会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译
浅析上市公司财务舞弊毕业论文
毕业设计(论文)论文题目:浅析上市公司财务舞弊毕业设计(论文)原创性声明和使用授权说明原创性声明本人郑重承诺:所呈交的毕业设计(论文),是我个人在指导教师的指导下进行的研究工作及取得的成果。
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涉密论文按学校规定处理。
作者签名:日期:年月日导师签名:日期:年月日注意事项1.设计(论文)的内容包括:1)封面(按教务处制定的标准封面格式制作)2)原创性声明3)中文摘要(300字左右)、关键词4)外文摘要、关键词5)目次页(附件不统一编入)6)论文主体部分:引言(或绪论)、正文、结论7)参考文献8)致谢9)附录(对论文支持必要时)2.论文字数要求:理工类设计(论文)正文字数不少于1万字(不包括图纸、程序清单等),文科类论文正文字数不少于1.2万字。
上市公司财务舞弊的分析与思考
上市公司财务舞弊的分析与思考DTitle Analysis and Thinking listed companies’ financial fraud——Case study on SinovelAbstractAccompany with the development of capital market, financial fraud behavior always emerge in endlessly. From the collapse of Enron Corporation in foreign countries, WorldCom was traced to fraud, from Yunnan green earth in the domestic. Then just near Edmond Health Division fraud cases. The prohibition of financial fraud cases, and seriously hindered the healthy development o domestic, securities industry. Not only because significant losses to investors, but also seriously affected the resources configuration, harm to the capital market. Therefore, this shows that financial fraud of listed company’ research is imperative for financial fraud prevention and regulatory penalties have more far-reaching.Abroad is relatively more developed domestic capital, accounting profession has a lot of research on financial fraud, this is our country’s financial fraud has reference value and significance of the research. But considering our country’s social system legal environment, economic situation, combined with actual situation of our country to research the financial fraud of listed companies. This show adopts the way of theory research and case for analysis. Through the introduction to financial fraud and related concepts, and the analysis of risk factors, and combined with Sinovel cases. From the enterprise itself,intermediary institutions, government department three Angle analysis, and put forward suggestions to, finally summarizes the countermeasures to prevent financial fraud of listed companies.This article mainly is composed of six parts; the first part is the introduction, introduced in this paper, the research background, significance, purpose, literature review, research methods and contents. The second part is about the analysis of the dynamics of financial fraud of listed companies, mainly general risk factor and individual risk factors. The third part is to introduce Sinovel fraud cases and make a analysis an thinking. The fourth part of the listed company fraud proposes appropriate preventive measures. Finally, there are summarizes and thanks.Keyword Financial fraud Sinovel Precautions目录摘要............................................ 错误!未定义书签。
基于GONE理论的上市公司财务舞弊动因分析及防范——以QX公司为例
2024年1月第27卷第2期中国管理信息化China Management InformationizationJan.,2024Vol.27,No.2基于GONE理论的上市公司财务舞弊动因分析及防范——以QX公司为例唐芝明(贵州财经大学会计学院,贵阳550025)[摘 要]上市融资是许多公司发展到一定程度时所采取的一种融资方式,但是公司上市后面临的是高标准、高透明的压力。
为了保持良好的形象,能继续在证券市场上融资,偶有公司进行财务舞弊。
文章以QX公司为例,采用GONE理论(企业会计舞弊与反会计舞弊理论)对其舞弊动因展开分析,由此提出防范措施,以期为中小投资者、上市公司及政府监管机构防范财务舞弊提供参考。
[关键词]财务舞弊;GONE理论;上市公司doi:10.3969/j.issn.1673 - 0194.2024.02.008[中图分类号]F275 [文献标识码]A [文章编号]1673-0194(2024)02-0025-031 案例回顾1.1 QX公司简介QX公司成立于1995年,主营建筑装饰设计与施工,于2015年在深交所上市,在股权方面,原实际控制人控制的投资公司为第一大股东。
2020年,QX公司当地某国有企业购买该公司29.99%的股权成为控股股东,此后,QX公司的诸多问题逐渐浮出水面。
1.2 QX公司财务舞弊行为根据深交所公布的信息,QX公司在2023年年初收到了中国证监会下发的《行政处罚及市场禁入事先告知书》,其中表明公司2015年披露的招股说明书中存在虚假记载。
2012年到2015年上半年期间,该公司通过对内部承包项目少计成本、体外支付、签订虚假合同、放大合同金额等方式虚增营业收入,以及虚增和虚减营业成本,以此虚增利润总额。
QX公司2012年 到2015年上半年虚增利润总额及其占当期披露利润总额的比例见表1,在此期间的年度财务报告经天职国际会计师事务所审计,并得到了标准的无保留意见。
财务造假的国内外文献综述
财务造假的国内外文献综述财务造假的国内外文献综述本文关键词:造假,综述,文献,国内外,财务财务造假的国内外文献综述本文简介:第2章文献综述 2.1国外文献综述2.1.1动因理论证券市场迅速发展越来越多的问题暴露出来,国外研究财务造假的理论成果不断增多。
主流研究集中在造假动因分析上,比较经典的动因理论主要有以下几个: (1)舞弊三角理论该理论被公认为迄今为止财务造假动机理论中最具代表性的理论。
最早研究舞弊因财务造假的国内外文献综述本文内容:第 2 章文献综述2.1 国外文献综述2.1.1 动因理论证券市场迅速发展越来越多的问题暴露出来,国外研究财务造假的理论成果不断增多。
主流研究集中在造假动因分析上,比较经典的动因理论主要有以下几个:(1)舞弊三角理论该理论被公认为迄今为止财务造假动机理论中最具代表性的理论。
最早研究舞弊因子学说的是美国内部审计之父劳伦斯.索耶先生,早在 20 世纪 50 年代就提出舞弊的产生需要三个条件:异常需求、机会和合乎情理,为后来舞弊学理论的发展奠定了基础[1]。
在 1995 年由美国注册舞弊审核师协会(ACFE)的创始人、伯明翰大学的史蒂文▪阿伯雷齐特(W.Steve Albrecht)进一步完善了舞弊学理论[2]。
该理论认为企业舞弊的产生是由压力(Exposure)、机会(Opportunity)和自我合理化(Rationalization)三要素组成,三者缺一不可。
经营受到阻碍、财务上出现困境、资金供应不足都会给企业带来压力,企业也就产生了舞弊行为的动机。
企业采取舞弊通常由于以下四种压力:工作压力、经济压力、恶癖的压力和其他压力。
这四种压力构成企业舞弊的动机。
舞弊的第二种要素--机会,是指企业进行舞弊的同时又不会被揭发或者不会受到相关处罚,主要有以下六种情况:"缺乏发现企业舞弊行为的内部控制,无法判断工作的质量,缺乏惩罚措施,信息不对称,能力不足和审计制度不健全"。
在具备以上两个要素以后真正的舞弊行为就差借口(自我合理化)这一要素,即企业舞弊者必须找到某个理由,使企业舞弊行为与其本人的道德观念、行为准则相吻合,无论这一解释本身是否真正合理。
会计学内部控制外文文献
会计学内部控制外文文献外文翻译J.Wild,Ken W.Shaw,Barbara Ghiappetta. Principles of Accounting本节将介绍内部控制及其基本原则,并讨论科学技术对内部控制的影响和控制程序的局限性。
一、内部控制的目的小型企业的管理者(或老板)常常需要控制企业整体经营。
他们要负责资产的采购、员工的雇佣和管理、合约洽谈以及支票签发。
这些管理者通过亲自接触和观察来了解企业是否取得了已进行过支付的资产或劳务。
但更多企业无法通过这种监督方式保证企业的运转,他们必须划分责任并依靠正式程序来控制企业经营活动。
管理者使用内部控制制度监督和控制企业的各种活动。
内部控制制度(internal control system)是由各种政策和程序构成的,管理者通常使用他们: , 保护企业资产。
, 确保会计录的可靠性。
, 提高运营效率。
, 保证公司政策的贯彻执行。
一套设计完善的内部控制制度是系统设计、分析和实施的关键环节。
管理者之所以重视内部控制制度是因为他可以预防可避免的损失,帮助经营者制定运营计划,监督企业运营期情况和员工表现。
尽管内部控制无法提供担保,但可以降低企业遭受损失的风险。
二、内部控制的原则隐隐无性质和企业规模等因素的不同,不同企业采用的内部控制政策和程序也各不相同。
但有些基本原则是普遍适用的,这些普遍适用的内部控制原则(principles of internal control)包括:, 明确责任。
, 保持适当的记录, 为资产投保,并为关键员工投保忠诚险, 保证资产报关与记录相分离, 划分相关交易的责任, 应用各种控制技术, 定期实施独立核查本节将介绍这七项原则以及如何使用内部控制将偷窃和欺诈风险减值最小。
这些程序也将增加会计记录的可靠性和准确性。
1( 明确责任良好的内部控制意味着将各工作任务的职责划分清楚并指派给适credit history, individual score of the borrower, loan purpose, source of payments, repayment options, guarantor of basic information and for loan amount, term, interest rate, payment methods, such as recommendations, if the customer agreed to process the business 当的员工,否则在发生差措施将很难确定是谁的责任。
会计造假行为外文翻译文献
会计造假行为外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)一、对会计造假行为主体的界定(一)会计造假的含义财务会计作假可以分成会计信息的急于作假和会计信息的有意不实。
本文主要牵涉会计信息的急于作假,它就是指财务会计活动中当事人.事前经过精心安排,故意以欺诈、舞弊等手段.假造、变造不实会计信息,并使会计信息歪曲充分反映经济活动和财务会计事项.以此达至特定利益的集团或个人的不能抗拒违法犯罪犯罪行为。
(二)会计造假主体的界定财务会计作假主体应当包含炮制假账和有关违法乱纪活动的主谋、共谋和执行者。
按照在作假过程中所充分发挥的促进作用相同,财务会计作假主体包含动议者、决策者、操作者和协同者。
造假的动议者是指为会计造假出谋划策的人。
通常是单位财会部门的负责人.在作假过程中往往饰演替编剧的角色。
造假的决策者是指有权决定会计造假实施的各级领导人。
决策者既可以是领导者个人.也可以是领导层集体,是会计造假的最大受益者。
作假的实施者就是指具有职务便捷、能碰触会计凭证、帐厚、报表等资料,亲自实行和顺利完成财务会计作假的人员。
它不仅包含有关会计人员、办事员人员,而且还包括有关的订货人员、销售人员、看管人员和统计人员。
作假的协同者就是所指从某些方面策应、协调作假的人员。
既包含在作假之初为之提供方便者.例如某些财会人员为作假积极主动出谋划策,提供更多信息及技术方法和手段,与领导共同设计严防检查的对策和措施:也包含在作假事实出现后为其掩盖、布防、通风报信和提供更多伪证等人员。
值得说明的是,在不同的造假案件中.造假主体的人员构成不尽相同.相关人员在造假过程中所承担的职资和所发挥的作用也不一样。
二、做为企业的经营者,对不实会计信息的回潮和传播有著较为繁杂的心态(一)“高指标”诱出假数字前些年在企业和主管部门还没全然挂勾的情况下,一些厂长经理不顾经营业绩的考核压力年年把销售、利润当作最要紧的“任务”揪,推行以“低指标”“乌纱帽”的考核办法,在这种压力下,经营者不粉饰报表、不捏造假数字就伤心考核第一关。
外文翻译--关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究
本科毕业论文(设计)外文翻译外文题目Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud外文出处Internal Auditor外文作者Green, Scott原文:Fighting Financial Reporting FraudCONGRES PASSED THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT of 2002 with the goal of rebuilding investor confidence and protecting capital markets. It recognized that strong internal controls were an important component of confidence building. Section 404 of the act addresses this component by mandating an annual evaluation of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting and requiring management to assess and certify the effectiveness of these controls.In addition Sarbanes-Oxley requires a company's external auditor to complete a separate report that attests to management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. In short, the external auditor must perform testing to validate management's assessment of the internal control structure.A strong internal audit function can provide both management and the public accountants with comfort that the control structure is being evaluated regularly and that deficiencies are remedied. Documenting and evaluating a company's processes and related control structure are traditional internal audit tasks that protect the enterprise. However, the degree to which internal auditors focus on the accuracy of their organization's financial reporting presentation and disclosure, in addition to operational audits, is a matter of judgment. Critical factors that will determine the scope of internal auditing involvement in the financial reporting process include the strength and experience of the external auditors as well as the extent of their reliance on the internal control function the transparency and culture of the enterprise andaudit priorities based on solid risk analysis.There are three steps every auditor should take-regardless of their level of' involvement-to help protect the organization from fraudulent financial reporting: * Listen to rogues and whistleblowers.