this mechanism through more suitable research designs.中文译文小额信贷、制度环境与创业能力之间相互作用的实证研究摘要学者们越来越多关注，在哪种条件下，小额信贷才会被新的、成长中的企业所使用。
农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献
农村金融小额信贷中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)RURAL FINANCE: MAINSTREAMING INFORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSBy Hans Dieter SeibelAbstractInformal financial institutions (IFIs), among them the ubiquitous rotating savings and credit associations, are of ancient origin. Owned and self-managed by local people, poor and non-poor, they are self-help organizations which mobilize their own resources, cover their costs and finance their growth from their profits. With the expansion of the money economy, they have spread into new areas and grown in numbers, size and diversity; but ultimately, most have remained restricted in size, outreach and duration. Are they best left alone, or should they be helped to upgradetheir operations and be integrated into the wider financial market? Under conducive policy conditions, some have spontaneously taken the opportunity of evolving into semiformal or formal microfinance institutions (MFIs). This has usually yielded great benefits in terms of financial deepening, sustainability and outreach. Donors may build on these indigenous foundations and provide support for various options of institutional development, among them: incentives-driven mainstreaming through networking; encouraging the establishment of new IFIs in areas devoid of financial services; linking IFIs/MFIs to banks; strengthening Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as promoters of good practices; and, in a nonrepressive policy environment, promoting appropriate legal forms, prudential regulation and delegated supervision. Key words: Microfinance, microcredit, microsavings。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译the XXX credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)。
However。
micro enterprises (MEs) which are smaller than SMEs。
have been XXX。
using a path XXX finance。
such as family and friends。
due to the lack of access to formal finance。
Path dependence is also evident。
XXX finance.翻译：乌干达的小微企业融资：路径依赖和其他融资决策的决定因素XXX：Winifred XXX-XXX博士摘要：发展中国家的融资文献主要关注正规金融机构向中小型企业（SMEs）提供信贷的角色。
然而，小微企业（MEs）比SMEs更小，却被忽视了。
本文使用路径依赖框架，研究了乌干达小微企业的融资决策，识别了影响它们获得融资的因素。
研究发现，由于缺乏正规融资渠道，小微企业严重依赖非正规融资来源，如家人和朋友。
路径依赖也很明显，过去的融资决策和与非正规融资来源的关系影响了当前的融资决策。
本研究建议政策应着重改善小微企业获得正规融资的渠道，并促进金融素养，减少对非正规融资来源的依赖。
Access to credit is crucial for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro enterprises。
as they are considered to be the main drivers of economic growth。
In e countries。
XXX role than SMEs。
XXX-agricultural self-XXX。
XXX due to the way they are XXX。
刘颖会 外文翻译原文及译文
大连民族学院国际商学院英文翻译2007级毕业论文外文翻译资料Microfinance's Latest Growing Pains小额信贷业的发展阵痛《Knowledge Wharton》February 2nd 2011《沃顿知识》杂志 2011年2月2日译者：刘颖会大连民族学院国际商学院国际经济与贸易072班2011年6月小额信贷业发展阵痛近期的小额信贷危机源于印度南部城市安得拉邦，当地过度负债、暴力催款和借款者被迫自杀等问题引发了民众对小额信贷行业的广泛指责，并强烈呼吁政府加强监管。
10月，印度政府对损害信贷、强行控制回款天数并拖累印度最大的盈利性小额信贷公司SKS股价暴跌的小额信贷机构实施管制。
1月19日，印度储备银行发布Malegam委员会报告，建议对印度小额信贷机构施加一系列新的监管措施，包括设置利率上限、贷款限额以及对借款人的收入进行规定。
有些观察家对此表示欢迎，而悲观人士则认为此举难以避免信贷紧缩和行业崩溃。
尽管现在要分析行业前景还为时尚早，但安得拉邦的危机着实引发了民众对全球小额信贷行业的热烈讨论和深刻反省。
近期在沃顿阿瑞斯高级管理教育学院小额信贷管理培训班上，讨论的焦点集中在过度信贷、高速的行业增长以及如何在追求利润的同时更好地实现小额信贷的设立宗旨。
小额信贷业经历了一场由坏账“大地震”所引发的“痛苦的觉醒”，26名来自全球各地的社会财富计划参与者之一Kamran Azim在一堂主题为小额信贷业的增长与可持续发展的讨论中如此比喻道。
Azim是创立于1996年的巴基斯坦拉合尔小额信贷机构Kashf 基金的运营总监。
他指出，过去20到30年间，小额信贷的方式方法几乎都没有发生过变化。
但现在，突然之间，这个行业经历了一场地震。
正如该培训计划中一门课程的导言所说：“面对不断加速的变革，人们趋向于依赖传统的方式进行商业发展。
然而，正是在这样的时刻，创新方显得尤为重要。
”此外，几名学员也指出，小额信贷行业必须在兼顾客户需求的同时通过创新的方式来巩固发展。
小额贷款与创业能力中英文对照外文翻译文献
小额贷款与创业能力中英文对照外文翻译文献1. 简介创业活动受到其所处环境的强烈影响（Baumol，1990，1993；Autio 和Acs，20XX年；Welter，20XX年）。
特别是在新兴市场，企业家面临着诸多挑战，例如创新成败参半（Bradley 等，20XX 年）、制度薄弱（Acemoglu，20XX年）和人力资本水平低下（Acs 和Virgill，20XX年）。
这些企业家面临的一个特别挑战是获得资金的机会(Honohan，20XX年)，这可能导致他们陷入“贫困陷阱”(Berthelmy 和Varoudakis，1996)，最终削弱了他们自由选择的能力(Gries 和Naudé，20XX年)和追求价值目标的能力(Alkire，20XX年)。
相反，一个发展良好的金融部门将使他们有能力更充分地参与到经济交流中（Sen，1999；Beck、Demirgüç-Kunt 和Levine，20XX年）。
为了应对发展中经济体特有的融资挑战，向企业家提供小额信贷已被视为可以改善生计战略的一个重要组成部分（Mair 和Marti，20XX年；Peredo 和Mclean，20XX年；Khavul，20XX年）。
小额信贷机构（MFIs）追求盈利战略，促进和1/ 7支持向企业家提供资本的持续活动，同时努力扩大服务范围，并推动外联（Morduch，1999；Fernando，20XX年）。
通过提供小额信贷、储蓄、保险和退休计划，个人能够获得资金，用于资助新企业的创建和生存（Campbell，20XX年；Khavul，20XX 年）。
因此，因此，小额信贷使企业家能够建立资产和经济资源，同时为当地社区创造就业机会和服务（Helms 20XX年）。
这最终可能会对个人能力和企业家的经营环境产生影响（Mair 和Marti，20XX年）。
目前关于小额信贷和小额融资的文献中的辩论侧重于小额信贷的部署动态，特别是对女性的小额信贷及其有效性（参见Mair、Marti 和Ventresca，20XX年；Milanov、Justo 和Bradley，20XX年；Chliova、Brinckmann 和Rosenbusch，20XX年），小额信贷机构如何运作（参见Morduch，1999；Armendariz 和Morduch，20XX年）小额信贷的可持续发展水平（参见Gonzalez-Vega，1994；Morduch，20XX年），以及小额信贷塑造其运作环境的能力（参见Mair 和Marti，20XX年；Khavul、Chavez 和Bruton，20XX年）。
小额贷款公司经营风险外文文献翻译最新译文
文献出处：M Swan. The study on the operating risk prevention of small Loan Companies [J]. Decision Support Systems, 2015，12(4): 828-838.原文The study on the operating risk prevention of small Loan CompaniesM SwanAbstractSmall Loan Company is still in its infancy. Just in the process of its establishment and continuously explore, suffered a lot from themselves and the environment problems. As the regulators in the financial markets and relevant scholars, on how to locate small loan companies, how to make small loan companies play a real role in the national economy is full of concern. Small loan company capital source channel is narrow. Mechanisms involved in microfinance planning period is not long, after internal personnel practice survey, random diffusion time or disturbing both inside and outside conditions. Whether internal standard units or departments, professional analysis for such enterprises in the financial markets of rapid infiltration and perpetuate problems have been attached great importance to. As folk further liberalization of the capital market, therefore, small loan companies the management risk and financial risk is increasingly highlighted.Keywords: Small loan companies; Risk management; Control to prevent1 IntroductionIn the operation of small loan companies in the various risk, especially in its operation risk management tends to bring to the company a lot of difficult to estimate the trouble, so how to discover, to summarize these appear in running the root cause of the risk management, it is more important, after find out root cause, according to the scientific and effective methods for these problems existing in the management risk of classified division, to make small loans in the operation of the company's future operation and management of risks for effective, systematic, scientific prevention. Most scholars, according to the theory of small loan companies run the risk and prevention countermeasures of research, mainly concentrated in all kinds of risk and risk analysis is put forward, put small loan companies this new industrycompared with other financial industry environment, in the concrete for small loan companies on risk management in the operation of the fundamental problems, and how to guard against these problems has not conducted detailed discussed and countermeasures, and only in small loans risk aspects of problems in the operation of the company in theory emphasizes the overall risk of small loan companies and prevention. In the operation of small loan companies in the various risk, especially in its operation risk management tends to bring to the company a lot of difficult to estimate the trouble, so how to discover, summed up in these. The root cause of the risk management in the operation of, is all the more important, after find out root cause, according to the scientific and effective means to these problems existing in the management risk of classified division, to make small loans in the operation of the company's future operation and management of risks for effective, systematic, scientific prevention.2 Risk and risk managementSo-called hidden risks in small loan companies operating activities, mainly in the specific planning period internal profit performance on derivatives with the default index of conflicting phenomenon, especially given risk loss of effect. Combining normative power relatively broad regulatory body Angle of observation, the symptoms mainly joint mechanism disorders, loss events and the concrete performance of the amount of loss data. Under the background of this kind of developing system management, strategic planning can be established targets more completely, which along with all the fluctuations of will appropriate to eliminate, or make the disturbing factors have condition remains inside the company can accept the reasonable space structure, so as to strengthen the organization interest charge ability. Set of small loan companies, this article mainly emphasized by supervision, legal person or organization in the society structure transition to reverse the operation, one for the public deposits were rejected, hope to be able to operate in microfinance project implement profit motive for a long time under the control indicators. Need special attention is, the need to accept the country specific regulatory legal department, under the premise that the arrangement of all business, profit and loss or risk ofconflict will be borne by the company leadership comprehensive, and any shareholder will direct retain significant asset management personnel selection and accurate maintenance right content such as earnings results. After all these there is essential difference between companies and Banks, not synchronous open deposit business, will therefore shall be regarded as more formal financial management unit.The so-called risk management problem, that is, any enterprise during the period of Foreign Service accordingly to keep conflict prediction results and the prevention and control means, excluding the above factors still excessive crisis situation. Now comprehensive perfect the internal financial market regulation system in our country, but such risks does not2.1 Market riskIn its depth of stress is that when a specific enterprise marketing mode hidden conflicts hidden premise for market competition, the core area and actual occupy the share of late will produce certain gap preset indexes and as a result, under this background, a specific commodity technology innovation preparation procedure will breed a disorder or scale effect, which is difficult to cause the public recognition. Question on this part of the risk detailed analysis the following contents: first, the demand for consumer self satisfaction biased forecast results. Actually in such trouble enterprise product styles are different, but the late consumer activity development would be struggling, as for when to break free from the shackles of established the shackles of thinking is much more difficult to provide accurate answers. Second, the distortion of market core competitive power. In this kind of technology challenges of the corporate sector are often consumers and market regulators to double review, including the internal capital adequacy, executive’s comprehensive technical ability and moral quality level and finally improve the quality of our products means. At a particular stage based on enterprise competitive potential certification is trouble until trouble troubles you. Finally, the market demand curve from time to time. Market and product structure change activities must maintain synchronization effect, through heterogeneous mechanism connotation lap joint debugging, technical personnel will be left arbitrary cope with habits problem because of the weak.2.2 Technical riskRelative technical risk problems during the implementation of product shape transition depth, if you don't on any technical content cohesion, can make innovation activities. Such technical achievement to run from the initial transmission process through three levels, including scientific research experiments, quality testing and industrial structure promotion and so on, but the legacy of the potential risks will be more severe. During scientific research projects, the unit can content to cater to the preset standards are often difficult to conclude that negligence often because the operation subject facing failure situation. Mid-term test link, even the innovation product has production, but the public response to the information collection is not comprehensive, including side effects or ecosystem destruction in the planning process, etc. On this basis, to realize commercialization of research results will not be so easy. And large-scale production and sales stage, because the high-tech content in succession process has rough surface, make the products within the market to gain a foothold, especially under the condition of life is not long by the rest of the technology to replace the possibility is very high. So any a product no matter from the initial development stage for internal promotion is to the market and involving internal process is filled with all kinds of risk. In particular, technical risk mainly covers the detailed aspects: first, technology research and development activities extend range is not accurate verification; Second, the late in response to population fluctuations from time to time. Third, the market competition activity is participating in the lack of persistence.2.3 The financial riskIs mainly refers to project funding cannot achieve reasonable dredge out and make the result of the failure mechanism of innovation activities. Information funds for the financial position at risk enterprise how important, but in reality such enterprise expansion fund tends to have the following characteristics. First of all, the capital demand range is larger; Second, the concrete financing way too narrow. Late for venture enterprises economic benefits inherent fluctuation, makes any unit in to invest in its early after a long period of psychological war, so, its implementingoverall financing is still not enough reality. Financial control activities related to performance of the risk elements as follows: first, the financing sources and the number are difficult to textual research. Fortunately when such companies to adapt to the development stage, especially along with the expansion of business scope, make internal capital demand quantity full boom, if still can not get money as it should be within the prescribed period of time the number of support, will lose industry competitive advantage, eventually be eliminated by times. Second, money supply timeliness position shakes. Risk enterprises need to rely on money supply mechanism transition reform task, especially in well-funded, aging characteristics influence premise, despite the results spectacular gains phase, but may also be because cash shortage and make both industrial chain break, enabling enterprises to edge back intoa rout.2.4 Manage riskSpecific enterprise due to the default response mechanism in the process of implementation of the project planning result error and influence department reputation foundation, makes the development prospect of the late of blank, this kind of phenomenon also is late investment risk control activities need to focus on the core of the comprehensive technical problems. Combined with the morphology of risk enterprises, mismanagement signs are spreading, for enterprise management in the future bring depth limit crisis. Specific breeds reasons are: first, the enterprise established imbalance effect management organization structure design, especially with the field of technology transition entrepreneurial subject, often because under the background of knowledge management lack of license enterprises effect diffusion mechanism shortcomings; Secondly, the enterprise cohesion cooperation organizations cannot complete and enterprises in a task, even if is the size of the business situation is good, but neglected will derive more prominent contradiction, further into the root cause of risk management. About this part of the risk situation presents the following rules: (1) specific management thinking innovation main body is not strong enough, most of the internal rectification technology innovation risk firms simply focus on details, for the daily work of team quality form and technicalapplication ability almost unnoticed, makes the process structure, management content is difficult to meet the demand of era, it is bound to make enterprise strategy presents simplification feature in the future.