tax avoidance-large positive temporary book-tax differences and earnings persistence
关于政治的英文词汇
constitution 宪法legislation立法Democrats党Republicans Amendment修正案Congress美国国Senate 参议院House of Representatives 众议院monarchy 君主制anarchism 无政府主义federal system 联邦制presidential system 总统制municipal 市的,市政的metropolitan 大都市的centralized 中央集权的ideology 意识形态tariff 关税immigrant 移民institutionalize 机构化election 选举veto 否决poll 投票,投票数,民意测验office holding 任职American Revolution美国革命/独立战争Independence War 美国独立战争American Civil War 美国战radical 激进的,根本的overturning 颠覆性的independent 独立的breathtaking 冲动人心的military 军事的colonize 拓殖,殖民percapita 人均treason 叛国 conspiracy 阴谋imprisonment 监禁release 释放pardon 特赦accusation 遣责,指控welfare 福利patronage 资助,赞助unionization 联合,结合attache [法语] 随行人员glasnost [俄语] 公开性;开放jujitsu [日语] 柔术karate [日语] 空手道laissez-faire [法语] 自由主义Lebensraum [德语] 生存空间per annum [拉丁语] 每年rapport [法语] 和睦;友好rendezvous [法语] 约会(地点)sumo [日语相扑karaoke; judo; per capita;tai chi chuan;Big Apple (大苹果)美国纽约市Big Board (纽约证券交易所的大行情板)纽约证券所/纽约股市Broadway (百老汇大街)美国或纽约市商业性戏剧(业)City of Angels (天使城)洛杉矶City of Brotherly Love (博爱城)费城City by the Golden Gate (1/ 6金门城)旧金山市Crescent City (新月城)新奥尔良市Dice City (赌城)(美国以夜总会和赌场著称的)拉斯韦加斯市Empire State (帝国州)纽约州Fun City (逍遥城)纽约市Golden State (黄XX)加利福尼亚州Hollywood (好莱坞)美国电影业;美国电影界Hub of the Universe(宇宙中心)波士顿市Madison Avenue( 美国广告业中心)麦迪逊大街美国广告业/美国商业Mother of Presidents (总统之母)美国弗吉尼亚州或俄亥俄州Steel City (钢城)匹兹堡市Windy City (多风城)芝加哥市White House(白宫)美国政府;美国总统the City [(英国首都伦敦市中心)伦敦城] 英国商业界;英国金融界Fleet Street (舰队街)英国新闻界Scotland Yard (格兰场;伦敦警察局)伦敦警方Elysee [(法国总统官邱)爱丽舍宫]法国政府;法国总统Maginot Line [(第二次大战前法国所筑防御阵地体系)马其诺防线]盲目行动;迷恋于维持现状Quai d'Orsay [(法国外交部附近地名)凯道赛码头]法国外交部;法国外交政策;法国政府Bermuda/Bermuda Triangle [百慕大(魔鬼)三角]危险的禁区Horn of Africa (非洲之角)索马里和埃塞俄比亚cancer-causing drug致癌药物policy-making body 决策机构Peace-keeping force 维和部队Oil-producing country 产油国long-standing issue由来己久的问题wide-spreading AIDS 到处蔓延的艾滋病high-ranking official高级官员far-reaching significance深远意义blood-cemented friendship 鲜血凝成的友谊贫困地区poverty-stricken area外向型经济export-oriented economy deep-rooted social problems 根深蒂固的社会问题quick-frozen food 速冻食品foreign-owned enterprise外资企业long-faced job loser愁眉苦脸的失业者dimly-lit room 光线昏暗的房间2/ 6well-informed source 消息灵通人士richly-paid job薪水丰厚的工作highly-sophisticated technology 尖端技术inflation-proof deposit 保值储蓄vehicle-free promenade/ street 步行街interest-free loan无息贷款labor-intensive enterprise 劳动力密集型企业arms-reduction talks 裁军谈判year-end report 年终报告labor-management conflict 劳资冲突供求失调supply-demand imbalance long-t erm,low-interest loan长期低息贷款top-level talk 最高级会谈fair-trade agreement互惠贸易协定long-range nuclear missile远程核导弹100-metre dash百米赛跑one-man government 专制政府one-way street 单向道21-gun salute 21响礼炮face-to-face talk 会晤;面晤hand-to-mouth pay 温饱工资ground-to-air missile地对空导弹dusk-to-dawn curfew彻夜宵禁touch-and-go affair 一触即发的局势middle-of-the-road policy 中立政策be-kind-to-animal campaign 保护动物运动see-while-you-talk phone 可视good-to-excellent care无微不至的关心on-the-spot interview现场采访on-the-job training; 在职培训;one-country-two-system policy一国两制的政策China’s actual conditions中国国情be honest in performing one’s official duties廉洁奉公build a clean and honest government; construction of aclean government廉政建立abuse of power for personal gain;misuse of power for privateinterest以权谋私corruption reporting centre举报中心be responsible for one's own profit and loss 自负盈亏jack up price哄抬物价single youth above the normal matrimonial age大龄青年3/ 6high-tech business incubator ; pioneer park创业园“物质文明〞〔material progress 〕、〔intellectual and ideological development〕、“宰客〞〔rip off〕、“打白条〞〔issue IOUs〕关系网〔network of personal connect ions 〕、“下海〞〔risk one’s fortune in business〕、“跳槽〞〔job-hop〕euthanasia〔安乐死〕,AIDS艾滋病elevated highways〔高架道路〕information superhighway信息高速公路value-added tax 〔增值税〕,hula hoop〔呼拉圈〕,surfing 〔冲浪运动〕,talk show〔访谈节目;谈话类节目)lucky draw抽奖vicious circle恶性循环Yangtze River delta长江三角洲tax avoidance避税localization外乡化;本地化settling-in allowance安家费interdisciplinary talent复合型人才jerry-built project豆腐渣工程worse off than some, betteroff than many比上缺乏,比下有余fight corruption and builda clean government反腐倡廉real estate market房地产市场Comfortable Housing Project安居工程distribution according toone's performance按劳分配to buy a house on mortgage; to mortgage a house按揭购房Service industry/ service trade窗口行业Pet clinic宠物医院Inter-city train城际列车Green hand 菜鸟,新手Multinational company跨国公司Passive smoking; second-handsmoking被动吸烟Copyright reserved所有Money worship拜金主义Start from scratch白手起家century-old shop百年老店Host country东道国countdown倒计时Crack down on fakeproducts 打假Protective umbrella保护伞find a sugar daddy;be a mistress for a rich man;lean on a moneybag傍大4/ 6款National Committee of the Ch inese People's Political Cons ultative Conference (CPPCC)迎难而上face difficulties squarelywork with courage and determ ination, 奋勇拼搏困难险阻all difficulties and obstacle保持平稳较快增长maintain steady and rapid gr owth社会事业social programfight against massive natur al disaster〔抗击特大自然灾害〕残奥会Paralympicsthe Shenzhou VII manned sp ace missionsocialism with Chinese char acteristics 〔中国特色社会主义〕奋勇前进bravely forge ahead宏观经济政策macroeconomic policies复杂多变complex and volatile预见性、针对性和有效性proactive, targeted and effective。
税务英语词汇大全
英语词汇大全-税务英语专用词汇税务专用词汇State Administration for Taxation 国家税务总局Local Taxation bureau 地方税务局Business Tax 营业税Individual Income Tax 个人所得税Income Tax for Enterprises企业所得税Income Tax for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises外商投资企业和外国企业所得税tax returns filing 纳税申报taxes payable 应交税金the assessable period for tax payment 纳税期限the timing of tax liability arising 纳税义务发生时间consolidate reporting 合并申报the local competent tax authority 当地主管税务机关the outbound business activity 外出经营活动Tax Inspection Report 纳税检查报告tax avoidance 逃税tax evasion 避税tax base 税基refund after collection 先征后退withhold and remit tax 代扣代缴collect and remit tax 代收代缴income from authors remuneration 稿酬所得income from remuneration for personal service 劳务报酬所得income from lease of property 财产租赁所得income from transfer of property 财产转让所得contingent income 偶然所得resident 居民non-resident 非居民tax year 纳税年度temporary trips out of 临时离境flat rate 比例税率withholding income tax 预提税withholding at source 源泉扣缴State Treasury 国库tax preference 税收优惠the first profit-making year 第一个获利年度refund of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount 再投资退税export-oriented enterprise 出口型企业technologically advanced enterprise 先进技术企业Special Economic Zone 经济特区。
海关审价、关务规划及关务实操高级研讨班(Customsvaluation,customsa..
海关审价、关务规划及关务实操高级研讨班(Customs valuation, customs and customs operation planning seminar)Customs valuation, customs and customs operation planning seminar.Txt insane lunatic is not terrible, terrible is the spirit of normal! Customs valuation, customs and customs operation planning seminarOpening time:August 2011 26-27, Guangzhou--------------------------------------------------------"Customs valuation, customs clearance and pragmatic planning exercises curriculum outline of senior seminar" (by Zhou Shijie)Curriculum background1, Chinese and WTO, the most important standards of customs valuation approach to the biggest impact on business is facing the biggest revision in recent years after joining WTO, especially with the expansion of general trade import and domestic sales growth, and the transformation of tax relief equipment value-added tax, customs and make enterprises continue to face challenges and confusion. Enterprises must learn to understand the ways and methods of customs valuation through study so as to avoid unnecessary losses.2, customs planning is from the company's strategy,organization structure, business mode and management mode to make the customs more effective compliance operation, from the financial, tax, logistics, legal and other aspects of customs arrangements and influence, and from global perspective and interpretation of both inbound and outbound customs arrangements, to achieve "the ultimate goal of win-win" related enterprises.3, the new processing trade policy and business combination of practical operation, closely combined with the actual operation of the main case, from the enterprise logistics cost and tax cost control and customs risk averse perspective, interspersed with lots of customs operation cases and related fiscal issues, grasp the comprehensive management, enterprise comprehensive arrangement, mastery, break the other common course of compartmentalization, coordination and management requirements for enterprises of various departments.Curriculum syllabusThe first part: the Customs Valuation ReportTopic 1 WTO Customs Valuation Agreement and China Customs Valuation policy1, WTO Customs Evaluation of the main points of the agreement2, China customs price evaluation mechanism and price inspection system3, China customs price audit trend analysisTopic two principles and methods of Customs Valuation1, the operation of the valuation methods and related requirements?2, the dutiable value of imported goods, taxable items and non taxable items identified3, what are the fees in the enterprise franchise fees, how to seek relief?5, how can the transfer pricing be accepted by the customs?6, under what circumstances will the customs issue price queries?The main means and evidence 7, price fraud smuggling certification8, the customs anti fraud measuresTopic three customs valuation risk management and control strategy1, how to define the price concealment and declaration untrue? How to avoid the price fraud?2, what are the similarities and differences between the "special relationship" and the "tax relation" of customs?3, the declaration price, how to do "separately listed" related costs and taxes?5, how can the transfer pricing obtain the understanding and trust of the customs, and how to protect the trade secrets?6, exit repair goods - goods shipped out of the country imported enterprises suffered valuation cases6, how do companies assess the customs' self-assessment (a case of the world's top 500)?Topic four valuation of general trade and processing trade1, customs valuation of general trade (case study)2, customs valuation of processing tradeA, enterprises long-term use of the contract price for import or domestic price declaration, what are the risks? How to deal with it?B, materials and many batches of domestic sales, how to declare the price, in order to avoid punishment?D where the bonded materials are damaged, the customs will not give up, and when the goods are shipped back or sold in the domestic market, how will the prices be declared?G, customs scrap valuation is too high, what should I do?I, bonded processing affected or stolen, what conditions required by the customs tax? What circumstances can be exempted from tax?Theme five tax exempt equipment & Evaluation of non valuation equipment1, customs supervision equipment import common valuation risk and punishment case2, import duty free equipment, which costs can not be included in the dutiable value? Reasonable tax avoidance casesTopic six comprehensive application evaluation of special customs supervision area1, from the bonded area and export processing zone entry, customs valuation methods difference.2, the use of special regulatory areas and warehouses, "transit" or "one-day tour" of the goods, is the price at the entry price or out of the valuation?3, whether the domestic taxes and fees of the goods in the free trade zone or out of the zone can be deducted from the dutiable value?The second part: the planning of customs affairsI. comprehensive business planning of enterprises1) strategic planning in International Relations: an international perspective1 offshore investment: the use of free trade agreements2, overseas investment: take advantage of the free trade round area of host country3, foreign processing: output, tape and foreign processing trade4 entrepot trade: the use of the first sale principles2) customs planning in strategic decisions: a domestic perspective1, the business combination (separation) and the relocation of the planning issues2, the planning of the shareholding system reform of the company3 "three" business transformation of Customs planning4 business entity planning: a corporate entity or several?5 investment location planning: is it located in the special customs supervision area?3) operational planning at the operational level1 processing trade or general trade? (comprehensive planningmodel)2, processing, feed processing, or general trade? (decision matrix)3, how to improve the management level of Customs in the enterprise?4) transaction level planning1 customs planning of import channels2 export and domestic customs planningThe tax planning of 3 bonded logistics4, preferential tax breaks for imported equipmentTwo, customs enforcement and customs operations1) planning and implementation of commodity classification1 effective management measures for commodity classification2 planning methods of commodity classification3, "risk" in planning risk - a case study2) planning and implementation of processing trade1 manual management of processing trade2 bonded material and logistics management (case study)3 bonded logistics planning: deep processing and external processing4 taxation and foreign exchange control of processing tradeThe third part, customs policy and PracticeA processing trade, the latest customs policies and practice skills "(J _# 'Y# M8?The latest policies of processing trade in 1 and 2011 and their impact on Enterprises2, concrete measures and policy guidance for the transformation and upgrading of processing trade3. Interpret the background and major changes in the latest customs classification management practices4, the characteristics of the large customs supervision system and its impact on Enterprise Logistics5, the deep processing and transfer, outward processing the biggest adjustment initiatives (v+ * W* L C6 D K4 W ".6, customs "three check and one" characteristic and influence analysis7, the choice of general trade, materials, feed processing, which is more beneficial to enterprises?8, processing enterprise transformation process and customs, finance and taxation difficult to deal with9, the understanding and application of the "domestic facilitation" policy of the customs10, how to make the return, maintenance, compensation or replacement goods duty-free?11, leasing, shipped overseas processing repair price declaration to tax?12, supplies, test machine materials, affected bonded goods how to tax free or less tax?The best tax treatment for 13, more than expected, scrap, defective products, by-products?14, how to deal with the goods express in order to avoid tax losses?15, tax relief goods how to lift supervision or processing, it may be less tax?16, how to make use of the temporary import and export and ATA documents to make the goods duty-free?17, how to make full use of the free trade zone to carry outbusiness and tax avoidance?18, the latest development and application skills of the special customs supervision area (detailed explanation)19, how to reduce the risk of tax, foreign exchange and customs supervision through offshore trade20, financial, warehouse and customs accounts, how to achieve "three accounts balance" (detailed explanation)?21, customs inspection and enterprise response strategy (detailed explanation)The lecturer introduces Mr. Zhou ShijieExpert in customs management, MBA, Berkeley, master of economics, senior economist, Chinese cpa.He has successively held the leading position in the foreign economic and Trade Department of Guangdong, the foreign investment office, the Guangzhou customs, the Tianjin customs, and the Qingdao customs and other directly under the customs. He also serves as consultant of Guangdong Foreign Investment Enterprises Association, consultant of Shenzhen processing trade enterprise association and adjunct professor of Shanghai Customs College. He is a senior consultant in business consulting and customs affairs of an international four largest CPA firm.Mr. Zhou long trade and customs departments working outside,import and export customs affairs and management of enterprise problems have a profound understanding, to participate in the preparation of the "customs inspection", "processing trade practice", "practice", "import and export declaration" China customs affairs series "and other books on the book, was invited to for many large foreign investment, foreign trade and private import and export business conducted by the customs business guidance, business and students from 20 years of trade and customs experience, he has accumulated very rich customs operation, processing trade management experience, and a deep understanding of the inner workings of the customs and rules, especially the unique insights and techniques in dealing with difficult processing trade customs and related fiscal issues, is rare in the industry to import and export trade, processing trade, customs clearance, customs, logistics management Comprehensive, financial, taxation, foreign exchange, banking business to fully blend the lecturer, the main teaching method of Mr. Zhou is the use of heuristic problem and case teaching method to answer, using the case of MBA teaching management mode, reference 100% industry case in the policy proposed cut feasible solution, very close to the internal management of enterprises the actual teaching, adhering to the concept of legal system, rigorous, and suitable style, emphasize application, can be combined with the present situation of enterprise management,To solve the problems encountered by enterprises in the actual work, praised by enterprises and students.He has worked in Hongkong, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Dalian, Chengdu, Chongqing, Wuhan, Hangzhou, Ningbo,Qingdao, Suzhou, Nanjing, Xiamen, Dongguan, Zhuhai and other more than 20 major city held personal open class.The main customers have training and counseling: Guangzhou Honda, Guangzhou Lite, Guangzhou LITE-ON optoelectronics, Guangdong nuclear power group, ZTE, Guangzhou TOYOTA automobile, Dongju electronics, brother industries, Mead Johnson (Guangzhou), Guangzhou Pepsi beverages, Yoshida zipper (Shenzhen), Kingboard chemical group, Fisher Jeon gas (Guangzhou Chengdu, Tokyo (Zhuhai), byokane), Xinli Electronics Group, the Swedish Trade Council (Guangzhou), Zhejiang, Xinjiang Bao min group, TBEA group, LG, TCL, Changhong electronics, Kingfa, Shanghai BP (Shanghai, Beijing), Delphi, SIEMENS (Guangzhou, Ji'nan, Wuhan, Qingdao etc. Flextronics (Shanghai), Zhuhai, Qingdao, Shenzhen), Haier, Motorola, Matsushita China, Tyco Electronics, general electric, Ningbo Zhonghua paper, Eastern Communications Shanghai, Meihua, Shenzhen and Beijing through the system on taxpayers' club, Sinopec and other more than 6000 large and medium-sized enterprises.--------------------------------------------------------Participants: general manager, logistics, finance, import and export, customs clearance, purchasing senior managementParticipation fee: 2800 yuan / person (including data fee, lunch and afternoon tea, etc.)Meeting organization: Mori Tao training network, Mori Tao training consulting service centerAdvisory Tel: o2o-34O7-125O, 34O7-1978 (advance registration may enjoy more concessions, welcome to inquire)。
