The Banks-Zaks Expansion and Freezing in Perturbative QCD
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国际金融英文版第十五版复习资料
前言学弟学妹们,当你们看到这篇复习资料的时候, 学长已经在文档上传的当天上午参加了国际金融的考试, 本复习资料主要针对对象为成都信息工程学院(CUIT)英语系大三学生, 且立足教材也基于托马斯·A ·普格尔(Thomas A. Pugel)先生所著国际金融英文版·第15版, 其他版本或者相似教材也可作为参考, 本资料的整理除了参考维基百科,百度百科以及MBA 智库百科,当然最重要的是我们老师的课件. 为了帮助同学们顺利通过考试, 当然是拿到高分, 希望此资料能够帮助你们节省时间, 达到高效复习的效果.外国语学院2011级,陈爵歌(Louis) 2014年1月6日晚于宿舍 Chapter 2Transnationality Index (跨国化指数)(TNI ) is a means of ranking multinational corporations that is employed by economists and politicians. (反映跨国公司海外经营活动的经济强度,是衡量海外业务在公司整体业务中地位的重要指标) Foreign assets to total assets(外国资产占总资产比)Foreign sales to total sales(海外销售占总销售)Foreign employees to total employees(外籍雇员占总雇员)跨国化指数的构成联合国跨国公司与投资司使用的跨国化指数由三个指标构成:国外资产对公司总资产的百分比;国外销售对公司总销售的百分比;国外雇员人数对公司雇员总人数的百分比关于TNI 的计算公式:International Economic Integration( 国际经济一体化)International economic integration refers to the extent and strength of real -sector and financial -sector linkages among national economies.(国际经济一体化是指两个或两个以上的国家在现有生产力发展水平和国际分工的基础上,由政府间通过协商缔结条约,让渡一定的国家主权,建立两国或多国的经济联盟,从而使经济达到某种程度的结合以提高其在国际经济中的地位)Real Sector(实际经济部门): The sector of the economy engaged in the production and sale of goods and services(指物质的、精神的产品和服务的生产、流通等经济活动。
利率市场化相关文献
利率市场化相关文献以下是一些关于利率市场化的相关文献:1. Kroszner, R. S., & Strahan, P. E. (2014). Regulation and deregulation of the US banking industry: Causes, consequences, and implications for the future. In Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Volume 2, Part A (pp. 1135-1200). North Holland.2. White, E. N. (1995). The impacts of interest rate deregulation on the banking industry. In Deregulation and Monetary Control: The Federal Reserve and the Economies of the 1980s (pp. 189-211). Brookings Institution Press.3. Anderson, T. W., & Rasche, R. H. (1998). Financial market volatility and the implications for the structure of central banks. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 30(3), 283-298.4. Harchaoui, T., & Tarkhani, F. A. (2003). The software and information technology industry: A review of the empirical literature. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 51(4), 487-521.5. Allen, F., Carletti, E., & Marquez, R. (2011). Credit market competition and capital regulation. Review of Financial Studies, 24(4), 983-1018.6. Gersbach, H., & Sánchez-Páramo, C. (2001). Competition and stability: What's special about banking?. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 10(3-4), 218-245.以上文献提供了对利率市场化的不同方面的经济学和金融学视角的研究,包括市场化的原因、效果以及与银行业和金融稳定性的关系等。
克鲁格曼JAPAN’S SLUMP AND THE RETURN OF THE LIQUIDITY TRAP
IT’S BAAACK! JAPAN’S SLUMP AND THE RETURN OF THE LIQUIDITY TRAPIn the early years of macroeconomics as a discipline, the liquidity trap - that awkward condition in which monetary policy loses its grip because the nominal interest rate is essentially zero, in which the quantity of money becomes irrelevant because money and bonds are essentially perfect substitutes - played a central role. Hicks (1937), in introducing both the IS-LM model and the liquidity trap, identified the assumption that monetary policy was ineffective, rather than the assumed downward inflexibility of prices, as the central difference between “Mr. Keynes and the classics”. It has often been pointed out that the Alice-in-Wonderland character of early Keynesianism, with its paradoxes of thrift, widow's cruses, and so on, depended on the explicit or implicit assumption of an accommodative monetary policy; it has less often been pointed out that in the late 1930s and early 1940s it seemed quite natural to assume that money was irrelevant at the margin. After all, at the end of the 30s interest rates were hard up against the zero constraint: the average rate on Treasury bills during 1940 was 0.014 percent.Since then, however, the liquidity trap has steadily receded both as a memory and as a subject of economic research. Partly this is because in the generally inflationary decades after World War II nominal interest rates stayed comfortably above zero, and central banks therefore no longer found themselves “pushing on a string”. Also, the experience of the 30s itself was reinterpreted, most notably by Friedman and Schwartz (1963); emphasizing broad aggregates rather than interest rates or monetary base, they argued in effect that the Depression was caused by monetary contraction, that the Fed could have prevented it, and implicitly that even after the great slump a sufficiently aggressive monetary expansion could have reversed it. To the extent that modern1macroeconomists think about liquidity traps at all - EconLit lists only 21 papers with the phrase in title, subject, or abstract since 1975 - their view is basically that the liquidity trap can’t happen, it didn’t happen, and it won't happen again.But it has, and to the world's second-largest economy. Over the past several years money-market rates in Japan have been consistently below 1 percent, and the Bank of Japan plausibly claims that it can do no more; yet the economy, which has been stagnant since 1991, is sliding deeper into recession.Since Japan is such an important economy, and its slump threatens to shatter the already fragile prospects for economic recovery in the rest of Asia, understanding what is going wrong there has become quite urgent. And there is also a deeper reason for concern: if this can happen to Japan, perhaps it can happen elsewhere. In short, it is time to reexamine the theory of liquidity traps, which has turned out not to be irrelevant after all.But don't we already understand liquidity traps well enough to formulate policy? Can't we just pull the old models out of the basement, dust them off, and put them to work? In effect that is what policymakers at the U.S. Treasury and elsewhere have done: drawing on the simple liquidity trap framework that used to appear in macroeconomics textbooks a generation or so ago, they have urged Japan to follow the classic recovery strategy of pump-priming fiscal expansion. (Since hardly anybody in the thoroughly urbanized societies of modern America and Japan has any idea what it means to prime a pump, I hereby suggest that we rename this the “jump-start” strategy). Macroeconomics has, however, moved on since those textbooks, in several ways that might require a rethinking of the issue.We might, in particular, identify three strands of modern thought that are missing from the2classic IS-LM analysis. First is the intertemporal nature of decisions: we now understand, perhaps better than macroeconomists 50 years ago, that how one formulates expectations is a crucial matter in macroeconomic analysis, and that a good first-pass assumption is that these expectations are rational. Second is the openness of the economy. Although the Britain of Keynes and Hicks was actually a quite open economy - with a share of trade in GDP more than twice that of modern Japan - their analysis, and almost all subsequent analysis of the liquidity trap, ignored foreign trade and capital mobility. It was a justifiable strategic simplification; but since many of the disputes surrounding Japan's direction involve the future of the country's current account and exchange rate, we need to know what happens when this assumption is relaxed. Finally, traditional IS-LM analysis neglects the role of financial intermediaries. But how you interpret the experience of the 1930s hinges crucially on how broad a monetary aggregate you choose; and the same has turned out to be true in recent arguments over Japan. Furthermore, one school of thought about the Depression argues that a troubled banking system was the essence of the problem; a similar view has become near-orthodoxy about contemporary Japan. So we had better have at least a basic sense of how financial intermediation fits into the liquidity-trap picture.This paper is in two major parts. The first, longer part is an extended generic discussion of the causes and consequences of liquidity traps; it uses a succession of small, highly stylized models to address both the traditional questions regarding liquidity traps and a number of novel issues. The central new conclusion of this analysis is that a liquidity trap fundamentally involves a credibility problem - but one that is the inverse of the usual one, in which central bankers have difficulty convincing private agents of their commitment to price stability. In a liquidity trap the problem is that the markets believe that the central bank will target price stability, given the chance - and3hence that any current monetary expansion is merely transitory. The traditional view that monetary policy is ineffective in a liquidity trap, and that fiscal expansion is the only way out, must therefore be qualified: monetary policy will be effective after all if the central bank can credibly promise to be irresponsible, to seek a higher future price level.The theoretical analysis also appears to refute two widely held beliefs. First, international capital flows, which allow a country to export savings to the rest of the world, are not a sure-fire guarantee against a liquidity trap; because goods markets remain far from perfectly integrated, the required real interest rate in terms of domestic consumption can be negative even if capital is perfectly mobile and there are positive-return investments abroad. A corollary to this is that the extent to which a successful monetary expansion - in which the central bank succeeds in creating expectations of inflation - will be a beggar-thy-neighbor policy that expands demand at the rest of the world's expense will probably be less than widely imagined.Second, putting financial intermediation into a liquidity-trap framework suggests, pace Friedman and Schwartz, that looking at monetary aggregates under these circumstances is quite misleading: in a liquidity trap the central bank may well find that it cannot increase broader monetary aggregates, that increments to the monetary base are simply added to reserves and currency holdings - and thus both that such aggregates are no longer a valid indicator of the stance of monetary policy, and that their failure to rise does not indicate that the essential problem lies in the banking sector.The second, briefer part of the paper turns to some specific questions surrounding Japan; it essentially represents a survey of others’ estimates rather than original empirical work. It considers four main issues. First is the size of Japan's output gap; I argue that it is probably4considerably larger than the standard estimates, and hence that the need for expansionary policy is even greater than commonly supposed. Second is the reason for the apparent large gap between saving and willing investment at full employment. Third is the relevance of Japan's banking woes to its macroeconomic malaise; although the conventional wisdom is that Japan's banks are at the center of the problem, I argue that banking problems have less of a causal role than is widely assumed. Finally, I make a stab at quantifying the size, duration, and side effects of the inflation that would be needed to lift Japan out of its trap.REVISITING THE THEORY OF LIQUIDITY TRAPSGeneral considerationsIt is useful, in considering the problem of Japan's liquidity trap, to begin at a high level of generality - to adopt what we might almost call a philosophical stance. The reason is that popular discussion of the current problem has a strong tendency to plunge quickly into the specifics, to cite one or another structural issue as the problem, missing the central point that whatever the specifics of its history Japan is now in a liquidity trap, and that the generic issues surrounding such traps apply whatever the details of the particular case.A liquidity trap may be defined as a situation in which conventional monetary policies have become impotent, because nominal interest rates are at or near zero - so that injecting monetary base into the economy has no effect, because base and bonds are viewed by the private sector as perfect substitutes. By this definition, a liquidity trap could occur in a flexible-price, full-5employment economy; and although any reasonable model of the United States in the 1930s or of Japan in the 1990s must invoke some form of price stickiness, we can think of the unemployment and output slump that occurs under such circumstances as what happens when the economy is “trying” to have deflation - a deflationary tendency that monetary expansion is powerless to prevent.This may seem a peculiar way of putting the issue, but it does highlight the central mystery of a liquidity trap - and the reason why “structural” explanations, in a fundamental sense, cannot by themselves resolve that mystery. For if there is one proposition everyone agrees with in macroeconomics it is that, aside from the possible role of price stickiness in causing monetary expansion to be reflected in output rather than prices, increases in the money supply raise the equilibrium price level. Indeed, the normal view is that money is roughly neutral - that an increase in the money supply produces a roughly equiproportional increase in the general price level.1 Or to be more specific, an increase in outside money - the monetary base - must raise prices.Putting it this way immediately reveals that many of the explanations one often hears for the ineffectuality of monetary policy in Japan are wrong, or at least inadequate. One often hears, for example, that the real problem is that Japan's banks are troubled, and hence that the Bank of Japan cannot increase monetary aggregates; but outside money is still supposed to raise prices, regardless of the details of the transmission mechanism. In addition to the problem of bad loans, one often hears that corporations have too much debt, that the service sector is overregulated and inefficient, and so on. All of this may be true, and may depress the economy for any given monetary base - but it does not explain why increases in the monetary base should fail to raise prices and/or output. One way to say this is to remember that the neutrality of money is not a6conditional proposition; money isn't neutral “if your banks are in good financial shape” or “if your service sector is competitive” or “if corporations haven't taken on too much debt”. Money (which is to say outside money) is supposed to be just plain neutral.2So how is a liquidity trap possible? The answer lies in a little-noticed escape clause in the standard argument for monetary neutrality: an increase in the money supply in the current and all future periods will raise prices in the same proportion. There is no corresponding argument that says that a rise in the money supply that is not expected to be sustained will raise prices equiproportionally - or indeed at all.In short, approaching the question from this high level of abstraction already suggests that a liquidity trap involves a kind of credibility problem. A monetary expansion that the market expected to be sustained (that is, matched by equiproportional expansions in all future periods) would always work, regardless of whatever structural problems the economy might have; if monetary expansion does not work, if there is a liquidity trap, it must be because the public does not expect it to be sustained.To firm up this insight, of course, we need a specific model.Money, interest, and prices: a minimalist modelAlthough the idea of a liquidity trap is normally bound up with the IS-LM model, there are several compelling reasons not to start with that model here. For one thing, many macroeconomists believe that IS-LM is too ad hoc to be worthy of serious consideration. Some of us do not share that view, and continue to regard Hicks's construction as a very useful heuristic78U '11&D j c 1&D t D t (1)device. Still, it is important to stress that the possibility of a liquidity trap is not something that depends on the ad hockery of the IS-LM model, that it can occur in a model that dots its microeconomic “i”s and crosses its intertemporal “t”s. Also, a liquidity trap does, as we have already seen, fundamentally involve expectations and credibility; using models that explicitly recognize the intertemporal aspects of the problem helps clarify this point.Let us therefore move immediately to an explicit intertemporal model that establishesrelationships among output, money, prices, and interest rates; we will then be able to use this model as a base for a series of thought experiments and extensions.We consider a one-good, representative agent economy (in which, however, agents must purchase their consumption from others); initially we suppose that the good is inelastically