哈佛公开课Justice 第一课字幕 中英对照精解
哈佛大学公开课《公正》课堂笔记.doc
哈佛大学公开课《公正》课堂笔记.doc公正是一个关键的理论和实际问题。
参加正义的追求，是大多数文化的一个中心问题。
公正是哲学、政治和法律学的重要主题。
在哲学中，公正是价值和道德基础的探究，而在政治科学中，则是权利和权力的探究。
公正是自治的标志。
自治有时显然是重要的，因为人们会认为，只有自主选择，才能使人们成为自己的主人。
课程注重分析公正所涉及的几个关键问题：1.分配公正（distributive justice）——财产、权利、机会分配的公正性。
2.修补公正（corrective justice）——如何修正不公正的分配，如何弥补由不公正引起的损失和伤害。
3.诉讼公正（judicial justice）——法律程序和司法制度的公正性。
我们如何理解正义？正义是一个广泛的概念。
在不同的情境下，正义有不同的含义。
正义包含以下几个要素：2.平等（equality）：平等可以有很多不同的含义，但是，基本上平等要求对待某个人或群体时不进行歧视，而且对待所有人时包括适当的地位和敬意。
3.尊重（respect）：尊重指的是对所有人的自由和权利的尊重，尊重他们的意志或决定。
在本意义上，正义与自由、尊重等价。
分配公正分配公正是指资源分配是公正、合理、合法和合法的问题，这个问题是至关重要的，因为这牵涉到人们的生活、权利和机会。
效用学派认为公正需要基于效用，也就是人类的福利最大化。
原则：最大化幸福，最小化不幸福。
资源主义认为资源应当按照人们所做的贡献进行分配。
自由主义者认为，重要的是人们能够获得自己选择的东西、自己的财产和自己的立场，重要的是不受不正当干涉和不当限制。
马克思主义强调，分配应基于不同的需求，而不是贡献，应该根据各个人的基本需要以均等的方式进行分配。
修补公正人们无法忽略的是，虽然我们都希望进行公正的资源分配，但有时它仍会失败。
此时，我们则需要进行一些修补，来纠正不正当的分配。
此时就涉及到了“修补公正”。
有两种基本的思路：1.撤销（restitution)：撤销原来有利的状态，消除不公正的结果。
哈佛大学公开课《公正：该如何做是好》：第一课：英文字幕
Funding for this program is provided by...Additional funding provided by...This is a course about justice and we begin with a you're the driver of a trolley car, and your trolley car is hurtling down the trackat miles an hour. And at the end of the track you notice five workers working on the try to stop but you can't, your brakes don't feel desperate because you know that if you crash into these five workers, they will all 's assume you know that for so you feel helpless until you notice that there is, off to the right, a side track and at the endof that track, there is one worker working on the steering wheel works,so you can turn the trolley car,if you want to,onto the side trackkilling the one but sparing the 's our first question:what's the right thing to do?What would you do?Let's take a many would turnthe trolley caronto the side track?Raise your many wouldn't?How many would go straight ahead?Keep your hands up those of youwho would go straight handful of people would,the vast majority would 's hear first,now we need to beginto investigate the reasonswhy you thinkit's the right thing to 's begin with those in the majoritywho would turn to goonto the side would you do it?What would be your reason?Who's willing to volunteer a reason?Go ahead. Stand it can't be rightto kill five peoplewhen you can onlykill one person wouldn't be rightto kill five if you could killone person 's a good 's a good else?Does everybody agreewith that reason? Go I was thinking it's the same reasonon / with regardto the people who flew the planeinto the Pennsylvania fieldas heroes because they choseto kill the people on the planeand not kill more peoplein big the principle therewas the same on /.It's a tragic circumstancebut better to kill oneso that five can live,is that the reasonmost of you had,those of youwho would turn? Yes?Let's hear nowfrom those in the minority,those who wouldn't turn. , I think that'sthe same type of mentalitythat justifies genocideand order to saveone type of race,you wipe out the what wouldyou doin this case?You would, to avoidthe horrors of genocide,you would crashinto the five and kill them?Presumably, would?. Who else?That's a brave 's consideranother trolley car caseand see whether those of youin the majoritywant to adhereto the principle"better that one should dieso that five should live."This time you're not the driverof the trolley car,you're an 're standing on a bridgeoverlooking a trolley car down the track comesa trolley car,at the end of the trackare five workers,the brakes don't work,the trolley caris about to careeninto the five and kill now, you're not the driver,you really feel helplessuntil you noticestanding next to you,leaning over the bridgeis a very fat you couldgive him a would fall over the bridgeonto the track right in the wayof the trolley would diebut he would spare the , how many would pushthe fat man over the bridge?Raise your many wouldn't?Most people wouldn''s the obvious became of the principle"better to save five liveseven if it means sacrificing one?"What became of the principlethat almost everyone endorsedin the first case?I need to hear from someonewho was in the majorityin both do you explainthe difference between the two? second one, I guess,involves an active choiceof pushing a person downwhich I guess that person himselfwould otherwise not have beeninvolved in the situation at so to choose on his behalf,I guess, to involve himin something that heotherwise would have escaped