Tax avoidance
Student ID No: 610068995 0050065919Tax avoidanceTable of Contents1.I NTRODUCTION22.S ECTION 1: TAX AVOIDANCE IS A THREAT TO PUBLIC WELFARE23.S ECTION 2: THE RELATION WITH SOCIAL UNREST34.S ECTION 3: TAX AVOIDANCE CREATES FURTHER AVOIDANCE35.S ECTION 4: IMPACTS TO THE ECONOMY46.C ONCLUSION4IntroductionA company minimizing its tax within a legal method refers to as tax avoidance. Tax avoidance, as a method to make more profit, is embraced by multinational companies and became increasingly popular among them. Base onBarford and Holt(2012), multinational companies like Starbucks, Google and Amazon, which had earn a high profit from England, have avoided millions of pounds from their taxes. This news has shocked British people, and a part of people started to restrain the companies. Starbucks stores, for example, were facing people’s protests during the whole December.This has rushed tax avoidance to a heated debate. Some scientists state that tax avoidance is a moral issue, while others recoil it (Barford and Holt, 2012).Morally wrong in this essay is defined as behaviours that damaging societies and other residents. I support tax avoidance is morally wrong. Followed by the introduction, this essay will analyse four reasons why tax avoidance is morally wrong and reach the conclusion.Section 1: tax avoidance is a threat to welfareFirstly, tax avoidance is immoral because it threats social welfare. People who accept tax avoidance might think that consumers can get the product with a lower price if they do not ask the invoice. The cost of an insignificant reduction in the price for those individuals, however, is inestimable losing of their welfare (Treanor 2009). This is resulted form the relation between tax and welfare.Louis stated this opinion in 2008; he reached the conclusion that“I t is no certain how important taxes are for social welfare”(Kaplow, 2008). It means that a country’s welfare is built on the redistribution of the fiscal income, and the fiscal revenue is mainly form the government’s taxes. The relation between tax and welfare strongly supports that tax avoidance will hinder the complete of social welfare.In details, Louis (2008) has calculated the accurate proportion to explain how taxes influence the welfare;the welfare benefits from the redistribution under the tax might be on the order of 5% of national income.The relation shows thecontribution of taxes to public welfare; vice versa,it mirrorstax avoidance contributes to the reduction in welfare level. Unlike the contribution of paying taxes for public benefits can be calculated with percentage, there is no way to estimate or to budget the damage to revenue each year (Tooma, 2008). In brief, costs of tax avoidance overweigh its benefits, and tax avoidance is a kind of damage for public welfare so it is morally wrong.Section 2: the relation withsocial unrestThe second reason is that tax avoidance can create social unrest indirectly. Tax avoidance is seems to be increasingly severe;in order to protect their right under the increasing threat, buyers’ protests to fight against it have been a common occurrence. This kind of protests is one of the main factors of social unrest in recent days because part of protestors is harbouring the intention to intimidate.The protest organised by the UK uncut on 22nd March is a good example; it has caused disgusting results: during the protest near 150 people occupied the store; some goods in the store were damaged or stolen; and fear was spread in the crowd (22nd March, BBC news). In short, tax avoidance is immoral since it might cause social unrest via creating inorganised protesting, and it may threat residents’ property and security.Section 3: tax avoidance creates further avoidanceAnother remarkable reason is a vicious chain can be caused by tax avoidance. According to Rachel (2008), there is evidence that taxpayers or companies might be engaged to do tax avoidance while they believing that other taxpayers or companiesengage in tax avoidance schemes. The main reason is that the tax avoidance builds an unfair distribution of the tax burden: Tax avoiders can gain extra revenue via the avoiding taxes, and an increasing tax burden ultimately falls on those taxpayers not engaged in tax avoidance (Tooma 2008). The unfair redistribution of the tax liability will ineluctably lead to a deterioration of taxpayermotivation.Moreover, via cutting down the tax bill companies can earn additional benefits, which might immediately influence the competition in the market. Increasingly, the unjust competition will put their competitors at a disadvantage. Naturally, companies at the disadvantage will adopt tax avoidance for the higher competitiveness (Tooma 2008). However, this is not the end of the tax panies, which have lost their advantages because others flowing, will seek a more saving way for their taxes; and others will take the new approach in order to offset the gap between their competiveness in the market. Finally, tax avoidance creates more avoidance, and starts a vicious circle. The vicious circle is an extra cost for the society. Thus, there is evidence that tax avoidance should be blamed in the moral domain.Section 4: impacts to the economyTax avoidance can also create costs in the economy. Many economists claim that the economic effects of tax avoidance as a consequence of the application of scare resources to tax avoidance activities (Tooma 2008).Tooma (2008) identifies that multinational companies might alter their productions and distribution of investment in order to take advantage of tax avoidance activities. In other words, companies are tending to be intensive in industries with high chances to avoid their taxes; for this reason the number of companies in other fields might decrease.This tendency results anineffective market because the imbalance between demand and supply. That kind of market may makes unproductive decisions from the social point of view.Naturally, tax avoidance is morally wrong since it might block the development of economy.ConclusionTo sum up, even through tax avoidance is legal and reasonable in certain ways, it is damaging society and people via four ways: it damages the social welfare because that it is a loss in the government revenue; it may do harm to the peaceof the society for it arouse consumers dissatisfaction and protests; it might cause additional tax avoidance via redistribute the tax burden and market competiveness; additionally, it blocks the economic growth through creating unproductivity. Tax avoidance of multinational companies violates the morality that should take responsibility for the society and other citizens. Finally, refers back to the argument that whether tax avoidance is immoral,indeed, tax avoidance is morally wrong.BibliographyVanessa, Barford & Gerry, Holt. "Google, Amazon, Starbucks: The rise of "tax shaming"." BBC News Magazine, December 2012.BBC News. Fortnum and Mason protestors lose conviction appeal. March 22, 2013. /news/uk-england-london-21901009 (accessed 5 19, 2013). Louis, Kaplow. The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.Rachel Anne, Tooma. Legislating against Tax Avoidance. Amsterdam, 2008. Treanor, Jill. Avoiding tax robs our services, declares minister. 9 20, 2009./business/2009/sep/20/tax-avoidance-penalties (accessed 4 21, 2013).。
银行考试常用英语词汇R-Z
银行考试常用英语词汇R-Z1.ransom 赎金2.rate of deposit turnover 存款周转率3.rate of depreciation 折旧率4.ratio of cash reserves to deposits 存款支付准备率5.ratio of cash reserves to deposits 存款支付准备率6.ratio of cash reserves to deposits 存款支付准备率7.ratio of doubtful loans to total loans 坏帐比率8.ratio of profit to capital 收益同资本的比率9.rationing of exchange 外汇配售10.real estate 不动产11.real estate and personal property tax 不动产和动产税12.real estate brokerage services 不动产经纪业务13.real estate investment trust 不动产投资信托公司14.real estate loans 不动产贷款15.real estate mortgage 不动产抵押16.real estate mortgage bonds 不动产抵押债券17.real estate tax 不动产税18.reciprocal reinsurance 互惠互保19.red balance 赤字差额20.red balance 赤字差额21.red balance 赤字差额22.rediscount bank 再贴现银行23.rediscount policy 再贴现政策24.reexchange 回汇、退汇25.registration fee 注册费26.related documents 有关单据27.remit vt. 传寄,汇寄,送28.remittance bank 汇款银行29.remittance by draft 汇票汇款30.remittance charges 汇费31.remittance n. 汇款32.remitter n. 汇款人33.remitting bank 汇出银行34.remitting bank 汇出行,汇款行35.remitting bank (= entrusting bank) 托收行36.repressed inflation 抑制性通货膨胀37.requesting bank 委托开证银行38.required reserve ratio 法定准备率39.reserve account 准备金帐户40.reserve deposit 准备存款41.reserve financing 累积融资42.reserve margin 准备金比率43.reserve ratio 法定存款准备金比率44.reserve requirements 法定存款准备金45.reserving bank 储备银行46.resistance 阻挡区47.resource tax 资源税48.restrictive lending policy 贷款紧缩政策49.restrictive monetary policy 紧缩通货膨胀50.retail transaction 零售交易51.retaliatory tariff 报复性关税52.revenue account 收入帐户53.reversal 反转54.revise the repay and condition 已定的细则55.rigged market 受操纵的市场56.right of pledge 质权57.risk (or risk-bearing) capital 承担风险的资本58.risk adjusted return 风险调整报酬率59.risk analysis 风险分析60.risk analysis 风险分析61.risk assets 冒风险的资产62.risk assets 风险资产63.risk decision 风险性决策64.risk fund 风险基金65.risk guaranty 风险担保66.risk hedge 风险保值67.risk hedging instruments 风险保值工具68.risk losses 风险损失69.risk management 风险管理70.risk minimization 风险减至最小限度71.risk money (出纳员)短款补贴72.risk premium 风险补贴,风险溢价73.risk prevention 风险防范74.risk project 风险项目75.risk protection 风险保护76.risk ratio 风险率77.risk transfer 风险转移78.risk transformation 风险转移79.risk/venture capital 风险资本80.risk-adjusted discount rate 风险调整折现率81.risk-covering insurance 风险保险82.risk-return characteristics 风险与收益特性83.risks contribution 风险分摊84.risk-taking company 风险企业85.risky cost 风险成本86.risky investment 风险投资87.risky loans 有风险贷款88.risky reserve 风险储备89.risky revenue 风险收入90.run on a bank 银行挤兑91.safe deposit facilities 保险箱业务92.safety deposit boxes 保管箱93.sale and leaseback agreement 出售资产与回租安排94.sale of property 出售物业95.sales tax 销售税96.sales taxes 销售税97.salt tax 盐税98.saving account (S.A.) 储蓄帐户99.savings accounts 储蓄存款帐户100.savings and loan association 储蓄与放款合作协会101.savings and loan share accounts 储蓄贷款协会的股金券102.savings bank 储蓄银行103.savings deposit 储蓄存款104.scientific research unit bonus tax 科研单位奖金税105.screen (stocks) 选股106.securities brokerage services 证券经纪业务107.securities underwriting services 证券承销业务108.security bond 保付单109.security for an obligation 债权担保110.seek a market 寻求入市机会111.self-liquidated loans 自偿性商业贷款112.self-owned capital ratio 自有资本比率113.sell forward 远期卖出114.seller's risks 卖方风险115.selling bank 卖方银行116.selling risk 销售风险117.settlement 交割118.settlement price 结算价格119.shifting risk 转嫁风险,转移风险120.shipping tonnage duty 船舶吨税121.short arbitrage 空头套利122.short position 空头123.short purchase 买空,空头补进124.short rate 短期汇率125.short seller 卖空者126.shortage of financial resources 财源短缺127.short-lived securities 短期有效证券128.short-term deposits 短期存款129.short-term funds 短期资金130.shunting (美)套利、套汇131.side-work bank 兼业银行132.simple interest 单利133.single exchange rate 单一汇率134.sinking fund 偿债基金135.slack of finance 银根松缓136.slaughtering tax 屠宰税137.sliding peg (汇率)滑动钉住138.small business finance 中小企业融资139.small leases 小型租赁140.small-order automatic system 小额定单执行系统141.social security payments 支付社会保障金142.socialized medical insurance 社会医疗保险143.soft currency 软币144.solicitor's fee 律师费145.source of finance 融资渠道146.special bank 特殊银行147.special consumption tax (special consumer tax)特别消费税148.special deposit 特种存款149.special finance 特别融资150.special fuel oil tax 烧油特别税151.special regulation tax 专项调节税152.specialized foreign exchange bank 外汇专业银行153.specific insurance 特殊保险154.speculating risks 投机风险155.speculation 投机156.speculation in stock 股票投机157.speculation on foreign exchange 外汇投机158.spot and forward prices 即期与远期价格159.spot exchange 现汇160.spot exchange rate 单方面外汇买卖161.spot exchange transactions 即期外汇业务162.spot rate of exchange 即期外汇汇率163.spread 差额,利差,利润幅度164.spread between domestic and overseas int 国内外利润差额165.square position 差额轧平(未抵冲的外汇买卖余额的轧平状况)166.stagflation 滞胀167.stamp duty 印花税168.stamp tax 印花税169.state-owned enterprise bonus tax 国营企业奖金税170.state-owned enterprise income tax 国营企业所得税171.state-owned enterprise regulation tax 国营企业调节税172.state-owned enterprise wages regulation 国营企业工资调节税173.status inquiry 信用状况调查174.sticky deal 棘手交易175.stock index futures 股票指数期货176.stock index futures contract 股票指数期货合约177.stock indexes 股票指数178.stock wrap 股市行情179.stockpile financing 储存融资180.stop-gap fund 临时通融资金181.strike price 协定价格182.subaccount 公帐户183.sublease 转租,分租184.subrogated right 代位求偿185.subscription 认股书186.subsidy account 补助金帐户187.sum-of-the-years' digits method of depre年数总和折旧法188.sundry account 杂项帐户189.surrender of exchange 移存外汇190.surtax 附加税191.swap position 调期汇率头寸192.swap rate 掉期率193.swing 变动(幅度),摆动,涨落194.symmetry 对称195.syndicate leases 银团租赁196.synthetic financial futures position 综合金融期货头寸197.synthetic options 合成期权198.T/T (= Telegraphic Transfer) 电汇199.tariff 关税200.tax anticipation note (bill,bond) 预付税金票据,先期缴税债券201.tax avoidance 避免202.tax base 征税基础203.tax code 税法204.tax collection 税收制度205.tax concession 赋税优惠206.tax credit leases 减税租赁207.tax evasion 逃税208.tax grades 征税级距209.tax holiday 免税期210.tax on transport 运输税211.tax relief 税收减免212.tax statutes 税收法213.taxable 可征税的,应纳税的214.taxing power 税收能力,课税能力215.technology risk 技术风险216.telegraphic transfer (T/T) 电汇217.telephone transfers 电话转帐218.tell quel exchange rate 调整汇率219.teller's window (= teller' station) 出纳窗口220.temporary bridging finance 临时融资221.tender bond 投标保证金222.tender n. 货币,投、招标,提供,偿付223.terms of loan 放款条件224.the additional insured 附加被保险人225.the capacity of a tax 税收负担226.the Construction Bank of China 中国建设银行227.the Gilts 金边债券228.the International Trust and Investment C中国国际信托投资公司229.the open interest 未结清权益230.the People's Bank of China 中国人民银行231.the rate structure of the tax 税率结构232.thrift encouragement 储蓄鼓励233.tight market 旺市234.time lag 时滞235.time order 限时订单236.time-deposit accounts 定期存款帐户237.to be hedging 进行套做保值238.to defuse (attempted monopoly positions) 冲破(形成的市场垄断状况)239.total foreign exchange 外汇收支总额240.total FX portfolio 外汇投资总额241.total loss 全损242.total loss of part 部分全损243.total loss only 全损赔偿险244.trade claim 商业索赔245.trade risk 交易风险246.trading pit 交易场247.transaction exposure 交易风险248.transactions costs 交易费用249.transfer n. 转让,划拨,转帐250.transfer to reserve account 转到准备金帐户251.transferable money 可转帐货币252.translation exposure 转换风险253.transmitting bank 转证银行254.transnational leases 跨国租赁255.traveller's letter of credit 旅行信用证256.trust bank 信托银行257.trust fund 信托基金258.trust leases 信托租赁259.trust services 信托业务260.trustee bank 受托银行261.turnover of account receivable 应收帐款周转率262.turnover ratio of working capital 流动资本周转率263.two-tier exchange rate 双重汇率264.ultimate borrower 最终借款人265.ultra-cheap money policy 超低息政策266.unbalance finance 赤字财政267.uncovered interest arbitrage 未担保利率套利268.underinsurance 保险不足269.underinsured 保额不足270.underlying securities 标的证券271.undertaking unit bonus tax 事业单位奖金税272.underwriter 承销商273.underwriter 保险承受人274.underwriting 承保275.underwriting account 保险帐户276.underwriting limit 承保限额277.underwriting profit 承保利益278.unemployed capital 游资279.unexpired insurance 未过期保险280.uninscribed deposit 不记名存款281.unissued stock 未发行股票282.unlimited guarantee 无限责任担保283.unwind a trade 清理交易284.up-front fee 预付费用,先期费用285.urban house and land tax 市房地产税286.urban maintenance and construction tax 城市维护建设税287.V.A.T(Value Added Tax) 增值税288.value added tax 增值税289.value date 起息日290.valuer 估价行291.variation margin 盈亏保证金,变动保证292.vehicle and vessel licence use tax 车船使用牌照税293.vehicle and vessel use tax 车船使用税294.Visa card 维萨卡295.volatile 易变的,不稳定的296.volatile market 不稳定的市场行情297.voluntary conveyance 无偿转让298.voluntary savings 自愿储蓄299.warehousing 非法回购300.warrant money 保证金301.weak market 弱市302.withdrawal from circulation (货币)回笼303.withdrawal of bank notes 钞票回笼304.withdrawal of funds 资金回收305.withholding income tax 预提所得税306.withholding tax 预提税307.working balance 周转余额,往来余额308.working budget 流动预算,经营预算,周转预算,业务预算309.world bank 世界银行310.write 签发,签署,承保,编写311.zero-sum game 一方得益引起另一方相应受损的游戏;零和竞赛。
less tax, more money 逃税 避税和税务筹划
Case of Tax Planning
Professor Qian Party A will pay party B ¥50,000. Party B is responsible for the expenses including accommodation. Before tax planning: Tax: 50000×(1-20%)×20%×(1+50%)=12,000
Tax evasion? NO!!!
