120107230外文翻译--审计和管理

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内部审计外文文献翻译

内部审计外文文献翻译

外文文献及原稿原稿IntroductionInt ernal a ud it ef fe ctive n e s s, t h e ext e nt t o whic h an inte r nal a udit offic e me e ts i ts ra ison d'êt re, i s a r guably a result o f the i n t e rpla y a mong four fa c tors: in t erna l audi tq uali t y; management support; or gani z at i onal sett i ng; and attributes of the audi t or.An i nt ern al audit func t ion's capabil i ty to provi de us eful a udi t findi ngs and re commendations w oul d help ra isemanagement'sintere s ti n it s re c omm e ndation s.T he m a na gementsupportw i thresourcesandc om mi t me nt to i mplement t heinternal a udi t reco m me nd ationsi s essenti a l in attainingaudit e ffec t ive ne s s.A l s o,the o rganizati o nals et ting i n w hi c h i ntern a laudit ope rat e s,i.e.t he or ga nizatio na ls t at us ofth eof fi ce,i t si nt erna lor ganizatio n andthepoli c ie s andpr oc edure s applyi ng t o eachaudi t o r, sho ul d enable smooth audi t s t ha t l ea d to reaching us e f ul a udi tfindings.Furth e r,thecapab i li t y,at t itudesandl e velofcoopera t ionoftheaudi t or i mpacton t heeffec t ive ne ss ofaud i ts.T herefore, internal audit ef fe ct i veness s houl d be vie w e d as a dynamicprocessthat is c ontinuously s ha ped by t h e interac t ions among t he fo ur factors me ntionedabove.Thi s s t udy e xami n ed,u singcasestudyan a lysis,t heint e rnala udi ts e rvic eof ala rgepublicsectororganization.Thepaperisstructuredasfollows.Thenextsectionpresents a review of the related literature; introduces a model for analyzingauditeffectiveness; and provides the research question. The third section presentstheresearch methodology; fourth section provides empirical analysis based on acasestudy; and fifth section presents a summary of the findings. The paperthensummarizes the conclusions, noting limitations of the study and suggesting avenuesfor futureresearch. InternalauditeffectivenessThe Instituteof Internal Auditors (IIA, 1999a) defined internal auditing as:an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add valueandimprove an organization's operations. It helps an organization accomplish itsobjectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improvetheeffectiveness of risk management, control, and governanceprocesses.This definition signifies that internal audit has undergone a paradigmshift froman emphasis on accountability about the past to improving future outcomes tohelpauditors operate more effectively and efficiently (Nagy and Canker, 2002; Stern,1994;Goodwin, 2004). Since, the definition equally serves both the private and thepublicsectors (Goodwin, 2004), it is used in this study as a basis to analyze publicsectorinternal auditeffectiveness.Internal audit is effective if it meets the intended outcome it is supposed tobringabout.Sawyer(1995)states,“…internalauditor'sjobisnotdoneuntildefectsarecorrecte d and remain corrected.”Van Hansberger (2005) explains that internalauditeffectiveness in the public sector should be evaluated by the extent to whichitcontributes to the demonstration of effective and efficient service delivery, asthisdrives the demand for improved internal audit services. Based on the results ofaconsultative forum that focused on improving public sector internal audit [1],VanHansberger (2005) identified perceptionsandownership; organizationandgovernance framework; legislation; improved professionalism; conceptualframework;and also resources as factors influencing internal audit effectiveness.Effectiveinternal audit undertakes an independent evaluation of financial andoperatinginformation and of systems and procedures, to provide useful recommendationsfor improvements asnecessary.The effectiveness of internal audit greatly contributes to the effectiveness ofeachauditor in particular andthe organization at large (Dittenhofer, 2001).Dittenhofer(2001) has also observed that if internal audit quality is maintained, it will contributeto the appropriateness of procedures and operations of the auditor, and therebyinternal audit contributes to effectiveness of the auditor and the organization asawhole. Using agency theory, Dingdong (1997) explained the role that internalauditplays in an economy and points out that internal audit has an advantage over externalauditin obtaining information quickly and finding problems at an earlier stage; and Sparkman (1997), applying the theory of transaction cost economics, demonstratedhow internal audit recommendations are important to the management ofgovernmentorganizations.Priorliteraturerelatingtointernalauditeffectivenesshaseitherfocusedontheinternal audit's ability to plan, execute and objectively communicate usefulfindings(Dingdong, 1997 Sparkman, 1997;Dittenhofer, 2001); or taken a broader viewandincluded factors that transcend the boundary of a single organization (VanHansberger,2005). This paper attempts to introduce a new perspective for evaluation of internalaudit effectiveness by identifying factors within an organization that impact onauditeffectiveness. A model, which assumes that there is a common interest to achieveorganizational goals for auditor management, top management and internal audit,isused for analysis of this case study. Since, audit effectiveness fosters theachievementof a common goal; there would be a natural incentive in an organization to improveit.The model considers four potential factors –internal audit quality,managementsupport, organizational setting, and auditor attributes to explain audit effectiveness,and shows how the interaction of these factors improves audit effectiveness.Internal audit quality, which is determined by the internal audit department'scapability to provide useful findings and recommendations, is central toauditeffectiveness. Internal audit has to prove that it is of value to the organization and earna reputation in the organization (Sawyer, 1995). Internal audit has to evaluateitsperformance and continually improve its service .audit quality is a function ofthelevelofstaffexpertise,thescopeofservicesprovidedandtheextenttowhichaudits areprope rlyplanned,executedandcommunicated.Audit findings and recommendations would not serve much purposeunlessmanagement is committed to implement them. Adams (1994) used agency theorytoexplain that it is in the interest of management to maintain a strong internalauditdepartment. Implementation of audit recommendations is highly relevant toauditeffectiveness (Van Hansberger, 2005) and the management of an organization isviewed as the customer receiving internal audit services. As a result,management'scommitment to useaudit recommendations and its support in strengthening internalauditis vital to audit effectiveness (Sawyer,1995).Organizational setting refers to the organizational profile, internal organizationand budgetary status of the internal audit office; and also the organizationalpoliciesand procedures that guide operation of auditors. It provides the context inwhichinternal audit operates. Thus, organizational setting can exert influence on the levelofeffectiveness that internal audit could achieve. The auditor attributes relate tothecapability of the auditor to meet its intended objectives. Auditor attributeswithimplications on audit effectiveness include the auditors' proficiency to efficientlyandeffectively meet organizational sub-goals; their attitude towards internal audit; andthelevel of cooperation provided to the auditor .Since, the four factors discussed aboveare intricately linked, audit effectiveness is a dynamic process that results fromtheeffect of each factor and the interplay among all. audit quality andmanagementsupport strongly affects audit effectiveness. Better audit effectiveness, in turn, hasapositivebearingonthesetwofactors.Ifinternalaudit enhancesqualitytotheextent itelicits management's interest, management support would be a natural quid proquobecause the management would realize the contribution of internal audit totheachievement of organizational goals. This would positively reflecton auditqualityand enhance audit effectiveness. The management's commitment to implementauditrecommendations improves the operation of the auditor, as a result of whichtheauditor attributes would improve to the benefit of audit effectiveness.Further,management retains the authority to improve the organizational setting andinfluencethe auditor towards a positive effect on audit effectiveness, whichin turn,benefitsauditquality.ConcludingcommentsThis study investigated the internal audit service of a large public sectorhighereducational institution, to identify factors influencing internal audit effectiveness,using a model developed for the analysis. The model consisted of fourinterrelatedfactors: internal audit quality; management support; the organizational setting;andattributes of theauditors.The findings of the study reveal that the internal audit office of theorganizationstudied needs to enhance the technical proficiency of the internal audit staffandminimizestaff turnover so as to foster audit effectiveness. The organizational statusand internal organization of the internal audit office are fairly rated, butinternalaudit'slackofauthorityonbudgetsreducesitscontrolofresourceacquisitionandutil ization.The scope of internal audit services is limited to regular activities. Extendingthescopeofservicesbywideningtherangeofsystemsandactivitiesaudited,withappropr iateriskanalysis,wouldimprove auditeffectiveness. Management'scommitment in providing greater attention to internalaudit recommendations andstaffingtheofficewithwell-qualifiedemployeesdeservesattentioninthisstudy.Theinternalauditors,undertheimpressionthat theirreportsarenotsufficientlyutilizedbythe management, may not be encouraged to exert the maximum possible effort in their engagements. In addition, the lack of attention by management may send awrongsignal about the importance of internal audit services to the audited, which in turnadversely affects the auditedattributes.The study has shown that internal audit of the organization studiedneedsimprovement in the areas of audit planning, documentation of audit work,auditcommunications and follow-up of recommendations. Audit effectiveness couldbeenhanced by ensuring consistency in documenting audit work to enableimprovedreview of audit work; proper follow-up of the status of audit findingsandrecommendations; increased distribution of audit reports; and further improvementinthe quality ofreporting.The limitation of this study is readily apparent. As in all case studies,thegeneralisabilityof the findings and the conclusions drawn is limited, althoughthestudy does provide evidence of the problems internal auditors face in providinganeffective service to management. Further, research could be welcome tofullyunderstand the level of internal audit effectiveness in the Ethiopian public sectorvis-à-vis its private sector, with a view to highlighting differences, if any,andconclusively defining the variables affecting internal audit effectiveness inEthiopia.译文简介内部审计的有效性,在何种程度上满足了内部审计处其存在的理由,可以说是一个四因素之间的相互作用的结果:内部审计质量,管理支持,组织设臵,以及受审核方属性。