* Ask focused questions that may lead to red flags of financial reporting trouble.* Watch for financial oddities by benchmarking performance. Investors depend on interim financial reports and need to believe these reports are fair and accurate. Internal auditing can provide valuable oversight to organizations by helping to ensure that communications arc free from inappropriate financial engineering.THE ART OF LISTENINGOne of the problems with financial reporting scandals is that an unscrupulous chief financial officer (CFO) and members of his or her team are unlikely to announce their intentions. In fact, a common thread running through World Com, Enron, and other high-profile financial sandals is that each company had a strong, respected CFO who kept the number of people involved in the scandal to a minimum, exerted incredible control over the working group and commanded the group's loyalty above all other ethical considerations. These CFOs reportedly rewarded those who supported them and intimidated, excluded, and punished those who did not. No auditor can reasonably expect such II tightly knit group to volunteer that their boss is playing with the numbers. The CFO's sycophants will court his or her approval at the expense of all else even the total destruction of the enterprise.The good news is that, in recent cases, there were outsiders who were willing to step forward. At Enron, for example, Sherron Watkins, a corporate vice president, specifically told both Andersen and senior executives of her concerns regarding the conflict of interest between Enron and the special purpose entities (SPEs) the CFO administered as well as the perception of improper accounting at many of the SPEs he created. She also raised the possibility of the complete financial collapse of the company. Had they listened to Watkins, the fraud might have been identified earlier, thereby limiting the damage to the company and its employees.The lesson for auditors is clear: Listen the rogues who complain. Particu1arly towhere constructive criticism is viewed as an act of disloyalty, those who arc not viewed as a part of the team can be a terrific source information. It is often too easy to dismiss the grumbling of those who arc perceived as outsiders or on the fast track to termination. Internal auditors should resist passive behavior and listen, evaluate, and, if warranted, investigate what they hear.IDENTIFY RED FLAGSAlthough the number of possible disclosure omissions and financial presentation errors are many, internal auditors can look for patterns to help focus their activities to where they will be most effective. Uncovering these red flags may take some digging and may require the auditor to ask tough questions.AGGRESSIVE REVENUE RECOGNITION POLICIESA typical red flag is revenue that is matched to future performance or expense. Qwest Communications has stated that, between 1999 and 200l, it incorrectly accounted for more than $1.1 billion in transactions. Revenues were contingent on the purchase of fiber capacity and future services, but they were improperly booked as earned.Unify Corp, a provider of software products, reportedly went even further when it boosted revenue by loaning money to customers. Those customers then bought Unify's products with no reasonable expectation of ever repaying the loans. A $15 million profit was eventually restated into a 57 million loss.Understanding when revenues are recognized is the first step to comprehending the quality of the revenue stream.Revenues of the highest quality are those that are booked after the customer has received, accepted, and paid for the product or service without any further performance requirement or contingency. To identify aggressive accounting and contingencies, auditors can:* Make a direct inquiry to management ns to the existence of loans to customers or asset- swap agreements.* Conduct a detailed analysis or debt obligations, which may uncover undisclosed contingencies.* Evaluate alternative revenue recognition methodologies available to the company and ask the CFO and external auditors why these were rejected in favor of the current practice. Such inquiry is not a sign of ignorance, but instead demonstrates prudence and due diligence.The revenue policy applied must have a sound business rationale that is easily understood by senior management and directors. If it doesn't, this issue should be raised with the audit committee.EVER-PRESENT NONRECURRING CHARGESCompanies are continually making provisions expenses, even if they are not sure of their exact amount. There has been an epidemic of merger. Product return, lawsuit, obsolete inventory, and bad loan expenses that usually give rise to reserves or nonrecurring charges. The Center for Business Innovation reports that the number of Standard and Poor's 500 (S&P 500) firms declaring special losses grew from 68 in 1982 to Z33 in 2000. 1 n other words, a whopping 47 percent of the S&P 500 had nonrecurring charges in 2000.There arc many legitimate nonrecurring expenses - due to acts of nature, mergers, and asset sales. So how does an auditor identify the misuse of this accounting method to hide underlying weaknesses in operating results? One clue is if a company regularly reverses reserves, such as reorganization expenses, back into operating income. This type of activity creates inflation in reported results. To identify such activity, an auditor should ask probing questions such as:* Why the charge nonrecurring and not a part of normal operating income?* How was the amount of the charge determined and how accurate is it?* What is the likelihood that all or a portion of the charge neither will nor be used?* What will be disclosed about the charge in the financial statements?Confusing or hesitant answers be investigated further. Auditors should have responses documented and on hand future meetings. If nonrecurring for charges are reversed at a later date, auditors should and challenge detailed explanations regarding this treatment.REGULAR CHANGES TO RESERVE, DEPRECIATION, AMORTIZATION,OR COMPREHENSIVE INCOME POLICY Frequent changes in accounting guidance can also mask manipulation of the numbers. It is to be expected that the dollar amount of reserves will change with the business c1imare, bur the method used to calculate reserves should not. If an increase in sales results in an increase in accounts then a corresponding and proportional increase in reserves and bad debt expenses would be expected. I f there does not seem to be a direct correlation; internal auditors should challenge the consistency of the reserve calculation.Likewise, capitalized costs should not increase at a rate greater than revenue over time. There may be a lag in related revenue until after major capitalized projects are completed. Auditors should question capitalization techniques that appear aggressive. Any change in methodology should be just; 6ed by long-term trends, not short-term needs.RELATED·PARTY TRANSACTIONSRelated panics are entities whose management or operating policies can be controlled or influenced by another party. Although related-parry transactions are particularly difficult to identify, there are auditors can regularly several activities undertake to help reveal this red flag. As discussed earlier, ongoing communications with rogues can be effective; however, quarterly procedures should also include activities designed to conflicts, such as:* Maintaining open communications with outside auditors.* Conducting periodic balance-sheet analyses.