会计学外文翻译--大股东异质性影响公司的会计质量和信息不对称

毕业设计（论文）
外文翻译
题目大股东异质性：影响公司的会计
质量和信息不对称
专业会计学
班级
学生
指导教师
X X X X大学
2013年
大股东异质性:影响公司的会计质量和信息不对称
第1章：介绍、动机和贡献
我调查了大股东与公司会计质量和信息不对称之间的关系。

具体来说，我检查了企业的会计信息质量和信息不对称是否与一个公司的大股东的类型，大小，以及监测侵略性与有关。

最近的经济衰退,增加大股东行动主义,以及新的安全交易委员会(SEC)规则允许大股东更大的代理访问，这些都激励了我对此的研究。

此前的研究表明，大股东能够影响企业的各种政策，如投资策略、经理薪酬、财务决策，但几乎没有证据证明大股东是如何涉及到企业的会计信息质量和信息不对称的。

在这些情况下，现存的会计文献都不考虑大股东的作用，这隐含的一个假设是，所有的大股东共享类似的投资偏好，技能和监控能力。

鉴于大股东所有权与企业的经营决策和公司治理相关的情况，立法者和监管机构在资本市场已经开始认识到，大股东履行着重要的监督作用。

尽管SEC之前有不成功的尝试，让这些有影响力的业主更大的访问董事会代表以增加大股东的影响力，但美国证券交易委员会最近仍颁布规则，允许大股东获得更多代理材料。

2010年7月21日,奥巴马总统将《多德-弗兰克华尔街改革和消费者保护法案》订为法律(白宫,2010)。

该法案授权美国证券交易委员会建立规则，让大股东获得代理材料。

在SEC新规则下，股东的代理材料中包括一名或多名公司在年度会议上被提名当选董事的大股东。

虽然威胁要更换整个石板董事的代理权争夺，是相当罕见的（拜伯切克，2007年）和昂贵的（<金融时报> ，2010年），美国商业团体似乎准备采取一切必要的步骤来对付这些新的SEC规则（伊格尔舍姆，2010）。

除了立法者和监管者，学者也有兴趣研究大股东在公司企业事务中的作用。

最近，学者们越来越关注大股东在公司中的作用，特别是与公司企业决策方面有关的作用。

这些文献一般讲述的是大股东由于他们有着大型股权投资，在企业作为一个独特的位置，起着监控经理和影响经营决策的作用。

理论表明,大股东在公司积累模块中共享控制和私人控制福利(Holderness，2003；Shleifer and Vishny，1986)。

共享控制的好处是指企业价值的增加带来的好处，所有股东可能获得大股东的监控力度，而私人控制利益表明，由于大股东他们的影响力和所有权位置，他们能够提取的相应的好处。

最近的研究已开始认识到,并不是所有的大股东也有类似的监控的技能和能力。

例如，Cronqvist Fahlenbrach（2009）分析大股东之间的异质性的影响，并找到公司的投资差异显著和重要经济差异在公司的投资、金融和高管薪酬政策都存在在不同类型的大股东之间。

此外，在过去10年的研究中大多都集中在股东维权活动上。

股东维权人士的文献表明,目标公司有较低的托宾Q值,降低销售增长率、降低股息支付率,和较低的股息收益率。

大多数研究发现积极的非正常回报股东维权人士围绕宣布购买和长期积极购买异常收益率在第一年的。

尽管从融资文学的令人信服的证据表明，企业决策由不同类型的大股东出席，股东积极主义的坚定和无数的证据表明，大股东被作为投资者类似的监察组同质能力。

我寻求进一步研究，并提供大股东所有权的异质性，涉及到企业的会计信息质量和信息不对称的证据。

我的研究最开始是通过构建三种规格的大股东异质性(LSH)基于类型、大小、和监控攻击性的大股东存在于一个公司。

接下来,我测试的是对于公司的会计质量和信息不对称而言，这些措施是否是重要的决定因素。

最终找出了影响公司会计质量和信息不对称的相关因素。

应用的所有权异质性的三个措施，我首先检查，LSH是否有助于解释企业的会计信息质量的变化。

我使用两个权责发生制为基础的指标来衡量会计信息质量。

两个权责发生制为基础的模型是酌情权责发生制模型由塔克和Zarowin的（2006）琼斯（1991）开发的实施，德肖和Dichev（2002），麦克尼科尔斯（2002）修改的应计质量模型。