supplied, so that we can simply think of each agent as receiving a given endowment y t in each period. For concreteness, the utility function is assumed to take the formwhere c is consumption within a period, D is relative risk aversion, and D the discount factor. The simplest way to introduce money into this model, one that has the added advantage of avoiding the suspicion that the conclusions are dictated by arbitrary assumptions about the way money enters utility, is to assume a cash-in-advance constraint. Specifically, within each period agents are assumed to go through a two-stage process. At the beginning of each period there is a capital market, in which individuals can trade cash for one-period bonds, with a nominal interest rate i t . Their consumption during the period is then constrained by the cash with which they emerge from this trading: the nominal value of consumption, P t c t , cannot exceed moneyholdings M. After the capital market is held, each individual purchases his desired consumption,twhile receiving cash from the sale of his own endowment.Government policy can take two forms. First, the central bank is assumed able to engage in open-market operations during that beginning-of-period capital market, buying or selling bonds. Second, at the end of the period the government can collect or distribute lump-sum taxes and transfers. The government must obey its own intertemporal budget constraint, which takes into account the seignorage that results from money creation.Analyzing this model in general requires a careful specification of the budget constraints of both individuals and the government, and of intertemporal choices. However, if we make some simplifying assumptions the model's implications can be derived with almost no algebra. Let us assume that from the second period onwards output (and therefore also consumption) will remain constant at a level y*, and that the government will also hold the money supply constant at a level M*. Then we can immediately guess at the solution from period 2 on: the price level will remain constant at P* = M*/y*, and the interest rate will also be constant at a rate i* = (1-D)/D. It is straightforward to confirm that this is indeed an equilibrium: one plus the real interest rate equals the ratio of marginal utility in any two successive periods; because the nominal interest rate is positive individuals have an incentive to acquire only as much cash as they need, so all money will indeed be spent on consumption.All the action, then, goes into determining the price level and interest rate in the first period. Let us use un-subscripted letters to represent first-period output, consumption, interest rate, etc.. Our first relationship comes from the monetary side. Under normal circumstances - that is, when the nominal interest rate is positive - individuals will hold no more cash than they need to9P'M/y(2) (c/c()&D'DP(1%i)/P((3)1%i'P(DPy(/y)1/D(4)make their consumption purchases. So the cash-in-advance constraint will be binding: Pc =Py = M, so thatSo under normal circumstances there is a simple proportional relationship between the money supply and the price level.The second relationship comes from intertemporal choice. By holding one less yen in period 1, an individual gives up 1/P units of first-period consumption but allows himself to consume(1+i)/P* additional units in period 2. At an optimum this change must leave him indifferent. But the marginal utility of consumption in period 1, given the assumed utility function, is c-D; the marginal utility in 2 is D(c*)-D. It follows that we must haveor, since consumption must equal output in each period,This says that the higher is the current price level, the lower the nominal interest rate. The easiest way to think about this is to say that there is an equilibrium real interest rate which the economy will deliver whatever the behavior of nominal prices. Meanwhile, since the future price level P* is assumed held fixed, any rise in the current level creates expected deflation; hence higher P means lower i.10The two relationships are shown in Figure 1 as MM and CC respectively; as drawn, they intersect at point 1, simultaneously determining the interest rate and the price level. It is also immediately apparent that an increase in the first-period money supply will shift MM to the right, leading to a higher price level and a lower nominal (but not real) interest rate.While this is surely the normal case, however, there is also another possibility, to which we now turn.The liquidity trap in a flexible-price economySuppose that we start with an economy in the equilibrium described by point 1 in Figure 1, and then imagine an initial open-market operation that increases the first-period money supply. (Throughout we imagine that the money supply from period 2 onwards remains unchanged - or equivalently that the central bank will do whatever is necessary to keep the post-2 price level stable). Initially, as we have already seen, this operation will increase the price level and reduce the interest rate. And such a monetary expansion can clearly drive the economy down the CC curve as far as point 2 in Figure 1. But what happens if the money supply is increased still further - so that the intersection of MM and CC is at a point like 3, with a negative nominal interest rate? The answer is clearly that the interest rate cannot go negative, because then money would dominate bonds as an asset. What must therefore happen is that any increase in the money supply beyond the level that would push the interest rate to zero is simply substituted for zero-interest bonds in individual portfolios (with the bonds being purchased by the central bank in its open-market operation!), with no further effect on either the price level or the interest rate. Because11spending is no longer constrained by money, the MM curve becomes irrelevant; the economy stays at point 2, no matter how large the money supply may be.It is probably worth emphasizing here that the interest rate at point 2 is zero only on one-period bonds; it would not be zero on longer-term bonds, such as consols. This is important if one is trying to map the model onto the current situation in Japan, or for that matter the United States during the 1930s: long rates in Japan are still positive, but short-term rates are indeed very close to zero.A good way to think about what happens when money becomes irrelevant here is to bear in mind that we are holding the long-run money supply fixed at M*, and therefore also the long-run price level at P*. So when the central bank increases the current money supply, it is lowering the expected rate of money growth M*/M, and also - if it does succeed in raising the price level - the expected rate of inflation P*/P. Now what we know is that in this full employment model the economy will have the same real interest rate whatever the central bank does. Since the nominal interest rate cannot become negative, however, the economy has a minimum rate of inflation or maximum rate of deflation.Now suppose that the central bank in effect tries to impose a rate of deflation that exceeds this minimum - which it does by making the current money supply M large relative to the future supply M*. What will happen is that the economy will simply cease to be cash-constrained, and any excess money will have no effect: the rate of deflation will be the maximum consistent with a zero nominal rate, and no more.This may seem a silly thought experiment. Why would a central bank try to impose massive deflation? But the maximum rate of deflation need not be large, or even positive. Suppose that the12required real rate of interest is negative; then the economy “needs” inflation, and an attempt by the central bank to achieve price stability will lead to a zero nominal interest rate, and excess cash holdings.The condition under which the required real interest rate is negative is straightforward in this simple endowment economy. Market-clearing will require a negative real interest rate if the marginal utility of consumption in period 2 is greater than that of consumption in period 1, which will be the case if the economy’s future output is expected to be sufficiently less than its current output. Specifically, given the assumed utility function, the required real interest rate is negative if(y/y()1/D<D(5)This condition may seem peculiar. After all, we normally think of economies as growing rather than shrinking. One possible answer involves an equity premium; another involves demography; but let us reserve this issue for later discussion.Of course, in a flexible-price economy even the necessity of a negative real interest rate does not cause unemployment. This conclusion may surprise economists who recall the tortured historical debate about the liquidity trap, much of which focussed on the question of whether wage and price flexibility were effective as a way of restoring full employment. In this model the problem does not arise - but the reason is a bit peculiar. What happens is that the economy deflates now in order to provide inflation later. That is, if the current money supply is so large compared with the future supply that the nominal rate is zero, but the real rate needs to be negative, P falls below P*; the public then expects the price level to rise, and this provides the13necessary negative real interest rate. And to repeat, this fall in the price level occurs regardless of the current money supply, because any excess money will simply be hoarded without adding to spending.At this point we have a version of the liquidity trap: money becomes irrelevant at the margin.3 But aside from frustrating the central bank - which may have a thing about price stability, but finds itself presiding over inflation no matter what it does - this trap has no adverse real consequences. To turn this analysis into a real problem, in both senses, we need to introduce some kind of nominal rigidity.The Hicksian liquidity trapSuppose that the consumption good is produced rather than simply appearing, with a maximum productive capacity y f in period 1. And suppose, also, that this productive capacity need not be fully employed. In particular, this paper will simply assume that the price level in period 1 is predetermined - so that the economy now acquires a Keynesian feel, and monetary policy can affect output. (In period 2 and subsequently output will still be assumed to take on the value y*). In this sticky-price world the level of period-1 consumption and output must still be equal, but now output adjusts to consumption rather than the other way around. Given the utility function, and the assumption that consumption will be y* in period 2, we can immediately write an expression for current real consumption, which becomes the “IS curve” determining real output:c'y'y((P(/DP)1/D(1%i)&1/D(6)14Figure 2 illustrates the joint determination of the interest rate and output in this case. The curve IS, as just indicated, shows how output will be determined by consumption demand, which is decreasing in the interest rate. Meanwhile, as long as the nominal interest rate is positive, the cash-in-advance constraint will be binding, so we will have the MM curvey'M/p(7)Increasing the money supply can now increase output, up to a point - specifically, up to point 2. But what if productive capacity is at a point like 3? Then the same argument as in the previous section applies: since the nominal interest rate cannot go negative, any increase in money beyond the level that drives the rate to zero will simply be substituted for bonds, with no effect on spending. And therefore no open-market operation, no matter how large, can get the economy to full employment. In short, the economy is in a classic Hicksian liquidity trap.Under what conditions will a liquidity trap occur? One possibility is that P is high compared with P* - that people expect deflation, so that even a zero nominal rate is a high real rate. The other possibility, however, is that even if prices are expected to be stable, y f is high compared with the future - or to put it differently, peoples’ expected future real income is low compared with the amount of consumption needed to use today’s capacity. In that case, to persuade people to spend enough now may require a negative real interest rate, and with downwardly inflexible prices that may not be possible.Or to put it yet another way, one that is closer to the language of applied macroeconomics: if people have low expectations about their future incomes, then even with a zero interest rate they may want to save more than the economy can absorb. (In this case, of course, the economy15cannot absorb any savings - but we will come to that point below). And in that case, no matter what the central bank does with the current money supply, it cannot reflate the economy sufficiently to restore full employment.So we have now seen that a fully specified model, which does not fudge either the role of money or the necessity of making intertemporal choices, can indeed generate a liquidity trap. The model does, however, clearly omit some important aspects of standard macro models; perhaps most notably, it has no investment; no foreign trade or capital mobility; and no financial intermediation, so that all money is outside. Can the same story still be told if these elements are introduced?Investment, productive capital, and qOne way of stating the liquidity trap problem is to say that it occurs when the equilibrium real interest rate, the rate at which savings and investment would be equal at potential output, is negative. An immediate question is therefore how this can happen in an economy which is not the simple endowment economy described above, but one in which productive investment can take place - and in which the marginal product of capital, while it can be low, can hardly be negative. An answer that may be extremely important in practice is the existence of an equity premium. If the equity premium is as high as the historic U.S. average, the economy could find itself in a liquidity trap even if the rate of return on physical capital is as high as 5 or 6 percent.A further answer is that the rate of return on investment depends not only on the ratio of capital’s marginal product to its price, but also on the expected rate of change of that price. An16。
亚洲的行为金融学中英双语
注:英文原文来源:广西工学院图书馆外数据库Elsevier电子期刊全文库(国外站点SDOL)检索词:Articles all fields:behavioral finance译者:小马亚洲的行为金融学作者:肯尼思.A金纽约州立大学布法罗分校管理学院约翰R ·诺夫辛格美国华盛顿州立大学商学院。
摘要:本文介绍了太平洋盆地金融杂志特别关注的亚洲行为金融学的问题。
我们首先讨论一下一般行为金融学,然后,我们再解释为什么在亚洲行为金融学是一个值得研究的重要课题。
我们先描述所发表的这篇论文所关注的问题,在这过程中,我们将适当的联系当前所拥有的关于行为金融学的文献。
我们也将严密的公正的审阅这个特殊的问题,并同时附简短的思考。
关键词:亚洲,行为金融,企业融资,投资。
文章概要1.介绍2.观点概要3.结论,文献参考一:介绍为什么在亚洲,行为金融学会成为重要而有趣的话题呢?首先,行为金融的研究仍然是一个年轻的领域。
学术界,金融界最近才接受它作为一种可行的模式来解释金融市场参与者如何作出决定和反过来,这些决定如何影响金融市场。
第二,亚洲金融市场是世界上最大的金融市场,而且有一些证据- 轶事,理论和实证确认,亚洲人患上比其他文化背景的人更深的偏见。
因此,通过对亚洲行为金融学的研究我们就可以更深的理解这两个重要的问题。
在行为金融学的研究中认知心理学扮演者重要的角色。
人并不总是理性的,那样,人们在做金融决策是就有可能部分或是全部是受个人行为偏见的驱使,如果人们的信仰或偏好不符合决策者传统决策的理性公里。
那么,重要的一点,我们就可以确定这些行为偏见的影响,特别是当他们的认识误区影响了价格而又无法摆脱时。
许多金融学者认为这一研究领域开始的80年代中期。
邦特,泰勒(1985)研究表明:股市对信息的过分反应。
谢弗迎和斯塔特曼(1985)争辩说,投资者更可能出售他们有利的股票而不是损失的,虽然出售损失的股票才是最优的。
如果有人想去研究行为金融学的起源,这个领域的研究只不过二十年的历史。
金融市场学双语题库及答案(第十四章)米什金《金融市场与机构》