Tax avoidance NO!!!
Tax planning YES!!!
Say no to tax evasion
• Tax evasion is the illegal practice • deliberate criminal non-fulfillment of tax liabilities • loss of public revenue
Say no to tax avoidance
• Tax avoidance is the legal practice • deliberate acts of reducing one’s taxes by legal means • Find loopholes with the intention to pay less tax • Against the spirit of the law and in this sense considered noncompliant
Thanks for watching!
Tax: Personal 200,000 income tax: 180,000
Ways of tax planning
• One-time income: declare tax payment for more than one time • Sign the contract in another way
财政学双语重点(重中之重啊!)
财政学双语重点(重中之重啊!)1.Unified budget: The document which itemizes(逐项列出)all the federal government’s expenditures(支出)and revenues (收入).统一预算:联邦政府在一种文件中将其支出逐项列出。
2.substitution effect: The tendency of an individual to consume more of one good andless of another because of a decrease in the price of the former relative to the latter.替代效应一个人因一种商品相对于另一种商品的价格降低而多消费前者,少消费后者的倾向。
3. income effect :The effect of a price change on the quantity demanded(需求量)due exclusively(唯一的)to the fact that the consumer’s income has changed.收入效应价格变化对需求量的影响完全是由于消费者的实际收入的变化所致。
4. Pareto efficient: An allocation of resources such that no person can be made better off without making another person worse off.帕累托效率一种资源配置状态,在该状态下,如果不使一个人的境况变差就不可能使另一个人的境况变好。
5. Pareto improvement: A reallocation of resources that makes at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off.帕累托改进资源的重新配置可在不使任何人的境况变差的前提下,至少使一个人的境况变好。
税务英语词汇大全
英语词汇大全-税务英语专用词汇税务专用词汇State Administration for Taxation 国家税务总局Local Taxation bureau 地方税务局Business Tax 营业税Individual Income Tax 个人所得税Income Tax for Enterprises企业所得税Income Tax for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises外商投资企业和外国企业所得税tax returns filing 纳税申报taxes payable 应交税金the assessable period for tax payment 纳税期限the timing of tax liability arising 纳税义务发生时间consolidate reporting 合并申报the local competent tax authority 当地主管税务机关the outbound business activity 外出经营活动Tax Inspection Report 纳税检查报告tax avoidance 逃税tax evasion 避税tax base 税基refund after collection 先征后退withhold and remit tax 代扣代缴collect and remit tax 代收代缴income from authors remuneration 稿酬所得income from remuneration for personal service 劳务报酬所得income from lease of property 财产租赁所得income from transfer of property 财产转让所得contingent income 偶然所得resident 居民non-resident 非居民tax year 纳税年度temporary trips out of 临时离境flat rate 比例税率withholding income tax 预提税withholding at source 源泉扣缴State Treasury 国库tax preference 税收优惠the first profit-making year 第一个获利年度refund of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount 再投资退税export-oriented enterprise 出口型企业technologically advanced enterprise 先进技术企业Special Economic Zone 经济特区。
考研英语翻译天天练:个人所得税法_毙考题
2019考研英语翻译天天练:个人所得税法学好英语翻译一定要加强练习,掌握不同话题的相关词汇短语和专业表达。
小编整理分享不同话题段落和翻译,19考生注意每天练一练,相信日积月累必然提升翻译能力。
2019考研英语翻译天天练:个人所得税法个人所得税法individual income tax law请看例句:A draft amendment to the individual income tax law has been submitted for afirst reading at a bimonthly session of the National People s Congress StandingCommittee. Specific personal income tax changes that aim to reduce taxpayerburdens and boost consumption are expected after the proposed changes receiveregulatory approval.近日,个人所得税法修正案草案提请全国人大常委会初次审议。
此次提交审议的草案通过后,有望出台减轻纳税人负担、刺激消费等个人所得税具体改革措施。
个人所得税法修正案草案的亮点有:起征点提高raise the thresholdThe draft amendment raises the threshold for personal income tax from 3,500yuan to 5,000 yuan per month, or 60,000 yuan per year.草案将个税起征点由之前的3500元上调至5000元/月(6万元/年)。
专项附加扣除special expense deductionsThe draft amendment adds special expense deductions for items likechildren s education, continuing education, treatment for serious diseases, aswell as housing loan interest and rent.草案首次增加子女教育支出、继续教育支出、大病医疗支出、住房贷款利息和住房租金等专项附加扣除。
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm ValueMihir A. DesaiHarvard University and NBERmdesai@Dhammika DharmapalaUniversity of Connecticut and University of Michigandhammika@August 2007AbstractDo corporate tax avoidance activities advance shareholder interests? This paper tests alternative theories of corporate tax avoidance that yield distinct predictions on the valuation of corporate tax avoidance. Unexplained differences between income reported to capital markets and to tax authorities are used to proxy for tax avoidance activity. These “book-tax” gaps are shown to be larger when firms are alleged to be involved in tax shelters. OLS estimates indicate that the average effect of tax avoidance on firm value is not significantly different from zero, but is positive for well-governed firms as predicted by an agency perspective on corporate tax avoidance. An exogenous change in tax regulations that affected the ability of some firms to avoid taxes is used to construct instruments for tax avoidance activity. The IV estimates yield larger overall effects and reinforce the basic result that higher quality firm governance leads to a larger effect of tax avoidance on firm value. The results are robust to a wide variety of tests for alternative explanations. Taken together, the results suggest that the simple view of corporate tax avoidance as a transfer of resources from the state to shareholders is incomplete given the agency problems characterizing shareholder-manager relations.Keywords: Taxes, tax avoidance, tax shelters, book-tax gaps, governance, firm valueJEL Codes: G32, H25, H26, K34Acknowledgments: We would like to thank the Editor (Daron Acemoglu), two anonymous referees, Rosanne Altshuler, Alan Auerbach, Amy Dunbar, Ray Fisman, Sanjay Gupta, Michelle Hanlon, Jim Hines, Peter Katuscak, Mark Lang, Lillian Mills, John Phillips, George Plesko, Dan Shaviro, Joel Slemrod and John Wald for helpful discussions and comments. We also thank Sanjay Gupta and Jared Moore for kindly providing the data used in Section III on firms involved in tax shelter litigation. Desai acknowledges the financial support of the Division of Research of Harvard Business School and Dharmapala acknowledges the financial support of the University of Connecticut Research Foundation.Corresponding Author: Mihir Desai, Baker 265, Harvard Business School, Boston MA 02163; mdesai@; ph: 617 495 6693; fax: 617 496 6592I. IntroductionWhile tax consequences are a motivating factor in many corporate decisions, managerial actions designed solely to minimize corporate tax obligations are thought to be an increasingly important feature of U.S. corporate activity.1 Do such activities advance shareholder interests? If avoidance activities are costless to investors, the question is trivial as avoidance activity results in a transfer of value from the state to shareholders. Indeed, this has been the presumption in the large literature on the effects of taxes on financial decision-making. Corporate tax avoidance activity, however, may be costly on several margins. Aside from the direct costs of engaging in such activities, managers typically have to ensure that these actions are obscured from tax authorities. In the process, such machinations may afford managers increased latitude to pursue self-serving objectives. Can the latter effect be significant enough to change the simple answer that investors fully capture the value of corporate tax avoidance activity?Two small sample studies indicate that the valuation of tax avoidance activities may not conform to the simple story of tax avoidance as a transfer of value to shareholders. First, corporate expatriations - transactions where U.S. firms invert their corporate structure so that a subsidiary in a tax haven becomes the parent entity - provide significant corporate tax savings with limited, if any, operational changes. However, markets do not react in a strongly positive fashion – and often react negatively – to U.S. firms announcing such moves (e.g. Desai and Hines, 2002). Second, an event study of an episode of increased tax enforcement in Russia indicates that these enforcement actions are associated with positive market reactions (Desai, Dyck and Zingales, 2007). These small sample studies are provocative but leave open questions about the nature of corporate tax avoidance activity generally and in larger samples.This paper investigates the degree to which corporate tax avoidance activity is valued by investors in a large sample of US firms. While the traditional view of corporate tax avoidance suggests that shareholder value should increase with tax avoidance activity, an agency perspective on corporate tax avoidance provides a more nuanced prediction. Specifically, firm governance should be an important determinant of the valuation of purported corporate tax savings. While tax avoidance per se should increase the after-tax value of the firm, this effect is potentially offset, particularly in poorly-governed firms, by the increased opportunities for rentdiversion provided by tax shelters. Thus, the net effect on firm value should be greater for firms with stronger governance institutions.The relative merits of these two views of tax avoidance are evaluated using a dataset with 4,492 observations on 862 firms over the period 1993-2001. This panel is drawn from the Compustat and Execucomp databases, merged with data on institutional ownership of firms from the CDA/Spectrum database. Firm value is measured using Tobin’s q, and governance quality is proxied for by the level of institutional ownership, reflecting the ability of institutional owners to monitor managerial performance more aggressively. Tax avoidance is measured by inferring the difference between income reported to capital markets and tax authorities – the book-tax gap – and controlling for accruals and other measures of earnings management. The analysis demonstrates that, for a given firm, this measure takes on higher values in years when the firm is involved in litigation relating to aggressive tax sheltering activity than in other years.OLS results indicate that, controlling for a variety of other relevant factors including firm and year fixed effects, the effect of the tax avoidance measure on q is positive, but not significantly different from zero. As predicted by the agency perspective on corporate tax avoidance, the effect is positive for those firm-years with high levels of institutional ownership. The interpretation of these results, however, is complicated by the possibility of measurement error in the proxy for tax avoidance and by the potential endogeneity of tax avoidance activity. Specifically, it is possible that firms that are performing worse for exogenous reasons may be more likely to engage in tax avoidance.2 Fortunately, a 1997 regulatory change unintentionally and significantly changed the costs of tax sheltering differentially across firms. This source of exogenous variation permits the implementation of an instrumental variables strategy that can be used to address these concerns and to investigate the causal effect of tax avoidance on firm value.The “check-the-box” regulations were designed to enable small firms to choose their organizational form for tax purposes. Altshuler and Grubert (2005) and various practitioners have observed that these regulations also had the unintended consequence of lowering the costs of tax avoidance for firms. Specifically, “hybrid entities” became increasingly common. These entities are classified as separately incorporated subsidiaries under the tax rules of one country while simultaneously being treated as unincorporated branches under the tax rules of anothercountry. This flexibility in entity classification creates a sizable tax avoidance opportunity for firms with incentives to capitalize on these regulatory changes. The central idea underlying the identification strategy is that, for a given incentive to engage in tax avoidance, a firm will engage in more actual tax avoidance after the “check-the-box” regulations were adopted. A crucial determinant of the incentives to engage in tax avoidance is the availability of “tax shields.” Thus, instruments for tax avoidance are constructed by interacting a dummy variable for the period after the “check-the-box” regulations with variables (at the firm-year-level) that proxy for the availability of tax shields, namely NOL carryforwards and two different measures of debt.IV estimates using the instruments described above lead to results that are in the same direction as the OLS results, but are considerably stronger. The interaction between institutional ownership and tax avoidance is positive and significant, as predicted by the agency perspective on tax avoidance. This result is robust to the inclusion of various additional control variables, and to a variety of extensions to the model. The exclusion restriction underlying the IV results may be invalid if the effect on firm value of the tax shield variables changed over time for reasons unrelated to the “check-the-box” regulations. Reassuringly, the basic result is robust to including interactions between these variables and time trends in the model. Overall, the substantially larger effects found using the IV approach suggests that the OLS results are significantly affected by attenuation bias due to measurement error in the tax avoidance proxy or by the endogeneity of tax avoidance.The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the alternative views of corporate tax avoidance. Section 3 describes the data and the measure of corporate tax avoidance. Section 4 presents the OLS results, while Section 5 describes the IV methodology and results. Section 6 concludes.II. Theories of Corporate Tax AvoidanceThe purported growth in corporate tax avoidance activity has given rise to two alternative perspectives on the motivations and effects of this activity. Several studies investigate corporate tax avoidance as an extension of other tax-favored activity, such as the use of debt. In particular, Graham and Tucker (2006) construct a sample of firms involved in 44 corporate tax shelter cases over the period 1975-2000. By comparing these firms with a matched sample of firms not involved in such litigation, they identify characteristics (such as size and profitability) that arepositively associated with the use of tax shelters, and argue that tax shelters serve as a substitute for interest deductions in determining capital structure. This paper is representative of the common view that corporate tax shelters are merely tax-saving devices without any other agency dimensions.An alternative theoretical approach emphasizes the interaction of these tax avoidance activities andthe agency problems that are inherent in publicly held firms. According to this view, obfuscatory tax avoidance activities can create a shield for managerial opportunism and the diversion of rents. This perspective underlies several recent studies, including Desai and Dharmapala (2006a) and Desai, Dyck and Zingales (2007), and forms part of an emerging paradigm that emphasizes the links between firms’ governance arrangements and their responses to taxes.3 In this view, corporate tax avoidance not only entails distinct costs, but these costs may actually outweigh the benefits to shareholders, given the opportunities for diversion that these vehicles provide. Desai and Dharmapala (2006b) discuss examples of the interaction between tax shelters and various forms of managerial opportunism, illustrating that straightforward diversion and subtle forms of earnings manipulation can be facilitated when managers undertake tax avoidance activity.While the traditional view of corporate tax avoidance suggests that shareholder value should increase with tax avoidance activity, the alternative view provides a more nuanced prediction. Specifically, firm governance should be an important determinant of the valuation of purported corporate tax savings. While the direct effect of tax avoidance is to increase the after-tax value of the firm, these effects are potentially offset, particularly in poorly-governed firms, by the increased opportunities for managerial rent diversion. Thus, the net effect on firm value should be greater for firms with stronger governance institutions.III. Measuring Firm Value, Governance, and Corporate Tax AvoidanceThe data used to test the hypothesis described above is drawn from three sources. Financial accounting data is drawn from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database, executive compensation data (and certain other control variables) from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp database, and data on institutional ownership of firms from the CDA/Spectrum database. Merging these variables leads to a dataset with 4,492 observations at the firm-year level, on 862firms over the period 1993-2001. The variables are described in detail below; summary statistics are reported in Table 1.In emphasizing the value implications of corporate tax avoidance, this paper builds on the extensive literature in corporate finance on the determinants of firm value. Within this literature, it has become standard since Demsetz and Lehn (1985) to use Tobin’s q to measure firm value. The definition of q used in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is employed in the analysis below, with one modification: deferred tax expense is not included in the definition of q used in the basic results below, as current tax avoidance activity may result in changes to future tax liabilities and thus create a mechanical correlation between the dependent variable and the measure of tax avoidance.4 While q is the primary dependent variable used in the analysis, alternative measures of firm value lead to consistent results, as discussed in Section 5.In addition to drawing on financial statement data, the analysis below requires a measure of firm governance. The primary measure of governance used in testing the paper’s main hypothesis is the fraction of the firm’s shares owned by institutional investors (from the CDA Spectrum database, based on Schedule 13F filings with the SEC by large institutional investors). This fraction (which is reported quarterly) is averaged over each firm-year, and is denoted by I itє[0, 1] for firm i in year t. The basic motivation underlying this proxy is that institutional investors have greater incentives and capacity to monitor managerial performance. Thus, the higher is I it, the greater the degree of scrutiny to which managerial actions are subjected, and the less important are agency problems between managers and shareholders. In addition, a different measure – the index of antitakeover provisions constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) – is used in robustness checks. While this captures a quite different aspect of governance than does I it (namely, managerial entrenchment rather than the quality of monitoring), its use leads to highly consistent results, as discussed in Section 5 below.Given the efforts undertaken to obscure such activities, tax avoidance is difficult to measure. The analysis in this paper adopts an indirect approach, constructing a measure of corporate tax avoidance that takes as its starting point the gap between financial and taxable income. The difference between income reported to capital markets (using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)) and to the tax authorities – the so-called book-tax gap – hasattracted considerable interest in recent years, and has been related to measures of corporate tax avoidance (Manzon and Plesko, 2002; Desai, 2003, 2004). Given that tax returns are confidential, income reported to tax authorities cannot be observed directly and must be inferred using financial accounting data, as described in Manzon and Plesko (2002) and implemented in Desai and Dharmapala (2006a). This approach uses firms’ reported current Federal tax expense and “grosses up” this tax liability by the US Federal corporate tax rate.5 For firms with positive current Federal tax expense, the graduated structure of corporate tax rates is used in this calculation. For firms with negative current Federal tax expense, the top statutory rate of 35% is used.Given this inferred value of the firm’s taxable income, the book-tax gap can be estimated by simply subtracting inferred taxable income from the firm’s reported pretax (domestic US) financial income.6 To control for differences in firm scale, and because the dependent variable is deflated by the book value of assets, the inferred book-tax gap is also scaled by the book value of assets. This yields the measure of the book-tax gap used in the analysis below (denoted BT it for firm i in year t).7The book-tax gap does not necessarily reflect corporate tax avoidance activity, so any measure of tax avoidance must control for other factors. In particular, the overreporting of financial income (known in the accounting literature as “earnings management”) may contribute to the measured book-tax gap.8 Studies of earnings management (e.g. Healy, 1985) have argued that such manipulation is most likely to occur through the exercise of managerial discretion in determining accounting accruals (i.e. adjustments to realized cash flows that are used in calculating the firm’s net income). The basic intuition underlying the measure of tax avoidance used here is that book-tax gaps are attributable either to earnings management or to tax avoidance activity. Accordingly, adjusting for earnings management with an accruals proxy isolates the component of the gap that is due to tax avoidance. In the regressions reported below, BT it is used as a proxy for tax avoidance activity, while earnings management is controlled for by including a measure of total accruals (denoted TA it for firm i in year t) as a control variable.9 Given the confidentiality of tax returns, the procedure outlined above yields the best measure of corporate tax avoidance that can be obtained using publicly-available data. However, in view of the limitations associated with inferring taxable income, and as there are alternativeexplanations for book-tax gaps, it is important to implement a validation check of the book-tax gap as a measure of corporate tax sheltering activity before proceeding to determine its valuation effects.Graham and Tucker (2006) construct a sample of firms involved in 44 cases of tax shelter litigation over the period 1975-2000, using publicly-available court records and press articles. The validation check undertaken here uses a dataset compiled using a similar methodology. This information can be used to construct a variable that indicates whether tax sheltering activity was alleged in any given firm-year. Specifically, let the indicator variable L it be equal to one if firm i was alleged to have used a tax shelter in year t, and zero otherwise. This variable is merged with data on the book-tax gap and a set of control variables from the merged Compustat-Execucomp dataset, in order to examine the relationship between involvement in tax shelter litigation and book-tax gaps. The regression specification used is:BT it = β1L it+ β2TA it+ X itγ+ µi+ εt+ νit (1) where µi and εt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively, and νit is the error term. X it is a vector of control variables that includes measures of firm size (assets, sales and market value) and the structure of executive compensation.The resulting sample is very small – there are only 14 firms that were involved in tax shelter litigation at some point in the sample period, and for which all the required data is available. Nonetheless, estimating Equation (1) using this sample results in a positive coefficient on L it, as reported in column 1 of Table 2; i.e. the book-tax gap for a given firm tends to be larger in years when that firm is allegedly using tax shelters, relative to the book-tax gap for the same firm in other years. This result is driven entirely by within-firm variation in L it, controlling for time-specific changes in sheltering activity. Unsurprisingly, this result is of borderline statistical significance, given the small sample size. Column 2 reports the same specification using all available observations in the merged Compustat-Execucomp dataset; the estimate of β1 is very similar in magnitude to that in Column 1.10Any conclusions from this validation check are necessarily tentative, given the small number of firms that have been involved in tax shelter litigation. Nonetheless, it appears that the measure of tax avoidance employed below captures a critical element of tax sheltering activity,as it takes on higher values for those firm-years for which there is some independent evidence for alleged tax shelter activity.IV. OLS Approach and ResultsWhile the central hypothesis of the paper concerns the interaction of governance institutions and tax avoidance activity, the question of whether tax avoidance tends to be associated with increases or decreases in firm value is also of considerable interest. This is addressed using the following specification:q it = β1BT it+ β2TA it+ X itγ+ µi+ εt+ νit (2) where the variables BT it and TA it are as defined above, µi and εt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively, and νit is the error term (note that all regressions reported in this paper use both firm and year fixed effects).X it is a vector consisting of the following control variables. Changes in firm size over time are controlled for using sales.11 The value of stock option grants to executives as a fraction of total compensation12 is included because a substantial literature (e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Mehran, 1995) finds stock-based compensation to be a determinant of firm value, presumably through incentive-alignment effects. In addition, the structure of executive compensation plays a central role in Desai and Dharmapala (2006a). To control for changes over time in the risk associated with a firm’s stock price, a measure of volatility is also included.13 As net operating loss (NOL) carryforwards are not taken into account in the measure of tax avoidance (and because NOLs can affect the incentives to engage in tax avoidance), NOL carryforwards scaled by assets (with missing values treated as zeroes) are also included.The tax avoidance measure is restricted to domestic US tax expense and US Federal taxes, but tax liabilities and the incentives for tax avoidance may be influenced by foreign activity under the US system of worldwide taxation. Thus, a proxy for foreign activity - the absolute value of foreign income or loss - is included in X it. As tax shields can affect the value of engaging in tax avoidance, changes in firms’ leverage are controlled for by including measures long-term debt and debt in current liabilities. Changes in intangibles that affect q but are imperfectly measured in the book value of assets are proxied for by research and development (R&D) expenditures. A number of additional control variables are used in robustness checks, asdescribed below. Note also that because firm fixed effects are employed in the specification described below, many of the sources of cross-sectional variation in q across firms that have been discussed in the literature are effectively controlled for here.The specification used to test whether the valuation of corporate tax avoidance is dependent on firm governance extends Equation (2) as follows:q it = β1BT it+ β2TA it+ β3I it + β4(I it*BT it) + X itγ+ µi+ εt+ νit (3) where I it is the measure of institutional ownership defined above. The hypothesis in Section 2 implies that β4 > 0: i.e. the effect of tax avoidance on q is greater in firm-years in which institutional ownership is higher (and governance is stronger).The results using OLS estimation on Equations (2) and (3) are reported in Table 3; note that all results reported in this paper use robust (White, 1980) standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. Column 1 presents the results from the estimation of Equation (2).14 The overall effect on firm value of the proxy for tax avoidance is positive, but insignificant. The test of the hypothesis using Equation (3) is reported in Column 2. Here, the coefficient on the interaction term (I it*BT it) – β4 in Equation (3) – is positive, consistent with the paper’s hypothesis, and is of borderline statistical significance. The intuition can be reinforced by running Equation (2) separately for firm-years with high and low levels of institutional ownership (Columns 3 and 4, respectively), where “high” institutional ownership is defined as being a fraction that exceeds 0.6, which is approximately the mean of the sample. For well-governed firm-years, the effect of tax avoidance on q is positive and of borderline significance. For less well-governed firm-years (with institutional ownership below 0.6), the effect is also positive, but statistically insignificant, and considerably smaller in magnitude. Thus, while the estimated overall effect of tax avoidance on firm value is indistinguishable from zero, the effect appears to be more positive for well-governed firm-years than for poorly-governed firm-years. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that agency problems mitigate the benefits to shareholders of corporate tax avoidance. V. Instrumental-Variables Approach and ResultsV.a. IV ApproachOLS estimation of Equations (2) and (3) gives rise to two types of potential problems.15 The first is measurement error in the proxy for tax avoidance, particularly if the extent ofmeasurement error differs by governance institutions. For example, if the proxies used for earnings management are incomplete, then the remaining component of the book-tax gap may be mischaracterized as tax avoidance when it actually represents earnings management. Accordingly, it is possible that the results are driven by differential market reactions to earnings management by well-governed and poorly-governed firms. The second is the potential endogeneity of tax avoidance activity. For example, firms that are performing worse for other reasons may be more likely to engage in tax avoidance.In order to address these concerns, an exogenous source of variation in firms’ opportunities for tax avoidance is required. Fortunately, a 1997 regulatory change with unrelated objectives lowered the costs of tax avoidance for a subset of firms. In late 1996, the Treasury issued what are known as the “check-the-box” (CTB) regulations. These regulations enable firms to choose their organizational form for tax purposes – for example, whether to be taxed as a C-corporation or as a pass-through entity such as a partnership or sole proprietorship – by filing a one-page form on which they could simply check the appropriate box. In replacing a complex set of rules by which the IRS determined firms’ tax status, the CTB regulations were intended to reduce the administrative burdens faced by small firms. Researchers studying international taxation argue that the CTB regulations also had the unintended consequence of facilitating tax avoidance by large US-based multinational firms through the use of what are known as “hybrid entities” (see in particular Altshuler and Grubert (2005)). Hybrid entities are classified in two distinct ways – as separately incorporated subsidiaries under the tax rules of one country and as unincorporated branches under the tax rules of another country.16The instruments for tax avoidance involve interacting a dummy variable for the post-CTB time period (i.e. the years since 1997) with firm-year-level variables that capture the incentive to engage in tax avoidance. The central idea underlying the identification strategy is that, for a given incentive to engage in tax avoidance, a firm will engage in more actual tax avoidance after the CTB regulations were adopted than it would have before, other things equal. A crucial determinant of the incentives to engage in tax avoidance is the availability of “tax shields” (i.e. tax deductions from other sources, such as interest deductions or NOL carryforwards resulting from losses in previous years); for instance, Graham and Tucker (2006) emphasize the substitutability of tax shelters and other kinds of tax shields. Instruments for tax avoidance can thus be constructed by interacting a dummy variable for the period after the CTB regulations。
税收英语词汇
税务专用英语词汇State Administration for Taxation 国家税务总局Local Taxation bureau 地方税务局Business Tax 营业税Individual Income Tax 个人所得税Income Tax for Enterprises企业所得税Income Tax for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises外商投资企业和外国企业所得税tax returns filing 纳税申报taxes payable 应交税金the assessable period for tax payment 纳税期限the timing of tax liability arising 纳税义务发生时间consolidate reporting 合并申报the local competent tax authority 当地主管税务机关the outbound business activity 外出经营活动Tax Inspection Report 纳税检查报告tax avoidance 逃税tax evasion 避税tax base 税基refund after collection 先征后退withhold and remit tax 代扣代缴collect and remit tax 代收代缴income from authors remuneration 稿酬所得income from remuneration for personal service 劳务报酬所得income from lease of property 财产租赁所得income from transfer of property 财产转让所得contingent income 偶然所得resident 居民non-resident 非居民tax year 纳税年度temporary trips out of 临时离境flat rate 比例税率withholding income tax 预提税withholding at source 源泉扣缴State Treasury 国库tax preference 税收优惠the first profit-making year 第一个获利年度refund of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount 再投资退税export-oriented enterprise 出口型企业technologically advanced enterprise 先进技术企业Special Economic Zone 经济特区tax exemption 免税Tax Exemption Certificate 免税证明书tax heldover 延缓缴纳的税款tax holiday 免税期tax in default 拖欠税款tax investigation税务调查tax liability 纳税责任;税务负担tax payable应缴税款body corporate 法团;法人团体保护关税(Protective Tariff)保税制度(Bonded System)布鲁塞尔估价定义(Brussels Definition of Value BDV)差别关税(Differential Duties)差价关税(Variable Import Levies)产品对产品减税方式(Product by Product Reduction of Tariff)超保护贸易政策(Policy of Super-protection)成本(Cost)出厂价格(Cost Price)初级产品(Primary Commodity)初级产品的价格(The Price of Primang Products)出口补贴(Export Subsidies)出口退税(Export Rebates)从量税(Specific Duty)从价(Ad Valorem)从价关税(Ad Valorem Duties)反补贴税(Counter Vailing Duties)反倾销(Anti-Dumping)反倾销税(Anti-dumping Duties)关税(Customs Duty)关税和贸易总协定(The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade)关税配额(Tariff Quota)自主关税(Autonomous Tariff)最惠国税率(The Most-favoured-nation Rate of Duty)优惠税率(Preferential Rate)标题:能介绍一下营业税的知识吗TOPIC: Would you please give the general introduction of the business tax?对话内容:纳税人:我公司马上就要营业了,能介绍一下营业税的知识吗?Taxpayer: my company will begin business soon, but I have little knowledge about the business tax. Can you introduce it?税务局:尽我所能吧!一般地说,提供应税业务、转让无形资产和出卖不动产都要交纳营业税。
财税英语-税务专用词汇及税收英语
财税英语-税务专用词汇及税收英语财税英语-税务专用词汇及税收英语对话字体:[ 大中小 ] 日期:2008-04-11 浏览次数:1729 保护视力色:1.税务专用词汇State Administration for Taxation 国家税务总局Local Taxation bureau 地方税务局Business Tax 营业税Individual Income Tax 个人所得税Income Tax for Enterprises企业所得税Income Tax for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises外商投资企业和外国企业所得税tax returns filing 纳税申报taxes payable 应交税金the assessable period for tax payment 纳税期限the timing of tax liability arising 纳税义务发生时间consolidate reporting 合并申报the local competent tax authority 当地主管税务机关the outbound business activity 外出经营活动Tax Inspection Report 纳税检查报告tax avoidance 逃税tax evasion 避税tax base 税基refund after collection 先征后退withhold and remit tax 代扣代缴collect and remit tax 代收代缴income from authors remuneration 稿酬所得income from remuneration for personal service 劳务报酬所得income from lease of property 财产租赁所得income from transfer of property 财产转让所得contingent income 偶然所得resident 居民non-resident 非居民tax year 纳税年度temporary trips out of 临时离境flat rate 比例税率withholding income tax 预提税withholding at source 源泉扣缴State Treasury 国库tax preference 税收优惠the first profit-making year 第一个获利年度refund of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount 再投资退税export-oriented enterprise 出口型企业technologically advanced enterprise 先进技术企业Special Economic Zone 经济特区2. 税收英语对话――营业税标题:能介绍一下营业税的知识吗TOPIC: Would you please give the general introduction of the business tax?对话内容:纳税人:我公司马上就要营业了,能介绍一下营业税的知识吗?Taxpayer: my company will begin business soon, but I have little knowledgeabout the business tax. Can you introduce it?税务局:尽我所能吧!一般地说,提供应税业务、转让无形资产和出卖不动产都要交纳营业税。
BEC高级必备词汇