审计英文词汇整理.doc

审计英文词汇整理.doc

审计英文词汇整理.docoverall financial statement level and in 存在related account balances and transaction 发生levels 财务报表层和相关账户、交易层完整性or omissions 错报或漏报obligations 权利和义务总计allocation 计价和分摊events 期后事项截止the financial statements 调整财务报表准确性additional audit procedures 实施追加的审计分类程序检查risk 审计风险of counting 监盘risk 检查风险观察audit opinion 不适当的审计意见函证misstatement 重大的错报计算misstatement 可容忍错报procedures 分析程序acceptable level of detection risk 可接受的核对检查风险追查level of material misstatement risk 重大错sampling 审计抽样报风险的评估水平误差business 小规模企业error 预期误差system 会计系统总体of control 控制测试risk 抽样风险test 穿行测试risk 非抽样风险沟通unit 抽样单位流程图sampling 统计抽样of internal control 重新执行error 可容忍误差evidence 审计证据of under reliance 信赖不足风险procedures 实质性程序of over reliance 信赖过度风险risk of incorrect acceptance 误受风险opinion否定意见trial balance 试算平衡表审计词汇cross-referencing 索引和交叉索引审计法 Audit Law, Audit Act 现金收入审计法实施条例the Implementary Rules of the disbursement 现金支出Audit lawstatement 银行对账单审计标准 audit criteria , audit standard reconciliation 银行存款余额调节表审计准则 auditing standard sheet date 资产负债表日审计原则 auditing principlesvalue 可变现净值审计手册 audit manualroom 仓库公认审计准则 Generally Accepted Auditinginvoice 销售发票Standardslist 价目表审计法律规范 audit laws and regulationsconfirmation request 积极式询证函审计体制 audit systemconfirmation request 消极式询证函审计权限 audit purview ;audit jurisdiction ;requisition 请购单audit mandatereport 验收报告审计职责 audit responsibilitymargin 毛利审计监督audit supervision ;supervision overhead 制造费用through auditingrequisition 领料单审计管辖权 audit jurisdiction存货盘点审计执法 implementation of audit laws andcertificate 债券regulationscertificate 股票审计处理 audit sanctionreport 审计报告审计处罚 audit penalty被审计单位依法审计 conduct auditing in accordance withof the audit report 审计报告的收件人lawsopinion 无保留意见审计意见 audit opinionopinion 保留意见审计决定 audit decision审计建议audit suggestion, audit 绕过计算机审计auditing around the computer recommendation 通过计算机审计 auditing through the computer复核意见conclusion of audit review 计算机辅助审计computer-assited audit审计复议 audit appeal 信息技术审计 IT audit审计听证audit hearing 合法性审计compliance audit, regularityaudit审计复核 audit review 合规性审计 compliance audit审计战略 audit strategy 综合审计 comprehensive audit审计计划 audit plan 效益审计 value for money audit ( VFM audit )审计方案 auditing program 绩效审计 performance audit 审计目标 auditing objective 财务审计 financial audit审计范围 audit scope 财务报表审计 financial statement audit 审计内容audit coverage 财务收支审计audit of financial revenues and审计结论 audit conclusion expenditures审计任务 audit assignments 决算审计 final account audit审计结果 audit finding 经济责任审计 accountability audit审计报告audit report 任中经济责任审计middle term accountability审计方法 audit method audit审计过程auditing process 离任经济责任审计term-end accountability审计证据 audit evidence audit审计测试 audit test 管理审计 management audit审计风险 audit risk 项目审计 project audit审计抽样 audit sampling 外部审计 external audit审计软件 audit software 内部审计 internal audit审计程序 auditing procedures 政府审计 government audit审计调查 audit investigation 联合审计 joint audit审计小组 audit team 实地审计 field audit审计线索 audit trail 期末审计 final audit定期审计periodic audit 注册公共会计师certified publicaccountant 初次审计 initial audit ( CPA)初步审计 preliminary audit 特许会计师 chartered accountant ( CA)事后审计 post-audit 审计经费 audit funds事前审计 pre-audit 审计业务费 audit operating expense事中审计concurrent audit 审计专项经费special funds for auditing专项审计 special audit 无保留意见 :unqualified opinion法定审计 statutory audit 保留意见 qualified opinion后续审计 successive audit 无法表示意见 : disclaimer of opinion 跟踪审计 follow up audit 否定意见 :adverse opinion全过程审计whole process auditing突击审计surprise audit审计报告audit report标准报告standard report长式报告long-form report短式报告short-form report审计工作报告audit working report审计结果公告Announcement of Audit Findings审计长 Auditor General副审计长Deputy Auditor General审计主任chief auditor资深审计师senior auditor审计师(员)auditor注册内部审计师certified internal auditor( CIA)注册信息系统审计师certified informationsystems auditor(CISA)。

审计与内部控制词汇英译3

审计与内部控制词汇英译3
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151 IAPS 1002 CIS environments-on-line computer systems IAPS 1002 CIS 环境-(与主机)联机计算器系统 152 IAPS 1003 CIS environments-database systems IAPS 1003 CIS 环境- 数据库系统 153 IAPS 1005 the special considerations in the audit of small entities 在小的个体审计中的 IAPS 1005 特别的考虑 154 IAS 2 inventories 信息家电 2 库存 155 IAS 10 events after the balance sheet date 在平衡 sheeet 日期後面的信息家电 10 事件 156 IFACs code of ethics for professional accountants IFACs 道德准则为职业会计师 157 income tax 所得税 158 incoming auditors 收入审计(查帐)员 159 independent estimate 独立的估计 160 ineligible for appointment 无被选资格的为任命 161 information technology 信息技术 162 inherent risk 固有风险 163 initial communication 签署通讯 164 insurance 保险 165 intangibles 无形 166 integrity 完整性 167 interim audit 中期审计 168 internal auditing 内部审计

审计报告中英文对照

审计报告中英文对照

审计报告中英文对照审计报告中英文对照irumstanes.二、注册会计师的责任Auditor’s Responsibilit 我们的责任是在实施审计工作的基础上对财务报表发表审计意见。

我们按照中国注册会计师审计准则的规定执行了审计工作。

中国注册会计师审计准则要求我们遵守职业道德规范,计划和实施审计工作以对财务报表是否不存在重大错报获取合理保证。

Our responsibilit is to express an opinion on these finanial statements based on our audit. We onduted our audit in aordane ith the Standards on Auditing for Certified Publi Aountants. Those standards require that e pl ith ethialrequirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurane hether the finanial statements are free from material misstatement 审计工作涉及实施审计程序,以获取有关财务报表金额和和披露的审计证据。

选择的审计程序取决于注册会计师的判断,包括对由于舞弊或错报导致的财务报表重大错报风险的评估。

在进行风险评估时,我们考虑与财务报表编制相关的内部控制,以设计恰当的审计程序,但目的并非对内部控制的有效性发表意见。

审计工作还包括评价管理层选用会计政策的恰当性和作出会计估计的合理性,以及评价财务报表的总体列报。

An audit involves performing proedures to obtain audit evidene about the amounts and dislosures in the finanial statements. Theproedures seleted depend on the auditor’s judgment, inluding the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the finanial statements, hether due to fraud or error. In making those ris assessments, the auditor onsiders internal ontrol relevant to the entit’s preparation and fai presentation of the finanial statements in order to design audit proedurestha ar ppropriate in the irumstanes, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effetiveness of the entit’s internal ontrol. An audit als inludes evaluatingthe appropriateness of aounting poliies use an he reasonableness of aounting estimates mad b management, as el as evaluating the overall presentation of the finanial statements. 我们相信,我们获取的审计证据是充分、适当的,为发表审计意见提供了基础。

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文

审计风险外文文献翻译最新译文The n of Audit Risk ControlXXXIn any market。

the optimal n of resources is an internal XXX。

however。

n asymmetry exists een investors and creditors。

debtors and regulators。

and other regulated XXX verify the financial n of foreign enterprises and other n to ensure that the market's main body has as close to complete n as possible。

This process is known as the audit.XXX' subjective ns。

which are usually based on sampling surveys。

XXX。

audit risk is XXX.n:The auditing n has e an essential part of the market economy。

XXX the development of the capital market。

It holds a XXX the financial market。

However。

in recent years。

due to the repeatedn of cases XXX accountants。

the industry has XXX。

A 2002study published in the American Journal of Accounting Statistics revealed that the number of lawsuits against auditors in the United States over the past 15 years is far more than the total number of lawsuits in the industry's 105-year history。