(2) management experience is inadequate. In Chinese with the innovation of technology to realize the development of the corporate sector, will be because manager’s lack of personal ability makes it hard for business activities smoothly. (3) The personnel position structure arrangement conflict. Retain risk disadvantages enterprise position and corresponding matching, always involuntarily handover odds and enterprise development, has repeatedly let will only make the internal structure of high quality talents to pieces, make the business activities in the future as well as usual.3 Management risk control and prevention3.1 Strengthen the internal controlMost of the small loan companies will face professional’s scarce status, because small loans company belongs to the emerging of financial industry, industry system is not perfect. Therefore, the company's employees determine the small loan company can survive in the fierce market, and can be continuous development. Small loan company first to employ the persons with specialized knowledge and rich experience as executives, make financial institutions work and rich management experience of personnel to conduct regular training, less experienced practitioners organization personnel system to study the laws and regulations, familiar with financial knowledge of business and finance case, improve the staff's work ability and business level, strengthen the awareness of risk prevention.3.2 Open up the financing channels, the realization of diversified sources of fundingFirst of all, for subsequent insufficient funds become the greatest threat to the large-scale promotion in the future. At present, the company can only by the shareholders of a company constantly additional investment or developing new east and solve the problem of loan able funds, this makes the how to develop and maintain business steadily to become the biggest challenge. Second, countries to promote small loan credit, be in namely to promote the development of "agriculture, rural areas and farmers", small enterprises. Let go of small loan companies financing channels, togive financial institutions such as identity, fiscal and tax reduction policy support to process, small companies have the funds to solve legal channels, which naturally will not desperate to go "deposits" and off-balance-sheet financing illegally, this is the fundamental problem of small loan company funds source, as well as the development of basic problem, but as a small loan companies this is not the short-term investors, operators may change the status.3.3 Optimize the company's internal and external environment, strengthen the management of loansFirst of all, on the premise of guarantee its own environmental benign circulation, with the deepening of the company's business do more big, can slowly to such as Banks and other financial industry such as type of organization, benchmarking learning successful case of financial institutions, to further clear the requirement of the mortgaged property and improve the mortgaged property to accept mortgage threshold, so that we can effectively control the mortgaged property depreciation causes losses to the company. Secondly, establish and perfect the restraint mechanism with capital management as the core, and the traditional mainly denotation expansion of extensive growth mode to give priority to with connotation improve gradually intensive growth mode transformation. At the same time, small loans companies should adhere to market-oriented, commercial orientation, by high interest rates to reduce transaction risk and transaction costs, ensure that the company's earnings and normal operation. In risk control department and business department can through the establishment of "firewall system", strengthen the monitoring of loan risk, to timely feedback of loan quality deterioration, the loan provision for risk provisions for bad enough value. Give full play to the functions of small loan company's industry association, improve the industry self-discipline consciousness, and strengthen the financial accounting system, management personnel, registered capital of supervision and management, promoting its healthy development. Positive use of internal ratings and small credit has more mature technology, and through the way of market research, analysis of the demand for loans, and thus to develop a business strategy, so can make small loan co., LTD for the issuance of loans more tend to be more reasonable, and ismore practical and effective to control the loan risk.译文小额贷款公司经营风险防范M Swan摘要小额贷款公司目前仍处于起步阶段。
外文翻译-----小额信贷的可持续发展问题
中文3132字原文The Question of Sustainability forMicrofinance Institutions1.PrefaceMicroentrepreneurs have considerable difficulty accessing capital from mainstream financial institutions. One key reason is that the costs of information about the characteristics and risk levels of borrowers are high. Relationship-based financing has been promoted as a potential solution to information asymmetry problems in the distribution of credit to small businesses. In this paper, we seek to better understand the implic ations for providers of ―microfinance‖ in pursuing such a strategy. We discuss relationship-based financing as practiced by microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the United States, analyze their lending process, and present a model for determining the break-even price of a microcredit product. Comparing the model’s results with actual prices offered by existing institutions reveals that credit is generally being offered at a range of subsidized rates to microentrepreneurs. This means that MFIs have to raise additional resources from grants or other funds each year to sustain their operations as few are able to survive on the income generated from their lending and related operations. Such subsidization of credit has implications for the long-term sustainability of institutions serving this market and can help explain why mainstream financial institutions have not directly funded microenterprises. We conclude with a discussion of the role of nonprofit organizations in small business credit markets, the impact of pricing on their potential sustainability and self-sufficiency, and the implications for strategies to better structure the credit market for microbusinesses.2.The MFI Lending Model in the United StatesMarketingMarketing drives the business model in terms of the volume of potential borrowers that an MFI is able to access and the pool of loans it can develop. Given that MFIs do not accept deposits and have no formal prior insight into a freshpotential customer base, they must invest in attracting new borrowers. Marketing leads are generated from a variety of sources: soliciting loan renewals fromexisting borrowers, marketing to existing clients for referrals, ―grassroots‖ networking with institutions possessing a complimentary footprint in the target environment, and the mass media.At the outset of operations, before a borrower base is developed, portfolio growth is determined by the effectiveness of marketing through network and mass media channels. Once a borrower pool is established, marketing efforts can be shifted toward lower-cost marketing to existing borrowers and their peer networks. Even so, loans will likely attrite from a portfolio at a faster rate than renewals and borrower referrals can replenish it—new leads must continue to be generated through other, less effective channels.The Loan Application ProcessIn economic terms, the loan application process represents an investment at origination with the aim of minimizing credit losses in the future. All else being equal, a greater investment in the credit application process will result in lower subsequent rates of delinquency and default; conversely, a less stringent process would result in greater rates of credit loss in the future. Setting the appropriate level of rigor in a credit application process is an exercise in analyzing loanapplicant characteristics and forecasted future behaviors while being cognizant of the cost of performing these analyses.Three steps characterize the loan application process.Preliminary Screen. The applicant is asked a short set of questions to establish the applicant’s eligibility for credit under the MFI’s guidelines. This is sufficient to determine the likely strength of an application and whether an offer of credit could, in principle, be extended.Interview. At the interview stage, due diligence is performed to ensure that the loan purpose is legitimate and that the borrower’s business has sufficient capacity and prospects to make consistent repayments. Cash-flow analysis is the core of the MFI due diligence procedure and for microfinance borrowers the data is often insufficiently formal, hindering easy examination of cash flow stability and loanpayment coverage. As a result, this is a less standardized, more timeconsuming task than its equivalent in the formal lending markets.Underwriting and Approval. If a loan is recommended by an officer following the interview the application is then stresstested by an underwriter, who validates the cash flow and performs auxiliary analysis to ensure that the loan represents a positive addition to the lending portfolio.The dynamics of loan origination illustrate the trade-offs to be made to ensure an efficient credit process. Improved rigor could lead to a higher rate of declined applicants, and so higher subsequent portfolio quality, but at the expense of increased processing costs. For medium and larger loans, as application costs increase past an optimal point, the marginal benefit of improved portfolio quality is outweighed by the marginal expense of the credit application itself. However, for small loans there exists no such balance point—the optimal application cost is the least that can be reasonably achieved. This motivates a less intensive credit application process, administered when a loan request falls beneath a certain threshold, typically a principal less than $5,000. MFIs can disburse such loans more quickly and cheaply by fast-tracking them through a transaction-based process and context learning.Loan MonitoringPost-loan monitoring is critical toward minimizing loss. In contrast to the credit application process, which attempts to preempt the onset of borrower delinquencyby declining high risk loans, monitoring efforts minimize the economic impact of delinquency once a borrower has fallen into arrears. In addition to the explicit risk to institutional equity through default, managing delinquent borrowers is an intensive and costly process.When dealing with repeat clients, there exists the opportunity to leverage information captured through monitoring on previous loans, enabling the MFI to shorten the full credit application without materially impacting the risk filter. In short, there is an opportunity to reduce operational costs without a corresponding increase in future loss rates. Repeat borrowers enable the information accrued during the relationship to be leveraged to mutual benefit of MFI and borrower. In this case, much of the information required to validate a loan application has been gathered during theprevious lending relationship. An MFI will also possess the borrower’s payment history, a more accurate indicator of future performance than an isolated financial snapshot taken during the standard application process. The challenge, however, is that for many MFI, a part of their mission is to graduate customers into mainstream commercial banking, which would not allow the MFI to collect additional interest payments from those customers.Overhead CostsFor an MFI to sustain itself, each outstanding balance must contribute a proportional amount to institutional costs. Institutional costs are driven primarily by the size of the portfolio being maintained. The necessary staff, tools, technology, work environment, and management are functions of portfolio scale.We outline in Table 2 the institutionallevel costs of five MFIs with varying portfolio sizes to identify the proportional cost loading necessary to guarantee that central costs are compensated for. The table shows that institutional costs increase at a slower rate than the rate at which the loan portfolio grows, so that the overhead allocation declines as an MFI achieves scale. We find that an MFI with a $500,000 portfolio will incur indirect costs of 26 percent, while an MFI with a $20 million portfolio will experience a much lower indirect cost loading of 6 percent. In the United States, the largest institution engaging solely in microfinance presently has a portfolio of $15 million.3.Discussion and ConclusionsContinued subsidization of credit also has implications for the long-term sustainability of MFIs. Our high-level analysis of projected self-sufficiency levels of various MFI sizes shows the importance of pricing appropriately. Even a modest deviation from the value-neutral price has a significant impact on the amount of subsidies needed to sustain the institution. As a consequence, it is imperative that MFIs rigorously analyze the true costs and review their pricing structures accordingly.It has yet to be demonstrated that microfinance can be performed profitablyin the United States. Nondepository MFIs may not have better information and/or technology to identify and serve less risky microbusinesses than formal institutions. Itwould therefore appear that formal institutions are acting rationally in choosing not to serve this market at present. However, MFIs have succeeded in channeling capital to microbusinesses. Still, MFIs often operate with certain public and/or private subsidies. Ultimately, more research is needed to ascertain whether the provision of microfinance offers a societal benefit in excess of economic costs. This paper is oneof the first to document a very wide dispersion in the difference between value-neutral and actual pricing for a sample of MFIs. This suggests a wide dispersion in the economic subsidies inferred by these MFIs. More specifically,these subsidies are not being allocated on a consistent basis.If subsidies are required to serve the market at palatable interest rates for lenders and borrowers, it is incumbent on the microfinance industry to demonstrate that theirs is an efficient mechanism for delivering such subsidies. Once a subsidy is justified, institutions must be motivated to improve their operational efficiency so that they may offer microfinance borrowers the lowest possible equitable prices while not jeopardizing institutional viability.外文题目：The Question of Sustainability for Microfinance Institutions 出处：Journal of Small Business Management 2007 45(1), pp.23–41.作者：J. Jordan Pollinger, John Outhwaite,and Hector Cordero-Guzmán译文：小额信贷的可持续发展问题（一）前言微型企业从主流金融机构获得资金有相当大的困难，其中的一个重要原因是对了解借款者所花费的信息费以及风险等级是很高的。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献，我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源，其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。
