融资外文文献
融资外文文献
融资外文文献Bank Involvement with SMEs:BeyondRelationship LendingThe financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has attracted much attention in recent years and has become an important topic for economists and policymakers working on financial and economic development. This interest is driven in part by the fact that SMEs account for the majority of firms in an economy and a significant share of employment (Hallberg 2001). Furthermore, most large companies usually start as small enterprises, so the ability of SMEs to develop and invest becomes crucial to any economy wishing to prosper.2The recent attention on SME financing also comes from the perception among academics and policymakers that SMEs lack appropriate financing and need to receive special assistance, such as government programs that increase lending. V arious studies support this perception. A number of papers find that SMEs are more financially constrained than large firms. For example, using data from 10,000 firms in 80 countries,Beck, Demirgü?-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006) show that the probability that a firm rates financing as a major obstacle is 39% for small firms, 38% for medium-size firms, and 29% for large firms. Furthermore, small firms finance, on average, 13 percentage points less of their investments with external finance when compared to large firms.4 Importantly, lack of access to external finance is a key obstacle to firm growth, especially for SM Es (Beck, Demirgü?-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005). On the policy side, there are a large number of initiatives across countries to foster SME financing including governmentsubsidized lines of credit and public guarantee funds. One example that has been deemed as relatively successful is Chile’s Fondo de Garantía para Peque?os Empresarios (FOGA PE), a fund created to encourage bank lending to SMEs through partial credit guarantees. This fund has many features that make it attractive,including some incentives to reduce moral hazard, promote competition among banks, and encourage self sustainability银行参与中小企业融资：超越关系型贷款近年来，中型和小型企业（中小企业）的融资问题，已成为致力于财政与经济发展工作的经济学家们和政策家们的重要议题，备受关注。
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献在研究中小企业融资问题时，寻找相关的英文文献是获取国际经验和最佳实践的重要途径。
以下是一些值得参考的英文文献，涵盖了中小企业融资的理论背景、现状分析、政策建议以及案例研究等方面。
“Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Global Perspective”, by P.K. Agarwal, A.K. Dixit, and J.C. Garmaise. This book provides an comprehensive overview of the issues and challenges related to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. It presents an analytical framework for understanding the different dimensions of SME financing and outlines best practices and policy recommendations for improving access to finance for these businesses.“The Financing of SMEs: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence”, by R. E. Cull, L. P. Ciccantelli, and J. Valentin. This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on the financing challenges faced by SMEs, exploring the various factors that influence their access to finance,including information asymmetries, lack of collateral, and limited access to formal financial markets. The paper also presents empirical evidence on the impact of different financing strategies on SME performance and outlines policy recommendations for addressing these challenges.“The Role of Microfinance in SME Finance: A Review of the Literature”, by S. Hossain, M.A. Iftekhar, and N. Choudhury. This paper focuses on the role of microfinance in financing SMEs and explores the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance as a financing option for SMEs. It also outlines the potential for microfinance to play a greater role in supporting SME development in emerging markets and provides policy recommendations for achieving this objective.“The Political Economy of SME Finance: Evidence fromCross-Country Data”, by D.J. Mullen and J.R. Roberts. This paper examines the political economy of SME finance, exploring the relationship between government policies, market institutions, and SME financing constraints. Usingcross-country data, the paper finds evidence that government policies can have a significant impact on SME access to finance and that countries with better market institutions are more successful in supporting SME development. The paper provides policy recommendations for improving SME financing in different political and institutional settings.“Financing SMEs in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India”, by S. Bhattacharya, S. Ghosh, and R. Panda. This case study explores the financing challenges faced by SMEs in India and identifies the factors that limit their access to finance, including government policies, market institutions, and cultural traditions. It also presents an in-depth analysis of the various financing options available to SMEs in India, such as informal credit markets, microfinance institutions, and banks, and outlines policy recommendations for enhancing access to finance for these businesses.这些文献提供了对中小企业融资问题的多维度理解，并提供了实用的政策建议和案例研究，有助于更好地解决中小企业的融资需求。
中小企业融资英文文献
中小企业融资英文文献Title: Financing Options for Small and Medium-sized EnterprisesIntroduction:Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a crucial role in driving economic growth, job creation, and innovation. However, one of the major challenges faced by SMEs is accessing adequate financing. This article aims to explore various financing options available for SMEs, highlighting their advantages and disadvantages.1. Traditional Bank Loans:Traditional bank loans have long been the primary source of financing for SMEs. They offer a fixed amount of capital, typically with a defined repayment period and interest rate. Bank loans provide stability and reliability, making them suitable for long-term investments and capital expenditures. However, the loan application process can be time-consuming and require a strong credit history, which may be challenging for some SMEs.2. Equity Financing:Equity financing involves raising capital by selling shares or ownership stakes in the company to investors. This type of financing is especially beneficial for high-growth potential SMEs. Equity investors provide not only financial resources but also expertise and industry connections. However, SMEs need to dilute their ownership and share profits with investors, which may limit their control over business decisions.3. Venture Capital (VC):Venture capital firms invest in SMEs with high growth potential in exchange for equity. VC funding is especially attractive for innovative startups and technology-driven enterprises. Apart from financial support, venture capitalists often provide valuable guidance and mentorship. However, securing VC funding can be highly competitive, and SMEs often have to demonstrate a unique and scalable business model to attract investors.4. Crowdfunding:Crowdfunding platforms allow SMEs to raise funds from a large number of individuals through online campaigns. It provides an opportunity for SMEs to engage with their target audience and build a loyal customer base. In return for their contributions, supporters may receive rewards or early access to the company's products or services. However, the success of a crowdfunding campaign depends on the SME's ability to effectively market their project and generate interest.5. Government Grants and Subsidies:Many governments offer grants and subsidies to support SMEs. These funds are typically targeted towards specific sectors or industries and aim to encourage innovation and economic growth. Government programs vary across countries, and SMEs must meet certain eligibility criteria. While government funding can provide a significant financial boost, the application process can be complex, and the availability of funds may be limited.6. Supplier Financing:Supplier financing involves negotiating extended payment terms with suppliers, allowing SMEs to free up working capital and manage cash flow. This form of financing is particularly useful for businesses with low credit ratings or limited access to traditional loans. However, SMEs need to establish strong relationships with their suppliers to negotiate favorable terms.Conclusion:In conclusion, small and medium-sized enterprises have various financing options available to them. It is crucial for SMEs to assess their specific needs and goals when considering different financing sources. Combining multiple financing options may also be a viable strategy for addressing diverse funding requirements. By exploring these options, SMEs can overcome financing challenges and continue to contribute to economic growth and development.。
中小企业融资外文文献翻译
文献信息：文献标题：Financing of SMEs（中小企业融资）国外作者：Jan Bartholdy, Cesario Mateus文献出处：London business review,2007(9),pp43-45字数统计：英文2124单词，10802字符；中文3529汉字外文文献：Financing of SMEsAbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instrument are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sources are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the marginal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SME’s confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact of the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are rejected.For SME’s the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costsof the sources which is primarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collecting the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs’ management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section we have suggested that SME’s in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first external financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the credit channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding th e firm’s products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality before submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is therefore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer haslittle information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade finance on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their costs of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing.Trade credits are also used to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are therefore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate between delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck drive r delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is that firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in particular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financialinstitution is able to monitor the cash inflow and outflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan [1997] briefly discusses several ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visit s the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the conditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with an indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have advantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business. In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. These advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additional credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm.That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obtain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuer’s general knowledge of the firm and the industry. In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBanks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size and number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limited by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantages over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explaining thebehaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the use of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods and services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good information regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main conclusion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We further argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. Thetheory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.中文译文：中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资的主要来源有：股权融资、按时兑现的贸易信贷融资、中长期银行信贷融资、延迟兑现的贸易信贷融资以及其他债务融资，每种融资方式的边际成本取决于与其滞纳金相关的信息不对称成本和交易成本。
关于融资的外文文献一篇
1291
1292 Journal of Financial and QuantitБайду номын сангаасtive Analysis
projects, outsourced to independent firms specializing in R&D.1 Moreover, some firms prefer to undertake their R&D investment outside of firm boundaries in collaboration with specialized firms yet still provide financing for the project from their own internal funds in the form of corporate venture capital (CVC). Over the last decade, companies such as Microsoft, Intel, and Merck have undertaken substantial amounts of CVC investment in collaboration with external start-ups where they reduced the start-ups’ need to raise financing from external capital markets and independent venture capitalists (Chesbrough (2002)). In 2001, more than 400 established firms participated in 2,123 CVC deals worth of $16.5 billion, representing 15% of all venture capital investment. In the first 6 months of 2007, CVC investments reached near-record levels, with firms investing $1.3bn in 390 deals—the highest level since 2001 (National Venture Capital Association).
融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献
融资租赁中英文对照外文翻译文献XXX LeasingSmall and medium-sized companies have XXX in the global economy。
In this article。
we will discuss the XXX.2.XXX LeasingXXX it provides them with a number of advantages。
One of the main XXX without having to make a large upfront investment。
This is particularly XXX that may not have access to the capital XXX.XXX it allows companies to keep up with the latest XXX。
which means that companies can stay up-to-date without having to make nal XXX.3.XXX LeasingXXX whether a small company will choose to lease or not。
One of the most important factors is the cost of leasing versus the cost of purchasing。
Small XXX associated with each n in order to make an XXX.Another factor that can XXX is the length of the XXX。
XXX.4.nIn n。
leasing XXX。
it is XXX.At the turn of the 20th century。
mass n methods neered by Ford Motor Company led people to believe that large-scale business enterprises were the way of the XXX well into the late20th century。
[原创]研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献
![[原创]研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/d2af560ee87101f69e3195f1.png)
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献英文图书和期刊类文献：[1]Allen N.Berger,Gregory F.Udell,“Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small FirmFinance,”Journal of Business,Vol.68,no.3.(1995),pp.351-381．[2]Aghion,P.,Incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting,Review of Economics Studies,1992,Vol.59,p473-494．[3]Albertode，M.&JulioPindado.Determinants of capital structure:new evidence from Spanish Panel data[J].Journal of Corporate Finance，2001，(7):77-99．[4]A.N.Berger，ler，M.A.Petersen，R.G.Rajan，J.C.Stein，2001，“Does Function Follow Organizational Form?Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks”,Board of Governors of Federal Reserve SystemWorking Paper．[5]Azam,J.P.,B.Biais,M.Dia and rmal and Formal Credit Marketsand Credit Rationing in Cote D’Ivoire,Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2001,17(4),520-532.[6]Bernanke,B.S.,M.Gerler.Inside the Black Box:The Credit Channel ofMonetary Policy Transmission[J].Journal of EconomicPerspectives,1995,(9);27-48．[7]Barbosa,E.&Moraes,C.,Determinants of the Firm’s Capital Structure:theCase of the Very Small Enterprises,Working Paper from Econpapers，2003,366-358。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译the XXX credit to small and medium enterprises (SMEs)。
However。
micro enterprises (MEs) which are smaller than SMEs。
have been XXX。
using a path XXX finance。
such as family and friends。
due to the lack of access to formal finance。
Path dependence is also evident。
XXX finance.翻译：乌干达的小微企业融资：路径依赖和其他融资决策的决定因素XXX：Winifred XXX-XXX博士摘要：发展中国家的融资文献主要关注正规金融机构向中小型企业（SMEs）提供信贷的角色。
然而，小微企业（MEs）比SMEs更小，却被忽视了。
本文使用路径依赖框架，研究了乌干达小微企业的融资决策，识别了影响它们获得融资的因素。
研究发现，由于缺乏正规融资渠道，小微企业严重依赖非正规融资来源，如家人和朋友。
路径依赖也很明显，过去的融资决策和与非正规融资来源的关系影响了当前的融资决策。
本研究建议政策应着重改善小微企业获得正规融资的渠道，并促进金融素养，减少对非正规融资来源的依赖。
Access to credit is crucial for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and micro enterprises。
as they are considered to be the main drivers of economic growth。
In e countries。
XXX role than SMEs。
XXX-agricultural self-XXX。
XXX due to the way they are XXX。
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献