审计的专业术语中英对照汇总

审计的专业术语中英对照汇总

审计的专业术语中英对照汇总2008-10-14四大”会计师事务所:普华永道 Princewater - houseCoopers安永 Ernst & Young毕马威 KPMG德勤 Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu安达信 Arthur Anderson安然 Enron世通 worldcom国际机构的名称::国际会计师联合会 IFAC国际会计师联合会下设的国际审计和鉴证准则理事会 IAASB美国注册会计师协会 AICPA中国注册会计师协会 CICPA审计 audit内部审计 internal audit政府审计 public sector audit账项基础审计 accounting number-based audit风险导向审计方法 risk-oriented audit approach其他鉴证业务 audit related services审阅业务 review有限责任公司制 limited liability companies, LLCs有限责任合伙制 limited liability partnerships, LLPs注册会计师职业道德规范 code of ethics for professional accountantsRules of professional conduct独立 independence客观 objectivity公正 integrity专业胜任能力 professional competence应有关注 due care保密 confidentiality confidence职业行为 professional conduct技术准则 technical standards保持实质上的独立和形式上的独立The member is, and is seen to be independent费用 fee佣金 commission经济利益 interest经济利益的冲突 conflicts of interest舞弊 fraud: refers to intentional acts which may involve the falsification of documents and records, the misappropriation of assets, or misapplication of accounting policies.差错 error: refers to the unintentional misapplication of accounting policies, oversights or misinterpretations of fact and clerical errors.更换会计师事务所 Changes in professional appointments国际趋同 global convergence /international convergence鉴证业务 assurance services全面质量管理 quality control of auditEnforce the ethical guidance注册会计师的法律责任Professional responsibility“深口袋”理论 deep-pocket theory创新会计处理 creative accounting诉讼爆炸 litigation explosion违约 breach the contract过失 negligenceMisconduct欺诈 cheat / illegal acts审计目标 audit objectives怀疑态度 suspend财务报表认定: financial statement assertions存在 existence权利与义务 rights and obligations发生 occurrence完整性 completeness准确性和计价 measurement and valuation分类和可理解性 classification and understandabilitypresentation and disclosure财务报表循环 cyclesSales and receivables cyclePurchases and payables cycleWages and salaries cyclePetty cash cycleInventory recording cycle截止 cut-off审计任务约定书 the letter of engagement管理层声明书 report of the directors’responsibilities for the financial statement审计证据 audit evidence审计工作底稿 audit working paper审计记录 audit records计划工作 planning重要性 material: information is material if its omission or misstatementcould influence the economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.审计风险 audit risk检查风险 detection risk重大错报风险 risk of material misstatement in audit report风险评估 risk evaluation分析复核程序 analytical review procedures内部控制 internal control局限性 limitation控制环境 control environment信息系统与沟通 information system and communication符合性测试 compliance test控制测试 control test报表层次重大错报 material misstatement on level of financial statement认定层次重大错报 material misstatement on level of assertion实质性程序 substantial procedures舞弊 fraud审计抽样 sampling抽样风险 sampling risk非抽样风险 non-sampling risk统计抽样 statistical sampling非统计抽样 non-statistical sampling销售与收款循环审计 Sales and receivables cycle采购与付款循环审计 Purchases and payables cycle存货与仓储循环审计 Inventory recording cycle监盘 physical inspection筹资与投资循环审计 Investment and finance cycle货币资金审计 Audit of monetary assets完成审计工作 finish the audit work期初余额 opening balance期后事项events after the balance sheet date或有事项contingent evens试算平衡表trail balance审计报告Audit report审计报告的要素标题 title收件人 receiver引言段 introduction管理层对财务报表的责任段 management’s responsibility for the financial statements 注册会计师的责任段 auditor’s responsibility审计意见段 opinion注册会计师的监管和盖章auditor’s signature会计师事务所的名称、地址和盖章auditor’s address报告日期 date of the Auditor’s report无保留意见 unqualified audit report非无保留意见 modified audit report保留意见 qualified opinion无法表示意见 disclaimer 否定意见 adverse。

审计英语词汇大全

审计英语词汇大全

审计英语词汇大全审计英语词汇1 ability to perform the work能力履行工作2 accepta nee procedures 承兑程序过程3 accountability经管责任,问责性4 acco un ti ng estimate 会计估计5 acco unts receivable listi ng 应收帐款挂牌6 acco unts receivable 应收账款7 accruals listi ng 应计项目挂牌8 accruals应计项目9 accuracy 准确性 10 adverse opinion否定意见11 aged analysis 年老的分析(法,学)研究约定审查业务错误的分析(法,学)研究反常的错误任命伦理学任命联合的坚挺19 associati on of chartered certified acco unts计的证(经执业的结社(ACCA20 assura nee en gageme nt 保证债务21 assura nee 保证12 age nts 代理人 13 agreed-up on procedures14 an alysis of errors 15 ano malous error 16 appo in tme nt ethics17 appo in tme nt18 associated firms(ACCA 特22 audit 审计,审核,核数23 audit accepta nee 审计承兑24 audit approach 审计靠近25 audit committee 审计委员会,审计小组26 ahudit en gageme nt 审计业务约定书27 audit evaluati on 审计评价28 audit evide nee 审计证据29 audit plan 审计计划30 audit program 审计程序31 audit report as a means of com muni cati on 审计报告如一个通讯方法32 audit report 审计报告33 audit risk 审计风险34 audit sampli ng 审计抽样35 audit staffi ng 审计工作人员36 audit tim ing 审计定时37 audit trail 审计线索38 audit ing sta ndards 审计准贝U39 auditors duty of care 审计(查帐)员的抚养责任40 auditors report 审计报告41 authority attached to ISAs 代理权附上到国际砂糖协定42 automated work ing papers 自动化了工作文件43 bad debts 坏账44 bank银行45 bank rec on ciliatio n银行对账单,余额调节表61 clubs62 com muni cati ons betwee n auditors and man ageme nt通讯在审计(查帐)员和经营之间63 com muni cati ons on in ter nal control通讯64 compa nies act 公司法46 ben eficial in terests受益权47 best value 最好的价值 48 busi ness risk经营风险49 cadbury committee 50 cash cou nt 现金盘点 cadbury 委员会51 cash system兑现系统52 cha nges in n ature of en gageme nt质上改变债务的性53 charges and commitme nts 54 charities 宽大55 tom wallstom 墙壁费用和评论56 chrono logy of an audit57 CIS applicati on con trols一审计的年代表CIS 申请控制58 CIS en vir onments sta nd-al one microcomputers CIS环境单机微型计算器59 clie nt scree ning 委托人甄别 60 closely conn ected接近地连接俱乐部内部控制上的86 cost of conversion转换成本,加工成本65 comparative financial statements 66 comparatives 比较的67 compete nee 能力68 compilati on en gageme nt 84 corporate governance 公司治理,公司管制85 corresp onding figures 相应的计算87 cost 成本69 complete ness 完整性比较财务报表编辑债务70 completi on of the audit审计的结束71 complia nee with acco unting regulati ons 作法会计规则72 computers assisted audit tech niq ues器援助的审计技术 (CAATS73 con fide nee 信任 74 con fide ntiality保密性75 confirmation of accounts receivable符合~的(CAATS 计算应收帐款的查证76 con flict of in terest 利益冲突 77 con structive obligati on 建设的待付款78 contingent asset 或有资产79 con ti ngent liability或有负债80 con trol en vir onment 控制环境 81 con trol procedures 控制程序82 control risk控制风险83 con troversy论战88 courtesy 优待89 creditors 债权人90 curre nt audit files 本期审计档案91 database management system (DBMS 数据库管理制度(数据管理系统)92 date of report 报告的日期93 depreciation 折旧,贬值94 desig n of the sample 样品的设计95 detection risk 检查风险96 direct verificati on approach 直接核查法97 directio nal test ing 方向的抽查98 directors emolume nts 董事酬金99 directors serve con tracts 董事服务合约100 disagreeme nt with man ageme nt 与经营的不一致101 disclaimer of opi nio n 拒绝表示意见102 distributio ns 分销,分派103 documentation of understanding and assessment of con trol risk 控制风险的协商和评定的文件编集104 docume nti ng the audit process 证明审计程序105 due care 应有关注106 due skill a nd care 到期的技能和谨慎107 economy 经济108 educatio n 教育109 effective ness效用,效果130 finan cial 财务110 efficie ncy 效益,效率 111 eligibility / i neligibility113 en gageme nt econo mics 114 en gageme nt letter 业务约定书115 error 差错116 evaluating of results of audit procedures序的结果评估117 exam in atio ns 检查 118 existe nee 存在性 119 expectatio ns 期望差距 120 expected error 预期的错误 121 experie nee 经验122 expert 专家 123 external audit独立审计124 external review reports 外部的评论报告125 fair 公正 126 fee negotiation费谈判127 final assessme nt of control risk控制风险的确定评定128 final audit 期末审计112 emphasis of matter物质的强调合格/无被选资格债务经济学审计手。