Financial Markets and Institutions, 8e (Mishkin)Chapter 14 The Mortgage Markets14.1 Multiple Choice1) Which of the following are important ways in which mortgage markets differ from the stock and bond markets?A) The usual borrowers in the capital markets are government entities and businesses, whereas the usual borrowers in the mortgage markets are individuals.B) Most mortgages are secured by real estate, whereas the majority of capital market borrowing is unsecured.C) Because mortgages are made for different amounts and different maturities, developing a secondary market has been more difficult.D) All of the above are important differences.E) Only A and B of the above are important differences.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.1 What Are Mortgages?Question Status: Previous Edition2) Which of the following are important ways in which mortgage markets differ from stock and bond markets?A) The usual borrowers in capital markets are government entities, whereas the usual borrowers in mortgage markets are small businesses.B) The usual borrowers in capital markets are government entities and large businesses, whereas the usual borrowers in mortgage markets are small businesses.C) The usual borrowers in capital markets are government entities and large businesses, whereas the usual borrowers in mortgage markets are small businesses and individuals.D) The usual borrowers in capital markets are businesses and government entities, whereas the usual borrowers in mortgage markets are individuals.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.1 What Are Mortgages?Question Status: Previous Edition3) Which of the following are true of mortgages?A) A mortgage is a long-term loan secured by real estate.B) A borrower pays off a mortgage in a combination of principal and interest payments that result in full payment of the debt by maturity.C) Over 80 percent of mortgage loans finance residential home purchases.D) All of the above are true of mortgages.E) Only A and B of the above are true of mortgages.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.1 What Are Mortgages?Question Status: Previous Edition4) Which of the following are true of mortgages?A) A mortgage is a long-term loan secured by real estate.B) Borrowers pay off mortgages over time in some combination of principal and interest payments that result in full payment of the debt by maturity.C) Less than 65 percent of mortgage loans finance residential home purchases.D) All of the above are true of mortgages.E) Only A and B of the above are true of mortgages.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 14.1 What Are Mortgages?Question Status: Previous Edition5) Which of the following are true of mortgage interest rates?A) Interest rates on mortgage loans are determined by three factors: current long-term market rates, the term of the mortgage, and the number of discount points paid.B) Mortgage interest rates tend to track along with Treasury bond rates.C) The interest rate on 15-year mortgages is lower than the rate on 30-year mortgages, all else the same.D) All of the above are true.E) Only A and B of the above are true.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition6) Which of the following are true of mortgages?A) More than 80 percent of mortgage loans finance residential home purchases.B) The National Banking Act of 1863 rewarded banks that increased mortgage lending.C) Most mortgages during the 1920s and 1930s were balloon loans.D) All of the above are true.E) Only A and C of the above are true.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 14.1 What Are Mortgages?Question Status: Previous Edition7) Which of the following is true of mortgage interest rates?A) Longer-term mortgages have lower interest rates than shorter-term mortgages.B) Mortgage rates are lower than Treasury bond rates because of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest rates.C) In exchange for points, lenders reduce interest rates on mortgage loans.D) All of the above are true.E) Only A and B of the above are true.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition8) Typically, discount points should not be paid if the borrower will pay off the loan in ________ years or less.A) 5B) 10C) 15D) 20Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition9) Which of the following is true of mortgage interest rates?A) Longer-term mortgages have higher interest rates than shorter-term mortgages.B) In exchange for points, lenders reduce interest rates on mortgage loans.C) Mortgage rates are lower than Treasury bond rates because of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments.D) All of the above are true.E) Only A and B of the above are true.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition10) Which of the following reduces moral hazard for the mortgage borrower?A) CollateralB) Down paymentsC) Private mortgage insuranceD) Borrower qualificationsAnswer: BTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition11) Which of the following protects the mortgage lender's right to sell property if the underlying loan defaults?A) A lienB) A down paymentC) Private mortgage insuranceD) Borrower qualificationE) AmortizationAnswer: ATopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition12) Which of the following is true of mortgage interest rates?A) Mortgage rates are closely tied to Treasury bond rates, but mortgage rates tend to stay below Treasury rates because mortgages are secured with collateral.B) Longer-term mortgages have higher interest rates than shorter-term mortgages.C) Interest rates are higher on mortgage loans on which lenders charge points.D) All of the above are true.E) Only A and B of the above are true.Answer: BTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition13) During the early years of an amortizing mortgage loan, the lender appliesA) most of the monthly payment to the outstanding principal balance.B) all of the monthly payment to the outstanding principal balance.C) most of the monthly payment to interest on the loan.D) all of the monthly payment to interest on the loan.E) the monthly payment equally to interest on the loan and the outstanding principal balance.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition14) During the last years of an amortizing mortgage loan, the lender appliesA) most of the monthly payment to the outstanding principal balance.B) all of the monthly payment to the outstanding principal balance.C) most of the monthly payment to interest on the loan.D) all of the monthly payment to interest on the loan.E) the monthly payment equally to interest on the loan and the outstanding principal balance.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition15) During the last years of a balloon mortgage loan, the lender appliesA) most of the monthly payment to the outstanding principal balance.B) all of the monthly payment to the outstanding principal balance.C) most of the monthly payment to interest on the loan.D) all of the monthly payment to interest on the loan.E) the monthly payment equally to interest on the loan and the outstanding principal balance.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition16) During the early years of a balloon mortgage loan, the lender appliesA) most of the monthly payment to the outstanding principal balance.B) all of the monthly payment to the outstanding principal balance.C) most of the monthly payment to interest on the loan.D) all of the monthly payment to interest on the loan.E) the monthly payment equally to interest on the loan and the outstanding principal balance.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition17) A borrower who qualifies for an FHA or VA loan enjoys the advantage thatA) the mortgage payment is much lower.B) only a very low or zero down payment is required.C) the cost of private mortgage insurance is lower.D) the government holds the lien on the property.Answer: BTopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition18) (I) Conventional mortgages are originated by private lending institutions, and FHA or VA loans are originated by the government. (II) Conventional mortgages are insured by private companies, and FHA or VA loans are insured by the government.A) (I) is true, (II) false.B) (I) is false, (II) true.C) Both are true.D) Both are false.Answer: BTopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition19) Borrowers tend to prefer ________ to ________, whereas lenders prefer ________.A) fixed-rate loans; ARMs; fixed-rate loansB) ARMs; fixed-rate loans; fixed-rate loansC) fixed-rate loans; ARMs; ARMsD) ARMs; fixed-rate loans; ARMsAnswer: CTopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition20) (I) ARMs offer lower initial rates and the rate may fall during the life of the loan. (II) Conventional mortgages do not allow a borrower to take advantage of falling interest rates.A) (I) is true, (II) is false.B) (I) is false, (II) is true.C) Both are true.D) Both are false.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition21) Growing-equity mortgages (GEMs)A) help the borrower pay off the loan in a shorter time.B) have such low payments in the first few years that the principal balance increases.C) offer borrowers payments that are initially lower than the payments on aconventional mortgage.D) do all of the above.E) do only A and B of the above.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition22) A borrower with a 30-year loan can create a GEM byA) simply increasing the monthly payments beyond what is required and designating that the excess be applied entirely to the principal.B) converting his ARM into a conventional mortgage.C) converting his conventional mortgage into an ARM.D) converting his conventional mortgage into a GPM.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition23) Which of the following are useful for home buyers who expect their income to rise in the future?A) GPMsB) RAMsC) GEMsD) Only A and B are useful.E) Only A and C are useful.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition24) Which of the following are useful for home buyers who expect their income to fall in the future?A) GPMsB) RAMsC) GEMsD) Only A and B are useful.E) Only A and C are useful.Answer: BTopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition25) Retired people can live on the equity they have in their homes by using aA) GEM.B) GPM.C) SAM.D) RAM.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition26) Second mortgages serve the following purposes:A) they give borrowers a way to use the equity they have in their homes as security for another loan.B) they allow borrowers to get a tax deduction on loans secured by their primary residence or vacation home.C) they allow borrowers to convert their conventional mortgages into GEMs.D) all of the above.E) only A and B of the above.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition27) Which of the following is a disadvantage of a second mortgage compared to credit card debt?A) The loans are secured by the borrower's home.B) The borrower gives up the tax deduction on the primary mortgage.C) The borrower must pay points to get a second mortgage loan.D) The borrower will find it more difficult to qualify for a second mortgage loan.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition28) The share of the mortgage market held by savings and loans isA) over 50 percent.B) approximately 40 percent.C) approximately 20 percent.D) less than 5 percent.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.4 Mortgage-Lending InstitutionsQuestion Status: Updated from Previous Edition29) The share of the mortgage market held by commercial banks is approximatelyA) 50 percent.B) 30 percent.C) 15 percent.D) 5 percent.Answer: BTopic: Chapter 14.4 Mortgage-Lending Institutions Question Status: Updated from Previous Edition30) A loan-servicing agent willA) package the loan for an investor.B) hold the loan in their investment portfolio.C) collect payments from the borrower.D) do both A and C of the above.E) do both B and C of the above.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 14.5 Loan ServicingQuestion Status: Previous Edition31) Distinct elements of a mortgage loan includeA) origination.B) investment.C) servicing.D) all of the above.E) only B and C of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.6 Secondary Mortgage MarketQuestion Status: Previous Edition32) The Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)A) was set up to buy mortgages from thrifts so that these institutions could make more loans.B) funds purchases of mortgages by selling bonds to the public.C) provides insurance for certain mortgage contracts.D) does all of the above.E) does only A and B of the above.Answer: ETopic: Chapter 14.6 Secondary Mortgage MarketQuestion Status: Previous Edition33) The Federal Housing Administration (FHA)A) was set up to buy mortgages from thrifts so that these institutions could make more loans.B) funds purchases of mortgages by selling bonds to the public.C) provides insurance for certain mortgage contracts.D) does all of the above.E) does only A and B of the above.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition34) ________ issues participation certificates, and ________ provides federal insurance for participation certificates.A) Freddie Mac; Freddie MacB) Freddie Mac; Ginnie MaeC) Ginnie Mae; Freddie MacD) Ginnie Mae; Ginnie MaeE) Freddie Mac; no oneAnswer: ETopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition35) REMICs are most likeA) Freddie Mac pass-through securities.B) Ginnie Mae pass-through securities.C) participation certificates.D) collateralized mortgage obligations.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security? Question Status: Previous Edition36) Ginnie MaeA) insures qualifying mortgages.B) insures pass-through certificates.C) insures collateralized mortgage obligations.D) does only A and B. of the above.E) does only B and C of the above.Answer: BTopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security? Question Status: Previous Edition37) Mortgage-backed securitiesA) have been growing in popularity in recent years as institutional investors look for attractive investment opportunities.B) are securities collateralized by a pool of mortgages.C) are securities collateralized by both insured and uninsured mortgages.D) are all of the above.E) are only A and B of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition38) The most common type of mortgage-backed security isA) the mortgage pass-through, a security that has the borrower's mortgage payments pass through the trustee before being disbursed to the investors.B) collateralized mortgage obligations, a security which reduces prepayment risk.C) the participation certificate, a security which passes the borrower's mortgage payments equally among all the owners of the certificates.D) the securitized mortgage, a security which increases the liquidity of otherwise illiquid mortgages.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition39) The interest rate borrowers pay on their mortgages is determined byA) current long-term market rates.B) the term.C) the number of discount points.D) all of the above.Answer: DTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition40) A loan for borrowers who do not qualify for loans at the usual market rate of interest because of a poor credit rating or because the loan is larger than justified by their income isA) a subprime mortgage.B) a securitized mortgage.C) an insured mortgage.D) a graduated-payment mortgage.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition41) The percentage of the total loan paid back immediately when a mortgage loan is obtained, which lowers the annual interest rate on the debt, is calledA) discount points.B) loan terms.C) collateral.D) down payment.Answer: ATopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition42) Which of the following terms are found in mortgage loan contracts to protect the lender from financial loss?A) CollateralB) Down paymentC) Private mortgage insuranceD) All of the aboveAnswer: DTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition43) What factors are used in determining a person's FICO score?A) Past payment historyB) Outstanding debtC) Length of credit historyD) All of the aboveAnswer: DTopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition44) Between 2000 and 2005, home prices increased an average of ________ per year.A) 2%B) 4%C) 8%D) 12%Answer: CTopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: New Question45) From 2000 to 2005, housing prices increased, on average, by over 40%. This run up in prices was caused byA) speculators.B) an increase in subprime loans, which increased demand for new and existing houses.C) both A and B.D) None of the above are correct.Answer: CTopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Updated from Previous Edition14.2 True/False1) In 2012, mortgage loans to farms represented the largest proportion of mortgage lending in the U.S.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.1 What Are Mortgages?Question Status: New Question2) Down payments are designed to reduce the likelihood of default on mortgage loans.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition3) Discount points (or simply points) are interest payments made at the beginning of a loan.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition4) A point on a mortgage loan refers to one monthly payment of principal and interest.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition5) Closing for a mortgage loan refers to the moment the loan is paid off.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition6) Private mortgage insurance is a policy that guarantees to make up any discrepancy between the value of the property and the loan amount, should a default occur.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition7) During the early years of a mortgage loan, the lender applies most of the payment to the principal on the loan.