小额贷款公司信用风险研究外文文献翻译
文献出处:Dietrich A. The Research of Small loan Company Credit Risk [J]. Small Business Economics, 2015, 8(4): 481-494.原文The Research of Small loan Company Credit RiskDietrich A.AbstractMicrofinance is pointing to the tiny enterprises or individual enterprises provide credit service, small loans basic characteristics for the process simple, amount of small, unsecured, etc.The emergence of small loan companies before fill in the blank of traditional financial institutions, to ensure the development of small and medium-sized enterprises and individual enterprises need. However, due to the particularity of micro-credit Company itself exists, there are many deep level problems to be solved. Such as capital source, interest rate limits, etc., especially the credit risk control problem. Credit risk is the main risk facing microfinance institutions. Quality was monopolized by the original financial institutions, loan to customers rely mainly on credit personnel subjective judgments, the weakness of the service object group, partly due to the scarcity of high-quality professionals, in the specific operation and operation on the face of the numerous credit risk. Microfinance is a small loan company's core business, loan assets are an integral part of its assets, loan income is the main income, and credit risk will lead to microfinance institutions to produce a large amount of bad debts will not be repaid, will seriously affect the quality of credit assets. Previous management, risk management is equivalent to afterwards that the understanding for the loan risks management of collection, the processing of bad loans, etc.Practice has proved that this approach will only increase operating costs, and late is no guarantee of the company's asset quality. Risk control is the key to identify risk, credit risk is the main source of customers, choose good customer credit conditions at the time the loan is helpful to reduce the probability of credit risk. Therefore, we should from the source to control risk, when choosing loan customers, carefully screening customers, for customers to make the right evaluation. Key words: small loans; Credit risk; Prevention mechanism;1 IntroductionThe rise of small loan companies, making the private capital to enter the small loan companies, great convenience is provided for the small and medium-sized enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households.Microcredit in absorbing private capital at the same time, broaden the financing channels. As a legitimate financial intermediation, enriched the organization form of the financial system. It also makes a lot of in the "underground" sunlight to folk financing mechanism; standardize the order of the financial market financing. Small Loan Company’s gradual development, make it’s become important force in the future diversified financial market.Small Loan Company since its establishment, has been for many small and medium-sized enterprises and individual industrial and commercial households offers a wide range of financial support, guarantee the good operation of the economy. However, small loans company also has a lot of problems. First of all, according to the small loan companies operating conditions, the management mode for the "credit not only to save”. Can’t absorb deposits, which are also the biggest different microfinance companies and Banks. So its sources of funding are mostly shareholder investment and bank lending. This leads to the size of its capital is limited by great, when it comes to an amount loan amount, small loan company's business is difficult to maintain. Second, the small loan company's clients are difficult to loan from the bank's clients, in this high quality customer was monopolized by the traditional financial institutions, small loans company greatly increase the credit risk. Because we can not from the credit status of customer credit systems, company surveys every loan applicants need to spend a lot of time and energy. Finally, small loan company's products are mostly unsecured, completely by customer credit loans, which accelerate the speed and efficiency of the loan, but at the same time, the company's capital safety not guaranteed, when customer default, can calculate the loss of the company. These weaknesses can require small loan companies from the source to control risk, makes every effort to do it by reducing the credit risk to the minimum.In the process of field research, small loan companies do better on the credit riskcontrol, but also the above problems. Therefore, combined with the characteristics of small loan companies, a set of accord with the actual situation of the simple and easy to use credit evaluation system, through analyzing the characteristics of the default customer, for new loan customer default probability for effective judgment, control and reduce the risk of credit business is the main problems of small loan companies are facing at present stage.2 The necessity of research on theBased on the principle of small loans and related theory, under the guidance of conduct empirical study of Microfinance Company, through analysis of the situation, credit risk has the following practical significance:2.1 Promote microfinance company better risk controlExisting micro credit company risk control relies mainly on the subjective judgment of executives and the loan officer, lack of professional assessment of risk and risk management system, the risk is the intrinsic attributes of financial activities. For microfinance companies the special financial institutions, can effectively control and manage risk, related to the sustainable development of small loan companies can. Small Loan Company’s ultimate goal is profit, improve risk management, and help to reduce non-performing loans, to ensure the safety of the assets of the company, so as to realize the sustainable development of small loan companies.2.2 To perfect the existing financial system of risk controlTraditional financial institutions attach great importance to risk control, the state-owned commercial bank's risk management and internal control are better, on the basis of legal, effective and prudent, set up a specialist team of risk assessment methods. Such as 0, the agricultural bank of China credit rating for business customers, eventually will be divided into enterprise credit grade AAA, AA, A, B, C five grades, China construction bank efficacy coefficient method is used to determine the score, to measure the customer credit risk size, as according to the judgment of borrowers credit risk condition, and issuing different credit lines to different customers.3 Small loans company credit riskMicrofinance company time is not long, data is not complete, so dedicated to small loans of credit risk assessment model is less, because small loans business and loan business of commercial Banks and other financial institutions to traditional similar, so we can draw on the experience of credit risk assessment model of commercial Banks. In the context of index selection, developing countries believe that the most predictive power of microfinance credit risk assessment indicators are: customer own characteristics: age, gender, number of family members, etc;Family or corporate financial data; Loan characteristics and the status of the default in the past. Schreiner (2004) also think that risk is associated with the characteristics of lending institutions, such as the loan officer's experience and branch loan situation. n addition, policy changes, seasonal factors will have an effect to the default. In terms of developed countries, the evaluation index and the developing countries, James Copes take said (2007) through the questionnaire results showed that age, gender, household assets and labor quantity is the determinant of small loans to repay. Italian commercial Banks selected the explanatory power of higher indicators are: personal characteristics: the borrower characteristics and borrowing record; Business features: inventory, number of employees, revenue expenditure, etc; Other features: real estate properties, the current address live time, etc.3.1 Small loans company credit risk definitionCredit Risk (Credit Risk), also known as default Risk, refers to the borrower fails to carry out obligations in the contract within the prescribed time, the possibility of economic loss caused by small loans company. Specifically, the borrower may change because of its environment and cause credit conditions are poor and cannot afford the rest of the loan repayment, or false application materials when apply for a loan, get loans from microfinance company after not getting paid on time. The above conditions will lead to small loans company actual earnings deviating from the expected return, serious when still can cause company losses, credit risk has always been a traditional financial institutions risk, is also the main risk. According to the study, carries on the comparison to all kinds of risks, credit risk has the highest proportion, is considered to be all the factors which lead to debt repayment, thebiggest. This makes the credit risk control important. Small Loan Company profits from customers, but the company the biggest risk comes from the customer. From the causes of credit risk, mainly including: to understand the borrower's information is not complete, no accurate judgment to the borrower's credit status, colluding with collusion between the loan officer and the borrower, the loan examination and approval is not strict, a lack of understanding of customer credit situation, accredit risk arises from the whole process of lending, any mistakes will cause credit risk.3.2 Small loans company forms of credit riskMicro-credit companies are facing the credit risk is the main form of borrower default, delinquent loans, resulting in the delinquent loans, bad debt loss and etching order to prevent and reduce the possibility of loss, make. To minimize the loss, it is necessary for us to study on specialized default. Default refers to the borrowers did not follow the stipulations of the contract, within the prescribed time limit; pay off the loan, thus making the loan payments or delinquent loans. Different microfinance firm definition of default is not the same, if some agency interpret default loans for any overdue payment loans (American education to promote small business network, SEEP), also some think a loan is a loan default or delay paying behavior refers to the returned overdue loans. Specific how long overdue is recorded as the default; in practice of microfinance company is diverse.4 Prevention mechanism to reduce the credit riskThrough analysis, we believe that the individual situation, operation stability, loan borrowers credit records and other factors associated with small loans company customer credit risk, through the empirical study of small loan companies, we also found that good credit score model can help the loan officer found good potential defaulters, in view of the above situation, we put forward the following countermeasures.4.1 Starting from the customer, the establishment of customer resource filesFrom the article analysis shows that any risk assessment model is the basis of data collection, the role of the model is to extract important information from a large number of customer information, and according to the customer's payment tocustomer classification, and data collection is in accordance with the information provided by the customer. Make full use of by the customer, the information provided by the customer bank running water, such as accounts receivable bills for the record, and is an important factor analysis customers repay ability. Establish the borrower repayment ability analysis system, through to the borrower can bear the liabilities of the biggest limit the ability of analysis, control the loan amount and duration of the borrowers, in helping borrowers through financing difficulty, development business at the same time, reduce the loan funds transferred or misappropriate possibility, greatly reduce the occurrence of bad loans.4. 2 Establish and constantly improve microfinance credit reporting databaseBased on field research shows, small loan companies, now of small loan companies can only rely on the loan officer to spend a lot of time and energy to investigate the credit status of customers. As a result of the existence of moral hazard and adverse selection, there is a big risk of small loans to the company's business, if small loan companies can enter the credit reporting system for customer's credit standing, you can quickly understand the customer's information, speed up the lending, at the same time, saving manpower and financial resources, reduce the cost of operation.4. 3 Choose reasonable and scientific credit evaluation modelField survey found in small loan companies, petty loan company's risk management department is research and development of "score CARDS", the so-called "score card", is to report according to the customer manager of customer's basic situation, through certain technical means, the overall customer risk scores. The customer the higher the score, the more performance rate, the lower the score, the more possible risk of default. At present this technology for unsecured customers only, because this part of the customer is the biggest customer base, and because there is no collateral, so the risk is bigger. Unsecured customer loan program is relatively simple, the use of "score CARDS", can quickly determine the client's credit standing, making lending more convenient.译文小额贷款公司信用风险研究Dietrich A.摘要小额信贷是指向微型企业或个体经营户提供额度较小的贷款服务，基本特征为流程简易，额度较小，无抵押等。
