《美国经济评论》百年经典论文导读

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美国经济周期稳定化研究述评.

美国经济周期稳定化研究述评.论文报告：美国经济周期稳定化研究述评一、引言二、美国经济周期的发展历程及特点1.美国经济周期的起源2.美国经济周期的特点3.美国经济周期的演变三、美国经济周期中的稳定化措施1.货币政策2.财政政策3.结构性改革四、美国经济周期稳定化措施的评价1.货币政策的优缺点2.财政政策的优缺点3.结构性改革对经济的影响五、美国经济周期稳定化措施的案例分析1.2008年全球金融危机2.1990年代初的股市泡沫3.2001年的经济衰退4.20世纪70年代的经济萧条5.1960年代的经济繁荣六、结论引言作为经济学家，经济周期的稳定化一直是我们关注的重要问题之一。

在过去几十年，美国经济的周期波动频率不断降低，与此同时，美国经济中的通货膨胀率和失业率也趋于稳定。

这种趋势在全球范围内也是普遍存在的。

因此，本论文将围绕美国经济周期的稳定化问题展开研究，并对美国在经济周期波动时期采取的稳定化措施进行评价，最终分析其有效性和可行性。

美国经济周期的发展历程及特点1.美国经济周期的起源美国经济周期的起源可以追溯到19世纪初，发生了一系列的经济萧条和经济衰退。

这些经济周期的起因都是由于生产过剩和金融危机等原因导致的。

这种经济周期的不稳定性，在19世纪末到20世纪初逐渐得到了缓解，主要原因是美国经济结构的变化，劳动力市场的稳定以及生产技术不断创新等因素的作用。

2.美国经济周期的特点近年来的研究表明，美国经济周期具有一定的稳定性，主要表现在以下几个方面：（1）周期波动频率降低：过去几十年，美国经济中的周期波动频率不断降低，经济周期的周期越来越长，经济危机的发生也越来越稀少。

（2）通货膨胀率稳定：近年来，美国的通货膨胀率趋于稳定，这主要是由于美国的货币政策比较稳定，缺乏大幅度的通货膨胀。

（3）失业率稳定：经济周期频率降低以及就业稳定的政策措施的实施，是导致失业率趋于稳定的两个主要因素。

3.美国经济周期的演变美国的经济周期在演变过程中，最初的周期都是和生产规模的波动相联系，后来和金融市场因素的波动相联系变得更为显著。

经济周期中段的美国经济特征与预期其它经济学论文

内容提要：本文分析了处于经济周期中段的美国经济的特征并据此作出预期。

主要结论是：近期，美国经济将持续增长，但增速有所降低；通胀压力日益增大，但仍在可控之下。

美联储极有可能在6月份提升联邦基金利率25年基本点。

8月份是否继续加息，要视新的经济数据而定。

由于利率目标升到5.25~5.5％，将标志着美国货币政策进入紧缩周期，所以美联储会持谨慎态度。

关键词：美国经济周期中段美国经济在2001年3～11月经历了自60年代以来的第七次衰退，此后进入增长周期。

2006年是该周期的第5年，正处于周期中段。

处于这一阶段的美国经济具有以下特征：第一，典型的中期减速增长。

第二，由于经济表现和数据变动的方向复杂，非确定性因素增加，近期经济走势更加难以预期。

第三，经济走势和联储货币政策都更加依赖和敏感于新的数据，市场也变得更加敏感脆弱。

容易随新的经济数据而波动。

第四，相应地，对联储的货币政策走向也更难以预期。

本文对此作具体剖析。

一、2006年以来的美国经济特征（一）经济增长从这次经济周期的路径特征看：由于周期前的衰退时间短、幅度小，复苏也相应地具有时间短、幅度平缓的特征。

2004年gdp增长达到4.2％的峰值，2005年开始出现减速增长。

1.gdp 2006年第一季度，美国gdp年率在2005年第四季度仅增长1.7％的基础上强劲反弹达5.3％，高于历史趋势水平。

从增长成份看，以耐用品为主的消费者支出。

设备和软件等商业投资支出，出口起主导作用。

同期，公司税后利润达$15，950亿历史高点，在gdp中的占比也达8.9％历史高点。

在物价增长有限的条件下，公司主要从生产率增长获得利润增长动力。

2.商业支出2006年前5个月，工业产出、建筑支出增长率和采购经理指数（ism）等反映商业支出的主要指标有一个共同特征：波动频繁，幅度较大。

经济前景的不确定性，导致了商业部门的支出举棋不定。

3.消费者支出消费者收入和支出依然持续和稳定，但其中的住房销售，这个曾在本次经济周期中起到中流砥柱作用的功臣，已是强弩之末。

浅谈美国经济政治

成绩：论文题目：浅谈次贷危机后的美国经济政治以及对中国的启示作者：课程名称：授课教师：院系：年级：学号：时间：浅谈次贷危机后的美国经济政治以及对中国的启示2007年－2009年环球金融危机，又称世界金融危机、次贷危机、信用危机，更于2008年起名为金融海啸及华尔街海啸等，是一场在2007年8月9日开始浮现的金融危机……直到2008年9月9日，这场金融危机开始失控，并导致多间相当大型的金融机构倒闭或被政府接管。

——百度百科2008年的次贷危机，由美国首发，几乎在一夜之间，以迅雷不及掩耳之势席卷全球。

这是继1929—1933年经济大萧条之后，又一次在美国爆发的世界性的经济灾难。

在全球化日益发展的今日，“牵一发而动全身”的例子被“完美”地呈现。

美国为此次灾难的始作俑者，在经济方面自然也首当其冲地受到了极其严重的打击。

经济危机的发生不可避免，这是资本主义经济发展呈现的一种“危机-萧条-复苏-高涨”的周期性规律。

正如恩格斯所说：“在把资本主义生产方式本身炸毁以前不能使矛盾得到解决，所以它就成为周期性的了。

资本主义生产产生了新的‘恶性循环’”。

当然，这与其存在的上层建筑——资本主义制度也是密不可分的。

资本主义制度促进商品经济的高度发达以及竞争规律促进生产力的飞速发展，同时也使资本主义私人占有和社会需求的矛盾突显并日益加深。

美国史密斯商学院经济学家皮特.凯尔教授说：“银行业普遍关心平衡自己的资产负债水平，从而出现借贷紧缩甚至借贷枯竭，其必然后果就是美国经济陷入衰退。

现在我们正在步入经济衰退期……”。

面对此次经济上的穷山恶水，世界各国尤其是资本主义世界自是一片恐慌。

就美国而言，其经济一直在连年的财政赤字下运行，由流动性危机爆发（如2007年四月，美国第二大次级房贷公司——新世纪金融公司的破产就暴露了次级抵押债券的风险），到道琼斯工业平均指数创历史新高，再到后来的股市崩盘，美林证券被美国银行收购，雷曼兄弟申请破产，Wachovia的存款业务可能被花旗银行收购等等，无不令美国政府忧心忡忡。

The American Economic Review 论人力资本投资

Nonhuman capital
人力资本
非人力资本
Labor capital Conventional capital Material capital Physical capital Labor force Competitive market Economic growth Inheritance taxation
舒尔茨十分关注农业发展的滞后、贫穷与工业的高生产率、高收入水平之间的反差，将农业经济作为经济体的一部分去研究，并将研究延伸至全世界的发展中国家。舒尔茨系统地分析了教育投资对农业生产率以及经济发展影
响，并在1960年提出了人力资本投资理论，认为人力资本投资
是促进经济增长的关键因素。舒尔茨在《论人力资本投资》一文中第一次提出了“人力资本”这一新的资本概念，对其后各类人力资本学说直到发展为今天的人力资源管理这一较为完善的学科起到了深远影响。
观点四：关于社会和政策的九项建议
1）在税收政策上应该给人力资本给予优惠；
2）防止人人力资本的闲置和老化； 3）避免对人力资本投资进行人为的干扰； 4）完善人力资本市场，银行应积极主动地提供人力资本所需的费用，鼓励私人和公共投资；
5）政府应承担人力资本投资的大部分费用，特别是资助
劳动力向城市转移；
开始探究传统经济学的不足。
里昂惕夫之谜
里昂惕夫在1953年和1956年的两次研究中发现了一个难以
解释的现象：按照传统理论，美国这个世界上具有最昂贵劳动力和最密集资本的国家，应主要出口资本密集型产品，进口劳动密集型产品。但事实恰好相反，美国出口量最大的却是农产品等劳动密集型产品，进口量最大的却是汽车、钢铁
对于发展中国家来说，20世纪60年代的物质资本投资收益率为15％，人力资本投资收益率为20％； 20世纪70年代这两个数字分别为13％和15％。可见，加大人力资本投资对发展中国家意义尤为重大。

(完整版)微观经济学教学案例

目录上篇—-微观经济学经济学基础案例1:关于大学生占座现象的经济学分析.案例2：对房租的限制有利于解决住房问题吗？案例3：莫斯科歌剧院的票价。

案例4:美国农产品的价格保护.消费者理论案例1:为什么水要比钻石便宜?案例2：买“黄牛票”案例3：吉芬商品：向右下方倾斜的需求曲线是例外吗？案例4:利息所得税如何影响家庭储蓄？生产者理论案例1：美国啤酒行业的适者生存测试.案例2：“无花边费用"业务模式。