BEC高级必备词汇(1)p.a.(=per annum) n. 每年packaging n. 包装物;包装parent company n. 母公司,总公司part-time adj. 部分时间工作的,业余的participate v. 参加,分享(in)partnership n. 合伙(关系),合伙,合伙企业patent n. 专利pay n. 工资,酬金 v. 付钱,付报酬take-home pay 实得工资payroll n. 雇员名单,工资表peak n. 峰值,顶点penetrate ['penitreit] v. 渗透,打入(市场)penetration n. 目标市场的占有份额pension n. 养老金,退休金perform v. 表现,执行performance n. 进行,表现工作情况performance appraisal n. 工作情况评估perk n. 额外待遇(交通、保健、保险等)小费personnel n. 员工,人员petty cash n. 零用现金phase out n. 分阶段停止使用pick v. 提取生产用零部件或给顾客发货picking list n. 用于择取生产或运输订货的表格pie chart n. 饼形图pilot n. 小规模试验pipeline n. 管道,渠道plant capacity n. 生产规模,生产能力plot v. 标绘,策划plough[plau]犁 back n. 将获利进行再投资point of sale (POS) n. 销售点policy n. 政策,规定, 保险单portfolio[pɔ:t'fəuljəu] n. (投资)组合portfolio management n. 组合证券管理post n. 邮件,邮局;职位position n. 职位potential n. 潜在力,潜势power n. 能力purchasing power 购买力PR=Public Relations 公共关系preference shares n. 优先股market price 市场价,市价retail price 零售价probation[prəu'beiʃən] n. 试用期product n. 产品production cycle n. 生产周期production schedule n. 生产计划product life cycle n. 产品生命周期product mix n. 产品组合(种类和数量的组合)productive adj. 生产的,多产的profile n. 简介形象特征profit n. 利润operating profit n. 营业利润profit and loss account n. 损益帐户project v. 预测promote v . 推销promotion n. 提升,升级proposal n. 建议,计划prospect n. 预期,展望vi. 勘探prospectus[prəu'spektəs n. 计划书,说明书prosperity[prəu'spektəs n. 繁荣,兴隆prototype{'prəutətaip] n. 原型,样品publicity n. 引起公众注意public adj. 公众的,公开的go public 上市public sector 公有企业publicity n. 公开场合,名声,宣传publics n. 公众,(有共同兴趣的)一群人或社会人士punctual adj. 准时的punctuality[,pʌŋktju'æliti] n. 准时purchase v. & n. 购买purchaser n. 买主,采购人QC(=Quality Circle) n. 质检人员qualify v. 有资格,胜任qualified adj. 有资格的,胜任的,合格的qualification n. 资格,资格证明quality n. 质量quality assurance n. 质量保证quality control 质量控制,质量管理quarterly adj./adv. 季度的,按季度quote n. 报价,股票牌价quotation n. 报价,股票牌价R&D Research and Development 研究与开发radically['rædikəli] adv. 根本地,彻底地raise[reiz]n.(美)增加薪金v. 增加,提高;提出,引起range n. 系列产品rank n./v. 排名rapport n. 密切的关系,轻松愉快的气氛rate n. 比率,费用采集者退散fixed rate 固定费用,固定汇率going rate 现行利率,现行汇率rating 评定结果ratio['reiʃiəu] n. 比率rationalise v. 使更有效,使更合理raw adj. 原料状态的,未加工的raw material n. 原材料receive v. 得到receipt[ri'si:t] n. 收据receiver n. 接管人,清算人accounts receivable 应收帐receivership n. 破产管理recession n. 萧条reckon v. 估算,认为recognise v. 承认reconcile['rekənsail]v. 使……相吻合,核对,调和recoup[ri'ku:p] v. 扣除,赔偿recover v. 重新获得,恢复recovery n. 重获,恢复recruit v. 招聘,征募 n. 新招收的人员recruitment n. 新成员的吸收in the red 赤字,负债reduce v. 减少reduction n. 减少redundant adj. 过多的,被解雇的redundancy n. 裁员,解雇reference n. 参考,参考资料reference number (Ref. No.)产品的参考号码refund n./v. 归还,偿还region n. 地区reimburse v. 偿还,报销reject n./v. 拒绝reliability n. 可靠性relief n. 减轻,解除,救济relocate v. 调动,重新安置remuneration[ri,mju:nə'reiʃən] n. 酬报,酬金rent v. 租 n. 租金rep (代表)的缩写report to v. 低于(某人),隶属,从属reposition v. (为商品)重新定位represent v. 代表,代理representative n. 代理人,代表reputation n. 名声,声望reputable adj. 名声/名誉好的reserves n. 储量金,准备金resign v. 放弃,辞去resignation n. 辞职resistance n. 阻力,抵触情绪respond v. 回答,答复response n. 回答,答复restore v. 恢复result/results n. 结果,效果retail n./v. 零售retailer n. 零售商retained earnings n. 留存收益return n. 投资报酬return on investment (ROI) n. 投资收入,投资报酬revenue n. 岁入,税收review v./n. 检查reward n./v. 报答,报酬,奖赏rework v. (因劣质而)重作risk capital n. 风险资本rival n. 竞争者,对手adj. 竞争的rocket v. 急速上升,直线上升,飞升ROI Return on Investment 投资利润roughly adv. 粗略地round adj. 整数表示的,大约round trip 往返的行程royalty n. 特许权,专利权税run v. 管理,经营running adj. 运转的tactic ['tæktik] n. 战术,兵法tailorv. 特制产品tailor made products 特制产品take on 雇用takeover n. 接管target n. 目标 v. 把……作为目标tariff['tærif] n. 关税;价目表task n. 任务,工作task force n. 突击队,攻关小队(为完成某项任务而在一起的一组人)tax n. 税,税金capital gains tax n. 资本收益税corporation tax n. 公司税,法人税income tax n. 所得税value added tax 增值税tax allowance 免减税tax avoidance 避税taxable 可征税的taxation 征税tax-deductible 在计算所得税时予以扣除的telesales n. 电话销售,电话售货temporary adj. 暂时的temporary post 临时职位tender n./v. 投标vt. 提供territory n. (销售)区域tie n. 关系,联系throughput n. 工厂的总产量TQC(=Total Quality Control) n. 全面质量管理track record n. 追踪记录,业绩trade n./v. 商业,生意;交易,经商balance of trade 贸易平衡trading profit 贸易利润insider trading 内部交易trade mark 商标trade union 工会trainee n. 受培训者transaction n. 交易,业务transfer n./v. 传输,转让transformation n. 加工transparency n. (投影用)透明胶片treasurer n. 司库,掌管财务的人treasury n. 国库,财政部trend n. 趋势,时尚trouble-shooting n. 解决问题turnover n. 营业额,员工流动的比率staff turnover 人员换手率stock turnover 股票换手率undertake v. 从事、同意做某事undifferentiated marketing n. 无差异性营销策略uneconomical adj. 不经济的,浪费unemployment n. 失业unemployment benefit n. 失业津贴unit n. 单位unit cost n. 单位成本update v. 使现代化up to date adj./adv. 流行的,现行的,时髦的upgrade v. 升级,增加upturn n. 使向上,使朝上USP 唯一的销售计划BEC专业词汇(1)痴迷者 addict持币待购 wait to buy with cash in hand持平 hold the line持续、稳定、协调发展 sustained[sə'steind], stable and coordinated development赤潮 red tides (which appear on the ocean)赤贫人口 people living in absolute poverty; destitute population充电 recharge one's batteries; update one's knowledge; brush up[brʌʃ'ʌp]充分调动积极性和创造性 give full play to the initiative[i'niʃiətiv] and creativity充分利用两个市场,两种资源 fully utilize both domestic and international markets and resources充值卡 rechargeable card冲动性购买 impulse buying; impulse shopping冲剂 dissolved medicines; instant herbal medicines冲浪艇 surfboat冲帐 strike a balance; counter-balance accounts; reverse an entry崇洋媚外 worship things foreign and fawn on foreign countries宠物医院 pet clinic抽调 transfer a portion抽检 spot check抽奖 lucky draw抽杀成功 hit through抽样调查 sample survey筹备委员会 preparatory committee筹划指导委员会 steering committee筹资 raised capital/proceeds筹资渠道 fundraising channels臭老九 stinking ninth category (of class enemies next to landlords, reactionaries and even spies, etc. , a term of abuse by ultra-Leftists for teachers and other educated people in the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution)出风头 show off;in the limelight出家 pravrajana; cloister出境签证 exit visa出口创汇能力 capacity to earn foreign exchange through exports出口创汇型产业 export-oriented industry出口加工区 export processing zones出口卖方信贷 seller's credit on exports出口退税率 export rebate rate出口退税制度 the system of refunding taxes on exported goods; export (tax) rebate 出口押汇 bill purchased (B/P); outward documentary bill出口转内销 domestic sales of commodities orginally produced for exports出笼 release a bad publication, plan, etc.出难题偏题 raise out-of-the-way and catchy questions出气筒 punching bag出勤率 attendance rate出入平安 Safe trip wherever you go出台 unveil[,ʌn'veil] fresh policy出租业务 leasing除 "四害 " eliminate the four pests---rats, bedbugs, flies and mosquitoes除草剂 weed killer储备基金 reserve funds储币待购 save for purchases储运 storage and transport处理存货 sell-off处理价格 bargain price; reduced price处理品 items for disposal触摸屏 touchscreen穿梭外交 shuttle diplomacy穿小鞋 make it hot for; make trouble for穿新鞋走老路 wearing new shoes to walk on the old path; change in form but not in content; put old wine in new wineskins穿针引线 act as go-between传统产业 conventional industries传销 pyramid sales; multi-level marketing船务公司 shipping service company窗口行业 various service trades创建卫生城市 build a nationally advanced clean city创利 generate profit创业精神 enterprising spirit; pioneering spirit创业园 high-tech business incubator[,ʌn'veil]; pioneer park创业者 start-up创意 create new ideas or concepts吹风会 (advanced) briefing垂直管理 vertical['və:tikəl] management垂直贸易 vertical trade春蕾计划 Spring Buds Program春运 passenger transport around the Chinese lunar new year春运 (passenger) transport during the Spring Festival纯净水 purified water辞旧迎新 bid farewell to the old and usher in the new; ring out the old year and ring in the new磁卡电话 magnetic card telephone磁悬浮列车 "Maglev['mæɡlev] train (magnetically levitated train), magnetic suspension train "此地无银三百两 A guilty person gives himself away by consciously protesting his innocence.次大陆 subcontinent次新股 sub-new stock从粗放经济转变为集约经济 shift from extensive economy to intensive economy从零开始 start from scratch从群众中来,到群众中去 from the masses, to the masses从众心理 group psychology凑份子 club together粗放经营 extensive operation粗放式管理 extensive management粗放型 extensive form粗加工产品 rough-wrought product促进对外贸易多元化 diversify our trading partners; promote the diversificationof foreign trade促进全球经济一体化 foster integration with the global economy促销 promote sales; promotion催泪弹 tear gas存储能力 storage capacity存款保证金 guaranty money for deposits存款单 Certificates of Deposits存款准备金制度 reserve against deposit system存量资本 stock of capital。
BEC初级商务英语必备词汇S-V
BEC初级商务英语必备词汇S-V为了让大家更好的准备商务英语BEC考试,给大家整理BEC 初级商务英语必备词汇,下面就和大家分享,来欣赏一下吧。
BEC初级商务英语必备词汇(S)save v. 节省,储蓄savings n. 存款scale n. 刻度,层次scapegoat n. 替罪羊scare adj. 缺乏的,不足的scrap n. 废料或废品seasonal adj. 季节性的section n. 部门sector n. 部门ecurities n. 债券及有价证券segment n. 部分v. 将市场划分成不同的部分segmentation n. 将市场划分成不同的部门semi-skilled adj. 半熟练的settle v. 解决,决定BEC初级商务英语必备词汇(T)tactic n. 战术,兵法tailor v. 特制产品tailor made products 特制产品take on 雇用takeover n. 接管target n. 目标v. 把......作为目标tariff n. 关税;价目表task n. 任务,工作task force n. 突击队,攻关小队(为完成某项任务而在一起的一组人)tax n. 税,税金capital gains tax n. 资本收益税corporation tax n. 公司税,法人税income tax n. 所得税value added tax 增值税tax allowance 免减税tax avoidance 避税taxable 可征税的taxation 征税tax-deductible 在计算所得税时予以扣除的telesales n. 电话销售,电话售货temporary adj. 暂时的temporary post 临时职位tender n./v. 投标territory n. (销售)区域来BEC初级商务英语必备词汇(U-V)undertake v. 从事、同意做某事undifferentiated marketing n. 无差异性营销策略uneconomical adj. 不经济的,浪费unemployment n. 失业unemployment benefit n. 失业津贴unit n. 单位unit cost n. 单位成本update v. 使现代化up to date adj./adv. 流行的,现行的,时髦的upgrade v. 升级,增加upturn n. 使向上,使朝上USP 唯一的销售计划Vvacancy n. 空缺vacant adj. 空缺的value n./v. 价值,估价valuation n. 价值value-added n. 增加值variable n. 可变物variation n. 变化,变更variety n. 多样化a variety of 多种多样的vary v. 改变,修改VAT Value Added Tax 增值税vendor n. 卖主(公司或个人) venture n. 冒险,投机venue n. 地点,集合地点viable adj. 可行的viability n. 可行性vision n. 设想,公司的长期目标vocation n. 行业,职业vocational adj. 行业的,职业的。
The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance
The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance*JOHN GALLEMORE,University of ChicagoEDWARD L.MAYDEW,University of North CarolinaJACOB R.THORNOCK,University of Washington1.IntroductionThis study investigates whetherfirms and their top executives bear reputational costs from engaging in aggressive tax avoidance activities.At least two decades of empirical tax research has shown thatfirms engage in a wide range of strategies for tax avoidance pur-poses.1Recent studies suggest that for manyfirms,tax avoidance appears to be highly effective at reducing thefirms’tax payments and increasing their after-tax earnings.For example,Dyreng,Hanlon,and Maydew(2008)find that more than a quarter of publicly traded U.S.firms are able to reduce their taxes to less than20percent of their pre-tax earnings,and are able to sustain such low rates of taxation over periods as long as ten years.Tax avoidance strategies are abundant and include a wide variety of activities such as shifting income into tax havens(Dyreng and Lindsey2009),using complex hybrid secu-rities(Engel,Erickson,and Maydew1999),and engaging in other tax shelters(Wilson 2009).While the evidence indicates there is wide variation in tax avoidance acrossfirms, the extant literature has a difficult time explaining this variation.What is puzzling is not that somefirms engage in tax avoidance,but rather why somefirms engage in it enthusiastically while others appear to shun it.For example,while showing that some firms engage in substantial tax avoidance,Dyreng et al.(2008)alsofind that approxi-mately one-fourth offirms pay taxes in excess of35percent of their pre-tax income over a ten-year period.Given a U.S.federal corporate tax rate of35percent,these firms appear to be engaging in little or no sustainable tax avoidance.The question of why so manyfirms do not avail themselves of tax avoidance opportunities has been coined the“under-sheltering puzzle”(Desai and Dharmapala2006;Hanlon and Heitz-man2010;Weisbach2002).*Accepted by Steve Salterio.The authors would like to thank Kathleen Andries,Darren Bernard,Jenny Brown,Nicole Cade,Charles Christian,Lisa De Simone,Katherine Drake,Don Goldman,Susan Gyeszly, Michelle Hanlon,Bradford Hepfer,JeffHoopes,Becky Lester,Kevin Markle,Zoe-Vonna Palmrose,Phil Quinn,Steven Savoy,Terry Shevlin,Michelle Shimek,Stephanie Sikes(Oxford discussant),Bridget Stom-berg,Laura Wellman,Brady Williams,Ryan Wilson,participants at the2012Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation annual conference,Vienna University of Economics and Business,and reading groups at Arizona State,Iowa,MIT,and University of Texas-Austin for helpful comments.They espe-cially thank Michelle Hanlon,Joel Slemrod,and Ryan Wilson for sharing tax shelter data and Bob Bo-wen,Andy Call,and Shiva Rajgopal for sharing Fortune Magazine reputation data.John Gallemore gratefully acknowledges thefinancial support of the Deloitte Foundation.1.For reviews of the literature on tax avoidance,see Hanlon,and Heitzman(2010),Maydew(2001),andShackelford and Shevlin(2001).Contemporary Accounting Research Vol.31No.4(Winter2014)pp.1103–1133©CAAAdoi:10.1111/1911-3846.120551104Contemporary Accounting ResearchReputational costs are often posited as an important factor that limits tax avoidance activities,particularly the most aggressive tax strategies.2For example,the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service(IRS)asserts that aggressive tax strategies can pose“a sig-nificant risk to corporate reputations”and“the general public has little tolerance for overly aggressive tax planning”(Shulman2009).However,empirical evidence on the repu-tational costs of tax avoidance is scarce.The most compelling evidence to date is Hanlon and Slemrod(2009)and Graham,Hanlon,Shevlin,and Shroff(2012).Hanlon and Slem-rod(2009)examine the stock price responses offirms accused of engaging in tax shelters. Theyfind evidence thatfirms suffer stock price declines following public revelation of tax shelter behavior.They are careful to acknowledge that there are many possible determi-nants of the negative returns,of which reputational costs are only one.With the exception of some tests on retailfirms,they leave extensive testing of reputational costs for future research.Graham et al.(2012)survey tax executives andfind that more than half agree that potential harm to theirfirm’s reputation is an important factor in deciding whether or not to implement a tax planning strategy.This evidence is consistent with managers perceiving that aggressive tax avoidance will subject them or theirfirms to reputational costs.Beyond this important initial evidence,we know very little about the reputational costs of tax shelters.In particular,we do not know iffirms that are publicly scrutinized for having engaged in tax shelters actually bear reputational costs,as might have been feared ex ante.In their review of tax research,Hanlon and Heitzman(2010)call for research on the under-sheltering puzzle,specifically posing the following questions:“Why do some corporations avoid more tax than others?How do investors,creditors,and con-sumers perceive corporate tax avoidance?...These are interesting questions worthy of study”(137,146).This study answers the call for research,focusing on the extent to which tax sheltering results in reputational costs.We analyze a sample offirms identified in prior studies as engaging in aggressive tax shelters.Our study combines the samples of several prior studies of tax shelter behavior; namely,Graham and Tucker(2006),Hanlon and Slemrod(2009),and Wilson(2009). After imposing data requirements,our sample constitutes118firms revealed during the period1995to2005as having engaged in tax shelters.To our knowledge,this is the larg-est sample of publicly identified corporate tax shelters analyzed to date.We maintain the assumption that managers act rationally in considering costs and benefits of a tax strategy for thefirm.When the managers decide to engage in tax avoid-ance,they weigh the expected benefits of tax avoidance against the expected costs and will not engage in tax avoidance unless the net benefits are positive in an expected value sense. Hence,for our sample of tax shelter users,our assumption is that managers expected the tax shelters to yield positive net benefits.However,we distinguish between the ex post cost of getting caught and the ex ante decision to engage in tax avoidance.While the probabil-ity of bearing reputational costs may be low ex ante,those costs will be realized ex post forfirms subject to scrutiny.Thus,a manager may rationally engage in tax sheltering even though doing so places thefirm at risk of bearing costs if it is later challenged;our objec-tive is to assess those potential ex post reputational costs.Reputation is a multifaceted construct associated with several parties,including the firm and its management,as well as shareholders,customers,and tax authorities.We begin by examining the reputational effects of tax sheltering exerted by shareholders.To provide some assurance that the sample and research design have sufficient power,we replicate Hanlon and Slemrod(2009)using our sample and design to test for capital 2.We define reputation as a general perception of thefirm by all interested stakeholders and further discussthis concept in section2.CAR Vol.31No.4(Winter2014)The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance1105 market reactions to tax shelter revelations.In the short window surrounding the revela-tion date,wefind that the stocks publicly revealed to have tax shelters exhibit signifi-cantly negative abnormal returns,consistent with thefindings in Hanlon and Slemrod (2009).We then expand the event period to30days past the revelation date to test whether the short-window effects on stock price are permanent or temporary.Wefind evidence that,although the immediate stock price response around the tax shelter is nega-tive,in the days that follow,the stock price systematically reverses back to its pre-event levels.Thus,we confirm that the Hanlon and Slemrod(2009)short-window effect on stock price is a robust result and at the same time,we alsofind that it is a temporary effect that reverses within30days.3Next,we examine the potential reputational effects on thefirms’managers,specifically those related to their employment.We do notfind evidence of increased chief executive officer(CEO),chieffinancial officer(CFO),or auditor turnover in the three years follow-ing tax shelter revelation relative to the turnover rates for matched controlfirms.Next,we assess whether customers exert a reputational cost on shelterfirms.Wefind no differential change in sales,sales growth,or advertising expense for revealed shelterfirms relative to that of controlfirms.We also examine how the revelation of a tax shelter influences the public media reputation of afirm,as measured by the Fortune magazine list for“Most Admired Companies,”following Bowen,Call,and Rajgopal(2010).Wefind no evidence that being caught in a tax shelter lowers the likelihood of making the Fortune list relative to the matched control sample.Firms also face potential reputational consequences with the tax authorities.When the IRS learns that afirm has engaged in what it considers a tax shelter,its policy allows it to expand the scope of information that it requests from thefirm,which can lead to the discovery of other aggressive tax avoidance.Accordingly,we examine whetherfirms accused of engaging in tax shelters become more conservative in the future regarding their tax avoidance,perhaps as a result of increased IRS scrutiny.If they do,we would expect to observe the effective tax rate(ETR)of tax shelterfirms to increase following scrutiny of their activities.The data,however,show that the ETR of tax shelterfirms remains approximately the same before and after discovery,and this is true regardless of whether ETRs are measured on a generally accepted accounting prin-ciples(GAAP)basis or on a cash basis.These results suggest thatfirms identified as tax shelter users may not suffer significant reputational costs even at the hands of the tax authorities.In summary,across a battery of tests,we do not observe a reputational effect of tax sheltering.We are careful to note,however,that such an effect may indeed exist;but we are simply unable tofind it empirically in our tests,perhaps because shelterfirms are peculiar or because we have a small sample and/or low power.For example,it is possi-ble thatfirms expecting nonzero reputational costs ex ante avoid tax shelter use com-pletely and that onlyfirms that are immune to reputational concerns engage in tax shelters.While we cannot rule out this possibility completely,it appears unlikely given the wide variety offirms we observe engaging in tax shelters.4Moreover,in logistic regressions of tax shelter usage on proxies for reputation and other factors known to be associated with tax shelter usage(Wilson2009),wefind no evidence that reputation sig-nificantly influences the likelihood of tax shelter participation.In summary,the absence of ex post reputational costs and the insignificance of reputation as a determinant of tax 3.By comparison,prior research shows that the stock price declines associated with corporate malfeasance arepermanent.For example,Hennes et al.