中小企业融资渠道中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The areas of SME financing channels: an overview 1.IntroductionIn all countries, SMEs are an important source of economic growth and create jobs. In addition, these companies through their dynamism and flexibility, the power of innovation and development.The research method is to start from the literature to highlight the importance of the theme of our research. This paper analyzes the data and statistics based on mainly by the World Bank survey, small and medium-sized private enterprises in Romania by some empirical research. According to the method used, and pointed out the importance of financing of SMEs and enhance the public bodies concerned about, especially the measures taken to improve financial development.2.the literature on SMEs financing channelsA popular academic literature on the financing channels of SMEs, has witnessed a lot of research to solve this problem.Countless research studies have indicated that financing channels is a critical obstacle in the growth and development process, especially in small and medium enterprises.Through Baker Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Ivan, and Marca Smokin Popovich (2004) research, reflecting the fundamental factors of 10 000 enterprises from 80 countries mainly depend on the financing of enterprises. Therefore, the relationship between the study highlights the corporate finance and its characteristics such as age, size and structure of property rights. From this perspective, the authors found that the small size of the young company, and face greater obstacles when they seek financial resources.The iResearch Dick Mei Leke and Salta (2011) analysis of macroeconomic and institutional factors affecting SME financing loans through the statistical data found. In other similar studies, the authors found a positive correlation between the overall economic development (a measure of per capita income) and financial development (measured by private lending ratio of gross domestic product), on the other hand, the level of SME financing is the opposite. In addition, the authors show that the level of financing for SMEs depends on the legal structure and overall business environment.3.in the process of SME financing in the general obstaclesIn general, access to financial products or financial services or financial inclusion assumes that there is no trade barriers to the use of financial products or services, regardless of whether these barriers or non-related pricing (Dumont reggae - Ke Lute, Baker, and Honorine root 2008:2). Therefore, to improve this means of access means increasing the degree of financial products or financial services at a fair price toeveryone.Enterprise does not use financial products or services can be divided into several categories, their identification is necessary, in order to take the necessary measures to improve their financing channels. Therefore, on the one hand, enterprises obtain financing, the financial products and services, but do not use them because they do not have a viable investment projects. On the other hand, it can distinguish between non-voluntary refuse corporate Although these business needs, but not have access to financial services. The status of independent corporate finance or financial services in some companies do not earn enough money or safeguards required by financing institutions and therefore have higher credit risk. At the same time, when some companies in need of funding, financial and banking institutions involved too costly and can not agree to financing. Finally, in the context of the enterprise refused to appear over-priced financial products or services and financial products or services that meet their requirements.Financing channels for enterprise development and the efficient allocation of funds essential. However, compared with large enterprises, SMEs seeking finance is facing many difficulties, because of several reasons, including: the judicial and legislative structure of the instability and imperfect, it does not support the enterprises in need of financing and funding the relationship between; part of the funding and corporate information is incomplete or even lack of information, which hinders the normal and efficient development of relations between enterprises and providers of finance; especially in the young company, the lack of credit history and guarantees the creditors, and sometimes limits the range of financial products that can be used.The number of surveys, especially the World Bank stressed that the financing is one of the biggest obstacle to good development and growth of the SME. For example, the World Bank in the 2006-2009 survey foundthat 31% of the worldwide study of corporate finance is a major obstacle to the current implementation, and even higher proportion of young company in the 40% of cases up to three years of experience (Chavez, kt Boer and Ireland 2010:1). In addition, a series of global surveys, including the information provided by the World Business Environment Survey show that SME financing transaction costs is the main obstacle to enterprise development.4.SME bank financing difficulties and support measuresIn most countries, especially in countries with bank-oriented financial system, the main source of external financing for SMEs by bank loans. Therefore, this type of loan is crucial to the development of SMEs. However, the survey showed, compared to the SMEs and large enterprises are using the new investment in the small extent of bank financing.As we mentioned, the use of financial products is determined by supply and demand. It is therefore important to understand why the SMEs use bank financing to a small extent only. In this regard, some studies (Banerjee and Duflo: 2004) has shown that the main reason for the supply, because every time when SMEs are able to obtain loans, they use it to increase production. This behavior is more proof of financing is an important factor in the development of enterprises. In addition, in the context of the current global financial crisis, the declining availability of bank loans and limited financing opportunities for SMEs. Therefore, it is the main problem facing small and medium enterprises.October 29, 2010, this survey of SMEs in Romania highlights the main problems faced by SMEs and banks. Therefore, 82% of the interviewed entrepreneurs obtain bank financing is very difficult, mainly because of excessive bureaucracy, unreasonable high demand, high interest rates, rigid bank credit indicators, as well as many types of commission and expenses. In addition, more than 61% of SMEentrepreneurs and managers reporting banks lack of transparency (hidden costs, lack of communication channels, etc.), there is no real consultation (using the standard contract, the bank refused to modify or complete the credit contract, etc.) and banks do not legitimate or misuse of the terms of the contract (for example, perform the unauthorized transaction accounts or bank fraud). Understanding this knowledge to take measures to support and promote SME financing.Improve SME financing is still cause for concern, but also national, European and international facing a challenge. For example, in the EU, through the implementation of the new measures established by the Small Business Administration for Europe to improve the financing channels for SMEs, by reducing the return of the structural funds requirements to promote the access of small and medium enterprises, the establishment of the Credit Ombudsman to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and dialogue between the credit institutions, to avoid the double taxation of the tax legislation, which will hinder the international venture capital plays an important role.In particular, empirical research, emphasizing the impact of the degree of financial development of a country is essential that the level of development of the SME financing. Therefore, a series of measures to support SMEs to obtain financing, to ensure the efficient development of the country's financial, which will ensure greater availability of corporate finance. Specifically, the authorities should take measures commonly used to measure the degree of financial development in the seven pillars, namely, the institutional environment, business environment, financial stability, banking and financial services, non-bank financial services, financial markets and access to finance.5 .ConclusionEffective financing for SMEs to create new business is of great significance, and existing growth and development of enterprises, whilepromoting the country's economic and social development. In addition, in the case of the economic crisis, SMEs contribute to restoring the national economy, so it is particularly important to support SME financing. However, most of the survey report stressed, always the financing channels of SMEs is one of the most important factor to affect its operation and development.SMEs trying to get the necessary financial resources to face difficulties related to the entrepreneurs and the economic environment of each country, as well as existing legal and institutional structure. To alleviate these difficulties, the measures taken by public authorities should focus on improving the financial development and to ensure that the corporate finance and economic growth, greater effectiveness.In various countries, including Romania, the decline on the availability of SME financing, or even the lack of statistical data, we believe that policy makers need to focus on and monitor a series of important indicators, depending on the size of the SMEs, experience and industry events share of its loans, which will benefit the public authorities, creditors and investors.原文来自罗马·安吉拉中小企业的融资渠道的领域:概述（奥拉迪亚大学：经济科学，2011年第一卷第一期，431-437）摘要通过中小企业在创造附加值和新的就业岗位中的贡献,使它在国家的经济和社会发展中拥有一个显著的角色。
融资融券英文文献-摘录
文献综述1.2011Pedro A. C. Saffi and Kari Sigurdsson 《Price Efficiency and Short Selling》(价格效率和卖空)主要研究借贷市场影响价格效率和收入分配，使用股票借贷供给和借贷费用来代理卖空限制。
主要研究结论：第一，卖空限制降低价格效率；第二，卖空限制的废除不会增加价格波动和极端负收益的发生。
2.2014Saqib Sharif, Hamish D. Anderson, Ben R. Marshall《Against the tide: the commencement of short selling and margin trading in mainland China》（应对潮流：中国大陆融资融券的开端）对于A股和H股，可卖空股票价格的下降，表明，融券主导融资的影响。
与监管部门的意图和新开发市场实验证据相反，卖空股的流动性和买卖价差都下降。
与Ausubel (1990)的结论一致，这些结果表明，不知情的投资者避开卖空股以减少和知情投资者的交易风险。
研究卖空、买空对价格、流动性和波动性的影响，使用中国大陆和香港的数据。
贡献：第一，研究融资、融券的双重影响，可以让我们评价哪个更好，我们发现卖空影响更强。
卖空交易会增加和信息知情者的交易风险；第二，我们通过新兴市场论证卖空和买空对流动性的影响。
相比发达市场，新兴市场似乎在这些方面研究较少。
新兴市场可能与发达市场不同，因为新兴市场的投资者保障更弱(Morck et al., 2000)。
与监管部门的目的和发达市场的证据不同，这种在监管上的改变导致流动性下降。
这表明，投资者避开与监管涉及的股票。
第三，新兴市场上，卖空、买空对股票收益影响有限。
Lee and Yoo (1993)发现，在韩国和台湾，买空需求和股票收益波动性之间无关，而Lamba and Ariff(2006)发现在马来西亚，买空约束的放松伴随收入的增加。
中小企业融资问题英文参考文献(精选122个最新)
近年来，随着中小企业的飞速发展，中小企业融资问题，已经成为一些中小企业进一步发展所面临的“瓶颈”。
在我国经济体制转型和经济结构调整的特殊历史时期,中小企业融资问题不仅表现得较为突出,也更为复杂。
下面是搜索整理的中小企业融资问题英文参考文献，欢迎借鉴参考。
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Acta Universitatis Danubius: Oeconomica,2016,12(6).[115]Fabio Albuquerque,Joaquín Texeira Quirós,Rosário Justino. Are the cultural accounting values a relevant issue for the SMEs’ financing options?[J]. Contadur ía y Administración,2017,62(1).[116]Cheng Zhang. Small and medium-sized enterprises closed-loop supply chain finance risk based on evolutionary game theory and system dynamics[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University (Science),2016,21(3).[117]Hezron Mogaka Osano,Hilario Languitone. Factors influencing access to finance by SMEs in Mozambique: case of SMEs in Maputo central business district[J]. Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship,2016,5(1).[118]Mohamed Shaban,Meryem Duygun,John Fry. SME's lending and Islamic finance. Is it a “win–win” situation?[J]. Economic Modelling,2016,55.[119]Pengfei Luo,Huamao Wang,Zhaojun Yang. Investment and financing for SMEs with a partial guarantee and jump risk[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2016,249(3).[120]David F. Moreira. The Microeconomic Impact on Growth of SMEs When the Access to Finance Widens: Evidence from Internet & High-tech Industry[J]. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences,2016,220.[121]Wei NIE,Yueliang SU. Credit Risk Evaluation of SMEs Based on Supply ChainFinancing[J]. Management Science and Engineering,2016,10(2).[122]Alexandra Moritz,Joern H. Block,Andreas Heinz. Financing patterns of European SMEs – an empirical taxonomy[J]. Venture Capital,2016,18(2).以上就是关于中小企业融资问题英文参考文献的分享，希望对你有所帮助。
资本融资外文文献翻译
文献出处：Cumming D, Fleming G, Schwienbacher A. Liquidity risk and venture capital finance [J]. Financial Management, 2005, 34(4): 77-105.原文Liquidity Risk and Venture Capital FinanceDouglas; Grant; SchwienbacherThis article provides theory and evidence in support of the proposition that venture capitalists adjust their investment decisions according to liquidity conditions on IPO exit markets. We refer to technological risk as a choice variable in terms of the characteristics of the entrepreneurial firm in which the venture capitalist invests, and liquidity risk as the current and expected future external exit market conditions. We show that in times of expected illiquidity of exit markets (high liquidity risk), venture capitalists invest proportionately more in new high-tech and early-stage projects (high technology risk) in order to postpone exit requirements. When exit markets are liquid, venture capitalists rush to exit by investing more in later-stage projects. We further provide complementary evidence that shows that conditions of low liquidity risk give rise to less syndication. Our theory and supporting empirical results facilitate a unifying theme that links related research on illiquidity in private equity.Policymakers around the world often express concern about why there is not more investment in privately held early-stage companies. Further, the extreme cyclically of early-stage investment, and what the drivers are, remains a relatively unexplored issue in private equity and venture capital research. This article introduces a new and somewhat counterintuitive theory to facilitate an understanding of these issues. The US data examined herein support the theory.Venture capitalists ("VCs") invest in small private growth companies that typically do not have cash flows to pay interest on debt or dividends on equity. VCs invest in private companies over a period that generally ranges from two to seven years prior to exit. As such, VCs derive their returns through capital gains in exit transactions. IPO exits typically provide VCs with the greatest returns andreputational benefits (Gompers, 1996 and Gompers and Lerner, 1999,2001 ). Liquidity risk in the context of VC finance therefore refers to exit risk, particularly IPO exit risk. That is, liquidity risk refers to the risk of not being able to effectively exit and thus being forced either to remain much longer in the venture or to sell the shares at a high discount.4 The risk of not being able to effectively exit an investment is an important reason why VCs require high returns on their investments (Lerner, 2000, 2002; Lerner and Schoar, 2004, 2005). It is therefore natural to expect that exit market liquidity affects VCs' incentives to invest in different types of entrepreneurial firms.Liquidity risk is, of course, not the only type of risk that VCs face when deciding to invest in a particular project. The other types of risk may be grouped into a broad category of what we refer to in this article as technological risk, or the risk of investing in a project of uncertain quality (particular types of technological risk could include the quality of the product technology as well as the quality of entrepreneurs' technical and managerial abilities). This article considers whether changes in external conditions of liquidity risk give rise to adjustments in VCs' undertaking of projects with different degrees of technological risk.In particular, we investigate whether exit market liquidity affects the frequency of VC investment in nascent early-stage firms and hightech firms with intangible assets.5 We provide a theory and supporting empirical evidence that show the willingness of VCs to undertake projects of high technological risk is directly related to conditions of liquidity risk. We further provide complementary evidence that shows that external conditions of high liquidity risk give rise to more prevalent syndication, which in turn shows that while VCs assume more technological risk in periods of low liquidity, they take steps to mitigate this risk through syndication. We show that the theory and evidence in regards to liquidity risk introduced herein provides a unifying theme that links the results in a number of related papers on venture capital finance.It is important to point out that the ultimate source of the liquidity risk analyzed in this article is the difference in time preferences between VCs and management, since there is a greater incentive for VCs to cash out earlier than management. Thetime horizon of a VC is typically shorter because of his exit requirements. If Cs were long-term investors and would not wish to exit already after a few years, liquidity risk would not matter and incentives between VCs and management would probably be better aligned (provided managers are capable and wish to remain in place).With respect to early-stage investments, there are therefore two opposite effects documented in this article. On the one hand, more liquidity increases the likelihood of investing in new ventures; but on the other hand, it reduces the likelihood that these new ventures are in the early stage. In other words, liquidity increases the absolute number of new investments, but reduces the proportion of ventures that get early-stage finance relative to the total number of investments. These results thus indicate that VCs adjust their expected demand for liquidity to the expected supply. If they expect low liquidity in the future, they reduce their future demand for liquidity by reducing the absolute number of new ventures and by postponing the demand for liquidity for a portion of the new investments by financing ventures in their early stages.For such financial assets as publicly listed equity, there seems to be consensus about the concept of liquidity. Four different dimensions have been suggested to define the concept for traded assets (Harris, 2003; Kyie, 1985): width, immediacy, depth, and resiliency. Loosely speaking, liquidity refers to the ability to trade at low (explicit and implicit) transaction costs. KyIe (1985) further stresses the importance of continuous trading and frictionless markets to achieve perfect liquidity of assets.As for real estate or art objects, private equity is infrequently traded and thus the standard concept of liquidity hardly applies. Private equity investments are not continuously traded, since by definition they are private prior to the IPO. An important element that distinguishes private from public equity is that IPO markets are characterized by "hot" and "cold" issue