外文翻译-----小额信贷与经济增长,对印度经验的思考
原文Microfinance and Economic Growth –Reflections on IndianExperience1.IntroductionAchieving balanced and inclusive economic growth is a key challenge facedbypolicymakers in countries around the world. The gains of economic growthareaccessible to a greater extent by the relatively advantaged, who find it easiertoparticipate in the growth process. Poorer people, who are separated by distancefromthe urban areas where economic activity is concentrated, have to wait much longertoreap the benefits of economic growth. Engaging these sections of society intheeconomic mainstream is essential to achieve balanced growth, which is critical forthelong-term sustainability of social development and economic prosperity. Accesstofinancial services is a key element of the process of socio-economicempowerment.Only by delivering financial services to people in rural areas and lower incomestratacan they be brought within the ambit of economic activity. Only then can thefull potentialofthecountry’s p hysicalandhumanresourcesberealised.Therural economy represents a large latent demand for credit, savings and riskmitigationproducts like insurance. Governments and regulators the world over havearticulatedthe expansion of financial service delivery to this segmentofthe population as a priorityobjective.2.TheImportanceofFinancialServicesThe delivery of financial services to lower income households in ruralareas,however,presents a unique set of challenges. This customer segment has ahighvolume of low value transactions and requires doorstep services, flexibility intimingas well as simple procedures and documentation . These require a set ofskillscompletely different from those deployed by mainstream financial intermediaries.Atthe same time, traditional modes of outreach, like physical branch networks, provetobe inappropriate because of their high costs. Microfinance is a model which seekstoprovide financial services to the rural population in a viable and sustainable manner.3.MicrofinanceMicrofinance encompasses the provision of a broad range of services suchasdeposits,loans, payment services, money transfers and insurance products to poorandlow-income households and microenterprises. Microfinance allows replacementofhigh-costdebtfrominformalsources,therebyincreasingdisposableincome.Itinculcates financial discipline, resulting in ownership of assets, and enhances theability to withstand shocks due to access to savings products, credit and insurance.Inlower income countries with inadequate institutional infrastructure, microfinance isanimportant development tool and has helped expand the depth of financialservices.4.TheIndianContextWith a population of over 1 billion and estimates of the number of poorpeopleranging from 300 to 400 million, India is one of the largest markets formicrofinancialservices. It is estimated that a large part of the demand for credit in this stratumiscurrently met by informalsources.The twentieth century saw large-scale efforts to improve the quality of life inrural India. Different approaches were adopted by government agenciesandnongovernment organisations (NGOs) to improve the condition oftheruralpopulation.Theseincludedlandredistribution,buildingeconomicand politicalawareness, technology transfer and delivery of a variety of services. Credit in theruralsector was largely supplied by co-operative societies till the mid-1960s withthecommercial banks’rural operationscenteredaroundagri-businessesandmarketing. Oneoftheobjectivesofbanknationalisationsin1969and1980wastoincreasetheflowofruralcredit .However,merelyexpandingphysicalpresenceinruralareasdid not achieve the desired results, given the need to overlay mainstream financialservicedelivery models with the social mobilisation skills that were essential tomeetdevelopmentalobjectives.The self-help group (SHG)-bank linkage programme was the initialmicrofinanceinitiative launched by the National Bank for Agriculture and RuralDevelopment(NABARD) in 1992. While this model of partnership between the banking sectorandvoluntary organisations achieved reasonable success, it continued to depend onthecreation of an extensive banking network. Challenges in scaling up this model ledtothe introduction of financial intermediation by microfinance institutions (MFIs) that provide microfinance services to the poor, especially in rural areas.5.MicrofinanceInstitutionsMFIs borrow from commercial sources and on-lendtoclients(groups/individuals). Most MFIs in India started with grants and concessionalloansand gradually made the transition to commercial funding. While much of thegrowthintheinitialyearswasfinancedbyconcessionalloansfromfundingagencies,thisw as followed from 2001 onwards by raising equity from domestic as wellasinternational agencies and by borrowings from the banking sector. MFIs havebeenobserved to administer risks better than the traditional banking sector. There maybetwo explanations forthis:〃M FIshavedevelopedspecialisedsystemsofevaluation,supervision,administrationand recovery of credits attuned to their clientele,and〃t h e clientshavedevelopedanappropriatefinancialculture.Since2003,severalbankshave entered the microfinance sector with innovative scaling-up strategies. Inadditiontotermloans,someoftheinnovativestructuresofferedbybanksinIndiato createaccess to financial services in the rural areasare:〃Partnership:SeveralMFIshaveanexcellentbaseandinfrastructureintheirspecific markets. However,theylackaccesstoproductknowledge,fundingandtechnologyplatforms. In the partnership model, the bank provides mezzanine equity and technology to the NGO/M FI and lends directly to clients with risk-sharing bythe NGO/MFI.Thebankalsoprovidesloanfundsforthe MFI’s owninvestment requirements. The MFI undertakes loan origination, monitoring and collection. The advantage of this structure is that it separates the risk of the MFI from the risk oftheportfolio. Here the intermediary or the MFI assumes a fraction of the credit risk(tothe extent of risk sharing), leading to a reduction in capital required. It combinesthecore competence of NGOs/M FIs with that of banks–social mobilisation skills withfinance.〃S ecuritisation:Inthismodelthecommercialbankidentifies a portfoliobasedon fulfillment of minimum criteria and past portfolio performance. Though theMFIcontinues to collect receivables from the borrowers, its leverage is reducedwhichenables it to originate further assets. This product gives the bank the advantageof differentiating between the financial and operational risk of the MFI whilecreditenhancement improves the rating of the portfolio and enables competitivepricing.Theproduct has highlighted the potential for creating a large secondary market inIndiaformicrofinancereceivables.Bondsmayalsobeissuedagainstsecuritisedmicrofinance assets, creating linkages between MFIs and capitalmarkets.〃On-Tap Securitisation:InthisproductthebankprovidestheMFIadvancefundingwith which the MFI can build assets. Once created, assets are assigned to thebank.TheMFI can continue to build assets and assign them to the bank onaregularbasis.Microfinance provides a credit delivery channel to rural households. Themainimpactsofmicrofinanceareincreasedaccesstocreditforthoseatthe‘Bottom ofthe Pyramid’w itheasyanddoor-stepdeliveryofinstitutionalcredit,and,whereavailable, the provision of risk cover for financial losses through a range ofinsuranceproducts.6.WayForward–ScalingupMicrofinanceScaling up the MFI model would involve thefollowing:〃Delivery ofservicesat appropriatecosts:Reductioninthecostofintermediationwould have a direct impact on the profitability of MFIs. This could beachievedthrough increased efficiency in operations and through greateroutreach.〃S ervingawider setofclients:Inadditiontofinancingpoorhouseholds,MFIscouldextend their services to individuals with larger loan capacity to set upenterprises,purchasing farm equipment and housing. This would involve a shift from acting asanMFI to acting as an LFI (local financialinstitution).〃Increasing profitabilitythroughcross-selling:MFIbranchesinunbankedareas provide significant opportunities to bundle services like insurance and collectionofsavings. Income from cross-selling would lead to an increase in the profitsofMFIs.7.SummaryIn every country, development takes place over time, but its level and pacemaynot be adequate to maintain a satisfactory standard of living for the lessadvantaged.In such situations, intervention is in order to speed up the natural paceofdevelopment.Microfinance is an intervention which tries to speed up this process ina twopronged manner –improving household income by providing timely andadequatesupport for economic activities, and sharing the responsibilities of the governmentandof the mainstream financial sector. In India, microfinance is at a nascent stage withavast potential for growth. While the sector has begun to grow, challenges mustbeaddressed to make this growth both effective andsustainable.Microfinanceneeds to become more accessible, more customised and more comprehensive.Toscale up activity in this area, we must build financial skills inmicrofinanceinstitutions and establish linkages to the debt and equity capitalmarkets.Microfinancecan then truly contribute to transforming rural India into an engine of economicgrowth.外文题目：MicrofinanceandEconomicGrowth ——ReflectionsonIndianExperience出处：M anagingDirector&CEO,ICICIBank,CHAPTER5:85-88.作者：K.V.Kamath一、译文小额信贷与经济增长，对印度经验的思考（一）前言实现具有平衡性和包容性的经济增长，是世界各国政策制定者所共同面临的一个关键挑战。
小额贷款在帕恰斯,墨西哥：通过集体贷款减少贫困【外文翻译】
外文翻译原文Micro Credit in Chiapas, Me´xico: Poverty Reduction Through Group ending Material Source: Journal of Business Ethics, September 2009, V olume 88, Supplement 2, p283-299, DOI: 10.1007/s10551-009-0286-7;Author: Gustavo Barboza and Sandra TrejosIntroductionGeorge Akerlof (1970) brought the issues of asymmetric information and moral hazard (adverse selection) to the forefront of economic theory.While Akerlof relies on the example of the used car market to illustrate the existence of such informational problems, asymmetric information examples are found in everyday life situations, including the functioning of financial markets. In general, riskier borrowers pay higher interest rates to compensate for their higher probability of default, whereas safer borrowers pay lower interest rates. Financial markets use credit ratings to assess the borrowers’ probability of default and therefore, determine the corresponding interest rate to be charged. Collaterals, such as leans on cars or mortgages on land property, secure the loan in case of default. When neither collateral nor credit rating is available, no lending takes place. The lack of collateral or credit ratings inhibits the ability of financial institutions to internalize possible information asymmetries, and limits the prospects for economic activity to develop.Unfortunately, the above-mentioned scenario describes the reality of about half of t he world’s population. The lack of credit rating and/or collateral leaves about two to three billion people with no access to formal credit markets. They are unable to obtain loans for economic activities. This lack of access to financial markets is a major problem when trying to reduce poverty around the world.The 2006 Nobel Peace Prize2 was awarded to Mohammed Yunus and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh for their pioneer work on developing Micro Credit3 (MC) as a method to reduce poverty through the provision of financial resources to the poorest of the poor. MC programs have emerged in many countries and are aviable option for people with entrepreneurial skills and promising business projects. Under the new organizational model, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) managing MC programs receive financial support from donors, grants, or borrowed money from international organizations at preferential interest rates4 (sometimes interest rate free), to then lend to impoverished people. These programs bridge the gap between no access to financial markets and institutions, and one-time lump sum government aid programs.Poverty and Micro-creditThe recent rise of Micro Credit is a direct response to the failure of the formal financial markets to include the poor as different and unique economic agents. Governments have tried to improve this market failure by providing lump sum aid. But this solution does not correct the situation in which the poor lack access to loan funds. In the early 1970s,Mohammed Yunus initiated the Grameen Bank project, an MC program that provided small loans for poor people who lacked collateral. The Grameen Bank currently has similar and derived programs operating around the world. MC is an innovative approach to lend financial resources to the poor, without making use of collateral, by creating a network of trust where families, neighbors, friends, or even strangers come together to support each other financially. MC programs focus on the poorest of the poor, those that are shunned away from formal financial markets opportunities.How do MC programs work? MC programs receive financial support from socially responsible donors and international organizations because of their positive impact on poverty alleviation while promoting economic development. Financial viability of MC programs is crucial to continuing the provision of resources to those in the lowest income bracket. Achieving and consistently maintaining high repayment rates on outstanding loans is, hence, central not just for survival of the organization, but to achieve the goals of dissemination of wealth and integration into modern society. Alternatively, low repayment rates or high delinquency on outstanding loans would most likely create an adverse effect on the willingness of donors to support MC programs.MC programs are tailored to the specific needs of the clientele they target. For instance, some