会计信息失真外文翻译文献
会计信息失真 外文文献译文及原文
封面目录1 绪论 (3)1 Introduction (4)2 会计信息失真的原因 (5)2.1 会计法律法规体系的局限性 (5)2.2 会计工作人员的疏漏 (5)2.3 职业道德的背离 (5)2.4 政府监管机制不完善 (6)2 The reason of the accounting information distortion (7)2.1 The limitation of accountant laws and regulations system (7)2.2 The accountancy fault (7)2.3 Occupational ethics deviating (8)2.4 The imperfect government mechanism (8)3 会计信息失真的对策 (9)3.1 建立标准化的会计准则，加强会计制度的建设 (9)3.2 建立和完善公司内部监管体系 (9)3.3 完善会计人员监管体系，加大违规的惩处力度 (9)3.4 完善职业资格证制度，加大后续教育的力度，提高会计人员的综合素质 (10)3 The Countermeasure of Accounting Information Distortion (11)3.1 Standard accounting guide line and strengthen the construction of accounting system .. 113.2 Establishing and perfecting enterprise internal control system. (11)3.3 Perfecting accountant supervises system, enhancing punishment. (12)3.4 Consummating employed qualifications system, enhancing following education,improving the accountant quality comprehensively. (12)4 结论 (14)Conclusions (15)摘要这些年，会计信息失真已经影响到了社会经济秩序，本文主要分析了我国会计信息失真产生的原因，及其对策。
华信学院论文格式(开题报告、文献综述和外文翻译、论文前置部分)
毕业设计（论文）文献综述、外文翻译题目分析会计信息失真的原因及解决办法姓名赵岩峰学号 408417012627系别会计系专业会计学指导教师贡燕军200 年月日本文只要的内容是：一,.分析一下会计信息失真表现方面1.经济交易失真2.会计核算失真（包括凭证、账簿、报表失真）3.会计信息披露失真。
4.故意失真和非故意失真2.具体分析会计信息失真的原因3.通过失真的原因寻求解决办法毕业设计（论文）开题报告书题目分析会计信息失真的原因及解决办法姓名赵岩峰学号 408417012627专业会计学指导教师贡燕军年月日说明1.毕业设计（论文）题目一经选定，毕业生要严格围绕选题开展各项工作，并认填写开题报告书。
2.开题报告会由各专业毕业设计（论文）指导小组组织安排。
3.毕业设计（论文）指导小组要指定一位教师认真填写开题报告会意见。
4.此开题报告书填写一式二份，一份由华信学院保存，一份放入学生档案。
注：此页部分打印在封面的背面（打印前请删除此句话）毕业设计（论文）题目姓名学号专业指导教师年月日毕业设计（论文）任务书系专业班级姓名毕业设计（论文）起止日期实习地点设计（论文）题目毕业设计（论文）内容与要求指导教师：年月日石家庄经济学院华信学院毕业设计（论文）指导意见表专业班姓名论文题目注:1.指导教师要认真指导批阅学生设计（论文）2.针对学生设计（论文）, 认真填写指导意见3.在学生设计(论文)定稿后,将此表附在设计（论文）“指导教师评语”的前面。
会计信息质量外文文献及翻译
LNTU---Acc附录A会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响安妮比蒂，美国俄亥俄州立大学瓦特史考特廖，多伦多大学约瑟夫韦伯，美国麻省理工学院1简介管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。
与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。
威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。
当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。
通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。
符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。
他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在日本。
他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。
我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金流量的不同影响。
直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。
为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。
我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性可能较低获得债务融资的可能性。
然而，这种可能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。
具体来说，我们确定的数据样本证券公司有1163个采样公司（议会），通过发行资本公共债务或银团债务。
我们限制我们的样本公司最近获得的债务融资持有该公司不断融资与借款。
然而，在样本最近获得的债务融资的公司，也有可能是信号，在资本提供进入私人信息差异和约束他们放在管理中的行为。
会计准则外文文献翻译-财务会计专业
会计准那么外文文献及翻译-财务会计专业(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Buschhüter M, Striegel A. IAS 37 – Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets[M]// Kommentar Internationale Rechnungslegung IFRS. Gabler, 2021:955-974.英文原文Accounting Standard (AS) 37Contingent Liabilities and Contingent AssetsBuschhüter M, Striegel AThis International Accounting Standard was approved by the IASC Board in July 1998 and became effective for financial statements covering periods beginning on or after 1 July 1999.Introduction1. IAS 37 prescribes the accounting and disclosure for all provisions, contingent liabilities and contingent assets, except:(a) those resulting from financial instruments that are carried at fair value;(b) those resulting from executory contracts, except where the contract is onerous. Executory contracts are contracts under which neither party has performed any of its obligations or both parties have partially performed their obligations to an equal extent;(c) those arising in insurance enterprises from contracts with policyholders;(d) those covered by another International Accounting Standard. Provisions2. The Standard defines provisions as liabilities of uncertain timing or amount. A provision should be recognised when, and only when:(a) an enterprise has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past event; (b) it is probable (i.e. more likely than not) that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation;(c) a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation. The Standard notes that it is only in extremely rare cases that a reliable estimate will not be possible.3. The Standard defines a constructive obligation as an obligation that derives from an enterprise's actions where:(a) by an established pattern of past practice, published policies or a sufficiently specific current statement, the enterprise has indicated to other parties that it will accept certain responsibilities; (b) as a result, the enterprise has created a valid expectation on the part of those other parties that it will discharge those responsibilities.4. In rare cases, for example in a law suit, it may not be clear whether an enterprise has a present obligation. In these cases, a past event is deemed to give rise to a present obligation if, taking account of all available evidence, it is more likely than not that a present obligation exists at thebalance sheet date. An enterprise recognises a provision for that present obligation if the other recognition criteria described above are met. If it is more likely than not that no present obligation exists, the enterprise discloses a contingent liability, unless the possibility of an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is remote.5. The amount recognized as a provision should be the best estimate of the expenditu required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date, in other words, the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle the obligation at the balance sheet date or to transfer it to a third party at that time.6. The Standard requires that an enterprise should, in measuring a provision: (a) take risks and uncertainties into account. However, uncertainty does not justify the creation of excessive provisions or a deliberate overstatement of liabilities;(b) discount the provisions, where the effect of the time value of money is material, using a pre-tax discount rate (or rates) that reflect(s) current market assessments of the time value of money and those risks specific to the liability that have not been reflected in the best estimate of the expenditure. Where discounting is used, the increase in the provision due to the passage of time is recognised as an interest expense;(c) take future events, such as changes in the law and technological changes, into account where there is sufficient objective evidence thatthey will occur; and(d) not take gains from the expected disposal of assets into account, even if the expected disposal is closely linked to the event giving rise to the provision.7. An enterprise may expect reimbursement of some or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision (for example, through insurance contracts, indemnity clauses or suppliers' warranties). An enterprise should:(a) recognise a reimbursement when, and only when, it is virtually certain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the obligation. The amount recognised for the reimbursement should not exceed the amount of the provision; and(b) recognise the reimbursement as a separate asset. In the income statement, the expense relating to a provision may be presented net of the amount recognised for a reimbursement. 8. Provisions should be reviewed at each balance sheet date and adjusted reflect thecurrent best estimate. If it is no longer probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, the provisioshould be reversed.9. A provision should be used only for expenditures for which the provision was originally recognised.Provisions - Specific Applications10. The Standard explains how the general recognition and measurement requirements for provisions should be applied in three specific cases: future operating losses; onerous contracts; and restructurings. Contingent Liabilities11. An enterprise should not recognise a contingent liability. , unless the12. A contingent liability is disclosed, as required by paragraph 86possibility of an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is remote.13. Where an enterprise is jointly and severally liable for an obligation, the part of tobligation that is expected to be met by other parties is treated as a contingentThe enterprise recognises a provision for the part of the obligation for which an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is probable, except in the extremely rare circumstances where no reliable estimate can be made.14. Contingent liabilities may develop in a way not initially expected. Therefore, theare assessed continually to determine whether an outflow of resources embodying probable. If it becomes probable that an outflow of economic benefits has become future economic benefits will be required for an item previously dealt with as a contingent liability, a provision is recognised in the financial statements of the period in which the change in probability occurs (except in the extremely rare circumstances where no reliable estimate can be made).Contingent Assets15. An enterprise should not recognise a contingent asset.16. Contingent assets usually arise from unplanned or other unexpected events that give rise to the possibility of an inflow of economic benefits to the enterprise. An example is a claim that an enterprise is pursuing through legal processes, where the outcome is uncertain. 17. Contingent assets are not recognised in financial statements since this may result in the recognition of income that may never be realised. However, when the realisation of income is virtually certain, then the related asset is not a contingent asset and its recognition is appropriate. 18. A contingent asset is disclosed, as required by paragraph 89 economic benefits is probable.19. Contingent assets are assessed continually to ensure that developments are appropriately reflected in the financial statements. If it has become virtually certain that an inflow of economic benefits will arise, the asset and the related income are recognised in the financial statements of the period in which the change occurs. If an inflow of economic benefits has become probable, an enterprise discloses the contingent asset.Measurement20. The amount recognised as a provision should be the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date.21. The best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation is the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle the obligation at the balance sheet date or to transfer it to a third party at that time. It will often be impossible or prohibitively expensive to settle or transfer an obligation at the balance sheet date. However, the estimate of the amount that an enterprise would rationally pay to settle or transfer the obligation gives the best estimate of the expenditure required to settle the present obligation at the balance sheet date. 22. The estimates of outcome and financial effect are determined by the judgement of the management of the enterprise, supplemented by experience of similar transactions and, in some cases, reports from independent experts. The evidence considered23. Uncertainties surrounding the amount to be recognised as a provision are dealt with by various means according to the circumstances. Where the provision being measured involves a large population of items, the obligation is estimated by weighting all possible outcomes by their associated probabilities. The name for thistatistical method of estimation is 'expected value'. The provision will therefore be different depending on whether the probability of a loss of a given amount is, for example, 60 per cent or 90 per cent. Where there is a continuous range of possible outcomes, and each point in that range is as likely as any other, the mid-point of thrange is used. 24. Where a single obligation is beingmeasured, the individual most likely outcome may be the best estimate of the liability. However, even in such a case, the enterprise considers other possible outcomes. Where other possible outcomes are either mostly higher or mostly lower than the most likely outcome, the best estimate will be a higher or lower amount. For example, if an enterprise has to rectify a serious fault in a major plant that it has constructed for a customer, the individual most likely outcome may be for the repair to succeed at the first attempt at a cost of1,000, but a provision for a larger amount is made if there is a significant chance that further attempts will be necessary.25. The provision is measured before tax, as the tax consequences of the provision, , Income Taxes. and changes in it, are dealt with under IAS 12,Income Taxes.Risks and Uncertainties26. The risks and uncertainties that inevitably surround many events and the best estimate of a circumstances should be taken into account in reachin the best estmeate of a provision.27. Risk describes variability of outcome. A risk adjustment may increase the amount at which a liability is measured. Caution is needed in making judgements under conditions of uncertainty, so that income or assets are not overstated and expenses or liabilities are not understated. However, uncertainty does not justify the creation of excessive provisions or adeliberate overstatement of liabilities. For example, if the projected costs of a particularly adverse outcome are estimated on a prudent basis, that outcome is not then deliberately treated as more probable than is realistically the case. Care is needed to avoid duplicating adjustments for risk and uncertainty with consequent overstatement of a provision. Present Value28. Where the effect of the time value of money is material, the amount ofa provision should be the present value of the expenditures expected to be required to settle the obligation.29. The discount rate (or rates) should be a pre-tax rate (or rates) that reflect(s) current market assessments of the time value of money and the risks specific to the liability. The discount rate(s) should not reflect risks for which future cash flow estimates have been adjusted. Future Events 30. Future events that may affect the amount required to settle an obligation should be reflected in the amount of a provision where there is sufficient objective evidence that they will occur.31. Expected future events may be particularly important in measuring provisions. For example, an enterprise may believe that the cost of cleaning up a site at the end of its life will be reduced by future changes in technology. The amount recognised reflects a reasonable expectation of technically qualified, objective observers, taking account of all available evidence as to the technology that will be available at the time of theclean-up. Thus it is appropriate to include, for example, expected cost reductions associated with increased experience in applying existing technology or the expected cost of applying existing technology to a larger or more complex clean-up operation than has previously been carried out. However, an enterprise does not anticipate