phases and by clustering waves. In this article, liquidity is related to the possibility of exiting by either listing the company on a stock market or finding a strategic buyer. The notion of liquidity used here is closest to the dimension of immediacy, since here liquidity represents the likelihood of being able to divest (cost of immediacy). Das et al. (2003) show that this illiquidity mayinduce a substantial non-tradability discount.Finally, our evidence is consistent with the view that illiquidity is one reason why VCs require high returns on their investments (Gompers and Lerner, 1999a, 2001 ; see also Barry, Muscarella, Perry, and Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lerner and Schoar, 2004; Cochrane, 2005; Das et al., 2003). Our evidence is consistent, in that the greater assumption of technological risk occurs at times when we may infer that the relative cost of financing innovative deals is lower. That is, in bust periods when illiquidity is high, it is generally viewed that the deal cost (in terms of the amount that a VC must pay for a given equity share in a company) is low; therefore, in bust periods, the cost of financing the more innovative companies is lower. This is consistent with our finding of a higher proportion of financings of early-stage firms in periods of exit market illiquidity.The issues considered in this article give rise to a number of questions and further research issues. Our sample was based on data from a randomly selected group of limited partnership VCs in the United States over the period 1985 - 2004. We considered a large number of robustness checks, many of which we have provided. An earlier version of this article reported other robustness checks, such as the exclusion/inclusion of Internet firms, and hot and cold markets; those excluded results were very supportive of the results explicitly reported herein. In Tables V-VII, we showed the robustness of the results to the inclusion and exclusion of the years 1999 and 2000, as well as of the years 1998-2001. We also explicitly showed the robustness of the results to numerous different explanatory variables.This article puts forth a theoretical model whereby VCs time their investments according to exit opportunities. When exit markets become less liquid, VCs invest proportionately more in new early-stage projects (relative to new projects in other stages of development) in order to postpone exit requirements and thus invest in riskier projects. As such, VCs trade-off liquidity risk against technological risk when exit markets lack liquidity. In contrast, when liquidity is high, VCs invest more in expansion-stage and later-stage projects where time until exit (investment duration) is reduced.译文流动性风险和风险资本融资道格拉斯;格兰特; 斯科威巴彻风险投资家会根据IPO退出市场的流动性状况来适时地调整他们的投资决策，本文对这一观点提供了理论和实证上的支持。
上市企业融资文献综述及外文文献资料
本份文档包含：关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献出处：Abor J; Bokpin A. Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policy. Studies in Economics and Finance. 2015; 27(3):180-194.Investment opportunities, corporate finance, and dividend payout policyAbor J; Bokpin AAbstractPurpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Design/methodology/approach - This issue is tested with a sample of 34 emerging market countries covering a 17-year period, 1990-2006. Fixed effects panel model is employed in our estimation. Findings - A significantly negative relationship between investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy is found. There are, however, insignificant effects of the various measures of corporate finance namely, financial leverage, external financing, and debt maturity on dividend payout policy. Profitability and stock market capitalization are also identified as important in influencing dividend payout policy. Profitable firms are more likely to support high dividend payments to shareholders. However, firms in relatively well-developed markets tend to exhibit low dividend payout policy. Originality/value - The main value of the paper is in respect of the fact that it uses a large dataset from emerging market countries. The results generally support existing literature on investment opportunity set and dividend payout policy.Keywords: International; Dividends; Corporate finance;1. IntroductionThe impact of investment and financing decisions on firm value has been the focus of extensive research since [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the "separation principle". The theory asserts that in a perfect capital market, the value of the firm is independent of the manner in which its productive assets are financed. In fact someauthors like [12] Barnes et al.(1981) support their view. However, others have contrasted the findings of the earlier studies suggesting that investment, financing, and dividend policy are related ([30] Grabowski and Mueller, 1972; [46] McCabe, 1979;[5] Anderson, 1983). This is predicated on the assumption that Modigliani and Miller's ideal world does not exist. Financial markets are not perfect given taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and uncertain inflation in the market place. According to [13] Bier man and Hass (1983), management usually addresses the dividend target payout level in the context of forecasting the firm's sources and use of funds. Considering prospective investment opportunities and the internal cash generation potential of the firm, both capital structure and dividend policy are chosen to ensure that sufficient funds are available to undertake all desirable investments without using new equity ([14] Black, 1976). But what constitutes a "desirable" investment? If it is one that has an expected return greater than the cost of funds that finance it, and if the cost of retained earnings is different from the cost of new equity capital, then dividend policy, capital structure, and investment strategy are necessarily jointly determined ([15] Black and Schools, 1974).Dividend payout policy is an important corporate issue and may be closely related to, and interacts with, most of the financial and investment decisions firms make. A proper understanding of dividend policy is critical for many other areas such as asset pricing, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, and capital budgeting ([2] Allen and Michael, 1995). Firms' dividend decisions could also be influenced by their profit level, risk, and size. Though dividend policy has been identified as a major corporate decision faced by management, it remains one of the puzzles in corporate finance ([52] Obi, 2001). There has been emerging consensus that there is no single explanation of dividends. [19] Brook et al.(1998) agree that, there is no reason to believe that corporate dividend policy is driven by a single goal.Attention of empirical research has been at ascertaining the relationship between investment opportunities, corporate financing and dividend payout ([54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991; [6] Aviation and Booth, 2003). However, these findings have failed toestablish any clear link concerning this issue. Most of these studies tend to focus on developed markets. Little is, however, known about how investment opportunities and corporate finance influence dividend payout policy of emerging markets. This present study contributes to the extant literature by focusing on emerging markets. Firms in emerging markets tend to exhibit different dividend behavior from those of developed markets like the US. This may be a result of the differences in levels of efficiency and institutional arrangements between developed markets and emerging markets. It is, therefore, useful to improve our understanding of the issue from an emerging market perspective.The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout. The contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it considers a large-scale dataset covering 34 emerging market countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the literature on dividend policy. It also reviews the existing literature on the effects of investment opportunities and corporate finance on dividend payout policy. Section 3 discusses the data used in the study and also details the model specification used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 includes the discussion of the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.2. Overview of literatureSince the publication of the dividend irrelevance theory by [47] Miller and Modigliani (1961), a lot of studies have been conducted in the area of determinants of dividend payout the world over. The dividend irrelevance theory is possible in a perfect and efficient market where stockholders are perfectly rational and there are no taxes and transaction costs. The theory, however, pointed out the importance of investment as being the main issue. Miller and Modigliani framework has thus formed the foundation of subsequent work on dividends and payout policy in general. Their framework is rich enough to encompass both dividends and repurchase, as the only determinant of a firm's value is its investment policy ([3] Allen and Michael, 2002). It is arguably said a company's overriding goal is to maximize shareholder wealth ([18]Berkley and Myers, 1996; [16] Block and Hart, 2000), but to [16] Block and Hart (2000) this concept is not a simple task as management cannot directly influence the price of a share but can only act in a manner consistent with the desires of investors. In the view of [61] Woods and Randall (1989), shareholder wealth is generally accepted as the aggregate market value of the common shares, which in turn is assumed to be the present value of the cash flows which will accrue to shareholders, discounted at their required rate of return on equity. These cash flows include dividend and perhaps more importantly capital appreciation except for its high volatility. Firms must, therefore, make important decisions over and over again about how much cash the firm should give back to its shareholders and probably what form it should take.Black (1976) observed that the harder we look at the dividends picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just do not fit together. This attests to the much controversy that surrounds dividend policy. The dividend puzzle revolves around figuring out why companies pay dividends and investors pay attention to dividend. To [18] Berkley and Myers (1996), dividend policy is seen as a trade-off between retaining earnings on one hand and paying out cash and issuing new shares on the other. The theoretical principles underlying the dividend policy of firms range from information asymmetries, tax-adjusted theory to behavioral factors. The information asymmetries encompass several aspects, including the agency cost, free cash flow hypothesis, and signaling models.Tax-adjusted models presume that investors require and secure higher expected returns on shares of dividend-paying stocks. The consequence of tax adjusted theory is the division of investors into dividend tax clientele and the clientele effect is responsible for the alterations in portfolio composition ([49] Modigliani, 1982). To [45] Marsalis and Truman (1988), investors with differing tax liabilities will not be uniform in their ideal firm dividend policy. They conclude that as tax liability increases, the dividend payment decreases while earnings reinvestment increases and vice versa.Shareholders typically face the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard in the face of separation of ownership and control. The problem of information asymmetry is evident in conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. It holds that insiders such as managers have more information about the firm's cash flow than the providers of the funds. Agency costs are lower in firms with high managerial ownership stakes because of better alignment of shareholder and managerial control ([39] Jensen and Heckling, 1976) and also in firms with large block shareholders that are better able to monitor managerial activities ([57] Heifer and Vishnu, 1986). [27] Fame and Jensen (1983) argue that agency problems can be resolved by the payment of large dividend to shareholders.According to the free cash flow model, [37] Jensen (1986) explains that finance available after financing all positive net present value projects can result in conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Clearly, dividends and debt interest payment decrease the free cash flow available to managers to invest in marginal net present value projects and manager perquisite consumption. Firms with higher levels of cash flow should have higher dividend payout and/or higher leverage.The signaling theory suggests that corporate dividend policy used as a means of putting quality message across has a lower cost than other alternatives ([48] Miller and Rock, 1985; [8] Asquith and Mullins, 1986). This was developed initially for the labor market but its usefulness has been felt in the financial markets. [7] Aero (1970) defines signaling effect as a unique and specific signaling equilibrium in which a job seeker signals his/her quality to a prospective employer. The signaling theory suggests that dividends are used to signal managements' private information regarding the future earnings of the firm. Investors often see announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as managers' forecast of future earnings changes ([34] Healy and Pileup, 1988). Dividends are used in signaling the future prospects, and dividends are paid even if there is profitable investment opportunity ([11] Baker et al., 1985; [54] Pruitt and Gilman, 1991).2.1 Investment opportunities and dividend payoutThe investment opportunities available to the firm constitute an important component of market value. The investment opportunity set of a firm affects the way the firm is viewed by managers, owners, investors, and creditors ([43] Caliper and Tremble, 2001). The literature has given considerable attention in recent years to examining the association between investment opportunity set and corporate policy choices, including financing, dividend, and compensation policies ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992;[29] Giver and Giver, 1993; [41] Caliper and Tremble, 1999; [40] Jones and Sharma, 2001; [1] Abbott, 2001). According to [40] Jones (2001), investment opportunity set represents a firm's investment or growth options but to [51] Myers (1977) its value depends on the discretional expenditures of managers. [51] Myers (1977) further explains investment opportunity as a yet-to-be realized potentially profitable project that a firm can exploit for economic rents. Thus, this represents the component of the firm's value resulting from options to make future investments ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992).Growth opportunities are also represented by the relative fraction of firm value that is accounted for by assets in place (plant, equipment, and other tangible assets), and that the lower the fraction of firm value represented by assets in place, the higher the growth opportunities ([32] Gull and Kelley, 1999). [43] Caliper and Tremble (2001) suggest that, the conventional notion of investment opportunity set is of new capital expenditure made to introduce a new product or expand production of an existing product. This may include an option to make expenditure to reduce costs during a corporate restructuring. An investment opportunity has been measured in various ways by various writers. These include market to book value of equity ([21] Collins and Kithara, 1989; [20] Chung and Charoenwong, 1991), book to market value of assets ([59] Smith and Watts, 1992), and Tobin's q ([58] Skinner, 1993).Existing literature suggests a relationship between investment opportunities and dividend policy. [59] Smith and Watts (1992) argue that firms with high investment opportunity set are likely to pursue a low dividend payout policy, since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources ([29] Giverand Giver, 1993). [40] Jones (2001), extending and modifying the work of [29] Giver and Gaver (1993), found out that high growth firms were associated with significantly lower dividend yields. [32] Gul and Kealey (1999) also found a negative relationship between growth options and dividends. [1] Abbott (2001) argues that firms that experienced an investment opportunity set expansion (decrease) generally reduced (increase) their dividend payout policy. Others support the fact that firms with higher market-to-book value tend to have good investment opportunities, and would retain more funds to finance such investment, thus recording lower dividend payout ratios ([56] Rozeff, 1982; [44] Lloyd et al. , 1985; [22] Collins et al. , 1996; [4] Amidu and Abor, 2006). [55] Riahi-Belkaoui and Picur (2001) also validated the fact that firms in high investment opportunity set group are "PE valued" whilst firms in low investment opportunity set are "dividend yield valued". This implies that for firms in low investment opportunity set, dividends are of greater relevance than earnings whilst the opposite is true for firms in high investment opportunity set. Using market-to-book ratio as proxy for investment opportunity set, [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), however, found a positive relationship between market-to-book value ratio and dividend payments, suggesting that firms with higher investment opportunities rather pay higher dividends.2.2 Corporate finance and dividend payoutThe financing choice of firms is perhaps the most researched area in finance in the past decades following the seminal article of [50] Modigliani and Miller (1958) raising the issue of the relationship between a firms choice of finance and its value. Recently, there are still increasing research and new evidence