(2008)show that the stock prices decline by nearly30percent following discovery offinancial irregularities and stay at reduced levels.4.For example,our sample of shelter users containsfirms from15of the17industries in the Fama-French17industry classification and has total assets ranging from$13million to$1.3billion.CAR Vol.31No.4(Winter2014)1106Contemporary Accounting Researchshelter use suggest that reputational costs are not likely to be responsible for the signifi-cant variation in tax sheltering.Thus,it appears that under-sheltering is more of a puz-zle than ever.52.Prior literature and research questionPrior literature on tax avoidance and tax sheltersThere is a vast and growing empirical literature on tax avoidance,dating back at least as far as Scholes,Wilson,and Wolfson(1990)and continuing to the present day,that pro-vides ample evidence that tax avoidance is pervasive and adaptable.Research has shown thatfirms engage in all manner of tax avoidance strategies,ranging from simple strategies like holding tax-exempt municipal bonds,to complex strategies such as debt–equity hybrid securities(Engel et al.1999),cross-border avoidance strategies(Dyreng and Lindsey 2009),intangible holding companies(Dyreng,Lindsey,and Thornock2013),and corpo-rate-owned life insurance(COLI)tax shelters(Brown2011).While prior research indicates that somefirms do not actively engage in tax avoidance (Dyreng et al.2008),the forces that are curtailing more widespread tax avoidance are not well understood.On average,it is reasonable to assume thatfirms are engaging in the optimal amount of tax avoidance.A maintained assumption in the literature,and in this paper,is that the presence of costs of tax avoidance at some point outweigh the benefits. However,such costs have been difficult to identify.6The lack of tax avoidance more gen-erally,especially in nonregulated settings and settings with nofinancial reporting trade-off, has been dubbed the“under-sheltering puzzle.”Essentially,the question is:what is hold-ing thosefirms back from taking advantage of known tax avoidance opportunities being used by otherfirms?Reputational costs are often conjectured to be an important factor constraining tax avoidance,particularly the more aggressive forms of tax avoidance.COLI shelters are a useful example of a tax avoidance strategy that many viewed as particularly aggressive and that resulted in adverse scrutiny forfirms that engaged in them.The COLI shelter involvedfirms taking out life insurance policies on their rank-and-file employees and then receiving the death benefits if the employee died(see Brown[2010]for a more detailed description).The COLI shelter was the subject of unflattering coverage in the media,including the Wall Street Journal,which identified the companies that engaged in COLI alongside pictures of their actual deceased employees(Schultz and Francis 2002).As noted in Hanlon and Slemrod(2009),there is anecdotal evidence that somefirms apply a“Wall Street Journal”test to their tax avoidance activities,whereby they forgo activities that would look unsavory if they were linked to thefirm on the front page of the Wall Street Journal.There is also anecdotal evidence that companies want to be perceived as being good corporate citizens that pay their“fair share”of taxes,although evidence on this is mixed(Davis,Guenther,Krull,and Williams2013;Watson2011).General Electric, for example,has been criticized by the New York Times for paying no taxes to the U.S. government in2011despite being one of the largest companies in the world by earnings 5.We test the robustness of our results using two different matching techniques(i.e.,a propensity scorematched control sample and an industry,size,and effective tax rate matched control sample),multiyear periods(i.e.,one,two,and three years following tax shelter revelation),and subsamples offirms for which the potential reputational effect of tax shelter involvement is likely to be higher.Throughout all of these dif-ferent specifications,we do notfind significant reputational costs from tax avoidance.6.The costs identified arefinancial reporting costs and regulatory costs,which apply to a subset of tax avoid-ance strategies and a subset offirms,respectively.See Frank,Lynch,and Rego(2009)and Badertscher,Phi-lips,Pincus,and Rego(2009)for examples offinancial reporting costs of tax avoidance and Mills,Nutter, and Schwab(2013)for an example of the regulatory costs of tax avoidance.CAR Vol.31No.4(Winter2014)The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance1107 and by market capitalization.7GE immediately responded by pointing out its other contri-butions to society,such as being a major employer and exporter,its prior tax payments, as well as tallying up a broader measure of its tax burden including payroll,property,and sales taxes paid.8These examples are consistent with the conjecture thatfirms perceive reputational costs from aggressive tax avoidance,especially when subjected to media scrutiny.To date, however,there is little in the way of empirical evidence on the validity of that claim.The closest evidence on the reputational effects of tax shelters is provided by Hanlon and Slemrod(2009),who examine the change infirms’market values following public revela-tion that thefirms engaged in tax sheltering,and by Graham et al.(2012),who survey tax executives in regard to their tax planning activities.Hanlon and Slemrod(2009)find that when tax shelter participation is revealed in the news media,the tax shelterfirms suffer a decline in market value.Graham et al.(2012)survey tax executives andfind that nearly 70percent respond that potential harm to theirfirm’s reputation is“very important”or “important”when deciding what tax planning strategies to implement.Moreover, responding to a question about tax disclosures,approximately half of executives surveyed responded that risk of adverse media attention was very important or important in reduc-ing theirfirm’s willingness to be tax aggressive.Other research examines the role of political costs in determining effective tax rates, where political costs can be viewed as a type of reputational cost or at least related to rep-utational costs.Zimmerman(1983)hypothesizes that accounting choices are often driven by political costs,such as taxation,andfinds that largefirms have higher effective taxes, which he asserts are a function of the higher political costs faced by thesefils et al.(2013)examine the influence of political costs on the tax avoidance in a sample of federal contractors.Theyfind that federal contractors that are highly sensitive to political costs have higher effective tax rates,consistent with political costs driving the tax strategy of federal contractors.Prior literature on corporate reputationMost of the prior research on corporate reputation focuses on nontax settings.In account-ing andfinance,the extant literature examines the reputational costs of malfeasance on bothfirms and their managers.For example,Karpoff,Lee,and Martin(2008a)track the careers of over2,000managers who allegedly engaged infinancial misrepresentation and find that93percent of these managers arefired and suffer a significant loss in personal wealth.Desai,Hogan,and Wilkins(2006)examine whether managers offirms suffer repu-tational costs following earnings restatements.Theyfind that top managers offirms that restate their earnings experience more turnover than managers at a control sample of firms.Bowen,Call,and Rajgopal(2010)find evidence of negative effects from whistle-blowing events,including significant negative abnormal returns,restatements,shareholder lawsuits,and negative future operating performance.Prior research has shown thatfirms accused of accounting improprieties(Karpoff,Lee,and Martin2008b;Dechow,Sloan, and Sweeney1996),defective products(Jarell and Peltzman1985),and violating environ-mental regulations(Karpoff,Lott,and Wehrly2005)are subject to adverse effects follow-ing revelation of the alleged misdeeds.However,there is also evidence that managers andfirms are not always severely pun-ished for improprieties.Beneish(1999)finds that managers offirms with extreme earnings overstatements do not have higher employment losses than managers of a matched sample offirms.Agrawal,Jaffe,and Karpoff(1999)find no evidence that managers and directors7./2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html?_r=1,accessed September30,2011.8./setting-the-record-straight-ge-and-taxes/,accessed September30,2011.CAR Vol.31No.4(Winter2014)1108Contemporary Accounting Researchoffirms charged with fraud have higher rates of turnover.Finally,Srinivasan(2005)finds that outside directors face labor market penalties following accounting restatements but not penalties through regulatory actions or litigation.In sum,there is evidence of significant reputational costs accruing to bothfirms and managers in a range of nontax settings.This evidence suggests that it is reasonable to expect that tax avoidance can be accompanied by adverse reputational costs if it is discov-ered and subject to outside scrutiny.However,some evidence suggests the opposite is the case,in which managers go unpunished following instances of inappropriate behavior. Moreover,tax avoidance may be viewed in a completely different light than other corpo-rate misdeeds because of the positive cashflow effects of such activity.Research question:Does tax sheltering affect corporate reputation?The reputation of thefirm is a multifaceted construct that results from the impressions and perceptions of numerous interested stakeholders.However,as Walker(2010)notes, the concept of corporate reputation is somewhat difficult to define because it means differ-ent things in different contexts.In this paper,we take a broad view of reputation,in which stakeholders form a perception of the corporation that influences the interactions between thefirm and stakeholders.The stakeholders of thefirm include any party with which the firm has a vested interest in maintaining a relationship,including equity-holders,debt-holders,customers,suppliers,and governments,among others.We follow Fombrun and Shanley(1990)in defining reputation as something that is both created and consumed as part of a corporate strategy.Hence,afirm’s reputation is an integral part of its compara-tive advantage,and as such,thefirm and its management will act to protect and grow the reputation of thefirm.To do so,it will strategically consider reputation in undergoing strategic initiatives and will make decisions,including tax decisions,based in part on the costs/benefits to its reputation.Accordingly,we are interested in those aspects of thefirm’s reputation that have real consequences for thefirm.This includes aspects of reputation that affect people’s percep-tions of thefirm and its managers for honesty and fair dealing,which could affect the firm’s brand values and sales,as well as scrutiny by parties thefirm deals with such as cus-tomers,suppliers,the IRS,and outside auditors.These costs may manifest as increased advertising costs to counter reputational damage,increased effective tax rates from height-ened IRS scrutiny,and increased auditor turnover.We are also interested in the reputation for competence and the effects on top execu-tives.Tax shelters that ultimately backfire and become the subject of intense IRS and media scrutiny may call into question the competence of thefirm’s managers.An impor-tant way that managers may internalize the reputational consequences of adverse scrutiny is through increased manager turnover following the tax shelter scrutiny,consistent with prior literature on nontax reputation-damaging events.However,as Hanlon and Slemrod(2009)discuss,some stakeholders may actually react positively to news of tax shelter involvement,or at least they will not react nega-tively.As a result,involvement in a tax shelter may affect afirm’s reputation differently than the corporate misdeeds listed above,for the following reasons.First,unlike account-ing fraud,corporate tax sheltering is usually legal or at least in an area of the tax law with substantial gray area.Second,tax sheltering can improve thefirm’s after-tax cashflow if the IRS ultimately agrees with thefirm’s interpretation of the tax law.Third,the risk involved in tax sheltering may not be the same(or even rank anywhere near the gravity) as other risk factors that thefirm faces,such as liquidity risk,competition,and going con-cern.Thus,the reputational risk of a tax shelter may not be of major importance to the firm or the parties with whom it does business.CAR Vol.31No.4(Winter2014)The Reputational Costs of Tax Avoidance11093.Data and SampleTo assessfirms’reputational costs of aggressive tax avoidance,we concentrate onfirms that were subjected to media scrutiny for having participated in a tax shelter.Tax avoid-ance activities range from mundane strategies that are unlikely to attract adverse attention to aggressive strategies that have little economic purpose other than to reduce taxes.Tax shelters tend to be at the extreme end of the tax avoidance spectrum.By focusing on tax shelters that attracted media scrutiny,we give the best chance for the public(including shareholders and governments)to form a negative opinion about thefirm.However,if we observe reputational costs in the sample of tax shelterfirms,we need to be careful about generalizing the results to less aggressive forms of tax avoidance.Conversely,if we do not observe reputational costs in this extreme sample,then it is unlikely that more mundane forms of tax avoidance result in significant reputational costs.Tax shelters are secretive by nature.As a result,it is difficult to identify a comprehen-sive sample offirms that are engaged in sheltering.Prior research has identified small sam-ples of public cases of tax sheltering.This research includes Graham and Tucker(2006), 44firm-year observations;Hanlon and Slemrod(2009),107firm-year observations;and Wilson(2009),33firm-year observations.To create a broad sample of tax shelter observa-tions,we combine the samples in these prior studies of tax sheltering with61additional observations of the COLI shelter(Sheppard1995),resulting in245tax shelter observa-tions.To the best of our knowledge,we have the largest public tax shelter database employed in current and past research.9To maximize power,we require the data to meet only minimal conditions to remain in the sample.Panel A of Table1presents the details of our sample composi-tion.From the combined245observations,we remove69observations that are dupli-cated across the databases.10We then remove foreignfirms(3observations),those for which the initial date of public scrutiny is unclear or missing(15),pre-1993tax shelters (10),those with insufficient data(17),and those that upon closer inspection are not clearly tax shelters(2).11,12Finally,we remove observations for which we cannot obtain a matched controlfirm(1observation),according to the matching process described below.In the end,we are left with118shelter observations from1995–2005.Panel B of Table1shows the number of tax shelter revelations in each year,from which we see that our shelter observations tend to cluster more in some time periods than others (e.g.,tax shelters made public in1995comprise about40percent of our sample).13The distribution of tax shelter revelations across time largely follows prior research that gave rise to the data(Graham and Tucker2006;Hanlon and Slemrod2009;and Wil-son2009).We perform sensitivity tests for the effects of temporal patterns in tax shel-tering in section5below.For the main tests,we match each revealed shelterfirm-years(i.e.,the treatment group)to a controlfirm from the same industry that is the closest infirm size(i.e.,assets) 9.Other researchers(e.g.,Lisowsky,Robinson,and Schmidt2012)have obtained larger samples of tax shel-ter transactions using confidential IRS data.Although that sample is useful for many research questions, the tax shelters in those studies are unobservable to the public and thus would not be suitable for tests of reputational penalties exerted by outside stakeholders.10.Since this study is conducted at thefirm-year level,if there is more than one tax shelter revelation in ayear,we count that as one observation.11.We begin our sample period in1993because SFAS109changed the rules regarding thefinancial reportingof taxes,and we want to maintain similar accounting treatment of income taxes for all our observations.12.Both incidents involved transfer pricing,which can be considered an aggressive form of tax planning.However,these observations are likely to be quite different from the other tax shelters,and hence we remove them from the sample.13.This time clustering results because the Tax Notes article identifying COLI users was published in1995.CAR Vol.31No.4(Winter2014)。
财税英文文案小作文