programs focus on urban areas and provide financial resourcesexclusively to the poor. Other MC programs concentrate their operations in rural areas, and provide access to financial resources and related services, such as educational programs and health services. Furthermore, some programs use the individual group lending model, while others lend to groups, or lend money individually under joint liability contracts. The unifying factor of these programs is that their final goal is to lift the poor out of poverty, not through charity, but through the efficient use of scarce resources and the development of feasible entrepreneurship projects that allow the borrowers to use their capabilities towards reaching their potential. In this regard, some programs, such as BancoSol, are defined as for-profit organizations, while most others are operated by NGOs with a clear non-profit status.The empirical results of MC performance and impacts are generally very impressive. According to the United Nations’ High Level Event fact sheet,65% of all Grameen Bank borrowers ‘‘have managed to lift themselves out of extreme poverty.’’However, there is still work to do given that a great proportion of people around the world still live on less than $1.25 a day (purchasing power parity in 2005 prices). Using this threshold, the World Bank estimates from August 2008 reveal that 1.4 billion people live in extreme poverty.Perhaps the best known MC program in Me´xico is Compartamos, which is active in over 26 Mexican states and provides services mainly to rural borrowers. Compartamos, like many other MC programs, lends mostly to women, though recently its services has been extended to men. Compartamos is one of the first MC institutions to be listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange and it became a commercial bank in 2006 (Sengupta and Aubuchon, 2008). However, Compartamos is different from most MC programs because MC programs operate at a much lower scale than the former.Very little research has been conducted on the impact of MC programs on poverty in Mexico. One Micro Credit in Chiapas, Me´xico 285 study reports that people who have been microfinance clients for more than one year are financially better off than new clients (Woodworth and Hiatt, 2003). The study reported that nonclients earned only $1.69 a day and 22% of the nonclients earned less than $1 a day. MCs offer these poorest of the poor a clear and feasible alternative that is already yielding positive effects for those in most need.A model of Micro-credit lendingFirst, lenders can either loan money directly to borrowers or use a financial intermediary. According to Prescott (1997), lending to the financial intermediary, under the riskier return projects, is the optimal solution for individual lenders. The main reasons are the high monitoring, screening, and administrative costs that the lender would have to incur to secure a full repayment. The financial intermediary has a comparative advantage in these regards (Prescott, 1997).Second, lenders can provide individual loans,group loans, or individual loans under group joint liability.Third, lenders can lend without monitoring but with liquidation, lend and monitor, or lend to groups and have them self-monitor.Fourth, MC institutions lending to small borrowers also need to consider private information on borrowers’ returns, liquidation costs, costly monitoring, and costly screening (Prescott, 1997). The existence of private information on the borrowers istypically unknown, which is one of the reasons why formal financial markets do not to lend to poor people. Borrowers can lie and claim bad performance which the lending institution is not able to verify. Finding mechanisms to ameliorate the existence of private information is the first task for the lending institution, both from the generation of revenue perspective and the use of funds to guarantee high repayment rates. The selected mechanisms will, in turn, dictate the lending approach,loan structure, and corresponding cost structure on the MC lending institution side.Fifth, the operating mechanisms of MC institutions preclude them from receiving direct deposits from savers.Sixth, loans from socially responsible lenders and donors, and other financial resources from donors,can be used either to lend to borrowers or to cover administrative expenses. The most common practice is for socially responsible lenders and donors to earmark that the money be allocated for specific uses.MethodologyOur objective is to provide empirical evidence on poverty reduction, repayment rates, and group dynamics to determine the role that donors can play in assuring thefinancial viability of MC programs. To determine the impact MC programs have on poverty alleviation, repayment rates, and approximate overall program sustainability were estimated using data from the ALSOL Micro Credit Program in Chiapas, Me´xico. The official transaction records of weekly payments were examined from July 2000 to July 2001 for a total of 2151 participants.ALSOL provides loans to urban borrowers at a 30% flat interest rate and rural borrowers at a 20% flat interest rate. Under the progressive loan structure, loans are given out in six levels. Borrowers move to the next loan level upon successful completion of the previous loan.FindingsThe findings reported below are organized based on the following analysis: (1) overall loan sample, (2) active loans versus inactive loans for the overall sample, (3) rural loans versus urban loans for the overall sample, (4) active rural loans versus active urban loans, (5) inactive rural loans versus inactive urban loans, (6) active loans by region and level, and (7) inactive loans by region and level.Overall loan sampleThere were significant weekly variations in loanrepayment patterns. Figure 1 indicates that ALSOL Micro Credit has overall weekly loan repayment rates ranging from a low of 84% (just prior to 9/1/00) to a high of 98% (shortly after 12/10/00), for the period July 2000 to July 2001. Multiple factors can explain this variation: differentiated learning-bydoing process between urban and rural settings, drop outs of poor performers, early cancellation of loans,recomposition among overall rural and urban participants,and relative loan structure recompositions.These elements represent the group dynamics that are inherent in an MC program in the form of peer monitoring, assortative matching, and response of program participants to a given set of dynamic incentives.Figure 1. ALSOL program performance in actual to expected payments.Active loans versus inactive loans for the overall sampleIn the case of active participants (see Figure 2), the lower performance numbers,Figure 2. ALSOL Micro Credit performance of active and inactive loans.relative to inactives,can be attributed to the prevalence of loans that decided to remain in the program as of July 2, 2001despite having a history of arrears (repayment difficulty).For inactives, the relative average performanceincludes two different types of participant groups: (1)women who paid off the loan in full many weeks ago anddecided not to receive a new loan and (2) women who received a loan recently and paid it off in less than 50 weeks. We also identified 21 defaulted cases.Rural loans versus urban loans for the overall samplePerformance differentials are more evident when a rigional specific classification is considered (see Figure 3) For instance, the evidence indicates positive difference in performance in favor of urban women over rural women. On average, urban women had stronger, and more consistent, performance.Urban loan performance, compared to rural loan performance, is closer or above the number one for a larger number of observations. Rural participants display more arrears in the loans, with an overall difference of about 15% for overall program,compared to 10–12% for actives.Figure 3. ALSOL rural and urban loan performance.ALSOL provides economic incentives to rural participants by charging a lower interest rate in comparison to urban loan. This incentive attempts to enhance the likelihood of repayment for rural participants,as it is assumed that they have a more difficult time accessing markets to sell their wares. The results in Figure 3 tend to suggest that the market conditions are indeed more difficult for rural participants. Two key factors come to play in this regard: (1) cash flows are not generated on a daily basis, and (2) the larger physical distance from markets makes it more difficult for these entrepreneurs to interact with consumers and obtain information about market performance. The combination of these elements results in greater difficulty to make payments on a weekly time schedule.A derived issue from the difficulties encountered rural participants is the slower advancement made along the progressive loan ladder. As rural participants are unable to generate a strong and consistent cash flow, their borrowing capacity is proportionally hindered because they are unable to repay as much as fast.Active rural loans versus active urban loansTo further understand the dynamics of repayment patterns, we analyzed the Active/Inactive categories by regional classification. Active urban loans carry relatively low arrears and tend to perform ahead of schedule (see Figure 4). The significant positive performance of active urban loans supports the assumption that projects with higher expected returns have lower levels and frequency of arrears. These require a lower need for peer monitoring and represent an overall reduction in monitoring and administrative costs to the lending institution. Active rural loans, despite displaying an upward trend on repayment rates, do not catch up with those of the urban participants.Figure 4. Active urban and rural loans.Inactive rural loans versus inactive urban loansSimilar patterns of behavior are observed in the inactive classification when dividing the groups into urban and rural categories (see Figure 5). Inactive urban participants tend to outperform inactive rural ones. The difference in performance, however, is not as strong as before. Indeed, during the period between July 2000 and January 2001, rural participants show a considerable improvement in repayment rates and catch up with the performance of urban loans several months into theanalysis.Figure 5. Inactive urban and rural loans.For rural participants this period corresponds to a significant number of cancellations on highly delinquent loans, which results in an improved overall performance. The catching up effect disappears as rural participants increase the number of arrears during the first half of 2001, because the remaining inactive rural loans continue to accumulate arrears. On the other hand, the inactive urban participants show a strong tendency towards early loan payments. The performance of inactive rural loans present a tendency to worsen as many loans are not cancelled and become inactive after accumulating more than 25 weeks without activity. Active loans by region and levelThe tendency of active urban loans to outperform active rural loans is consistently present at all loan levels (see Figures 6 and 7). Active urban loans have a strong tendency to be ahead in terms of payments with a low incidence of arrears. For rural loans, no single category of loan level has a performance indicator equal or greater than 1.Figure 6. Active rural loans by level.Figure 7. Active urban loans by level.Active rural loans by levelActive rural loans display a significantly differentiated performance when classified by level (see Figure 6).First level loans strongly pull down the overall performance. Performance at the first level is always below the average for the overall rural program,which indicates that there are differences associated with newcomers into the program compared to groups and centers that have acquired relevant business experience as they move up in the progressive loan structure.Even within the first loan level, there are distinctive patterns related to learning and improved performance as participants mature on their loans.This suggests that incentives positively affect behaviors. The poorer performance of the active rural first loan level is explained by those that are at the verge of strategic default. Out of a total of 320 active rural first loans, 26.25% are at high risk of default; for 161 second loans, 36.02%; and for 108 third loans, 20.37%. None of the 28 fourth loans are at high risk of default.Active urban loans by levelFigure 7 illustrates the existence of a considerable degree of convergence towards optimal performance for active urban loans. It is of particular relevance that the reduction in the overall variance and the coherent movement of most all categories are in the same direction. Even in the lowest level of performance towards the end of the period, the maximum level of arrears does not exceed 4–5%.Without doubt the active urban participants outperform the active rural ones in many regards.Repayment rates are better, the number and frequency of arrears are much lower with a strong tendency to be ahead of schedule, and there is a faster repayment of loans reinforced by consequently faster upward movement along the loan ladder. In addition, even though there is some small degree of variation in the time trend performance, there is also enough evidence to suggest that all categories tend to move toward the same level of performance for active urban centers.Why? Easier and prompt access to the market translates into a better and more stable cash flow that allows better repayment rates and fewer arrears on average. In addition, a higher return on economic activities is promoted by access to credit, resulting in successful business ventures. Access to credit through MC materializes those economic opportunities urban people have been developing that are economically feasible. This further promotes entrepreneurship development. None of these opportunities could have been propelled to the current status if borrowers relied on access to credit from formal markets.Inactive loans by region and levelAs indicated in Figures 8 and 9, the same general impressions made about active loans apply to Figure 8. There is a difference in magnitude of effects, but not in direction. The same basic structural factors affect both inactive urban and rural participants, but each region has identifying factors that ameliorate their respective performance. Further analysis of the inactive records indicates that the inactive urban loans are more consistent on their performance of repayments, havingsignificant low arrears and, in general, perform ahead of inactive rural loans.Figure 8. Inactive