* Scheduling regular management interviews.At Enron, the external auditors were intimately involved in the creation of SPEs and were aware of the potential conflicts of interest associated with them. SPEs can be effective financing and risk management vehicles if used correctly. A parent company's debt level or other can hinder the capability of risk factors a strong: business segment to obtain favorable interest rates to finance its operations. In such a situation, the parent can create an SPE and transfer the asset to it with the goal of receiving more favorable lending rates. As long as there is another independent third-party investor that has contributed at least 3 percent of the assets, the PE doesnot be consolidated into the parent have to for financial-reporting purposes. Furthermore, if the assets in the SPE are of high quality, banks will perceive the entity as a desirable borrower, resulting in lower lending rates. The SPE will then use this money to pay the parent for the asset received. The bottom line is that the company obtains the money it requires, bur pays less to obtain it than it would without the SPE.Enron ran out of quality assets, so the company transferred inferior assets and pledged Enron stock as a guarantee of payment to the banks. According to the Report of Investigation by the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Powers Report), Enron reported earnings from the third quarter of 2000 through the third quarter of 2001 of almost $1 billion more than should have been reported us a result of this shell game. External auditors routinely request that management attest to and disclose their knowledge of related-party transactions. Simply asking the external auditors about their knowledge of related-party transactions would identified this potential threat to the organization. Such inquiries can be easy for the internal audit department if it maintains it strong relationship with the external auditors. Insightful analyses of balance sheet movements, particularly at year-end when the pressure to report strong results is at its peak, might also identify related-party transactions. The asset movements at Enron were large, and inquiry into their removal from the balance sheet would have uncovered the SPEs and the conflicts of interest with the CFO. Internal auditors need to: ask management directly about any related-party activities and, where appropriate, raise their existence to the audit committee.COMPLEX PRODUCTS Some companies provide complex financial products, such as structured financia1 instruments containing derivatives, or use hedging strategies that few understand. When a star performer produces complex products, few want to challenge this success or reveal that they don't understand how the system works. This is evidenced by the Joe Jett story, the infamous trader who executed seemingly profitable trades that, in reality, had no economic benefit. These trades caused the investment bank Kidder Peabody to port more than S300 million in bogus profits. No one was sure how Jett made his margins, but no one - from supervisors, toauditors, to finance staff wanted to admit their ignorance. Several internal controls should have identified this control break; however, simply requiring that the process be documented in derail may have dissolved the mirage of profitability.An auditor can insist that managers or their employees map out complex strategies. Jett's supervisor would not have able to do this because he did not been know how Jett made money on his trades. Likewise, Jett would not be able to document the process, as the fraud has been discovered.Green, Scott. Fighting Financial Reporting Fraud [J]. Internal Auditor, 2003, 60(6).译文:关于打击财务报告舞弊的研究美国于2002年通过了《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》,旨在重建投资者的信心和保护资本市场的有效运行。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含:英文原文及中文译文)文献出处:Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting fraud sandaction for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2).英文原文GlobalCorporate Accounting Frauds and Actionfor ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt.John’sUniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulentfinancial reportinghas promptedglobal actions for reforms in corporategovernance and financialreporting, by governmentsand accounting andauditingstandard-setting bodies in theU.S.and internationally, includ ingtheEuropean Commission; the InternationalFederation ofAccountants; the Organization for Econ omicCooperationand Development;and others,in order torestoreinvestor confidence in financi alreporting, theaccounting professionand global financialmarkets.IntroductionDuringthe recent series of corporatefraudul ent financial reporting incidentsin the U.S.,simila rcorporate scandals were disclosed in several other c ountries.Almost all casesof foreign corporateaccountingfrauds werecommitted byentitiesthatcond ucttheir businessesinmore than one country, and most of these entitiesare alsolisted on U.S. stockexchanges. Followingthe legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America,resulting from the SarbanesOxley Actof 2002,reforms werealso initiatedw orldwide. Theprimary purpose of this paper is twofo ld:(1) to identify theprominent American andforeign companiesinvolved in fraudulent financial reporting and the natureof accounting irregularities they committed;and(2) to highlight the globalreactionfor corporate reforms whichare aimedat restoring investor confidence infinancial reporting,the public accountingprofession and global capital markets.Casesof GlobalCorporateAccounting FraudsThelist of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. isextensive, and each one was the result of one ormore creative accountingirregularities. Exhi bit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companiesthat committed such fraud andthe nature oftheir fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people whocommit financial statement frauds. They rangefrom senior management (CEOand CFO); mid- and lower-level manag ement; and organizational criminals[6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true busin essperformance, to preserve personal status andcontrol and to maintain personal incomeand wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related totheirarea ofresponsibility (subsidiary,division or other unit) to conceal poorperformance and/orto earnperformance-basedbonuses. Organizational criminalsfalsifyfinancial statements toobtainloansor to inflate a stockthey planto sellin a “pump-and-dump”scheme. Methodsof financialstatement schemes range fromfictitiousor fabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized;improper assetvaluationsand reporting;concealing liabilitiesand expenses; and improperfinancia lstatement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action forCorporate and Accounting ReformsIn responseto corporateand accounting scandals,theeffectsofwhich arestill beingfelt throughouttheU.S. economy, and in orderto p rotect public interestand torestore investorconfidence in the capital market, U.S.lawmakers, in a compromisebythe House andSenate, passed theSarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002.President Bush signed thisAct into law (Public Law107-204) on July 30,2002. The Act resultedinmajorchangesto compliancepractices oflarge U.S. and non-U.S.companies whose securitiesare listed or traded on U.S.stoc kexchanges, requiringexecutives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability,responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes oftheAct, and thenewSEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered themost significantlegislation and regulationsaffecting the corporate community andtheaccounting profession since 1933.Other U.S. regu latorybodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the StateSocietiesof CPAs have alsopassed new regulations which place additionalburdens on publiclytraded c ompanies and their external auditors.TheSarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA)is expressly applicab le to any non-U.S.companyregistered on U.S.exc hanges under either the Securities Act of1933 orthe Security Exchange Actof 1934,regardless of countryof incorporationor corporate domicile.Furthermore, external auditors ofsuch registrants,regardless oftheir n ationality or placeofbusiness,are subject tothe oversight of the Public Company Accounting OversightBoard(PCAOB) andtothe statutoryrequ irements of the SOA.TheUnited States’ SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by theInternational Federation ofAccountants (I FAC);the Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development(OECD);the European Commission (UC);and authoritative bodies within individual Europeancountries.International Federation ofAccountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organizationwhos emembersare thenational professional associations of accountants.It formallydescribes itself as the global representativeof the accountingprofession, with the objectiveof servingthe publicinterest,strengtheni ng the worldwide accountancyprofession and contributingtothedevelopment of stronginternationaleconomiesbyestablishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards[9].The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide andhas served as a reminder thatrestoringpublic confidence in financial reportingandthe accountingprofession shouldbe considered