the new technology for cleaning up unless it is supported by development of a completel sufficient objective evidence.32. The effect of possible new legislation is taken into consideration in measuring an existing obligation when sufficient objective evidence exists that the legislation is virtually certain to beenacted. The variety of circumstances that arise in practice makes it impossible to specify a single event that will provide sufficient, objective evidence in every case. Evidence is required both of what legislation will demand and of whether it is virtually certain to be enacted and implemented in due course. In many cases sufficient objective evidence will not exist until the new legislation is enacted.Expected Disposal of Assets33. Gains from the expected disposal of assets should not be taken into account in measuring a provision.34. Gains on the expected disposal of assets are not taken into account in measuring a provision, even if the expected disposal is closely linked to the event giving rise to the provision. Instead, an enterprise recognisesgains on expected disposals of assets at the time specified by the International Accounting Standard dealing with the assets concerned. Reimbursements35. Where some or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision is expected to be reimbursed by another party, the reimbursement should be recognised when, and only when, it is virtually certain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the obligation. The reimbursement should be treated as a separate asset. The amount recognised for the reimbursement should not exceed the amount of the provision.36. In the income statement, the expense relating to a provision may be presented net of the amount recognised for a reimbursement.37. Sometimes, an enterprise is able to look to another party to pay part or all of the expenditure required to settle a provision (for example, through insurance contracts, indemnity clauses or suppliers' warranties). The other party may either reimburse amounts paid by the enterprise or pay the amounts directly.38. In most cases the enterprise will remain liable for the whole of the amount in question so that the enterprise would have to settle the full amount if the third party failed to pay for any reason. In this situation, a provision is recognised for the full amount of the liability, and a separate asset for the expected reimbursement is recognised when it is virtuallycertain that reimbursement will be received if the enterprise settles the liability.39. In some cases, the enterprise will not be liable for the costs in question if the third party fails to pay. In such a case the enterprise has no liability for those costs and they are not included in the provision.40. As noted in paragraph 29,severally liable is a contingent liability to the extent that it is expected that the obligation will be settled by the other parties.Changes in Provisions41. Provisions should be reviewed at each balance sheet date and adjusted to reflect the current best estimate. If it is no longer probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be required to settle the obligation, the provision should be reversed.42. Where discounting is used, the carrying amount of a provision increases in each period to reflect the passage of time. This increase is recognised as borrowing cost.Use of Provisions43. A provision should be used only for expenditures for which the provision was originally recognised.44. Only expenditures that relate to the original provision are set against it. Setting expenditures against a provision that was originally recognised for another purpose would conceal the impact of two different events.Future Operating Losses45. Provisions should not be recognised for future operating losses.46. Future operating losses do not meet the definition of a liability in paragraph 10.the general recognition criteria set out for provisions in paragraph 1447. An expectation of future operating losses is an indication that certain assets of the operation may be impaired. An enterprise tests these assets for impairment under IAS 36, Impairment of Assets.Onerous Contracts48. If an enterprise has a contract that is onerous, the present obligation under the contract should be recognised and measured as a provision. 49. Many contracts (for example, some routine purchase orders) can be cancelled without paying compensation to the other party, and therefore there is no obligation. Other contracts establish both rights and obligations for each of the contracting parties. Where events make such a contract onerous, the contract falls within the scope of this Standard and a liability exists which is recognised. Executory contracts that are not onerous fall outside the scope of this Standard. 50. This Standard defines an onerous contract as a contract in which the unavoidable costs of meeting the obligations under the contract exceed the economic benefits expected to be received under it. The unavoidable costs under a contract reflect the least net cost of exiting from the contract, which is the lower ofthe cost of fulfilling it and any compensation or penalties arising from failure to fulfil it.51. Before a separate provision for an onerous contract is established, an enterprise recognises any impairment loss that has occurred on assets dedicated to that contract(see IAS 36, Impairment of Assets). Restructuring52. The following are examples of events that may fall under the definition of restructuring: (a) sale or termination of a line of business; (b) the closure of business locations in a country or region or the relocation of business activities from one country or region to another; (c) changes in management structure, for example, eliminating a layer of management; (d) fundamental reorganisations that have a material effect on the nature and focus of the enterprise's operations.53. A provision for restructuring costs is recognised only when the general recognition are met. Paragraphs 72-83 set out how criteria for provisions set out in paragraph 14the general recognition criteria apply to restructurings.54. A constructive obligation to restructure arises only when an enterprise:(a) has a detailed formal plan for the restructuring identifying at least: (i) the business or part of a business concerned;(ii) the principal locations affected;(iii) the location, function, and approximate number of employees whowill be compensated for terminating their services;(iv) the expenditures that will be undertaken;(v) when the plan will be implemented;(b) has raised a valid expectation in those affected that it will carry out the restructuring by starting to implement that plan or announcing its main features to those affected by it. . Evidence that an enterprise has started to implement a restructuring plan would be provided, 55for example, by dismantling plant or selling assets or by the public announcement of the main features of the plan. A public announcement of a detailed plan to restructure constitutes a constructive obligation to restructure only if it is made in such a way and in sufficient detail (i.e. setting out the main features of the plan) that it gives rise to valid expectations in other parties such as customers, suppliers and employees (or their representatives) that the enterprise will carry out the restructuring.56. For a plan to be sufficient to give rise to a constructive obligation when communicated to those affected by it, its implementation needs to be planned to begin as soon as possible and to be completed in a timeframe that makes significant changes to the plan unlikely. If it is expected that there will be a long delay before the restructuring begins or that the restructuring will take an unreasonably long time, it is unlikely that the plan will raise a valid expectation on the part of others that theenterprise is at present committed to restructuring, because the timeframe allows opportunities for the enterprise to change its plans.57. A management or board decision to restructure taken before the balance sheet date does not give rise to a constructive obligation at the balance sheet date unless the enterprise has, before the balance sheet date:(a) started to implement the restructuring plan;(b) announced the main features of the restructuring plan to those affected by it in a sufficiently specific manner to raise a valid expectation in them that the enterprise will carry out the restructuring. In some cases, an enterprise starts to implement a restructuring plan, or announces its main features to those affected, only after the balance sheet date. Disclosure may be , Events After the Balance Sheet Date, if the restructuring is of required under IAS 10 such importance that its non-disclosure would affect the ability of the users of the financial statements to make proper evaluations and decisions.58. Although a constructive obligation is not created solely by a management decision, an obligation may result from other earlier events together with such a decision. For example, negotiations with employee representatives for termination payments, or with purchasers for the sale of an operation, may have been concluded subject only to board approval. Once that approval has been obtained and communicated to the other parties, the enterprise has a constructive obligation to restructure, if theconditions of paragraph 72 are met.. 59. In some countries, the ultimate authority is vested in a board whose membership gement (e.g. employees) includes representatives of interests other than those of managment.or notification to such representatives may be necessary before the board decision is taken. Because a decision by such a board involves communication to these representatives, it may result in a constructive obligation to restructure.60. No obligation arises for the sale of an operation until the enterprise is committed to the sale, i.e. there is a binding sale agreement.61. Even when an enterprise has taken a decision to sell an operation and announced that decision publicly, it cannot be committed to the sale until a purchaser has been identified and there is a binding sale agreement. Until there is a binding sale agreement, the enterprise will be able to change its mind and indeed will have to take another course of action if a purchaser cannot be found on acceptable terms. When the sale of an operation is envisaged as part of a restructuring, the assets of the operation , Impairment of Assets. When a sale is only are reviewed for impairme-ent under IAS 36part of a restructuring, a constructive obligation can arise for the other parts of the restructuring before a binding sale agreement exists.62. A restructuring provision should include only the direct expenditures arising form the restrict-uring,which are those that are both:(a) necessarily entailed by the restructuring; and(b) not associated with the ongoing activities of the enterprise.63. A restructuring provision does not include such costs as:(a) retraining or relocating continuing staff;(b) marketing; or(c) investment in new systems and distribution networks.These expenditures relate to the future conduct of the business and are not liabilities for restructuring at the balance sheet date. Such expenditures are recognised on the same basis as if they arose independently of a restructuring.64. Identifiable future operating losses up to the date of a restructuring are not included in a provision, unless they relate to an onerous contract as defined in paragraph 10. , gains on the expected disposal of assets are not taken65. As required by paragraph 51into account in measuring a restructuring provision, even if the sale of assets is envisaged as part of the restructuring.Disclosure66. For each class of provision, an enterprise should disclose:(a) the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period;(b) additional provisions made in the period, including increases toexisting provisions; (c) amounts used (i.e. incurred and charged against the provision) during the period; (d) unused amounts reversed during the period; and(e) the increase during the period in the discounted amount arising from the passage of time and the effect of any change in the discount rate. Comparative information is not required67. An enterprise should disclose the following for each class of provision:(a) a brief description of the nature of the obligation and the expected timing of any resulting outflows of economic benefits;(b) an indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of those outflows. Where necessary to provide adequate information, an enterprise should disclose the major assumptions made concerning future events, as addressed in paragraph 48(c) the amount of any expected reimbursement, stating the amount of any asset that has been recognised for that expected reimbursement.68. Unless the possibility of any outflow in settlement is remote, an enterprise should disclose for each class of contingent liability at the balance sheet date a brief description of the nature of the contingent liability and, where practicable:;(a) an estimate of its financial effect, measured under paragraphs 36(b) an indication of the uncertainties relating to the amount or timing of any outflow; (c) the possibility of any reimbursement.69. In determining which provisions or contingent liabilities may be aggregated to form a class, it is necessary to consider whether the nature of the items is sufficiently similar for a single statement about them to fulfil the requirements of paragraphs 85(a)and (b) and 86(a) and (b). Thus, it may be appropriate to treat as a single class of provision amounts relating to warranties of different products, but it would not be appropriate to treat as a single class amounts relating to normal warranties and amounts that are subject to legal proceedings.70. Where a provision and a contingent liability arise from the same set of -86 in a circumstances, an enterprise makes the disclosures required by paragraphs 84 that shows the link between the provision and the contingent liability.71. Where an inflow of economic benefits is probable, an enterprise should disclose a brief description of the nature of the contingent assets at the balance sheet date, and, where practicable, an estimate of their financial effect, measured using the principles set out for provisions in paragraphs 3672. It is important that disclosures for contingent assets avoid giving misleading ndications of the likelihood of income arising.73 In extremely rare cases, disclosure of some or all of the information required by paragraphs 84-89 can be expected to prejudice seriously the position of the enterprise a dispute with other parties on the subject matterof the provision, contingent or contingent asset. In such cases, an enterprise need not disclose the information, but should disclose the general nature of the dispute, together with the fact that, and reason why, the information has not been disclosed. Transitional Provisions74. The effect of adopting this Standard on its effective date (or earlier) should be reported as an adjustment to the opening balance of retained earnings for the period in which the Standard is first adopted. Enterprises are encouraged, but not required, to adjust the opening balance of retained earnings for the earliest period presented and to restate comparative information. If comparative information is not restated, this fact should be disclosed. , Net Profit or Loss for the75. The Standard requires a different treatment from IAS 8requires Period, Fundamental Errors and Changes in Accounting Policies. IAS 8comparative information to be restated (benchmark treatment) or additional pro forma comparative information on a restated basis to be disclosed (allowed alternative reatment) unless it is impracticable to do so.。
