Stuart Hall “Encodingdecoding”

Shane Harris, Joleen Rogers, and Jennalee BecklesPresentation on Stuart Hall’s“Encoding/decoding”Hall, Stuart. “Encoding/decoding.” Culture, Media, Language. Ed. Stuart Hall et al. New York: Routledge, 1980. 128-138.Hall begins by pointing out that traditional research on communication has been critcised for being too linear by interpreting communication as a mere “circulation circuit” (128). He asserts that a better approach, conceptualised by Marx, is one which encompasses additional distinctive aspects of communication so that the old model ofsender/message/receiver should be replaced by a new model of production-circulation-distribution/consumption-reproduction. Underlying the new model is a “‘complex structure in dominance’” (128) in that each element, though connected, is quite distinct from the other and dominates at that specific moment in the communication process. Hall also notes that the model emphasizes what makes discursive production different from other forms of production.Influenced by Althusser, Hall asserts that the meaning derived from the media systems is dependent on “the ope ration of codes within the syntagmatic chain of a discourse” (128). In other words, media communication is structured within an equal system of signs that engages both langue and parole. The production and circulation of the message are thus fueled by the rules of the language (langue) as well as the actual discourse (parole) in an entire system of interconnected parts. Furthermore, in alluding to Marx’s base/superstructure model, he posits that the economic base produces a symbolic form in which the message is circulated among different audiences. However, if meaning is not derived from the message, the audience will not be able to translate/consume the message which further prevents it from being reproduced. Hence, the circuit remains incomplete. Hall notes that it is in this way that each element is linked as an interruption in one will hinder the reproduction of the message.Encoding and decoding are therefore fundamental processes in the communicative exchange. The message in its natural form must be encoded by the source and decoded by the receiver so that a symbolic exchange is produced. The rules of language (langue) predominate in each process, despite the fact that each process occurs at determinate/fixed moments. Because the broadcaster makes assumptions about the audience in sending the message, Hall supports the view that the audience is paradoxically both the source and receiver of the message.The message, however, must be correctly decoded by the receiver in order for meaningful exchange to take place. In other words, the message cannot be said to be understood unless it produces the intended reaction within the audience. Consequently, the “meaning structures” (131) of the broadcaster cannot always be equated with the “meaning structures” of the audience. Understanding is then dependent on the extent to which the decoded message is equivalent to the encoded message, and because the sender and the receiver occupy different positions in the communicative process, the result is usually a distortion in communication.According to Hall, our understanding of television content is being reshaped because we begin to change our perception of audience reception, reading and response.Hall proposes a new area of media studies which is called “the use of semiotic paradigm” (131). This deals mainly with behaviorism and it helps in our understanding of content in the media. Traditional researchers have studied behaviorism and came to the conclusion that violence on television is not real violence but just messages about violence. However, there is continuous research on the topic because the question arises about those audiences which are not able to “comprehend this epistemological distinction” (131) between reality and messages about reality.The televisual sign is complex according to Hall, and it is “constituted by a combination of two types of discourse, visual and aural” (131). It is also iconic in Pierces terminology because it possesses some of the properties of the thing being reported. Nevertheless, the televisual sign is not a complete representation of reality because reality exists outside of language.Some codes are presumed innate instead of being constructed by a community or a particular culture because they are learned from an early age (simple signs). Although natural visual codes are culture specificthis does not mean that no codes have intervened; rather that the codeshave been profoundly naturalized…. naturalized codes [have] a degree ofhabituation produced when there is fundamental alignment and reciprocity- an achieved balance- between the encoding and the decoding sides of anexchange of meanings. (132)Eco stated that objects wh ich are iconic are more realistic because “they look like objects in the real world” (132). Therefore, Iconic signs usually seem more realistic or somewhat natural because they have a wider distribution and are less arbitrary than the linguistic sign.Hall believes that the widely accepted distinction for connotation and denotation is inaccurate and he states that the distinctions between the two concepts are simply analytic. Signs are not always organized in a discourse to signify only their literal meaning but a combination of both denotation and connotation. Therefore, the distinctions between these two notions are “largely a matter of analytic value” (133). Connotative signs have an ideological value; hence, there is no fixed meaning and “their fl uidity of meaning and association can be more fully exploited and transformed” (133). “So it is at this level of the sign that situational ideologies alter and transform signification” (133), i.e. that at this level we can see the intervention of our ideo logies depending in and on discourse.Nonetheless, denotative meanings do not completely escape reality but its ideological value is probably more strongly fixed, so that it becomes universal and natural. “The terms denotation and connotation, then, are merely useful analytic tools for distinguishing, in particular context, between not the presence/absence of ideology in language but the different levels at which ideologies and discourses intersect” (133).Hall further explains thatthe level of connotation of the visual sign, of its contextual reference andpositioning in different discursive fields of meaning and association, is thepoint where already coded signs intersect with the deep semantic codes ofa culture and take on additional, more active ideological dimensions”(133).That is, connotative signs have semantically different meanings depending on the context of reference and the ideologies (which are already coded) of a culture at a particular pointin time. These kinds of codes are what Hal l refers to as “‘maps of meaning,’ into which a culture is classified” … and, “if you like, ‘fragments of ideology’” (134).Hall reinforces that there are two levels of televisual signs, the denotative and connotative. In any given society or culture one is aware of connotative codes which impose classifications on the social, cultural and political world. Within the society there are also discursive domains, which are organized into dominant or preferred meanings. These dominant meanings are mapped out in social reality through institutional, political and ideological order, which eventually become institutionalized.Additionally, television discourse attempts to live up to objective responsibility but can only operate within a ‘subjective capacity’. Add itionally, they find that their messages are not getting across to the audience thus the effectiveness of communication is lost. Researchers have attempted to discern how their messages are failing. In doing so, they attempt to discover how much of the message the audience decodes and, to improve them so that they adhere to the dominant code of the broadcasters. This consequently distorts communication.Even of greater concern for broadcasting is that the audience has failed to take the message as they intended. This is because while encoding imposes limitations on decoding which prevents audiences from simply interpreting the message as they like, it cannot actually determine decoding. This is why we have an imperfect circuit. In other words, this leads to misunderstandings which deal with the reciprocity between the encoding and decoding moments, which makes up the communication model. Moreover, three hypothetical positions may be taken by the decoder from the televisual discourse. The first code is the dominant-hegemonic position, where the viewer takes the encoded meaning. The message is decoded in reference to the dominant code. The second position is the negotiated code. This is where the audience both adapts to and opposes the hegemonic view. A ‘misunderstanding’ may consequently arise as the meaning of the decoder contradicts the meaning of the encoder. Lastly, the oppositional code is where the viewers totally ignore the encoded message even though they understand it.。