审计英语词汇

审计英语词汇

accounting period 会计期间
accounting policies 会计政策
accounting professional bodies 会计职业组织,会计职业团体
accounting records 会计记录
accounting responsibility 会计责任
apply consistently 一贯地执行,一贯地实施
appropriate 适当的,合适的;
appropriate authorization 适当的授权
appropriateness of audit evidence 审计证据的适当性
approval 批准,核准
audit team 审计小组
audit test 审计测试
audit trai l 审计轨迹
audit work 审计工作
audit working paper 审计工作底稿
audited financial statement 审计会计报表,已审计财务报表
accounting service 会计服务
accounting standards 会计准则
Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises 企业会计准则
accounting system 会计系统
accounting treatment 会计处理
alternative audit procedures 替代审计程序,备选审计程序
amend 修改,修订
amortisation 摊销
analytical capacity 分析能力
analytical procedures 分析性程序

审计术语 中英对照

审计术语 中英对照

审计法 Audit Law, Audit Act审计法实施条例 the Implementary Rules of the Audit law审计标准 audit criteria,audit standard审计准则 auditing standard审计原则 auditing principles审计手册 audit manual公认审计准则 Generally Accepted Auditing Standards审计法律规范 audit laws and regulations审计体制 audit system审计权限 audit purview; audit jurisdiction;audit mandate 审计职责 audit responsibility审计监督 audit supervision; supervision through auditing 审计管辖权 audit jurisdiction审计执法 implementation of audit laws and regulations审计处理 audit sanction审计处罚 audit penalty依法审计 conduct auditing in accordance with laws审计意见 audit opinion审计决定 audit decision审计建议 audit suggestion, audit recommendation复核意见 conclusion of audit review审计复议 audit appeal审计听证 audit hearing审计复核 audit review审计战略 audit strategy审计计划 audit plan审计方案 auditing program审计目标 auditing objective 审计范围 audit scope审计内容 audit coverage审计结论 audit conclusion审计任务 audit assignments 审计结果 audit finding审计报告 audit report审计方法 audit method审计过程 auditing process审计证据 audit evidence审计测试 audit test审计风险 audit risk审计抽样 audit sampling审计软件 audit software审计程序 auditing procedures审计调查 audit investigation审计小组 audit team审计线索 audit trail工作底稿 working paper绕过计算机审计 auditing around the computer通过计算机审计 auditing through the computer计算机辅助审计 computer-assited audit信息技术审计 IT audit合法性审计 compliance audit, regularity audit合规性审计 compliance audit综合审计 comprehensive audit效益审计 value for money audit (VFM audit)绩效审计 performance audit财务审计 finan cia l audit财务报表审计 financial statement audit财务收支审计 audit of financial revenues and expenditures 决算审计 final account audit经济责任审计 accountability audit任中经济责任审计 middle term accountability audit离任经济责任审计 term-end accountability audit管理审计 management audit项目审计 project audit外部审计 external audit内部审计 internal audit政府审计 government audit联合审计 joint audit实地审计 field audit期末审计 final audit期中审计 interim audit定期审计 periodic audit初次审计 initial audit初步审计 preliminary audit事后审计 post-audit事前审计 pre-audit事中审计 concurrent audit专项审计 special audit法定审计 statutory audit后续审计 successive audit跟踪审计 follow up audit全过程审计 whole process auditing 突击审计 surprise audit审计报告 audit report标准报告 standard report长式报告 long-form report短式报告 short-form report审计工作报告 audit working report审计结果公告 Announcement of Audit Findings审计长 Auditor General副审计长 Deputy Auditor General审计主任 chief auditor资深审计师 senior auditor审计师(员) auditor注册内部审计师 certified internal auditor(CIA)注册信息系统审计师 certified information systems auditor(CISA)注册公共会计师 certified public accountant(CPA)特许会计师 chartered accountant(CA)审计经费 audit funds审计业务费 audit operating expense审计专项经费 special funds for auditing无保留意见:unqualified opinion保留意见 qualified opinion无法表示意见: disclaimer of opinion否定意见:adverse。

审计的专业术语中英对照汇总

审计的专业术语中英对照汇总

审计的专业术语中英对照汇总在审计领域中,存在许多专业术语,以下是一些常见的术语及其中英对照:1. 审计(Audit)审计是指对一个机构或个人的财务记录、报表和账户进行审核,并对其合规性和准确性进行评估的过程。