会计造假行为外文翻译文献
会计造假行为外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)一、对会计造假行为主体的界定(一)会计造假的含义财务会计作假可以分成会计信息的急于作假和会计信息的有意不实。
本文主要牵涉会计信息的急于作假，它就是指财务会计活动中当事人．事前经过精心安排，故意以欺诈、舞弊等手段．假造、变造不实会计信息，并使会计信息歪曲充分反映经济活动和财务会计事项．以此达至特定利益的集团或个人的不能抗拒违法犯罪犯罪行为。
(二)会计造假主体的界定财务会计作假主体应当包含炮制假账和有关违法乱纪活动的主谋、共谋和执行者。
按照在作假过程中所充分发挥的促进作用相同，财务会计作假主体包含动议者、决策者、操作者和协同者。
造假的动议者是指为会计造假出谋划策的人。
通常是单位财会部门的负责人．在作假过程中往往饰演替编剧的角色。
造假的决策者是指有权决定会计造假实施的各级领导人。
决策者既可以是领导者个人．也可以是领导层集体，是会计造假的最大受益者。
作假的实施者就是指具有职务便捷、能碰触会计凭证、帐厚、报表等资料，亲自实行和顺利完成财务会计作假的人员。
它不仅包含有关会计人员、办事员人员，而且还包括有关的订货人员、销售人员、看管人员和统计人员。
作假的协同者就是所指从某些方面策应、协调作假的人员。
既包含在作假之初为之提供方便者．例如某些财会人员为作假积极主动出谋划策，提供更多信息及技术方法和手段，与领导共同设计严防检查的对策和措施：也包含在作假事实出现后为其掩盖、布防、通风报信和提供更多伪证等人员。
值得说明的是，在不同的造假案件中．造假主体的人员构成不尽相同．相关人员在造假过程中所承担的职资和所发挥的作用也不一样。
二、做为企业的经营者，对不实会计信息的回潮和传播有著较为繁杂的心态(一)“高指标”诱出假数字前些年在企业和主管部门还没全然挂勾的情况下，一些厂长经理不顾经营业绩的考核压力年年把销售、利润当作最要紧的“任务”揪，推行以“低指标”“乌纱帽”的考核办法，在这种压力下，经营者不粉饰报表、不捏造假数字就伤心考核第一关。
外文翻译--关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究
本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译外文题目Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud外文出处Internal Auditor外文作者Green, Scott原文：Fighting Financial Reporting FraudCONGRES PASSED THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT of 2002 with the goal of rebuilding investor confidence and protecting capital markets. It recognized that strong internal controls were an important component of confidence building. Section 404 of the act addresses this component by mandating an annual evaluation of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and requiring management to assess and certify the effectiveness of these controls.In addition Sarbanes-Oxley requires a company's external auditor to complete a separate report that attests to management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. In short, the external auditor must perform testing to validate management's assessment of the internal control structure.A strong internal audit function can provide both management and the public accountants with comfort that the control structure is being evaluated regularly and that deficiencies are remedied. Documenting and evaluating a company's processes and related control structure are traditional internal audit tasks that protect the enterprise. However, the degree to which internal auditors focus on the accuracy of their organization's financial reporting presentation and disclosure, in addition to operational audits, is a matter of judgment. Critical factors that will determine the scope of internal auditing involvement in the financial reporting process include the strength and experience of the external auditors as well as the extent of their reliance on the internal control function the transparency and culture of the enterprise andaudit priorities based on solid risk analysis.There are three steps every auditor should take-regardless of their level of' involvement-to help protect the organization from fraudulent financial reporting: * Listen to rogues and whistleblowers.* Ask focused questions that may lead to red flags of financial reporting trouble.* Watch for financial oddities by benchmarking performance. Investors depend on interim financial reports and need to believe these reports are fair and accurate. Internal auditing can provide valuable oversight to organizations by helping to ensure that communications arc free from inappropriate financial engineering.THE ART OF LISTENINGOne of the problems with financial reporting scandals is that an unscrupulous chief financial officer (CFO) and members of his or her team are unlikely to announce their intentions. In fact, a common thread running through World Com, Enron, and other high-profile financial sandals is that each company had a strong, respected CFO who kept the number of people involved in the scandal to a minimum, exerted incredible control over the working group and commanded the group's loyalty above all other ethical considerations. These CFOs reportedly rewarded those who supported them and intimidated, excluded, and punished those who did not. No auditor can reasonably expect such II tightly knit group to volunteer that their boss is playing with the numbers. The CFO's sycophants will court his or her approval at the expense of all else even the total destruction of the enterprise.The good news is that, in recent cases, there were outsiders who were willing to step forward. At Enron, for example, Sherron Watkins, a corporate vice president, specifically told both Andersen and senior executives of her concerns regarding the conflict of interest between Enron and the special purpose entities (SPEs) the CFO administered as well as the perception of improper accounting at many of the SPEs he created. She also raised the possibility of the complete financial collapse of the company. Had they listened to Watkins, the fraud might have been identified earlier, thereby limiting the damage to the company and its employees.The lesson for auditors is clear: Listen the rogues who complain. Particu1arly towhere constructive criticism is viewed as an act of disloyalty, those who arc not viewed as a part of the team can be a terrific source information. It is often too easy to dismiss the grumbling of those who arc perceived as outsiders or on the fast track to termination. Internal auditors should resist passive behavior and listen, evaluate, and, if warranted, investigate what they hear.IDENTIFY RED FLAGSAlthough the number of possible disclosure omissions and financial presentation errors are many, internal auditors can look for patterns to help focus their activities to where they will be most effective. Uncovering these red flags may take some digging and may require the auditor to ask tough questions.AGGRESSIVE REVENUE RECOGNITION POLICIESA typical red flag is revenue that is matched to future performance or expense. Qwest Communications has stated that, between 1999 and 200l, it incorrectly accounted for more than $1.1 billion in transactions. Revenues were contingent on the purchase of fiber capacity and future services, but they were improperly booked as earned.Unify Corp, a provider of software products, reportedly went even further when it boosted revenue by loaning money to customers. Those customers then bought Unify's products with no reasonable expectation of ever repaying the loans. A $15 million profit was eventually restated into a 57 million loss.Understanding when revenues are recognized is the first step to comprehending the quality of the revenue stream.Revenues of the highest quality are those that are booked after the customer has received, accepted, and paid for the product or service without any further performance requirement or contingency. To identify aggressive accounting and contingencies, auditors can:* Make a direct inquiry to management ns to the existence of loans to customers or asset- swap agreements.* Conduct a detailed analysis or debt obligations, which may uncover undisclosed contingencies.* Evaluate alternative revenue recognition methodologies available to the company and ask the CFO and external auditors why these were rejected in favor of the current practice. Such inquiry is not a sign of ignorance, but instead demonstrates prudence and due diligence.The revenue policy applied must have a sound business rationale that is easily understood by senior management and directors. If it doesn't, this issue should be raised with the audit committee.EVER-PRESENT NONRECURRING CHARGESCompanies are continually making provisions expenses, even if they are not sure of their exact amount. There has been an epidemic of merger. Product return, lawsuit, obsolete inventory, and bad loan expenses that usually give rise to reserves or nonrecurring charges. The Center for Business Innovation reports that the number of Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) firms declaring special losses grew from 68 in 1982 to Z33 in 2000. 1 n other words, a whopping 47 percent of the S&P 500 had nonrecurring charges in 2000.There arc many legitimate nonrecurring expenses - due to acts of nature, mergers, and asset sales. So how does an auditor identify the misuse of this accounting method to hide underlying weaknesses in operating results? One clue is if a company regularly reverses reserves, such as reorganization expenses, back into operating income. This type of activity creates inflation in reported results. To identify such activity, an auditor should ask probing questions such as:* Why the charge nonrecurring and not a part of normal operating income?* How was the amount of the charge determined and how accurate is it?* What is the likelihood that all or a portion of the charge neither will nor be used?* What will be disclosed about the charge in the financial statements?Confusing or hesitant answers be investigated further. Auditors should have responses documented and on hand future meetings. If nonrecurring for charges are reversed at a later date, auditors should and challenge detailed explanations regarding this treatment.REGULAR CHANGES TO RESERVE, DEPRECIATION, AMORTIZATION,OR COMPREHENSIVE INCOME POLICY Frequent changes in accounting guidance can also mask manipulation of the numbers. It is to be expected that the dollar amount of reserves will change with the business c1imare, bur the method used to calculate reserves should not. If an increase in sales results in an increase in accounts then a corresponding and proportional increase in reserves and bad debt expenses would be expected. I f there does not seem to be a direct correlation; internal auditors should challenge the consistency of the reserve calculation.Likewise, capitalized costs should not increase at a rate greater than revenue over time. There may be a lag in related revenue until after major capitalized projects are completed. Auditors should question capitalization techniques that appear aggressive. Any change in methodology should be just; 6ed by long-term trends, not short-term needs.RELATED·PARTY TRANSACTIONSRelated panics are entities whose management or operating policies can be controlled or influenced by another party. Although related-parry transactions are particularly difficult to identify, there are auditors can regularly several activities undertake to help reveal this red flag. As discussed earlier, ongoing communications with rogues can be effective; however, quarterly procedures should also include activities designed to conflicts, such as:* Maintaining open communications with outside auditors.* Conducting periodic balance-sheet analyses.* Scheduling regular management interviews.At Enron, the external auditors were intimately involved in the creation of SPEs and were aware of the potential conflicts of interest associated with them. SPEs can be effective financing and risk management vehicles if used correctly. A parent company's debt level or other can hinder the capability of risk factors a strong: business segment to obtain favorable interest rates to finance its operations. In such a situation, the parent can create an SPE and transfer the asset to it with the goal of receiving more favorable lending rates. As long as there is another independent third-party investor that has contributed at least 3 percent of the assets, the PE doesnot be consolidated into the parent have to for financial-reporting purposes. Furthermore, if the assets in the SPE are of high quality, banks will perceive the entity as a desirable borrower, resulting in lower lending rates. The SPE will then use this money to pay the parent for the asset received. The bottom line is that the company obtains the money it requires, bur pays less to obtain it than it would without the SPE.Enron ran out of quality assets, so the company transferred inferior assets and pledged Enron stock as a guarantee of payment to the banks. According to the Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Powers Report), Enron reported earnings from the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2001 of almost $1 billion more than should have been reported us a result of this shell game. External auditors routinely request that management attest to and disclose their knowledge of related-party transactions. Simply asking the external auditors about their knowledge of related-party transactions would identified this potential threat to the organization. Such inquiries can be easy for the internal audit department if it maintains it strong relationship with the external auditors. Insightful analyses of balance sheet movements, particularly at year-end when the pressure to report strong results is at its peak, might also identify related-party transactions. The asset movements at Enron were large, and inquiry into their removal from the balance sheet would have uncovered the SPEs and the conflicts of interest with the CFO. Internal auditors need to: ask management directly about any related-party activities and, where appropriate, raise their existence to the audit committee.COMPLEX PRODUCTS Some companies provide complex financial products, such as structured financia1 instruments containing derivatives, or use hedging strategies that few understand. When a star performer produces complex products, few want to challenge this success or reveal that they don't understand how the system works. This is evidenced by the Joe Jett story, the infamous trader who executed seemingly profitable trades that, in reality, had no economic benefit. These trades caused the investment bank Kidder Peabody to port more than S300 million in bogus profits. No one was sure how Jett made his margins, but no one - from supervisors, toauditors, to finance staff wanted to admit their ignorance. Several internal controls should have identified this control break; however, simply requiring that the process be documented in derail may have dissolved the mirage of profitability.An auditor can insist that managers or their employees map out complex strategies. Jett's supervisor would not have able to do this because he did not been know how Jett made money on his trades. Likewise, Jett would not be able to document the process, as the fraud has been discovered.Green, Scott. Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud [J]. Internal Auditor, 2003, 60(6).译文：关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究美国于2002年通过了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》，旨在重建投资者的信心和保护资本市场的有效运行。