责任的社会工作者道德理论与实践的含义【外文翻译】

本科毕业设计（论文）外文翻译原文：The responsibility of the social worker: ethical implications oftheory and practiceHeinz J. KerstingProtestant University of Applied Sciences, Freiburg, and Institute of Consultation and Supervision, Aachen, GermanyAbstract：Purpose–To focus on the topic of ethics and responsibility, specifically on the ethical action of the social worker.Design/methodology/approach–Considers that while ethical questions are discussed in social discourse everywhere, social work in Germany seems to avoid a reformulation of deeply ethical premises. This is perhaps so, because ethics already are implicit in the actions of social work.Findings– The author believes that the implicit dealing with ethics on the part of the social worker is simila r to the “implicit ethics” of Heinz von Foester, which “cannot be articulated”, but are immanent in every action.Originality/value– A consideration of the ethical responsibilities of the social worker.Keywords Cybernetics；Ethics,；Social welfareNowadays, there are no more conferences, where there is not at least one lecture dedicated to the topic of ethics. Almost every professional group concerns itself with this topic, and many professional associations establish committees on ethics. The German government recently established an ethics committee, with very distinguished members, focussed on the problems of stem cell research. When one looks at the literature, we see a blossoming landscape of ethics, which is semantically innovative, used economically, and politically arguable. Presented linguistically andsometimes already established as morality in technology, business ethics, bio-ethics and until now appearing only in the form of neologisms such as theor-ethics, CybernEthics (von Foerster, 1993b), aesthethics and gene-ethics. Economically rewarding, one finds morality as something for consultants to investin. Politically speaking, morality is often assiduously taxed, as most recently in the discussion for and against the Iraqi war. Ethical imperatives are very current for business, and increasingly ethical questions, concerns and limitations are also being discussed in relation to scientific research, especially in the fields of gene technology and brain research.Here I will focus on the topic of ethics of responsibility, i.e. on the ethical acting of the social worker. However, the professional group of social workers in Germany seems to be immune regarding the topic of its own professional ethics, at least when one looks at the professional literature, browses through the respective magazines and attentively listens to conversations among colleagues. It seems to me that, aside from some exceptions, German social work is little touched by questions regarding ethics.By comparison, social workers in the US and the Netherlands have succeeded in coming up with a “code of ethics”, recognized by its professional group. Perhaps social workers in Germany are mentally too inflexible to pick up on the important developments of the times. Perhaps for them ethical questions are a matter of course in their acting, not warranting big discussions. Perhaps, however, something already shows in their implicit handling of ethics that makes for the standing of ethics in the last years of the second and the first years of the third millennium, thereby pointing to a new and rather useful approach to ethics.Well, I do not think that German social workers are mentally less flexible than the social workers of other countries and the members of the other professional groups. Possibly they perceive the world more pragmatically, need to improvise more, and overload themselves with work so that while they are acting they do not have much time left for explicit ethical reflecting. On the other hand, in many areas, especially those concerning the marginal zones and the vital questions of society, the German social workers have their fingers on the pulse of the times, whileseismographically perceiving the problems of the people more clearly than many other professional groups. In addition, social work is the first professional group that invented supervision for its own reflection, which today has been adopted by many other professional groups throughout Europe as a useful consulting tool for its own practice.In the process of supervision, social workers let themselves to be observed by supervisors. They allow a total stranger to look at their cards, which initiates a very effective process of reflection. With supervision, social work has introduced second-order observation into their practice, and institutionalized the supervisor as the observer of the observers long before “cybernetics of cybernetics” or “second-order cybernetics” (von Foerster, 1993b, pp. 91-4; Bradmann, 1996; Kersting, 1997, 2002, pp. 25-31) was thought about theoretically. Second-order cybernetics delivered a posteriori the theroretical foundation for the effectiveness of supervision as a reflective tool thus far “only” experienced in practice.For social workers this was nothing new, because they had always thought in terms of social interdependencies, which already on early charts had come out as circles. (It would be interesting to reread the classics of social work, for example, Jane Addams, Alice Salomon, Bertha Reynolds, Felix Biesteck, Louis Lowy, Jim Garland, Alex Gitterman for this aspect). Cybernetic thinking clearly contravenes the “fundamental principles of scientific discourse , which commands the separation of observer and the observed. That is the principle of objectivity: The characteristics of the observer shall not enter the description of the observed . . . ” (von Foerster, 1993b, p. 