is,I guess, more than whatyou have in the first casewhere the three parties,the driver and the two sets of workers,are already, I guess,in the the guy working,the one on the trackoff to the side,he didn't chooseto sacrifice his life any morethan the fat man did, did he?That's true, but he wason the tracks and...This guy was on the ahead, you can come backif you want. All 's a hard question. You did did very 's a hard else can find a wayof reconciling the reactionof the majorityin these two cases? , I guess in the first casewhere you have the one workerand the five,it's a choicebetween those twoand you have to makea certain choice and peopleare going to diebecause of the trolley car,not necessarily becauseof your direct trolley car is a runaway thingand you're making a split second pushing the fat man overis an actual actof murder on your have control over thatwhereas you may not have controlover the trolley I think it's a slightlydifferent right, who has a reply?That's good. Who has a way?Who wants to reply?Is that a way out of this?I don't think that'sa very good reasonbecause you choose to-either way you have to choosewho dies because you eitherchoose to turn and kill the person,which is an actof conscious thought to turn,or you choose to pushthe fat man overwhich is also an active,conscious either way,you're making a you want to reply?I'm not really surethat that's the just still seemskind of act of actually pushingsomeone over onto the tracksand killing him,you are actually killing him 're pushing himwith your own 're pushing himand that's differentthan steering somethingthat is going to causedeath into know, it doesn't really sound rightsaying it , no. It's good. It's 's your name? me ask you this question, standing on the bridgenext to the fat man,I didn't have to push him,suppose he was standing overa trap door that I could openby turning a steering wheel like you turn?For some reason,that still just seems more ?I mean, maybe if you accidentallylike leaned into the steering wheelor something like ... Or say thatthe car is hurtlingtowards a switchthat will drop the I could agree with 's all right. Fair still seems wrong in a waythat it doesn't seem wrongin the first case to turn, you in another way, I mean,in the first situationyou're involved directlywith the the second one,you're an onlooker as right. -So you have the choiceof becoming involved or notby pushing the fat right. Let's forget for the momentabout this 's 's imagine a different time you're a doctorin an emergency roomand six patientscome to 've been in a terribletrolley car of themsustainmoderate injuries,one is severely injured,you could spend all daycaring for the oneseverely injured victimbut in that time,the five would you could look after the five,restore them to healthbut during that time,the one severely injured personwould many would save the five?Now as the doctor,how many would save the one?Very few people,just a handful of reason, I life versus five?Now consider another doctor time, you're a transplant surgeonand you have five patients,each in desperate needof an organ transplantin order to needs a heart,one a lung, one a kidney,one a liver,and the fifth a you have no organ are about to see them then it occurs to youthat in the next roomthere's a healthy guywho came in for a he's –you like that –and he's taking a nap,you could go in very quietly,yank out the five organs,that person would die,but you could save the many would do it?Anyone? How many?Put your hands upif you would do in the balcony?I would? Be careful,don't lean over too many wouldn't?All right. What do you say?Speak up in the balcony,you who would yank outthe organs. Why?I'd actually like to explore aslightly alternate possibilityof just taking the oneof the five who needs an organwho dies first and usingtheir four healthy organsto save the other 's a pretty good 's a great ideaexcept for the factthat you just wreckedthe philosophical 's step back from these storiesand these argumentsto notice a couple of thingsabout the way the argumentshave begun to moral principleshave already begun to emergefrom the discussions we've let's considerwhat those moral principles look first moral principlethat emerged in the discussionsaid the right thing to do,the moral thing to dodepends on the consequencesthat will result from your the end of the day,better that five should liveeven if one must 's an exampleof consequentialist