案例3：服装店的张老板是盈利了，还是亏损了？案例4：如何确定企业的最佳批量规模？市场结构理论案例1：结合现实生活谈谈西方经济学中不同市场结构的区别.案例2:企业的定价策略。

案例3：方便面市场竞争案例。

分配理论案例1：天津丑女“张静事件"及美国经济学家的调查报告.案例2：美国大型企业CEO的薪水报告。

案例3:华为的神话。

总体均衡与福利经济学案例1：经济学家的赌博。

案例2：苏联解体与其经济状况。

案例3：中国改革中收入分配差距的拉大。

微观经济政策案例1：农村改革第一步：家庭联产承包责任制。

案例2：沱江特大污染事故。

案例3:楼道安装防盗门的事件。

下篇——宏观经济学国民收入核算理论案例1:部分国家的GDP比较。

案例2：中国和印度的经济增长的比较。

案例3：“绿色GDP"警示中国经济.国民收入决定理论：总需求—总供给模型。

案例1：利用AD—AS模型分析我国宏观经济运行中的具体问题。

案例2：20世纪90年代日本经济的衰退。

案例3:石油危机与滞胀。

宏观经济政策（一)货币政策案例1：“治大国如烹小鲜”。

案例2：中央银行的独立性与通货膨胀。

案例3：宽松货币政策刺激内需,推动英国经济增长.案例4：稳健货币政策中的“适度从紧”.（二）财政政策案例1：政府增加政治支出，大选因素刺激亚洲经济增长。

案例2：增税反而促进经济增长？—-克林顿政府财政政策评析。

案例3:中国积极的财政政策.宏观经济问题（一）就业与失业理论案例1:大萧条与罗斯福新政.案例2：严峻的中国就业形势。

美国经济及QE3对全球经济影响论文

浅析美国经济及QE3对全球经济的影响2012年，全球进入新一轮的经济衰退期。

美国也正经历自1933年经济大萧条以来最为严重的经济衰退。

全球三大经济体——美国、欧盟、中国，像高速行驶的火车，经济连续十年高增长。

由此而引发的产能过剩，产业结构失调，工业技术进步缓慢，是此一轮经济衰退的根本原因。

继2010年美国联邦储备系统（federal reserve system，简称fed），在以雷曼兄弟倒闭为标志的“金融危机”增发6000亿美元的货币量化宽松（简称qe2）之后，2012年美国经济因欧盟成员国一系列的债务危机影响，经济再度落入低谷。

尤其是美国制造业，制造业指数3年来首次跌破50，至49.7。

（见图1.1）此外，美国6月公布的零售数据已连续三个月下降，这是自08年以来持续时间最长的连续下降。

（见图1.2）全球市场都增强了对fed推行新一轮货币量化宽松（简称qe3）的预期。

首先，如果推行qe3其货币发行量会有多大根据卡甘模型货币需求函数：mt-pt=-γ（ept+1-pt）其中mt是t期货币量的对数；pt是t期物价水平的对数（t期为2010年qe2），而γ是决定货币需求对通货膨胀率敏感度的参数。

mt-pt是实际货币余额的对数，而pt+1-pt是t期和t+1期（目前盛炒的qe3）之间的通货膨胀率（2010年qe2时美国的cpi为0.1%，截止5月美国的cpi为1.8%）。

如果通货膨胀上升1%，那么实际货币余额就减少γ%。

ept+1是预期的物价水平，实际货币余额取决于预期的通货膨胀率。

也就是说美联储的预期通货膨胀率是2%现在低于2%说明预期的货币余额远远大于实际货币余额。

根据菲利普斯曲线，当π每增加1%那么失业率就相对减小1%（这个只是理论值，并且必须在cpi远小于正常cpi的时候，以此来看qe2的推出是起到效率最大化的。

美国的失业率从15%降低到了8.2%附近，通货膨胀率从0.1%上升到2.5%那么菲利普斯曲线的斜率应当是2.4：6.8，可能存在不精确。

《美国经济评论》20篇百年经典经济论文导读

《美国经济评论》20篇百年经典经济论文导读2014-09-13经济学茶座由美国经济学联合会主办的《美国经济评论》创刊于1911年，是在美国影响最大，也是世界知名遐迩的经济学期刊之一。

为纪念创刊100周年，期刊特邀了阿罗（K.J.Arrow）、伯恩黑姆（D.Bernheim）、费尔德斯坦（M.S.Feldstein）、麦克法登（D.L.McFadden）、波特巴（J.M.Poterba）与索洛（R.M.Solow）等六位著名经济学家，成立了“20篇最佳论文”评选委员会，在该刊100年来刊登的数千篇文章中，甄选出对经济学发展与实践产生深远、重大影响，且富有创造性的20篇最佳论文。

2011年第1期《美国经济评论》出版了百年纪念特刊，开辟了百年论坛专栏，并公布了中选结果。

膺选论文都名重一时，代表了每一时期经济学的最高学术水平,同时整体再现了百年来在经济学领域艰辛跋涉、不断探索的历史发展轨迹，反映了美国主流经济学的基本走向。

为了提选最具开创意义和积厚流广的论文，评委会首先使用了JSTOR （JournalStorage）系统的论文引用和查询数量作为参考指标进行初选。

其后，为避免因论文引用与查询数量指标的内在缺陷可能导致早期刊发的经济学家的文章被漏选或误选，评委会对若干著名经济学家的相关文章也给予了重点关注。

最后，评委会每个人以自己对于质量和重要性的判断为标准，从已选论文中再作遴选，授予20篇论文为百年最佳论文。

其中，12篇论文为诺贝尔经济学奖得主独著或合著的经典论文。

现给出这20篇膺选最佳论文的导读，以飨读者，让读者感受这些经济学经典文献所蕴含的内在价值。

论文导读按文章发表先后顺序排列：《生产理论》（1982）C.W.柯布与P.H.道格拉斯著本文研究了1899-1922年间美国制造业的资本、劳动与产出的关系，分析了这一时期劳动与资本两类要素对产出的影响，首次提出并使用了此后以其名字命名的不变弹性柯布－道格拉斯（Cobb－Douglas）生产函数，其一般形式为：P＝ALαKβ,式中，P、L、K分别为产量、劳动、资本，A、α、β为三个参数。

美国金融危机研究论文

美国金融危机研究论文一、所谓战略家们构思的能享受不劳而获的长期稳定的“美梦路径图”1、“美梦路径图”的由来早在“布雷顿森林体系”的年代，美国因为庞大的军事开支和国外贸易竞争的日益激烈，就已经面临了贸易赤字的问题。

然而，当时毕竟美元与黄金挂钩，使得美国在面临黄金储备流失的问题上不得不考虑其贸易逆差的问题，经常性地通过提高关税、实施贸易配额和美元贬值等方式来改善贸易条件。

但是，由于美国不愿意削减其消费效用和庞大的军费开资，仍然不能从根本解决这个问题。

于是在尼克松的时代，他宣布了黄金禁运，并脱离了美元金本位，进一步让美元贬值，以减少美元外债价值。

似乎在这个时候，美国人意识到可能已经发现了一条可以不劳而获地安享他人财富的路径，那就是对贸易逆差不必过于在意，通过增发美元，贸易顺差国家将不得已将美元外汇投资到美国，美国人可以安享财富而不必削减消费效用和军费开支。

到了第二代布雷顿森林体系的时代，以东亚新兴经济体为代表的国家和地区让本国货币紧盯住美元，形成出口导向型经济发展模式，从而赚取大量美元外汇。

由于没有了美元与黄金的挂钩，美国在货币发行量上得以以其贸易状况为标准过量发行美元。

美国之所以能够无视长期巨额逆差甚至故意制造逆差，原因在于他们相信：由于长期经济发展的依存关系，贸易顺差国家对于这些美元外汇的处理上没有太多的选择权，只能将赚取的外汇重新投放美国，购买美国的各种证券及金融衍生品，把钱借给美国人消费，从而形成一种美元回流的状态。