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition8) One important advantage to a borrower who qualifies for an FHA or VA loan is the very low interest rate on the mortgage.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of Mortgages9) Adjustable-rate mortgages generally have lower initial interest rates than fixed-rate mortgages.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition10) Mortgage interest rates loosely track interest rates on three-month Treasury bills.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition11) An advantage of a graduated-payment mortgage is that borrowers will qualify for a larger loan than if they requested a conventional mortgage.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.3 Types of Mortgages12) Nearly half the funds for mortgage lending comes from mortgage pools and trusts.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.4 Mortgage-Lending InstitutionsQuestion Status: Updated from Previous Edition13) Many institutions that make mortgage loans do not want to hold large portfolios of long-term securities, because it would subject them to unacceptably high interest-rate risk.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.4 Mortgage-Lending InstitutionsQuestion Status: Previous Edition14) A problem that initially hindered the marketability of mortgages in a secondary market was that they were not standardized.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.6 Secondary Mortgage MarketQuestion Status: Previous Edition15) Mortgage-backed securities have declined in popularity in recent years as institutional investors have sought higher returns in other markets.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition16) Mortgage-backed securities are marketable securities collateralized by a pool of mortgages.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition17) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together either own or insure the risk on nearly one-fourth of America's residential mortgages.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.4 Mortgage-Lending InstitutionsQuestion Status: Previous Edition18) A FICO score below 660 is considered good while a score above 720 is likely to cause problems in obtaining a loan.Answer: FALSETopic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition19) Subprime loans are those made to borrowers who do not qualify for loans at the usual market rate of interest because of a poor credit rating or because the loan is larger than justified by their income.Answer: TRUETopic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition14.3 Essay1) How has the modern mortgage market changed over recent years?Topic: Chapter 14.1 What Are Mortgages?Question Status: Previous Edition2) Explain the features of mortgage loans that are designed to reduce the likelihood of default.Topic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition3) What are points? What is their purpose?Topic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition4) How does an amortizing mortgage loan differ from a balloon mortgage loan?Topic: Chapter 14.2 Characteristics of the Residential MortgageQuestion Status: Previous Edition5) Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages, from both the lender's and borrower's perspectives, of fixed-rate and adjustable-rate mortgages.Topic: Chapter 14.3 Types of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition6) Why has the online lending market developed in recent years and what are the advantages and disadvantages of this development?Topic: Chapter 14.4 Mortgage-Lending InstitutionsQuestion Status: Previous Edition7) Why may Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pose a threat to the health of the financial system?Topic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition8) What are mortgage-backed securities, why were they developed, whattypes of mortgage-backed securities are there, and how do they work?Topic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: Previous Edition9) What are the benefits and side effects of securitized mortgages?Topic: Chapter 14.7 Securitization of MortgagesQuestion Status: Previous Edition10) Discuss the pros and cons of a subprime market for residential mortgages in the U.S.Topic: Chapter 14.8 What Is a Mortgage-Backed Security?Question Status: New Question。
Big bad banks The winners and losers from bank deregulation in the United States
THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE•VOL.LXV,NO.5•OCTOBER2010Big Bad Banks?The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States THORSTEN BECK,ROSS LEVINE,and ALEXEY LEVKOV∗ABSTRACTWe assess the impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income in the UnitedStates.From the1970s through the1990s,most states removed restrictions onintrastate branching,which intensified bank competition and improved bank per-formance.Exploiting the cross-state,cross-time variation in the timing of branchderegulation,wefind that deregulation materially tightened the distribution of in-come by boosting incomes in the lower part of the income distribution while havinglittle impact on incomes above the median.Bank deregulation tightened the distribu-tion of income by increasing the relative wage rates and working hours of unskilledworkers.I NCOME DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS have played a central—if not the central—role in shaping the policies that governfinancial markets.For in-stance,Thomas Jefferson’s fears that concentrated banking power would help wealthy industrialists at the expense of others spurred him tofight against the Bank of the United States,and similar anxieties fueled Andrew Jackson’s veto of the re-chartering of the Second Bank of the United States(Hammond(1957), Bodenhorn(2003)).During the20th century,politicians in many U.S.states implemented and maintained restrictions on bank branching,arguing that the formation of large banks would disproportionately curtail the economic oppor-tunities of the poor(Southworth(1928),White(1982),Kroszner and Strahan (1999)).And today,in the midst of afinancial crisis,unease about central-ized economic power and growing income inequality have fueled debates about Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the desirability of stiffer regulations onfinancial con-glomerates.1However,while beliefs about the influence offinancial regulations ∗Beck is from CentER,Department of Economics and EBC,Tilburg University;Levine is with the Brown University and NBER;Levkov is with The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.Martin Goetz and Carlos Espina provided exceptional research assistance.We thank an anonymous ref-eree,the Editors,Phil Strahan,and Yona Rubinstein for detailed comments on earlier drafts.We received many helpful comments at the Bank of Israel,Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,Brown University,Boston University,International Monetary Fund,European Central Bank,Georgia State University,New York University,Tilburg University,Vanderbilt University, University of Frankfurt,University of Lausanne,University of Mannheim,University of Virginia, and the World Bank.We are grateful to the Charles G.Koch Charitable Foundation for providing financial support.The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System.1On compensation in thefinancial sector and income inequality in the overall economy,see Philippon and Reshef(2009)and Kaplan and Rauh(2010).Many have recently suggested that16371638The Journal of Finance Ron the distribution of income affect policies,researchers have devoted few re-sources toward evaluating the actual impact offinancial regulations on the distribution of income.In this paper we econometrically evaluate the causal impact of bank regulations on income distribution.Theoretical debates and welfare concerns further motivate our analyses of the distributional effects of bank regulation.If banking is a natural monopoly, then unregulated,monopolistic banks may earn rents through highfixed fees that disproportionately hurt the poor as developed in models by Greenwood and Jovanovic(1990),Banerjee and Newman(1993),and Galor and Zeira(1993). Countervailing arguments,however,challenge the view that restricting the consolidation and expansion of banks will help the poor.Regulatory restrictions on bank mergers,acquisitions,and branching could create and protect local banking monopolies,curtailing competition and raising fees that primarily hurt the poor.In light of this debate,we evaluate whether regulatory restrictions on bank expansion increased,decreased,or had no effect on income inequality. Furthermore,bank regulations could directly affect social welfare by altering the distribution of income.As summarized by Kahneman and Krueger(2006) and Clark,Frijters,and Shields(2008),people care about relative income,as well as absolute income and risk.Thus,understanding the impact offinancial regulations on the distribution of income provides additional information on the welfare implications offinance.More specifically,this paper assesses how branch deregulation altered the distribution of income in the United States.From the1970s through the1990s, most states removed restrictions on intrastate branching,which intensified bank competition and improved bank efficiency and performance(Flannery (1984),Jayaratne and Strahan(1998)).Researchers have examined the im-pact of these reforms on economic growth(Jayaratne and Strahan(1996), Huang(2008)),entrepreneurship(Black and Strahan(2002),Kerr and Nanda (2009)),economic volatility(Morgan,Rime,and Strahan(2004),Demyanyk, Ostergaard,and Sørensen(2007)),and the wage gap between male and female bank executives(Black and Strahan(2001)).In this paper,we provide thefirst evaluation of the impact of branch deregulation on the distribution of income in the overall economy and help resolve a debate about bank deregulation that extends across two centuries.The removal of branching restrictions by states provides a natural setting for identifying and assessing who won and lost from bank deregulation.As shown by Kroszner and Strahan(1999),national technological innovations triggered branch deregulation at the state level.Specifically,(i)the invention of auto-matic teller machines(ATMs),in conjunction with court rulings that ATMs are not bank branches,weakened the geographical bond between customers and banks;(ii)checkable money market mutual funds facilitated banking by mail and telephone,which weakened local bank monopolies;and(iii)improve-ments in communications technology lowered the costs of using distant banks.financial deregulation,including bank branch deregulation,the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,and the accommodating supervisory approach at the Federal Reserve,contributed both to thefinancial crisis and to growing income inequality;see,for example,Moss(2009).Big Bad Banks?1639 These innovations reduced the monopoly power of local banks,weakening their ability and desire tofight against deregulation.Kroszner and Strahan(1999) further show that cross-state variation in the timing of deregulation reflects the interactions of these national technological innovations with pre-existing state-specific conditions.For example,deregulation occurred later in states where politically powerful groups viewed large,multiple-branch banks as po-tentially serious competitors.Moreover,as we demonstrate below,neither the level nor rate of change in the distribution of income before deregulation help predict when a state removed restrictions on bank branching,suggesting that the timing of branch deregulation at the state level is exogenous to the state’s distribution of income.Consequently,we employ a difference-in-differences es-timation methodology that exploits the exogenous cross-state,cross-year vari-ation in the timing of branch deregulation to assess the causal impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income.The paper’s majorfinding is that deregulation of branching restrictions sub-stantively tightened the distribution of income by disproportionately raising incomes in the lower half of the income distribution.While income inequality widened in the overall U.S.economy during the sample period,branch deregu-lation lowered inequality relative to this national trend.Thisfinding is robust to using different measures of income inequality,controlling for time-varying state characteristics,and controlling for both state and yearfixed effects.We find no evidence that reverse causality or prior trends in the distribution of income account for thesefindings.Furthermore,the economic magnitude is consequential.Eight years after deregulation,the Gini coefficient of income in-equality is about4%lower than before deregulation after controlling for state and yearfixed effects.Put differently,deregulation explains about60%of the variation of inequality after controlling for state and yearfixed effects. Removing restrictions on intrastate bank branching reduced inequality by boosting incomes in the lower part of the income distribution,not by shrinking incomes above the median.Deregulation increased the average incomes of the bottom quarter of the income distribution by more than5%,but deregulation did not significantly affect the upper half of the distribution of income.These results are consistent with the view that the removal of intrastate branching restrictions triggered changes in banking behavior that had disproportionately positive repercussions on lower income individuals.To provide additional evidence that bank deregulation tightened the distri-bution of income via changes in bank performance and not through some other mechanism,we show that the impact of deregulation on the distribution of in-come varied across states in a theoretically predictable manner.In particular, if branch deregulation tightened the distribution of income by improving the operation of banks,then deregulation should have had a more pronounced ef-fect on the distribution of income in those states where branching restrictions were particularly harmful to bank operations before deregulation.Based on Kroszner and Strahan(1999),we use four indicators of the degree to which intrastate branching restrictions hurt bank performance prior to deregula-tion.For example,in states with a more geographically diffuse population,1640The Journal of Finance Rbranching restrictions were particularly effective at creating local banking mo-nopolies that hindered bank performance.After deregulating,therefore,we should observe a bigger effect on bank performance in states with more diffuse populations.This is what wefind.Across the four indicators of the cross-state severity of branching restrictions and their impact,wefind that deregulation reduced income inequality more in those states where these branching restric-tions had been particularly harmful to bank operations.Thesefindings increase confidence in the interpretation that deregulation reduced income inequality by enhancing bank performance.Wefinish by conducting a preliminary exploration of three possible explana-tions for the channels underlying thesefindings.We view this component of the analysis as a preliminary exploration because each of these explanations war-rants independent investigation with individual-level longitudinal data sets. Nevertheless,we provide this extension to further motivate and guide future research on the channels linking bank performance and the distribution of income.Thefirst two explanations stress the ability of the poor to access banking services directly.In Galor and Zeira(1993),for example,credit market imper-fections prevent the poor from borrowing to invest more in education,which hinders their access to higher paying jobs.Deregulation that eases these credit constraints,therefore,allows lower income individuals to invest more in edu-cation,reducing inequality.A second explanation focuses on the ability of the poor to become entrepreneurs.In Banerjee and Newman(1993),financial im-perfections are particularly binding on the poor because they lack collateral and because their incomes are relatively low compared to thefixed costs of obtaining bank loans.Thus,deregulation that improves bank performance by lowering collateral requirements and borrowing costs will disproportionately benefit the poor by expanding their access to bank credit.A third explanation highlights the response offirms to the lower interest rates triggered by deregulation,rather than stressing increased access to credit by lower income individuals.While the drop in the cost of capital encourages firms to substitute