rural loans by level.Figure 9. Inactive urban loans by level.Comparing the degree of arrears of inactive rural loans suggests that these loans maintain a much better record of payments than active rural loans.On the other hand, urban participants, both active and inactive, have relatively comparable performance indicators that appear at first glance not to be correlated with the active/inactive classification. However, this tendency changes towards the end of the period of analysis when inactive rural loans start presenting a significant deterioration as theaverage number of arrears increases. This is particularly significant when one considers that the inactive urban participants considerably improved their performance, remaining ahead of schedule at about 8% for most of 2001.There are several possibilities for the significant performance divergence. First, from a purely statistical point of view, basic indicators for urban participants tend to have a more consistent pattern of repayment. Second, given that the number of urban participants grows faster than rural participants, the overall performance in the urban sector is more dynamic. Thus, instead of being associated with higher risk, the higher returns may be associated with better opportunities and ability of urban participants to use MC incentives.ConclusionsMicro Credit programs are a viable alternative for those in the lowest income bracket. A combination of available funding through socially responsible lenders and donors, and individual lending under joint liability, allows for significantly high recuperation rates on outstanding loans. The ALSOL Micro Credit in Chiapas, Me´xico case study shows that this new organizational approach, through the provision of financial resources to those considered unbankable by the formal financial system, can successfully achieve and maintain high recuperation rates. This, in turn, translates into opportunities for participants to migrate out of poverty.MC programs provide opportunities to poor people and their families in ways that the market fails to address. MC programs also fill empty holes left by market imperfections incapable of assimilating the existence of asymmetric information. These gaps in market functioning, due to the market’s inability to effectively account for private and asymmetric information, create severe and persistent problems for those less fortunate.Poverty alleviation is a persistent challenge requiring immediate attention. Spreading the goodness of access to the market is one form to address this problem. The research reported in this article suggests six implications for poverty reduction.First, contrary to common beliefs held by many formal lending institutions, the poor are capable of borrowing money, developing successful entrepreneurship ideas, making regular repayments, and successfully completing a full lending–borrowing cycle.Second, while formal lending markets fail to incorporate those in most need because of the existence of asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, MC programs are able to bridge these differences and provide real opportunities toward poverty alleviation.Third, the existence of market imperfections precludes the poor from participating in resource allocation efficiency gains markets provide. Yet, access to markets benefits, precisely, the poor the most. At the margin, an increase in income has a much larger positive effect at initial low levels of income.Fourth, MC programs and full access to market participation complement each other. Differences in performance across urban and rural participants – in favor of the former – indicate that urban borrowers have better access to markets where they sell their wares. This allows urban borrowers to complete the borrowing cycle faster, progress to higher loan levels faster, and consequently escape away from poverty more rapidly.Fifth, despite the impressive performance of MC programs, administrative costs remain high. Continuous financial support from socially responsible lenders and donors is still in much need to secure a long-term positive effect on program development and consequent poverty reduction until an MC program reaches sustainability.Lastly, further research on the overall impact of MC programs is needed. Some issues of interest that remain unresolved include: overall MC program sustainability, actual extent of poverty reduction in Latin America derived fromMCprograms, incidence of social mobility because of MC programs, and inner group dynamics under non-collateralized borrowing.译文小额贷款在帕恰斯，墨西哥：通过集体贷款减少贫困资料来源:商业伦理[J].2009(9), 88卷，附录2, p283 – 299.作者：古斯塔沃·巴尔沃萨，桑德拉·特雷霍斯引言George Akerlof (1970)把信息不对称和道德风险（逆向选择）的问题推到了经济理论最前沿。
外文翻译--小额贷款机构外汇风险管理和小额信贷投资基金
中文4100字，2400单词，12500英文字符出处：Barrès I. The Management of Foreign Exchange Risk by Microfinance Institutions and Microfinance Investment Funds[M]// Microfinance Investment Funds. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006:115-146.原文：The Management of Foreign Exchange Risk by Microfinance Institutions and Microfinance Investment FundsIsabelle BarresThe term “MFI” is used broadly in this chapter to encompass institutions thatprovide small-scale financial services, such as loans, savings, insurance, remittancesand other services (generally in amounts less than 250 % of GNP per capita). Theterm encompasses a wide variety of organizations: NGOs, credit unions, non-bankfinancial intermediaries, rural banks, etc.Most microfinance investment funds (MFIFs) and other funders such as officialdevelopment agencies finance their activities in US dollars (USD) or Euros (EUR),which may be called “hard currencies.”However, most microfinance institutions(MFIs) operate in nondollarised or non-Euro-based economies and lend local currencyto their clients.Funding in one currency and lending in another, and the probability that therelative values of the two currencies will alter, creates foreign exchange (FX) risk.V olatile currency exchange rate fluctuations in many countries where MFIs operatemake FX risk a serious issue, but one that has often been accorded little urgency inmicrofinance. The accelerated development of microfinance through access to capitalmarkets makes it imperative that foreign exchange be managed in ways that areconsistent with best practice in finance. Until this is widely achieved, access to capitalmarkets for the benefit of microfinance will be retarded.Foreign exchange risk is one of many risks that MFIFs face. Interest rate risk isan additional risk that is related to FX risk. As currency values change, interestexpense or income will also change. And, spreads between interest rates on both sidesof the balance sheet may change, that is, interest rates on money borrowed in onecurrency by a microfinance institution, for example, may diverge from interest rates on money loaned to micro entrepreneurs by the MFI. Each of these effects has implications for MFIF and MFI profitability. For purposes of economy, these second order exchange risks are not discussed further here in.This chapter explores the nature of FX risk in debt funding by focusing on which party is likely to bear the risk of exchange rate fluctuations in different situations at different points in a funding transaction. The importance of hedging is noted, and mechanisms are listed that MFIFs and MFIs use to address their respective FX risks.The relationships between currency and risk described below apply to equity funds, while in the case of guarantee funds the situation is reversed. Equity investments, as capital, are always in the currency of the MFI. For the foreign equity investor, “foreign exchange risk becomes one of several risks associated with an investment rather than a central factor in making a loan.”Equity and guarantee funds, while not the focus of this chapter, are included in the Appendices with examples to identify when they face a currency risk and the hedging mechanisms they use.The most common foreign exchange risk possibilities are summarized in Table. These combinations involve positions in Euros (EUR) and local currency, US dollars (USD) and local currency, and between EUR and USD, that comprise the currencies in which assets and liabilities are held by MFIs and MFIFs. Generalizing, we assume that before the MFI receives funding, it has no currency mismatch. Its “operating currency,”the currency in which its assets are denominated, is the same as its “funding”currency, which is the currency in which its liabilities are denominated.The example of change in value of the EUR against the USD is an interesting one to examine. Over a 2-year period, the EUR gained close to 40% of its value against USD. This large change in the relative values of two “hard”currencies was underestimated by many MFIs and MFIFs. The EUR was launched in 2002 at USD 1.17, and subsequently fell to less than USD 0.90. Recently, however, the EUR has appreciated considerably against the USD, and many European MFIFs operating in EUR and lending in USD in dollarizsed countries in Latin America have incurredsignificant losses from the transactions.The sharp appreciation of the EUR against the USD has created significant exchange losses on the EUR loans of many MFIs, which in some cases will require restructuring. The ASN-Novib Fonds is an example. It is an MFIF in the Netherlands that lends in hard currency (both USD and EUR), with most of its portfolio concentrated in Latin America. It is seeking opportunities in Asia and Africa if the foreign exchange risks can be hedged. In the past, the ASN-Novib Fonds made EUR loans to MFIs operating in dollarised economies, but the lack of hedging by its client MFIs and subsequent losses have forced ASN-Novib Fonds to discontinue unhedged EUR funding, which it considers too risky for the MFIs. On the other hand, MFIs borrowing in USD and on-lending in EUR have experienced currency gains their Euro-equivalent USD repayments of principal and interest have diminished considerably.Regardless of who bears the direct currency risk (i. e., direct losses from currency fluctuations), both parties are at risk for indirect losses resulting from currency risk. For example, if an MFIF suffers losses and downscales operations or changes the allocation of countries in which it invests, client MFIs may lose access to a funder that has been helpful in the past. On the other hand, MFIFs face increased credit risk (i. e., an indirect currency risk in this case), when MFIs have not hedged their currency risk and suffer subsequent losses that affect their profitability and long term viability. In this sense, some dimensions of currency risk are always shared between the MFIF and the MFI, regardless of which bears the direct risk, as portrayed in the examples above.Because of direct and indirect FX risks, MFIFs and MFIs are working together to develop hedging mechanisms in countries where the capital markets may offer few of the hedging options that are available in developed countries. To mitigate indirect currency risks, most MFIFs try to assess whether it is reasonable for their client MFIs to borrow in a certain currency. They examine their funding and operating currencies and monitor their overall foreign currency exposure on a regular basis as part of their due diligence process. MFIFs that have adopted these procedures include BIO,Cordaid, Etimos, Incofin, Luxmint-ADA, Rabobank and Triodos. Exposure analysis varies, and is not used in every case. Informal cross-checking among MFIFs also helps raise their awareness of the foreign exchange exposure of their affiliates. Some MFIFs such as ASN-Novib Fonds have changed their policies to reduce MFI currency risks.Interviews conducted by ADA, CGAP, and The MIX for the KfW symposium in 2004 shed some light on MFIFs’perceptions of FX risk. The study found that perceptions of the degree of risk linked to currency fluctuations depend largely on direct currency exposure, although most MFIFs interviewed expressed great concern for the larger issue whether or not they directly faced a risk–because of the potential repercussions of a loss incurred by MFIs as a result of transactions with an MFIF.When asked: “Is foreign exchange risk a big issue for the MFIs that you invest in?”, MFIFs were almost unanimous in saying that foreign exchange risk is a major issue in lending to MFIs because it increases the risk of losses, regardless of who assumes the risk. MFIFs that shared this view included BIO, Cordaid, Luxmint-ADA, Rabobank, and Triodos. Some MFIFs, including BIO, Cordaid, and PlaNet Fund, were nevertheless willing to assume greater FX risk, or were generally less concerned about it, for several reasons: The potential currency losses linked to currency risk discussed previously contrast with the responses regarding risk mitigation. While levels of risk vary, not enough is being done from the perspectives of both MFIFs and MFIs. Many MFIFs and MFIs that should hedge because of the level of their exposure do not have hedging mechanisms in place, for a variety of reasons explored below. Of the 64 MFIFs analyzed for the KfW symposium and through The MIX Market, 49 provided the currency breakdown of their microfinance investment portfolios. Of these, 46 provided information about their hedging policies –or lack thereof. Only a little over 40% (19) of the MFIFs that gave details of their hedging policies indicated that they had a hedging policy in place.As noted previously, not all MFIFs need to hedge. MFIFs that offer funding in their currency of operations have no FX risk and therefore do not have hedging policies in place.Excepting the 7 MFIFs that were not exposed to direct currency risk, 20 MFIFs, about 50% of the 39 that faced exposure from currency risk, did not have hedging mechanisms in place, as illustrated in Table . Failures to hedge adequately created losses for several of the MFIFs studied, including many European microfinance investors, such as NOVIB (on local currency loans and participations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Mexico, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Uganda), Cordaid (on loans in Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, etc, and others.How are exchange rate losses treated in accounting information? Some MFIFs show returns prior to exchange rate losses while others show returns after exchange rate losses. Lack of standardisation produces important differences in the overall return, often turning a positive return into a negative one. This difference should be taken into consideration when examining the financial statements of MFIFs. A forthcoming edition of the MicroBanking Bulletin, focusing on the supply side of MFI funding, will provide more details