moral moral reasoninglocates moralityin the consequences of an act,in the state of the worldthat will result from the thing you then we went a little further,we considered those othercasesand people weren't so sureabout consequentialist moral people hesitatedto push the fat manover the bridgeor to yank out the organsof the innocent patient,people gestured toward reasonshaving to do withthe intrinsic qualityof the act itself,consequences be what they were thought it was just wrong,categorically wrong,to kill a person,an innocent person,even for the sakeof saving five least people thoughtthat in the second versionof each story we this pointsto a second categorical wayof thinking about moral moral reasoninglocates moralityin certain absolutemoral requirements,certain categorical duties and rights,regardless of the 're going to explorein the days and weeks to comethe contrast betweenconsequentialist and categoricalmoral most influential exampleof consequential moral reasoningis utilitarianism,a doctrine inventedby Jeremy Bentham,the th centuryEnglish political most important philosopherof categorical moral reasoningis the th centuryGerman philosopher Immanuel we will lookat those two different modesof moral reasoning,assess them,and also consider you look at the syllabus,you'll notice that we reada number of greatand famous books,books by Aristotle, John Locke,Immanuel Kant, John Stewart Mill,and 'll notice toofrom the syllabusthat we don't onlyread these books;we also take up contemporary,political, and legal controversiesthat raise philosophical will debate equality and inequality,affirmative action, free speech versushate speech, same sex marriage,military conscription,a range of practical questions. Why?Not just to enliventhese abstract and distant booksbut to make clear,to bring out what's at stakein our everyday lives,including our political lives,for so we will read these booksand we will debate these issues,and we'll see how each informsand illuminates the may sound appealing enough,but here I have to issue a the warning is this,to read these booksin this way as an exercisein self knowledge,to read them in thiswaycarries certain risks,risks that are both personaland political,risks that every studentof political philosophy has risks spring from the factthat philosophy teaches usand unsettles usby confronting us withwhat we already 's an difficulty of this courseconsists in the factthat it teacheswhat you already works by taking what we knowfrom familiar unquestioned settingsand making it 's how those examples worked,the hypotheticals with which we began,with their mix of playfulnessand 's also how thesephilosophical books estranges usfrom the familiar,not by supplying new informationbut by inviting and provokinga new way of seeing but,and here's the risk,once the familiar turns strange,it's never quite the same knowledge is like lost innocence,however unsettling you find it;it can never be un-thoughtor makes this enterprise difficultbut also rivetingis that moral and political philosophyis a story and you don't knowwhere the story will what you do knowis that the story is about are the personal what of the political risks?One way of introducing a courselike this would be to promise youthat by reading these booksand debating these issues,you will become a better,more responsible citizen;you will examine the presuppositionsof public policy,you will hone your political judgment,you will become a moreeffective participant in public this would be a partialand misleading philosophy,for the most part,hasn't worked that have to allow for the possibilitythat political philosophymay make you a worse citizenrather than a better oneor at least a worse citizenbefore it makes you a better one,and that's becausephilosophy is a distancing,even debilitating, you see this,going back to Socrates,there's a dialogue,the Gorgias, in whichone of Socrates' friends, Callicles,tries to talk him out tells Socrates"Philosophy is a pretty toyif one indulges in itwith moderationat the right time of life. But if onepursues it further than one should,it is absolute ruin.""Take my advice," Callicles says,"abandon theaccomplishmentsof active life,take for your modelsnot those people who spendtheir time on these petty quibblesbut those who have a good livelihoodand reputation and manyother blessings."So Callicles is really saying to Socrates"Quit philosophizing, get real,go to