故而，本文将该过程称为美国人之梦路径图，简称“美梦路径图”。

2、“美梦路径图”的全过程对于美国的赤字借贷循环，贸易顺差国家在处理美元外汇时面临的三条选择，如图1所示。

其中，对于贸易顺差国而言，第一条选择路径显然是不可取的，美国的战略家们显然也以这一点为假设而进行了下面博弈的设想。

第二条购买美国企业的选择也许会随时间的推移而有所变化，不过可以肯定的是在危机爆发之前，美国不会允许的确也没有允许贸易顺差国购买其关系未来经济制高点的相关企业。

美国经济评论century paper3

American Economic Review 101 (February 2011): 36–48/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.1.36Some Unsettled Problems of IrrigationBy Katharine Coman*[Geologist Nathaniel] Shaler called the Cordilleran area, comprising the western third of the United States, the “curse of the Continent.” West of the hundredth merid-ian, precipitation, except for certain favored sections, is insufficient for agriculture or for forest growth, and pasturage can be reckoned on for the spring and early summer only. From the mesas and foothills of the Rockies to the western slope of the Sierras, arid or semi-arid conditions prevail. The average annual rainfall varies from two inches in the deserts of the southwest to 20 inches on the Great Plains, but nowhere except on the north Pacific coast does it furnish a reliance for the farmer.On the western slopes of the mountain ranges, where the moisture-laden winds of the Pacific ascend to colder altitudes, there is considerable rain. The precipitation of autumn and winter is held in vast beds of snow and ice until the fervid suns of May and June release the flow. Then springs and torrents rush down to the lowlands, the rivers overflow their banks, and the valleys are flooded. How to conserve this excess water to serve the needs of summer-grown crops is the problem of arid America.The first Americans who attempted to farm the desert were the pioneers of the Mormon migration. Brigham Young and the 140 devoted saints who followed his lead across the Wasatch Mountains to the new Zion on the mesa above Great Salt Lake had no knowledge of irrigation; but agriculture was a sine qua non to a settle-ment so remote from civilization. Within two hours of their arrival they began to plow for a belated planting. “We found the land so dry,” wrote Lorenzo Snow, “that to plow it was impossible, and in attempting to do so some of the plow beams were broken. We therefore had to distribute the water over the land before it could be bro-ken.” The simple device worked satisfactorily and was used thereafter, not only to soften the soil but to water the crops. The damming of City Creek marked the begin-ning of irrigation in the Great Basin. Thereafter water supply was regarded even more than character of soil and means of transportation in determining the location of the successive “stakes” planted in the wilderness. Irrigating works were built, as were roads and bridges and sawmills, by cooperative effort, each colonist contribut-ing labor or material or money as he best could. New and struggling communities were not infrequently financed by the Church, stock being taken in exchange for funds advanced. The Mormon communities have now some six million acres under irrigation in the arid West and are producing wheat and alfalfa, sugar beets, peaches, cherries, and strawberries, out of all proportion to their ratio in the agricultural pop-ulation of the United States.* Coman (1857–1915), Wellesley College, Wellesley, MA 02481. Originally appearing in March 1911, this is a reprint of the first article published in the first issue of the American Economic Review, volume 1, issue 1, pp. 1–19.During her time at Wellesley (1883–1900), Coman served as professor of history, chair of the economics depart-ment, and dean of the college.3637 Vol. 101 no. 1comAn: somE unsEttlEd pRoBlEms oF iRRigAtionMeantime the American pioneers in California were profiting by the irrigating experience of their Spanish predecessors. Dr. John Marsh, a Yankee and a Harvard graduate, secured a Spanish grant to a good square mile of land at the foot of Mt. Diablo and set about its cultivation with a zeal that soon made him one of the wealth-iest landowners in the province. His orchards and vineyards and irrigated fields were the marvel of the hijos del pais. Sutter’s ranch on American Fork was an equally convincing demonstration of what brains could do by adding water to the soil and climate of California. Water rights were free as air, and every ranchero used the streams that the winter rains sent across the lowlands, according to his own conve-nience. Only in the pueblos, San José and Los Angeles, was there endeavor to treat the scant supply as a common property to be developed by the building of dams and ditches under the direction of the public authorities. The advent of the gold seekers made heavy demands upon the water resources of the Sierras. Running water was a prime necessity in placer mining, the new market afforded by the mining communi-ties induced a far more extensive agriculture, and water rights became, for the first time, a matter of serious concern. The water needed to operate the sluices and long toms had to be conducted to the diggings in flumes, sometimes many miles in length and representing a considerable investment of labor and capital. Mining custom, which the California Legislature formulated into law, established the principle of “first come first served.” A notice posted at the point of diversion, stating date of posting and the amount of water to be taken out, constituted a claim to a specified number of miners’ inches. The law required that the claim should be registered with the county officer within 60 days of the posting, and the courts later decided that the claimant must prove that the construction of ditches, canals, or flumes had been undertaken immediately and prosecuted with diligence, and that the water drawn off was being put to a beneficial use. Notwithstanding these precautions, the m iners’ custom, notably when applied to agricultural districts, gave rise to strife and uncertainties that seriously handicapped industrial development. It had become evident that land with no assured water supply was of little value for agriculture. The streams that might be utilized within the resources of individual ranchmen were soon monopolized, and works of greater cost were needed to construct diversion dams, build main canals, and set up pumping machinery for the irrigation of the thousands of acres of fertile land that lay back from the water courses. In the hope of encouraging the development of the Great Valley between the Sierras and the Coast Range, a region all untouched by the Spanish regime, the Legislature (1862) passed an act authorizing the incorporation of canal companies and the construction of canals “for the transportation of passengers and freights, or for the purpose of irrigation and water power, or for the conveyance of water for mining or manufac-turing purposes, or for all of such purposes.” Under this liberal enactment, several irrigation companies were organized on the basis of claims to the flow of the San Joaquin and its tributary rivers.The common law doctrine of riparian rights was adopted by the courts of California in the early years of American occupation with no question as to its appli-cability to the new conditions. Practice vested in the adjacent landowner not only right to a continuous and undiminished flow, but to diversion for his own use and also for sale to agriculturists less fortunately situated. The effect was to give an extraordinary advantage to first comers and to speculators in this most valuable of38tHE AmERicAn Economic REViEW FEBRuARy 2011 natural resources. Subsequent cultivators, men who were proposing to convert cattle ranches and wheat fields into orchards and vegetable gardens, were obliged to be content with what was left or to defend their secondary claims by force. Appeal to the courts involved long and costly suits with inconclusive results, since the process of adjudication must be gone over whenever a new claimant appeared or an old claim was revived or extended. Agricultural enterprise in California is still retarded by the uncertainty of water rights and the heavy costs of litigation. Any one of the tens and hundreds of appropriators along a single stream may bring suit to enlarge his share, and the law offers no remedy to the revival of old disputes. Often the small farmer cannot afford the contest, and the victory goes by default to the wealthy ranchman or the well capitalized company. The doctrine of riparian rights even as modified by 50 years of court decisions is hopelessly inadequate, and the water users have had to resort to private agreements with mutual recognition of all the rights appurtenant to the supply in question. The doctrine of appropriation, the only doctrine suited to an arid agriculture, has never been formally recognized in California, much less the superior right of the public to the water supply which is precipitated on the mountain heights, collected in state-owned lakes and rivers, and which is indispensable to the future development of the commonwealth.By 1875 all the easily irrigated lands of the Cordilleran area were occupied, and it had become evident that the homestead law which had worked so satisfactorily in the Mississippi Valley was quite inapplicable to the conditions presented to the set-tler in the arid regions. The Desert Land Act was passed (1877) with intent to offer a sufficient reward to induce the man taking up public land to put in irrigating works.A full section of arid land, four times the amount permitted under the preemption or homestead acts, might be acquired by paying 25 cents per acre at the time of entry, redeeming the same by irrigation, within three years, and then paying the final charge of one dollar per acre. Residence on the holding was not required.1The Desert Land Act was put through Congress by men who knew little of west-ern conditions, on the assumption that water would always be found upon the land and in such form that it could be readily diverted to the fields; but few regions are so fortunately situated. Irrigation on a scale necessary to utilize distant mountain streams or to pump the subterranean flow required more capital and engineering skill than the ranchmen possessed and usually developed a capacity for watering tens of thousands of acres. The organization of irrigation companies followed. Hydrographic engineering was a new art, construction was not infrequently faulty, water rights uncertain, and the quantity of water available often grossly exaggerated. The promoters of these schemes relied on the fact that the settlers could do nothing toward completing their titles without water, and they devised contracts by which the farmer paid a flat rate per acre, regardless of the amount of water furnished. The temptation to contract to irrigate more land than could be provided for proved irresistible, and many of the settlers were ruined. Such promoters soon discovered, however, that they had killed the goose that laid the golden egg, for without water users there could be no revenue.1 The act was amended in 1891, reducing the holding to 320 acres and introducing the residence requirement.39 Vol. 101 no. 1comAn: somE unsEttlEd pRoBlEms oF iRRigAtionThe decade of 1880 to 1890 was the boom period of irrigation. The energies of the West were turned from the dwindling returns of cattle ranches and mining properties to the latent possibilities of the desert. Speculation ran riot. The capac-ity of lakes and streams was overestimated, and the agricultural value of land and climate exaggerated by overenthusiastic promoters; stocks and bonds were sold broadcast among investors who appreciated the significance of irrigation, but had no means of testing the legal or financial status of any individual proposition. The great majority of these projects failed, and the money contributed by thousands of small investors was irretrievably lost. Nothing goes to wreck more quickly than irri-gation works where repairs are not maintained; the ditches fill with sand or silt, the flumes warp in the sun, and the cement dams disintegrate under the alternate action of frost and heat. Many of the promoters, as well as the investors, had reason to ask themselves the unanswerable conundrum: What is the difference between a boom and a boomerang?Of far more interest than the physical problems of irrigation or its speculative possibilities is the slow but steady growth of custom and legislation away from the doctrine of riparian rights and priority claims to the recognition of the paramount importance of beneficial use and the public good. The first scientific study of irriga-tion as an economic problem was made by J. W. Powell, Chief of US Geographical Survey, in his report on the lands of the Arid Region, published by the government in 1879. Powell had spent a decade in the exploration of the great desert region between the Colorado River and the Snake, and his conclusions were worthy of con-sideration. He estimated that 8 percent or about 60 million acres of the Cordilleran area was both fertile and susceptible of irrigation, a conclusion not greatly in excess of the latest calculations of irrigation experts. Since the isolated farmer was unequal to the task of building and maintaining the dams and ditches needed, Powell pro-posed that Congress “authorize the organization of irrigation districts by homestead settlements upon the public lands requiring irrigation for agricultural purposes.” Any nine or more persons applying for a tract of land with the intention of construct-ing irrigation works were entitled to register for 80 acres each, in a continuous tract, the lands to be patented when evidence of successful irrigation was submitted. His observation of irrigation in Utah convinced Powell that a cooperative undertaking of this nature was not only practicable but the best means of preventing land monop-oly, and he deemed such legislation essential “if these lands are to be reserved for actual settlers, in small quantities, to provide homes for poor men, on the principle involved in the homestead laws.” Thus early was attention called to the inadequacy of the Desert Land Act, the desirability of encouraging a more democratic form of irrigation by cooperating communities, the necessity of attaching the water right to the land in order to guard against monopolization of both land and water, and the importance of a scientific classification of the public lands into irrigable, pasture, timber, and mineral, so that the diverse interests might be promoted by appropriate legislation. Powell was, unfortunately, 20 years in advance of public sentiment, and his farseeing recommendations attracted little attention at Washington.What might be accomplished by cooperative effort had already been demon-strated in the Mormon communities and in the Union Colony at Greeley, Colorado; but the first legislative enactment in furtherance of cooperative construction was the Wright Act, the California law of 1887. This provided that irrigation districts might40tHE AmERicAn Economic REViEW FEBRuARy 2011 be organized under state supervision wherever a majority of the resident freeholders should petition for the privilege. The district, once established, had authority to issue bonds, secured by a mortgage on the lands in question, for the purchase or construc-tion of