a global mission.Itis also considered akey player inthe global auditingarena which,among other things,constructs internationa lstandards on auditing and has laiddown an internationalethical code forprofessional accountants [14].TheIFAC has recently secureda deg reeof supportfor its endeavors from someof theworld’s most influential international organizationsin economic and financial spheres, including globalFinancialStability Forum(FSF), the International Organizationof SecuritiesCommissions(IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002,IFAC commissioned aTaskForce on Rebuil ding Public Confidencein Financial Reporting to use a global perspectiveto considerhow to restore thecre dibilityof financial reporting and corporate disclosure.Its report, “Rebuilding PublicConfidence in FinancialReporting: An International Perspective,” includes recommendations for strengtheningcorporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions andrecommendationsrelated to audit committees are:1.All public interestentities shouldhave an independent audit committee or similar body.2.The auditcommittee shouldregularly reportto the boardandshould addressconcerns about financial information,internal controls or theaudit.3. The audit committee mustmeet regularly and have su fficient timeto perform its roleeffectively.4.Audit committees should havecoreresponsibilities, including monitoringand reviewing the integrityof financial reporting, financial controls,the internal audit function, as well asforrecommending,working with and monitoringthe externalauditors.5. Auditcommittee membersshould be financially literate andamajority should have“substantialfinancialexperience.” Theyshould receivefurthertrainingas necessary ontheirresponsibilities and onthecompany.6. Audit committees should have regular private “executive sessions” with the outside auditors and the head of theinternal auditdepartment.These executive ses sions should not include members of management. T here should be similar meetings with thechief financialofficer and otherkey financial executives,butwithout othermembers of management.7. Auditcommittee members shouldbeindependentofmanagement.8. Thereshouldbe a principles-based approach to defining independenceon an international level. Companies should disclose committeemembers’credentials, remuneration andshareholdings.9. Reinforcing therole of the auditcommitteeshould improve the relationshipbetweenthe auditor and thecompany. The auditcommitteeshould recommendthe hiringand firingofauditors and approv etheir fees, as well as review theaudit plan. 10.The IFAC Code ofEthics should be the foundation for individual national independencerules. It should be relied on in making decisions onwhether auditors should provide non-audit services.Non-audit services performed by the auditor shouldbe approved by theaudit committee.11.Allfees, forauditand non-audit services, shouldbe disclosedto shareholders.12.Key auditteam members,including the engag ement andindependentreview partners, shouldserve nolonger thansevenyearson theaudit.13. Two years should pass before a key auditteam m embercantake a position at the companyasadirector or any otherimportant management position Organizationfor EconomicCooperation and D evelopment (OECD)The Organizationfor Economic Cooperation and Developm ent(OECD) is a quasi-think tankmade up of 30member countries, including the United Statesand United Kingdom, andit has working relationships with more than70 othercountries.In 2004, the OECD unveiledthe up dated revisionof its “Principlesof CorporateGove rnance” that had originally been adopted by its membergovernments(including the U.S. and UK)in 1999.Although theyare nonbinding, the principlesprovide a reference for national legislationandregulation, as well as guidance for stockexchanges, inves tors,corporations andother parties [11,13]. The p rinciples have longbecome an internationalbenchmark forpolicymakers, investors,corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. Theyhaveadvanced the corporategovernance agenda and provided specificguidanceforlegislative andregulatory initiativesin both the OECDand non-OECDcountries.The 2004 updatedversion of “Principles of CorporateGovernance” includes recommendations on accounting andauditing standards,the independence of board mem bers and the need for boardsto act in the interest of the company and the shareholders.Theupdated version also setsmoredemandingstandards in a number of areas thatimpact corporate executive compensation andfinance,such as:1.Granting investors the right to nominateco mpanydirectors, aswell as a moreforcefulrolein electingthem.2. Providing shareholderswith a voice in the compens ation policy for board membersand executives,and giving these stockholders theability to submit questionstoauditors.3. Mandatingthat institutionalinvestorsdisclos etheir overallvoting policiesandhow theymanage material conflictsof interest that may affec tthe way the investors exercise keyownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying theneed for effective protection of creditor rights and anefficientsystem fordealing withcorporate insolvency.5. Directing ratingagencies,brokers and other providers ofinformationthat couldinfluenceinvestor decisions todisclose conflicts ofinterest, and how thoseconflictsare beingmanaged.6.Mandating boardmembers to be more rigorous indisclosing related party transactions, andprotecting socalled “whistle blowers” by providing theemployeeswith conf identialaccess to aboard-level contact.U.S.-EUCooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resentedapplicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Actreforms to European companies a nd accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after aseriesof negotiations, theU.S.andEU auth oritieshave agreed to cooperate anddecided to d evelop acompatible set of regulations.The regulatorybodies on bothcontinents have undertaken a two-waycooperative approach basedon effective equivale nceof regulationandoversight authorities.Fu rthermore, member states of theEuropean Union have prop osed a code of conduct on theindependentauditors which includesafive-year auditorrotation requirement.Furthermore,the national governments ofthe individual European countrieshaveproposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example,in July2002, the Britishgovernment released a white paper proposing changes to theCompany Law,which includ edharsherpenaltiesformisleading auditors;redefining the roles of the directors; andcreating standards for boards in accounting supervisionand other disclosure issues.The British government isalso reviewing the roles of non-executive directors andis consi dering the regulation of auditcommittees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革,政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构,包括欧盟委员会,国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告,会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for Reforms1、IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.2、Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.EXHIBIT 1. A SAMPLE OF CASES OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING3、Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsI. U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA 2002)In response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed, are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as the New York StockExchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA .The United States' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.II. International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world's most influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization ofSecurities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the European Communities(EC).In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, "Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective," includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are :1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body .2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit .3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively .4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have "substantial financial experience." They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private "executive sessions" with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer (CFO) and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management .8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members' credentials,remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan.10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit .13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can take a position at the company as a director or any other important management position .III. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, including the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK), and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its "Principles of Corporate Governance" that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are non-binding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties .The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of "Principles of Corporate Governance" includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and theshareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as :1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders the ability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting .4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency .5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed .6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting so-called "whistle blowers" by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact .4、ConclusionThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the U.S. government's response to the wave of fraudulent corporate financial reporting experienced during the 1990s and early 2000s an represented a significant step in regaining investors' confidence in the global financial reporting process. The SOA created new and stricter statutes to avoid a repeat of previous corporate financial disasters. The Act not only applies to U.S. entities but also covers primarily large non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, as well as their non-U.S. external auditors, regardless of their nationality or place of business. Foreign entities have to comply with the SOA by June 2005 .Across the Atlantic, the IFAC, OECD and EU have recognize the recent eruption of corporate scandals in Europe and affirmed the inevitable need forcorporate governance reforms and regulation of the public accounting profession worldwide. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has passed the Code of Professional Ethics for international accounting firms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has passed guidelines for improving corporate governance. The European Union (EU) has proposed a code of conduct for independent auditors, which include a five-year auditor rotation requirement. European countries are also individually involved in improving their corporate laws through governance codes of practice.Sourse: Badawi, Ibrahim M. Review of Business; Spring2005, Vol. 26 Issue 2, p8-14, 7p译文:全球公司会计舞弊和改革行为一、前言随着最近一系列公司虚假财务报告事件在美国发生,类似丑闻也在其他国家被曝光。
虚假财务报告的后果中英文对照外文翻译文献
虚假财务报告的后果中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)虚假财务报告的后果1.欺诈和欺诈性财务报告从广义上讲,欺诈可能被定义为故意以不正当行为或非法手段获得的增益以及优势。
这可能包括:(鲁宾G . A .,2007)财务报告舞弊;挪用资产(在内部或外部的系统中做出,如:贪污,工资欺诈和盗窃等行为);获得非法资产或进行不道德的活动(如:利用过度的客户结算或欺诈性的销售行为);用于非法目的的费用(商业和公共贿赂以及其他不正当支付系统);欺瞒获得的收入或有意回避成本(在系统实体中对员工或第三方欺诈,或当一个实体通过一定手段故意避免成本,如收入税和销售税);对公司的欺诈行为(例如假冒生产者故意侵犯知识产权)。
可以通过对该部门机构的制度的完整性的认识来调查它的欺诈行为。
它在调查了世界银行集团和银行的融资项目后,指控了他们的欺诈和腐败行为,认定了哪些行为可以被认为行为是在银行系统中的欺诈或腐败行为:(Banca银行,蒙迪艾尔.2009)拍卖欺诈,在拍卖中理解所有的参与者,在合同执行中的欺诈,避免对合同执行的审计,做出不适当的价格和伙伴关系,让审计人员误判合同中的成本和工作,并对审计人员进行贿赂,错误地使用世界银行的资金或自己的立场,这就是在运动,偷窃和欺骗的情况下的欺诈。
虽然所有类别的欺诈都可以说是主要的和值得辩论,但是只有财务报告舞弊才是影响最大的和最值得研究的。
(鲁宾G . A .,2007)在财务报告中欺诈行为的基础是肇事者(董事,审计人员,员工等)错误地提出了现实的自觉意图。
但错误地提出现实的自觉意图的原因可能是欺诈财务报告中任何一项不当资产的回收。
因此,“欺诈性报告仅指故意歪曲,包括遗漏大量财务信息旨在误导财务报表的使用者”也可译为(波帕一人,铝。
罗斯·,2009):操纵,伪造,伪造或更改文件或证明文件,错误或遗漏的事件、交易或信息,故意滥用会计原则与价值、分类、方式介绍或信息传递,虚拟条目记录(年底)操纵结果或达到其他目标,调整不正确的假设和判断来估计帐户余额,遗漏、发展或拖延承认事件或交易发生在报告所述期间,隐瞒或保密的事实可能影响的数量记录在财务报表,在改变记录或条件的重大交易中;进行复杂的交易旨在歪曲实体的财务状况或性能。
财务舞弊实证研究文献综述
1.1概述本节将从财务舞弊的概念和财务舞弊理论研究方法两个方面进行概述。
1.1.1财务舞弊的概念在研究公司舞弊问题时,国内外研究中和实际中经常出现财务舞弊(financial fraud)、财务报表舞弊(financial statement fraud)和欺诈性财务报告(fraudulent financial reporting)三种表述方式。
这三种表述方式有典型的应用。
其中Beasley (1999)研究董事会构成和财务报表舞弊关系时使用了财务报表舞弊的概念,而欺诈性财务报告是国际审计标准(ISA)(AI240)规定的舞弊概念,与我国2001《独立审计具体准则第8号——错误与舞弊》规定的舞弊概念非常相似。
纵观国内外研究文献,发现还有财务舞弊概念与之接近的概念表述。
财务舞弊在文献中使用的概念,比前两个外延更广,有时指的是财务报表舞弊,有时不限定于财务报表,指通过欺骗等违法手段损害组织经济利益的行为,是一个通用的概念。
而财务报表舞弊与欺诈性财务报告两者在使用意义上基本一致,都是针对具体的财务报表而言。
中国,美国,国际上与此相关的准则对舞弊都有个自的界定。
表2-1就中国、美国、国际就关于财务舞弊的概念和内容进行了部分列举。
表2-1由以上列表可以看出,我国准则中财务舞弊的概念和内容与国际准则相似度高,而且规定得更具体,在对财务舞弊进行判断时,具有较强的操作性。
1.1.2财务舞弊理论研究方法在财务舞弊理论的研究领域对财务舞弊的研究有不同的划分方法。
文章从财务舞弊的两种大类的研究方法进行概述,这两种大类的研究方法分别为规范性理论研究和实证研究。
首先是规范性理论研究。
国际上主要有四种规范性研究理论。
第一种规范性研究理论是二因素理论,又称作冰山理论,该理论将导致舞弊行为的因素分成两大类,并将这两大类因素形象地比喻成冰山,将导致舞弊行为的看得见的原因比作冰上在海面上的部分,而将导致舞弊行为的看不见得原因比作看不见得深深埋在海底的部分。
上市公司财务风险文献综述中英文资料外文翻译文献
中英文资料外文翻译文献上市公司财务风险的评价及控制的文献综述中国从资本市场建立开始,上市公司也随之不断地发展,上市的公司从行业、类型到地区、规模都呈现多样化趋势。
中国的上市公司,特别是上市公司中的ST公司,存在着严重的财务风险问题,财务风险比较大,对上市公司的发展会有很大的影响。
因此对上市公司财务风险问题的研究是十分重要的。
通过对这一领域大量文献的研究,从企业财务风险的成因、评价体系及控制三个角度综述,加强分析,以期对上市公司财务风险的理论和实践研究提供借鉴和指导。
(一)国外研究综述西方古典经济学家在十九世纪就已经提出了风险的概念,认为风险是经营活动的副产品,经营者的收入是其在经营活动中承担风险的报酬。
从狭义上看,企业的财务风险是指由于利用负债给企业带来的破产风险或普通股收益发生大幅度变动的风险。
这种观点立足于企业筹资时过多举债或举债不当。
西方国家强调全面风险管理的观念是从资金运动到资本经营整个体系的过程,对财务风险的控制包括风险预警、风险识别、危机处理等内容。
美国经济学家富兰克.H.奈特(Frank H.Knight)在1921年出版的(Risk,Uncertainty and Profit)一书中认为:风险是指“可度量的不确定性”。
而“不确定性”是指不可度量的风险。
风险的特征是概率估计的可靠性,概率估计的可靠性来自所遵循的理论规律或稳定的经验规律。
与可计算或可预见的风险不同,不确定性是指人们缺乏对事件的基本知识,对事件可能的结果知之甚少,因此,不能通过现有理论或经验进行预见和定量分析①。
②Ross, Westerfield, Jordan(1995)在《Fundamentals of Corporate Finance》提到①[美] Frank H.Knight,王宇,王文玉译.《风险、不确定性和利润》[M].中国人民大学出版社.2005;②此段原文如下:“The debt finacing increases the risks borne by the stockholders. The extra risk that arises from the use of debt finacing is called the financial risk of the firm equity. In other word,financial risk is the equity risk债务筹资会增加股东的风险,使用债务筹资所产生的这部分额外风险称为公司股东的财务风险。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译Corporate accounting fraud has been on the rise in recent times。
leading to a global call for XXX。
accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies。
and other ns such as the European n。
the XXX Accountants。
and the n for Economic XXX.BackgroundThe corporate accounting scandals of the early 2000s。
such as Enron and WorldCom。
brought to light the XXX scandals had far-reaching consequences。
including the loss of jobs。
ns。
and investments。
and a XXX。
leading to the XXX.Current XXXXXX fraud。
it still XXX。
Some of the common methods used by XXX fraud。
overstating assets。
understating liabilities。
and XXX。
including legal n。
fines。
XXX.XXXXXX fraud。
us XXX increased transparency and disclosure requirements。
stricter ns。
and the XXX.nCorporate accounting fraud remains a significant issue。
but the global call for XXX。
XXX.During XXX United States。
世通会计舞弊英文版(The WorldCom Fraud)
10.
11.
12.
July 21, 2002 - WorldCom filed for bankruptcy
© 2003, 2005 by the AICPA
17,000 jobs cut to save $1 billion. WorldCom may write off $50.6 billion in intangible assets. Added additional board members to serve on a special investigative panel to review accounting practices:
Netted $140 million from stock sales
Facing dismissal, he resigned from WorldCom on April 30, 2002
Bernie Ebbers classic resignation statement: "I am confident that WorldCom will continue to lead the industry, setting the standards others will follow.”
Operating Expenses to Assets
-CFO’s directions affected the balance sheet: Assets: Computer assets Leasing assets
xxx (Huge Increase) xxx (Huge Increase)
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译备课讲稿
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含:英文原文及中文译文)文献出处:Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2).英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John’s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than onecountry, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management; and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “pump-and-dump” scheme. Methods o f financial statement schemes range from fictitious or fabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the mostsignificant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States’ SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening theworldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world’s most influential interna tional organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective,” includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent auditcommittee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “substantial financial experience.” They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private “executive sessions” with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to definingindependence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members’ credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can takea position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, includingthe United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “Principles of Corporate Governance” that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “Principles of Corporate Governance” includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting soca lled “whistle blowers” by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decided to develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors whichincludes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changes to the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革,政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构,包括欧盟委员会,国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告,会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译教学提纲