being sought for the relevance or otherwise of the theory started by Modigliani and Miller. The theorem hinges on the principle of perfect capital markets. This asserts that firm value is completely independent of how its productive assets are financed. Subsequent researches have suggested a relationship between choice of financing and firm value even though some researchers corroborated the findings of Modigliani and Miller's irrelevance theory ([26] Fama, 1974; [54] Pruitt and Gitman, 1991). However, studiesby [5] Anderson (1983), [53] Peterson and Benesh (1983) have proved that in the "real world" market imperfections effectively prohibit the independence of firm's investment and financing decisions. This market imperfection is primarily coming from the fact that there are taxes, transaction cost, information asymmetry, and bankruptcy cost. This indicates a relationship between the choice of financing and firm value.Financial leverage is said to play an important role in reducing agency costs arising from shareholder-manager conflict and is believed to play a vital role of monitoring managers ([39] Jensen and Meckling, 1976; [37] Jensen, 1986; [60] Stulz, 1988). [28] Farinha (2003) contends that debt is likely to influence dividend decisions because of debt covenants and related restrictions that may be imposed by debtholders. Also, firms with high financial leverage and implied financial risk tend to avoid paying high dividends, so they can accommodate risk associated with the use of debt finance. [56] Rozeff (1982), [25] Easterbrook (1984) and [22] Collins et al. (1996) extending the agency theory observe that firms pay dividend and raise capital simultaneously. In the view of [25] Easterbrook (1984), increasing dividends raises the probability that additional capital will have to be raised externally on a periodic basis. This view is also shared by [31] Green et al. (1993) who argue that dividend payout levels are not totally decided after a firm's financing has been made. [35] Higgins (1972) suggests that firms' dividend payout ratio could be negatively influenced by their need for finance. Thus, dividend decision is taken alongside financing decisions. [36] Higgins (1981) shows a direct link between growth and financing needs, in that rapidly growing firms have external financing need because working capital needs normally exceed the incremental cash flows from new sales. [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003) support the fact that financial constraints can affect dividend decisions, therefore, firms with relatively less debt have greater financial slack and are more likely to pay and maintain their dividends.3. Data and econometric method3.1 Data and variable constructionThis study examines the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on the dividend payout policy of emerging market firms. Our dataset is composed of accounting and market data for a large sample of publicly traded firms in 34 emerging market countries over the period 1990-2006. These countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Columbia, Czech, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. This information is obtained through the Corporate Vulnerability Utility of the International Monetary Fund. The corporate vulnerability utility provides indicators for surveillance of the corporate sector and it relies on accounting data from Worldscope and market data mainly from Datastream.The dependent variable, dividend payout is defined as the ratio of dividend to capital. Dividend is total cash dividend paid to equity and preferred shareholders. The independent variables include investment opportunity set and corporate finance. We also control for profitability, risk, market capitalization, and two other macroeconomic variables: inflation rate and log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as a measure of the country's income level.In terms of the independent variables, Tobin's q is used as a proxy for investment opportunity set. Three measures of corporate finance are used. These are; financial leverage (the ratio of debt to equity), external finance (the ratio of external finance to total finance), and debt maturity (the ratio of short-term debt to total debt).In terms of the control variables, profitability is measured as return on assets. Profitability is considered as the primary indicator of the firm's capacity to declare and pay dividends. [11] Baker et al. (1985) find that a major determinant of dividend payment is the anticipated level of future earnings. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) also report that current and past years' profits are important in influencing dividend payments. Others such as [38] Jensen et al. (1992), [6] Aivazian and Booth (2003), and [4] Amidu and Abor (2006) find evidence of a positive association betweenprofitability and dividend payouts. [10] Baker (1989) finds that an important reason cited by firms for not paying dividends is "poor earnings". Similarly, [23] DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) find that a significant proportion of firms with losses over a five year period, tend to omit their dividends entirely. A positive relationship should exist between profitability and dividend payout.Risk is defined using the O-Score, which is a measure of probability of default. [54] Pruitt and Gitman (1991) find that risk is a major determinant of firms' dividend policy. Firms which have higher risk profiles are more likely to maintain lower dividend payout policy compared with those with lower risk profiles. Using ßvalue of a firm as a measure of its market risk, [56] Rozeff (1982), [44] Lloyd et al. (1985), and [22] Collins et al. (1996) found a significantly negative relationship between ßand dividend payout. Their findings suggest that firms having a higher level of market risk will pursue lower dividend payout policy. [24] D'Souza (1999) also suggests that risk is significantly and negatively related with firms' dividend payout. We expect risk to be negatively related to dividend payout.We control for size of the market. This is defined as ratio of market capitalization to GDP. Size of the market is used as a proxy for capital market access. Firms with better access to the capital market should be able to pay higher dividends ([6] Aivazian and Booth, 2003). It is expected that a positive relationship will exist between market capitalization and dividend payout policy.We also control for two macroeconomic variables: inflation and GDP per capita. Inflation is the inflation rate. GDP per capita is log of GDP per capita and is included as a measure of the country's income level.3.2 Model specificationWe estimate the following panel data regression model: Equation 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where subscript i and t represent the country and time, respectively. Y is a measure of dividend payout. Invt is a measure of investment opportunity set. Fin are measures of corporate finance variables including, financialleverage, external finance, and debt maturity. X are the control variables and include profitability, risk, stock market capitalization, inflation, and GDP per capita. μ is the error term. Using this model, it is possible to investigate the effects of investment opportunity set and corporate finance on dividend payout policy.3.3 Estimation issuesThis study adopts a panel data method given that it allows for broader set of data points. Therefore, degrees of freedom are increased and collinearity among the explanatory variables is reduced and the efficiency of economic estimates is improved. Also, panel data can control for individual heterogeneity due to hidden factors, which, if neglected in time-series or cross section estimations leads to biased results ([9] Baltagi, 2005). The panel regression equation differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression by the double subscript attached to each variable. The general form of the model can be written as: Equation 2 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where α is a scalar, ßis KX 1 and X it is the it th observation on K explanatory variables. We assume that the μit follow a one-way error component model: Equation 3 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] where μi is time-invariant and accounts for any unobservable individual-specific effect that is not included in the regression model. The term V it represents the remaining disturbance, and varies with the individual countries and time. It can be thought of as the usual disturbance in the regression. The choice of the model estimation whether random effects or fixed effects will depend on the underlying assumptions. In a random effect model, μi and V it are random with known disturbances. In the fixed effects model, the μi are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic with V it independent and identically distributed, i.e. νit∼iid (0,σν2 ). The explanatory variables X it are assumed independent of the V it for all i and t . We use the [62] Hausman (1978) specification test in choosing the appropriate model. We report the results of the Hausman specification test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.].4. Empirical results4.1 Descriptive statisticsTable I [Figure omitted. See Article Image.] presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. The sample covers 34 emerging countries over a 17-year period, 1990-2006. It reports the mean and standard deviation of all the variables used in the study as well as the number of observations over the sample period. The mean value for the dependent variable (dividend payout) is 0.32, implying that across the sample countries the average dividend payout is 32 percent. There is, however, a variation in the dependent variable across the countries over the time period as shown by standard deviation of 0.49 with a minimum and maximum dividend payout of 0.00 and 3.93, respectively.The mean investment opportunity set measured by the Tobin's q is 1.05 with a variation of 0.52. All the countries have positive investment opportunities with minimum and maximum values of 0.06 and 5.01, respectively. Financial leverage, measured by the debt to equity ratio has a mean value of 1.17 and has a standard deviation of 127.58. External finance registers an average value of -0.01 over the period with a standard deviation of 5.27. Debt maturity has a mean figure of 0.58, indicating that short-term debt accounts for 58 percent of total debt. Profitability defined in terms of return on assets also registers an average value of 6.66 percent. The standard deviation is also shown as 5.37. Risk shows a mean value of -3.37. Stock market capitalization to GDP has a mean value of 49.74 percent. The minimum and maximum values for this variable are 0.00 and 528.49, respectively, with a variation of 66.52. The average inflation rate and GDP per capita are 2.61 and 8.04 percent, respectively (Figure 1 [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]).4.2 Correlation analysisWe test for possible degree of multi-collinearity among the regressors by including a correlation matrix of the variables in Table II [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. Dividend payout shows significantly positive correlations with debt maturity, profitability, and GDP per capita. Investment opportunity set exhibits significantly negative correlations with financial leverage, inflation, and GDP per capita, but shows significantly positive correlations with external finance, debt maturity, profitability,and market capitalization. There is a significant but negative correlation between financial leverage and profitability and a positive correlation between financial leverage and risk. External finance shows significant and positive correlations with profitability and inflation but a negative correlation with GDP per capita. Debt maturity is significantly and negatively correlated with GDP per capita. There are significant and negative correlations between profitability and risk, market capitalization, as well as GDP per capita. However, we found positive correlation between profitability and inflation. There are statistically and significant positive correlations between risk and market capitalization, and GDP per capita. Market capitalization is also positively correlated with GDP per capita. Overall, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients indicates that multi-collinearity is not a potential problem in the regression models.4.3 Panel regression resultsBoth fixed and random effects specifications of the model were estimated. After which the [62] Hausman (1978) test was conducted to determine the appropriate specification. We report the results of the Hausman test in Table III [Figure omitted. See Article Image.]. The test statistics are all significant at 1 percent, implying that the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects. The Hausman specification test suggests we reject the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients are not systematic.The results indicate a statistically significant but negative relationship between investment opportunities and dividend payout ratio. It could be inferred that firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to exhibit low dividend payout ratio. In other words, firms with high investment opportunities are more likely to pursue a low dividend payout ratio since dividends and investment represent competing potential uses of a firm's cash resources. Paying low dividends means that such firms could retain enough funds to finance their future growth and investments.[29] Gaver and Gaver (1993) note that firms with high growth potential or investment opportunity set are expected to pay low dividends, since investment and dividends are。
小微企业融资外文文献翻译
小微企业融资外文文献翻译小微企业融资外文文献翻译(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Micro Enterprise Finance in Uganda: Path Dependence and Other and Determinants of Financing DecisionsDr. Winifred Tarinyeba- KiryabwireAbstractAccess to finance literature in developing countries focuses onaccess to credit constraints of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) micro enterprises because they are considered the drivers of economic growth. However, in low income countries, micro enterprises play a much more significant role than SMEs because of their contribution to non-agricultural self-employment. The predominant use of informal credit rather than formal credit shows that the manner in which micro enterprises are formed and conduct their businesses favors the former over the latter. In addition, other factors such as lengthy credit application procedures, negative perceptions about credit application processes make informal credit more attractive. On the other hand specific factors such as business diversification, the need to acquire business inputs or assets than cannot be obtained using supplier credit are associated with a tendency to use formal credit.IntroductionIt well established that in markets where access to credit is constrained, it is the smaller businesses that have the most difficulty accessing credit. Various policy interventions have been made to improve access to credit including reforming the information and contractual frameworks, macro-economic performance, competitiveness in the financial system, and regulatory frameworks that enablefinancial institutions to develop products for SMEs such as leasing and factoring. Over the past ten years, policy makers in developing and low income countries have focused on microfinance as an intervention to bridge the access to credit gap and improve access to credit for those than cannot obtain credit from mainstream financial institutions such as commercial banks. However, despite, the use of what are often termed as “innovative lending” methods that are designed to ease access to credit, such as use of group lending and other collateral substitutes, micro enterprises continue to rely heavily on informal finance as opposed to formal credit. While other studies have focused broadly on factors that inhibit access to credit, this article seeks to throw some light on specific characteristics of micro enterprises that make them more inclined to use informal credit, as well as specific factors that are more associated with use of formal credit. The former are what I term as path dependence factors.The majority of micro enterprises operate as informally established sole proprietorships. This finding is consistent with the literature on micro enterprises, particularly the fact that they operate in the informal sector. However, nearly all of the enterprises had some form of trading license issued by the local government of the area in whichthey operate. The license identifies the owner of the business and its location, and is renewable every financial year. Most respondents did not understand the concept of business incorporation and thought that having a trading license meant that they were incorporated. Several factors can be attributed to the manner in which micro enterprises are established. First, proprietors generally understand neither the concept of incorporation nor the financial and legal implications of establishing a business as a legal entity separate from its owner. Second, the majority of micro enterprises start as spontaneous business or economic opportunities, rather than as well-thought out business ventures, particularly businesses that operate by the road side, or in other strategic areas, such as telephone booths that operate along busy streets. The owners are primarily concerned with the economic opportunity that the business presents rather than with the formalities of establishing the business. Third, rule of law issues also explain the manner in which businesses generally are established and financed. Although a mechanism exists for incorporating businesses in Uganda, the process and the legal and regulatory burdens, associated with formalizing a business, create costs that, in most cases, far outweigh the benefits or even the economic opportunity created by the business.Commenting on the role of law in determining the efficiency of the economic activities it regulates, Hernando De Soto argues that if laws impede or disrupt economic efficiency, they not only impose unnecessary costs of accessing and remaining in the formal system, but costs of operating informally as well. The former include the time and cost of registering a business, taxes and complying with bureaucratic procedures. On the other hand, the costs of informality include costs of avoiding penalties, evading taxes and labor laws and costs that result from absence of good laws such as not inadequate property rights protection, inability to use the contract system, and inefficiencies associated with extra contractual law.Businesses in Uganda are registered by the Registrar of Companies under the Company’s Act. The office of the Registrar of Companies is located in the capital city of Kampala and this imposes a burden on businesses that operate in other parts of the country that would wish to be registered. However, remoteness of the business registration office was not the primary inhibitor because the tendency not to register was as pronounced in businesses close to the registration office, as it was in those that were remotely placed. In addition, the following fees are required to incorporate a company: a name search andreservation fee of Ugshs. 