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for Reforms1、IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.2、Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.EXHIBIT 1. A SAMPLE OF CASES OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING3、Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsI. U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA 2002)In response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed, are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as the New York StockExchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA .The United States' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.II. International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world's most influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization ofSecurities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the European Communities(EC).In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, "Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective," includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are :1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body .2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit .3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively .4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have "substantial financial experience." They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private "executive sessions" with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer (CFO) and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management .8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members' credentials,remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan.10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit .13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can take a position at the company as a director or any other important management position .III. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, including the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK), and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its "Principles of Corporate Governance" that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are non-binding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties .The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of "Principles of Corporate Governance" includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and theshareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as :1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders the ability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting .4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency .5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed .6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting so-called "whistle blowers" by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact .4、ConclusionThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the U.S. government's response to the wave of fraudulent corporate financial reporting experienced during the 1990s and early 2000s an represented a significant step in regaining investors' confidence in the global financial reporting process. The SOA created new and stricter statutes to avoid a repeat of previous corporate financial disasters. The Act not only applies to U.S. entities but also covers primarily large non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, as well as their non-U.S. external auditors, regardless of their nationality or place of business. Foreign entities have to comply with the SOA by June 2005 .Across the Atlantic, the IFAC, OECD and EU have recognize the recent eruption of corporate scandals in Europe and affirmed the inevitable need forcorporate governance reforms and regulation of the public accounting profession worldwide. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has passed the Code of Professional Ethics for international accounting firms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has passed guidelines for improving corporate governance. The European Union (EU) has proposed a code of conduct for independent auditors, which include a five-year auditor rotation requirement. European countries are also individually involved in improving their corporate laws through governance codes of practice.Sourse: Badawi, Ibrahim M. Review of Business; Spring2005, Vol. 26 Issue 2, p8-14, 7p译文：全球公司会计舞弊和改革行为一、前言随着最近一系列公司虚假财务报告事件在美国发生,类似丑闻也在其他国家被曝光。
关于会计的英文文献原文(带中文翻译)
The Optimization Method of Financial Statements Based on Accounting Management TheoryABSTRACTThis paper develops an approach to enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements. International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) was fundamentally flawed by fair value accounting and asset-impairment accounting. According to legal theory and accounting theory, accounting data must have legal evidence as its source document. The conventional “mixed attribute” accounting system should be re placed by a “segregated” system with historical cost and fair value being kept strictly apart in financial statements. The proposed optimizing method will significantly enhance the reliability and usefulness of financial statements.I.. INTRODUCTIONBased on international-accounting-convergence approach, the Ministry of Finance issued the Enterprise Accounting Standards in 2006 taking the International Financial Reporting Standards (hereinafter referred to as “the International Standards”) for reference. The Enterprise Accounting Standards carries out fair value accounting successfully, and spreads the sense that accounting should reflect market value objectively. The objective of accounting reformation following-up is to establish the accounting theory and methodology which not only use international advanced theory for reference, but also accord with the needs of China's socialist market economy construction. On the basis of a thorough evaluation of the achievements and limitations of International Standards, this paper puts forward a stand that to deepen accounting reformation and enhance the stability of accounting regulations.II. OPTIMIZA TION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEM: PARALLELING LISTING OF LEGAL FACTS AND FINANCIAL EXPECTA TIONAs an important management activity, accounting should make use of information systems based on classified statistics, and serve for both micro-economic management and macro-economic regulation at the same time. Optimization of financial statements system should try to take all aspects of the demands of the financial statements in both macro and micro level into account.Why do companies need to prepare financial statements? Whose demands should be considered while preparing financial statements? Those questions are basic issues we should consider on the optimization of financial statements. From the perspective of "public interests", reliability and legal evidence are required as qualitative characters, which is the origin of the traditional "historical cost accounting". From the perspective of "private interest", security investors and financial regulatory authoritieshope that financial statements reflect changes of market prices timely recording "objective" market conditions. This is the origin of "fair value accounting". Whether one set of financial statements can be compatible with these two different views and balance the public interest and private interest? To solve this problem, we design a new balance sheet and an income statement.From 1992 to 2006, a lot of new ideas and new perspectives are introduced into China's accounting practices from international accounting standards in a gradual manner during the accounting reform in China. These ideas and perspectives enriched the understanding of the financial statements in China. These achievements deserve our full assessment and should be fully affirmed. However, academia and standard-setters are also aware that International Standards are still in the process of developing .The purpose of proposing new formats of financial statements in this paper is to push forward the accounting reform into a deeper level on the basis of international convergence.III. THE PRACTICABILITY OF IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS SYSTEMWhether the financial statements are able to maintain their stability? It is necessary to mobilize the initiatives of both supply-side and demand-side at the same time. We should consider whether financial statements could meet the demands of the macro-economic regulation and business administration, and whether they are popular with millions of accountants.Accountants are responsible for preparing financial statements and auditors are responsible for auditing. They will benefit from the implementation of the new financial statements.Firstly, for the accountants, under the isolated design of historical cost accounting and fair value accounting, their daily accounting practice is greatly simplified. Accounting process will not need assets impairment and fair value any longer. Accounting books will not record impairment and appreciation of assets any longer, for the historical cost accounting is comprehensively implemented. Fair value information will be recorded in accordance with assessment only at the balance sheet date and only in the annual financial statements. Historical cost accounting is more likely to be recognized by the tax authorities, which saves heavy workload of the tax adjustment. Accountants will not need to calculate the deferred income tax expense any longer, and the profit-after-tax in the solid line table is acknowledged by the Company Law, which solves the problem of determining the profit available for distribution.Accountants do not need to record the fair value information needed by security investors in the accounting books; instead, they only need to list the fair value information at the balance sheet date. In addition, because the data in the solid line table has legal credibility, so the legal risks of accountants can be well controlled. Secondly, the arbitrariness of the accounting process will be reduced, and the auditors’ review process will be greatly simplified. The independent auditors will not have to bear the considerable legal risk for the dotted-line table they audit, because the risk of fair value information has been prompted as "not supported by legalevidences". Accountants and auditors can quickly adapt to this financial statements system, without the need of training. In this way, they can save a lot of time to help companies to improve management efficiency. Surveys show that the above design of financial statements is popular with accountants and auditors. Since the workloads of accounting and auditing have been substantially reduced, therefore, the total expenses for auditing and evaluation will not exceed current level as well.In short, from the perspectives of both supply-side and demand-side, the improved financial statements are expected to enhance the usefulness of financial statements, without increase the burden of the supply-side.IV. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONSThe current rule of mixed presentation of fair value data and historical cost data could be improved. The core concept of fair value is to make financial statements reflect the fair value of assets and liabilities, so that we can subtract the fair value of liabilities from assets to obtain the net fair value.However, the current International Standards do not implement this concept, but try to partly transform the historical cost accounting, which leads to mixed using of impairment accounting and fair value accounting. China's accounting academic research has followed up step by step since 1980s, and now has already introduced a mixed-attributes model into corporate financial statements.By distinguishing legal facts from financial expectations, we can balance public interests and private interests and can redesign the financial statements system with enhancing management efficiency and implementing higher-level laws as main objective. By presenting fair value and historical cost in one set of financial statements at the same time, the statements will not only meet the needs of keeping books according to domestic laws, but also meet the demand from financial regulatory authorities and security investorsWe hope that practitioners and theorists offer advices and suggestions on the problem of improving the financial statements to build a financial statements system which not only meets the domestic needs, but also converges with the International Standards.基于会计管理理论的财务报表的优化方法摘要本文提供了一个方法，以提高财务报表的可靠性和实用性。
小型私营企业的强制性会计信息披露失真外文翻译(可编辑)
小型私营企业的强制性会计信息披露失真外文翻译外文翻译Mandatory Accounting Disclosure by Small Private CompaniesMaterial Source: Forthcoming, European Journal of Law and EconomicsAuthor: Benito Arru?adaThis article analyzes how mandatory accounting disclosure is grounded on different rationales for private and public companies. It also explores technological changes, such as computerised databases and the Internet, which have recently made disclosure of company accounts by small companies potentially less costly and more valuable, thanks to electronic filing and universal online access to credit information systems. These recent developments favour policies that would expand the scope of mandatory publication for small companies in countries where it is voluntary.They also encourage policies to reduce the costs and enhance the value of disclosure through administrative reforms of filing, archive and retrieval systems.Survey and registry evidence on how the information in the accounts is valued and used by companies is consistent with these claims about the evolution of the tradeoff of costs and benefits that should guide policy in this area.Mapping costsPublishing company accounts involves substantial private costs. These include the direct administrative cost of preparing and filing the accounts. There may be other less direct costs, as publication may cause a competitive disadvantage for the disclosing firms, which may damage their incentives to invest. A third type of private cost is the loss of personal privacy Administrative costsThese costs are not trivial, as revealed by the lack of compliance observed when enforcement is lenient, as in Germany Weilbach, 1991: 800 or The Netherlands Bolle, 1996. It has been argued that to avoid the costs of mandatory publication some firms are willing to do substantial restructuring Barry, 2006, and publication avoidance has played a role in some massive changes in organisational form Maijoor, 1996. Furthermore, mandatory disclosure may also interfere in the optimal choice of safeguarding instruments Gore, Sachs and Trzcinka, 2004 But the size of these costs is open to question, at least for most firms. First, the direct cost of compliance is small. The cost of preparing the annual accounts is low as the public accounts are now a standard by-product of any accounting software, which is in any case indispensable for managerial and