capital for labor,the cost reduction also increases production, boosting the demand for capital and labor.On net,if the drop in the cost of capital increases the demand for labor and this increase falls disproportionately on lower income workers,then deregulation could reduce inequality by affecting firms’demand for labor.Although branch deregulation stimulated entrepreneurship and increased education,our results suggest that deregulation reduced income inequality primarily by boosting the relative demand for low-skilled workers.More specifi-cally,deregulation dramatically increased the rate of new incorporations(Black and Strahan(2002))and the rates of entry and exit of nonincorporatedfirms (Kerr and Nanda(2009)).However,the reduction in total income inequality is fully accounted for by a reduction in earnings inequality among salaried employees,not by a movement of lower income workers into higher paying self-employed activities or by a change in income differentials among the self-employed.Furthermore,the self-employed account for only about9%of the working age population,and this percentage did not change significantly afterBig Bad Banks?1641 deregulation.On education,Levine and Rubinstein(2009)find that the fall in interest rates caused by bank deregulation reduced high school dropout rates in lower income households.Yet,changes in educational attainment do not ac-count for the reduction in income inequality triggered by branch deregulation during our sample period.Rather,consistent with the view that bank dereg-ulation increased the relative demand for low-income workers,wefind that deregulation increased the relative wages and relative working hours of un-skilled workers,thus accounting for a tightening of income distribution.Beyond the increase in the relative wages and working hours of low-income workers, bank deregulation also lowered the unemployment rate,further emphasizing the labor demand channel.This paper relates to policy debates concerning the currentfinancial crisis and the role offinancial markets in promoting economic development.First, the international policy community increasingly emphasizes the benefits of providing the poor with greater access tofinancial services as a vehicle for fighting poverty and reducing inequality.In a broad cross-section of countries, Beck,Demirguc-Kunt,and Levine(2007)find that an overall index of banking sector development is associated with a reduction in income inequality across countries,but they do not analyze the impact of a specific,exogenous policy change.Burgess and Pande(2005)find that when India reformed its banking laws to provide the poor with greater access tofinancial services,this policy change reduced poverty by boosting wages in rural areas.Ourfindings also suggest thatfinancial development might help the poor primarily by intensi-fying competition and boosting wage earnings,not by increasing the income of the poor from self-employment.Second,given the severity of the globalfinancial crisis,many governments are re-evaluating their approaches to bank regulation.Many economists and policymakers stress the potential dangers offinancial deregulation.Though our work does not examine the current crisis,the results do indicate that regulations that impeded competition among banks during the20th century were disproportionately harmful to lower income individuals,which should not be ignored as countries rethink and redesign their regulatory systems.The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.Section I describes the data and econometric methodology.Section II provides the core results,while Section III provides further evidence on how deregulation influences labor mar-ket conditions.Section IV concludes.I.Data and MethodologyTo assess the effect of branch deregulation on income distribution,we gather data on the timing of deregulation,income distribution,and other banking sec-tor and state-level characteristics.This section presents the data and describes the econometric methods.A.Branch DeregulationHistorically,most U.S.states had restrictions on branching within and across state borders.With regards to intrastate branching restrictions,most states1642The Journal of Finance Rallowed bank holding companies to own separately capitalized and licensed banks throughout a state.Other states were“unit banking states,”in which each bank was typically permitted to operate only one office.Beginning in the early1970s,states started relaxing these restrictions,al-lowing bank holding companies to consolidate subsidiaries into branches and permitting de novo branching throughout the state.This deregulation led to significant entry into local banking markets(Amel and Liang(1992)),consolida-tion of smaller banks into large bank holding companies(Savage(1993),Calem (1994)),and conversion of existing bank subsidiaries into branches(McLaughin (1995)).This relaxation,however,came gradually,with the last states lifting restrictions following the1994passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act.Consistent with Jayaratne and Strahan(1996)and others,we choose the date of deregulation as the date on which a state permitted branching via merg-ers and acquisitions(M&As)through the holding company structure,which was thefirst step in the deregulation process,followed by de novo branch-ing.In the Internet Appendix(an Internet Appendix for this article is avail-able online in the“Supplements and Datasets”section at / supplements.asp)we present the deregulation dates.Twelve states deregulated before the start of our sample period in1976.Arkansas,Iowa,and Minnesota were the last states to deregulate,only after the passage of the Riegle-Neal Act in1994.We have data for50states and the District of Columbia.Consis-tent with the literature on branch deregulation,we drop Delaware and South Dakota because the structure of their banking systems was heavily affected by laws that made them centers for the credit card industry.Over this period,states also deregulated restrictions on interstate banking by allowing bank holding companies to expand across state borders.We con-firm this paper’s results using the date of interstate deregulation instead of the date of intrastate deregulation.However,when we simultaneously control for inter-and intrastate bank deregulation,wefind that only intrastate deregu-lation enters significantly.Thus,we focus on intrastate rather than interstate deregulation throughout the remainder of this paper.B.Income Distribution DataInformation on the distribution of income comes from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey(CPS),which is an annual survey of about 60,000households across the United States.The CPS is a repeated,representa-tive sampling of the population,but it does not trace individuals over time.The CPS provides information on total personal income,wage and salary income (earnings),proprietor income,income from other sources,and a wide array of demographic characteristics in the year prior to the survey.Most importantly for our study,we start with the1977survey because the exact state of residence is unavailable prior to this survey.Each individual in the CPS is assigned a probability sampling weight corresponding to his or her representativeness in the population.We use sampling weights in all our analyses.Big Bad Banks?1643 We measure the distribution of income for each state and year over the pe-riod1976to2006in four ways.First,the Gini coefficient of income distribution is derived from the Lorenz rger values of the Gini coefficient imply greater income inequality.The Gini coefficient equals zero if everyone receives the same income,and equals one if a single individual receives all of the econ-omy’s income.We present results with both the natural logarithm of the Gini coefficient as well as the logistic transformation of the Gini coefficient(logis-tic Gini)in the regression analyses.While using the logistic Gini does bound the minimum value at zero,using the log of Gini allows one to interpret the regression coefficient as a percentage change.Our second measure of income distribution is the Theil index,which is also increasing in the degree of income inequality.If all individuals receive the same income,the Theil index equals zero,while the Theil index equals Ln(N)if one individual receives all of the economy’s income,where N equals the number of individuals.An advantage of the Theil index is that it is computationally easy to decompose the index into that part of inequality accounted for by differences in income between groups in the sample and that part of inequality accounted for by differences within each group.Third,we examine the difference between the natural logarithm of incomes of those at the90th percentile and those at the10th percentile (Log(90/10)).Finally,we use the difference between the natural logarithm of incomes of those at the75th percentile and those at the25th percentile((Log (75/25)).The Internet Appendix provides more detailed information on the construction of these income distribution indicators.Consistent with studies of the bor market,our main sample includes prime-age(age25to54)civilians that have nonnegative personal income,and excludes(i)individuals with missing observations on key variables(education, demographics,etc.),(ii)individuals with total personal income below the1st or above the99th percentile of the distribution of income,(iii)people living in group quarters,(iv)individuals who receive zero income and live in house-holds with zero or negative income from all sources of income,and(v)a few individuals for whom the CPS assigns a zero(or missing)sampling weight.As discussed below,the results are robust to relaxing these standard definitions of the relevant labor market.The Internet Appendix provides details on the construction of the sample.There are1,859,411individuals in our sample.The average age in the sample is38years,49%are female,and75%are white,non-Hispanic individuals.In the sample,49%have a high school degree or less,while27%graduated from college.Only9%of the individuals report being self-employed(entrepreneurs). In the Internet Appendix,we present basic descriptive statistics on thefive measures of income inequality,which are measured at the state-year level.In particular,we have data for the31years between1976and2006and for48 states plus the District of Columbia.Thus,there are1,519state-year observa-tions.Besides providing information on the means of the inequality indicators and their minimum and maximum values,we also present three types of stan-dard deviations of the natural logarithms of the inequality indexes:cross-state, within-state,and within state-year.The cross-state standard deviation of Y is1644The Journal of Finance Rthe standard deviation of(Y st−˜Y s),where˜Y s is the average value of Y in state s over the sample period.The within-state standard deviation of Y is the standard deviation of(Y st−˜Y t),where˜Y t is the average value of Y in year t. The within state-year standard deviation of Y is the standard deviation of (Y st−˜Y s−˜Y t),where˜Y s is the average value of Y in state s and˜Y t is the average value of Y in year t.These standard deviations help in assessing the economic magnitude of the impact of bank branch deregulation on the distri-bution of income.C.Control V ariablesTo control for time-varying changes in a state’s economy,we use U.S.Depart-ment of Commerce data to calculate the growth rate of per capita Gross State Product(GSP).We also control for the unemployment rate,obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,and a number of state-specific,time-varying socio-demographic characteristics,including the percentage of high school dropouts, the proportion of blacks,and the proportion of female-headed households.We also test whether the impact of deregulation on income inequality varies in a predictable way with different state characteristics at the time of dereg-ulation.As we discuss below,we control for the interaction of branch dereg-ulation with a unit banking indicator,the small bank share,the smallfirm share,and population dispersion.The unit banking indicator equals one if the state had unit banking restrictions prior to deregulation and zero otherwise. The following states had unit banking before deregulation:Arizona,Colorado, Florida,Illinois,Iowa,Kansas,Minnesota,Missouri,Montana,Nebraska, North Dakota,Oklahoma,Texas,West Virginia,Wisconsin,and Wyoming.The small bank share equals the fraction of banking assets in the state that are held by banks with assets below the median size bank of each state,while the smallfirm share equals the proportion of all establishments operating in a state with fewer than20employees.Data on the smallfirm share and small bank share are from Kroszner and Strahan(1999).Population dispersion equals one divided by population per square mile,which is obtained from the U.S.Census Bureau.D.MethodologyWe use a difference-in-differences specification to assess the relation between branch deregulation and income distribution,based on the following regression set-up:Y st=α+βD st+δX st+A s+B t+εst,s=1,...,49;t=1976, (2006)(1) In equation(1),Y st is a measure of income distribution in state s in year t, A s and B t are vectors of state and year dummy variables that account for state and yearfixed effects,X st is a set of time-varying state-level variables,andεstBig Bad Banks?1645 is the error term.The variable of interest is D st,a dummy variable that equals one in the years after state s deregulates and zero otherwise.The coefficient,β, therefore indicates the impact of branch deregulation on income distribution.A positive and significantβsuggests that deregulation exerts a positive effect on the degree of income inequality,while a negative and significantβindicates that deregulation pushed income inequality lower.In total,we have data for 48states plus the District of Columbia,over31years,so the1,519state-year observations serve as the basis for much of our analysis.The difference-in-differences estimation technique allows us to control for omitted variables.We include year-specific dummy variables to control for nation-wide shocks and trends that shape income distribution over time,such as business cycles,national changes in regulations and laws,long-term trends in income distribution,and changes in female labor force participation.We in-clude state-specific dummy variables to control for time-invariant,unobserved state characteristics that shape income distribution across states.We estimate equation(1)allowing for state-level clustering of the errors,that is allowing for correlation in the error terms over time within states.2II.Branch Deregulation and Income DistributionA.Preliminary ResultsOur empirical analysis rests on the assumption that the cross-state tim-ing of bank branch deregulation was unaffected by the distribution of income. Figure1shows that neither the level of the Gini coefficient before deregula-tion nor its rate of change prior to deregulation explains the timing of branch deregulation.In a regression of the year of deregulation on the average Gini coefficient before deregulation or on the rate of change of the Gini coefficient in the years before deregulation,the t-statistic on the inequality indicators is 0.20and–1.16,respectively.Additional evidence that income inequality did not affect the timing of branch deregulation emerges from a hazard model study of deregulation.Following Kroszner and Strahan(1999),Table I reports tests of whether the Gini coef-ficient of income inequality influences the likelihood that a state deregulates in a specific year given that it has not deregulated yet.While the Kroszner and Strahan(1999)sample period starts in1970,we do not have Gini data available before1976.Also,since we use the original Kroszner and Strahan 2In robustness tests,reported in the Internet Appendix,we confirm the results using both boot-strapped standard errors and seemingly unrelated regression(SUR)standard errors.Bootstrapped standard errors are calculated using the following procedure:First,we take a random sample of 1,519state-year observations from our data and calculate the impact of deregulation on income in-equality while accounting for state and yearfixed effects.The sample size is done with replacement such that a certain state in a certain year may appear several times.We take500such samples and estimate the impact of deregulation on income inequality500times.The standard deviation of the resulting estimates is the bootstrapped standard error.Second,following Bekaert,Harvey, and Lundblad(2005),we estimate SUR standard errors,restricting the off-diagonal elements of the weighting matrix to be identical.。