waterworks, and further, to levy taxes assessed on the real estate represented sufficient to meet interest on the bonds and the annual costs of maintenance. The conduct of routine business was vested in elected trustees, but extraordinary con-tracts must be submitted to vote and ratified by the freeholders. Extravagant hopes were entertained of this system, and many districts were organized, but few have proven entirely successful. In many instances worthless or contested water rights were purchased, and the district was involved in long and costly litigation. In others, engineering works of great difficulty were undertaken with small comprehension of the expense involved, and the original bond issue was swallowed up in the prelimi-nary works. In order to get the water within reach of the farmers, a new issue was made necessary, and the trustees found the marketing of second mortgage bonds on property as yet undeveloped a piece of financiering quite beyond their powers. In the effort to push the enterprise through to completion, they not infrequently resorted to illegal means, and the district was in consequence dissolved. The crisis of 1893 involved in financial ruin still other districts that had been successfully managed up to that time.Some of these difficulties were peculiar to California, where confusion as to water rights and the hostility of private companies presented well-nigh insuperable diffi-culties, but others are universal. It is not an easy matter to get a group of landowners, geographically selected with reference to drainage basin, to cooperate intelligently and to wait patiently the result of an engineering problem; and again, the resources of such a community are rarely adequate to the carrying through of any but the simpler works. The irrigation district has since been legalized in half a dozen western states, and many bankrupt companies have been bought out by farmers thus associated; but nowhere is the device regarded as the solution of the larger financial problems of irrigation. The irrigation district can only succeed where cost of construction is light, and where soil and climate render the lands highly productive, as in southern California. Western men were becoming convinced that if the homestead law was to have any meaning west of the hundredth meridian, government must come to the aid of the settler, first in the adjudication of water rights, and second in the construction of the more costly irrigation works.Under the influence of Greeley and its daughter colonies, the state of Colorado (1876) had set aside the riparian right and announced the doctrine of appropriation,dedicating the water of every natural stream to the use of the people. A brief experi-ence of the hardships and loss involved in water wars and lawsuits determined the farmers of Colorado to insist on the public adjudication of conflicting claims. The state is now divided into districts according to drainage, and disputes as to priority and the prorating of water are referred to the corresponding water commissioners, from whose decision the aggrieved may appeal to the courts. But Colorado has as yet made no provision for the scientific measurement of the flow of streams, the capacity of canals, the acreage of land served, and the agricultural duty of the water furnished. The early settlers were accustomed to put in claims for a water supply far in excess of their needs, and the sum total of these claims was often in excess of the maximum output of the stream. The important water resources of the state are41 Vol. 101 no. 1comAn: somE unsEttlEd pRoBlEms oF iRRigAtionthus pledged to two and three times their utmost capacity, and the land now being developed can only be provided with water by the construction of mammoth reser-voirs. Colorado, however, took the lead in adopting the principle of appropriation as fundamental to any final adjudication of water rights. This doctrine and the necessity of public control were soon recognized in Congressional legislation (e.g., the Desert Land Act and the Timber Culture Act), and these principles may be regarded as now fully established for the arid region.The water code of Wyoming, adopted with its constitution in 1890, was the first thoroughgoing attempt to put the vexed question of water titles on a scientific and equitable basis and to render the water right inseparable from land ownership. Under this law, application for diversion of any portion of a lake or stream must be registered with the state engineer, and no claim has any validity until ratified by his office. The registration of a claim gives prescriptive right, but to secure legal title, the claimant must prove that the projected works have been constructed within the specified time and that the water is being used for a beneficent purpose. The state engineer is obliged to reject the application and to refuse registration in case the flow of the stream in question is all appropriated, or if he has reason to believe that the claimant is financially unequal to its development. Otherwise the certificate of registration might be used to promote a fraudulent undertaking. The adjudication of disputes is vested in a Board of Control made up of the state engineer and the super-intendents of the four water districts. Evidence as to the capacity of the stream and of the several diversion ditches, together with the agricultural requirements of the lands to be furnished, are ascertained by scientific survey. The superintendent of the division in which the disputed claims lie hears testimony as to priority of use, quan-tity utilized, etc., and prepares a list of existing claims. The decision of the Board of Control amounts to a formal decree defining all rights, and on this basis certificates of title are issued. Appeal may be made, however, from the Board of Control to the courts. This comprehensive and highly satisfactory system has been adopted with various minor modifications in Nebraska, Idaho, Utah, Nevada, the two Dakotas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Oregon and has gone far to straighten out the confused tangle of riparian rights, priority rights, excess claims, etc. The Wyoming plan has done all that law can do toward determining the legal status of irrigation in the com-monwealths adopting it, and the practice of enforcing unauthorized claims by armed gangs and dynamiting the dams of rival companies is fast fading into the dramatic if disastrous past.The legal problems of irrigation are thus in a fair way to settlement, but the finan-cial problems remain. The furnishing of water by a private monopoly is no more satisfactory to an agricultural district than to a municipality, and the danger of inad-equate supply and exorbitant charges is no less a menace. In southern Spain, where this system obtains and water is sold at auction, the water rates mount in a dry season to an all but prohibitive point. In a wet summer, on the contrary, when the farmers have no need of the artificial supply, they fall so low that the company does not realize enough revenue to offset running expenses. The California law of 1862 empowered water companies “to establish, collect and receive rates, water rents or tolls, which shall be subject to regulation by the board of supervisors of the county or counties in which the work is situated, but which shall not be reduced by the supervisors so low as to yield to the stockholders less than one and one half percent42tHE AmERicAn Economic REViEW FEBRuARy 2011 per month on the capital actually invested.” This method of adjusting charges has not proven entirely satisfactory to either producer or consumer of the water sup-ply. Eighteen percent, a not unusual rate of profit in the early days of California, is excessive now that there is abundant capital on hand for such investments, while the “capital actually invested” means an overestimate of the present value of the prop-erty. No redress was provided in case the supply furnished is insufficient to meet all engagements, and in the not infrequent cases where the canal crosses county lines, the several boards of supervisors may come to different conclusions as to the justice of a given rate. Finally, the courts have ruled that a contract negotiated between company and water user cannot be set aside by the dictum of a public officer, and many farmers have been induced to accept a “contracting-out” clause which renders the arbitrament of the supervisors invalid. However, in the last analysis, the pros-perity of the community served is recognized by sane promoters to be the ultimate source of revenue, and charges are regulated by what the farmer can afford to pay rather than by what the water monopoly might possibly extort, while in many dis-tricts the waterworks are owned and rates fixed by the farmers themselves.On the other hand the financial future of the irrigation company is often far from reassuring. Irrigation works are usually built in advance of settlement, and returns sufficient to pay interest on the cost of construction cannot be expected until the number of consumers has reached the full capacity of the flow. Even where all con-ditions are favorable, water abundant, works adequately built, and soil and climate promising, the promoters of water companies aiming to supply settlers on public lands are often balked of dividends by the “sooners,” who seek out each new p roject in advance of the constructing engineers and locate their claims as soon as the sur-veyors’ stakes are driven. By more or less fraudulent compliance with the homestead act, they manage to get possession of the best land under the prospective canal. They have no intention of developing their holdings and use little or no water for irrigation but hold their patents for a rise in value and thus retard legitimate settlement. An arrangement far more satisfactory both to the farmers and to the purveyor of water obtains where both land and water supply are owned by the same company. Thus the Crocker estate in the San Joaquin valley is being sold in small tracts of five, ten, and 20 acres to actual colonists, and the deed of sale guarantees sufficient water for irrigation at the flat rate of one dollar per acre per year. The same terms are accorded under the Miller & Lux irrigation project and on some of the great California wheat ranches that are now being divided into fruit farms. The system is an admirable one, ensuring to the cultivator the indispensable water supply at a reasonable and unvary-ing price and to the owner of the works an adequate return on his investment. Long and intimate acquaintance with the vexations that beset irrigation projects inspired Senator Carey of Wyoming to urge upon Congress the legislation which has finally put the private irrigation of public lands on a rational basis. Under the Carey Act (1894), the federal government offers to make over to any one of the arid states complying with certain provisions as to reclamation and settlement one million acres of the public land or such portion thereof as has been demonstrated by actual survey to be susceptible of irrigation. The land commission of the state participating in this privilege is made responsible for the projects undertaken. The adequacy of the water right, the character of the works, the financial standing of the undertaking company are all passed upon and the prescribed specifications accepted43 Vol. 101 no. 1comAn: somE unsEttlEd pRoBlEms oF iRRigAtionin a written contract before the lands covered by the project may be offered for sale or advertisements issued. The lands are sold by the state officials in tracts of from 20 to 160 acres, at a rate fixed by each state and to bona fide settlers.2 Persons filing on these lands must furnish proof of at least 30 days’ residence and the cultivation of one eighth of the tract before receiving clear title. Furthermore, they must have signed a contract with the water company agreeing to purchase the water right at a specified charge per acre. Ten years is allowed for the water right payment, but this obligation may be anticipated or passed on with the title in case the holding is sold to a later incumbent. The settlers are purchasing not water only but the irrigating sys-tem. The price put upon this perpetual possession varies according to the exigencies of construction from $25 to $50 per acre, estimated on the supposition that, all the lands being taken up, the returns will cover the cost of the works and a fair profit on the investment. The capital once recovered, the promoting company proceeds to a new venture, leaving the settlers owners of the works. The water rights are converted into water stock, and a water-users’ association is organized in which the farmers hold stock in proportion to their respective acreage. This cooperative company, like the irrigation district, is responsible for the maintenance of canals, the distribution of water, and for any repairs that may prove necessary.Idaho inaugurated the Carey Act system with signal success, and the sagebrush plains of the Snake River Desert were brought under cultivation with marvelous rapidity. The example of Wyoming and Idaho was followed by Montana, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, California, and New Mexico. The achievements of irrigation under the Carey Act have been highly gratifying to its sponsors, and the guaran-tees provided have given to this class of irrigation securities a recognized financial status. The farmers’ water right contracts, secured by a first mortgage on the land, are deposited as security for bonds issued in the ratio of one and a half to one. The annual payments are collected by the representatives of the bondholders and applied, year by year, to meet interest and the ten annual payments on the principal; but the value of the irrigation system as appraised by the state engineer is the ultimate secu-rity. Notwithstanding these precautions, a Carey Act project may fail to fulfill its obligations, in case it is unable to market bonds sufficient to complete the works, or the difficulties of construction prove unexpectedly great, or untoward floods carry away the dam and costly repairs are necessitated. It is evident, furthermore, that the ultimate source of revenue is the earning capacity of the lands under the project. If these are not rapidly taken up, or if the conditions of soil and climate are such as to render tillage unremunerative, water right payments will not be forthcoming, and the only asset recoverable may be a discredited irrigation system and the underlying lands. The recent collapse of the Conrad Land and Water Company and the Big Lost River Irrigation Company, which went into the hands of receivers with outstanding bond issues of $150,000 and $1,355,000 respectively, are cases in point.National interest in the reclamation of arid lands culminated in the Reclamation Act (1902) whereby the proceeds of public land sales, in excess of the educational obligations already assumed, are devoted to the reclamation of agricultural lands in 17 arid and semi-arid states. The Reclamation Service was organized under the2 Oregon makes no charge for the land but requires the cultivation of one fourth the area.。