25,000 ($12.50), stamp duty of 0.5% of the value of the share capital, memorandum and articles of association registration fee of Ugshs. 35,000 ($17.5), and a registration fee ranging from Ugshs. 50,000 to 4,000,000 ($25 to 2000).Legal systems characterized by low regulatory burden, shareholder and creditor rights protection, and efficient bankruptcy processes are associated with incorporated businesses and increased access to finance. On the other hand, inadequate legal protection is associated with limited business incorporation, low joint entrepreneurial activity, and higher financing obstacles. These impediments are what De Soto refers to as the mystery of legal failure. He argues that although nearly every developing and former communist nation has a formal property system, most citizens cannot gain access to it and their only alternative is to retreat with their assets into the extra legal sector where they can live and do business.译文乌干达小微企业融资路径依赖和融资的决定性因素Dr. Winifred Tarinyeba- Kiryabwire摘要通过查阅发展中国家的金融文献，我们往往可以发现由于中小企业是推动发展中国家经济增长的主要动力源，其金融问趣则主要侧重于中小企业的融资受限方面。
中小企业融资研究文献综述及外文文献资料
本文档包括改专题的：外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献The Role of Banks in Small and Medium Enterprises Financing: A Case Studyfrom KosovoAbstractIn this study we investigate the impact of firm and entrepreneurship characteristics in small and medium enterprises (SME-s) investment finance through debt (bank loan). Data are gathered from interviews based on a self-organized questionnaire with 150 SME-s in Kosovo. Based on the econometric model of linear regression, key factors are identified which influence the investment growth financed by debt. The results indicate that there is mutual correlation among the firm's age, size, business plan, sector, number of owners, sources of financing and the investment growth financed from banks in Kosovo. Therefore, findings in this work suggest that the access to external sources of financing through bank loan is an important factor that influences the investment growth. The paper provides some important conclusions and implications for policymakers and entrepreneurs.Keywords: SME, entrepreneurship, financing through debt, investment, Kosovo1. IntroductionIt is explicitly accepted that SME-s present a pivotal element in the economic activity in both, developed and developing countries (Acs & Audretsch, 1990; Johnson & Loweman, 1995). Numerous authors from academic and professional world designate SME-s as generators of both, economic growth and overall social development (Audretsch & Klepper, 2000; World Bank Group, 2005; McMillan & Woodruff, 2002).The discussion of the relevant literature related to the access of SME-s to finance, as well as to investment finance is of particular importance (Krasniqi, 2007). According to Beck et al. (2007), the SME-s access to, and cost of, finances is quite often characterized as a major difficulty, up to the extent of 35 percent. It should alsobe stressed that the small firms come with more difficulty to loans, since they encounter higher transaction costs and higher premium risks, for they are more fragile and they offer lower collaterals (Beck et al., 2006). Audretsch and Elston (2006) also stress that small firms confronted higher financial difficulties than large ones. Similar conclusions can be found among other authors who have worked in this direction (Beck et al., 2006; Oliveira & Fortunato, 2006).Brinckmann et al. (2011) finds that small firms have higher limitations to access external sources of financing than bigger firms, and, thus, they become more dependent on internal funds for financing their investment needs. A major obstacle in financial markets to the access on finances by SME-s is also the asymmetry of information. Thus, based on Zhao et al. (2006), one from the major difficulties for accessing finance is the asymmetry of information among lenders and debtors; for instance, borrowers have private information on the firm that lenders do not possess. Because of their small size, short history and inconsistent accounting data, the issue of asymmetric information for SME-s becomes more serious (Deakins et al., 2008; EBRD, 1999; Pissardies et al., 2003; Klapper et al., 2002).Difficulties of this kind are expressed also among SME-s of Kosovo, as one from the last countries in transition. In spite of the fact that the SME sector in Kosovo is relatively new, it constitutes 98% of all the firms, thus representing a huge potential for generation of new jobs and for economic development of the country. Based on data of the World Bank (2010), the major obstacle to the development of SME-s in Kosovo is access to bank loans. Only 10% of investments made by SME-s are financed through bank loans, and above 85% of investments are financed from private sources (World Bank, 2010).Objective of this work is to empirically investigate the role and importance of the firms and entrepreneurship characteristics that influence the investment growth through debt finance (loans) in Kosovo. Therefore, the research question in this study is: How does the investment growth impact the performance of SME-s, by discussing the firm and entrepreneurship characteristics of the investment growth of SME-s in Kosovo?The organization of the work is as following: Part one discusses the context of the research, part two the theoretical aspect and the summary of literature. In part three we provide the research methodology and model. Part four contains the results and empirical findings. And, part five deals with the conclusions.2. Theory and Literature ReviewUntil now, there is no single and unique theoretical model that explains the financing of SME-s, which influences the performance of investments, their growth and development. The theoretical principles underlying capital structure can generally be describes in terms of the static trade off theory by Modigliani and Miller (1958), the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984), managerial theory of investments (Marris, 1963; Baumol, 1967), agency theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and extended by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).According to neoclassical theory of investments (M-M), which affirms the attitude on the irrelevance of the capital structure for the value of the firm, internal and external sources of financing are perfect substitutes. In the world of the perfect functioning of the market, the choice between financing through capital or debt is irrelevant. Therefore, the cost of capital and the market value of the firm are independent from the value of the firm (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). The theory of M-M is based on the following premises: there are no taxes, there are no transaction costs, there are no bankruptcy costs, the equal cost of debt for companies and for investors, symmetrical information in the market, there is no influence of debt in the profit of the company before interest and taxation.Modigliani and Miller (1958) modify their theory by introducing the tax on profit. In this case, the value of the firm is positively related to debt. After introducing the tax on profit in their analysis, they ascertain that the financial leverage increases the value of the firm, since the interest decreases the tax base (it is deduced from the business profit), and, therefore, we have savings which have the value of the interest. From this ascertainment, the value of the firm grows bigger, as the financial leverage increases, which means that the highest value of the firm is achieved if the burden of debt becomes 100%. In this way the firm attains absolute advantage, given that it isdefended from taxes.Scott (1972) emphasizes that 100% tax shield does not exist in reality, because of distress costs. Debt leads to legal obligation to pay interest and principal. If a firm cannot meet its debt obligation, it is forced in to bankruptcy an incurs associated costs (Fatoki & Asah, 2011). This theory, in fact, does not take into the consideration all the other factors, such as: the costs of the bankruptcy of the firm, the costs of the agency, the impact of debt in profit, the asymmetry of information, and, therefore, this theory is challenged by other theories (Harris & Raviv, 1991).Thus, the static trade off theory, which is based on the M-M theory and is its complementary, except savings from the tax on profit, incorporates into the discussion also the cost of bankruptcy, such as: judicial taxes, attorney costs, administrative costs, and, also, the agency costs (the firms managers damage the interests of the creditors by working in the interest of shareholders), and this can reduce the value of the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This theory is, in fact, the dominant theory regarding the determination of the financial structure of the firm, and it is founded on the premise that it is the firm that chooses how much it will be financed from debt, and how much from the capital, by balancing the cost of profits. According to this theory, the optimal level of the structure of capital is the one which equates the profit and costs from debt.According to pecking order theory, the firm initially prefers internal sources of financing to external ones, and, regarding external sources, they prefer debt to capital (Donaldson, 1961). Thus, initially we have the use of accumulated profit, amortization, debt, and, finally, the equity capital. According to this theory, the firms finance their investment requirements based on a hierarchic order. This can direct also to existence of the asymmetry of information between managers (insiders) and investors (outsiders). As a result of this, managers have more information then investors (Myers & Majluf, 1984).Based on the agency theory, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) present the problem that, as a consequence of asymmetrical information, occur between managers and shareholders, on one hand, and the problem among shareholders, managers andcreditors, on the other. They argue that only SME-s knows the real financial structure of their own, the real strength of their investment projects and the tendencies for settling up the debt, and, therefore, the firm possesses superior private information (Mazanai & Fatoki, 2012).3. Hypothesis3.1 Business PlanAccording to Guffey, the business plan is a necessary requirement at the beginning of business, and it is used as an important element to acquire financial support during application to banking institutions (Guffey, 2008). An increase in the level of skills of those who are looking for credits in the compilation of business plans, will increase their opportunities to have properly prepared documentation, and to have a clear idea on the course of their business. According to Maziku (2012), the asymmetric information between the debt-seeking SME-s and the bank, is reflected in the incapability of the majority of SME-s to provide consistent financial data and real business plans, which increases the operational cost during the decision making for permitting the loans by the a bank (Maziku, 2012). Thus, the business plan does not have an impact only in reduction of operational costs, but it is also a key instrument in the decision making regarding the use of banking loans by the firms (Zhang, 2008; Madura, 2007). This is valid particularly for start-up businesses.Therefore, the following hypothesis is generated:H1: SME-s which have business plans are more likely to use bank loans than SME-s without written business plans.3.2 The Growth of the FirmThe growth of SME-s depends on the level of investments. The growth of SME-s can be measured in different ways, including the growth of sales, profits, or number of employees (McPerson, 1996). We measure this variable through the growth of the number of employees.The ability of SME-s to grow depends on a large measure from their potential to invest in the restructuring and innovations. All these investments require capital, that is, they require access to finance (Mazanai & Fatoki, 2012). According to Ganbold(2008), in a research of the World Bank, one among the key difficulties in the growth of the firm is access to financial services, which reflects in economic growth, employment generation, and reduction of poverty in the developing countries (Ganbold, 2008). Based on the theory of firm growth (Jovanovic, 1982), new enterprises grow faster, which means that these have to invest more.Therefore, the following hypothesis is generated:H2: SME-s that grow faster invest more than those with low level of growth.3.3 GenderIn the professional literature there are contradictory opinions regarding the impact that gender of the owner of the firm has into the access to finance. While a group of thinkers assert that gender of the owner has an impact into the capital structure of the firm, the other group denies this, ascertaining that gender doesn't have any impact into the determination of the capital structure.On one hand, Abor (2008) argues that businesses owned by female owners use the debt (loans) less for different reasons, including discrimination and aversion to risk. Watson et al. (2009) emphasize that a key factor in determining the capital structure in businesses owned by female owners is their propensity towards not accepting risk from the desire to keep things under control. Female clients are more hesitant to seek loans, since they feel discriminated and discouraged (Kon & Storey, 2003).On the other hand, Coleman (2000) find that there ar no important differences in the use of debt (banking loan) between female and male owners, and that gender is not an important predictor of the financial leverage of the firm. Whereas, Irving and Scott (2008), analyzing 400 SME-s, and based on the questionare prepared by Barclays Bank, in the most surprising way ascertain that female have easier access to finance then male. Therefore, based on the findings reported above, the following hypothesis is generated:H3: The male owners of firms are more likely to use bank loans then the female owners of firms.3.4 Sources of FinancingThe larger participation of investment finance from internal sources of SME-s increases the probability for acquiring of bank loans, since the internal sources carry the opportunity cost of financing of the project. Thus, SME-s provide higher level of trust to banks, since, in the case of failure, the unexpected burden falls on SME-s themselves. In their research conducted in 16 countries of OECD, Japelli and Pagano (1994) ascertain that banks don't finance 100% of the property value in any of these countries, but they do that with a certain coeficient loan/property. This is not equal for all the countries, and it differs from country to country, starting from the minimum financing of 50% in Turkey and Greece, up to 95% in Denmark.Thus, authors Lee and Ratti (2008) and Ahn et al. (2006) reports negative relationship between debt and investments. This relationship is stronger among smaller firms. As the debt (loans) grows, the cash flow is increasingly used for settling up the loan and its interest. Consequently, firms fulfill their obligations to creditors with more difficulties, and, on the other hand, the possibility for new investments is reduced.Therefore the following hypothesis is generated:H4: The higher the internal sources of SME-s, the higher probability to acquire bank loans for investment finance.3.5 EducationEducation is one of the important factors that influence the growth of the firm. Therefore, the high level of human capital (education and experience) has a positive impact in the growth of the firm. The owners of the firm who are of young age and low level of education are more active in using the external sources of financing, in spite of the fact that higher education reduces the fear for refusing the loans. In the meantime the owners of more mature age and with higher education, the so called "wiser" ones, can be found as less interested for external sources of financing (V os et al., 2007). Therefore, the majorities of owners of SME-s prefer to keep the control and do not apply for external capital (Curran, 1986; Jarvis, 2000).Thus, the internal capital is the