会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含:英文原文及中文译文) 文献出处:Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2). 英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John ' s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxleyAct of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management;and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsify financial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “ pum-pand-dump” scheme. Methods of financial statement schemes range from fictitious orfabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. andnon-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measuresto implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation orcorporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States ' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured adegree of support for its endeavors from some of the world 'ms ost influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres,including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “ Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective, in”cludes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “ substantiaflinancial experience. T”hey should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private “ executive sessionsw”ith the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management.There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members ' credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independencerules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independentreview partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can take a position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, including the United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “ Principlesof Corporate Governance ”that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges,investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “ Principles of Corporate Governance includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders.The updated version also sets moredemanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholderswith a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting socalled “whistleblowers ”by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decidedto develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors which includes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changesto the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣•巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革,政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构,包括欧盟委员会,国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告,会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。
外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策
Reasons and countermeasures of listed companies ' financial fraudPick to: financial fraud accompanied by China's reform and opening process and continuous development, bring social harm is more and more apparent, whether to financial fraud effective management by the people's widespread concern. On the listed company's financial fraud concepts and methods were summarized, from the interest drive, corporate governance, accounting personnel occupation moral standards, accounting and auditing system, in-depth analysis of the causes of financial fraud, and in view of the above reasons put forward the corresponding control measuresKey words: financial fraud; reasons; control countermeasures; listed companyIntroductionSince the beginning of Enron in late 2001, cases of financial fraud in listed companies at home and abroad frequently burst out. In early 2006, the Shanghai national accounting Institute Research Center for financial fraud (snaiFFRC) disclosed to "kelong" headed by the "2005 top ten most fraudulent financial companies of the listed companies" means is more amazing the financial fraud of "smart". Self, circulating trading, trading of yin and Yang, the packing channels, always accounting errors, large bath, mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, concealed stocks, the report cash traps, this is a top ten listing companies financial fraud trick.One, the concept of financial fraud and wayFinancial fraud is the subject of false financial information processing in accounting and reporting process, to obtain undue economic interests, used deceptive means to intentionally lied about the importance and financial facts of violations of laws and substantive violations. Financial fraud has four characteristics: unlawful, intentional sexuality, danger, and concealment. Specific means of financial fraud can be said to be endless, but the core is intact. Income fraud including fictitious earnings and revenue across periods; cost of fraud including cross-phase meter cost less and adjustment costs as well as costs of capital; corrupt cash fraud, should be the project assets, such as fraud, less provision for impairment; liabilities are generally less-total liabilities of fraud.Financial fraud means basically has the following several aspects:1.the use of improper accounting policies and accounting fraud. Management typically useintertemporal amortization class accounts for many share, share more, less or less cost to adjust profit. (1) the selection of inappropriate borrowing costs accounting method. In practice, many listed company through misuse of borrowing costs accounting, in build a project completed and not the final. (2) improper selection of equity investment accounting methods. Principles of enterprise accounting regulations: investment enterprises of joint control or significant influence, should adopt equity method; instead, it uses the cost method.But many companies use, when the investee company profit, should not use the equity method investment using the equity method of accounting; when the investee company loss, the equity method to the cost method .(3) improper selection of merging policy. (4) the improper selection of depreciation method.Extended depreciation, by accelerating method is changed into the straight line method, inpractice it is often seen. (5) the improper selection of income, cost confirmation method.Advance or delay the confirmation of income or expense is also listed companies generally adopt cheating. (6) the improper selection of the impairment provision method.2. use of enterprise internal control system defects and the weak link of fraud. As the cashier personnel use enterprise blank check, financial dedicated seal, legal person seal does not separate keeping malpractice, privately issued checks, misappropriation of public funds. Cozy with his duties incompatible staff collude with a fraud.3.related party transaction fraud. The related party transaction fraud, refers to the management using the related party transaction to hide losses, fictitious profits, and not in the statements and notes in accordance with the provisions as appropriate, full disclosure, the resulting information will have on the users of financial statements misleading a fraud method. Typically, Chinese listed companies using the purchase and sale of related fraud, fraud, entrusted with the operation of funds embezzlement, fraud and other four kinds of cost sharing related transactions by way of fictitious profit.4. the assets of fraud. Asset restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, debt restructuring, asset replacement form, occurring between the related parties. Assets reorganization of corrupt corrupt corrupt major mergers and