哥伦比亚大学佩里梅林货币银行学中英翻译4-微观和宏观的货币观
The Money View, Micro and Macro微观和宏观的货币观(see full matrix at beginning) Notable features—household deleveraging, switching from credit to money, instrument discrepancy is repo, sectoral discrepancies(⻅开始的完整矩阵)显着特征——家庭去杠杆化,信贷向货币的转变,回购⼯具分化,部⻔分化Last time we saw how the US banking system was born from the strains of war finance andfinancial crisis, and we also saw how understanding balance sheet relationships can help us to understand the underlying processes. Today we focus more specifically on the balance sheet approach that will be used throughout the course, and to aid that focus we confine our discussion to the most placid of events, namely the use of the banking system to facilitate ordinary daily exchange.上⼀次,我们看到了美国银⾏体系是如何在战争⾦融和⾦融危机的压⼒下诞⽣的,我们还看到了理解资产负债表的关系如何帮助我们理解基本流程。
今天,我们将更具体地关注在整个课程中使⽤的资产负债表⽅法,为了有助于集中精⼒,我们将讨论限制在最普遍的事件上,即使⽤银⾏系统促进⽇常交易。
农行笔试题目及答案英语
农行笔试题目及答案英语一、选择题(每题2分,共20分)1. The English word "bank" originally means:A. River bankB. A place to store moneyC. A financial institutionD. A building答案:A2. Which of the following is NOT a function of a bank?A. Accepting depositsB. Lending moneyC. Providing insuranceD. Offering credit cards答案:C3. The term "interest" in banking refers to:A. The cost of borrowing moneyB. The amount of money depositedC. The place where money is exchangedD. The value of money over time答案:A4. What is the primary goal of a commercial bank?A. To make a profitB. To provide services to the publicC. To support the governmentD. To regulate the economy答案:A5. The abbreviation "ATM" stands for:A. Automated Teller MachineB. Advanced Technology ModelC. Account Transfer ModuleD. Asset Tracking Module答案:A6. Which of the following is a type of investment product offered by banks?A. Savings accountB. Certificate of depositC. Credit cardD. Loan答案:B7. The process of transferring money from one bank to another is called:A. WithdrawalB. DepositC. TransferD. Exchange答案:C8. What does "NPL" stand for in banking?A. Non-Performing LoanB. New Product LaunchC. National Payment LicenseD. National Pension Law答案:A9. The term "forex" is short for:A. Foreign ExchangeB. Financial ExchangeC. Forward ExchangeD. Fixed Exchange答案:A10. Which of the following is NOT a risk associated with banking?A. Credit riskB. Market riskC. Operational riskD. Environmental risk答案:D二、填空题(每空1分,共10分)11. The basic function of a bank is to act as a _______ between savers and borrowers.答案:intermediary12. When a bank lends money, it usually charges a _______ to the borrower.答案:fee13. The _______ rate is the interest rate at which banks lend to each other.答案:federal funds14. A _______ is a document that proves the ownership of a certain amount of money in a bank.答案: check15. The _______ is the central bank of the People's Republic of China.答案: People's Bank of China16. Banks use _______ to manage the credit risk associated with lending.答案: credit scoring17. The _______ is a type of financial derivative used to hedge against currency risk.答案: forward contract18. A _______ is a type of loan that is secured by real estate.答案: mortgage19. The _______ is a measure of the amount of money that is circulating in an economy.答案: money supply20. The _______ is the process of converting a currency from one country to another.答案: exchange三、简答题(每题5分,共10分)21. What are the main types of accounts offered by banks?答案:Banks typically offer various types of accounts, including checking accounts, savings accounts, money market accounts, and certificates of deposit.22. Explain the concept of compound interest.答案:Compound interest is the interest on a loan or deposit calculated on the initial principal and also on the accumulated interest of previous periods, resulting ininterest being added to the total amount that will earn additional interest.四、论述题(每题15分,共30分)23. Discuss the role of banks in the economy.答案:Banks play a crucial role in the economy by facilitating the flow of funds from savers to investors, providing payment services, offering credit to businesses and consumers, and helping to manage the country's money supply and interest rates.24. Explain the importance of bank regulation and supervision.答案:Bank regulation and supervision are essential to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial system. They help to prevent bank failures, protect depositors' funds, and maintain public confidence in the banking system.Regulators set rules for banks to follow, monitor their activities, and intervene when necessary to correct problems.五、案例分析题(共30分)25. A customer deposits $10,000 into a savings account with an annual interest rate。
信任市场参与和投资收益的关系研究
信任、市场参与和投资收益的关系研究崔巍【内容提要】本文采用Sapienza等的实验方法,对信任进行经济学诠释,并首次将信任区分为普遍的社会信任和金融市场中的特殊信任即金融信任,探讨信任水平对金融市场参与和投资收益的影响。
研究发现:社会信任水平越高,金融市场的参与程度就越高;个人投资者的投资收益和其金融信任水平之间是存在峰度的倒U型关系,在金融信任较低的范围内,投资收益随着信任水平的提高而提高,在达到最大化后,投资收益随着信任的继续提高而显著下降。
【关键词】市场参与投资收益一引言信任作为一种社会资本在经济活动中具有重要意义。
早在亚当。
斯密时代,信任的重要性就引起了人们的关注,但直到20世纪中后期,随着新制度经济学派的兴起,人们才逐渐认识到交易成本、不完全信息以及社会和文化等因素对经济发展的重要作用,并开始从社会资本的角度对信任进行系统性研究。
近年来,有关信任的研究备受国内外经济学者的关注,并有大量研究成果问世。
在信任与经济发展之间的关系研究方面,Arrow(1972)认为信任是社会经济建立和运作的润滑剂,全球范围内经济发展的滞后大都源于相互信任的缺失。
Knack和Keefer(1997)认为包括信任和道德规范在内的社会资本对一个国家或地区的经济发展有重要影响。
在国民收入较高和收入较平等的国家,信任水平和道德规范程度比较高,经济活动的成本比较低。
信任每提高1个标准差会带来1.15%的经济增长和2.04%的投资水平增加。
Zak和Knack(2001)通过建立经济增长的一般均衡模型,解释了不同国家间信任水平的差异,探讨了信任对经济增长的影响机制。
较低的信任水平会降低投资率和经济增长率,甚至会使经济陷入贫困性陷阱。
福山(1998)认为社会信任是文化对经济的影响途径和表现形式,它可以直接影响到社会经济实体的规模、组织方式、交易范围和形式,以及社会中非直接生产性寻利活动的规模和强度。
Cabon-Dhersin和Ramani(2004)通过构建非合作博弈模型探讨了信任对研发(R&D)的影响,发现在合作式R&D中较高水平的相互信任有助于合作双方结成R&D联盟。
雅思阅读文章《汇丰银行缩减运营成本》
雅思阅读文章《汇丰银行缩减运营成本》雅思的阅读理解出题内容广泛,唯一可以确定的就是会涉及一些重要的社会现实新闻。
下面为大家送上一篇2017年雅思阅读文章,欢迎阅读。
One of the world's biggest banks, HSBC, has announced the first details of a major cost-cutting exercise. It's to sell its businesses in Brazil and Turkey, reduce its asset base and shrink its investment bank. Kamal Ahmed reports.“Europe's largest bank has announced that it wants to be significantly smaller. HSBC has revealed that its UK operations will be hit hard as it battles to find over 3.2 billion pounds of cost-savings. Stuart Gulliver, the bank's chief executive, said that it was time to recognize the world had changed, and the growth in Asia had to be the new focus. The bank is selling businesses in Turkey and Brazil, and will look to reduce the value of its risky assets by 290 billion pounds. HSBC also said that it will make a decision on whether it will retain its headquarters in London by the end of the year.”The Islamic State group has created a network of booby-traps, tunnels and barricades in Mosul to defend the Iraqi city against an offensive by government forces. A BBC investigation into life there one year after its capture by IS has found that the group now controls most aspects of life, from dress codes to schools, which residents say have been used to indoctrinate children. Mahmud spoke to the BBC.“I came home one day and saw my little brother drawing their Islamic State's flag and humming one of their chants. I went crazy, I took the drawing and tore it to pieces. We immediately removed him from school, as we'd rather he has no education at all than one such as IS is trying to spread. I’ve come to the conclusion that the goal of this organization is to plant the seed of violence, hate and sectarianisminto children's minds.”The Hong Kong government has issued a red alert against travel to South Korea because of the outbreak of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome there. The warning advises against all non-essential travel, and indicates that the authorities believe visiting South Korea couldpose a significant threat. The Health Ministry in Seoul says that seven people have now died from the outbreak of the respiratory disease.A judge in the United States has ordered the release of Albert Woodfox, the last of the so-called “Angola Three” sti ll in prison. Woodfox has been in solitary confinement for 43 years after the killing of a guard at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in 1972. Richard Hulls reports.“Campaigners for the ‘Angola Three’ have always maintained there was no physical evidence to link them to the crime and all convictions have been overturned on numerous occasions. In his ruling, the judge said Albert Woodfox's poor health and the length of the time spent in solitary confinement had contributed to the decision to free him. No man in the US has ever spent as much time in solitary confinement as he has. With the exception of a six-month period in a secure dormitory in 2008, Albert Woodfox has spent all of the past 43 years incarcerated on his own.”词汇解释:1.booby-trap n.饵雷 v.在微开的门上放一东西以惊打来人;设诡雷,布陷阱Police were checking the area for booby traps.警察在这一地区搜索饵雷。
中国银行业竞争有效性的实证研究
中国银行业竞争有效性的实证研究摘要:以中国14家银行1995—2006年的一组数据为样本,利用非结构方法建立Panzar-Rosse模型对我国商业银行竞争的有效性进行了实证研究。
研究结果表明:我国商业银行市场结构表现出垄断竞争的特点,但是竞争程度与国外银行市场结构相比还相对较低。
我国应通过增强市场准入的适度性、提高监管的专业性和有效性等措施,促进我国银行业的高效稳健发展。
关键词:银行业;竞争有效性;市场结构;Panzar-Rosse模型Abstract: Investigates empirically the competitive conditions forChina’s bankin g industry over the period from 1995 to 2006,with thedata of China’s 14 comme rcial banks taken as samples. The Panzar-Rosse model is redeveloped on the b asis of nonstructural estimation,and the results indicate that China’s bankin g industry operatesunder a monopolistic competition that is weaker in competit ive edgein comparison with other countries. It is suggested that Chinashouldimprove the approval system of market access and enhance the effectiveness of pr ofessional supervision to promote the healthy andefficient development of her b anking industry.Key words:banking industry; effective competition; marketstructure; Panzar-Rosse model自从1995年《商业银行法》颁布以来,我国银行业改革取得了较大突破,特别是加入世贸组织以后,随着银行相关管制的放松和创新步伐的加快,银行业的竞争程度不断提高。
经济学毕业论文英文文献及翻译1
The green barrier to free tradeC. P. ChandrasekharJayati GhoshAs the March 31 deadline for completing the "modalities" stage of the proposed new round of negotiations on global agricultural trade nears, hopes of an agreement are increasingly waning. In this edition of Macroscan, C. P. Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh examine the factors and the players constraining the realisation of such an agreement.AT THE END of the latest round of meetings of the agricultural negotiations committee of the WTO, the optimism that negotiators would meet the March 31 deadline for working out numerical targets, formulas and other "modalities" through which countries can frame their liberalisation commitments in a new full-fledged round of trade negotiations has almost disappeared. That target was important for two reasons.First, it is now becoming clear, that even more than was true during the Uruguay Round, forging an agreement in the agricultural area is bound to prove extremely difficult.Progress in the agricultural negotiations was key to persuading the unconvinced that a new `Doha Round' of trade negotiations is useful and feasible.Second, the Doha declaration made agricultural negotiations one part of a `single undertaking' to be completed by January 1, 2005. That is, in a take `all-or-nothing' scheme, countries had to arrive at, and be bound by, agreements in all areas in which negotiations were to be initiated in the new round. This means that if agreement is not worked out with regard to agriculture, there would be no change in the multilateral trade regime governing industry, services or related areas and no progress in new areas, such as competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement, all of which are crucial to the economic agenda of the developed countries.The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime.There are substantial differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich and the powerful disagree, a global consensus is not easy to come by.But that is not all. Even if an agreement is stitched up between the rich nations, through manoeuvres such as the Blair House accord, getting the rest of the world to go along would be more difficult this time.This is because the outcomes in the agricultural trade area since the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) began have fallen far short of expectations. In the course of Round, advocates of the UR regime had promised global production adjustments that would increase the value of world agricultural trade and an increase in developing country share of such trade.As Chart 1 shows, global production volumes continued to rise after 1994 when the implementation of the Uruguay Round began, with signs of tapering off only in 2000 and 2001. As is widely known, this increase in production occurred in the developed countries as well.Not surprisingly, therefore, the volume of world trade continued to rise as well after 1994 (Chart 2). The real shift occurred in agricultural prices which, after some buoyancy between 1993and 1995, have declined thereafter, and particularly sharply after 1997. It is this decline in unit values that resulted in a situation where the value of world trade stagnated and then declined after 1995, when the implementation of the Uruguay Round began.As Table 1 shows, there was a sharp fall in the rate of growth of global agricultural trade between the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, with the decline in growth in the 1990s being due to the particularly poor performance during the 1998 to 2001 period.Price declines and stagnation in agricultural trade values in the wake of the UR Agreement on Agriculture were accompanied and partly influenced by the persisting regionalisation of world agricultural trade.The foci of such regionalisation were Western Europe and Asia, with 32 and 11 per cent of global agricultural trade being intra-Western European and intra-Asian trade respectively (Chart 3). What is noteworthy, however, is that agricultural exports accounted for a much higher share of both merchandise and primary products trade in North America and Western Europe (besides Latin America and Africa) than it did for Asia.Thus, despite being the developed regions of the world, agricultural production and exports were important influences on the economic performance of North America and Western Europe.It is, therefore, not surprising that Europe is keen on maintaining its agricultural sector through protection, while the US is keen on expanding its role in world agricultural markets by subsidising its own farmers and forcing other countries to open up their markets. The problem is that the US has been more successful in prising open developing country markets than the large EU market.Thus, out of $104 billion worth of exports from North America in 2001, $34 billion went to Asia and $15 billion to Latin America, whereas exports to Europe amounted to $14 billion.The Cairns group of exporting countries (Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand and Uruguay), for some of whom at least agricultural exports are extremely important, want world market to be freed of protection as well as the surpluses that result from huge domestic support in the US and the EC.We must note that $35 billion of the $63 billion of exports from Latin America went to the US and the EU. More open markets and less domestic support in those destinations is, therefore, crucial for the region.The fact that Europe has been successful in its effort at retaining its agricultural space with the help of a Common Agricultural Policy that both supports and subsidises its agricultural producers is clear from Chart 4, which shows that intra-EC trade which accounted for 74 per cent of EU exports in 1990, continued to account for 73 per cent of total EU exports in 1995 and 2001.But North America, with far fewer countries in its fold, has also been quite insular. Close to a third of North American exports are inter-regional. Little has changed since the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.It is widely accepted that three sets of actors account for this failure of the AoA:First, in order to push through an agreement when there were signs that the Uruguay Round was faltering, the liberalisation of agricultural trade in the developed countries was not pushed far enough;Second, is the ability to use "loopholes", especially those in the form of inadequately well-defined Green and Blue Box measures, in the AoA, to continue to support and protect farmers on the grounds that such support was non-trade distorting; andFinally, there are violations of even the lax UR rules in the course of implementation, which have been aided by the failure of the agreement to ensure transparency in implementation.Not surprisingly, some countries, especially the Cairns group of exporting countries, have proposed an ambitious agenda of liberalisation in the agricultural area.Tariffs are to be reduced sharply, using the "Swiss formula", which would ensure that the proportionate reduction in the tariffs imposed by a country would be larger, the higher is the prevailing bound or applied tariff in that country.中文翻译:题目:自由贸易中的绿色壁垒作者:C. P. Chandrasekhar 、Jayati Ghosh在A完自由化的承诺在其最新一轮会议的农业谈判委员会,世界贸易组织,乐观地认为,谈判的框架将在3月31日最后期限为制定数字指标,公式和其他“方式,哪些国家可以”通过新的全面谈判回合贸易几乎已经消失。