美国经济评论century paper6

American Economic Review 101 (February 2011): 81–108/articles.php?doi =10.1257/aer .101.1.8181As the first decade of the twenty-first century comes to a close, the problem of the commons is more central to economics and more important to our lives than a century ago when Katharine Coman led off the first issue of the American Economic Review with her examination of “Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation” (Coman 1911). Since that time, 100 years of remarkable economic progress have accompa-nied 100 years of increasingly challenging problems.As the US and other economies have grown, the carrying capacity of the planet—in regard to both natural resources and environmental quality—has become a greater concern. This is particularly true for common-property and open-access resources. While small communities frequently provide modes of oversight and methods for policing their citizens (Elinor Ostrom 2010), as the scale of society has grown, commons problems have spread across communities and even across nations. In some of these cases, no overarching authority can offer complete control, rendering The Problem of the Commons:Still Unsettled after 100 Y earsBy Robert N. Stavins*The problem of the commons is more important to our lives and thus more central to economics than a century ago when Katharine Coman led off the first issue of the American Economic Review . As the US and other economies have grown , the carrying capac-ity of the planet—in regard to natural resources and environmental q uality—has become a greater concern , particularly for common-property and open-access resources. The focus of this article is on some important , unsettled problems of the commons. Within the realm of natural resources , there are special challenges associ-ated with renewable resources , which are frequently characterized by open-access. An important example is the degradation of open-access fisheries. Critical commons problems are also associated with environmental quality. A key contribution of economics has been the development of market-based approaches to environmental protec-tion. These instruments are key to addressing the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-first century—global climate change. (JEL Q15, Q21, Q22, Q25, Q54)* A lbert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138; University Fellow, Resources for the Future; and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research. I am grateful to Lori Bennear, Maureen Cropper, Denny Ellerman, Lawrence Goulder, Robert Hahn, Geoffrey Heal, Suzi Kerr, Charles Kolstad, Gilbert Metcalf, William Nordhaus, Wallace Oates, Sheila Olmstead, Robert Pindyck, Andy Reisinger, James Sanchirico, Richard Schmalensee, Kerry Smith, Robert Stowe, Martin Weitzman, and Richard Zeckhauser for very helpful comments on a previous version of this article; and Jane Callahan and Ian Graham of the Wellesley College Archives for having provided inspiration by making available the archives of Katharine Coman (1857–1915), professor of history, then economics, and first chair of Wellesley College’s Department of Economics. Any and all remaining errors are my own.82THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARy 2011 commons problems more severe. Although the type of water allocation problems of concern to Coman (1911) have frequently been addressed by common-property regimes of collective management (Ostrom 1990), less easily governed problems of open access are associated with growing concerns about air and water quality, haz-ardous waste, species extinction, maintenance of stratospheric ozone, and—most recently—the stability of the global climate in the face of the steady accumulation of greenhouse gases.Whereas common-property resources are held as private property by some group, open-access resources are nonexcludable. This article focuses exclusively on the latter, and thereby reflects on some important, unsettled problems of the commons.1 It identifies both the contributions made by economic analysis and the challenges facing public policy. Section I begins with natural resources, highlighting the dif-ference between most nonrenewable natural resources, pure private goods that are both excludable and rival in consumption, and renewable natural resources, many of which are nonexcludable (Table 1). Some of these are rival in consumption but characterized by open access. An example is the degradation of ocean fisheries. An economic perspective on these resources helps identify the problems they present for management and provides guidance for sensible solutions.Section II turns to a major set of commons problems that were not addressed until the last three decades of the twentieth century—environmental quality. Although frequently characterized as textbook examples of externalities, these problems can also be viewed as a particular category of commons problems: pure public goods, that are both nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption (Table 1). A key contribu-tion of economics has been the development of market-based approaches to environ-mental protection, including emission taxes and tradable rights. These have potential to address the ultimate commons problem of the twenty-first century, global climate change. Section III concludes.Several themes emerge. First, economic theory—by focusing on market failures linked with incomplete systems of property rights—has made major contributions to our understanding of commons problems and the development of prudent public policies. Second, as our understanding of the commons has become more complex, the design of economic policy instruments has become more sophisticated, enabling policy makers to address problems that are characterized by uncertainty, spatial and temporal heterogeneity, and long duration. Third, government policies that have not accounted for economic responses have been excessively costly, often ineffective, and sometimes counterproductive. Fourth, commons problems have not diminished. While some have been addressed successfully, others have emerged that are more important and more difficult. Fifth, environmental economics is well positioned to offer better understanding and better policies to address these ongoing challenges.1 Ostrom has made key contributions to our understanding of the role of collective action in common-property regimes, as she does in her article in this issue of the Review(Ostrom 2011). With her ably covering that territory, my focus is exclusively on situations of open access. As Daniel W. Bromley (1992) has noted, the better charac-terizations might be common property regimes and open-access regimes, because it is the respective institutional arrangements—as much as the resources themselves—that define the problems. However, I use the conventional characterizations because of their general use in the literature. Although my focus is on the natural resources and environmental realm, similar problems—and related public policies—arise in other areas, such as the allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum for uses in communication (Roberto E. Muñoz and Thomas W. Hazlett 2009).83STAVINS: THE pROBLEM OF THE COMMONS: STILL UNSETTLEd AFTER 100 yEARS VOL. 101 NO. 1I. The Problem of the Commons and the Economics of Natural ResourcesDespite their finite supply in the earth’s crust (and despite decades of doomsday predictions ),2 reserves of mineral and fossil fuel resources have not been exhausted. Price signals reflecting relative (economic ) scarcity have stimulated exploration and discovery, technological progress, and supply substitution. Hence, the world of non-renewable natural resources is characterized more by smooth transitions (Robert M. Solow 1991; William D. Nordhaus 1992) than by overshoot and collapse. Reserves have increased, demand has changed, substitution has occurred, and—in some cases—recycling has been stimulated. As a result, for much of the past century, the economic scarcity of natural resources had not been increasing, but decreasing (Harold J. Barnett and Chandler Morse 1963). Late in the twentieth century, increas-ing scarcity may have set in for a subset of nonrenewable resources, although the time trends are far from clear (V . Kerry Smith 1980; Junsoo Lee, John A. List, and Mark C. Strazicich 2006; John Livernois 2009).The picture is quite different if we turn from nonrenewable natural resources—minerals and fossil fuels—to renewable natural resources (including many forests and most fisheries ), which have exhibited monotonically increasing scarcity . The irony is obvious: many nonrenewable natural resources, which are in finite supply, have not become more scarce over time, and none has been exhausted; but renew-able natural resources, which have the capacity to regenerate themselves, have in many cases become more scarce, and in some cases have indeed been exhausted, that is, become extinct.This irony can be explained by the fact that while most nonrenewable natural resources are characterized by well-defined, enforceable property rights, many renewable resources are held as common property or open access (Table 1). Whereas scarcity is therefore well reflected by markets for nonrenewable natural resources (in the form of “scarcity rent,” the difference between price and marginal extraction cost, originally characterized by Harold Hotelling in 1931 as “net price”),3 such2See, for example, Donella H. Meadows et al. (1972).3 This is not to suggest that the market rate of extraction of nonrenewable natural resources always matches the dynamically efficient rate. Under any one of a number of conditions, markets may lead to inefficient rates of extrac-tion: imperfect information; noncompetitive market structure (the international petroleum cartel ); poorly defined property rights (ground water ); externalities in production or consumption (coal mining and combustion ); or differ-ences in market and social discount rates.Table 1—A Taxonomy of Common Problems in the Natural Resource and Environment RealmExcludableNonexcludable Rival pure private goodsRenewable natural resources Most nonrenewable natural resources characterized by open access (Fossil fuels & minerals )(Ocean fishing )Some privatized renewable resources Some nonrenewable resources (Aquaculture )(Ogallala Aquifer )NonrivalClub goods pure public goods (Water quality of municipal pond )(Clean air, greenhouse gases and climate change )84THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARy 2011 rents are dissipated for open-access resources, a reality well illustrated by the bio-economics of open-access fisheries.A. BiologySince the middle of the nineteenth century, open-access fishery stocks of numer-ous species have been depleted beyond sustainable levels, sometimes close to the edge of extinction. The basic biology and economics of fisheries—descendent from the Gordon-Schaefer model (H. Scott Gordon 1954; Anthony Scott 1955; M. B. Schaefer 1957; Colin W. Clark 1990)—makes clear why this has happened.In the upper panel of Figure 1, a logistical growth function plots the time rate of change of the fishery stock (dS/dt) on the vertical axis against the stock’s mass (S) on the horizontal axis:(1) F(S t)=δS t[1 −S t_K],where δ is the intrinsic growth rate of the stock, and K is the carrying capacity of the environment. As the size of the stock increases, its rate of growth increases until scarce food supplies and other consequences of crowding lead to decreasing growth rates. The maximum growth rate is achieved at S MSy , where the “maximum sustain-able yield” (MSy ) occurs. A stable equilibrium is found where the rate of growth transitions from positive to negative, a level of the stock described by biologists as the “carrying capacity” or “natural equilibrium” of the fishery. Another stable equi-librium is found at the origin—exhaustion (extinction).The likelihood of extinction is particularly acute when the natural growth function of a species exhibits “critical depensation,” illustrated in the lower panel of Figure 1:(2) F(S t)=δS t[1 −S t_K][S t_K0− 1],where K0 is the minimum viable population level. Below this critical level of the stock, the natural rate of growth is negative. Hence there are three equilibria: extinc-tion (the origin); the carrying capacity; and the minimum viable population. This reflects the reality that the large habitat ranges that exist for some species, such as whales and some species of birds, means that relatively small numbers are insuf-ficient for mating pairs to yield birth rates that exceed the natural rate of loss to predators and disease.This third equilibrium is unstable. Once the population falls below this critical level, it will proceed inevitably to extinction (unless “artificial” actions are taken, such as confined breeding of the California condor, man-made habitats for the whooping crane, or “zoos in the wild” for giant pandas in China). In the nineteenth century, hunters did not shoot down each and every passenger pigeon, but never-theless, the species was driven to extinction. A similar pattern has doomed other species. A contemporary case in point could be the blue whale (Michael A. Spence 1974), the largest animal known to have existed. Harvesting has been prohibited85STAVINS: THE pROBLEM OF THE COMMONS: STILL UNSETTLEd AFTER 100 yEARS VOL. 101 NO. 1under international agreements since 1965, but it is unclear whether stocks have rebounded, although numbers have been increasing in one region. Across species, there is a mixed picture. Stocks of some whale species are believed to be above and others below their respective minimum viable population (International Whaling Commission 2010).B. BioeconomicsA much greater threat to renewable natural resources than this unusual and unsta-ble biological growth function is the way many of