2. 审计师(Auditor)审计师是指专门从事审计工作的专业人员,负责审核财务信息和报告,以确定其合法性和准确性。

3. 内部审计(Internal Audit)内部审计是指一个组织内部的审计活动,由独立于被审计部门的内部审计员进行,以评估和改进组织的内部控制和风险管理。

4. 外部审计(External Audit)外部审计是由独立于被审计组织的审计师进行的审计活动,旨在评估和表达对被审计组织财务报表的意见。

合规性审计是指对一个机构或个人的业务行为是否遵循法规和政策的审计。

6. 经济利益审计(Financial Audit)经济利益审计是指对一个机构或个人的财务报表和账户进行审核,以确定其准确性、完整性和可靠性。

7. 风险审计(Risk Audit)风险审计是指对一个组织的风险管理和内部控制体系进行评估的审计活动。

8. 循环审计(Cycle Audit)循环审计是指对一个组织的特定业务过程(例如采购、销售等)进行审核,以评估其效率和合规性。

9. 目标审计(Objective Audit)目标审计是指衡量一个组织是否达到其规定的目标和目标的审计活动。

10. 管理审计(Management Audit)管理审计是对一个组织的管理过程和方法进行评估的审计活动。

11. 审计证据(Audit Evidence)审计证据是指审计师收集的用于支持其意见的信息和数据,包括原始记录、文件、证件等。

12. 审计程序(Audit Procedures)审计程序是审计师根据审计目标和程序规范制定的一系列步骤和方法,用于评估被审计单位的财务报告。

13. 内部控制(Internal Control)内部控制是指一个组织的管理方法和过程,用于确保合规性、准确性和可靠性,以及保护资产。

绩效审计与公共管理改革外文翻译

绩效审计与公共管理改革外文翻译

外文文献翻译译文原文Performance Audit and Public Management Reform Audit is one of the oldest and most venerable state functions. The French Cour des Comptes traces its origins back to 1318; the UK National Audit Office cites 1314 as the date of its first manifestation; the Dutch Algemene Rekenkamer finds ancestors as running back to 1386.State audit thus long preceded the emergence of modern forms of democratic government. However state audit offices have made many adaptations in the course of their long history and during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries they fashioned a crucial role for themselves within the machinery of democratic accountability.On this kind of historical scale, performance audit is a very recent activity. Although more or less plausible claims can be made for the existence of performance audit-like activities back to the 1960s—or even considerably earlier—performance audit as a large-scale, self-considerably distinct practice dates mainly since the late 1970s.Performance audit represents a modern variant of audit—not the only one but, as well shall demonstrate, a challenging and fascinating one. It is distinctive to state audit and does not have a close counterpart in private-sector, commercial audit.Over almost exactly the same period as performance audit has emerged as a distinct form of audit, the government of Western Europe, North America, and Australasia have embarked upon extensive programs of public management reform. These have aimed at modernizing, streamlining, and in some cases minimizing the whole of the state apparatus. Although the details of these reform programs have varied considerably between one country and another, most of them have given a central place to the themes of decentralization and performance management. This has entailed a widespread rethinking of the balance between the autonomy and the control of public organizations. It has generated a search for mechanism and incentives will help realize these new management ideas in practice.Prima facie, it appears highly probable that there is a connection between thesetwo phenomena: on the hand the growth of performance audit and on the other the search for a new solution to the ancient governmental problem of giving autonomy yet retaining control. Y et there seems to have been little systematic investigation of what the nature of this interaction might be. One of our ambitions is to fill this gap. We begin, in the next chapter, by looking at the boundaries and definitions of performance audit, and they move directly to describe the patterns of management reform in the five countries that form the basis for our comparisons: France, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK. This provides the context against which later chapters and tease out the connections between the development of performance audit and the forces of management change.If the official descriptions are anything to go by, performance audit is not just a technical tool. It does not at all correspond to the traditional image of auditing as a process cent ered on ‘checking the books’ in order to see that they have been accurately and properly kept. Performance audit has a more ambitious manifesto. Its practitioners declare that they are seeking to establish whether public policies or programs or projects or organizations have been conducted with due regard to economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and good management practice. It thus brings together, in a potent new combination, the older tradition of’’ audit’ with a much more recent focus on ‘performance ‘. T he exact terms within which audit bodies undertake this activity vary from country to country and over time. So we should not rush to say exactly what ‘it’ is or isn’t, but rather should problematize and explore the concept.In that chapter we will also take a brief look at some of the many other uses to which the term ‘audit’ has recently been put, a diversification of meaning and practice that recently led one academic to write an ambitious text entitled The Audit Society. For the moment, however, it will suffice to say that sets of practices termed ‘performance audit’ or value-for-money studies’ have become central activities for an increasingly powerful group of organizations-Supreme Audit Institutions. In most democratic countries, the SAI is located near the heart of the apparatus of the state. Potentially, therefore, performance audit should be of considerable political and democratic significance. It is practiced by powerful, independent institutions and ispresented as a mode of investigation aimed at establishing whether, at what cost, and to what degree the policies, programs, and projects of government are working.Given these general characteristics, one might expect that the considerable community of scholars working in subjects such as political science, public administration, public management, and public finance and accountancy would have generated a large literature about performance audit. Surprisingly, this is not the case. One may speculate on the reasons why SAIs and, within them, performance audit have suffered relative neglect as compared with, say, various aspects of public management reform.Several reasons for the apparent disparity of interest in performance audit and public management reform suggest themselves. To begin with, public management reform has been led—or at least fronted—by politicians, for whom it is natural to make public claims that what they are doing is innovative, valuable, and successful. Furthermore, such change has generated its own supporting ‘industry’, includi ng various kinds of consultant who have taken every opportunity to propel such reform even higher up political and administrative agendas. By contrast, SAIs are single institutions—and generally rather sober ones. The bulk of their work appears to be technical and detailed and they take some pains to stand clear of party political controversy. Typically, supreme audit institutions are mentioned briefly in general textbooks which describe the institutions of government in a given country, but few books or articles have been written specifically about them. The USA, though not part of the present study, was perhaps something of an exception to this general neglect, with a certain amount of analytical literature focusing upon the General Accounting Office. Only in the last few years has the trickle of journal articles and booklets begun to gather some momentum. In the past, SAIs seldom went out of their way to publicize themselves—it is only in the last decade that most of them have begun to produce booklets and brochures for popular consumption, or to deal proactively with the mass media. Some are still cautious in these respects.Finally, there is, of course, a difference of scale. Public management reform has swept across entire public sectors, affecting ministries, executive agencies, quangos,local authorities, and other kinds of public body. SAIs, by contrast, are single organizations, seldom employing more than a few hundred staff. Thus, changes in what auditors do simply do not appear to be as important or newsworthy as changes that affect the work of tens or hundreds of thousands of public officials, and which may impact directly on citizens’ use of public services.Even if the above considerations go some way towards explaining the relative lack of media and scholarly attention given to the development of performance audit, that does not mean that such activities are insignificant. On the contrary—and as we shall show--performance audit has become the largest single activity for some SAIs and an important part of the work of all the SAIs in this study. This is a relatively recent development. Although the definition of performance audit is less than straightforward, it is probably accurate to say that, allowing for some earlier, partial precedents, its emergence as a distinct and mainstream activity dates mainly from the late 1970s and 1980s. Thus, over the last two decades, a number of SAIs have invested a considerable proportion of their resources in developing a relatively new area of activity, one that is directly focused on those issues of performance that have themselves become such a central focus of concern for modern governments.While governments have declared themselves to be intensely concerned with the ‘three Es’ (economy, efficiency, and effec tiveness) at the same time as SAIs have been developing performance audit as a way of investigating those same three Es, the connection between these two lines of activity has not been as straightforward as might at first appear. Of course, some impacts are fairly obvious. For example, a recent UK National Audit Office handbook acknowledges that performance audit has had to respond to the fact that: ‘Two thirds of government business is now carried out by agencies, outputs and delivery are more important than inputs, and there is much greater involvement of the private sector in the delivery of publicly funded programs’. This is an example of a direct influence, running from public management reform to performance audit. However, the whole picture is considerably more complicated, with direct and indirect influences running in both directions.Our aim has therefore been to study the practice of performance audit and relateit to contemporary developments in public management. We have investigated the ‘state of the art’ of performance audit and explored its links wi th the processes of management reform. In empirical terms, we have had twin foci. First, we have gathered material about public management reform in each country—this describes the context in which SAIs have developed performance audit. Much of this has necessarily been secondary data, though some of it derives from other recent work by members of our team. Second, in relation to the performance audit side of the relationship, we have conducted extensive primary research. Our main focus has been on the performance audit report and on the process that leads up to that report. Some other recent work, though conceptually sophisticated, has been limited by its reliance on a more general type of evidence. We would contend that the acid test of what performance audit ’is’ ,or is capable of, may lie more in the bedrock of individual audits than in the superstructure of what SAIs say about performance audit in general, although both types of evidence are, of course, useful in their own right.We have therefore counted, categorized, and read a large number of audit reports. In practical terms, these seemed the least unsatisfactory unit for comparative analysis. They had the advantage of being concrete, discrete, and the basis for a number of recording systems within SAIs themselves. Unfortunately, however, they also carried some disadvantages. First, not all SAIs distinguish between performance audit reports and other types of report. Second, not all performance audit reports are in the public domain. Third, there are other important performance audit ‘products’ apart from individual reports. For example, some performance audit work by the NAO takes the form of unpublished reports to departments rather than reports to the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee. The bulk of the Cour’s work on bonne gestion takes place in the form of unpublished communications with the audited bodies and the ministries, often at ministerial level. Fourth, there is very considerable variation both between and within performance audit reports. They come in different shapes and sizes in different countries, and even within the corpus of a single SAI such reports may be long or short, expensive or cheap, very broad or quite narrow in scope, etc. Indeed, these variations are one of the features we describe and comment upon.Finally, it should be pointed out that choosing a different unit of analysis would likely have yielded different insights, but at the same time, and by the same token, would probably have concealed or obscured some of the features that our focus on reports has illuminated. For example, we have encountered some difficulty in analyzing the methods used in performance audit, partly because some reports use a variety of methods within a single study while others say virtually nothing about which methods may have been adopted.In conclusion, we should say that, although this work is certainly not intended to be prescriptive, we have nevertheless thought it appropriate in the final chapter, to set out an agenda for discussion. Drawing from our descriptions and analyses, we have identified a number of issues likely to shape the future development of performance audit. In effect, these constitute a set of strategic choices, with significant implications for the roles of SAIs. Some of these issues could be clarified by further research. All of them could benefit from wider and deeper debate. Just as politics is too important to be left to the politicians, the activities of our Supreme Audit Institutions are too important to be left exclusively to auditors.Source: Christopher Pollott, Hikka Summa. Performance Audit and Public Management Reform[M], Performance or Compliance, 2009.译文绩效审计与公共管理改革审计是最古老且最庄严的国家职责之一,法国审计院的历史可以追溯到1318年。