tax accounting. Accounting software packages simply reorganize the data and automatically prepare different sets of accounts which follow the different formats required for managerial purposes, tax complianceand, when so required, public filing. A main reason why this holds even for micro companies is that the complexity of tax compliance leads entrepreneurs to purchase all these bureaucratic services, therefore benefiting from specialization advantages and scale economies.Furthermore, the cost of filing the accounts can and should be minimised by extending the use of new technologies electronic filing, extending the use of simplified accounts and eliminating useless procedures such as notarising the signature of the company representative. In general, given that company accounts are not subject to any substantive review by the registry, it is relatively easy to automate the process.Publishing financial accounts also incurs additional costs for administering and regulating the disclosure, as well as for filing and processing the information. To the extent that these services are financed by the filing firms, most of these costs are the same as those analysed in the previous paragraph. However, examining their structure is worthwhile because it suggests that even a substantial drop in account publication might reduce costs little for two reasons. First, investments by public registries, to make account filing possible and to manage the information flow, and by private firms, to capture and exploit the information, are mostly sunk costs and therefore irrelevant in the short run. Second, because both filing and exploiting the files offer substantial economies of scale. Therefore, many costs would be incurredanyway to serve the non-exempted firms and those which voluntarily decide to continue filing their accounts.Lastly, part of the cost savings obtained by not filing the accounts would disappear, as all firms would be repeatedly required to provide more specific information to different agents. Such demanders of information would not only be their several banks and suppliers this demand could be satisfied by voluntarily disclosing, but also public agencies which would stop relying on the public record of accounts if this became substantially less complete and would start building additional databases as well as enlarging their current demand of information from firms.Of course, national governments could avoid this new demand for information by implementing mandatory disclosure.Distortion of competitionPublication of accounts might also cause private costs to the disclosing firm by informing its competitors, which might also distort competition. However, this effect seems unlikely to be substantial when small companies are involved. At least, these costs are clearly smaller than those of the disclosure now commonly required from public companies.A useful comparison would be that between the impact of publicly filing the annual accounts with that of announcing, for instance, the cancellation of a research programme. Doubt remains on this point, however, not for the micro companies considered by the European Commission butformedium-sized or even large private companies, for which disclosure may be quite sensitive, given their size and presence in concentrated and differentiated markets.The lesser competitive effects for smaller firms are confirmed by the results of a survey conducted in October 2007 among Spanish users of a business information system, the codebook and results of which are shown in Table 1 question 5:You use our services to get information on… mark one or several responses: Suppliers 1,513 25.54% 205 Clients 5,092 85.96% 558 Competitors 2,501 42.22% 309. The survey was conducted by a major provider of online credit information for small firms in a large EU country. It was conducted online on October 25-26, 2007 by sending 74,862 emails to a random sample of registered users, offering each of them a free credit report market price 13.92 if they answered the survey. A total of 5,924 users filled in the survey in 24 hours, with a response rate of 7.91%. Most of the respondents were small firms According to the survey, the percentage of firms which use the service to find out about competitors, given by the third answer, decreases significantly with the size of the user firm, as suggested by the differences in average use between groups of firms of different size. This is confirmed by the positive coefficient obtained for the Firm Size variable in the econometric estimation in which the dependent variable is Competitors, a binary variable equal to one when the firm uses the service to gain information on competitors zero.Nor does the fact that outlets in vertically integrated networks would be subject to different reporting requirements seem to create a significant cost difference. Franchised outlets publish their accounts when they are incorporated as companies, while vertically integrated outlets do not need to do so when they are mere divisions of the franchising firm. The potential difference in disclosure costs seems a trifle when considering that different rules apply to both types of vertical structures in matters such as resale price maintenance, collective bargaining or corporate tax rates.Privacy costDamage to privacy, considered as a highly significant cost by some authors e.g., Barry, 2006, is elusive and difficult to evaluate. The fact that most positive law does not grant privacy rights to corporations could be interpreted as an implicit social judgement whereby, overall, such privacy costs are not social costs. Two reasons may help in explaining why. First, a substantial part of the demand for company privacy is directed at tax evasion and fraud and therefore has little merit from a social perspective. Second, and closer to our case, it is doubtful that companies should be held to a lower standard of publicity than individuals. For individuals, most modern legal systems now protect privacy on financial matters but require publicity of the most important assets and liabilities: property rights on real estate, valuable movable goods, suchas automobiles, and even some financial assets, as with holdings in public companies. Notice that publicity on real property often refers not only to ownership rights but also to mortgages. The consequence is that the most valuable assets in the “balance sheets” of individuals are made public. In this context, exempting legal persons from publicity would allow them to hide property by means of legal entities incorporated for the sole purpose of holding property, a practice that is already widespread in the EU for hiding cross-border real estate purchases from the tax authorities.译文小型私营企业的强制性会计信息披露失真资料来源:欧洲法律与经济学期刊作者:Benito Arru?ada本文分析了上市公司与非上市公司建立在不同的原理上的强制性会计信息披露。
商业资料论会计信息失真的成因及对策
---------------------A thesis submitted toin partial fulfillmentof the requirementfor the degree ofMaster of Engineering论会计信息失真的成因及对策[摘要] 会计信息失真问题直接危害了会计工作的生命力。
经济界的有识之士认为这一问题已经干扰了市场经济秩序的正常运行，国务院总理朱镕基高度重视。
1995年他亲自主持制定了“整顿会计工作秩序的约法三章”，1996年财政部又印发了《关于会计基础工作规范》的通知，但虚假会计信息问题始终得不到扼制，必须深刻认识，分析其产生的原因，找出根治的良策。
[关键词]会计信息会计期间执业道德内部牵制会计委派制从我国“银广夏”等上市公司会计造假事件的陆续发生到美国安然公司倒闭、世界通信公司会计丑闻，使得会计信息失真这一问题受到世人的广泛关注。
所谓会计信息失真,就是会计核算的依据不真实或反映的财务状况和经营成果虚假,不符合实际情况。
会计信息失真,造成国有资产流失,国家税收减少,影响国家宏观调控,扰乱社会经济秩序,削弱会计的经济管理作用,阻碍经济发展,危害非常严重。
找出会计信息失真的原因,研究行之有效的治理对策,是当前会计改革的一项重要内容。
一、会计信息失真的原因从信息提供者(多数是企业)的角度分析,---------------------会计信息失真的原因有内在和外在两个方面。
（一）外在原因1、法规不健全。
我国会计法规体系已初见规模。
但必须看到，我国会计法制建设还存在着两个方面的问题。
一是会计法规制度的不相协调，法规制度实施不配套，法规体系还不够规范科学等；《企业会计准则》、十三个行业《会计制度》、相继颁布的具体准则共同起作用,状况较乱。
二是对现有法规制度的贯彻执行不力。
主要表现在对会计法规的宣传教育不深入，执法不严等方面。
《会计法》是会计工作的根本大法,在实施过程中显现出不足之处，如对违法处罚规定中,使用“情节严重”、“数额较大”等词语,缺少量的标准,可操作性不强,急需进行修改,出台相应的实施措施。
会计信息失真论文的参考文献.doc
会计信息失真论文的参考文献众所周知，各行各业都存在会计，其作用也不容小觑，然而时代的发展，它的弊端也凸显了出来，那就是会计信息的失真，为了大家深入了解剖析这一领域和论文的写作，我们整理了最近这几年来最有代表性的一些会计信息失真论文参考文献，欢迎大家阅读。
[1]钮真妮。
关于会计信息失真的法律控制[D].上海社会科学院，2019.[2]徐甜。
基于内部控制视角的农业会计信息失真治理研究[D].山东财经大学，2019.[3]马磊。
关于国内会计信息质量学术论文的文献计量研究[D].东北大学，2019.[4]付雨婷。
沈阳长城阀门管件有限公司会计信息披露的研究[D].天津商业大学，2019.[5]赵嘉林。
非同一控制下企业合并盈余管理研究[D].云南大学，2019.[6]郑俊雯。
基于心理学视角的会计信息失真调查分析[D].西南交通大学，2019.[7]向倩辉。
BDH利用资产减值进行盈余管理的案例研究[D].湘潭大学，2019.[8]卢丽娜。
上市公司内部控制缺陷披露理论研究与问题改进[D].杭州电子科技大学，2019.[9]王颖。
基于SM-SOM方法的上市公司财务信息异常识别问题研究[D].内蒙古财经大学，2019.[10]周延。
企业内部控制环境与会计信息质量的研究[D].对外经济贸易大学，2019.[11]郭慧贤。
农业上市公司会计信息披露研究[D].哈尔滨商业大学，2019.[]杨国红。
引入非财务信息的制造业上市公司财务危机预警研究[D].云南大学，2019.[13]蔡梦婷。
作业成本法在航空制造企业中的应用[D].财政部财政科学研究所，2019.[14]黄谧谧。
基于信息化的CS市属县级供电企业的内部会计控制研究[D].长沙理工大学，2019.[15]张伟。
我国商业银行会计信息披露问题研究[D].财政部财政科学研究所，2019.[16]刘振坤。
云会计环境下基于社会网络的会计信息失真影响研究[D].重庆理工大学，2019.[17]陈高硕。
250.D我国上市公司会计信息失真现状及对策外文翻译
这项计划的问题是，为什么不贷款人员支付最终盈利该贷款，而不是它的起源费。'根据贷款盈利将奖金优势给予贷款人员奖励，寻找良好的信用风险，贷款，销售较高的预期值。换句话说，这样的性能衡量标准将提供给一些人员贷款的激励机制。不过，这项计划也将给予更大的信贷风险，因为许多事情可能发生在债务人基本上不知道贷款的背景下。在这种情况下，风险和失真之间的权衡是赞成作低风险和较高的失真的决策的。
学院学生毕业设计（论文）
外文译文
院（系）经济管理学院专业班级 Nhomakorabea学生姓名
学号
译文要求
1.外文翻译必须使用签字笔，手工工整书写，或用A4纸打印。
2.所选的原文不少于2万字印刷字符，其内容必须与课题或专业方向紧密相关，注明详细出处。
3.外文翻译书文本后附原文（或复印件）。
译文评阅
评阅要求：应根据学校“译文要求”，对学生译文的准确性、翻译数量以及译文的文字表述情况等作具体的评价。
许多组织的最大价值是不能用于激励计划的。在私人控股公司，该组织的未知的财务价值，它是可能不是所有人的目标。相反，其目标是要最大限度地提高业主的实用工具，组织的事业显然不是一个收缩性能的措施。
这种非收缩组织价值的问题更体现在非营利性组织和政府机构。在这种类型的组织，甚至有可能不会为了使管理人员同意，而指定该组织的目标。这些组织通常的特点是不能使用基于股票的激励设备，以及在良好的组织目标的情况下阻碍有效的绩效评价体系设计。如果高层的目标不知道，那么如何衡量该组织个别员工的表现？下面我会说是在界定“良好”的非营利组织的绩效措施中，困难的一个原因是疲弱的奖励措施，经常组织这种类型的奖励措施，其功能失调的后果，往往发生在这T些类型的组织尝试使用奖励后。
会计信息披露外文文献翻译
会计信息披露外文文献翻译文献出处：Ebimobowei A. A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in the Annual Reports of Nigerian Companies [J]. Asian Journal of Business Management, 2011, 3(3): 145-151.原文A Study of Social Accounting Disclosures in theAnnual Reports of Nigerian CompaniesAppah EbimoboweiAbstract: Social accounting is concerned with the development of measurement system to monitor social performance. It is rational assessment of and disclosure on some meaningful domain of companies’ activities that have social impact. Thi s study examines the practice of social accounting disclosure in Nigerian companies. Forty companies from eight sectors quoted in the Nigerian Stock Exchange were randomly sampled. Data were collected from the annual reports of the companies’ for the perio d 2005 to 2007 and the level of disclosure is measured using content analysis and descriptive analysis. The paper found that 82.5% of the companies sampled present social accounting information in their annual reports. The results show that Nigerian companies prefer to disclose social accounting information in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the Accounts in the form of short qualitative information. Human resources, community involvement and environment were identified as the most popular themes. Hence, the paper recommends among others that companies should take social accounting as a moral duty; legislation for all companies to disclose social accounting information in Nigeria; social indicators to be developed at thenational level in the area of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health care etc and professional accounting bodies in the country should collaborate to expand research in social accounting.Key words: Annual reports, social accounting, social disclosure, NigeriaINTRODUCTIONThe increasing need for every organization to disclose in their annual reports the various activities that affect the society is becoming a very fundamental issue all over the world mostly in developed economies, but this is not the case in developing countries like Nigeria. This is because organizations are particularly more interested in the profit maximization objective to the detriment of the society. According to Iyoha (2010), in developing countries, the concern is about how efficient organizations are in terms of how much profits are made and how much dividends are paid. No serious thoughts are given to social issues in the annual reports of organizations such as environmental protection, energy savings, fair business practice, and community involvements etc. Asechemie (1996) stress that the absence of financial data relating to actions and arrangements for social concern in Nigeria is not in accord with the trend in the USA, Europe and Canada where companies are required to report on the effect of compliance with laws governing corporate social conduct on capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position.The objective of this paper is to examine the social accounting disclosures in the annual reports of Nigerian companies. Therefore, the content of annual reports must provide information to users relating to social factors. AsMathews (2002) suggested in his study, documenting and analyzing what is disclosed in the area of social accounting should be one of the feature of corporate social reporting. Hence, this study attempts to answer two main questions: (i) what are the most popular types of social accounting and how is social accounting disclosed in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria and (ii) where is the location of presentation of social accounting in the annual reports of companies in Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the paper is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the theoretical and empirical literatures adopted for the study. Section three examines the methodology of the study; section four examines the findings and discussions while the last section deals with the conclusion and recommendations.Theories on corporate social accounting disclosure behavior:Gray et al. (1995) in Orij (2007) provided a much cited categorization of social accountingdisclosure studies. They talked about three broad classifications of decision usefulness studies, economic theory and social and political theory. The decision usefulness generally relates to the usefulness of accounting information, which is social accounting in this case. These studies are of two types, ranking of information on its perceived decision-usefulness in the financial community and investigations of information on effects on share prices. The economic theory studies are a periphery of agency theory and Positive Accounting Theory (PAT) research. The social and political theory focuses on legitimacy theory (LEGT) and stakeholder theory (STAKT). LEGT and STAKT are theories developed out of political economies. They are overlapping perspectives in a political-economic framework. Intheoretical term, Guthrie and Parker (1990) also analyse their empirical evidence in relation to a socio-political economy theory of social disclosure and suggest that:a political economy theory of social disclosure is both viable and may contribute toward our understanding of observed developments in national reporting practices. Corporate social disclosures have appeared to reflect public social priorities, respond to government pressures, accommodate environmental pressures and sectional interests, and protect corporate prerogatives and projected corporate image.Prior empirical studies: A number of studies have been published on the subject of social accounting disclosure. A number of these rely on content analysis of annual reports. There are several different methods to the