对西班牙银行业的竞争力检测:Panzar-Rosse方法回顾【外文翻译】
外文翻译Testing For Competition In The Spanish Banking Industry: The Panzar-Rosse Approach RevisitedMaterial Source:Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE) Author: Luis Gutiérrez de Rozas1.IntroductionCompetition has become a recurrent topic in the banking literature.Specifically, during the last decade a great deal of empirical work has attempted to measure the level of competition prevailing in European banking markets. The beginning of the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union, in January 1999, and the projected changeover to the euro triggered the interest of researchers in this issue.The initial purpose was to explore the impact of European policy actions aimed to create a level-playing-field in the provision of financial services. The transformation of the European Union's financial landscape was expected to unleash competitive forces in the banking industry, boost the scope of desintermediation and securitisation, foster cross-border capital flows and prompt the restructuring and consolidation processes.Another stimulus which made researchers draw attention on this issue stems from industrial organization(IO)theory. In particular, the conventional view which holds that increasing concentration may lead to undesirable exercise of market power, i.e. that concentration impairs competition, has been subject to an enormous amount of controversy.The IO theory on competition is usually divided into two major streams, namely the structural and non-structural approaches. The former embraces the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis(EH).The SCP, originally due to Bain(1951),investigates whether high levels of market concentration result in collusive behavior and other non-competitive practices among larger firms. The simplest procedure to test the SCP paradigm consists in regressing a measure of the firms' profitability on a proxy for market concentration. A positive coefficient is expected to arise in order to validate this hypothesis as it would imply that higher concentration goes hand in hand with higher market power.On the other hand, the EH, which stems from Demsetz(1973)andPeltzman(1977), states that efficient firms increase in size and, therefore, in market share due to their ability to generate higher profits, leading to higher market concentration. Under the EH there is no direct relationship between competition and concentration, and a highly concentrated sector is the logical outcome of market forces.The banking literature has now advanced well past this simple approaches. In reaction to the theoretical and empirical shortcomings attributed to the structural stream, namely the recognition of the need to endogenize market structure, three non-structural models of competitive behavior have been developed within the emerging New Empirical Industrial Organization(NEIO)framework. These models, which measure competition and emphasize the analysis of the competitive conduct of firms without using explicit information about the structure of the market, belong to Iwata(1974),Bresnahan(1982)and Lau(1982), and Panzar and Rosse(1987).These models have an important feature in common, they measure competition by estimating deviation from competitive pricing.The Iwata model consists in the estimation of conjectural variation values for individual firms supplying an homogeneous product in an oligopolistic market. The Bresnahan-Lau model comes down to the estimation of a simultaneous equation system where a parameter representing the degree of market power of firms is included. Both the Iwata and the Bresnahan-Lau models have scarcely been applied for empirical purposes. For instance, the Iwata measure has only been applied once to banking by Shaffer and DiSalvo(1994).Their main drawback relies on their data-intensiveness.By contrast, the third approach has received widespread acceptance by the academic community. The Panzar-Rosse model builds a competition indicator, the so-called H-statistic, which provides a quantitative assessment of the competitive nature of a market. The H-statistic is calculated from reduced-form revenue equations and measures the elasticity of total revenues with respect to changes in factor input prices. Panzar and Rosse showed that, under certain assumptions, the comparative static properties of this type of equations provide a proxy for the overall level of competition prevailing in the market.Last, but not least, other reasons underlying the awakening of competition analyses in banking economics have to do with the safety and soundness of financial systems, as an adequate degree of competition and concentration is supposed to safeguard financial stability. Indeed, it has become a matter of prime interest amongcentral bank regulators and supervisors, who are in need of devices for monitoring the evolution of banking competition.Despite the great number of investigations devoted to the topic, it should be underlined that evidence is still rather mixed. The bulk of empirical studies report the existence of monopolistic competition for every single country under consideration(including Spain), albeit to varying degrees. In this context, the main purpose of this article is to contribute to the ongoing debate over this issue and to cast some light on the Spanish case by means of the Panzar-Rosse approach.The current paper draws upon a comprehensive bank-level dataset of Spanish depositary institutions covering an extensive twenty-year-long period(from 1986 to 2005). Two different econometric techniques are performed in order to exploit both the cross-sectional and time-series dimensions of the panel data, and, thus, ensure a robust assessment of the overall level of competition prevailing in the Spanish banking industry. Standard estimates reveal a hump-shaped profile for the H-statistic, within the upper monopolistic competition range. Subsequently, the analysis is sharpened with a weighted procedure which accounts for differences in firm size and the number of branches. A reinforced level of increasing competition is the main finding within this setting.The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses several views on the production process of banking firms in order to set the stage for the theoretical framework of the Panzar-Rosse approach, which is described in Section 3.A brief survey of the literature on this particular methodology is presented in Section4. Section 5 provides an overview of the dataset. The empirical model employed in the analysis is presented in Section 6. Afterwards, estimation results are reported in Section 7.The final section offers a brief summary and outlines some competition policy implications.2. A Primer in the Theory of Banks' ActivitiesBefore entering the analysis of the methodology put forward by Panzar and Rosse it is worth devoting a couple of pages to review the different approaches of banks' activities which have been developed within the industrial organization framework. Indeed, several assumptions about banks' production activities have to be made in order to transfer the NEIO approaches from classical industries to banking sectors, since the latter are only to a limited extent comparable to other kind of firms.Even though several attempts have intended to model the role played by banksas economic and production units of the economy, the lack of agreement concerning the appropriate delineation of output and inputs for banking firms has a long history and still remains as a controversial issue that plagues all bank studies. Briefly, the vast literature carried out in this field may be divided, according to Colwell and Davis(1992), into two separate branches: the production approach(PA) and the intermediation approach(IA). Both approaches apply the classical microeconomic theory of the firm, but differ in the specification of banks' activities.The PA, set forth by Benston(1965)and Bell and Murphy(1968), posits that banks are devoted to the production of services to depositors and borrowers using labor and physical capital as factor inputs. This approach explicitly recognizes the multiproduct nature of banking firms.A challenging point of view comes from the IA, as it holds that deposits and loans have different characteristics. While the former are presented as divisible, liquid, short-term and riskless assets, the latter are described as being indivisible, illiquid, long-term and risky. Besides, the total amount of loans granted by a certain bank may not equal the total amount of deposits collected, as it can adjust its surplus or deficit of funds at the interbank market. For these reasons, and in order to highlight the transformation activity carried out by banks, the IA posits that banks produce loans using labor, physical capital and financial capital (deposits plus funds borrowed in the financial markets)as inputs.Several tests addressing whether deposits are best characterized as outputs or inputs have been posed. For instance, Hancock(1991)provides an interesting study based on the' user cost methodology'. This author regresses banks' profits on the real balances of banks' balance sheet items. Those balance sheet items exhibiting positive coefficients are asummed to correspond to outputs, whereas variables reporting negative coefficients are associated with inputs. Hancock's inquiry reveals that both loans and deposits deserve the consideration of outputs. Thus, her findings are in line with the production approach.Nonetheless, Hughes and Mester(1993)developed another test consisting in the estimation of a variable cost function with fixed levels of deposits. They find that the derivatives of this function are negative, which they interpret to mean that deposits are inputs, as an increase in the level of one input, ceteris paribus, ought to be linked to a reduction in the amount of money spent on other inputs. In a more recent study, Hughes, Mester and Moon(2001)extend this analysis and draw the conclusion that uninsured and insured deposits alike are to be categorized as inputs3. Therefore,their results are consistent with the intermediation approach.Noteworthingly, a previous study by Sealey and Lindley(1977)offers a reconcilable view of both approaches. These authors, who were among the first to model the technical and economic features of banks' production functions, consider deposits as an intermediate output, supplied by means of several services offered to depositors, and later used in the issuance of loans. Thus, a remarkable feature of banking institutions stems from the fact that a substantial part of their costs relates with the provision of services as partial payment for an input(loanable funds). The cost of'attracting' this input comprises implicit resource costs, i.e. labor, capital and material inputs involved in this activity.对西班牙银行业的竞争力检测:Panzar-Rosse方法回顾资料来源:Comisión Nacional de Energía (CNE)作者:Luis Gutiérrez de Rozas1.引言竞争力,已经成为银行业文献中的很常见的话题。
公共管理经典书目
公共管理经典书目(一)基础理论经典原著1、威尔逊:《行政学之研究》,《国外政治学》1987年第6期、1988年第1期。
2、古德诺:《政治与行政》,华夏出版社1987年版。
3、泰罗:《科学管理原理》,中国社会科学出版社1990年版。
4、法约尔:《工业管理与一般管理》,中国社会科学出版社1998年版。
5、马克斯·韦伯:《经济与社会》,商务印书馆1997年版。
6、怀特:《行政学概论》,上海商务印书馆1947年版。
7、西蒙:《管理行为》,北京经济学院出版社1988年版。
8、西蒙:《管理决策新科学》,中国社会科学出版社1982年版。
9、沃尔多:《行政国家:美国公共行政的政治理论研究》,纽约:罗纳德出版社1948年版。
10、林德布洛姆:《决策过程》,上海译文出版社1988年版。
11、德罗尔:《逆境中的政策制定》,上海远东出版社1996年版。
12、雷格斯:《行政生态学》,台湾商务印书馆1985年版。
13、弗雷德里克森:《新公共行政学》,美国亚拉巴马大学出版社1980版。
14、奥斯特罗姆:《美国公共行政的思想危机》上海三联书店1999年版。
15、尼斯坎南:《官僚制与公共经济学》,中国青年出版社2004年版。
16、詹姆斯·Q·威尔逊:《官僚机构:政府机构的作为及其原因》,三联书店2006年版。
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18、布坎南、塔洛克:《同意的计算:立宪民主的逻辑基础》,中国社会科学出版社2000年版。
19、缪勒:《公共选择理论》,中国社会科学出版社1999年版。
20、罗森布鲁姆:《公共行政学:管理、政治和法律的途径》,中国人民大学出版社2002年版。
21、R·J·斯蒂尔曼:《公共行政学:概念与案例》,中国人民大学出版社2004年版。
22、罗伯特•登哈特:《公共组织理论》,中国人民大学出版社2003年版。
23、沙夫里茨、海德:《公共行政学经典》,中国人民大学出版社2004年英文版。
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a r X i v :h e p -p h /9705319v 1 15 M a y 1997DOE/ER/40717-45May,1997The Banks-Zaks Expansion and “Freezing”in Perturbative QCDS.A.Caveny and P.M.StevensonT.W.Bonner Laboratory,Physics Department Rice University,Houston,TX 77251,USAAbstract:The recent calculation of the four-loop β-function in QCD provides further evidence that the Banks-Zaks expansion in 1611IntroductionThe old idea that the QCD running coupling“freezes”at low energies has been phe-nomenologically successful in a wide variety of contexts.(See Refs.[1,2]and references therein.)Theoretical evidence that“freezing”does occur,and for purely perturbative rea-sons,comes from the third-order calculation of R e+e−[3]which,when“optimized”with respect to renormalization scheme,yields such behaviour[1].Pad´e approximant methods indicate a similar conclusion[4].Another approach is the Banks-Zaks(BZ)expansion [5,6,7,8],within which“freezing”is natural and ubiquitous.The relevance of the BZ expansion to low-energy QCD phenomenology hinges on an extrapolation in the number of(massless)flavours,n f,from161.For n f slightly less than1612,unless or until the BZ expansion breaks down.2Ref.[8]has suggested that the BZ expansion is qualitatively relevant to the real world where only2or3quarkflavours are light compared to the QCDΛscale.The crucial issue is whether the expansion shows reasonable numerical convergence when n f≈2.Assuming good behaviour,Ref[8]made a prediction for a certain coefficient.As we discuss,this prediction is borne out by the recent calculation of the QCDβfunction to four-loops[9].The plan of the paper is as follows:Section2presents the notation and extracts the relevant coefficients.Sections3and4discuss the BZ expansion for quantities at Q=0and at general Q,respectively.An important role is played byγ∗,the slope of theβfunction at thefixed point,and we discuss its coefficients(the“universal invariants”of Grunberg[7])to fourth order.Sect.5contains concluding remarks.Appendix A summarizes the results for a general SU(N)colour group.Appendix B discusses the issue of renormalization-scheme (RS)invariance and the notion of‘regular’and‘irregular’schemes.The Higgs-decay case, which we argue is not a good guide to infrared behaviour,is discussed in Appendix C.2NotationWe write the βfunction in the form:β(a )≡µdaMS scheme,are [10,11,9]:β0=2b =11−23n f ,β2=32bc 2=285718n f +3256+3564ζ3−107836127ζ3n f+ 5006581ζ3 n 2f +10932,the βfunction has a zero at a ∗∼−12−n f ).Its limiting form:a 0≡82−n f )(3)serves as the expansion parameter for the BZ expansion [8].Because the constant of proportionality is so small,a 0remains small (≤0.4)even with n f =0.To proceed,one re-writes all perturbative coefficients,eliminating n f in favour of a 0.The first two β-function coefficients,which are RS invariant,become:b =107a 0+19MS,perturbativecoefficients have a polynomial dependence on n f ,and we may writec i =1MS,are collected in the table below.c1,0=19c2,−1=− 8768 =−3.61c2,0=2438 325c3,−1= 81152+5335−16171138248 2587144ζ3 =451c3,2=− 1073456 =−56.6The BZ expansion can be applied to any perturbatively calculable physical quantity of the form:R=a 1+r1a+r2a2+r3a3+... .(7) In a‘regular’scheme the coefficients r i are polynomials in n f,and hence in a0:r i=r i,0+r i,1a0+r i,2a20+ (8)Note that a term r i,j a p0or c i,j a p0can be assigned a degree i+j−p,and all terms in any formula must have matching degree.The prototypical example is the e+e−ratio:σtot(e+e−→hadrons)R e+e−(Q)≡MS with the renormalization scaleµequated with Q,are collected in the table below[3]:Coefficients in R e+e−.[r1,0=18 11r2,0=−125218 4013ζ3+258 2 1513ζ3−π2Another example is the Bjorken sum rule:10dxg ep−en1(x,Q2)=1g V (1−R Bj).(10) (The same QCD corrections,apart from a(Σq i)2/(3Σq i2)term,appear in the Gross Llewellyn-Smith sum rule.)The coefficients,from Ref.[12]are listed below.Coefficients in R Bj[r1,0=−11=13.388−55728 274918ζ3−5ζ5 =70.25r2,2= 10772 =285.73 We mention that the same decomposition of coefficients is needed in the“large-b”ap-proximation[13],which employs the opposite limit(b→∞,rather than b=(107/8)a0→0 as here).3BZ Expansion:Q=0Thefixed-point conditionβ(a∗)=0always has a solution as a power series in a0:a∗=a0 1+v1a0+v2a20+v3a30+... .