审计外文文献翻译

审计外文文献翻译

AUDIT MARKET FAILUREBenedikt KoehlerThe auditing profession has called for the current regime of unlimited liability to be replaced with liability caps. The Department of Trade and Industry has tabled proposals to reform the structure of the market for audit services. These proposals fall short of meeting the demand for liability limitation but modify he current regime inasmuch as auditor liability, though uncapped, would be proportional to the damage caused by audit failure. This step is unlikely to reme dy audit market failure. This article argues the distortion of market ncentives in audit markets can be traced to government intervention and the re me dy lies in re placing government interve ntion with c ompetition.IntroductionProponents of audit lia bility reform argue that the c urre nt weight of obligations is untena ble. A re gime of unlimited lia bility, coupled with the doctrine of joint and se veral liability, implies that every c orporate insolvenc y can trigge r litiga tion by plaintiffs arguing tha t auditors are c ulpa ble for not spotting trouble in time. Worse, auditors can not only be he ld to acc ount by a compa ny’s mana ge me nt, but by third parties as well. Auditors feel tha t providing an a udit opinion in effect is ta nta mount to underwriting the solve ncy of their clients.The Ge neral Acc ounting Office (GAO) finds in a surve y of c orporate failures that auditors had qualified their opinion in only half of all cases. Therein lies the crux. Auditors attest whether a compa ny’s accounts are dra wn up in accordance with auditing standards. That is not the same thing as to vouc h for a company’s solve ncy. Auditors argue it is wrong to confla te audit failure and c orporate failure.In 1992 the Big Six US a uditors state d that without c hec ks to third-party litigation, it would only be a question of time until their number dwindled (Arthur Ande rsen et al., 1992). US le gisla tion passe d in 1995 se t hurdles for filing claims a nd for a while seeme d to ste m the tide of litigation. Yet the de mise of Arthur Andersen ga ve urge ncy to thecalls for a udit market reform. Auditors a ver that insolve ncies are a fact of life and the next major corporate c olla pse is like ly to start a nother round of musical c hairs in the audit sector. Another reduction in the number of auditors with global reach would contra vene the public interest in sta ble fina ncial markets.Not e veryone is c onvince d of the nee d to cap a uditor lia bility. EU Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, for exa mple, has little sympa thy for the auditing profession’s pleas. First, users of fina ncial accounts are reassure d by knowing a uditors back their attest with unlimited lia bility. Unlimited lia bility concentrates the mind. Sec ondly, argues Bolkeste in, the threat to a udit market struc ture is entirely self-inflicte d. Auditors pursue d a strategy of global growth by leve raging the re putation earne d in na tional marke ts. They could hardly c omplain that the threat of conta gion from partic ular markets might affect the entire operation. Bolkestein is but one of those who belie ve that cappin g claims against auditors is a cure worse tha n the disease (Bolkestein, 2003). Bolkestein ta bles two issues: one is market structure, the other is unlimited third-party lia bility.Market structureIn almost e very country, the Big Four a uditors enjoy a virtual monopoly in a uditing the large compa ny sector. The ga p separa ting the Big Four and the vast majority of a udit service providers is enormous. The auditing sector is marke d by a stark c ontrast betwee n four globa l firms accounting for the bulk of ind ustry re venue, and small firms with up to four pa rtners accounting for the bulk of industry numbers. The ga p see ms unbridgea ble. The question of ideal c ompany size in a uditing, and why there is little migra tion betwee n segments, is unse ttle d. George Stigler (1958) suggeste d segme nting a n industry into layers of compa nies of similar size and c omparing the ir returns on ca pital. Over time, firms will gravitate towards a size that maximises returns. Stigler’s ana lytical tools do not expla in the peculiar structure of the audit sector.We cannot be sure whether, in the audit sector, firm size can be divided into a continuous or ste pped c ontinuum. The firm-size dic hotomy in a uditing raises the question of whether la rge a nd sma ll firms are in the sa me market at all.Within the large-firm segme nt, howeve r, Ge orge Stigler’s forecast that compa nies gra vitate towa rds ideal c ompany size holds true. Sulliva n (2002) e xa mines the pricingstructure of the Big Eight firms before and after mergers a nd discovers price declines for large clie nts. Ba nker et al. (2003) find ta ngible productivity ga ins after audit firm mergers. At one end of the audit market spectrum, scale economies are real.Some proffer the working hypothesis that a uditing’s unlimite d lia bility re gime deters market e ntry. Thus, ending unlimite d lia bility would foster c onditions allowing smaller firms to scale-up opera tions. Once auditor lia bility is ca ppe d, according to this line of thinking, smaller firms would c ompete aga inst industry leaders a nd in due course break up the incumbe nt oligopoly.The Office of Fair Trading (2004) e xa mines this question and does not find the argument compelling. A c onnection betwee n audit lia bility re gimes and market struc ture is in a ny eve nt e mpirica lly unsubsta ntiate d. Three c ountries with ca ps on a uditor lia bility (Austria, Germa ny a nd Greece) are not known to ha ve conspicuously higher inte nsity of audit market c ompe tition for big clie nts. If the searc h for mea ns to improve audit markets has bee n unsuccessful, perha ps it would ma ke sense to look else where for polic y solutions. Argua bly, the proble ms of the a udit sector areinduced by government intervention.Unlimited third-party liabilityGovernments ha ve interve ned in a udit liability re gimes for over 150 years. The English Joint Stoc k Companies Act (1844) is the first insta nce of ma ndatory audit provision in legislation. The re mit of publicly ma ndated a udits in the UK a udits was exte nde d to banks in 1879 and to limite d liability c ompanies in 1900. In the Unite d States indepe ndent audits were voluntary until the 1934 Securities Exc ha nge Ac t. At that point auditors acquire d the function of ‘public wa tchdogs’.Before the 1934 Sec urities Exc hange Act (SEC Act) a uditors were only lia ble to the principals who hire d them. Third-party lia bility claims did not succee d in court. US Supre me Court Judge Benja min Cardozo, in his ruling in Ultra mares (1931), ring- fenced a uditors from ‘a lia bility in an indeterminate a mount for an indetermina te time to a n inde terminate class. The hazards of a business c onducte d on these terms are so extre me as to enkindle doubt whether a fla w ma y not exist in the implicating of a dutythat e xposes to these c onse quences.’The 1934 SEC Act did not hee dCardozo’s warning. The imposition of audits by public man date opene d the floodgates to the flow of third-party litigation that Ca rdoz o sought to seal off.The SEC Ac t ma de a uditors the target of lia bility claims file d by plaintiffs who read an a udit opinion as a seal of good house keeping. The tide of claims a nd se ttle me nts rose for severa l deca des and hit its high-wa ter mark by the 1990s. In the USA the 1995 Private Sec urities Litigation Reform Ac t curtaile d the scope for third-party la wsuits and brought a measure of re lief to the profession. Since then the twin corporate a nd a udit failures of Enron a nd Arthur Anderse n have once more brought the issue of audit market structure a nd lia bility to the fore. Authorities are looking for wa ys to improve market structure a nd entry c onditions. The following c omments sugge st as a re medy for the dysfunctional a udit market to re in bac k the re mit of government interve ntion.Market failure or regulatory failure?The 1934 SEC Ac t mandate d audits in the public interest. This ste p broade ne d the range of a uditors’contractual obligations. The SEC Ac t did not define what these liabilities were and it was left to the courts to interpret the m. The adde d lia bility to third parties c ha nge d the incentives of a udit market actors. Auditors are liable to the c ompany that hire d the m, and to third parties tha t did not. Companies pa y auditors, third parties do not. The impact of third-party litigation risk on a udit service pricing is not tra nsparent. Third-party litiga tion risk can be reflecte d in audit service contracts in three possiblewa ys. The first is that third-party litigation risk is priced into a udit c ontracts a nd compa nies foot the bill for free- riding parties. That mea ns compa nies overpa y. The second is that third-party litigation risk is not priced into a udit service c ontracts: in tha t case, auditors are underpaid. The third possibility is that c ompanies perceive auditor accounta bility to third-party liabilities as a be nefit to the mselves a nd are pre pared to reward this service. Researc h suggests this is the case. If so, this ha s some bearing on the issue of audit market reform. Companies in Spain, for e xa mple, report they c hoose a large a udit firm in the e xpectation that this will improve their cre dibility with business partners a broa d (Moizer et al., 2004). Another study rela te s the effect of a udit marketreform in Ca na da, where in 1994 le gislation ga ve certain large private compa nies a n exe mption from ma ndatory audits. Subseque ntly, a bout a quarter of all eligiblecompa nies re duced the e xte nt of audit services. Those that c onti nue d audit services at pre-reform le vels stated tha t the ir motivation was to maintain cre dibility with outside parties (Rennie et a l., 2001). Clearly, auditor third-party accounta bility is a ke ybenefit to c ompa nies.This finding has some bearing on reforms of audit regula tion. Compa nies that do not provide the information investors e xpect ha ve diffic ulty attracting investment. Over time, a company’s c os t of capital will signal whether the le vel of disclosure is right. The Ca na dia n experie nce shows c o mpanies choose the level of inde pende nt a udits that suit their nee ds. If compa nies are prepare d to hire auditors voluntarily, governments nee d not compe l the m.An objec tion a gainst a switch from ma ndatory to voluntary re porting might be tha t this would not make a differe nce. If private and public incentives overla p, outcomes in the market would be ide ntical. This objection overlooks tha t dropping government-ma nda ted a udits would allow flexibility in two respects. Both the le vel a nd the form of audit services could vary. Where re gulation dete rmines the level of a udit services, these ma y be overprovide d or underprovide d. An exa mple of each possibility follows.In Florida, regulation precludes some municipalities from putting their a udit contracts out to te nder. Re gulators wa nt municipalities to pic k their a uditor solely on quality. Restricte d and unrestric ted a udit markets in Florida allow c omparison of the effect on marke t outc omes. Munic ipa lities with bidding restrictions te nd to pa y more for audit services and to win more a wards for high standards of financ ial disclosure(Hac ke nbrac k et al., 2000). One might suspect that this is a case of gold plating. A case underprovision of audit services, on the other ha nd, beca me appare nt inGerma ny whe n corporations won the right to switc h from domestic to US acc ounting rules. DaimlerBe nz ava ile d itself of this opportunity. Eve n though itsrestated acc ounts showe d a loss rather tha n a profit,the compa ny’s post-restate me nt share price went up. This investor reaction is c onsiste nt with theexpectat ion that ca pital markets re wa rdincrease dtra nsparenc y (Le uz and Verrecchia, 2000; Myddelton, 2004).More over, imposing uniform accounting sta nda rds diminishes scope for the audit sector to develop varia nt disclosure for ms. Re gulatory competition in corporate governa nce is trie d a ndteste d in US fina ncial markets. An e xa mple is the highly sophisticate d fra me work for corpora tegovernance in the USA regarding domicile ofinc orporation. US c orporations are free to c hoose the ir domicile and over time realised that pic king the right location for incorporation gives an e dgein raising capital. Market discipline, rather tha n governme nt directives, creates incentives for choosing whe re to inc orporate. Similarly, giving compa nies an option to express a prefere nce for alternative accounting sta ndards would allow marke t forces to determine optima l reporting regimes (Sunder, 2002).The De partme nt of Trade a nd Industry’s proposa ls will not affec t the top-hea vy structure of the audit market. A more effective way to increase c ompe tition in a udit markets would be to re lease companies and auditors from the require me nt to c omply with guidelines impose d by governme nt. This step would e nd the distortion of ince ntives and re lease pote ntia l to ne gotiate a udit c ontracts that meet the re quire me nts ofcompa nies, a uditors a nd third parties.ReferencesArthur Anderse n, Coopers & Lybra nd, Deloitte Touc he, Ernst& Young, KPMG Peat Marwic k a nd Price Wa terhouse(1992) ‘The Lia bility Crisis in the Unite d Stat es: Impact on the Acc ounting Profession’, re printe d in Journa l of Acc ountanc y, 174, 19–23.Ba nker, R., H. Chang a nd R. Cunningham (2003) ‘The Public Accounting Industry Production Function’, Journal ofAccounting a nd Economics, 35, 255–281.Bolkestein, F. (2003) ‘Auditor Liability. An EU Perspective’,Address toBeac hcroft Wa nsborough Confere nce,24 Ma rch.Hac kenbrac k, K., K. Jense n and J. Pa yne (2000) ‘The Effect of a Bi dding Restriction on the Audit Services Market’,Journal of Acc ounting Research, 38, 355–374.Leuz, C. a nd R. Ve rrecchia (2000) ‘The Ec onomic Conse que nces of Increased Disclosure’, Journal of Accounting Researc h, 38, 91–136.Moizer, P., M. Bena u, C. Humphrey a nd A. Martinez (2004)‘The Corporate Ima ge of Auditors in a De veloping Audit Market wit hin the EU: The Ca se of Spa in’, Europea nAcc ounting Revie w, 13, 561–582.Myddelton, D. R. (2004) Unshac kling Accounta nts, London:Institute of Economic Affairs.Office of Fair Trading (2004) An Assessment of the Implications for Competition of a Ca p on Audito rs’ Lia bility (OFT 741),London: OFT.Re nnie, M., D. Senkow, R. Re nnie and J. Wa ng (2001) ‘The Audit Rete ntion Decision in the Face of Dere gulation: Evide nce from Large Private Ca nadian Corporations’,Auditing: A Journal of Practice and The ory, 20, 101–113.S tigler, G. (1958) ‘The Ec onomies of Scale’, Journal of La w andEc onomics, 1, 54 –71Sulliva n, M. (2002) ‘The Effect of the Big Eight Accounting Firm Mergers on the Market for Audit Services’, Journal of La w a nd Ec onomics, 45, 375–399.Sunder, S. (2002) ‘Re gulatory Compe tition a mong Acc ounting Sta ndards within and across InternationalBoundaries’, Journa l of Acc ounting and Public Polic y,21,219–234Benedikt Koehler works at the Fina ncial ServicesAuthority. This article is writte n in a personal ca pacity(bene***********************).。