analysis of narratives in annual reports. Bettie et al. (2004) distinguish two categories: subjective (analyst ratings) and semi-objective (disclosure index studies, content analysis, readability studies and linguistic analysis). Content analysis has been selected for this study because it has been widely used in the accounting research, particularly in social accounting disclosure studies. Since this is the method of analysis in the present study, we limit our review to these studies. Table 1 summary the methodology, sample and main results of these studies.RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONLevel of social accounting disclosure: Table 2 shows that 33 companies (82.5%) from various industry groupings made social accounting disclosures at least for oneyear in their annual reports. Analysis based on industry, showed that chemical and paints, construction and petroleum marketing had 100 percent disclosure of social accountinginformation. The lowest level of social accounting information was 66.7% contributed by Breweries and conglomerate while companies in the building materials (75%), food/beverages and tobacco (80%), and healthcare (83.3%) level of disclosure from year 2005 to 2007. Therefore, it can be deduced that there is a growing concern for companies reporting social performance in their financial statements.Form of social accounting disclosure: Table 3 shows that in 2005 75% of the companies disclose social accounting information using narrative/pictures and 25% disclose with monetary formats. The year 2006 81% used narrative and 19% used monetary format while in 2007 84% used narrative and 16% monetary format. However, there were also companies that used both narrative and monetary formats of disclosure. Many companies were also found to have used the monetary format to disclose human resource information and environmental contribution primarily related to retirement benefit, training and development and some community based projects such as adopting school, scholarships and donations.Location of social accounting disclosure: Table 4 shows that 4(12.12%) of the sampled companies (Appendix) disclose social accounting information in the chairman’s statement; 17(51.52%) disclose social accounting information in the directors report; 2(6.06%) in the statement of accounting policy; 10(30.30%) in the notes to the accounts. The paper discovers that Directors report is the most popular location where social accounting information is disclosed by companies in Nigeria and also the “notes to the accounts”. This result is also consistent with Mamman (2004) study that Directors report is the most preferred location of social accounting information.Quantification of amount of social accounting disclosure:This study used only number of disclosure as the approach of capturing data through content analysis. Almost all companies disclosed social accounting information in short qualitative discussion and some have extended qualitative discussion where they have sections to disclose the social accounting information especially on human resources andcommunity based projects.Trend of social accounting disclosure: Table 5 shows the trend of social accounting disclosures in Nigeria. Twelve (12) companies representing (36.36%) reveals that human resources is the trend of social accounting disclosure in the annual report; two companies representing (6.06%) says the trend is fair business practice; nine (9) companies representing (27.27%) suggests community development; three (3) companies representing (9.09%) reveals that the trend of social accounting is energy; five (5) companies representing (15.16%) in their annual reports disclosed that the trend is on the environment; and two (2) companies representing (6.06%) disclosed in their annual reports that the trends is on the organization’s products. The analysis therefore reveals that disclosure of social and environmental activities is specifically on the discretion of the companies.CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONThe study examined social accounting disclosure for a three-year period from 2005 to 2007. The type of social accounting disclosure, form and location were identified in the annual reports of 40 companies. This covers eight sectors of the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The study found that 82.5% of Nigerian Companies disclose one type or the other of social accountinginformation in their annual reports. These disclosures were voluntary in nature and largely qualitative; contrary to the developed and some developing countries. The most favoured places of disclosure are in the Directors Report, Chairman’s Statement and Notes to the account. The most popular theme that most companies disclose is human resources followed by community involvement and environment. Analysis done by industry found that the petroleum marketing, food/beverages and tobacco, chemicals and paints sectors provides a higher percentage of social accounting disclosure in Nigeria. Therefore, on the basis of the conclusion above, the following suggestions are provided by the researcher to improve the social accounting practice in Nigeria:﹒Companies should take social accounting disclosure as their moral duty; mere legislation would not solve the problem.﹒The government should provide some incentives like differentials in tax treatment, subsidies, rebates etc. so that companies can take social programmes.﹒Researchers should provide the basis and means of social accounting quantification as far as possible.﹒The government should put in place suitable legislation for all companies to compel them to make adequate disclosure of their activities to the society.﹒Professional institutes in the country like the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria and the Association of National Accountants of Nigeria should work together for developing social accounting and reporting techniques.﹒Social indicators should be developed at the national level in the areas of employment opportunities, environmental control, energy conservation, health education etc.译文会计信息披露，尼日利亚公司年度报告的实证研究阿帕·艾比莫泊威摘要：会计信息披露关系到对社会绩效监督的评估系统的发展。
财经类毕业论文浅论企业会计信息失真的问题
财经类毕业论文浅论企业会计信息失真的问题 Standardization of sany group #QS8QHH-HHGX8Q8-GNHHJ8-HHMHGN#浅论企业会计信息失真的问题【摘要】：会计信息是国家宏观调控和单位经济管理的重要资料，其质量如何，直接影响国家经济决策和市场经济的有序运行。
目前，会计信息失真问题严重损害了国家的整体利益。
文章从会计信息失真的表现入手，阐述了其危害性，并从法制、企业及政府行为、职业道德、会计监督等方面分析了会计信息失真之成因。
进而指出，必须采取法律的、行政的、经济的治理手段进行标本兼治以整顿会计秩序，治理会计信息失真，从而完善社会主义市场经济活动，使企业真正走上健康发展之路。
【关键词】：会计信息失真原因危害对策【英文摘要】：Accounting information is the national policies and institutions in economic management of information, the quality of a direct bearing on the country's economic policy and operation of the market economy order.At present, accounting information problem seriously undermine the overall interests of the state. article from the accounting information, the performance of its dangers, and the rule of law, business and government behaviour, professional monitoring and accounting and accounting information analysis of causes.Then pointed out, must take legal, administrative and economic governance means in order to rectify the symptoms and root cause of accounting, management accounting information, thus improving the socialist market economy, enterprises have really go to the healthy development.【The key words】： accounting information cause danger tocountermeasures【正文】：企业会计信息是指企业会计提供的关于本企业生产经营活动过程和结果的一切会计资料。
财务风险 外文文献
外文文献The Important Of Financial RiskSohnke M. Bartram Gregory W. Brown and Murat AtamerAbstract:This paper examines the determinants of equity price risk for a largesample of non-financial corporations in the United States from 1964 to 2008. Weestimate both structural and reduced form models to examine the endogenous natureof corporate financial characteristics such as total debt debt maturity cash holdingsand dividend policy. We find that the observed levels of equity price risk areexplained primarily by operating and asset characteristics such as firm age size assettangibility as well as operating cash flow levels and volatility. In contrast impliedmeasures of financial risk are generally low and more stable than debt-to-equity ratios.Our measures of financial risk have declined over the last 30 years even as measuresof equity volatility e.g. idiosyncratic risk have tended to increase. Consequentlydocumented trends in equity price risk are more than fully accounted for by trends inthe riskiness of firms’assets. Taken together the results suggest that the typical U.S.firm substantially reduces financial risk by carefully managing financial policies. As aresult residual financial risk now appears negligible relative to underlying economicrisk for a typical non-financial firm.Keywords：Capital structure；financial risk；risk management；corporate finance1 1.IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention to the effects offinancial leverage. There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financialinstitutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed evidenceindicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks e.g. through themortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations and the so-called “shadowbanking system”may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financialdislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms.To date problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to thedistress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis.For example non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economicdecline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact bankruptcyfilings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries e.g.automotive manufacturing newspapers and real estate that faced fundamentaleconomic pressures prior to the financial crisis. This surprising fact begs the question“How important is financial risk for non-financial firms”At the heart of this issue isthe uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firmrisk.Recent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance hasrekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk. A current strand of the assetpricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al. 2001 thatfirm-specificidiosyncratic risk has tended to increase over the last 40 years. Other work suggeststhat idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor see Goyal and Santa-Clara 2003among others. Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi 2003showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinantof idiosyncratic risk and firm value. Other research has examined the role of equityvolatility in bond pricing e.g. Dichev 1998 Campbell Hilscher and Szilagyi2008.However much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the riskof assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast thispaper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk. First we seek tounderstand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering totalrisk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations i.e. economic or businessrisks and risks associated with financing the firms operations i.e. financial risks.Second we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risksand the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller 1958 suggests that financial policymay be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate manyfinancial decisions by the firm at a low cost i.e. via homemade leverage andwell-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial andeconomic distress. Nonetheless financial policies such as adding debt to the capitalstructure can magnify the risk of equity. In contrast recent research on corporate riskmanagement suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase valuewith financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives. However thisresearch is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financialdistress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage. Empiricalresearch provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for atypical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk byexamining determinants of total firm risk. In our analysis we utilize a large sample ofnon-financial firms in the United States.Our goal of identifying the most importantdeterminants of equity price risk volatility relies on viewing financial policy astransforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage. Thusthroughout the paper we consider financial leverage as the wedge between assetvolatility and equity volatility. For example in a static setting debt provides financialleverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility. Because financial policy isdetermined by owners and managers we are careful to examine the effects of firms’asset and operating characteristics on financial policy. Specifically we examine avariety of characteristics suggested by previous research and as clearly as possibledistinguish between those associated of the company(i.e. factors determining economic risk) and those associated with financing the firm(i.e. factors determining financial risk).We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft(1996),or alternatively, in a reduced form model of financial leverage.An advantage of the structural model approach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implciations ofsome factors(e.g .dividends),as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volantility if common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daliy equity returns.Our proxies for econmic risk are designed to capture the essential charactersitics of the firm’s operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm.For example,firm size and age provide measures of line of –business maturity; tangible assets(plant,property,and equipment)serve as a proxy for the ‘hardness’of a firm’s assets;capital expenditures measure captial intensity as well as growth potential.Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows.To understand how financial factors affect firm risk,we examine total debt,debt maturity,dividend payouts,and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary resuit or our analysis is surpriing:factors determining economic risk for a typical company exlain the vast majority of the varation in equity volatility.Correspondingly,measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios. Specifically, in our sample covering 1964-2008 average actual net financial (market) leverage is 1.50 compared to our estimates of between 1.03 and 1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique).This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policise to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels.These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels,debt maturity,or cash holdings (see,for example , Acharya,Almeida,and Campello,2007).In addition,many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial dervatives,contractual arrangements with investors (e.g. lines of credit,call provisions in debt contracts ,or contingencies in supplier contracts ),spcial purpose vehicles (SPVs),or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our ecnomic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statiscally significant, with predicted size and age of the firm.This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business,which shoule be reflected in the volatility. This suggests that companties with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt, and therefore are potentially less risky .Among economic risk variables,the effects of firm size ,prfit volatility,and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies,our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leveage increases total firm risk. Otherwise,fiancial risk factors are not reliably to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy , it is no surprise that financial variables are , at least in part , determined by the econmic risks frims take.However, some of the specific findings are unexpected. For example , in a simple model of capital structure ,dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm(i.e.,increase net debt ).We find that dividends are associated with lower risk. This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g.,a mature company with limited growth opportunities). We also estimate howsensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time.Our result indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to 1983 tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consisitently negatively related to risk.This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadoa (2007) that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.。