major source of financing the SME-s (Ou & Haynes, 2003). Rand (2007) finds also negative influence between education ofowners-managers and access to credit, arguing that owners-managers with higher education can understand easier that their requirements for credits can be refused. Therefore, these owners-managers are for this reason discouraged and hesitate to apply for loans. In their study on new firms, Hartarska and Gonzales Vega (2006) find that education does not have an important role in the decision-making of the banks for lending.Therefore, the following hypothesis is generated:H5: Owners/managers with high level of education use less bank loans for financing the investment requirements.4. Methodology4.1. Sources of DataThe organization of data gathering from the questionnaire was developed in the period March-July, 2012, and data processing based on the answers was conducted in November and December 2012. On this occasion, a database was developed, which includes characteristics of SME-s in general, and characteristics related to investments and their financing in particular. Data processing was conducted with the STATA software.The questionnaire is specially designed for this scientific research with 150 SME-s in Kosovo, and it includes years 2010 and 2011. The sample selection is made randomly, from database at the Agency for Businesses Registration in the Ministry of Industry and Trade of Kosovo, and it is stratified in three basic sectors, in order to reflect eventual changes among the production, trade and service firms. Interviews were conducted directly (face to face) with owners/managers, or financial managers of the firms.4.2 QuestionnaireThe questionnaire consisted of 4 major sections. The first section included data on the owner/manager of the firm, and general data about the firm (location, the year of establishment, type of activity, and qualification of owners/managers). Second section included the orientation regarding the development in the future as well as investments, and here are presented data regarding volume of investments, sources ofinvestment, the use of bank loans in realization of investments, conditions of financing, activities that are conducted during the realization of investments, and investment plans for the future. The third section covers information regarding business activities of the firms inside and outside of the country, that is, whether a certain firm imports or exports merchandise. The fourth section includes data regarding the business plans of the firms: possession of the business plan, its impact on the decisions of the banks. Information gathered from the questionnaire was important for determining the variables in the econometric model of linear regression.5. Survey ResultsBased on the results, we conclude that the regression linear model mentioned above is specified good, given that Adj R-squared 0.36, which shows that the variation in independent variables explains the variation in dependent variable for more than 36%. In addition, the statistical F-test, shows that all the independent variables, jointly, which are statistically significant, are different from zero.Also, the correlation analysis shows that the problem of correlation in independent variables is not present in our data, given that there no higher coefficients in our estimation. Also, the dependent variable has a normal distribution and does not represent a statistical problem that requires treatment.Based on the table 2, in which the results of the linear regression are presented, from nine independent variables, six are statistically significant with impact on the dependent variable, or on the investment growth.According to results, the variable business plan, is statistically significant and with positive sign. This means that the firms that have business plans, on average have investment growths that are bigger than those of the firms that do not have business plans. Similar ascertainments can be found among other authors who emphasize that the business plan serves as a mean for increasing financing from external sources (Zhang, 2008).The variable trade is statistically significant and with negative impact in the investment growth when compared with the firms that belong to the service sector. This has the meaning that services on average invest more than other sectors. Inaddition the variable production is also statistically significant and with negative impact on the increase of investments when compared with the firms that belong to the sector of services. This has the meaning that when compared with the services, the sector of production invests less than other sectors. Similar ascertainments for the case of Kosovo can be found in the work of the author Krasniqi (2010).The next variable no_own, which indicates the number of owners, is statistically significant and with positive impact, which means that the greater the number of owners, the greater will be the investments. We have also size_emp as a variable that shows the size of the firm expressed by the number of employees, and is statistically significant and with inverse impact on the growth of investments. This means that smaller firms have larger investment growths. This finding clearly reflects that as the number of employee's grows, the firms grow slowlier. This is in full accordance with findings of other authors (Audretsch & Klepper, 2000; Caves, 1998). These results are the same with other studies that oppose the Gibrat Law (Krasniqi, 2006; Harris & Trainor, 2005).The firm_age as an independent variable is statistically significant and with negative sign, which means that new firms grow faster than older firms. This ascertainment is in accordance with findings of many authors who ascertain that younger firms grow faster than the older ones, and, therefore, have higher investment growth (Woldie et al., 2008; Storey, 1994; Barkham et al., 1996).The gender of the owner of the firm in the presented model, as a variable is not statistically significant, which means that the owners of the businesses of both genders have the same probability to obtain bank loans for SME-s investments. These results are in accordance with the studies conducted by Kalleberg and Leicht (1991), who, in a study conducted with 300 firms in three sectors, ascertain that female owners were as successful as male owners. We find similar ascertainment in the study of 298 businesses in United Kingdom, which emphasizes that gender, is not a determinant for financing the business (Johnson & Storey, 1993). Coleman (2000) emphasizes that there are no important differences in the use of debt (bank loans) between males and females, and that gender is not an important predictor for financial leverage of thefirm.Finally, education represents a variable which is not statistically significant and has negative sign, which means that the level of education of the managers/owners doesn't impact external sources of financing (bank loans) for SME-s investments. This is explained by the fact that Kosovan SME-s suffer from permanent lack of capital, and on average the time frame of establishment is short and the means that are accumulated from the profits are insufficient for financing the investments. Therefore, the only alternative that remains to them is financing from banking credits, taking into the consideration that the capital market does not function in Kosovo, which causes that the possibility to use other forms of external financing is very difficult. Similar results can be found at Krasniqi (2010).6. ConclusionsIn this study we have investigated empirically the key factors of the firms and entrepreneurship which influence the increase of investment growth through bank loans. The data gathered by the self organized questionnaire with 150 SME-s in the entire territory of Kosovo for the years 2010 and 2011 are used to test the impact of certain factors in the increase of investments through the use of financial means from debt (bank loans). Based on the statistical analysis and the method of linear regression, key factors are identified as indicators that influence the growth of investments of SME-s in Kosovo.The findings of this work stress that the business plan is a factor with statistical importance which has positive influence in the access to the bank loans for financing the SME-s investment. This means that the firms that posses business plan and use it for seeking bank loans necessary for financing investments, on average have higher growth of investments than the firms who do not have a business plan.The variables trade and production are statistically significant, but they have negative influence in the growth of investments. This means that the firms that use bank loans for investment in the sector of trade and production, on average, have lower chance to grow, than firms in the service sector. This is an indicator that shows that the sector of services is more attractive in the aspect of investments of Kosovanfirms, than other sectors of the economy, and this results from faster returns of investments and, consequently, faster settling up of the bank loans.The next variable named as the number of owners also results positive and significant in the statistical aspect, which means that the larger the number of owners, the greater the investments. This is explained by the fact that in Kosovo firms have started to use other forms of organization that influence the growth of business and of firm, through larger number of owners who use investment as another opportunity for the growth and development of the firm.The size of the firm expressed by the number of employees results with inverse influence in the growth of investments, and is statistically significant. The meaning of this is that smaller firms have bigger growth of investment on average than other firms. This result is in accordance with other studies that oppose the Gibrat's Law for the case of Kosovo (Krasniqi, 2010). Similar results are attained regarding the variable the age of the firm, which is statistically significant and has a negative sign, which means that the younger firms invest more on average than older firms.Empirical evidence and findings in this work can be used as recommendations for a broad spectrum of users. The problems of asymmetric information between owners-managers and creditors (banks) are of particular importance. This represents a clear signal for policy makers to create conditions for favorable environment for stimulating the sources of external financing of SME-s in Kosovo, such as: the creation of the guarantee fund for SME-s, the increase of banking supply through licensing of new banks in the financial market, which will increase the competition between the existing banks, and which will, in turn, enable the improvement of the conditions of financing of SME-s, with the reduction of the interest, reduction of managerial costs, increase of the grace period, softening of the conditions for collateral, longer periods of use of financial means, particularly for SME-s that have longer investment plans. Also, in the institutional aspect, initiatives should be undertaken for the creation of conditions for development of entrepreneurial capabilities, and for other forms of cooperating networks of firms that will facilitate the growth of businesses in general, and investment growth in particular.二、文献综述中小企业融资研究文献综述摘要长时间以来，融资难问题都是制约中小企业长期稳定发展的最主要因素之一，各国学者对于中小企业的融资问题从本国范围和世界范围内进行了深入的研究,在此对国内外学者的研究成果进行了文献综述，主要内容包括：中小企业融资现状和制度环境分析；分别从内、外部原因以及信息不对称等原因分析中小企业融资难问题；第三部分是关于应对中小企业融资难问题的对策研究；最后给出关于中小企业融资难问题的建议。
众筹投资融资外文文献翻译
众筹投资融资外文文献翻译(含：英文原文及中文译文)文献出处：Klöhn L, Hornuf L, Schilling T. The Regulation of Crowdfunding in the German Small Investor Protection Act: Content, Consequences, Critique, Suggestions[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2015.英文原文The Regulation of Crowdfunding in the German Small InvestorProtection ActContent, Consequences, Critique, Suggestions（L Klöhn ，L Hornuf ，T Schilling）The German Bundestag has adopted the Small Investor Protection Act on 23 April 2015, which will enter into force in the coming weeks. By this Act the German legislator establishes for the first time – among other things –a regulation of the German crowdfunding market. This article describes the content of the act as relevant to crowdfunding, identifies its probable consequences, and examines the most important rules with respect to their regulatory effects. The authors conclude that despite some modifications that have been made in the course of the legislative process there still is an urgent need of improvement regarding some provisions.1 The German Crowdfunding and Crowdinvesting MarketThe promise of the Grand Coalition of the current German government to create a “reliable legal framework” for “new forms offinancing such as crowdfunding”2 is, supposedly, poised t o be fulfilled. On 23 April 2015, the German Bundestag (Federal Parliament) passed the Small Investor Protection Act (Kleinanlegerschutzgesetz) in its second and third reading,3 which for the first time contains regulation specifically for project and company financing through specialized internet platforms (crowdfunding and crowdinvesting)4. If the German Bundesrat (Federal Council)5 approves the act – which is assumed to be the case –it will enter into force in the coming weeks.6 The first Discussion Draft7 and the Draft Act of the German Federal Government8, which successively had been circulated since July 2014, have engendered criticism not only from the part of the German crowdinvesting industry,9 but also from academic literature.10 The Finance Committee of the Bundestag (Finanzausschuss) has engaged in an attempt to address these concerns in a last-minute recommendation,11 which resulted in the adoption of the Small Investor Protection Act reflecting the proposed amendments.The crowdfunding and crowdinvesting market is interesting not only from a legal perspective but also from an economic point of view: In Germany there are now approximately 80 crowdfunding platforms through which companies, real estate acquisitions, and projects from various other business and consumer areas are financed. The market for internet-based company financing (crowdinvesting)13 alone has reachedan impressive volume:14 At 18 May 2015, German crowdinvesting portals such as Seedmatch, Companisto, and Innovestment had underta ken more than 174 financings with a volume of almost € 41 million (excluding real estate and movie crowdinvesting). The following figures show the development of the market as well as the distribution of the total issuance volume of the 174 financings.Few investors were rewarded by their investments. In only four cases17 they were offered a premature exit possibility in the context of a follow-on financing through a venture capital fund. For example, when the start-up Smarchive (today: Gini) acquired financing by the venture capitalist T-Venture, investors could obtain a 25 % return within a year by timely accepting the start-up’s re-purchase offer. Other investors were less fortunate, in particular in at least 22 cases in which (preliminary) insolvency proceedings were commenced or applied for, or the opening of such proceedings was rejected for lack of assets, or operations ceased –sometimes a few weeks after the financing.2 Legal Situation Preceding the Small Investor Protection Act and IssuancesBefore the adoption of the Small Investor Protection Act neither crowdfunding nor crowdinvesting were specifically regulated in Germany.18 Its legal framework was found in general laws governing banking, capital markets, and trade regulation.19 The parties involved incrowdinvesting tried to avoid falling within the scope of this regulation to the greatest extent they could.Initially, crowdinvesting platforms brokered silent partnership interests and profit- participation rights, these being investments as defined by the German Investment Act (Vermögensanlagengesetz –VermAnlG). As these offerings did not exceed the threshold of € 100,000 per year, they qualified for an exemption from the prospectus requirement, § 2 no. 3 lit. b) Investment Act (as valid prior to the amendment). Since about November 2012, the platforms have moved to brokering subordinated profit-participating loans, these being roughly defined as loans (1) for which the interest rate depends on profits or revenue of the borrower, (2) which give the lender no rights in management of the borrower, (3) through which the lender has no exposure to losses of the borrower, and (4) which rank below other debts in an insolvency proceeding20 (partiarische Nachrangdarlehen). Because profit- participating loans did not qualify as investments under the Investment Act they permitted issuances in unlimited amount without a prospectus.21 Such offerings have experienced enormous demand in some cases. For example, the start-up Protonet took in € 200,000 in profit-participating loans in 48 minutes on 29 November 2012. Five issuers have taken in amounts of over € 1 million.3 Comparative Law EnvironmentThe German legislator does not enter virgin territory by regulating crowdfunding and crowdinvesting. Comparable regulation already exists in the United States (US), where the federal government has fashioned a tightly-knit legal fabric two years ago with the CROWDFUND Act (Title III of the JOBS Act).25 At the center of this regulation is an exemption from the prospectus requirement for the offering of securities through defined “funding portals” up to an amount of US$ 1 million. In place of the prospectus requirement there are less stringent disclosure obligations depending on the amount of capital collected. In addition, the US legislation provides for strict subscription limits for investors and detailed duties of the “funding portals”, and prevents the development of a secondary market by a resale prohibition on shares issued without a prospectus for one year after the offering. Other national legislators have adapted and modified parts of this regulatory scheme, most prominently the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Austria.4 Content4.1 Exemption from the Prospectus RequirementThe German Small Investor Protection Act closely follows the basic approach taken in the US model. The centerpiece of the act with respect to crowdfunding and crowdinvesting is the newly created § 2a Investment Act (VermAnlG), which establishes an exemption from the prospectus requirement stipulated in § 6 Investment Act for investments as definedby the Act. This “crowdfunding exemption” is required, because § 1 para.2 Investment Act as amended by the Small Investor Protection Act defines investments covered by the Act to include profit-participating loans, subordinated loans, and similar forms of financing – the forms of investment currently brokered by crowdinvesting platforms.The exemption applies only if the following conditions are fulfilled: The offering must be of investments within the meaning of § 1 para.2 no. 3, 4 or 7 Investment Act as amended by the Small Investor Protection Act, that is, of profit- participating loans, subordinated loans, or other similar financing forms and investments, which are subject to a prospectus requirement for the first time because of the revisions contained in the Small Investor Protection Act.The aggregate value of these investments issued by the company must not exceed € 2.5 million.The investments must be offered exclusively by means of investment consulting or investment brokerage via an internet platform. The exception does not extend to an issuer executing a direct offering without an internet brokerage platform (as was done in the case of the Bavarian company Giesinger Bräu).The crowdinvesting platform must have a legal obligation to monitor the subscription limit described below; it must be an investment service enterprise within the definition of the German Securities Trading Act(Wertpapierhandelsgesetz –WpHG) or be subject to monitoring by general trade regulatory authorities under §34f Trade Regulation Act (GewO).