(11) A straightforward calculation yields:v1=c1,0+c2,−1,v2=(c1,0+2c2,−1)(c1,0+c2,−1)+c2,0+c3,−1,(12)v3=c31,0+6c21,0c2,−1+c1,0(3c2,0+4c3,−1+10c22,−1)+c2,−1(4c2,0+5c3,−1)+5c32,−1+c2,1+c3,0+c4,−1.(Numerically,v1=1.1366,v2=23.27,v3=c4,−1−138.6,in thewherew1=v1+r1,0,w2=v2+2r1,0v1+r2,0+r1,1,(14)w3=v3+(2v2+v21)r1,0+v1(2r1,1+3r2,0)+r2,1+r3,0.These coefficients are RS-scheme independent(see Appendix B)and so their numerical values are significant.They should be order-1numbers,if all is to be well.For the e+e−case,Ref.[8]obtained the value of thefirst coefficient,w1=1.22,but w2could only be obtained as−18.25+c3,−1,since c3,1was then unknown.To quote Ref.[8]:“For the expansion to be credible one needs c3,−1(aδdx˜Λ =limδ→0The constant of integration C(δ)needs to be suitably singular asδ→0and we choose [14,8]:C(δ)=P.V. ∞δdxδ+c lnδ+c ln|c|+O(δ).(20) Note that Cauchy’s principal value(P.V.)is introduced to deal with the pole at x=−1/c when c<0.This choice amounts to a definition of˜Λ,within a given RS.[We use a tilde to distinguish it from the older,but still widely used,definition of theΛparameter[15]. The relation is ln(Λ/˜Λ)=(c/b)ln(2|c|/b).While the two definitions are not dissimilar for small n f,they become infinitely different as n f→161ˆβ(x)=−1x−1dx x=a∗=−ba∗ 1+2ca∗+3c2a∗2+4c3a∗3+... .(22) As discussed below,ˆγ∗can be obtained as a series in a0.The remainder function H(x) can be expanded as a power series,H0+H1x+...,whose coefficients are of order a0.One now inserts(21)into(19)and performs the integration.One can then eliminate a and a∗in favour of R and R∗.In fact,since the result must be RS invariant,one can —without loss of generality—short-cut this step by utilizing the“effective-charge”RS in which a≡R.This leads to the formula[8]:ρ1=1ˆγ∗(n)ln 1−R i+1.(23)The last term,involving the H(ec)icoefficients(of the effective-charge scheme),is only relevant in fourth order and beyond.Thus,for thefirst three orders the equation takes the same form,just with the parametersˆγ∗and R∗approximated to the appropriate order. On the left-hand side,ρ1is the RS invariant[14]ρ1≡b ln µ˜Λeff ,(24) where˜Λeffis a characteristic scale specific to the particular physical quantity R.It is related to the˜Λparameter of some reference scheme(eg.factor exp(r1/b)involving the r1coefficient in that scheme,evaluated atµ=Q.(We caution thatρ1cannot be split into O(1)and O(a0)pieces in a RS-invariant way[8].) Numerically inverting Eq.(23)provides R as a function of Q.The resulting R(Q) naturally agrees with ordinary perturbation theory to the corresponding order at large Q,but freezes to the value R∗(n)as Q→0.The BZ series expansion for R∗was dis-cussed in the previous section.The BZ expansion forˆγ∗is obtained straightforwardly by substituting the expansion of a∗(Eqs.(11)and(12))into(22).This gives:ˆγ∗=a0 1+g1a0+g2a02+g3a03+ (25)where,g1=c1,0,g2=c1,02−c2,−12−c3,−1,(26)g3=c1,03−4c2,−13−5c1,0c2,−12−4c1,0c3,−1−2c2,−1c2,0−6c2,−1c3,−1−c3,0−2c4,−1.It is noteworthy that certain terms of degree n are absent in g n:g1does not contain c2,−1; g2does not contain c2,0or c2,−1c1,0;and g3does not contain c2,1or c2,0c1,0or c2,−1c1,02.The significance ofγ∗=bˆγ∗is that it is the‘critical exponent’governing how R approaches R∗as Q→0;asymptotically,R−R∗∝Qγ∗.As pointed out by Grunberg, the g n coefficients are RS invariants,and are universal,in the sense that they are not specific to some particular physical quantity R.(See Appendix B for discussion of some subtleties.)The newβ-function result[9]enables us to determine the numerical value of the second invariant;g2=−8.99.(The exact expression,for general N,is given in Appendix A.) Hence theˆγ∗series is:ˆγ∗=a0 1+4.75a0−8.99a02+ (27)Clearly,theˆγ∗series is not as well behaved as the R∗series that we saw earlier.In Fig. 1(a)we showγ∗(=bˆγ∗)as a function of n f.(Fig.1(b)shows shows the same quantity normalized by1/(ba0).)The lower and upper solid curves are thefirst-and second-order results,respectively,while the middle solid curve is the third-order result.The dashed curve represents the third-order result re-cast as a Pad´e approximant:(1+6.64a0)ˆγ∗≈a0For comparison we also give,as the dotted curve,the prediction arising from an optimized-perturbation-theory analysis of the e+e−case[1](see comments in Appendix B).The reasonable agreement between the last three curves gives us some confidence that the extrapolation to low n f is qualitatively valid,even if the quantitative precision is not good.The next coefficient isg3=269.44−2c4,−1.(29) We therefore predict that c4,−1(.2 We think both approximations are useful;neither is very precise,but both seem to be qualitatively valid,and offer a great deal of insight into QCD.Our preliminary studies indicate that the large-b approximation also predicts“freezing,”and we hope to report on this shortly.Acknowledgements:We thank Jiˇr´i Ch´y la for correspondence,particularly regarding the issues in Appendix B.This work was supported in part by the U.S.Department of Energy under Grant No.DE-FG05-92ER40717.Appendix A:SU(N)generalization The critical number offlavours is:n crit f =11MS are[9]β0=2b=13N(34N3−n f(13N2−3))β2=32bc108N2 5714N5+n f(−3418N4+561N2+27)+n2f(224N3−66N)β3=128bc1944N3 601892N7−25920N5+ζ3(9504N7+684288N5)+n f −485513N6+58583N4−21069N2−5589+ζ3(−4320N6−118368N4+9504N2)+n2f 69232N5−19816N3−22428N+ζ3(18144N5−13824N3+52704N)+n3f[1040N4−616N2] (31) The BZ expansion parameter becomesa0=1616a0,(33)c=−18N.(34)In48N(25N2−11),(35) c2,0=(318N4+55N2−9)3072N(37)c3,−1=(14731N6−30047N4−58839N2−2277)8(25N4−18N2+77)The Grunberg invariants,the coefficients in the expansion ofˆγ∗are: g1=(13N2−3)768N2(25N2−11)2−11(25N2−11)ζ3.(40)Appendix B:Regular and Irregular SchemesIn this appendix we discuss renormalization-scheme invariance of the BZ expansion results. Since the expansion parameter a0=82−n f)is an RS-invariant pure number,one expects the coefficients in the BZ expansion of a physical quantity R to be RS-invariant, but it is important to have confirmation.Wefirst consider thefixed point results at Q=0 (which are independent of the˜Λparameter).In the text,as in Ref[8],we limited the discussion to so-called‘regular schemes’in which the coefficients in R andβ(a)have a polynomial dependence on n f.Such schemes are natural in diagrammatic terms,since each fermion loop gives an n f factor.They are convenient for our purposes,since the BZ-expansion coefficients are easily extracted from calculations made in those schemes.However,we emphasize that“irregular”schemes are not necessarily“bad.”They will also lead to the same BZ-expansion results,but the extraction of the BZ coefficients from calculations in those schemes will be less straight-forward.An analogous situation arises,for example,with gauge invariance;a certain class of gauges may be convenient for some purposes,but inconvenient for others.It is easy to show the invariance of the BZ coefficients within the class of‘regular’schemes.This was done in Ref.[8]by considering the RS-invariantsρ2,ρ3,...[14]that are invariant combinations of R andβ(a)coefficients,and expanding them in powers of a0.A‘low-brow’version of the proof is also instructive.Consider a change of RS,a→a′, wherea′=a 1+u1a+u2a2+... .(41) The coefficients in the expansion of R change tor′1=r1−u1,r′2=r2−u2−2u1r1+2u21,(42) etc..Theβfunction transforms toβ′(a′)=(∂a′/∂a)β(a),whose coefficients are:c′=cc′2=c2+u2−u21−u1c,c′3=c3+2u3+cu21−2c2u1−6u1u2+4u31,(43) etc..If both the primed and unprimed scheme are regular,then the c i,c′i and r i,r′i coefficients are expandable as in Eqs.(6),(8),and the u i coefficients in the scheme transformation can be expanded as:u1=u1,0+u1,1a0,u2=u2,0+u2,1a0+u2,2a20,(44)etc..It is then straightforward to prove the invariance of the combinations appearing in the BZ expansion of R andγ∗.For instance,from the relationsr′1,0=r1,0−u1,0,c′2,−1=c2,−1+u1,0,c′3,−1=c3,−1−u21,0−2c2,−1u1,0,(45) one sees that r′1,0+c′2,−1=r1,0+c2,−1,and c′3,−1+(c′2,−1)2=c3,−1+(c2,−1)2,showing that these combinations are RS invariant.Extending this procedure one can prove the invariance of the higher-order w i and g i coefficients.Any scheme related toMS(µ=Q)is an example,these coefficients vanish.This distinction is unimportant for the BZ expansion,but matters for the large-b approximation[13].]The ‘effective charge’(or‘FAC’)scheme,in which a≡R for some specific physical quantity,is a‘regular’(but not‘strictly regular’)scheme.However,it is easy to construct RS’s that are‘irregular’simply by considering a transformation in which the u i depend on n f in a non-polynomial fashion,so that the coefficients r′i are no longer expandable in positive powers of a0.There is nothing intrinsically‘bad’about such schemes.They can arise quite naturally.For example,the’t Hooft scheme,in which c2=c3=...=0,is‘irregular’[13].[Recall that,in‘regular’schemes,c3,−1+(c2,−1)2is invariant and does not vanish.] The principle-of-minimal-sensitivity(PMS)scheme for any given physical quantity is also ‘irregular.’In both these cases the r i coefficients have1/a0pieces.In a‘regular’scheme,obtaining the BZ expansion to n th order requires terms of order n+1in theβfunction,and of order n in the physical quantity R.In an‘irregular’schemethe same information is distributed among higher-order coefficients as well.Starting froman‘irregular’scheme,one would require some knowledge of perturbative coefficients to higher orders;maybe to all orders.However,provided one carefully kept all terms that could contribute to a given order in a0,one would obtain the same BZ expansion.Finally,we discuss thefinite-Q case.Following Ref.[8],we have formulated the result as Eq.(23),which is to be solved numerically to obtain R as a function of Q.This formula involves the RS-invariant quantitiesρ1,,ˆγ∗,R∗,c,and H(ec)i.The˜Λparameterand Q appear only inρ1.The H(ec)icoefficients(relevant only in4th order and beyond) are directly related to the˜ρ2,˜ρ3,...invariants of Ref.[14]which can be conveniently redefined(hence the tilde)to coincide with theβ-function coefficients of the‘effective charge’scheme[16].The RS invariance of the BZ expansion ofˆγ∗[7]is verifiable by the procedure dis-cussed above.It is expected because of the well-known result[17]that the slope of the βfunction at afixed point is an invariant.However,there is an important caveat to the last statement[18],which necessitates some further discussion.The quoted result follows by differentiating theβ-function transformation,β′(a′)=(∂a′/∂a)β(a),to give∂β′∂a′∂2a′∂a.(46)Thefirst term vanishes at thefixed point—provided that neither∂a/∂a′nor∂2a′/∂a2is singular there[17].Ch´y la[18]has pointed out that,in general,it can be quite natural for those factors to be singular(and arbitrary scheme transformation can of course makefixed points appear and disappear!).In general,then,the critical exponentγ∗in R−R∗∝Qγ∗as Q→0is not the same as∂β/∂a|a=a∗.However,these two quantities will coincide in a large class of schemes.It also seems safe to assume that they coincide in the context of the BZ expansion,where there is necessarily afixed point at a∗=a0+....[Wefind that the3rd-order PMS scheme,though‘irregular,’also yieldsγ∗=∂β/∂a|a=a∗. This requires a detailed analysis of the optimization equations[14,1]as Q→0.The PMS results(in the e+e−case)forγ∗are shown as the dotted curve in Fig.1.]Appendix C:Higgs decayIn this appendix we discuss the case of Higgs-boson decay into hadrons.This seems to be a much more problematic than the cases discussed earlier.It could be viewed as conflicting with the general picture we have presented.We shall argue,though,that the crucial roleof quark masses in this quantity makes it unsuitable as a guide to the infrared behaviour of perturbative QCD.First,let us discuss the numbers.The hadronic decay width of the Higgs has the form ΓH =3G F 2πM H q m 2q Γ(a )with Γ(a )=1+Γ1a +...,and where m q is the running quark mass evaluated at some scale.For ΓH there is a factorization-scheme ambiguity (how much of the radiative corrections should be absorbed into m 2q ,and much should be left in the explicit series Γ(a )?).However,one can define the quantity [19]R Higgs =−1d ln M 2H (47)which is free of this factorization-scheme ambiguity,and is a physical quantity of the same form R =a (1+r 1a +...)considered earlier.The coefficients,from Ref.[19]are collected in the table below.Coefficients in R Higgs .[r 1,0=238 11r 2,0=−5034ζ3=−44.47r 2,1= 107144−73 =200.5r 2,2= 10772−ζ3−π2r 3,0=−22631621432ζ3+467524π2=−166.6r 3,1= 1073456−2075548ζ5−1378 2 6943034ζ3+2596π2 =6901r 3,3= 107108−524π2 =3808In Ref.[20]it was observed that,at third order in the effective-charge (or ‘FAC’)scheme,there is a fixed point with R ∗Higgs ∼a ∗≈0.15.The authors viewed this as probably spurious.Indeed,it is odd that it is only about half the size of the frozen couplant found in the e +e −case,and so is far from the leading-order BZ expectation that a ∗∼a 0.At 4th order Ref.[19]finds that this fixed point is no longer present.We have checked that the situation is much the same in optimized perturbation theory [14,21].The Q =0BZ series in this case is:R ∗Higgs =a 0(1+3.05a 0+7.67a 20+...)(48)whose coefficients are considerably larger than in the e +e −or Bjorken-sum-rule cases (Eqs.(15),(17)).For a low number of flavours the “corrections”are as big as the leading term,and both the same sign.(The next coefficient in the expansion is c4,−1−109and is still unknown;our estimate(see Eq.(29)suggests that it is around26±10.)One could conclude that this is perhaps a case where the BZ expansion breaks down before n f=2, so that maybe there is no freezing in this case.We believe,however,the problem is that this quantity is just not a useful indicator of massless QCD’s infrared behaviour,because of the way that quark masses are involved. For exactly massless quarks the hadronic Higgs-decay rate is zero,because the Higgs-quark coupling is proportional to quark mass.(The calculations neglect quark masses in the radiative corrections but not,of course,in the overall coupling factor.)If we keep the quark massesfinite when we consider,theoretically,the limit M H→0,we will trivially get zero as soon as the decay becomes kinematically forbidden.To avoid this we would need to consider a limit in which m q tends to zero at least as fast as M H;say m q∝(M H)κwith κ≥1.But then R Higgs is not of the form a(1+r1a+...),and depends onκ,making it ill-defined.These issues do not arise for R e+e−or R Bj,which are meaningful for massless quarks.References[1]A.C.Mattingly and P.M.Stevenson,Phys.Rev.D49,437(1994);Phys.Rev.Lett.69,1320(1992).[2]Yu.L.Dokshitzer,and B.R.Webber,Cavendish preprint HEP-97/2(hep-ph/9704298).[3]S.G.Gorishny,A.L.Kataev,and rin,Phys.Lett.B259,144(1991);L.R.Surguladze and M.A.Samuel,Phys.Rev.Lett.66,560(1991);ibid2416(E).[4]J.Ellis,E.Gardi,M.Karliner,and M.A.Samuel,Phys.Rev.D54,6986(1996);J.Ellis,M.Karliner,and M.A.Samuel,CERN-TH/96-327(hep-ph/9612202).[5]T.Banks and A.Zaks,Nucl.Phys.B196,189(1982).[6]A.R.White,Phys.Rev.D29,1435(1984);in Hadronic Matter in Collision,editedby J.Rafelski(World Scientific,1989);Int.J.Mod.Phys.A8,4755(1993).[7]G.Grunberg,Phys.Rev.D46,2228(1992).[8]P.M.Stevenson,Phys.Lett.B331,187(1994).[9]T.van Ritbergen,J.A.M.Vermaseren,and rin,preprint UM-TH-97-01(hep-ph/9701390).[10]W.E.Caswell,Phys.Rev.Lett.33,244(1974);D.R.T.Jones,Nucl.Phys.B75,531(1974).[11]O.V.Tarasov,A.A.Vladimirov,and A.Yu.Zharkov,Phys.Lett.B93,429(1980).[12]rin and J.A.M.Vermaseren,Phys.Lett.B259,345(1991).[13]C.N.Lovett-Turner and C.J.Maxwell,Nucl.Phys.B432,147(1994);ibid452,188(1995);C.J.Maxwell and D.G.Tonge,ibid481,681(1996).[14]P.M.Stevenson,Phys.Rev.D23,2916(1981).[15]W.A.Bardeen,A.J.Buras,D.W.Duke,and T.Muta,Phys.Rev.D18,3998(1978).[16]P.M.Stevenson,Phys.Rev.D33,3130(1986).[17]D.J.Gross,in Methods in Field Theory,edited by R.Balian and J.Zinn-Justin(North-Holland,Amsterdam,1976);A.Peterman,Phys.Rep.53C,157(1979).[18]J.Ch´y la,Phys.Rev.D38(1988)3845.[19]J.A.M.Vermaseren,rin,and T.van Ritbergen,preprint UM-TH-97-03/NIKHEF-97-012(hep-ph/9703284).[20]S.G.Gorishny,A.L.Kataev,rin,and L.R.Surguladze,Phys.Rev.D43,1633(1991).[21]J.Kubo,S.Sakakibara,and P.M.Stevenson,Phys.Rev.D29,1682(1984).Fig.1.(a)The critical exponentγ∗infirst,second,and third orders of the BZ expansion (lower,upper,and middle solid curves).A Pad´e approximant form of the third-order result is shown as the dashed curve.The dots represent the result of an optimized-perturbation-theory analysis[1].(b)The same,normalized by1/(ba0);i.e.,ˆγ∗/a0.2R e+e−61014Q/˜ΛeffFig.2.R e+e−as a function of Q/˜Λeffto third order in the BZ expansion for n f=14,10,6,2.R Bj261014Q/˜ΛeffFig.3.R Bj as a function of Q/˜Λeffto third order in the BZ expansion for n f=14,10,6,2.。