of issues arising from the lack of standardisation and transparency in MFIF reporting. MFIFs that reported having hedging mechanisms in place indicated differences in their degree of hedging: some fully hedged currency risk, while many hedged hard currency risk but not their local currency exposure. The most common reason for not hedging currency risk is that MFIFs are willing to assume the risk. MFIFs that had not hedged their currency exposure are identified in Appendix 5. Other MFIFs that were not hedging simply because they did not face direct currency risk are listed in Appendix 6. Some MFIFs also chose to bear the FX risk and not hedge, in order not to increase the costs of their loans and face the risk of losing potential customers.Appendix 3 indicates that a few investment funds, primarily social funds, are willing to assume direct currency risk by offering local currency loans to MFIs. However, most MFIFs invest in MFIs in hard currency, passing the FX risk to the MFIs, which then bear the responsibility for hedging by obtaining a hard currency guarantee or buying a derivative security that neutralises their risk. A number ofMFIFs are lending in hard currencies, sometimes recklessly, in countries where the devaluation risk is high and MFIs do not hedge. Similar to the MFIFs, MFIs face varying levels of risk that depend not only on the mix of currencies they borrow and on-lend to their clients, but also on the volume of funds borrowed and/or on-lent in different currencies.A recent survey conducted by CGAP and The MIX identified the funding structure and future funding projections of MFIs.Of the 216 MFIs that responded to the survey, 80 indicated that they were currently using hard currency funding (USD or EUR) and indicated the amount.Of these 80 MFIs, 8 operated in dollarised economies (Ecuador and El Salvador) or in Euros (Kosovo). The remaining 72 were exposed to either USD or EUR currency risk: 61 had an average exposure of USD 2.6 million and 11 had an average exposure of EUR 3.8 million.An average of 48% of USD loans and an average of 36% of EUR loans were hedged. Nevertheless, these averages hide important differences in hedging practices amongst MFIs. More interesting is the distribution of hedging (Table 4).In either USD or EUR exposures, 72 MFIs should have hedged: 54% were not hedging at all, while 24% were fully hedged. The remaining 16 MFIs (or 22%) partially hedged their currency risk. For more details on exposures and the percentage of hedging by the MFIs in the survey that were operating in a non-USD or non-EUR country, see Appendices 9, 10 and11.Most of the 216 surveyed MFIs had some exposure to currency risk through their transactions with an average of one foreign lender, and/or desired to increase their funding from foreign sources. In addition, 68 (or 31%) of the 216 MFIs surveyed indicated that foreign funders did not want to assume foreign exchange risk and that this was a challenge in obtaining foreign loans and equity. In addition, the sample results suggest that there is a high probability that MFIs that have access to foreign loans are not hedging properly. The hedging issue is therefore important: helping MFIs reduce currency risk will increase their interest in obtaining foreign lending and reducing FX losses.Similar to the MFIFs, the performance of MFIs is affected not only by theactual gains or losses incurred from foreign exchange, but also in the way these are accounted for. Adjustment methods used by external analysts such as rating agencies also contain considerable differences. It is important to examine the specific accounting treatments when comparing the performance of MFIs.Although FX risk occurs in almost every transaction between microfinance investors (especially foreign investors) and MFIs, too many MFIFs and MFIs are not hedging appropriately. Hedging is seldom used because common hedging mechanisms are not available in the countries where MFIs operate, or prohibitively costly for the small amounts of the transactions involved. While hedging increases transaction costs, lack of hedging results in losses that can be significant, especially for MFIs and MFIFs that do not have well diversified portfolios.In addition, MFIFs often compensate for FX risk by increasing their interest rates to MFIs to cover potential losses. FX risk therefore increases the lending costs for the MFIs (and ultimately, for their clients), regardless of whether or not they have access to local currency loans. Unless MFIFs are able to assume more of the FX risk linked to their lending to MFIs, other funding instruments such as guarantees may be more appropriate for MFIs that face small margins.“Best practices”for hedging by MFIFs should include strategies of when to hedge, how much to hedge, how to hedge. Sharing experiences with successful and innovative hedging mechanisms, such as FX insurance funds, would greatly encourage MFIFs to absorb more of the FX risk that MFIs are so ill equipped to address, reducing costs for MFIFs and MFIs.译文：小额贷款机构外汇风险管理和小额信贷投资基金术语“多边投资框架”在这一章中使用广泛，包括机构（一般金额小于人均国民生产总值250％）提供的小规模金融服务，如贷款，储蓄，保险，汇款和其他服务。
扶贫方案词汇
扶贫方案词汇扶贫方案词汇指的是在扶贫工作中常用的相关术语和词汇，下面将为您介绍一些常见的扶贫方案词汇，希望对您有所帮助。
1. 贫困县（Poor counties）：指国家确定的经济欠发达、人口贫困的县区，是扶贫工作的主要对象。
2. 根贫困家庭（Root impoverished families）：指贫困家庭长期处于贫困状态的家庭。
3. 扶贫政策（Poverty alleviation policies）：指国家采取的各类政策措施，旨在帮助贫困地区和贫困人口脱贫致富。
4. 精准扶贫（Targeted poverty alleviation）：指根据贫困人口的基本信息和需求，制定具体、有针对性的扶贫政策和措施。
5. 产业扶贫（Industrial poverty alleviation）：指通过发展产业，培育壮大农村经济实体，增加贫困地区居民收入的扶贫方式。
6. 教育扶贫（Educational poverty alleviation）：指通过提供教育资源和资助、改善教育条件等措施，帮助贫困家庭的子女接受良好的教育。
7. 医疗扶贫（Medical poverty alleviation）：指提供医疗保障和服务，改善贫困地区居民的健康状况和就医条件。
8. 生态扶贫（Ecological poverty alleviation）：指通过保护和修复生态环境，开展生态农业、生态旅游等项目，增加贫困地区居民的收入来源。
9. 政策倾斜（Policy support）：指国家在扶贫工作中采取的优惠政策和倾斜措施，如税收减免、贷款支持等。
10. 脱贫攻坚（Poverty alleviation campaign）：指全社会为实现贫困地区和贫困人口脱贫致富而进行的集中力量、有组织的扶贫行动。
11. 扶贫对象（Targeted population）：指贫困地区和贫困人口，是扶贫工作的主要服务对象。
12. 扶贫责任人（Poverty alleviation officials）：指负责贫困地区扶贫工作的相关领导和工作人员，承担督促、指导、协调等职责。
信贷基本词汇英汉对照
信贷基本词汇英汉对照第一篇：信贷基本词汇英汉对照演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案信贷基本词汇英汉对照信贷基本词汇英汉对照译道资源共享，更多关注译道论坛！M method 2M法 3M method 3M法A scores A值Accounting convention 会计惯例Accounting for acquisitions 购并的会计处理Accounting for debtors 应收账款核算Accounting for depreciation 折旧核算Accounting for foreign currencies 外汇核算Accounting for goodwill 商誉核算Accounting for stocks 存货核算Accounting policies 会计政策Accounting standards 会计准则Accruals concept 权责发生原则 Achieving credit control 实现信用控制Acid test ratio 酸性测试比率 Actual cash flow 实际现金流量精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Adjusting company profits 企业利润调整Advance payment guarantee 提前偿还保金Adverse trading 不利交易Advertising budget 广告预算Advising bank 通告银行Age analysis 账龄分析Aged debtors analysis 逾期账款分析Aged debtors’exception report 逾期应收款的特殊报告 Aged debtors’exception report 逾期账款特别报告Aged debtors’report 逾期应收款报告Aged debtors’report 逾期账款报告All—monies clause 全额支付条款 Amortization 摊销Analytical questionnaire 调查表分析 Analytical skills 分析技巧Analyzing financial risk 财务风险分析Analyzing financial statements 财务报表分析 Analyzing liquidity 流动性分析 Analyzing profitability 盈利能力分析 Analyzing working capital 营运资本分析Annual expenditure 年度支出Anticipating future income 预估未来收入精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Areas of financial ratios 财务比率分析的对象Articles of incorporation 合并条款Asian crisis 亚洲(金融)危机Assessing companies 企业评估 Assessing country risk 国家风险评估Assessing credit risks 信用风险评估Assessing strategic power 战略地位评估Assessment of banks 银行的评估Asset conversion lending 资产转换贷款 Asset protection lending 资产担保贷款Asset sale 资产出售 Asset turnover 资产周转率Assets 资产Association of British Factors and Discounters 英国代理人与贴现商协会Auditors report 审计报告 Aval 物权担保Bad debt 坏账Bad debt level 坏账等级 Bad debt risk 坏账风险Bad debts performance 坏账发生情况精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Bad loans 坏账Balance sheet 资产负债表Balance sheet structure 资产负债表结构Bank credit 银行信贷Bank failures 银行破产Bank loans．availability 银行贷款的可获得性Bank status reports 银行状况报告 Bankruptcy 破产 Bankruptcy code 破产法Bankruptcy petition 破产申请书Basle agreement 塞尔协议Basle Agreement 《巴塞尔协议》 Behavorial scoring 行为评分Bill of exchange 汇票 Bill of lading 提单 BIS 国际清算银行BIS agreement 国际清算银行协定Blue chip 蓝筹股 Bonds 债券Book receivables 账面应收账款 Borrowing money 借人资金Borrowing proposition 借款申请精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Breakthrough products 创新产品Budgets 预算Building company profiles 勾画企业轮廓Bureaux(信用咨询)公司Business development loan 商业开发贷款 Business failure 破产Business plan 经营计划 Business risk 经营风险 Buyer credits 买方信贷 Buyer power 购买方力量Buyer risks 买方风险CAMPARI 优质贷款原则 Canons of lending 贷款原则 Capex 资本支出Capital adequacy 资本充足性Capital adequacy rules 资本充足性原则 Capital commitments 资本承付款项 Capital expenditure 资本支出 Capital funding 资本融资 Capital investment 资本投资 Capital strength 资本实力精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Capital structure 资本结构Capitalization of interest 利息资本化Capitalizing development costs 研发费用资本化Capitalizing development expenditures 研发费用资本化Capitalizing interest costs 利息成本资本化 Cascade effect 瀑布效应Cash assets 现金资产Cash collection targets 现金托收目标 Cash cycle 现金循环周期Cash cycle ratios 现金循环周期比率Cash cycle times 现金循环周期时间 Cash deposit 现金储蓄Cash flow adjustments 现金流调整 Cash flow analysis 现金流量分析 Cash flow crisis 现金流危机 Cash flow cycle 现金流量周期Cash flow forecasts 现金流量预测 Cash flow lending 现金流贷出 Cash flow profile 现金流概况 Cash flow projections 现金流预测Cash flow statements 现金流量表Cash flows 现金流量精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Cash position 现金头寸Cash positive JE现金流量Cash rich companies 现金充足的企业Cash surplus 现金盈余Cash tank 现金水槽Cash-in-advance 预付现金Categorized cash flow 现金流量分类CE 优质贷款原则CEO 首席执行官 Chairman 董事长，总裁 Chapter 11 rules 第十一章条款 Charge 抵押Charged assets 抵押资产Chief executive officer 首席执行官Collateral security 抵押证券 Collecting payments 收取付款Collection activitv 收款活动Collection cycle 收款环节 Collection procedures 收款程序Collective credit risks 集合信用风险Comfortable liquidity positi9n 适当的流动性水平Commercial mortgage 商业抵押精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Commercial paper 商业票据 Commission 佣金Commitment fees 承诺费 Common stock 普通股Common stockholders 普通股股东 Company and its industry 企业与所处行业 Company assets 企业资产 Company liabilities 企业负债Company loans 企业借款Competitive advantage 竞争优势Competitive forces 竞争力Competitive products 竞争产品Complaint procedures 申诉程序Computerized credit information 计算机化信用信息Computerized diaries 计算机化日志 Confirmed letter of credit 承兑信用证Confirmed letters of credit 保兑信用证 Confirming bank 确认银行 Conservatism concept 谨慎原则 Consistency concept 一贯性原则 Consolidated accounts 合并报表Consolidated balance sheets 合并资产负债表精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Contingent liabilities 或有负债Continuing security clause 连续抵押条款Contractual payments 合同规定支出 Control limits 控制限度Control of credit activities 信用活动控制 Controlling credit 控制信贷Controlling credit risk 控制信用风险Corporate credit analysis 企业信用分析 Corporate credit controller 企业信用控制人员Corporate credit risk analysis 企业信用风险分析Corporate customer 企业客户Corporate failure prediction models 企业破产预测模型Corporate lending 企业贷款Cost leadership 成本领先型Cost of sales 销售成本 Costs 成本Country limit 国家限额Country risk 国家风险Court judgments 法院判决 Covenant 贷款保证契约 Covenants 保证契约Creative accounting 寻机性会计精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Credit analysis 信用分析Credit analysis of customers 客户信用分析Credit analysis of suppliers 供应商的信用分析Credit analysis on banks 银行信用分析 Credit analysts 信用分析 Credit assessment 信用评估Credit bureau reports 信用咨询公司报告 Credit bureaux 信用机构 Credit control 信贷控制Credit control activities 信贷控制活动Credit control performance reports 信贷控制绩效报告 Credit controllers 信贷控制人员Credit cycle 信用循环Credit decisions 信贷决策Credit deterioration 信用恶化 Credit exposure 信用敞口Credit granting process 授信程序 Credit information 信用信息Credit information agency 信用信息机构 Credit insurance 信贷保险Credit insurance advantages 信贷保险的优势 Credit insurance brokers 信贷保险经纪人精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Credit insurance limitations 信贷保险的局限Credit limits 信贷限额Credit limits for currency blocs 货币集团国家信贷限额 Credit limits for individual countries 国家信贷限额 Credit management 信贷管理 Credit managers 信贷经理Credit monitoring 信贷监控Credit notes 欠款单据 Credit period 信用期 Credit planning 信用计划 Credit policy 信用政策Credit policy issues 信用政策发布 Credit proposals 信用申请Credit protection 信贷保护Credit quality 信贷质量Credit rating 信用评级Credit rating agencies 信用评级机构 Credit rating process 信用评级程序Credit rating system 信用评级系统 Credit reference 信用咨询Credit reference agencies 信用评级机构 Credit risk 信用风险精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Credit risk assessment 信用风险评估 Credit risk exposure 信用风险敞口 Credit risk insurance 信用风险保险Credit risk．individual customers 个体信用风险Credit risk：bank credit 信用风险：银行信用 Credit risk：trade credit 信用风险：商业信用Credit scoring 信用风险评分Credit scoring model 信用评分模型 Credit scoring system 信用评分系统Credit squeeze 信贷压缩Credit taken ratio 受信比率Credit terms 信贷条款Credit utilization reports 信贷利用报告 Credit vetting 信用审查Credit watch 信用观察 Credit worthiness 信誉 Creditor days 应付账款天数 Cross-default clause 交叉违约条款Currency risk 货币风险 Current assets 流动资产 Current debts 流动负债Current ratio requirement 流动比率要求精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！演讲稿工作总结调研报告讲话稿事迹材料心得体会策划方案Current ratios 流动比率 Customer care 客户关注Customer credit ratings 客户信用评级Customer liaison 客户联络Customer risks 客户风险Cut-off scores 及格线Cycle of credit monitoring 信用监督循环Cyclical business 周期性行业源自译道翻译论坛网精心收集精心编辑精致阅读如需请下载！第二篇：英汉对照autozero自稳零：自动归零模式application [,æpli'keiʃən]n.应用；申请；应用程序；敷用time drive时间驱动scan [skæn]n.扫描；浏览；审视；细看concn.浓度；adj.浓缩的（等于concentrated）inst安装；设置；autosave ['ɔ:təuseiv]Sample info样品信息；采样信息identity [ai'dentəti]n.身份；特性；代号ordinate ['ɔ:dinət,-neit]n.纵座标；[数]纵线baseline correction基线校正curve [kə:v]n.曲线；曲线图表；曲线拟合；曲线类型intercept [,intə'sept]vt.拦截；截断；窃听n.拦截；[数]截距；number of revolution[机] 旋转次数；转数；重复测定次数response [ri'spɔns]n.响应；反应；回答use exipedition calibration利用已存的标准曲线enter calibration edit修改、校准标准曲线recalibration[ri'kæli'breʃən]n.[仪] 再校准；重新校准已存标准曲线output ['autput, ,aut'put]n.输出，输出量；产量；出产number of samples to average样本数取平均数replace [ri'pleis]vt.取代，代替；替换，更换；delete [di'li:t]vt.删除第三篇：英汉对照导游词长白山北坡导游词女士们、先生们你们好Ladies and gentlemen , good morning!欢迎您来到吉林省长白山国家级自然保护区旅游观光welcome to Changbai Mountain Natural Reserve in jilin province我是这里的导游员As your guide非常高兴能有机会陪同各位一道参观游览长白山it‟s my pleasure to visit Changbai Mountian with you 我愿意竭诚为您服务衷心祝您旅行愉快 I‟m willing to provide good service for you with sincerity and wish everyone has a good time here!敬爱的邓小平同志游览长白山后说‚不登长白山终生遗憾Our respected leader Deng Xiaoping , after visiting Changbai Mountain , said that it would be a lifetime regret without climbing the Changbai Mountain ‛是的我想诸位今天游览长白山后会有更加深刻的体会.Indeed, I believe all of you will have more impressive experience after the visit 长白山将是您生态旅游、回归自然的首选旅游胜地。
扶贫作文素材英文