- Finally, the exemption cannot be relied upon if an investment of the issuer is being offered publicly under para. 1 no. 3 Investment Act or if a previous investment offering of the company in reliance on the exception has not been fully satisfied and redeemed.4.2 Investment Information SheetDespite the absence of a prospectus requirement, Investment Act require the issuer to prepare an investment information sheet (Vermögensinformationsblatt –VIB) and to submit it to the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienst- leistung saufsicht – BaFin). The investment information sheet, thus, has the function of making essential information about the investment available to potential investors. Investment Act requires that the investment information sheet contain a notice that no prospectus was prepared for the offering. Moreover, para. 6 Investment Act requires that the investment information sheet include a highlighted warning notice on its first page to be worded as follows: “The purchase of this investment is associated with significant risks and can result in a total loss of the money invested.”4.3 Subscription LimitsAs does the CROWDFUND Act, the exemption from the prospectus requirement in para. Investment Act requires investors which are not corporate entities to stay within certain subscription limits. Unlike the US model, German law only limits the amount that an investor may invest in the same issuer (single issuer limit), but not the amount that an investor may invest in the entire crowdfunding market (aggregate limit).As under the US statute, the exact amount of the subscription limit depends on the investor’s freely available assets and mo nthly net income: If the investor provides a statement that he or she has freely available assets of at least € 100,000, he or she can invest up to a maximum of € 10,000 in an issuer. If the investor does not have that amount of assets, the limit is twice the investor’s monthly net income, but in any case not more than€ 10,000. In all other cases (i.e. particularly if the investor does not provide the statement on assets and income), the investor is limited to a maximum investment of € 1,000.While the Draft Small Investor Protection Act did not make a distinction between potentially different types of investors such as, e.g., small and professional investors, the current subscriptions limits only apply to “investors which are not corporate entities”.4.4 AdvertisementWhile the Draft Small Investor Protection Act provided for a strict regulation of advertisement for investment offers, the legislator droppedthe major limitations in the course of the legislative procedure. The remaining provisions merely require notices and warnings, which have to be published together with the advertisement. Investment Act, the issuer has the obligation to include the same warning notice underlining the risk of a total loss of the investment as in the investment information sheet.In the case of advertisements in electronic media containing less than 210 letters, the legislator, as a concession in particular to crowdfunding portals, reduced these requirements to the provision of a clearly highlighted link labeled “warning” and referring to a separate document with the warning notice.Finally, the Small Investor Protection Act expands the enforcement powers of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). Investment Act authorizes BaFin to prohibit issuers and offerors certain types of investment advertising in order to address wrongful advertising practices.中文译文“德国小投资者保护法案”中的众筹条例：内容、后果、批评、建议作者：L Klöhn ，L Hornuf ，T Schilling德国联邦议院于2015年4月23日采用了《小投资者保护法案》, 该法案将在未来几周内生效。
融资问题外文翻译文献
融资问题外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Chinese Listed Companies Preference to Equity Fund:Non-Systematic FactorsAbstract ：This article concentrates on the listed companies’ financing activities in China, analyses the reasons that why the listed companies prefer to equity fund from the aspect of non-systematic factors by using western financing theories, such as financing cost, types and qualities of the enterprises’ assets, profitability, industry factors, shareholding structure factors, level of financial management and society culture, and concludes that the preference to equity fund is a reasonable choice to the listed companies according to Chinese financing environment. At last, there are someconcise suggestions be given to rectify the companies’ prefer ence to equity fund. Keywords: Equity fund, Non-systematic factors, financial cost1. IntroductionThe listed companies in China prefer to equity fund, According to the statistic data showed in <China Securities Journal>, the amount of the listed companies finance in capital market account to 95.87 billions in 1997, among which equity fund take the proportion of 72.5%, and the proportion is 72.6% in 1998 and 72.3% in 1999, on the other hand, the proportion of debt fund to total fund is respective 17.8%, 24.9% and 25.1% in those three years. The proportion of equity fund to total fund is lower in the developed capital market than that in China. Take US for example, when American enterprises need to fund in the capital market, they prefer to debt fund than equity fund. The statistic data shows that, from 1970 to 1985, the American enterprises’ debt fund financed occupied the 91.7% proportion of outside financing, more than equity fund. Yan Dawu etc. found that, approximately 3/4 of the listed companies preferred to equity fund in China. Many researchers agree upon that the listed companies’ outside financing following this order: first one is equity fund, second one is convertible bond, third one is short-term liabilities, last one is long-term liabilities. Ma ny researchers usually analyze our national listed companies’ preference to equity fund with the systematic factors arising in the reform of our national economy. They thought that it just because of those systematic facts that made the listed companies’ financial activities betray to western classical financing theory. For example, the “picking order” theory claims that when enterprise need fund, they should turn to inside fund (depreciation and retained earnings) first, and then debt fund, and the last choice is equity fund. In this article, the author thinks that it is because of the specific financial environment that activates the enterprises’ such preference, and try to interpret the reasons of that preference to equity fund by combination of non-systematic factors and western financial theories.2. Financings cost of the listed company and preference to equity fund According to western financing the theories, capital cost of equity fund is more than capital cost of debt fund, thus the enterprise should choose debt fund first, then is theturn to equity fund when it fund outside. We should understand that this conception of “capital cost” is taken into account by investors, it is somewhat opportunity cost of the investors, can also be called expected returns. It contains of risk-free rate of returns and risk rate of returns arising from the investors’ risk investment. It is different with financing cost in essence. Financing cost is the cost arising from enterprises’ financing activities and using fund, we can call it fund cost. If capital market is efficient, capital cost should equal to fund cost, that is to say, what investors gain in capital market should equal to what fund raisers pay, or the transfer of fund is inevitable. But in an inefficient capital market, the price of stock will be different from its value because of investors’ action of speculation; they only chase capital gain and don’t want to hold the stocks in a long time and receive dividends. Thus the listed companies can gain fund with its fund cost being lower than capital cost.But in our national capital market, capital cost of equity fund is very low; it is because of the following factors: first, the high P/E Ratio (Price Earning Ratio) of new issued shares. According to calculat ion, average P/E Ratio of Chinese listed companies’ shares is between 30 and 40, it also is maintained at 20 although drops somewhat recently. But the normal P/E Ratio should be under 20 according to experience. We can observe the P/E was only 13.2 from 1874 to 1988 in US, and only 10 in Hong Kong. High P/E Ratio means high share issue price, then the capital cost of equity fund drops even given the same level of dividend. Second, low dividend policy in the listed companies, capital cost of equity fund decided by dividend pay-out ratio and price of per share. In China, many listed companies pay little or even no dividends to their shareholders. According to statistic data, there were 488 listed companies paid no dividend to their shareholders in 1998, 58.44 percents of all listed companies, there were 590, 59.83 percents in 1999, even 2000 in which China Securities Regulatory Commission issue new files to rule dividend policy of companies, there were only 699 companies which pay dividends, 18.47 percents more than that in 1999, but dividend payout ratio deduce 22%. Thus capital cost of equity is very low. Third, there is no rigidity on equity fund, if the listed companies choose equity fund, they can use the fund forever and has no obligation to return this fund. Most of listedcompanies are controlled by Government in China, taking financing risk into account, the major stockholders prefers to equity fund. The management also prefer equity fund because its lower fund cost and needn’t to be paid off, then the ir position will be more stable than financing in equity fund. We can conclude from the above analysis that cost of equity fund is lower than cost of debt fund in Chinese listed companies and the listed companies prefer to such low-cost fund.3. Types and qualities of assets in listed companies and preference to equity fund Static Trade-off Theory tells us, the value of enterprise with financial leverage is decided by the value of self-owned capital; value arising from tax benefit, cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost. Cost of financial embarrassment and agency cost are negative correlative to the types and qualities of companies’ assets, if the enterprise has more intangible assets, more assets with lower quality, it will has lower liquidity and its assets have lower mortgage value. When this kind of enterprise faces to great financial risk, it will have no way to solve its questions by selling its assets. Furthermore, because care for the ability of turning into cash of the mortgage assets, the creditors will high the level of rate and lay additional items in financial contract to rule the debtor’s action, all of those will enhance the agency cost and deduce the companies’ value. Qualcomm is supplier of wireless data and communication service in America, it is the inventor and user of CDMA and it also occupies the technology of HDR. The market value of its share is 1120 billions dollars at the end of March, 2000, but the quantities of long-term liabilities is zero. Why? Some reasons may be that there are some competitors in the market who own analogous technologies and the management of Qualcomm Company takes conservative attitude in financing activities. But the most important factor may be Qualcomm Company owns a mass of intangible assets which will have lower convertibility and the company’s value will decline when it has no enough money to pay for its debt.Many listed companies in China are transformed from the national enterprises. In the transformation, these listed companies take over the high-quality assets of the national enterprises, but with the development of economy, some projects can not coincidewith the market demand and the values of relative assets decline. On the other hand, there are many intangible assets in new high-tech companies. State-owned companies and high-tech companies are the most parts of the capital market. We can conclude that the qualities of listed companies’ assets are very low. This point is supported by the index of P/B (Price-to-Book value) which is usually thought as one of the most important indexes which can weigh the qualities of the listed companies’ assets. According to statistic data coming from Shenzhen Securities Information Company, by the end of November 14, 2003, there were 412 companies whose P/B is less than 2, take the 30% proportions of total listed companies which issue A-share in China, among them, there were 150 companies whose P/B is less than 1.53, and weighted average P/B of the stock market is 2.42. Lower qualities of assets means more cost may be brought out from debt fund and lower total value of the listed companies. Thus the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.4. Profitability and preference to equity fundFinancial Leverage Theory tells us that a small change in company’s profit may make great change in company’s EPS (Earnings per share). Just like leverage, we can get an amplified action by use of it. Debt fund can supply us with this leverage, by use of debt fund, these companies which have high level of profitability will get higher level of EPS because debt fund produces more profit for shareholders than interest shareholder shall pay. On the contrary, these companies which have low level of profitability will get lower level of EPS by use of debt fund because debt fund can not produce enough profit for shareholder to fulfill the demand of paying off the interests. Edison International Company has steady amount of customers and many intangible assets, these supply it with high level of profitability and ability to gain debt fund, its debt account to 67.2% proportions of its total assets in 1999.Listed companies in developed countries or regions always have high level of profitability. Take US for example, there are many listed companies which have excellent performance in American capital market when do business, such as J.P Morgan, its EPS is $11.16 per share in 1999. Besides it, GM, GE, Coca Cola, IBM,Intel, Microsoft, Dell etc. all always are profitable. In Hong Kong, most of those companies whose stock included in Hang Sang Index have the level of EPS more than 1 HKD, many are more than 2 HKD. Such as Cheung Kong (Holdings) Limited, its EPS is 7.66 HKD. But listed companies do not have such excellent performance in profitability in China inland. Their profitability is common low. Take the performance of 2000 for example, the weighted average EPS of total listed companies is only 0.20 Yuan per share, and the weighted average P/B is 2.65 Yuan per share, 8.55 percents of these listed companies have negative profit. With low or no profit, the benefit nixes, listed companies’ preference to equity fund is a reasonable phenomenon. Can be gained from debt fund is very little; the listed companies can even suffer from the financia l distress caused by debt fund. So with the consideration of shareholders’ interest, the listed companies prefer to equity fund when need outside financial support in China.5. Shareholding structure factors and preference to equity fundListed companies not only face to external financing environmental impacts, but also the structure of the companies shares. Shareholding structure of Chinese listed companies shows characteristics as followed: I. Ownership structure is fairly complex. In addition to the public shares, there are shares held with inland fund and foreign stocks, state-owned shares, legal person shares, and internal employee shares, transferred allotted shares, A shares, B shares, H shares And N shares, and other distinction. From 1995 to 2003, Chinese companies’ outstanding shares of the total equity share almost have no change, even declined slightly. II. There are different prices, dividends, and rights of shares issued by same enterprise. III. The over-concentration of shares. We use the quantity of shares of the three major shareholders who top the list of shareholders of the listed companies to measure the concentration of stock. We study he concentration of stock of these companies which issue new share publicly in the years from 1995 to 2003 and focus on the situation of Chinese listed companies over the same period. The results showed that: from 1995 to 2003, the company-Which once transferred or allotted shares-whose top three shareholders’ shareholding ratio are generally higher than t he average level of all thelisted companies, and most of these company's top three shareholders holding 40 percent or higher percent of companies’ shares. In some years, the maximum number even is more than 90 percent, indicating that the company with the implementation of transferred and allotted shares have relatively high concentration rate of shares and major shareholders have absolute control over it. In short, transferring allotting shares and the issuance of additional shares have a certain relevanc e to the company’s concentration of ownership structure; the company's financing policy is largely controlled by the major shareholders.Chinese listed companies’ special shareholding structure effects its financing action. Because stockholders of the state-owned shares, legal person shares, social and outstanding shares, foreign share have a different objective function, their modes of financing preferences vary, and their preference affect the financing structure of listed companies. Controlling shareholders which hold state-owned shares account for the status of enterprises and carry out financing decisions in accordance with their own objective function. When the objective function conflict with the other shareholders benefit, they often damage the interests of other shareholders by use of the status of controlling. As the first major shareholders of the companies, government has multiple objectives, not always market-oriented, it prefers to use safe fund such as equity fund to maintain the value of state-owned assets, thus resulting in listed company’s preference to equity financing. Debt financing bring business with greater pressure to pay off the par value and interests. Therefore, the state-owned companies are showing a more offensive attitude to debt fund, again because of Chinese state-controlled listed companies have the absolute status in all listed company.From: International Journal of Business and Management; October, 2009.