财税英文文案小作文英文回答:Taxation is a critical component of any government's revenue-generating strategy, providing essential fundingfor public services, infrastructure, and social welfare programs. In recent years, globalization and technological advancements have led to a significant shift in the way taxes are levied and collected, necessitating a comprehensive understanding of these evolving tax landscapes.One of the most pressing challenges in contemporary taxation is the issue of tax avoidance and evasion. With the rise of cross-border trade and investment,multinational corporations have become increasingly adept at exploiting tax loopholes and shifting profits to low-tax jurisdictions. This erosion of tax bases has led to a growing disparity between the tax burdens borne by large corporations and individuals, as well as a decline in theresources available for public services.To address these challenges, tax authorities worldwide are collaborating to develop and implement more effective measures to combat tax avoidance and evasion. These measures include increased transparency through automatic exchange of information, harmonization of tax laws, and enhanced enforcement capabilities.Another key issue facing tax systems is the need for equity and fairness. Taxes should be designed in a way that ensures that all taxpayers contribute their fair share, regardless of their income or wealth. This requires a progressive tax system that places a higher tax burden on those who have more, while ensuring that the tax burden does not unduly burden low-income individuals and families.Furthermore, the changing nature of work and the rise of the gig economy have brought new challenges to taxation. Traditional tax systems are based on the assumption offull-time, formal employment, but the increasing prevalence of contract work, part-time employment, and self-employmenthas led to a growing number of individuals falling outsideof traditional tax structures.To address this, tax authorities are exploringinnovative approaches to tax collection, such as the use of real-time reporting and artificial intelligence to ensure that all taxpayers are fulfilling their tax obligations. These technologies can also help to reduce theadministrative burden for taxpayers and tax authorities alike.In conclusion, the global tax landscape is undergoing a period of rapid transformation, driven by globalization, technological advancements, and the changing nature of work. To respond effectively to these challenges, tax authorities worldwide must collaborate to develop and implement more comprehensive, equitable, and efficient tax systems thatcan ensure the sustainability of public finances and promote economic growth.中文回答:税收是任何政府创收战略的关键组成部分,为公共服务、基础设施和社会福利计划提供必要的资金。
税收英语词汇
税务专用英语词汇State Administration for Taxation State Administration for Taxation 国国家税务总局Local Taxation bureau Local Taxation bureau 地方税务局地方税务局Business Tax Business Tax 营业税营业税Individual Income Tax Individual Income Tax 个人所得税个人所得税Income Tax for Enterprises 企业所得税Income Tax for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enter prises 外商投资企业和外国企业所得税tax returns filing tax returns filing 纳税申报纳税申报taxes payable taxes payable 应交税金应交税金the assessable period for tax payment the assessable period for tax payment 纳纳税期限the timing of tax liability arising the timing of tax liability arising 纳税义务发生时间纳税义务发生时间consolidate reporting consolidate reporting 合合并申报the local competent tax authority the local competent tax authority 当当地主管税务机关the outbound business activity the outbound business activity 外外出经营活动Tax Inspection Report Tax Inspection Report 纳纳税检查报告tax avoidance tax avoidance 逃税逃税tax evasion tax evasion 避避税tax base tax base 税基税基refund after collection refund after collection 先征后退先征后退withhold and remit tax withhold and remit tax 代代扣代缴collect and remit tax collect and remit tax 代代收代缴income from authors remuneration income from authors remuneration 稿酬所得稿酬所得income from remuneration for personal service income from remuneration for personal service 劳劳务报酬所得income from lease of property income from lease of property 财财产租赁所得income from transfer of property income from transfer of property 财产转让所得财产转让所得contingent income contingent income 偶然所得偶然所得resident resident 居民居民non-resident non-resident 非居民非居民tax year tax year 纳税年度纳税年度纳税年度 t emporary trips out of temporary trips out oftemporary trips out of 临临时离境 flat rate flat rate 比例税率比例税率比例税率withholding income tax withholding income tax 预提税预提税预提税 withholding at source withholding at source 源源泉扣缴State Treasury State Treasury 国国库 tax preference tax preference 税税收优惠the first profit-making year the first profit-making year 第一个获利年度第一个获利年度refund of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount refund of the income tax paid on the reinvested amount 再投资退税再投资退税再投资退税 export-oriented enterprise export-oriented enterprise 出口型企业出口型企业出口型企业technologically advanced enterprise technologically advanced enterprise 先进技术企业先进技术企业先进技术企业Special Economic Zone Special Economic Zone 经经济特区tax exemption 免税免税Tax Exemption Certificate 免税证明书免税证明书tax heldover 延缓缴纳的税款延缓缴纳的税款tax holiday 免税期免税期tax in default 拖欠税款拖欠税款拖欠税款 tax investigation 税务调查税务调查tax liability 纳税责任;税务负担纳税责任;税务负担tax payable 应缴税款应缴税款body corporate 法团;法人团体法团;法人团体保护关税(Protective Tariff )保税制度(Bonded System )布鲁塞尔估价定义(Brussels Definition of Value BDV )差别关税(Differential Duties )差价关税(Variable Import Levies )产品对产品减税方式(Product by Product Reduction of Tariff )超保护贸易政策(Policy of Super-protection )成本(Cost )出厂价格(Cost Price )初级产品(Primary Commodity )初级产品的价格(The Price of Primang Products )出口补贴(Export Subsidies )出口退税(Export Rebates )从量税(Specific Duty )从价(Ad Valorem )从价关税(Ad Valorem Duties )反补贴税(Counter Vailing Duties )反倾销(Anti-Dumping )反倾销税(Anti-dumping Duties )关税(Customs Duty )关税和贸易总协定(The General Agreement On Tariffs And Trade )关税配额(Tariff Quota )自主关税(Autonomous Tariff) 最惠国税率(The Most-favoured-nation Rate of Duty) 优惠税率(Preferential Rate) 标题:能介绍一下营业税的知识吗标题:能介绍一下营业税的知识吗TOPIC: Would you please give the general introduction of the business tax? 对话内容:对话内容:纳税人:我公司马上就要营业了,能介绍一下营业税的知识吗?纳税人:我公司马上就要营业了,能介绍一下营业税的知识吗?Taxpayer: Taxpayer: my my my company company company will will will begin begin begin business business business soon, soon, soon, but but but I I I have have have little little little knowledge knowledge knowledge about about about the the business tax. Can you introduce it? 税务局:尽我所能吧!一般地说,提供应税业务、转让无形资产和出卖不动产都要交纳营业税。
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THE ACCOUNTING REVIEW American Accounting Association Vol.87,No.1DOI:10.2308/accr-10158 2012pp.91–120Tax Avoidance,Large Positive Temporary Book-Tax Differences,and EarningsPersistenceBradley BlaylockOklahoma State UniversityTerry ShevlinUniversity of WashingtonRyan J.WilsonThe University of IowaABSTRACT:We investigate why temporary book-tax differences appear to serve as auseful signal of earnings persistence(Hanlon2005).We first test and show thattemporary book-tax differences provide incremental information over the magnitude ofaccruals for the persistence of earnings and accruals.We then opine that there aremultiple potential sources of large positive book-tax differences.We predict and findthat firms with large positive book-tax differences likely arising from upward earningsmanagement(tax avoidance)exhibit lower(higher)earnings and accruals persistencethan do other firms with large positive book-tax differences.Finally,we find significantvariation in current-period earnings and accruals response coefficients and insignif-icant hedge returns in period tþ1,consistent with investors being able to look through tothe source of large positive book-tax differences(earnings management and taxavoidance),allowing them to correctly price the persistence of accruals for thesesubsamples.Keywords:book-tax differences;earnings persistence;tax avoidance;earningsmanagement;earnings expectations.Data Availability:Data are available from public sources identified in this study.We acknowledge the helpful comments of Alex Edward,Michelle Hanlon,Stacie Laplante,Rick Mergenthaler,Tom Omer,Sonja Rego,and two anonymous referees.Professor Shevlin acknowledgesfinancial support from his Paul Pigott/ Paccar Professorship at the Foster School.Editor’s note:Accepted by Tom Omer.Submitted:March2010Accepted:July2011Published Online:August201191I.INTRODUCTIONP rior research suggests that the tax information contained in financial statements providesinformation about earnings persistence (e.g.,Lev and Nissim 2004;Hanlon 2005).Despite the important implications of these studies,little is known about what causes the observed link between tax information and earnings persistence.This study begins to develop an understanding of this link by first documenting that the information in temporary book-tax differences,documented by Hanlon (2005),about earnings and accruals persistence is incremental to the magnitude of accruals (i.e.,larger accruals are less persistent).We next investigate whether the implications of temporary differences between book and taxable income for the persistence of earnings vary depending on the likely source of those differences.We develop two distinct approaches for partitioning large positive temporary book-tax differences that provide meaningful information about future earnings and accruals persistence.Our analysis thus extends Hanlon (2005),who shows that for firm-years with large temporary book-tax differences,pretax income is less persistent for future earnings than it is for firm-years with small book-tax differences.1The purpose of accrual accounting is to better recognize firm performance,which often results in accruals smoothing out transitory shocks in cash flows (Dechow 1994;Dechow and Ge 2006).If accruals are recorded for book purposes but not for tax purposes,then the differences show up in deferred tax expense such that a larger deferred tax expense (hereafter,larger book-tax differences)could just be reflecting larger book accruals.Thus,the Hanlon (2005)result could just be reflecting the fact that larger accruals are less persistent,as argued by Sloan (1996)and shown by Dechow and Ge (2006).However,we argue that,when firms exhibit both large positive book-tax differences and large positive accruals,those accruals are more likely to have resulted from managerial discretion than a firm that exhibits large positive accruals and small book-tax differences.For this reason,we expect the accruals of firms with large positive book-tax differences to be less persistent than those of firms with small book-tax differences.Consistent with this expectation,we find that large book-tax differences provide incremental useful information about earnings persistence beyond the information provided by accruals.Having established that book-tax differences provide incrementally useful information about earnings and accruals persistence,we posit three primary sources of large positive book-tax differences.2First,book-tax differences can arise due to earnings management.Phillips et al.(2003)conjecture that,because tax law allows less discretion in accounting choices than GAAP,large positive differences between book and taxable income are informative about earnings management.Consistent with their assertion,they find that deferred tax expense is incrementally useful to the Jones’discretionary accruals model in detecting earnings management.In cases where book-tax differences are generated by earnings management,we expect that accruals are more likely to reverse in the next period,thus exhibiting low persistence.Second,a basic tax-planning strategy is to defer taxes as long as possible to decrease the net present value of the taxes paid.Such behavior leads to a large deferred tax expense,but does not necessarily result in accruals that reverse in the following year.We predict that,in cases where large positive book-tax differences arise primarily from extensive tax planning,these differences do not signal managerial discretion over the accruals process and,as a result,will not be associated with lower future earnings and accruals persistence.Therefore,we predict that firms with large positive 1The temporary book-tax differences examined in our study are equal to the deferred tax expense grossed-up by the applicable statutory tax rate.Consistent with Hanlon (2005),we do not include permanent differences because,as she notes,permanent differences are affected by tax rate differences,tax credits,and statutory tax breaks (e.g.,tax-exempt interest)that are not indicative of earnings persistence related to the accrual process.2Our analysis focuses on firms with large positive book-tax differences because these differences could be a signal of either earnings management or tax avoidance.92Blaylock,Shevlin,andWilsonThe Accounting ReviewJanuary 2012book-tax differences resulting primarily from tax planning will exhibit higher future earnings and accruals persistence than other large positive book-tax differencefirms.3Third,deferred tax expense can arise in the absence of tax planning and earnings management because of the normal differences in the treatment of revenue and expenses for book and tax purposes (Scholes et al.2008,39).Examples of normal temporary differences are depreciation and allowance for doubtful accounts,although both items can also be used for earnings management purposes.We use two alternative techniques to partitionfirms with large positive book-tax differences into three subsamples corresponding to the three conjectured sources of differences.Consistent with expectations,under both partitioning approaches wefind thatfirms with large positive book-tax differences that arise predominantly from upward earnings management have less persistent earnings and accruals than dofirms in the BASE subsample.Also consistent with expectations,we find thatfirms with large positive book-tax differences arising predominantly from tax avoidance exhibit significantly more persistent earnings and accruals relative to the BASE subsample under partitioning approach2,but not under partitioning approach1.We next investigate whether investors are able to identify the likely source of book-tax differences to help interpret price accruals.Hanlon(2005)notes that several accounting textbooks indicate large book-tax differences can provide information about earnings quality.4Consistent with investors heeding this lesson,Hanlon(2005)finds that investors reduce their expectations of the persistence of earnings and accruals in the presence of large positive book-tax differences and are able to efficiently price earnings and accruals for thesefirms;shefinds insignificant hedge portfolio returns in year tþ1.Despite these results,it is not clear whether investors are able to efficiently price earnings for sub-groups of large positive book-tax differencefirms partitioned on the basis of the predominant source of their book-tax differences.This question is important because we predict that the implications of large positive book-tax differences for earnings persistence vary depending on the likely source of the book-tax differences.Our analysis of different subsets of large positive book-tax differencefirms is similar in spirit to Sloan’s(1996)finding that,on average,investors correctly price the persistence of earnings for allfirms.However,Sloan(1996)also shows that there is differential persistence in the accrual and cashflow components of earnings and that the market fails to identify and correctly price this differential persistence,resulting in positive hedge portfolio returns to portfolios formed on accruals.The ability of investors to identify differences in earnings persistence is critical in valuation. Frankel and Litov(2009)point out that investors seek to identify the determinants of earnings persistence in order to better understand the relation between current earnings and permanent earnings.Ohlson(2009)discusses various theoretical models offirm valuation that all rely,to varying degrees,on earnings persistence.We conduct two market-based tests.First,wefind in regressions of current-period returns on earnings and accruals that the response coefficients vary for the subsamples,consistent with the 3We define tax planning as non-conforming tax positions that lower taxable income relative to book income in the current period.We acknowledge thatfirms could also engage in conforming tax planning that lowers reported income for both book and tax purposes.However,conforming tax planning transactions would not give rise to book-tax differences.Further,consistent with Hanlon and Heitzman(2010),we view tax avoidance as existing on a continuum.This continuum of avoidance includes clearly legal transactions,such as investments in municipal bonds that lower explicit taxes,on one end,to more aggressive forms of tax avoidance,such as tax sheltering where the legality of the transaction is less certain,on the other end.4Recent accounting textbooks continue to suggest that book-tax differences are an indicator of earnings quality.For example,Revsine et al.(2012,780)point out that‘‘deferred tax footnotes can be used to assess earnings quality.’’While their suggestion points to analysis of individualfirms,the comment is applicable to hedge funds and other investors using large sample screens to identify securities for investment.Earnings quality is difficult to define(see Dechow et al.[2010]for a discussion of this concept);consistent with Hanlon(2005),we sidestep the issue and simply focus on earnings and accruals persistence.Tax Avoidance,Large Positive Temporary Book-Tax Differences,and Earnings Persistence93The Accounting Review January2012documented variation in earnings and accruals persistence.Second,we find insignificant hedge portfolio returns in year t þ1,suggesting that investors can appropriately price accruals for tax avoidance and high earnings management subsamples under both our partitioning approaches.We contribute to the literature in three ways.First,we show that Hanlon’s (2005)finding that large book-tax differences are associated with lower earnings and accruals persistence is incremental to the effect of accruals on the persistence of earnings.Second,we provide two alternative means of partitioning firms with aggregate large positive book-tax differences that provide meaningful information about future earnings and accruals persistence.The observed differential earnings and accruals persistence of the different subsamples of large positive book-tax difference firms validate our approaches to partitioning the firms.These approaches should prove useful to researchers who want to identify the predominant source of book-tax differences for large samples of firms,as opposed to using a detailed firm-specific examination of individual line items in the tax footnotes as in Raedy et al.