these resources are managed: as common property or open access. To see this, we add some basic economics to theLogistic growthAnnual growthof stock F (S (tons )F (S )(tons )Figure 1. A Simple Model of the Fishery: The Biological Dimension86THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWFEBRUARy 2011biology of the fishery(Figure 2). First, a change in the stock of a fishery can be due not only to its biological fundamentals, but to harvests, that is, fishing:(3) dS _ dt= · S t = F (S t ) − q t ,where q t is the harvest rate at time t .4The harvest is a function of the stock and the level of effort, E t , by firms (fishing boats and crews ). Abstracting from dynamics, we can identify the static efficient sustainable yield (that is, we ignore discounting over time, which is all that distin-guishes this from the dynamically efficient sustainable yield ), without loss of key insights. To keep things simple for the graphics, three assumptions are employed: (a ) there is perfectly elastic demand, that is, the price of fish is constant, not a func-tion of the quantity sold; (b ) the marginal cost of a unit of fishing effort is constant; and (c ) the quantity of fish caught per unit of effort is proportional to the size of the stock. With these assumptions, the relationship between effort and harvest is:(4) q t(S t , E t ) = αt S t E t ,where αt is a proportional “catchability coefficient.” And profits, πt , are given by:(5)πt = p t q t (S t , E t ) − c t E t ,4 If equation (3) is replaced by a stochastic differential equation—to characterize uncertainty inherent in the biological growth function—then even lower harvest rates than otherwise can lead to extinction (Robert S. Pindyck 1984).of fishing effort ($)e E MSY E c Fishing effortNet benefit = rent)B (E eC (E e )StockFigure 2. A Simple Model of the Fishery: The Economic Dimension87 VOL. 101 NO. 1STAVINS: THE pROBLEM OF THE COMMONS: STILL UNSETTLEd AFTER 100 yEARSwhere p t is the market price of fish and c is the marginal cost of fishing effort. In the steady state, harvest is equal to growth:(6) F(S t)=q tand so from equations (1) and (2):(7) δS t[1 −S t_K]=αt S t E t .Solving for S and substituting into equation (4) yields steady-state harvest as a func-tion of effort:(8) q SS=αt E t K [1 −αt E t_δ].With this, total revenue at the steady-state (or sustainable) level, equivalent to pq, is indicated in Figure 2 as the total benefits of fishing as a function of effort level. When effort exceeds level E MSy, total fish catch and revenues decline. Total cost is equivalent to the constant marginal cost of effort, c, multiplied by the effort level. Hence, the efficient level of effort, E e, is where net benefits—the difference between total revenue and total cost—are maximized, namely where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. Clearly the maximum sustainable yield is not the efficient harvest level (but would be if fishing were costless).C. The Consequences of Open AccessWhat happens in actual markets with open access, which historically has charac-terized much of commercial fishing around the world (as well as markets for a num-ber of other renewable natural resources)? At the efficient level of effort, E e, each boat would make profits equal to its share of scarcity rent, B(E e) minus C(E e), but with open access these profits become a stimulus for more capital and labor to enter the fishery. Each fisherman considers his marginal revenue and marginal extraction cost, but—without firm property rights—scarcity rent is ignored, and each has an incentive to expend further effort (including more entry) until profits in the fishery are driven to zero: effort level E c in Figure 2, where marginal cost is equal to average revenue rather than equal to marginal revenue. Thus, with open access, it is rational for each fisherman to ignore the asset value of the fishery, because he cannot appro-priate it; all scarcity rent is dissipated (Scott 1955).Because no one holds title to fish stocks in the open ocean, for example, every-one races to catch as much as possible. Each fisherman receives the full benefit of aggressive fishing—a larger catch—but none pays the full cost, an imperiled fishery for everyone. One fisherman’s choices have an effect on other fishermen (of this generation and the next), but in an open access fishery—unlike a privately held c opper mine—these impacts are not taken into account.88THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARy 2011 These consequences of open access—predicted by theory—have been validatedrepeatedly with empirical data. A study of the Pacific halibut fishery in the BeringSea estimated that the efficient number of ships was nine, while the actual numberwas 140 (Daniel D. Huppert 1990).5 An examination of the New England lobsterfishery found that in 1966 the efficient number of traps set would have been about450,000, while the actual number was nearly one million. Likewise, an analysis ofthe North Atlantic stock of minke whale found that the efficient stock size was about67,000 adult males, whereas the open-access stock had been depleted to 25,000 (Erik S. Amundsen, Trond Bjørndal, and Jon M. Conrad 1995). In terms of social costs, an analysis of two lobster fisheries in eastern Canada found that losses dueto unrestricted entry amounted to about 25 percent of market value of harvests, duemainly to excess deployment of resources for harvest, with fishery effort exceedingthe efficient level by some 350 percent (J. V. Henderson and M. Tugwell 1979).Under conditions of open access, two externalities may be said to be present. Oneis a contemporaneous externality (as with any public good) in which there is over-commitment of resources: too many boats, too many fishermen, and too much effortas everyone rushes to harvest before others. The other is an intertemporal externalityin which overfishing reduces the stock and hence lowers future profits from fishing.A classic time path of open-access fisheries has been repeated around the world.First, a newly discovered resource is open to all comers; eventually, large harvestsand profits attract more entry to the fishery; boats work harder to maintain theirharvest; despite increased efforts, the harvests decline; and this leads to greaterincreases in effort, resulting in even greater declines in harvest, resulting in essentialcollapse of the fishery. This pattern has been documented for numerous species,including the North Pacific fur seal (Wilen 1976) and the Northern anchovy fishery (Jean-Didier Opsomer and Conrad 1994), as well as Atlantic cod harvested by USand Canadian fishing fleets in the second half of the twentieth century (Figure 3). Although open access drives the stock below its efficient level, it normally does not lead to the stock being exhausted (except possibly under critical depensation, as explained above), because below a certain stock level, the benefits of additional harvest are simply less than the additional costs. This is at the heart of a fundamental error in what is probably the most frequently cited article on common-property and open-access resources, Garrett Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968): Picture a pasture open to all … A rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another … Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of thec ommons. Freedom in the commons brings ruin to all (Hardin 1968, 1244).As Partha Dasgupta (1982)subsequently wrote: “It would be difficult to locate another passage of comparable length and fame containing as many errors as the one above.” Ruin is not the outcome of the commons, but rather excessive e mployment5 These fisheries are actually “regulated open-access fisheries,” because they are subject to restrictions (James N. Sanchirico and James E. Wilen 2007), as explained below.89STAVINS: THE pROBLEM OF THE COMMONS: STILL UNSETTLEd AFTER 100 yEARS VOL. 101 NO. 1of capital and labor, small profits for participants, and an excessively depletedresource stock.6 Those are bad enough.D. Alternative policies for the Commons problemThe most obvious solution to a commons problem—in principle—may be to enclose it, that is, put in place fee-simple or other well-defined property rights to limit access.7 In the case of a natural fishery, this is typically not feasible, but it is if species are immobile (oysters, clams, mussels ), can be confined by barriers (shrimp, carp, catfish ), or instinctively return to their place of birth to spawn (salmon, ocean trout ). Such fish farming (aquaculture ) is feasible and profitable with a limited but important set of commercial species (Table 1). Presently, approximately one-third of global fisheries production is supplied by commercial aquaculture, much of it in Asia (United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2007).Because aquaculture remains confined to a limited set of commercial species (and environmental concerns may preclude expansion ), there has been a history of g overnment attempts to regulate open-access fisheries through other means. The most frequent regulatory approach has been to limit annual catches (with the target typically being the maximum sustainable yield, not the efficient level of effort ) through restrictions on allowed technologies, closure of particular areas, or6The annual loss due to rent dissipation in global fisheries has been estimated to be on the order of $90 billion (Sanchirico and Wilen 2007).7 Recall that my focus is on open access, not common property. Arrangements of various kinds can and do serve to limit access to common-property resources (Ostrom 2010). An example in the fisheries realm would be the informal groups of lobster harvesters (“gangs”) in coastal Maine that seek to restrict access to identified areas (James M. Acheson 2003).0100,000200,000300,000400,000500,000600,0001950196019701980199020002010Landings (tons)YearFigure 3. Annual Harvest of Atlantic Cod, 1950–2008Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 2010.90THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW FEBRUARy 2011 i mposition of limited seasons. These regulatory approaches have the effect of rais-ing the marginal cost of fishing effort, in effect pivoting up the total cost function in Figure 2 until it intersects the benefit function at point X, thereby achieving the fish-ing effort associated with maximum sustainable yield, E MSy , or potentially to point y, thereby achieving the efficient effort level, E e.Marginal costs increase because each new constraint causes fishermen to r eoptimize. In response to constraints on technology, areas, or season, fishermen employ excessively expensive methods (overcapitalization) to catch a given quan-tity of fish. Technology constraints can lead to the employment of more labor; area closures can lead to the adoption of more sophisticated technologies; and reduced seasons result in the use of more boats. Although the harvest may be curtailed as desired, the net benefits to the fishery are essentially zero. Costs go up for fishermen (as resources are squandered). Social efficiency is not achieved, nor is it approached.A dramatic example is provided by New York City’s once thriving oyster fishery. In 1860, 12 million oysters were sold in New York City markets. By 1880, produc-tion was up to 700 million oysters per year. “New Yorkers rich and poor were slurp-ing the creatures in oyster cellars, saloons, stands, houses, cafes, and restaurants...” (Elizabeth Royte 2006). It became clear that the oyster beds were being depleted. First the city restricted who could harvest oysters, then when they were permitted to do so. Eventually, the city limited the use of dredges and steam power. Nevertheless, in 1927, the last of the city’s oyster beds closed (a casualty not only of open access to the oyster habitats, but also of the use of the city’s harbors as another sort of com-mons, namely as a depository for the city’s sewage).The economic implications of conventionally regulated open-access fisher-ies are typically worse than those that occur under unregulated open-access con-ditions (Frances R. Homans and Wilen 1997; Martin D. Smith and Wilen 2003). Overcapitalization is greater, as is the consequent welfare loss. Such situations with conventional open-access fisheries regulation are commonplace: overfishing occurs, the fishery stock is depleted, the government responds by regulating the catch, thereby driving up the cost of fishing, fishermen complain that they cannot make a profit, and harvests continue to fall. Is there a better way?From an economic perspective, the most obvious way of assuring that harvest lev-els are maintained at an efficient level while providing incentives for cost reductions is a tax on fish harvests. Such an efficient tax, which increases marginal costs, rotates the total costs line in Figure 2 until it intersects total benefits at point y, and thereby brings about E e, similar to conventional regulation. The tax that would accomplish this would be equal to the difference between B(E e) and C(E e). Despite the apparent graphical similarity with the conventional regulatory outcome, this approach is effi-cient, because rather than destroying the rents through higher resource costs, the tax transfers the rents from the private to the public sector. Hence, the social net benefits of the tax approach are identical to those under the efficient outcome.There is a problem, however. For the fishermen, these transfers are very real costs. The rent that would be received by a sole owner is received by the government instead. Any fishermen who might want the fishery to be managed efficiently will surely object to this particular approach. So, is there some way that the catch can be restricted to the efficient level, with real resource costs minimized, but without transferring the rents from fishermen to the government?。