译文：中国上市公司偏好股权融资：非制度性因素摘要：本文把重点集中于中国上市公司的融资活动，运用西方融资理论，从非制度性因素方面，如融资成本、企业资产类型和质量、盈利能力、行业因素、股权结构因素、财务管理水平和社会文化，分析了中国上市公司倾向于股权融资的原因，并得出结论，股权融资偏好是上市公司根据中国融资环境的一种合理的选择。
创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献
创业融资中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Entrepreneurial FinancingThe financing of startups entails potentially extreme adverse selection costs given the absent track record of the firms seeking capital, and given the risky nature of the industries in which many of them operate. Exacerbating the problem, this scenario often involves an innovator who has extensive technical knowledge but has neither the accumulated reputation nor the bondable wealth necessary to convey this information credibly.Barry characterizes venture capital as having evolved precisely to fill this startup financing niche:At the level of small, risky ventures, access to capital markets is restricted. Not all entrepreneurs can self-finance their projects, and not all can find bankers or angels who will carry the shortfall. Venture capitalists offer them a source of funds that is specifically designed for use in risky settings. The venture capitalists themselves perform due diligence prior to investing, and information gleaned in that process can greatly reduce the adverse selection problem..This outlook raises several questions. Why is it assumed that banks cannot (or choose not to) perform the same level of due diligence as venture capitalists (VCs)? In what sense is venture capital “designed” for risky settings? The puzzle deepens when one notes that straight debt is typically advocated as a solution to the adverse selection problem whereas in practice VCs often hold convertible preferred equity. Indeed, a defining characteristic of the venture capital market is that contracts are fairly high-powered in the sense that expected payoffs come disproportionately from the equity component or “upside”.These questions can be addressed by reflecting upon the costly due diligence to w hich Barry refers. By directly revealing the project’s quality, due diligence reduces information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and the VC. By contrast, if quality were signaled—the traditional solution to the adverse selection problem—costly due diligence would be unnecessary since there would be no more information to convey.In otherwise, either signaling or costly due diligence can solve the adverse selection problem. The two mechanisms are substitutes; the question then becomes which is more cost-effective.The first contribution of the paper is to show that signaling can be prohibitively expensive in entrepreneurial financing markets, and so costly due diligence dominates. The “cost” of signaling is driven by the incentives of bad firms to pool. Yet,for startups, if funding is not obtained then the firm may have almost no value. With such low reservation values, bad entrepreneurs attempt to pool at nearly any cost. As the analysis shows, securities is unattractive enough to drive out bad entrepreneurs—and thus to serve as a credible signal—tend to be unattractive to good entrepreneurs as well. Costly due diligence emerges as the preferred solution.As testament to the empirical importance of due diligence costs in venture capital markets, Fried and Hans characterize the VC funding process as composed of six distinct, progressively rigorous stages of screening. This due diligence takes an average of 97 days to complete even before the first round of funding is initiated. The majority of funding proposals do not successfully pass through the first screen, let alone subsequent screens, and the full process is described as “much more involved in bank loan reviews.The second contribution of the paper is to illustrate a link between costly due diligence and high-powered (or equity-like) financial contracts. The intuition behind this link is simple. By definition, low-powered contracts are safe; i.e., expected payoffs vary little across firms. High-powered contracts magnify the differential in payoff between funding good and bad projects, and hence magnify the incentives to screen out bad projects. In effect, high-powered contracts make the VC bear the cost of choosing entrepreneurs unwisely. Therefore high-powered contracts encourage due diligence.To summarize, this model is designed to make three simple points: (1) upside sharing is to be expected given costly evaluation, (2) such costly evaluations serve as a substitute traditional solutions to the adverse selection problem, and (3) traditional solutions are dominated for parameterizations of the model that correspond to venturecapital markets.Following the path-breaking empirical work of Saar, a theoretical literature on VC contract design emerged. One common feature of these papers is that they rationalize the optimality of convertible securities. A second common feature of these models is the admission of agency costs. For example, VCs and entrepreneurs may have different preferences regarding project risk or exit strategy.In part, the literature’s relia nce on agency costs owes to a widespread belief in their empirical relevance. It is also presumably related to the aforementioned consensus: since debt is considered the optimal response to adverse selection, non-debt securities must imply the presence of another market friction. On the other hand, it is clear how agency costs could lead to equity-like securities. Conflicts-of-interest over future actions are mitigated by granting both parties roughly symmetrical payoffs, which leads to upside-sharing. Of course, the omission of agency problems from the current model is not intended to suggest that they are unimportant empirically. Rather, the lesson is that agency costs are not a necessary condition for equity-like securities.Perhaps surprisingly, the theoretical results most closely related to this paper are contained in analyses of publicly traded securities. Assuming liquidity is exogenous and that prices are set by competitive market makers, Boot and Thakor show that splitting securities into an information-sensitive piece and a safer piece may either increase or decrease traders’ incentives to produce information. Fulghieri and Lukin study a similar environment but split the firm’s claims into a piece sold to outside investors and another piece that is retained, again analyzing the interaction between security design and information acquisition.Two important distinctions set my results apart from these models of public trading. First, their models exogenously rule out signaling, so it not possible to examine whether traditional solutions to adverse selection are dominated and, if so, under what conditions. Second, it is not clear how the results of these public trading models might be extended to entrepreneurial finance markets since the assumption that drives their results—losses by liquidity traders with perfectly inelasticdemand—has no obvious counterpart in an entrepreneurial finance setting.The economy consists of entrepreneurs with projects requiring capital investment K. The value of funded projects is 1 with probability πτ, where τ∈{G, B} is an indicator of project quality, and λ< 1 otherwise.Funded projects have expected value Vi = πτ 1 + (1 − πτ)λ. It is assumed thatλ< K. Otherwise the model would admit riskless debt, which would eliminate the adverse selection problem.Entrepreneurs have reservation value V; that is, contracts are acceptable only if the residual claim has expected value V or higher. In a model of mature firm financing, V is most clearly interpreted as the value of assets-in-place, because this is the continuation value of the firm in the absence of new investment. Such an interpretation is valid in entrepreneurial settings as well because without attracting financing the entrepreneur owns the existing assets outright. The key difference is one of magnitude. Compared to models of mature firms, in entrepreneurial settings the value of assets-in-place is small relative to other parameters.The net present value of projects, Vτ−V − K, is assumed to satisfyEVG − V − K ≥0 ≥EV B − V − K. (1) Equation (1) justifies the nomenclature “good” and “bad.” The net present value of a project is positive if and only if the project is good. Finally, it is assumed that net present values satisfyθ(EG − V − K) + (1 −θ)(EB − V − K) ≥0, (2) where θis the proportion of good projects in the economy. Because net present values are positive (on average), the model admits pooling equilibrium.One source of capital is an uninformed investor who conducts a mechanical credit evaluation based on observable characteristics. This investor may be thought of as a proxy for the competitive commercial banking market. Consistent with this interpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt.An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that canevaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes high-powered contracts in equilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor of funding all projects. Such an outcome would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good entrepreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects.Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s ∈{G, B} withPr{s = G | entrepreneur is bad} = Pr{s = B | entrepreneur is good} =ε(3) The unconditional probability of a good signal is θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε, so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) entrepreneurs before a goo d one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to compensate the VC for both capital contribution K and expected evaluation costs C= C/(θ(1 − ε) + (1 − θ)ε) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal.This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing instead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue becomes degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs’ contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive.In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts consideredarbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: high-powered securities promote due diligence, whereas low-powered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates comparison of my results with those of the existing literature.This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance markets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more cost-effective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC market.Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial complements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signaling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show complement may be motivated in multiple ways. For example, suppose entrepreneurs have noisy private information. Then the optimal security may involve signaling, thus eliminating entrepreneurs with bad information. But to the extent that the pool has residual uncertainty even after this self-selection, costly due diligence may still add value.Information acquisition occurs outside venture capital markets, of course. This model may shed light on the usage of unit IPOs, which are bundles of stocks and warrants often used for particularly small, risky offerings. The inclusion of warrants is puzzling from an adverse selection perspective, since the existing literature argues that securities should emphasize payoffs in bad states. The logic of this paper suggests that these securities, which emphasize good states to an extreme, motivate investors to evaluate projects and might be used when other mechanisms of dealing with adverse selection are too expensive.Finally, the model’s conclusions are not tied to the assumption that good entrepreneurs choose the contract. A connection between information acquisition incentives and the shape of the security exists independently of the contract’s origins. One could equivalently model a general partner in a venture capital fund raisingmoney from limited partners, announcing what securities the fund intends to hold. The more equity-like the securities are, the stronger the general partner’s information acquisition incentives.Source: Chris Yung. Entrepreneurial Financing And Costly Due Diligence. The Financial Review, 2009(44),pp137-149.译文：创业融资由于缺乏融资的信用记录以及所经营公司存在的风险性，初创企业的融资通常情况下都需要很高的逆向选择成本。
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Bank Involvement with SMEs:Beyond
Relationship Lending
The financing of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has attracted much attention in recent years and has become an important topic for economists and policymakers working on financial and economic development. This interest is driven in part by the fact that SMEs account for the majority of firms in an economy and a significant share of employment (Hallberg 2001). Furthermore, most large companies usually start as small enterprises, so the ability of SMEs to develop and invest becomes crucial to any economy wishing to prosper.2
The recent attention on SME financing also comes from the perception among academics and policymakers that SMEs lack appropriate financing and need to receive special assistance, such as government programs that increase lending. Various studies support this perception. A number of papers find that SMEs are more financially constrained than large firms. For example, using data from 10,000 firms in 80 countries,Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic (2006) show that the probability that a firm rates financing as a major obstacle is 39% for small firms, 38% for medium-size firms, and 29% for large firms. Furthermore, small firms finance, on average, 13 percentage points less of their investments with external finance when compared to large firms.4 Importantly, lack of access to external finance is a key obstacle to firm growth, especially for SMEs (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005). On the policy side, there are a large number of initiatives across countries to foster SME financing including government subsidized lines of credit and public guarantee funds. One example that has been deemed as relatively successful is Chile’s Fondo de Garantía para Pequeños Empresarios (FOGA PE), a fund created to encourage bank lending to SMEs through partial credit guarantees. This fund has many features that make it attractive,including some incentives to reduce moral hazard, promote competition among banks, and encourage self sustainability
银行参与中小企业融资：超越关系型贷款
近年来，中型和小型企业（中小企业）的融资问题，已成为致力于财政与经济发展工作的经济学家们和政策家们的重要议题，备受关注。
这种趋势的原因在于，市场经济中，中小型企业占绝大多数，并解决了大份额的就业问题（Hallberg，2001）。
此外，多数大型企业通常是由小型企业发展而来，因此，中小型企业的发展投资能力正是经济体进一步繁荣的关键。
同时，许多学者与政策家指出，中小型企业的融资问题在于缺乏合适的融资渠道，并理应得到特殊帮助。
如，政府应出台增加贷款金额等相关政策。
各类研究数据表明了此看法的正确性。
举例来说，一项对10,000家来自80多个不同国家的企业数据（Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Maksimovic 2006）分析表明，
其中认为企业发展的最大障碍为融资难的企业，小型企业占到39%，中型企业占据38%，而大型企业占29%。
此外，与大型企业的对外融资水平相比，小型企业平均融资资金低于大型企业13个百分点。
更为重要的是，特别是对于中小型企业来说，对外融资困难是阻碍企业发展的瓶颈。
（Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005）
在政策方面，许多措施与政策的出台，包括政府对给予企业最高贷款的银行单位发放津贴以及提供公共保障金，用以促进各国中小型企业的融资水平。
最典型的例子要属中国的FOGAPE（小型企业担保基金）政策，其鼓励银行给予小型企业贷款，使得小型企业可在较低信用额度的情况下获得贷款。
该项政策有着众多特点，包括鼓励减少（贷款中）不正当行为，提升银行之间的竞争力以及银行自身的承担力。