外文文献翻译--内部审计

外文文献翻译--内部审计

内部审计在沙特阿拉伯的发展:协会理论透视内部审计职能的价值1早先的研究已经运用各种各样的方法来制定适当的标准以评估内部审计职能的有效率。

比如说,视遵照标准的程度为影响内部审计表现的其中因素之一。

一份1988年国际会计师协会英国协会的研究报告就致力与研究内部审计作用价值中高级管理层和外部审计员的认知力。

这项研究证明了衡量所提供服务的价值的艰难性就是做评估的主要障碍。

收益性,费用标准以及资源利用率都被确认为服务价值的衡量标准。

在这项研究里,它强调了确保内部审计工作应遵从SPPIA的必要性。

在美国,1988的Albrechta研究过内部审计的地位和作用,还为了能有效的评估内部审计的效率特别制定出一套框架。

他们发现有四个能让内部审计部门发展从而提高内部审计效率的要件:一个合适的企业环境,高级管理层的支持,具备高素质的内部审计人员以及高质量的内部审计工作。

在这项研究里学者们强调管理层和审计人员都应该承认内部审计职能对于企业来说是一种具有增值性的职能。

在英国,1997年,Ridley 和D’Silva证明遵循专业标准的重要性是促进内部审计职能增值功能的最重要的因素。

遵循SPPIA大量的研究都特别专注于内部审计部门对于SPPIA遵从性的研究。

1992年,Powell et al对11个国家的国际会计师协会的成员进行了一项全球性的调查以证明是否有全球性的内部审计文化。

他们发现对这11个国家的国际会计师协会成员的调查中,有82%的是遵循SPPIA的。

这个蛮高的百分比率促使学者们建议SPPIA提供内部审计这个职业全球化的证据。

许多的研究已经关注涉及到独立性的SPPIA标准。

1981年,Clark et al发现内部审计部门的独立性和内部审计人员所做报告的权威性是影响他们工作客观性的最至关重要的两个因素。

1985年,Plumlee致力于研究影响内部审计人员客观性的潜在威胁,特别是参与内部控制制度的设计是否会影响到关于该制度质量与有效率的决断力。

英语 审计的名词解释

英语 审计的名词解释

英语审计的名词解释审计是一个广泛应用的名词,特别在商业和财务领域中,扮演着关键的角色。

审计旨在评估一个实体的财务状况和财务报表的准确性。

英语中审计一词通常翻译为"audit",这个词源于拉丁文的"audire",意为"听",也就是通过仔细倾听和评估来确保财务信息的可靠性。

审计的目的是验证财务报表的准确性和可靠性。

在进行审计时,审计师会对财务报表进行全面的检查,并保证其与会计准则的符合性。

通过审计,企业可以提供真实、公正和完整的财务信息,从而增强投资者、债权人和其他利益相关者的信心。

在一个审计过程中,审计师会采取多种方法和技术,以确保财务报表的准确性。

他们会仔细检查企业的账户和记录,检测是否存在错误,如风险漏报或欺诈行为。

审计师还会对内部控制系统进行评估,以确保企业的财务信息能够得到正确和及时的编制和记录。

审计通常被分为两类:内部审计和外部审计。

内部审计是由公司聘请的专业审计师或审计小组进行的,他们负责评估企业的内部控制和运营效率。

内部审计的目标是提供独立和客观的意见,为公司的管理者提供改进业务流程和风险管理的建议。

外部审计是由独立的审计师或专业审计事务所进行的,他们不属于企业的雇员。

外部审计的目标是对公司的财务报表进行审核,以发表独立和客观的意见。

外部审计通常是根据国家或地区的法律要求或市场的需求进行的,以确保财务报表的准确性和透明度。

审计的过程可以分为准备、实施、报告和后续行动四个阶段。

首先,审计师需要熟悉被审计实体的背景和运营情况,并制定审计计划和时间表。

然后,审计师会执行计划并进行实地检查和数据分析。

在收集和分析足够的证据后,审计师会编写审计报告,其中包括审计师的意见和建议。

最后,审计师会与实体的管理层一起审查审计结果,并决定是否需要进行后续行动,如改进内部控制或修订财务报表。

值得注意的是,审计并不等于鉴证。

审计仅仅是对客观事实的评估,而不是对主观判断的验证。

审计报告中英文对照

审计报告中英文对照

审计报告中英文对照Audit Report审计报告致:XYZ公司管理层我们对XYZ公司及其附属公司(统称为“集团”)2024年12月31日的合并财务报表以及截至该日的年度进行了审计。

合并财务报表包括截至2024年12月31日的合并资产负债表,年度综合收益表,股东权益变动表和合并现金流量表,以及合并财务报表的附注。

Responsibility of the Management for the Consolidated Financial Statements管理层对合并财务报表的责任The management of the Group is responsible for the preparation and fair presentation of these consolidatedfinancial statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards. This responsibility includes designing, implementing, and maintaining internal control relevant to the preparation and fair presentation of consolidated financial statements that are free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.集团管理层负责根据国际财务报告准则编制并公正呈现这些合并财务报表。