美国生活经济学读书随笔

《美国生活经济学》读书随笔1. 美国生活经济学概述《美国生活经济学》是一本揭示美国社会经济现象、阐释市场经济规律的著作。

本书以通俗易懂的语言，带领读者深入剖析美国社会的经济体系，理解美国人的生活经济学。

美国生活经济学概述部分主要介绍了美国经济的构成、运作机制以及与人们日常生活的紧密联系。

美国作为一个高度发达的市场经济国家，其经济体系包括私人部门、政府部门和金融机构等多个方面。

在这个体系中，市场起着资源配置的基础性作用，政府通过宏观调控来保持经济的稳定增长和社会的公平正义。

美国人的日常生活也深受生活经济学的影响，从签订合同、购买商品到投资理财，生活经济学渗透到美国人生活的方方面面。

在消费方面，美国人讲究性价比，追求物有所值；在投资方面，美国人注重风险意识和长期规划，力求实现财富的稳健增长。

《美国生活经济学》通过对美国经济的深入剖析，揭示了市场经济条件下，人们如何运用经济学原理来规划和管理自己的生活。

这本书不仅有助于读者更好地理解美国社会的经济现象，还能为那些对经济学感兴趣的人提供有益的启示和借鉴。

美国生活经济学，又称为行为经济学(Behavioral Economics),是一门研究人们在经济决策过程中的非理性行为的学科。

它关注人们在面对金钱、时间和风险等有限资源时的行为模式，试图揭示这些行为背后的心理因素和认知偏差。

美国生活经济学的研究对象包括消费者行为、企业行为、公共政策制定等多个方面。

与传统经济学理论不同，美国生活经济学强调个体在做出经济决策时所受到的心理和社会因素的影响。

这些因素可能导致人们在面对同样的选择时作出不同的决策，从而影响整个市场的运行。

人们可能会因为“锚定效应”(Anchoring Effect)而对价格产生误解，或者因为“损失厌恶”(Loss Aversion)而过度追求避免损失。

美国生活经济学的发展历程可以追溯到20世纪70年代，当时一些学者开始质疑传统经济学理论在解释现实世界中的经济现象时的局限性。

美国经济探讨及其对中国的启示

美国经济探讨及其对中国的启示美国经济探讨及其对中国的启示[摘要]本文对华尔街风云所反映出来的美国经济兴衰的历史进行探讨，并在此基础上就中国的经济发展提出思考，为中国特色社会主义市场经济发展提出可操作建议。

同时要注意到，作为从西方资本主义国家的资本运作市场得来的探讨成果，我国学者在利用这一理论分析中国相关社会现象时要考虑其适用性问题。

[关键词]编辑部论文发表,资本运作,经济危机,两条道路,制衡机制,华尔街1 探讨的意义1.1 资本主义市场有一定优势华尔街是美国经济的一个缩影，从很大程度上来说，是它将美国经济推向了世界。