(2010)and Guenther (2011).Third,we provide evidence that,for the most part,investors appear to understand the differential signal about accruals persistence provided by firms that exhibit large positive book-tax differences from different sources.Section II reviews the related literature and develops our hypotheses.Section III describes the sample.Section IV presents the earnings persistence test results.Section V presents the market pricing test results,and Section VI concludes.II.RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESESEarnings PersistenceHanlon (2005)examines the implications of large book-tax differences for earnings and accruals persistence.Hanlon (2005)posits that,because discretionary accruals are less persistent than nondiscretionary accruals (Xie 2001),if large book-tax differences are a signal of increased discretion in the accruals process,then firms with large book-tax differences should exhibit lower earnings and accruals persistence.Consistent with this argument,Hanlon (2005)finds that firms with large book-tax differences exhibit lower earnings and accruals persistence than firms with small book-tax differences.However,if accruals for book purposes are not also made for tax purposes,then the differences show up in deferred tax expense,and larger deferred tax expense (equivalently larger book-tax differences)could just be reflecting larger book accruals.Thus,we first test whether large book-tax differences provide incremental useful information about earnings persistence beyond the information provided by accruals.This analysis is similar in spirit to the approach of Weber (2009),who examines whether analyst forecast errors are associated with the ratio of taxable income to net book income after controlling for accruals.He finds that analysts’forecasts of future earnings display greater optimistic bias in firm-years where book income is high relative to taxable income even after controlling for accruals.We also note that Phillips et al.(2003)find temporary book-tax differences have incremental explanatory power over discretionary accruals,estimated using the Jones model,to detect earnings management around key earnings benchmarks.Thus,we predict that book-tax differences will have incremental explanatory power for the persistence of earnings and accruals:H1a:Temporary book-tax differences provide incremental information over the magnitude ofaccruals for the persistence of earnings.H1b:Temporary book-tax differences provide incremental information over the magnitude ofaccruals for the persistence of the accruals component of earnings.Assuming book-tax differences have incremental explanatory power,we next explore why book-tax differences might indicate differences in the persistence of earnings and accruals.We extend94Blaylock,Shevlin,andWilson The Accounting ReviewJanuary 2012Hanlon(2005)by making separate predictions about the earnings and accruals persistence for different subsamples offirms with large positive book-tax differences(LPBTDs)based on the likely predominant source of those differences.We expect that the ability of LPBTDs to serve as a red-flag for low earnings quality(less persistent earnings and accruals)will be most pronounced forfirms where upward earnings management is the predominant source of the large positive book-tax differences.Phillips et al.(2003,492)argue that deferred tax expense can be used as a measure of ‘‘managers’discretionary choices under GAAP because the tax law,in general,allows less discretion in accounting choice relative to the discretion that exists under GAAP.’’As an example of this flexibility,Phillips et al.(2003)note that GAAP allows discretion in accounting for bad debts,but tax reporting requires the receivable to actually be written off.Consistent with this argument,Phillips et al.(2003)find evidence of a positive association between deferred tax expense andfirms just avoiding a loss or a decline in earnings.They conclude that the deferred tax expense is a useful indicator of earnings management incremental to a proxy for discretionary accruals.Also consistent with this reasoning,Mills and Newberry(2001)find that the magnitude of book-tax differences is positively associated withfinancial reporting incentives such asfinancial distress and bonus thresholds.We compare the earnings and accruals persistence offirms likely to have managed earnings with large positive discretionary accruals to the LPBTD BASE subsamplefirms.The above discussion leads to our second set of hypotheses:H2a:Forfirm-years with large positive book-tax differences,the persistence of earnings is lower for the earnings management subsample than for the BASE subsample.H2b:Forfirm-years with large positive book-tax differences,the persistence of the accruals component of earnings is lower for the earnings management subsample than for theBASE subsample.In November2006,the Wall Street Journal noted that public companies reported40percent higher pretax profits to Wall Street(GAAP earnings)than to tax authorities during2004(Drucker 2006).5The article went on to report that one of the biggest drivers of this gap is reportable transactions.These are transactions sold by tax advisers to companies,including some listed transactions expressly forbidden by the IRS.In addition,Mills(1998)reports that proposed IRS adjustments are positively associated with large book-tax differences.6Wilson(2009)and Lisowsky(2010)find that book-tax differences are positively associated with identified cases of tax sheltering.7Together,thesefindings suggest that tax avoidance is an important determinant of book-tax differences.We conjecture that manyfirms report LPBTDs largely as a result of tax-planning strategies associated with deferring income or accelerating deductions.5Drucker(2006)notes that thesefigures were based on IRS data for4,195U.S.public companies withfiscal years ending between June and December.6Mills(1998)uses three alternative measures of book-tax differences.Her full sample analysis utilizes IRS data and measures book-tax differences as the difference between pretax book income and taxable income.She also uses the difference between the federal tax expense for book less the declared tax on the tax return as an alternative measure of book-tax differences andfinally the deferred tax expense as a third measure.Her third measure is consistent with the measure of book-tax differences used in our study because it does not include permanent book-tax differences.7Specifically,Wilson(2009)finds that both the permanent and temporary components of book-tax differences are significantly associated with identified cases of tax sheltering.While the ideal tax shelter might generate only permanent book-tax differences,Wilson’s(2009)analysis shows that,in practice,corporate tax shelters often generate temporary book-tax differences.In addition,Lisowsky et al.(2010)examine101tax shelters reported to the IRS as listed transactions andfind that more of these transactions(38)report a related temporary book-tax difference than those(12)that report a related permanent book-tax difference.Tax Avoidance,Large Positive Temporary Book-Tax Differences,and Earnings Persistence95The Accounting Review January2012Ayers et al.(2010)examine the association between changes in credit ratings and changes in book-tax differences.They conjecture that changes in book-tax differences can have implications for credit ratings as a signal to analysts of either low earnings quality or off-balance sheet financing.However,to the extent that changes in book-tax differences arise from tax planning,they should be less useful in assessing credit worthiness.Consistent with this argument,Ayers et al.(2010)find that tax planning attenuates the relationship between changes in book-tax differences and credit ratings.Similarly,we predict that in cases for which large positive book-tax differences likely arise from tax avoidance strategies,they will not be a useful signal of low earnings persistence.The above discussion leads to our third set of hypotheses:H3a:For firm-years with large positive book-tax differences,the persistence of earnings ishigher for the tax avoider subsample than for the BASE subsample.H3b:For firm-years with large positive book-tax differences,the persistence of the accrualscomponent of earnings is higher for the tax avoider subsample than for the BASE subsample.In summary,our hypotheses imply a ranking of earnings and accruals persistence for firms with LPBTDs.Specifically,we expect that,in cases where LPBTDs are largely a function of tax avoidance,earnings and accruals persistence will be the greatest.The lowest earnings and accruals persistence will be exhibited by firms where the large book-tax differences appear to be primarily a function of upward earnings management.We expect firms with LPBTDs not specifically identified as resulting from either upward earnings management or tax avoidance (the BASE subsample)to exhibit earnings and accruals persistence between the other two subsamples of firms.For BASE subsample firms,LPBTDs likely arise from a combination of tax avoidance and discretion over accruals as well as innate firm-specific characteristics (i.e.,normal book-tax differences).Firms can have large book-tax differences simply because of differences in the timing of revenues and expenses for GAAP versus the recognition required by tax law.These differences reflect the underlying differences in the economics or business model of the firm.8As a result,LPBTDs might provide some information about subjectivity in the accruals process for the BASE firms,but not to the degree that they do for firms for which the predominant source of LPBTDs is upward earnings management.Market PricingOur next set of hypotheses examine whether stock prices reflect different investor expectations about the future of earnings for firms with LPBTDs,depending on the source of those differences.Sloan (1996)provides evidence that investors do not correctly understand the differential persistence of accruals and cash flows.Hanlon (2005)finds that,in the presence of LPBTDs,investors reduce their expectations about the persistence of earnings and accruals and appear to correctly price the accruals component of earnings.9Our market tests are intended to examine 8Seidman (2010)finds that a small subset of changes in GAAP alone explains 50.45percent of the variation in the book-tax gap between 1993and 2004.Further,she finds that removing the effects of these GAAP changes from the book-tax gap increases the association between the book-tax gap and predicted cases of tax sheltering.9Specifically,Hanlon (2005)finds that investors correctly price the persistence of the accrual component of earnings for future earnings,but actually underestimate the persistence of the cash flow component of earnings for future earnings.As a result,investors underestimate the persistence of earnings for firms with large positive book-tax differences.There is a subtle distinction between Sloan (1996)and our study,which extends Hanlon (2005).Sloan (1996)argues that investors might not recognize the differential persistence between cash flows and accruals and,thus,might misprice accruals.Hanlon (2005)and we argue that the persistence of accruals can differ across subsamples;investors might not recognize this and,thus,might misprice accruals for these subsamples.96Blaylock,Shevlin,andWilsonThe Accounting ReviewJanuary 2012whether investors recognize the difference in earnings and accruals persistence between various subsamples offirms that we predict will exhibit meaningful differences in persistence.Following the above discussion,we expect the persistence of earnings and accruals to be lowest forfirms with LPBTDs arising from upward earnings management.In contrast,we expect the persistence of earnings and accruals to be highest forfirms with LPBTDs generated by tax avoidance activity.That is,we develop our pricing predictions assuming differential accruals persistence across subsamples.If investors focus only on aggregate book-tax differences as a signal of earnings persistence and do not examine the source of those book-tax differences,then we expect that investors will not correctly understand differences in the persistence of accruals between subsamples of LPBTDfirms separated according to the source of those differences.We develop two sets of hypotheses to test whether the pricing of equities is consistent with investors looking through book-tax differences to their source.Wefirst examine whether the earnings response coefficient varies across subsamples in a manner consistent with the predicted(in H2and H3)variation in persistence across the subsamples. These tests are motivated by prior literature that shows the earnings response coefficient is positively associated with persistence(Kormendi and Lipe1986;Collins and Kothari1989).Thus, we examine the association between current-period stock returns and earnings and accruals with the following set of hypotheses:H4a:The earnings response coefficient is lower(higher)forfirms classified as earnings managers(tax avoiders)than forfirms in the BASE subsample.H4b:The accruals response coefficient is lower(higher)forfirms classified as earnings managers(tax avoiders)than forfirms in the BASE subsample.Evidence consistent with H4a and H4b does not conclusively provide evidence that investors are correctly or fully recognizing the differential persistence.If investors only partially recognize the differential persistence of accruals across subsamples,then,as earnings and accruals are reported in the subsequent year,investors will correct their estimates and portfolios formed on the sign and magnitude of accruals should generate hedge portfolio abnormal returns.This reasoning leads to the following hypotheses:H5a:Forfirms classified as earnings managers,investors overestimate the persistence of the accruals component of pretax earnings,resulting in negative abnormal returns to a hedgeportfolio formed on the sign and magnitude of pretax accruals.H5b:Forfirms classified as tax avoiders,investors underestimate the persistence of the accruals component of pretax earnings,resulting in positive abnormal returns to a hedgeportfolio formed on the sign and magnitude of pretax accruals.III.SAMPLE SELECTIONWe begin with a sample of allfirms on the Compustat and CRSP tapes with non-missing asset and stock return data for the years1993–2005.We start our sample in1993to coincide with the implementation of SFAS109,thereby ensuring consistent accounting for income taxes over the sample period.10We eliminate observations with missing regression variables,pretax accounting losses,positive net operating losses(NOL carryforward),and negative current tax expense.As noted by Hanlon(2005),the presence of accounting losses,net operating losses,and negative 10We usefive years of data to estimate the cash effective tax rate.Because cash taxes paid are not affected by SFAS 109,we are able to collect data for the calculation of the cash effective tax rate prior to1993.Tax Avoidance,Large Positive Temporary Book-Tax Differences,and Earnings Persistence97The Accounting Review January2012current tax expense can obfuscate the deferred tax expense account we use to estimate book-tax differences.11After all exclusions,our sample is composed of 21,043firm-year observations.We first estimate the book-tax difference for each firm-year as [(U.S.Deferred Taxes þForeign Deferred Taxes)/0.35]scaled by average total assets.We next rank all firms each year on book-tax differences and partition them into the quintile of largest positive book-tax differences (LPBTD,4,195observations),the quintile of largest negative book-tax differences (LNBTD,4,263),and all other observations (12,585observations),which we call the small book-tax difference group (SBTD).Table 1presents descriptive statistics for firms categorized into the SBTD,LNBTD,and LPBTD groups,respectively.Similar to Hanlon (2005),we find that the LNBTD firms are smaller in terms of median assets.This finding is consistent with smaller growth firms being more likely to be categorized in the LNBTD group.We also find that the LPBTD firms exhibit the lowest median five-year cash ETR,which we calculate as the ratio of the sum of cash taxes paid over a five-year period to the sum of pretax book income over the same five-year period (Cash5ETR ).This result is consistent with the LPBTD firms being more likely to be engaged in tax avoidance that results in positive BTDs.Consistent with LPBTDs being,in part,a function of upward earnings management,we also find that the LPBTD firms exhibit the largest median discretionary accruals of any of the three groups.We estimate discretionary accruals using the Jones model with lagged return-on-assets (Kothari et al.2005).IV .TESTS OF EARNINGS PERSISTENCEThe Basic Persistence Regression ModelThe following regression model forms the basis of all our earnings persistence tests:PTBI t þ1¼c 0þc 1PTBI t þe t þ1;ð1Þwhere PTBI is pretax accounting income scaled by average total assets for cross-sectional comparability,and the coefficient c 1is an estimate of the mapping of current-period pretax earnings into future (one-period)earnings,referred to as the persistence parameter.This model can be expanded as in Hanlon (2005)to allow persistence to vary across groups of firms based on the sign and magnitude of book-tax differences:PTBI t þ1¼c 0þc 1LPBTD t þc 2LNBTD t þc 3PTBI t þc 4PTBI t 3LPBTD tþc 5PTBI t 3LNBTD t þe t þ1;ð2Þwith the BTD groups as defined above.We next decompose PTBI in Equation (1)into pretax cash flow and pretax accruals:PTBI t þ1¼c 0þc 1PTCF t þc 2PTACC t þe t þ1;ð3Þwhere PTCF is pretax cash flow and PTACC is pretax accruals,both scaled by average total assets for cross-sectional comparability.The coefficients c 1and c 2are estimates of the mapping of current-period cash flows and accruals into future (one-period)pretax earnings.This mapping is referred to in the literature (Sloan 1996;Xie 2001;Hanlon 2005)as the persistence of cash flows and accruals into future earnings.We again allow the persistence parameters to vary as a function of the sign and magnitude of BTDs:11In addition,Hayn (1995)argues that because shareholders have a liquidation option,loss years will exhibit lower earnings persistence than profitable firm-years.The lower persistence of loss-year observations could also obscure our ability to detect differences in persistence signaled by large book-tax differences.98Blaylock,Shevlin,andWilson The Accounting ReviewJanuary 2012。