接下来，我检查，LSH是否基于市场的措施，企业的信息不对称有关。

我使用两个基于市场的措施，审查LSH之间的关系和企业的信息不对称。

第一个措施,以下巴伦,金,Lim,史蒂文斯(1998)——以后“BKLS”——使用分析师的信息精度作为代理的精度的,公共和私人总信息用于资本市场。

第二个措施是买卖价差所使用的现存文献作为衡量信息不对称(例如。

Glosten和米格罗姆,1985;Laksmana,2008;理查森,2000)。

与监测理论相一致，我预测大股东所有权的异质性和企业的会计信息质量间有正相关。

这一预测与大股东在公司的监测能力是一致的。

与大股东潜在的套利者/投资者获得私人信息的动机，我预测，大股东拥有的异质性是与企业的信息不对称成正相关的。

我还预测，这种关系会受到大股东类型的影响。

具体来说，
我预测，积极的大股东更积极与会计信息质量和信息不对称有关系，相对于温和的大股东而言。

由于所有的大股东不同类似的监控能力，侵略性以及某些大股东的相对规模差异造成大股东所有权的异质性。

最后，我的分析侧重于企业的会计信息质量和信息不对称形成的后果。

我限制我的样本公司，有新的大股东的形成。

虽然这种限制显著降低了我的样本，但是数据提供了一个独特的机会，大量购买的后果在前置和后置形成期的变量提供了相关证据。

对于新成员的建立，我预测一个新成员的形成和企业的会计信息质量成正相关关系。

此前的研究已经证明监测和企业会计信息质量的水平之间呈正相关。

因此，谁拥有更多地股份，这些股东对经理的监督作用就更强。

我也预测，这种关系会受到大股东的类型影响，例如，新的成员中饭更积极的股东有较大的提高会计质量，因为以前的研究显示，侵略性大股东是较有影响力的因素，更有效地启动改变企业内部。