华尔街所创造的财富远远超过它对财富的破坏。

对华尔街风云变幻的研究和探讨，有利于更深入、更实际地了解资本主义市场经济以及它所隐含的各种风险。

1.2 经济全球化的要求2008年，由华尔街所导致的美国经济危机最终演变成世界性的金融危机，没有一个国家可以独善其身，这也为中国人提供了一次重新认识和研究世界金融市场与资本主义运作模式的机会，以他人之利得为己之借鉴，使中国经济在经济全球化的浪潮中求得发展。

1.3 国情的需要中国坚持走中国特色社会主义市场经济的道路，这条道路必然是宏观调控这只“有形手”和市场经济这只“无形手”的综合，从而实现资源的合理配置。

走这条道路离不开对资本主义市场经济的深入研究和对金融领域的把控。

虽然中国证券市场已经走在建立成熟、开放市场的路上，但毕竟发展历史较短，与世界发达国家的证券市场相比，依然存在很大差距，中国的复杂性也给我们接受金融市场带来极大的'困难，因此，面对金融全球化的趋势，中国只能选择走认识它、学习它、融入它、影响它的道路。

2 华尔街风云的历程表现2.1 与荷兰联系紧密的历史渊源华尔街起初就是一道墙，最初是由荷兰人建立的。

美国利用荷兰人创立的股份制形式，通过公开发行股票，将分散在公众手上的资金汇聚起来实现生产，股份制沿用至今仍然是最有活力的公司组织形式。

新美国经济史论文

浅谈新美国经济史美利坚合众国是一个由五十个州和一个联邦直辖特区组成的宪政联邦共和制国家。

1776年7月4日，大陆会议在费城正式通过《独立宣言》，宣告美国诞生。

自1870年代以来，美国国民经济就高居全球第一。

今天的美国则是联合国安理会五个常任理事国之一，其在全球的政治、经济、军事、娱乐等众多领域的庞大影响力更是其他国家所无法匹敌的。

美国有高度发达的现代市场经济，其国内生产总值和对外贸易额均居世界首位。

20世纪90年代，以信息、生物技术产业为代表的新经济蓬勃发展，受此推动，美经济经历了长达十年的增长期。

2001年美经济陷入短暂衰退，之后逐步复苏。

2008年，美国国内生产总值高达14.334万亿美元（2008年，世界国家和地区第1名）。

人均GDP为47,025美元（世界国家和地区第6名）。

然而，这样一个仅有不到300年历史的移民国家，是如何在大国如林的世界崛起的？又是如何在短短不到一百年里由一个名不见经转的殖民地发展为雄霸世界，让所有国家俯首称臣的超级大国的呢？这就要从美国1776年独立战争开始说起了。

独立战争期间，由于对英贸易的滞阻，北美的制造业得到了一定发展，但从生产技术和产品质量看则仍远落后于英国。

战争结束后，英国利用自身强大的制造业和商业优势，一方面对美国的出口实施严厉的商业限制，包括禁止美国货进入西印度群岛；另一方面则向美国大量倾销英国货。

出口萎缩、市场缩小，使价格大幅下跌，商人、农场主纷纷破产，债务链条破裂，造成了严重的社会动荡，许多地方爆发了农民起义。

在美国史上，1781 年至1789 年被称为“危机时期”。

从竞争的观点来看，其实质是英国挟裹着其市场竞争的强者优势对新独立的弱小的美国进行打击，以经济殖民来代替政治、军事殖民。

美国人民最终无法忍受英国殖民者的经济专制，他们开始主张自由贸易。

一方面要求英国取消出口限制，另一方面试图摆脱英国的商业垄断，开拓南欧、北欧市场及其他全球市场，同时则加快向西部扩张，将西部广袤的土地变为农产品的生产基地，以增强美国农产品的竞争力。

文献研究方法

文献研究的途径朱玲内容提要：文献学习，是经济学研究的重要环节。

在专题研究中，如果能够发现精品并且精读之，就有可能使研究从高起点展开。

本文试图向经济学青年提供一些文献辨识、搜寻、学习和综述的经验。

关键词：文献学习研究方法近年来，我在评审多部博士论文时注意到，作者在参考文献目录中罗列的着作，堪称经典文献或专题精品的不多，学术价值和信息量稀薄的报纸宣传文章不少。

还有相当一部分列出的着作，并未在其文献综述和正文中有任何涉及。

对此，我特意找了一些博士生询问究竟，方知原因在于一是作者没有下功夫搜寻和阅读文献，二是可能为了凑字数，就把良莠不齐的发表物一股脑儿地收了进来。

更令人诧异的是，有的文献综述通篇提到的几乎都是经典论着，可在论文末尾的目录中却不见这些文献的踪影。

大家推测，这种首尾不相顾的情况，极有可能是作者聘用不同的“枪手”分工“捉刀”所致。

本文的目的，是与青年经济学人探讨文献研究的基本方法，因此以下讨论撇开“枪手”案例不谈。

我理解，文献综述和参考目录对于其作者，是一种思想形成过程的记录；对于读者，则是一种特定专题研究线路的标识。

尤其是学位论文中的文献综述，它既不是用来出示作者读书成绩的证明，也不是展现其博学强记的工具，而是扎扎实实从事学术论着写作的开端。

因此，针对经济学博士论文中常见的文献研究问题，本文拟将围绕相关的文献搜寻、鉴别、学习和综述等环节，逐一说明注意事项。

有鉴于博士生一般均已掌握文献搜寻的技术手段和应有的阅读技巧，所以我把文章的重点置于辨识、学习和综述写作方法上。

一、精品文献的特征形象地说，搜寻文献如同研究者在寻找前人的足迹，以便从他们驻足的地方起步继续前进。

不过，只有精品文献才有可能使后人“踩着巨人的肩膀”攀登。

发现精品的前提，是把握此类文献的创新特征。

20多年前，我从董辅礽先生那里听到一番与此相关的精辟议论。

他认为，能够使博士论文出新的要素有3个，即新思想、新方法和新资料1。

由此我理解，那些堪称精品的文献或者是具有独到的思想和视角，或者是创造和发展了某种分析工具，抑或是蕴含着从1参见：朱玲，2005，伴随发展的脚步，山东人民出版社，第264页，济南。

_美国经济评论_创刊100年来的20篇最佳文章

经济资料译丛2011年第3期《美国经济评论》创刊100年来的20篇最佳文章 Kenneth J. Arrow, B. Douglas Bernheim, Martin S. Feldstein,Daniel L. McFadden, James M. Poterba, Robert M. Solow①著，吴春雷、马林梅译原载：American Economic Review 101 (February 2011): 1–8/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.101.1.1由Kenneth J. Arrow, B. Douglas Bernheim, Martin S. Feldstein, Daniel L. McFadden, James M. Poterba 和 Robert M. Solow组成的20佳文章评选委员会，受Robert Moffitt的委命，负责评选《美国经济评论》创刊100年以来所刊发的最优秀的20篇文章。

这些文章必定思想深刻、对经济学家的思想和实践产生了影响、具有普遍意义、得到应用广泛。

尽管我们并不打算将以上这些作为正式的评选标准，但是，我们无法找到更好的评判标准。

我们正在寻找的是20篇令人敬佩的、重要的文章。

一开始，我们考察了文章的引用次数和在JSTOR（过刊数据库）里的搜索量。

这样做无疑是重要的，从中可以得到相关的信息，但是这本身并不具有决定性。

越多人青睐的经济学分支，该领域的文章被引用的次数就会越多，这是一个偏向。

还有一个偏向是，发表时间适度靠近的文章被引用的次数较多，因为随着时间的推移，潜在读者和作者的数量不断增加，而非常新的文章由于发表时间较短，引用次数就会较少。

无论如何，我们都要对文章的质量和意义做出自己的判断。

因此，我们仅仅依靠引用次数和JSTOR数据库给出一组符合条件的备选文章。

我们特别担心的一点是：这样做会忽略了《美国经济评论》曾经发表过的、非常老的文章，其中的一些文章是经济学历史上的一些大师写的。

美国经济评论视野下的中国——以 1978 年以前华人经济学家的文章为中心

题性的研究要多于整体性的研究.同时从时间角度来看,专题性研究(最早开始于１９４１年)早于最早
的整体性研究(
１９５５年).这样的研究发展特点与实际研究材料获得的难易程度一致,同时也符合研
究过程循序渐进的基本逻辑.
二、关于中国问题的专题性研究
专题性的研究主要包括四个大的方向:外贸与金融业的研究、国民生产总值与国民收入的测算、
评论»中,书评与文章占有同等重要的地位,直到１９６８年«经济文献杂志»(
JEL)创立后,书评部分才
从«美国经济评论»中移出.１９６８年以前,«美国经济评论»中一直有大量的书评,篇幅约占整期内容
的一半以上,它是一个经济学界交流思想的重要媒介.每当有学者出版新书就会向编辑部提交,由编
国慈善事业的精神»的评论文章.１９１７年经济学家缪斯(
A．C．Muhs
e)发表了题为«中国的贸易组织
和贸易控制»一文,而华人经济学家的相关研究开始于１９４１年刘大中发表的 «论中国的外汇问题».
尽管自亚当斯密以来,欧美经济学家一直掌握着现代经济学的话语权,但华人经济学家以其特有的
算值 [１６](P１６６－１６７).
总的来说,现有的研究主要着眼于刘大中的一篇或多篇文章,并没有整体地探讨改革开放之前华
人经济学者对中国问题的研究.实际上这１７篇文章有很强的时代特征和思想内涵,需要一个提纲挈
领的研究来抓住思想脉络的发展,«美国经济评论»视野下的中国也将由此展现.中国学者发表的有
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