会计信息失真外文文献翻译2014年译文3300字
文献出处：Beck T. The Study of Accounting Information Distortion in Small and Medium Enterprise [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2014, 30(11): 30-43.（声明：本译文归百度文库所有，完整译文请到百度文库。
）原文The Study of Accounting Information DistortionIn Small and Medium EnterpriseAuthor: Beck T.AbstractSecurity market, in fact, is information market, and the timeliness, fairness and completeness of account information is the foundation of public confidence to the market. The falsehood of accounting information strongly influents whether security market can work well. With introducing Coherence Theory and Procedural Rationality, the article redefines fairness and falsehood of accounting information, then analysis the issue from perspective of Game Theory.As to the concept of fairness of accounting information, the article integrates Procedural Rationality with Coherence Theory. That is, the accounting information can be deemed true only if the procedure and institution of accounting rule-making are rational and the accounting information is produced and disclosed strictly according to the rules.From previous definition, the falsehood of accounting information can be defined as following two: if the procedure and institution of accounting rule-making are irrational, the accounting information is in falsehood even though it is produce according to rules and standards. Besides, if the rules and standards are of high quality, but not obeyed, the accounting information is also in falsehood.Keywords: Accounting Information, Game Theory, Procedural RationalityRationality is one of presumptions in economics, which means human beings always make decision which can maximum his or her interests. And the presumption restricts the areas, where the methods in economics can be used. Therefore, it is necessary to refine the study areas. The article is to study on the falsehood of accounting information induced by rule constitutors and executors who have incentive not to follow the procedure of rule-making and implementing when institution and procedure are irrational. According to categories of falsehood of accounting information, the article is foc used on player’s actions and strategies under irrational institution and procedure which lead to the institutional and intended falsehood. So the behavioral falsehood and falsehood led by humane-beings’ limited rationality are excluded.During the process of accounting rule-making, different game players have different claims for accounting information according to their own interests. They have their own payoff functions, and have different request for accounting standards. The parties will make the rules partial to themselves and advocate their own requests from their own position and interest. The ideal model for accounting rule making is cooperative game with Nash equilibrium of sub-game perfect-ness under dynamic and completely-informative environment. It is more costly for rational men to breaking the equilibrium than keeping under such circumstances. Then it becomes Pareto Perfection when nobody wants to break up. However, the ideal model is hard to attain. And conditions are needed to provide to get close to the ideal model. That is to say, a set of rational institution and procedure must be set up to guarantee all the decisions made by each player maximum the welfare of society. And the rationality of institution and procedure should be embodied by representation of rule-makers and independence of rule-making organization.The structure of corporate governess comes from the conflicts within stockholders and the ones between shareholder and management. Accounting information is the warranty for shareholder to split up profits, and thetrack record on management’s performance. In practice, it is common that management provides accounting information; controlling stockholders get more information at first place; and the potential investors decides their action by watching the movement of stock price and controlling shareholders. The features of the phenomenon are as follow: there is no perfect information between players, the game process is dynamic. Based on these features, the author builds up dynamic model with imperfect information, and makes the conclusion that minority only cares about the payoff of majority, the majority considers their own interest and the payoff of the management, the management needs to think of the payoff of the majority, the minority and their own. The factors influencing their actions are given. In reality, it is impossible for government regulatory department and the management to make a coalition. And the sequence of the game is not as clear as the one in the game between shareholders and management.Therefore, a static model with imperfect information is founded. Deducing from the model, government regulatory department can ensure the fairness of accounting information by enhancing efforts in supervising, raising the social benefits and rewards of effective efforts, increasing the punishment of disclosing false accounting information and so on.During the game between management and auditors, currently, the management provides information at first, and then auditor conducts auditing and present auditing statement. There is a clear sequence in the game. And a dynamic model with imperfect information is built up. We concludes that raising the punishment, enhancing the efforts in inspecting and other measures can be done to guarantee the quality of accounting information.By summing up theoretical analysis above, we can deal with the falsehood of accounting information in following ways: consummating the rulemaking procedures; nurturing mature market of controlling shareholders; construct all-round supervising system; enhancing functions of the board; and raising the independence and competence of auditors.The United States of Enron, WorldCom, Xerox and so on a series of accounting scandals, questions about accounting information distortion. The discussion of the rest of the world. The steady development of securities market, not only related to the current performance of listed companies, and investors more expectations about the future of the market development and the establishment of the relevant investment confidence. The key to ensure the stability of this information is the public company accounting information disclosed the question, namely disclosure information must ensure that the securities price timely, accurate and comprehensive to reflect the fundamentals of each listed company management and the risk of the securities market conditions. Only on this basis, the investors to make reasonable expectations about the future, and then make your own risk tolerance of investment options, buy securities for their own preference of the enterprise; Companies, in turn, from investors get the corresponding resource allocation, in this way, the financing costs and risk of the enterprise and the prospect of the business performance, to achieve the purpose of the securities market efficient allocation of resources. And on this basis, the regulatory agencies and governments to find problems in a timely manner, effectively protect the rights and interests of investors, and can prevent market system risks. So the stock market is, in fact, market information, accounting information disclosure is timely, accurate, comprehensive build public confidence in the securities market.Ensure the securities market information disclosure timely, accurate and comprehensive is a long-term and complicated system engineering, it is not includes only the securities regulator information disclosure regulation system is perfect, more depends on whether the corporate governance structure to improve the strengthening the supervision of the stakeholders, accountants and lawyers and other intermediaries can remain neutral and integrity to perform their duties, investment bank or brokerage, conscientious, and securities market regulation legislation whether complete, to ensure fair and effective exercise of judicial supervision, media and social supervision by public opinion effectively in time, the government and corporate relations is an embarrassment and a series of institutional arrangements.Famous economist professor Simon, Simon pointed out in his theory of "bounded rationality" due to the person's cognition is Limited, people grasp of the information is incomplete, inadequate understanding and application of information to the people, therefore, are Bounded Rationality (Bounded Rationality).On the basis of bounded Rationality, he make a clear distinction between the rational standard of Procedural and Rationality of new classical economics to Substantive standards, distinguish the Procedural Rationality (Procedural Rationality) and the rational (Rationality of outcome/product) which is also called the substantial Rationality (Substantive Rationality).If procedural rationality refers to the behavior is the result of the due consideration, then the behavior is procedural rationality.Therefore, the behavior of the program depends on its rational production process. Results rational is refers to the established conditions and, within the prescribed scope of when behavior is suitable for a given target it is the result of rational. Thus, emphasizes the procedural rationality of rational behavior mechanism, itself is not a behavior results, because the result is always the result of a certain behavior program, program so if behavior is rational, is properly considered, the result of the behavior is also acceptable; The reason, on the other hand, pay attention to behavior result should comply with the established goals, do not pay attention to produce this behavior results the behavior of the process. Classical economics refers to the rational, in fact, a kind of substantive rationality, is a completely rational, given the behavior hypothesis (complete information, unlimited computing power and zero information processing fees) and the behavior of the target (utility maximization), behavior would be natural to achieve its purpose. Simon thinks, under the environment of uncertainty, people could not accurately predict the future, thus unable to act according to the result of rational way, can only rely on adopting a rational procedures to reduce the degree of future uncertainty, therefore, and should take reason instead of the reason for studying the economics program.From the view of procedural rationality, emphasized the authenticity of accounting information is whether accounting information generation and disclosure process Rational, rather than the accounting information itself is in accordance withthe established goals, that is, if the disclosure of accounting information generation and is rational, the result of the accounting behavior, accounting information itself can be accepted, you can think of accounting information is true, on the other hand, argue that the accounting information is distorted, similar to follow under the theory of the concept of the accounting information authenticity. Under the rational process view, the focus of the authenticity of accounting information is transferred to the accounting behavior process, namely, the process of formation and disclosure of accounting information.译文中小企业会计信息失真研究作者：贝克摘要证券市场实际上是信息市场，会计信息披露是否及时、准确、全面是建立公众对证券市场的信心基础。
财务风险 外文文献