至于新的成员的形成和信息不对称，我预测新成员之间和企业的信息不对称有正相关关系。

这个预测是基于之前的研究表明，大股东拥有信息优势超过其他市场参与者例如积极参与信息搜索的这些有影响力的业主私人。

在尽可能多的情况下寻找一个新的机会，一个有影响力的股东获得私人信息和/或从事私人信息搜索要容易得多，我预测这务必增加了企业的信息不对称。

我还预测，这种关联类型的大股东在公司有很大的影响。

具体来说，积极的大股东已经被证明是更有效地影响企业的决策因素。

我认为，在新的成员建立中监测的侵略性与企业信息的不对称存在正相关关系。

我的研究结果支持了我的假设，大股东异质性与企业的会计信息质量和信息不对称是成正相关的。

此外，由于推测，某些大股东的监测侵略性与企业的会计信息质量和信息不对称也有正相关关系。

大股东异质性方面，指标变量捕获不同类型的大股东，目前在一家公司里是明显不为零的。

具体来说，指标变量捕获咄咄逼人的大股东与会计信息质量和信息不对称之间存在的正相关关系，而捕获温和的大股东，指标变量是不那么显著的。

与个别大股东的投资相比，其他大股东的相对大小不会是企业的会计信息质量和信息不对称的一个重要的决定因素。

这个结果并不令人惊讶，由于措施变化不大，
存在计算大小的差异和可能的测量问题。

侵略性大股东占的比例不大，但是，显著。

总的来说，这些结果表明，积极的大股东是我研究的重点，这是符合我的假说监控侵略性。

分析新的股东成员的建立给我提供了额外的证据，企业的会计信息质量和信息不对称的变化大都在大股东的投资后时期。

这一发现支持了我的主要假设和新的大股东投资企业会影响会计信息质量和信息不对称提供了证据。

补充证据也有助于解决我在研究中的因果关系。

具体来说，我的发现揭示了会计信息质量和信息不对称的增加是发生在投资后期的。

我的这篇文献的贡献在于在几个不同的方面。

人们很少知道大股东与公司的会计质量和信息不对称之间的关联性。

因此，相关证据一致的增加或减少企业的会计信息质量和/或水平信息不对称与某些类型的大股东时，对投资者的影响评估当前和未来的投资。

例如，一个公司的投资者更大程度上依赖有与会计信息质量有正相关的大股东的公司，它们认为公司的会计信息质量较好，盈利状况比较好。

同样，对于很少或根本没有大股东的公司，投资者则会认为会计信息质量较低，公司的盈利质量也较差。

（Trainor, Joseph E. Large shareholder heterogeneity: The effect on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry[D].Florida Atlantic University.2011.page1-8.）
Large shareholder heterogeneity: The effect on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry CHAPTER1:INTRODUCTION,MOTIVATIONS,AND CONTRIBUTIONS
I investigate the association between large shareholders1and firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Specifically, I examine whether the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of large shareholders present in a firm are associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. The recent economic downturns, increased large shareholder activism, and new Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules allowing large shareholders greater proxy access motivate my research.
Prior research suggests that large shareholders are able to influence a variety of corporate policies, such as investment strategy, manager compensation, and finance decisions, but little evidence exists on how large shareholders are related to firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. In those instances when the extantaccounting literature does consider the role of large shareholders, an implicit assumption is that all large shareholders share similar investment preferences, skills, and monitoring ability.
Given evidence that large shareholder ownership is associated with firms' operating decisions and corporate governance, legislators and regulators have begun to recognize the important monitoring role that large shareholders fulfill in the capital markets. Despite prior unsuccessful attempts by the SEC to increase the influence of large shareholders by allowing these influential owners greater access to board representation, the SEC was recently granted the authority to promulgate rules that allow large shareholders greater access to proxy materials.
On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was signed into law by President Obama (The White House, 2010).The Act authorizes the SEC to create rules that allow large shareholders access to proxy materials. Under the new SEC rules2, large shareholders meeting certain holding requirements would be allowed to include one or more nominees in the proxy materials distributed to shareholders prior to a firm’s annual meeting at which directors are elected. Although proxy contests that threaten to replace entire slates of directors are quite rare (Bebchuk, 2007) and expensive (Financial Times, 2010), U.S. business groups appear poised to take whatever steps necessary to fight these new SEC rules (Eaglesham, 2010).
In addition to legislators and regulators, academics are also interested in the role of large shareholders in firms' corporate affairs. Most recently, academics have devoted significant attention to the role of large shareholders with respects to firms' corporate decision making. This literature generally portrays large shareholders as being in a unique position to monitor managers and influence operating decisions due to their large equity investment. Theories suggest that large shareholders accumulate blocks in firms for shared control and private control benefits (Holderness, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The benefits of shared control refer to the benefits of increased firm value that all shareholders may gain from large shareholder monitoring efforts, while private control benefits suggest that large shareholders are able to extract benefits due to their influential ownership position.
Recent studies have begun to recognize that not all large shareholders have similar monitoring skills and abilities.For example, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) analyze the effects of heterogeneity across blockholders and find significant and economically important differences
in firms' investment, financial, and executive compensation policies among different types of blockholders
. In addition, many studies over the last 10 years have focused on the activities of shareholder activists.
The shareholder activist literature suggests that target firms have lower Tobin's Q, lower sales growth rates, lower payout ratios, and lower dividend yields than non-targets. Most studies find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of shareholder activist block purchases and also long-run positive abnormal returns over the first year of the block purchase.
Despite the compelling evidence from the finance literature suggesting that corporate decisions vary by the types of large shareholders present in a firm and myriad evidence of shareholder activism, much of the extant accounting literature has generally treated large shareholders as a homogeneous group of investors with similar monitoring capabilities. I seek to further this research and provide evidence on how the heterogeneity of large shareholder ownership relates to firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry.
I begin my examination by constructing three alternative specifications of large shareholder heterogeneity (LSH) based on the type, size, and monitoring aggressiveness of the large shareholders present in a firm. Next, I test whether these measures of LSH are significant determinants of firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. I conclude with an examination of the consequences of new block formations on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry.
Applying the three measures of ownership heterogeneity, I first examine whether LSH helps to explain the variation in firms’ accounting quality. I measure accounting quality using two accrual-based metrics. The two accrual-based models are the discretionary accrual model developed by Jones (1991) as implemented by Tucker and Zarowin (2006), and the accrual quality model from Dechow and Dichev (2002) as modified by McNichols (2002).