扶贫作文素材英文英文：Poverty alleviation is an important issue that needs to be addressed in our society. As an individual, I believethat we all have a responsibility to help those who areless fortunate. There are many ways to contribute topoverty alleviation, such as donating money, volunteering,or supporting businesses that employ people from impoverished communities.One example of a successful poverty alleviation program is microfinance. Microfinance provides small loans to individuals who do not have access to traditional banking services. These loans can be used to start a small business, which can help lift individuals and their families out of poverty. For instance, a woman in a rural village in India may use a microloan to start a small vegetable stand, which can provide her with a steady income and improve herfamily's living conditions.Another effective way to alleviate poverty is through education. Education is a powerful tool that can provide individuals with the skills and knowledge they need to improve their lives. By supporting education initiatives,we can help break the cycle of poverty and empower individuals to create a better future for themselves and their communities.中文：扶贫是我们社会需要解决的重要问题。
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外文翻译FINANCING MICROFINANCE FOR POVERTY REDUCTION1byDavid S.Gibbons and Jennifer W.MeehanII.THE NEED FOR A NEW FINANCING PARADIGMDemand for Micro Finance ServicesThere is no doubt that strong demand exists for microfinance services,among the poor around the world.Recent statistics on the global outreach of microfinance institutions(MFIs)report that as of December 31,2000,over 30 million families had access to microfinance services,of which more than 19 million qualified as poorest.This is both encouraging and daunting.Encouraging because the number has increased substantially since 1997,when the Microcredit Summit Campaign was launched.Daunting because that still leaves 81 million poorest families to be reached by 2005 if the Campaign target of 100 million of the poorest is to be achieved.On a regional basis,coverage remains extremely low.In Asia,where almost 15 million poorest families have access to microfinance services,still only 9.3%of all poorest families are being reached.And in Africa and Latin America,only 6%of all poorest families have access to financial services.2It is not surprising,therefore,that NGO-MFIs wanting to increase their outreach to the poorest,having the necessary institutional capacity and access to the necessary funding,have no difficulty in1The authors would like to thank the Microcredit Summit for inviting them to write the paper and for extending full co-operation in the process.V aluable comments were received from a large number of readers to whom an earlier draft was circulated by the Summit Secretariat.Particularly valuable comments were received from CIDA,Ramesh Bellamkonda,Brigit Helms,Dushyant Kapoor,John Lewis,Benji Montemayer,as well as participants in the CASHPOR-PHILNET Financing Microfinance for Poverty Reduction Workshop in Manila,the Philippines,from June 5 th to June 7 th.We thank all commentators for the time they have taken out of their busy schedules.We have done our best to incorporate your suggestions,and feel the paper is much stronger because of them.Helen Todd proof-read the final draft and made valuable suggestions.Nevertheless,we take final responsibility for what we have written.2State of the Microcredit Campaign Report 2001,p11.attracting new clients3.The failure of MFIs outside of Bangladesh to reach significant numbers of poor households in their own countries is not because of a shortage of MFIs.As of December 2000,over 1,600 MFIs(mostly NGO-MFIs)were reporting to the Microcredit Summit Campaign.However,the significant majority of these MFIs are very small,serving less than 2,500 clients each.43Good examples are SHARE in India,CARD in the Philippines,FINCA in Uganda and CRECER in Bolivia.4Efforts of CGAP World Bank(CGAP)to"massify"microfinance,through such intermediaries as rural post offices and even public telephone kiosks,are welcome.But these efforts are new and it would be unwise to neglect the institutions that to date have provided most of the micro finance for the poor,that is, MFIs.If only 10%of the MFIs currently serving the poorest,or approximately 162,could be scaled-up to serve an average of 500,000 very poor households,or 324(approximately 20%)to 250,000 clients,then the goal of the Microcredit Summit of reaching 100 million could be achieved.It is important to acknowledge up front that not all MFIs want to grow to reach truly large numbers(say 250,000-500,000)and certainly some will not be able to build the necessary institutional capacity.But there are many that do and can–certainly more than 10%of all the MFIs reporting to the Microcredit Summit Campaign.Capacity Building as an Ongoing TaskThe MFIs around the world that are interested in scaling-up their outreach to large numbers of poor households are already seeking the institutional capacity to do so.This is easier today than ever before because of the pioneering work of service providers in the industry,like CGAP World Bank,SEEP,the Microfinance Network, Women’s World Banking,ACCION,FINCA,the Grameen Trust and CASHPOR,among others.Much of the training materials needed can be downloaded from the web sites of these organizations.New,more cost-effective management tools are being developed and disseminated continually and MFIs are being required to build the capacity to utilize them.Capacity for scaling-up is being built,and more will be built.There is little,if any, human resource constraint 5.Donors and other funders are also requiring more and better information from the MFIs,whether NGOs or formal financial intermediaries,that they finance.They are asking for greater financial AID,for example,requires not only externally audited financial statements,but also that they be converted into the CGAP standard international format to make possible accurate financial analysis.So MFIs are having to build the institutional capacity to do this.Recognizing Capital 6as a Critical ConstraintWhile we recognize the on-going importance of capacity building,we do not see it as the only constraint.Even when capacity is built,lack of capital blocks rapid expansion.CGAP recently published an interesting and provocative Viewpoint titled Water, Water Everywhere but Not a Drop to Drink,which undertook an assessment of the funding environment for MFIs.It recognized that funding to the microfinance sector is on the rise,with donors and governments participating,often through apex and wholesale facilities as well as private investors.But then it asked the critical question;"With all the funds pouring into the sector,why do MFIs find it difficult to5In most poor countries,certainly in the bigger ones like India and Indonesia,there are huge pools of under-employed,educated youth.Experience tells us that within three months most of them can be trained to identify and motivate poor women to see micro finance as a good opportunity for themselves,and to manage the provision of micro finance services to them.We know also that educated young people in the rural areas,who have never touched a computer,can learn to use efficiently a user friendly software for purposes of data entry at the branch-level.The manpower is waiting for micro finance,at least in the poorer countries.6The term“capital”as used in this section refers to all sources of financing available to microfinance institutions.Please see Glossary,definition a.access needed financing?" Why do"managers of many high-potential MFIs face serious funding constraints"?The answer CGAP provided:"Much of the supply of funds to microfinance is ineffective–narrowly targeted and poorly structured."The first problem is that while donors played a critical role in building the microfinance industry by providing early support to pioneers,they seem reluctant to graduate a new generation of industry leaders.Everyone wants to fund the established "winners,"rather than take the risk of funding and helping to build new winners from among the hundreds of smaller MFIs looking for funding.This means that profitable MFIs get subsidized funding,crowding out the commercial investors who do have the vast resources to allow for rapid scaling-up.The venture capital role of the grant funding donors should instead be directed at potential winners,those with the vision to reach large numbers of the poorest,strong management teams,a commitment to transparency and professionalism and a drive towards efficiency and sustainability.As the CGAP Viewpoint states"…the principal task of donors should be to identify and bet on promising MFIs and leave the known winners to commercial investors."A second problem is that donors have a hard time moving money–funding is not designed to meet the needs of the MFIs,but rather the priorities of donors or governments.These can include country or regional priorities and/or an unhelpful insistence that the funds be used only for onlending.Limitations can be compounded by internal organizational concerns–country-level vs.global programming–and a lack of local knowledge.CGAP's current Peer Review exercise among its member donors,aimed at disseminating best-practice financing for microfinance,should result in a significant reduction of the current funding mismatch.However,it is not directed specifically at the main funding problem of MFIs,the dearth of equity and equity-like financing for microfinance institutions at any stage of maturity.In fact,this is the major funding problem in the industry and will remain so for the foreseeable future–an issue that has yet to be accepted broadly by its non-practitioner actors.The Primary Obstacle is EquityIn the lively discussion that followed the posting of the CGAP Viewpoint on the internet,it became clear that it is not just a lack of supply in general,which ishindering growth in outreach,but rather the type of financing being made available.Practitioners in particular focused on this point.Nejira Nalic,Executive Director of MI-BOSPO in Bosnia and Herzegovina noted that"our decision making processes are lead by our environment and we are in a way suppressed by lack of capital base…"Roshaneh Zafar,Managing Director of Kashf Foundation in Lahore,Pakistan also expressed the need for"socially motivated equity funds."Our experience in Asia,through CASHPOR,reaffirms these views.A recent workshop in the Philippines,Financing Microfinance forPoverty Reduction7,attended by leading MFIs from across the region,indicated that 72% of those attending were constrained in their growth specifically by a lack of funds to cover operating losses,prior to break-even of the expansion.As we are targeting 81 million new clients,and if we assume an average loan outstanding of US100,then around$8.1 billion would be needed in onlending funds.Assuming a capital adequacy requirement of 8%,about US$650 million would be needed as capital for leverage.International financier George Soros,in his book George Soros on Globalization,observes that:…The difficulty[of microlending]is in scaling it up.Successful microlending operations,although largely self-sustaining,cannot grow out of retained earnings,nor can they raise capital in financial markets.To turn microlending into a big factor in economic and political progress,it must be scaled-up significantly.This would require general support for the industry as well as capital for individual ventures8.We agree–even when MFIs become profitable,accumulated profits will not support the kind of large-scale growth required to reach large numbers.Until now,many MFIs have utilized grants from donors to support their operations both in the early years and as they scale up.Yet such grants,already limited in size and availability,are becoming harder to come by as the pool of global MFIs grows.Unfortunately,beyond donors,there really are no private sources of equity financing available to MFIs around the world,particularly those working with the poorest.We must start thinking more innovatively–as most commercial businesses do–about our financing strategies.This will require the microfinance industry to embrace the concept of quasi-equity,to adjust their financial statements to reflect a truer and fairer picture of their financial strength,to challenge prevailing standards7CASHPOR-PHILNET workshop from June 5th–7th,Manila,the Philippines.8George Soros on Globalization,George Soros,pp.83 and 84.for calculating capital adequacy and to set levels appropriate for different MFIS,according to their risk profiles.III.COVERING OPERATING DEFICITSTwo decades ago pioneers such as Muhammad Yunus of the Grameen Bank showed the world that poor,rural women without collateral were bankable.It is time that we recognize that microfinance institutions working with the poor,but lacking conventional capital adequacy,are also bankable.The reason is the same:most poor women,supplied with capital on reasonable terms,will invest it profitably and repay the loans,plus interest,faithfully in full on time.Just as this makes poor women bankable so too does it make MFIs servicing them bankable.The problem is not onlending funds.Local commercial banks are being persuaded that MFIs are worthy,if somewhat unconventional,customers;experience and Asia and Latin America prove this true.Apex institutions have been established in some countries,particularly in Asia,with the support of the World Bank(PKSF in Bangladesh) and the Asian Development Bank(PCFC in the Philippines and RMDC in Nepal),offering financing to MFIs on semi-or near-commercial terms.And social investors and large international NGOs still play an important role in financing loans for onlending.Savings,where MFIs are able to use this as a source of funds,can also play a critical role.Operating deficits to break-even are typically covered by grants,and where possible,private investment.After that,gradual expansion can be covered by retained profits.But few MFIs working with the poor have been able to attract much investment.And few donors are keen to sink funds into what they see as the bottomless pit of operational losses.Some donors insist that their grants be used only to finance onlending,ignoring the reality that onlending costs money.Even were this to change,none of these traditional sources–grants,investment(for non-NGO MFIs)and profits--are available in anywhere near enough supply to propel MFIs to meet the massive demand for microfinance that exists.Given the potential of microfinance to reduce poverty,we must look for prudent alternatives to traditional equity that would allow for faster growth of its outreach to the poor.小额信贷扶贫资金9资料来源：小额信贷扶贫资金，2002(06)作者：大卫·S·吉本斯，詹妮弗·瓦特米汉二、需要一种新型的融资范例小额信贷服务的需求毫无疑问，小额贷款服务在贫困世界存在着强劲需求,据全球外展小额贷款机构(MFIs)的报告，2000年12月31日,有超过30万的家庭有权申请小额信贷服务。