64; translated by Monika Broecker). Objective description acts as if the observer did not exist. However, when I observe the observer and when I observe myself as observer while observing something that seems to be outside of me, then the observer is part of the observation itself, then I as the observer am always the observed as well. This strange process, which in my opinion occurs with any scientific research, as “objective”as it may seem, is called cybernetics of cybernetics, or second-order cybernetics. “When the characteristics of the observer, i.e. the characteristics of observing and describing are excluded, there is nothing left, neither the observationnor the description” (vonFoerster, 1993b, p. 64; translated by Monika Broecker).It makes sense to me that science wants to hold on to this principle of excluding the observer with his characteristics, because it is afraid of paradoxes, for example, such paradoxes, in which we just got caught up. And here we are again, unwittingly, in the land of morality. Out of fear of self-reference, out of fear of the observer including himself in the observation, that he would become the implication of research, out of fear of having to talk about himself, this paradox was forbidden in science. At least since we concerned ourselves with cybernetics, we know that all our scientific theories are based on a belief and are only possible because an angel with a burning sword keeps away the paradoxes that occur through circular, self-referential thinking.Scientific theories usually assert their claim to truth. They operate according to the Aristotelian logic with the distinctions “true/false” and “right/wrong”. They cannot dea l with paradoxes. The statement “All Cretans are liars”, spoken by the Cretan Epimenides, creates a problem that can not be solved with Aristotelian logics. In the middle ages one told the following little story to the beginners in philosophy, in which Epimenides enters the scene; only in the form of a barber: A barber can shave all inhabitants in his little village who cannot shave themselves. But what does the barber do with himself? If he wants to shave himself he can’t shave himself. For if he agrees to the statement that says that he can only shave those who can’t shave themselves, hecan’t shave himself even though on the other hand he can shave himself as he is abarber.Western science was indeed unable to logically deal with paradoxes. And what does o ne do when one can’t logically deal with a thing or a person? One tries to ridicule him or her and imposes a ban. And both did in fact happen. Throughout the entire Middle Ages one made fun of the lying Cretan and of the constantly growing beard of the barber. Or, just as juggling was forbidden in some areas of Europe for religious and moral reasons, one imposed a ban on paradoxes because they were seen as infringing upon the laws of God and of nature. The devil was considered the father of the paradox, because as a fallen angel, he represented a contradiction in himself, which then Goethe lets Mephisto answer to Faust’s question as to who he was: A“part of that power that would always work evil, but always engenders good”. To pronounce the modern scientific verdict about paradoxes was left to Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica, and with that science saved itself in modern times conclusively on the side of the seemingly safe ground of morality.The theory that I have chosen with its implicit ethics does not claim any truth nor loyalty to some master, guru, secretary general, or redeemer. Even what important constructivist teachers like Heinz von Foerster, Humberto R. Maturana, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Paul Watzlawick und Niklas Luhmann say or said is interesting for me only as long it is useful in the process of making rigid situations flexible. If it is not useful in that respect it does not interest me! My responsibility as a social worker means to me precisely an increased attention and precisely this intelligent flexibility. Responsibility means being attentive, being present with myself and my clients means dissolving constancy in the solution of increased possibilities, means a freeing from certainty, only to offer solutions, as an offering and not as a command. As a further form of the ethical imperative I can say to myself: “Heinz (Kersting), be sure that an event remains an event and does not become part of what remains constant. Or worded more paradoxically: Heinz, s ee to it that an event becomes a persistent event!” In this sense it is part of my opinion of social work that it confuses restricting “world views” that have become useless, or expressed more methodically, more elegantly, that it planfully confuses (Bardmann et al., 1991; Kersting, 1992, translated by Monika Broecker). “Einstu¨ rzende Neubauten” (collapsing new buildings) and “Erste allgemeine Verunsicherung” (first general alienation) are the names of two musical groups in Germany, whose names fit this a ctivity. To my understanding social work’s job is not only to irritate but also to motivate and to develop. But beware of the term “develop”. Coming from paedagogy it is suspect. Developing is not to be thought of as progress. Development is not meant to be linear but circular. I want to understand de-veloping in the oldest form of the meaning of the word, which then connotes in the German language diaper, swaddling wrapping, diaper babies, in-volving, en-veloping.Understood like this the word de-veloping belongs to the vocabulary ofliberation. Developing liberates from progressive thinking. In history, paedagogy understood itself too frequently as the production of diaper babies。