Next, I examine whether LSH is related to market-based measures of firms’information asymmetry. I use two market-based measures to examine the relationship between LSH and firms’ information asymmetry. The
first measure, following Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998)--hereafter "BKLS”--use analysts’information precision as proxies for the precisions of total, public, and private information available to the capital markets. The second measure is the bid-ask spread which is used in the extant literature as a measure of information asymmetry (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Laksmana, 2008;
Richardson, 2000).
Consistent with monitoring theory, I predict a positive association between large shareholder ownership heterogeneity and firms' accounting quality. This prediction is consistent with large shareholders serving in a monitoring capacity.Consistent with large shareholders as potential arbitrageurs/investors with motivation to obtain private information, I predict that large shareholder ownership heterogeneity is positively associated with firms' information asymmetry. I also predict that this relationship is influenced by the types of large shareholders present in a firm. Specifically, I predict that aggressive large shareholders are more positively associated with accounting quality and information asymmetry than moderate large shareholders.Since all large shareholders do not share similar monitoring capabilities, the aggressiveness as well as relative size differences of certain large shareholders contributes to the heterogeneity of large shareholder ownership.
My final analysis focuses on the consequences of block formation on firms’accounting quality and information asymmetry. I restrict my full sample to firms that have new large shareholder block formations. While this restriction reduces my sample significantly, the data provide a unique opportunity to present evidence on the consequences of large block purchases by examining the levels of the dependent variables in the pre and post-block formation periods.
For new block formations, I predict a positive association between new block formations and firms' accounting quality in the post-block period. Prior research has demonstrated a positive association between the level of monitoring and firms' accounting quality.Therefore, new block creations represent a substantial increase in the concentration of shares held by a shareholder who has more incentive to monitor managers.
I also predict that this relationship is influenced by the type of large shareholder, such that new block formations with more aggressive monitors
have greater increases in accounting quality, since prior research has shown that large aggressive shareholders are more influential monitors and are more effective at initiating change within firms.
As far as new block formations and information asymmetry, I predict a positive association between new block formations and firms' information asymmetry.This prediction is based on prior research which suggests that large shareholders possess information advantages over other market participants and that these influential owners actively engage in private information search. In as much as new blocks create a new opportunity for an influential shareholder to gain private information and/or engage in private information search, I predict an increase in firms' information asymmetry. I also predict that this association is influenced by the types of large shareholders in a firm. Specifically, aggressive large shareholders have been shown to be more effective at influencing firms' decisions. I posit that monitoring aggressiveness is positively associated with firms’information asymmetry in the post-block formation period
The results of my study support my hypotheses that large shareholder heterogeneity is positively associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Further, as hypothesized, the monitoring aggressiveness of certain large shareholders is positively associated with firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry.
With respects to heterogeneity, large shareholder indicator variables capturing the different types of large shareholders present in a firm are significantly different from zero. Specifically, an indicator variable capturing the existence of aggressive large shareholders is positively associated with accounting quality and information asymmetry, while an indicator variable capturing moderate large shareholders is not significant. The relative size of an individual large shareholder's investment compared to other large shareholders does not appear to be a significant determinant of firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. This result is not surprising given little variation in the measure I use to calculate size differences and possible measurement issues. The ratio of large aggressive shareholders to total large
shareholders is, however, significant. Collectively, these results suggest that aggressive large shareholders are likely driving my results, which is consistent with my hypotheses on monitoring aggressiveness.
An analysis of new block formations provides additional evidence that changes in firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry are associated with large shareholders in the post investment period. This finding supports my main hypotheses and provides evidence of the effects of new large shareholder investment on firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. This supplementary evidence also helps to address causation in my study. Specifically, my findings reveal an increase in accounting quality and information asymmetry in the post block formation period
My study contributes to the literature in several distinct respects. Little is known about the association between large shareholders and firms' accounting quality and information asymmetry. Therefore, evidence consistent with increases or decreases in firms' accounting quality and/or level information asymmetry being associated with certain types of large shareholders has implications for investors when evaluating current and future investments. For example, investors of a firm with a new block formation created by an aggressive large shareholder may place greater reliance on the quality of earnings in light of the results which show a positive association between accounting quality and aggressive large shareholder block formation.Likewise, investors in firms with little or no large shareholders may find lower accounting quality and place less weight on the quality of the firm's earnings.
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