acquisitions and debt restructuring in two ways.5. cover up fraud transaction or fact. Hide transaction or fact of fraud is through the use of accounting statements to hide transactions of listed companies or the truth, or has not been fully disclosed in the notes to the report deals truth an fraud methods.Second, the causes of listed companies ' financial malpracticeListed companies ' financial malpractice caused several of the following reasons:1. financial return far greater than the cost of fraud. To meet listing standards at some companies desperate to find ways to make financial fraud, and fraud, to meet the policy requirements. In addition, because the share price is times the income and earnings per share, and high stock market price/earnings ratio of deformity in China, so the main purpose of listed company's financial fraud is false profits. False profits of $ 1, the circulation market value of listed companies will increase 10 times times times. Relative to the fraud fraud income, cost is too low, from a certain extent, it is too low a fraud cost contributed some fraud.2. corporate governance structure is not perfect. Corporate governance structure is in fact about between owners, the Board of Directors and senior executive officers rights assigned and the arrangement of a system of checks and balances, the reality in China, led directly to the equity structure of listed companies malformations include the general meeting of shareholders, Board of Directors, Board of supervisors, which distort the relationship between corporate governance structure of checks and balances, which has provided an opportunity for financial fraud in listed companies. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: (1) the ownership structure is not reasonable. As of the second half of 2006, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market, shares of over50 listed companies only 185, largest shareholder holding ratio of no more than 25 and only 219, 60~70 listed companies have invaded and occupied by large shareholders of listed company's funds. In the case of high concentration of ownership, possibilities of treatment failure of listed companies increased, listed companies, the greater possibility of financial fraud. (2) the independence of the Board is not strong, internal control is a serious problem. China listed company Director served as Senior Manager of the phenomenon is more prevalent, Director serves as the Senior Manager (internal control) more than 50 per cent of the sample company 32, more than 30 per cent of a sample of 65 companies. In this case, the operation of the Board is usually "Insider" or shareholder control, rather than based on the collective interest. This has led to the phenomenon of frequent corporate financial fraud. (3) the Supervisory Board weakening the oversight function, financial report difficulty in discharging its oversight functions. Based on analysis of listed company financial reporting fraud, Board of supervisors system in suppression of financial fraud in China did not play a role of Directors and managers of monitoring. Listed companies are required by law to set up a supervisory board, Board of supervisors actually are in a very awkward position, lower right or upper right of vulnerable rights of supervision or stronger right.3. accounting staff lack of professional ethics. Finance and accounting personnel who are directly involved in financial fraud, from the macro perspective, is mainly long term and not enough on accounting ethics education, lack of accounting professional standards; micro-perspective, strong sense of company accountants law, in order to meet company leaders of unhealthy psychological, thus violating the ethics of being practical and realistic, objective and fair. In addition, individuals driven by economic interests, has also led to some accountants deliberately forged, altered, hiding and destroyed the accounting information, taking advantage of his position of financial fraud.4. accounting and audit system is not sound. In recent years, although China is making a lot of accounting and auditing legislation, but from the practical point of view are not perfect and sound. Poor operability of some provisions, resulting in accounting fraud an opportunity. New accounting law "legal responsibility" chapter referred to "serious", "criminal", "significant losses" are not quantified, has no specific explanation. 2006 implementation of new accounting standards, provided more accounting options for management, which provides management with more profit opportunities. In addition, lack of punishment measures, social supervision is not strong, quality performance evaluation of accounting does not work, no ability to detect fraud, also can lead to occurrence of listed companies ' financial malpractice.Third, the governance of listed companies’financial fraud countermeasures1. coordinating the relationship between benefits and costs of financial fraud. We should increase the penalties for financial fraud, financial fraud costs more than it gains, so you can basically stop financial fraud. At the same time, in charge of financial malpractice should bear unlimited joint and several financial responsibility, which can to a large extent, inhibit their impulses of illegal counterfeiting. For those who dare to report the accounting officer shall provide ample rewards, so that its behavior is greater than the loss of income to report financial fraud. In this way, financial malpractice liability and they will take the initiative to give up the idea of financial fraud.2. perfect the corporate governance structure. Improve the internal governance structure of thecompany, is to prevent financial fraud, improve the quality of accounting information. (1) to improve the company's ownership structure, can solve the status of minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder is not symmetric. (2) the perfection of listed company's Board. In the establishment of external independent directors on the Board of the company, and provides that a certain proportion of the external independent directors, and established a number of specialized committees, raise the level of professionalization of the Board, to play the role of the Board. (3) improvement Board of supervisors of listed companies. As the Board of supervisors a mere formality, only to stand in the governance structure of the company, to further improve the system of Board of supervisors.3. raising the level of professional ethics of accountants. State management and accounting departments, should continuously strengthen the ideological education of accountants and accounting staff levels continue to improve, making it able to consciously resist financial malpractice, gradually establishing accounting integrity and fair image.4. accounting and auditing systems. Accounting standards and the flexibility of the system is the important basis for financial fraud to achieve. First of all, according to China's actual conditions, principles of system of accounting standards and make appropriate adjustments, in general lack of ethical culture in China now, improving the reliability of the accounting report is the key. Second, correctly handle the relationship between consistency and flexibility, reducing the options available to the company within the scope of accounting system as much as possible, especially when it comes to income and expenses recognized measuring principle, the depreciation of fixed assets, eight-asset impairment provision ratio and maximum detailed provisions should be made. Introduce specific implementation details will be quantitative and specific legal responsibility to explain, this has the advantage of parties a clear financial consequences of fraud, also in favour of the relevant departments to determine the financial fraud and punishable by appropriate penalties. Finally, give full play to the role of public opinion and the media. As the perfection of the securities market, market supervision is not limited to certified public accountants and the Government, the general public and the media has also been involved in the regulatory process.The endAt present, China is in an early stage of market economy, all kinds of deceptive behaviors emerge, accounting activity as a measure of economic activity, inevitably financial fraud. Financial fraud is not only an economic phenomenon, is also a visualization of the deep moral conviction. So, on the governance of financial fraud is a systems engineering, business, community and government supervision of Trinity system is required in all departments and make concerted efforts, coordinate with each other. Only an integrated approach to governance, to create good information environment for China's economic development.Reference.