这一责任包括设计、实施和维护与合并财务报表编制和公正呈现有关的内部控制,确保合并财务报表不存在重大错误或舞弊。

Responsibility of the Auditor审计师的责任我们的责任是根据我们所进行的审计,对这些合并财务报表发表意见。

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外文翻译审计和管理姓名:王伟国学号:120107230原文:Auditing And AdministrationSchools of public administration over the years have given attention bordering on idol worship to "who gets what, when, and how." In some ways that worship is understandable. Public budgeting and the appropriations process are at the heart of policy and decision making in American government. Schools and programs in public administration teach budgeting under a variety of titles. When contemplating career opportunities, their students learn that budgeting is where the action is.Regrettably, little attention has been given in American public administration to issues of accountability how funds are used; how their use is reported to the public; and what impact funding has had. Auditing raises these questions and provides answers.' But auditing is little known in public administration circles and, with few exceptions, public administration does not teach auditing.' The concept of financial, efficiency, and effectiveness accountability is almost foreign to public administration students and to public managers. The current interest in program evaluation by executive branch agencies does not address the deeper and more lasting issues: how are public sector managers to report to legislators on the use of public resources? Can this be accomplished as an integral part of the budget process? Public administration programs must explore answers to these questions.Since mid-1990s public executive agencies in the United States have dramatically expanded evaluation activities. This expansion has been marked by the establishment of large planning and evaluation staffs in cabinet level departments of the federal government, the publication of numerous books on the topic, the appearance of journals devoted exclusively to evaluation, and the introduction of evaluation courses and fields of concentration at major universities Nevertheless, the considerable growth and change of formal post audit and evaluation activities at the state legislative level has gone largely unnoticed. The U.S. General Accounting Office GAO, created in 1921, has received somewhat more attention. However, its important role as a congressional agency is still not well understood. State legislatures evaluate existing government programs departments require authorization for new programs. But the publication of formal performance audit reports has become a widespread phenomenon only in the1970s. The number of performance-type reports sent to the Legislative Program Evaluation Section LPES Clearinghouse at the Eagleton Institute of Politics of Rutgers University has grown from five reports published in 1971 by one New York State agency to 134 reports published by state legislative audit agencies in 20 states in 1977.The growth of performance audit reports reflects the growth of the organizations which produce them. The Council of State Governments reported that in 1998 there were only five states where sole post audit responsibilities rested with a legislative auditor. By the mid-1970s the number had grown to 25 and in others the legislatures shared post audit responsibility with executive branch agencies. By the 1977-78 biennium 44 states had at least one legislative staff agency with primary responsibility for the post audit function.Regrettably, little attention has been given in American public administration to issues of accountability? how funds are used; how their use is reported to the public; and what impact funding has had.There are two major structural approaches to performanceAuditing in state legislatures. One places the performance auditing capacity in the office ofthe legislative auditor. In most cases the legislative auditor and his staff are responsible to a legislative audit committee which includes members of both chambers and political parties. Traditionally, legislative auditors confined their activities to financial and compliance audits. Recently, auditors have increased efforts to assess not only efficiency but also the effectiveness of state agencies and programs.In 1967, for example, the Montana Office of the Legislative Auditor placed the performance auditing capacity in the legislative auditor's office. Before 1973, however, the office produced only financial-compliance audits. Since then the auditor has issued performance audits covering topics such as workmen's compensation, the state motor vehicle pool, and milk price regulations. In addition, eight sunset reviews have been carried out, covering state regulatory boards such as those on accountants, plumbers, and banks. Other states which employ the post audit approach include California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, and TennesseeThe establishment of a special purpose legislative audit or evaluation committee with its own professional staff is a second approach to building a performance audit capacity. These staffs generally conduct performance reviews, while the more traditional audit work is left to the states' audit agencies. In all cases these committees include members of both political parties. The Connecticut Program Review and Investigations Committee, established in 1972, is an example of the special purpose committee approach. Originally limited strictly to performance evaluations, the committee received statutory power in 2001 conduct investigations authorized by legislative resolution. In 1999 the legislature gave the committee the responsibility to conduct sunset reviews. The committee, with a staff of about 10, has published 12 program evaluations on topics such as vocational education, medicaid, and juvenile corrections. It also has conducted investigations of the Department of Environmental Protection and civil rights compliance by several departments. Other states using this structural approach include Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, Virginia, and Washington.Despite the different structures for performance audit efforts, staff directors agree on the need to recruit staff without regard to political affiliation. Most staffs include fewer than 15 professional employees. Almost all agencies try to hire people with varied educational backgrounds.The most prevalent academic disciplines include business and public administration, and the social sciences. A few staffs include lawyers, behavioral and natural scientists, and statisticians. Staff directors believe that basic research competence, analytical ability, and oral and written communication skills are more important than backgrounds in specific fields. In contrast, individuals with strong backgrounds in accounting and finance continue to perform financial audits. Most state legislative audit staffs follow the general guidelines set down in the GAO's 1972 "Yellow Book," Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions. The Yellow Book covers standards for audit work such as staff qualifications, planning, supervision, evidence, reporting, and review .One major difference among the staffs is the degree to which legislators participate in various stages of the projects. In most states legislators formally chose the topics for study while the staff always designs the audit reviews and collects the data. In a few states legislators participate by holding legislative hearings, visiting program sites, or in one state even assisting in interviews. Staff personnel analyze the data, reach conclusions, and draft audit reports.In almost all states the staff drafts recommendations. Legislators normally participate in the recommendations process through adopting, modifying, or rejecting them. Adoption by legislatorscan mean merely rubberstamping staff recommendations or actively debating and altering those recommendations.Most legislative audit agencies send a copy of completed final reports for comment to the executive branch agency under review. These comments are published as part of the reports. Many post audit agencies conduct regular report flow-up activities Annual staff reports note the extent of progress in implementing report recommendations by the legislature and executive branch. State legislative auditors are placing renewed emphasis on the specific uses made of the reports by both legislative and executive officials.The considerable growth and change of formal post audit and evaluation activities at the state legislative level has gone largely unnoticed.Executive agency officials do not always view the process this way. They fall into the ready trap that if only more money were available more good would result. If left to themselves, it seems likely that public works and highway departments would surely pave the whole nation with concrete. This type of agency thinking gave birth to a wildlife flyway and feeding system proposed for varied species of fowl as they crossed through the Tennessee Valley .When presented to the Board of Directors of the Tennessee Valley Authority, officials estimated that 100,000 birds, including innumerable ducks, could be expected to use the system. When the board chairman discovered the cost would be $100,000, he exclaimed: "My God, that a buck a duck!" No one knows if feeding a duck on its way to wintering in better weather is worth a dollar, but it is not a bad way to think about the flyway and feeding system program.Overly zealous quest for audit implementation, however, can lead auditors to avoid important areas, where either controversy or disinterest could result in a lack of action on staff recommendations. This would impair, rather than assist, legislators in their oversight responsibilities.The easiest way to improve an audit implementation score is to learn what key officials want and then put it in an audit report. No one advocates that strategy. Simply providing objective information for consideration in future decisions is a crucial task of performance audit-evaluation.Many audit-evaluations bring to the attention of key officials potential problems before they become actual and costly ones. A Kansas audit on water use policies recommended ways to improve existing water laws and integrate current information about water use for more effective management of current water resources. The audit has served as a study document for legislative hearings and regional conferences on water use, and its findings and recommendations should enable planners to make better decisions on water supply years from now.Many important effects of the audit process are intangible and thus not readily susceptible to measurement. The labels "watch dog" and "bird dog" did not come to audit agencies by accident. Audits of government agencies have long been considered valuable because they are believed to help minimize fraud, waste, mismanagement, and unrealistic budget requests. Like a regular medical examination, this "preventive effect" is valuable but difficult to measure in dollars. There are instances of officials resigning after completion of an audit in protest, in anger, or in sad recognition of the audit's accuracy. Such resignations-like that following publication of the South Carolina Medicaid Audit-are not evidence of implementation in any precise sense, but lend support to the view that good audit work promotes better management.There seems to be great enthusiasm for distributing appropriate shares of the public purse, but little concern for evaluating what is accomplished with the shares.Audit work requires objectivity, professionalism, and freedom from political pressures, which suggests a considerable degree of independence within the legislative setting. This difficult balancing act looks more precarious when one considers the evidence produced in the seven case studies? two of the seven key factors likely to lead to audit implementation are legislator approval of audit report topics and legislator interest in the audits. These factors suggest the need for a strong sensitivity and linkage to the legislature. The most promise of reconciling these contradictory strong forces lies in a healthy term of office for the head audit official, with difficult removal provisions, and the power of staff appointment reserved to the chief auditor.Without such assurances, the controversy which inevitab inevitably surrounds performance audit work is likely to bring disappointing results-less than totally objective work performed by a less than totally professional staff. The schools of public administration have not played a major role in the development of public sector auditing. Yet many of the leading concerns of government auditing should be the concerns of public administration.Few professors of public administration teach auditing of any variety. Courses in legislatures as organizations are scarce. Those that exist focus primarily on law-making and usually ignore the oversight and accountability responsibilities of legislatures.The direction of courses in public administration schools is subject to many competing emphases: for example, behavioral research, quantitative research, and institutional research. None of these options should allow students to escape from some basic core work in economics and finance, research techniques statistics, interviewing, surveys, etc., accounting, and oral and written communications-all of which are essential to understanding and performing effective audit and oversight work. Given the lack of exposure to auditing, it is not surprising that so many eager young public administration students go forth seeking policy analysis positions- if they cannot immediately be president, governor, or secretary of state, they at least want to tell him how he should do his job. There is little interest in the mechanics of understanding how and whether government works, and in improving service delivery. There seems to be great enthusiasm for distributing appropriate shares of the public purse, but little concern for evaluating what is accomplished with the shares.Pubic administration has failed American governmental and financial administration by not stressing that public officials must be held accountable for the financial resources entrusted to them. Accountability includes financial, compliance, and performance auditing. Careful financial reporting and auditing is required. Periodic outside examinations of organizational and program efficiency and effectiveness should be understood and welcomed. Public administration education and training should stress accountability in general and the audit function in particular. Such education is long the audit function in particular. Such education is long overdue.出处:Richard Brown. Auditing And Pubic Administration [J]. Interal Auditor, 2010,16: 60-65.译文:审计和管理多年以来,公共行政管理学校在对公共资金问题上给予了足够重视,这些问题包括“谁得到什么,在什么时候,以及通过怎样的方式得到。

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