外文文献The Important Of Financial RiskSohnke M. Bartram Gregory W. Brown and Murat AtamerAbstract:This paper examines the determinants of equity price risk for a largesample of non-financial corporations in the United States from 1964 to 2008. Weestimate both structural and reduced form models to examine the endogenous natureof corporate financial characteristics such as total debt debt maturity cash holdingsand dividend policy. We find that the observed levels of equity price risk areexplained primarily by operating and asset characteristics such as firm age size assettangibility as well as operating cash flow levels and volatility. In contrast impliedmeasures of financial risk are generally low and more stable than debt-to-equity ratios.Our measures of financial risk have declined over the last 30 years even as measuresof equity volatility e.g. idiosyncratic risk have tended to increase. Consequentlydocumented trends in equity price risk are more than fully accounted for by trends inthe riskiness of firms’assets. Taken together the results suggest that the typical U.S.firm substantially reduces financial risk by carefully managing financial policies. As aresult residual financial risk now appears negligible relative to underlying economicrisk for a typical non-financial firm.Keywords：Capital structure；financial risk；risk management；corporate finance1 1.IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention to the effects offinancial leverage. There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financialinstitutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis. Indeed evidenceindicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks e.g. through themortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations and the so-called “shadowbanking system”may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financialdislocation. Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms.To date problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to thedistress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis.For example non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economicdecline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact bankruptcyfilings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S. industries e.g.automotive manufacturing newspapers and real estate that faced fundamentaleconomic pressures prior to the financial crisis. This surprising fact begs the question“How important is financial risk for non-financial firms”At the heart of this issue isthe uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firmrisk.Recent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance hasrekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk. A current strand of the assetpricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al. 2001 thatfirm-specificidiosyncratic risk has tended to increase over the last 40 years. Other work suggeststhat idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor see Goyal and Santa-Clara 2003among others. Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi 2003showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinantof idiosyncratic risk and firm value. Other research has examined the role of equityvolatility in bond pricing e.g. Dichev 1998 Campbell Hilscher and Szilagyi2008.However much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the riskof assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. In contrast thispaper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk. First we seek tounderstand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering totalrisk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations i.e. economic or businessrisks and risks associated with financing the firms operations i.e. financial risks.Second we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risksand the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller 1958 suggests that financial policymay be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate manyfinancial decisions by the firm at a low cost i.e. via homemade leverage andwell-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial andeconomic distress. Nonetheless financial policies such as adding debt to the capitalstructure can magnify the risk of equity. In contrast recent research on corporate riskmanagement suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase valuewith financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives. However thisresearch is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financialdistress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage. Empiricalresearch provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for atypical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk byexamining determinants of total firm risk. In our analysis we utilize a large sample ofnon-financial firms in the United States.Our goal of identifying the most importantdeterminants of equity price risk volatility relies on viewing financial policy astransforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage. Thusthroughout the paper we consider financial leverage as the wedge between assetvolatility and equity volatility. For example in a static setting debt provides financialleverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility. Because financial policy isdetermined by owners and managers we are careful to examine the effects of firms’asset and operating characteristics on financial policy. Specifically we examine avariety of characteristics suggested by previous research and as clearly as possibledistinguish between those associated of the company(i.e. factors determining economic risk) and those associated with financing the firm(i.e. factors determining financial risk).We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft(1996),or alternatively, in a reduced form model of financial leverage.An advantage of the structural model approach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implciations ofsome factors(e.g .dividends),as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volantility if common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daliy equity returns.Our proxies for econmic risk are designed to capture the essential charactersitics of the firm’s operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm.For example,firm size and age provide measures of line of –business maturity; tangible assets(plant,property,and equipment)serve as a proxy for the ‘hardness’of a firm’s assets;capital expenditures measure captial intensity as well as growth potential.Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows.To understand how financial factors affect firm risk,we examine total debt,debt maturity,dividend payouts,and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary resuit or our analysis is surpriing:factors determining economic risk for a typical company exlain the vast majority of the varation in equity volatility.Correspondingly,measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios. Specifically, in our sample covering 1964-2008 average actual net financial (market) leverage is 1.50 compared to our estimates of between 1.03 and 1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique).This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policise to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels.These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels,debt maturity,or cash holdings (see,for example , Acharya,Almeida,and Campello,2007).In addition,many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial dervatives,contractual arrangements with investors (e.g. lines of credit,call provisions in debt contracts ,or contingencies in supplier contracts ),spcial purpose vehicles (SPVs),or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our ecnomic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statiscally significant, with predicted size and age of the firm.This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business,which shoule be reflected in the volatility. This suggests that companties with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt, and therefore are potentially less risky .Among economic risk variables,the effects of firm size ,prfit volatility,and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies,our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leveage increases total firm risk. Otherwise,fiancial risk factors are not reliably to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy , it is no surprise that financial variables are , at least in part , determined by the econmic risks frims take.However, some of the specific findings are unexpected. For example , in a simple model of capital structure ,dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm(i.e.,increase net debt ).We find that dividends are associated with lower risk. This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g.,a mature company with limited growth opportunities). We also estimate howsensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time.Our result indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to 1983 tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consisitently negatively related to risk.This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadoa (2007) that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.。
会计信息的失真及其对策探讨
1引言一直以来，会计信息质量较低是一个普遍问题，失真的会计信息使得企业实际情况无法得到反映，企业决策层使用无效会计信息作出的决策自然就缺乏实用性。
本次研究以会计信息为中心展开研究，着重分析会计信息失真的原因、探讨优化企业会计管理的具体措施，以期提升企业会计信息的真实性和准确性。
2信息、会计信息和会计信息失真的概述2.1信息信息是由数字、文字等汇集而成的对特定人有意义的数据文件。
信息的目的是用来“消除不确定的因素”。
本文要讨论的信息属于会计范畴领域中的信息，直接关系到企业的利益等多方面问题[1]。
2.2会计信息会计信息是企业经济信息的一种，是指经济活动中物质反映出的信号，信息中包括文字、图片、表格等多种资料反映的信息。
会计信息主要用于反映特定组织的财务情况、经营效果、管理状况等内容，其对特定组织的会计核算进行直观表现，成为核算的载体，成为组织进行战略部署和决策的直接依据。
会计信息的价值与作用不言而喻，真实有效的会计信息对企业而言，直接影响企业经营的质量和水平。
2.3会计信息失真第一，规范性失真，这一类会计信息失真是指会计规范性不强，导致信息出现不完整、不准确等现象。
规范性失真也可以分为两种，其一是不规范的会计信息无法真实反映出组织所进行的经济活动情况；其二是会计规范本身存在问题，对会计信息的规范和约束性不强，没有能够发挥会计信息应有的作用。
第二，违法性失真，此类会计信息失真指组织或者个人因为主观意愿违反规定或者制度，造成会计信息失去真实性，出现了会计信息造假现象。
虽然违法性失真并不是完全出于欺诈目的，但是其具有违法性质，对各方权益造成影响，导致会计管理真实性受到负面影响，进而各方关系人作出错误的决策和判断，损坏其利益[2]。
第三，技术性失真，此类失真则主要是人为因素造成，因为会计人员或管理者缺乏会计专业知识，导致会计信息出现误差。
3会计信息失真的原因分析所谓会计信息质量问题，简单来讲就是提供的会计信息具有虚假的可能性，可以说具有欺骗性因素，为了确保企业的某种利益而虚报企业利润。
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会计信息失真外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)目录1 绪论 (3)1 Introduction (4)2 会计信息失真的原因 (5)2.1 会计法律法规体系的局限性 (5)2.2 会计工作人员的疏漏 (5)2.3 职业道德的背离 (5)2.4 政府监管机制不完善 (6)2 The reason of the accounting information distortion (7)2.1 The limitation of accountant laws and regulations system (7)2.2 The accountancy fault (7)2.3 Occupational ethics deviating (8)2.4 The imperfect government mechanism (8)3 会计信息失真的对策 (9)3.1 建立标准化的会计准则，加强会计制度的建设 (9)3.2 建立和完善公司内部监管体系 (9)3.3 完善会计人员监管体系，加大违规的惩处力度 (9)3.4 完善职业资格证制度，加大后续教育的力度，提高会计人员的综合素质 (10)3 The Countermeasure of Accounting Information Distortion (11)3.1 Standard accounting guide line and strengthen the construction of accounting system .. 113.2 Establishing and perfecting enterprise internal control system. (11)3.3 Perfecting accountant supervises system, enhancing punishment. (12)3.4 Consummating employed qualifications system, enhancing following education,improving the accountant quality comprehensively. (12)4 结论 (14)Conclusions (15)摘要这些年，会计信息失真已经影响到了社会经济秩序，本文主要分析了我国会计信息失真产生的原因，及其对策。
关键词：会计信息失真问题对策AbstractIn recent years, the accounting information distortion has affected social economy order. This article mainly discusses on the causes and countermeasure of accounting information distortion in China.Keywords:Accounting Information, Distortion Causes, Countermeasure1绪论近些年，会计信息失真的事经常发生，已经影响到了投资者及债权人对公司经营状况的正确判断，导致了全国宏观经济调控和微观经济政策失效，同时也影响到了社会经济秩序的正常运转。
本文主要讨论了在我国产生这一问题的原因，及其对策。
1IntroductionIn recent years, it happens sometimes that the accounting information distort. It will affect information users such as investors and creditors correctly judge and deicide the management of enterprise, result in the national macroeconomic regulation and control and the microscopic policy-making fault, and affect the social economy order normally operate. This article mainly discusses on the causes and countermeasure of accounting information distortion in China.2会计信息失真的原因会计信息失真原因很多：公司内部因素和外部因素；客观原因和主管原因。
总之，不外乎以下几点：2.1会计法律法规体系的局限性会计准则制度与会计工作制度是所有会计工作的基础，也是会计工作原则的基石，同时也是会计工作流程方法和会计信息披露的基础。
作为会计工作的基本准则，会计准则和会计工作制度的局限性是会计信息失真的主要原因，其主要表现为：第一，传统的企业会计制度与会计准则的评估与判断会导致会计信息失真；第二，会计方法的灵活性可能会导致会计信息失真；第三，企业会计制度与会计准则的滞后性也会导致会计信息失真。
2.2会计工作人员的疏漏会计工作人员的疏忽是指，在统计、核实、记录和报送的过程中所出现的无意识的错误。
会计工作人员的疏忽也是会计信息失真的一个重要原因。
(1) 会计人员对会计制度和会计准则的理解和应用有偏差也会导致会计信息失真。
在会计准则和会计制度中，某些财务工作或现象的计算是相对的，它要求会计员采用合适的计算方法以进行独特的分析。
如果会计员对会计准则和会计工作制度不熟悉不了解，他就无法正确的计算财务工作，也就可能导致会计信息失真。
(2) 会计工作人员无意识的错误也会导致会计信息失真。
即使会计人员可以理解和准确把握企业会计制度和会计准则，工作中难免有些错误，也将导致会计信息失真。
2.3职业道德的背离职业道德背离是指会计人员缺少或丧失了职业准则。
自从改革开放以来，我国的会计工作改革使其充满了生机和活力，并且获得了巨大的成就。
但是，同时，原来的会计准则遭到严重破坏，甚至在一定程度上被摒弃，逐渐失去了对会计人员的约束。
会计职业道德标准的权威性也就逐渐的丧失了。
在实际工作中，一些会计师无法抗拒诱惑或者来自高层的权威，甚至故意制造信息失真以获取利益。
2.4政府监管机制不完善目前我国正在实行市场经济体制，但是，事实情况是，政府对企业的监管严重缺位，而一些政府行为也不符合市场经济规律。
在一些地方，政府对企业的直接管理，导致很多企业领导“围着政府转”。
在一些地方，政府通过目标检测、责任审计来管理企业，奖优罚劣。
但是企业的管理者们，在利益良好时可能会隐瞒利润，在经营不善时可能会夸大利润，以通过上级的决策评估。
在这种情况下，会计信息失真就不可避免了。
2The reason of the accounting information distortionThere are various reasons of accounting information distortion: the enterprise internal factor and also exterior factor; the objective reason and also the subjective reason. Summarily, it mainly has following several points:2.1The limitation of accountant laws and regulations systemThe accounting guide line and business accounting system are all the basic standards of accounting work, the concrete prescribe of business accounting principles, the accounting service processing method and the accounting information disclosure method and so on. As the basic standards of accounting work, the limitation of the accounting guide line and business accounting system is reason of accounting information distortion. It mainly displays in:First, the inherent estimate and the specialized judgment of the accounting guide line and business accounting system will cause the accounting information distortion. Second, the flexibility of accounting method may cause the accounting information distortion. Third, the hysteretic quality of the accounting guide line and business accounting system will also cause the accounting information distortion.2.2The accountancy faultThe accountancy fault refers to unconsciousness fault made in the accountancy as a result of the fault of measure, confirmation, record, report and so on. The accountancy fault is also an important reason of accounting information distortion. It mainly displays in:(1). Understood and applied the accounting guide line and business accounting system mistakenly will lead accounting information distortion. In the accounting guide line and business accounting system, certain economic work or the phenomenon calculation is compares principled, which calls for appropriate calculation method by purse bearer specialized analysis. If the purse bearer is not certain about the accounting guide line and business accounting system, he will not account economicwork correctly, and then it becomes possible to make distorted accounting information.(2). Unconsciousness fault made in the accountancy leads to accounting information distortion. Even if the accountant can understand and grasp accounting guide line and business accounting system accurately, some mistakes unavoidably in the work will cause the accounting information distortion. Such as the mistake of account category, accountant miscalculation, miss record the business occurred.2.3Occupational ethics deviatingAccountant occupational ethics deviating from the norm refers to accountant lack or lose the professional standard. Since reform and opening-up, the reform of accountant has filled with vitality and vigor and obtained the huge achievement in our country. But at the same time, original accountant standards encounter serious destruction or the denial by a certain extent，gradually lose restraint of 481 accountant. And form accountant occupational ethics standard authority losing. In practical work, some accountants fail to resist enticement or the instruction of higher authority, and intentionally manufacture the distorting accounting information seeking the benefit.2.4The imperfect government mechanismAt present, our country has practiced the market economy system, but in the reality, dislocation mechanism that the government manage enterprise extremely was still prevails, and government's behavior was not according to the market economy rule. The government manages enterprise directly in many place, as a result it always leads to a complexion that the leader of enterprise “revolving around government”. Some local government manages the leader of enterprise by target inspection, responsibility audit, rewards the excellent and punishes the inferior. But the head of enterprise hide the profit when getting good benefit, and forge the profit when not achieve the goal in order to go through a strategic pass. As the matter stands, the accounting information inevitably distorts.3会计信息失真的对策会计信息是公共产品，其用户众多，影响非常广泛。