[1] Hou Yanlei, Zhai Yingmin. The financial fraud of listed companies analysis [J]. Economy and management,2006, (7):71-73.[2] Huang Xinjian . Chinese listed company's financial fraud and the Countermeasures Research [J]. Economic survey,2006, (4):77-79.[3] Wang Jianxin. The financial fraud of listed companies : motives and management [J ]. Market modernization,2008, (2):346-347.[4] Yang Yunshu . The financial fraud of listed companies analysis [J ]. Accounting research,2006,(5):62-63.[5]You Xiaofeng. Chinese Research on financial governance of Listed Companies [ M]. Beijing: Economic Science Press,2005: 144-145.[6] Zhang Aimin. The combination of internal and external, prevention of financial fraud of Listed Companies [ J]. Contemporary economy,2006, (2):18-19.[7]Hong Ge. Fraud in financial reports of listed companies governance approach [J]. Economic review,2005, (9):117-137.[8]Wang Haixia. Internal governance structure in listed companies and the prevention of financial fraud [J]. Auditing & Finance,2005, (7):23-24.上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策摘要:财务舞弊行为伴随着中国改革开放的进程而不断演进发展,带给社会的危害也愈来愈明显,能否对财务舞弊行为进行切实有效地治理受到人们的普遍关注。
财务舞弊——精选推荐
我国上市公司财务报告舞弊行为的研究摘要:财务报告舞弊行为对资本市场的正常发展造成了巨大阻碍,一直受到资本市场监管部门和学术界的广泛关注。
本文结合中国转轨经济时期的特殊制度背景,对我国上市公司财务报告舞弊的动因、手段及识别进行了分析,本文最后为我国财务报告舞弊的综合防范与治理提供有益的政策建议。
关键字:财务报告舞弊;上市公司;动因;手段;识别An research on Financial reporting fraud of China’sListed CompanyAbstract:To the normal development of capital markets ,Financial reporting fraud has been tremendous obstacle ,which attract great attention of the capital market authorities and academic at. In this paper, We study the motives of the financial reporting fraud,the financial reportingfraud means and its identifying methods in the special institutional background of China's transition economy period. Finally, this paper proposes some useful suggestion and comprehensive policy to prevent and supervise it .Keywords: Financial reporting fraud;Listed Company;Motives;Means;Identify,一、引言(一)问题的提出上市公司报告舞弊现象一直是证券市场的“瘤疾”,它极大地挫伤了广大投资者的信心,损害了证券市场优化资源配置的功能。
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会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译(含:英文原文及中文译文)文献出处:Badawi I M. Global corporate accounting frauds and action for reforms[J]. Review of Business, 2005, :26(:2).英文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for ReformsIbrahim BadawiSt. John’s UniversityAbstractThe recent wave of corporate fraudulent financial reporting has prompted global actions for reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting, by governments and accounting and auditing standard-setting bodies in the U.S. and internationally, including the European Commission; the International Federation of Accountants; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; and others, in order to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, the accounting profession and global financial markets.IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than onecountry, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.Who Commits Financial Fraud and HowThere are three groups of business people who commit financial statement frauds. They range from senior management (CEO and CFO); mid- and lower-level management; and organizational criminals [6,16]. CEOs and CFOs commit accounting frauds to conceal true business performance, to preserve personal status and control and to maintain personal income and wealth. Mid- and lower-level employees falsifyfinancial statements related to their area of responsibility (subsidiary, division or other unit) to conceal poor performance and/or to earn performance-based bonuses. Organizational criminals falsify financial statements to obtain loans or to inflate a stock they plan to sell in a “pump-and-dump” scheme. Methods of financial statement schemes range from fictitious or fabricated revenues; altering the times at which revenues are recognized; improper asset valuations and reporting; concealing liabilities and expenses; and improper financial statement disclosures.Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsIn response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the Act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed [1,4,8,12,15], are considered the mostsignificant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as NYSE, NASDAQ and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA.The United States’ SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The IFAC is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening theworldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards [9]. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants [14]. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world’s most influential international organizations in econom ic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the EC. In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, “Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective,” in cludes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are:1. All public interest entities should have an independent auditcommittee or similar body.2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit.3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively.4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have “substantial financial experience.” They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committ ees should have regular private “executive sessions” with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management.8. There should be a principles-based approach to definingindependence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members’ credentials, remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan. 10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit.13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can takea position at the company as a director or any other important management positionOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, includingthe United States and United Kingdom, and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its “Principles of Corporate Governance” that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are nonbinding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties [11,13]. The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of “Principles of Corporate Governance” includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and the shareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as:1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders theability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency.5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed.6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting socalled “whistle blowers” by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact.U.S.-EU Cooperation for Corporate Reforms Initially, the European Union resented applicability of U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms to European companies and accounting firms operating in the U.S. However, after a series of negotiations, the U.S. and EU authorities have agreed to cooperate and decided to develop a compatible set of regulations. The regulatory bodies on both continents have undertaken a two-way cooperative approach based on effective equivalence of regulation and oversight authorities. Furthermore, member states of the European Union have proposed a code of conduct on the independent auditors whichincludes a five-year auditor rotation requirement. Furthermore, the national governments of the individual European countries have proposed reforms of their corporate laws. For example, in July 2002, the British government released a white paper proposing changes to the Company Law, which included harsher penalties for misleading auditors; redefining the roles of the directors; and creating standards for boards in accounting supervision and other disclosure issues. The British government is also reviewing the roles of non-executive directors and is considering the regulation of audit committees.中文译文全球企业会计欺诈与改革行动易卜拉欣·巴达维圣约翰大学摘要最近一波企业欺诈性财务报告激发了全球公司治理和财务报告改革,政府和会计和审计机构在美国和国际上的标准制定机构,包括欧盟委员会,国际会计师联合会;经济合作与发展组织;以恢复投资者对财务报告,会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。