business school."And Callicles did have a had a point because philosophydistances us from conventions,from established assumptions,and from settled are the risks,personal and in the faceof these risks,there is a characteristic name of the evasionis skepticism, it's the idea –well, it goes something like this –we didn't resolve once and for alleither the cases or the principleswe were arguing when we beganand if Aristotle and Lockeand Kant and Millhaven't solved these questionsafter all of these years,who are we to think that we,here in Sanders Theatre,over the course of a semester,can resolve them?And so, maybe it's just a matterof each person having his or her ownprinciples and there's nothing moreto be said about it,no way of 's the evasion,the evasion of skepticism,to which I would offerthe following 's true, these questions have beendebated for a very long timebut the very factthat they have recurred and persistedmay suggest that thoughthey're impossible in one sense,they're unavoidable in the reason they're unavoidable,the reason they're inescapableis that we live some answerto these questions every skepticism, just throwing up your handsand giving up on moral reflectionis no Kant described very wellthe problem with skepticismwhen he wrote"Skepticism is a resting placefor human reason,where it can reflect uponits dogmatic wanderings,but it is no dwelling placefor permanent settlement.""Simply to acquiesce in skepticism,"Kant wrote,"can never suffice to overcomethe restlessness of reason."I've tried to suggestthrough these storiesand these argumentssome sense of the risksand temptations,of the perils and the would simply conclude by sayingthat the aim of this courseis to awaken the restlessness ofreasonand to see where it might you very , in a situation that desperate,you have to dowhat you have to do to have to do what you have to do?You got to dowhat you got to do, pretty you've been going dayswithout any food, you know,someone just hasto take the has to make the sacrificeand people can , that's 's your name?, what do you say to Marcus?Last time,we started out last timewith some stories,with some moral dilemmasabout trolley carsand about doctorsand healthy patientsvulnerable to being victimsof organ noticed two thingsabout the arguments we had,one had to do with the waywe were began with our judgmentsin particular tried to articulate the reasonsor the principles lying behindour then confrontedwith a new case,we found ourselvesreexamining those principles,revising eachin the light of the we noticed thebuilt in pressureto try to bring into alignmentour judgmentsabout particular casesand the principleswe would endorseon also noticed somethingabout the substanceof the argumentsthat emerged from the noticed that sometimeswe were tempted to locatethe morality of an actin the consequences, in the results,in the state of the worldthat it brought we called thisconsequentialist moral we also noticedthat in some cases,we weren't swayedonly by the , many of us felt,that not just consequencesbut also the intrinsic qualityor characterof the act matters people arguedthat there are certain thingsthat are just categorically wrongeven if they bring abouta good result,even if they saved five peopleat the cost of one we contrasted consequentialistmoral principles with categorical and in the next few days,we will begin to examineone of the most influential versionsof consequentialist moral that's the philosophyof Bentham,the th centuryEnglish political philosophergave first the first clearsystematic expressionto the utilitarian moral Bentham's idea,his essential idea,is a very simple a lot of morallyintuitive appeal,Bentham's ideais the following,theright thing to do;the just thing to dois to maximize did he mean by utility?He meant by utilitythe balance of pleasure over pain,happiness over 's how he arrivedat the principle of maximizing started out by observingthat all of us,all human beings are governedby two sovereign masters:pain and human beingslike pleasure and dislike so we should base morality,whether we're thinking aboutwhat to do in our own livesor whether as legislators or citizens,we're thinking aboutwhat the laws should right thing to do individuallyor collectively is to maximize,act in a way that maximizesthe overall level of 's utilitarianismis sometimes summed upwith the slogan"The greatest goodfor the greatest number."With this basic principleof utility on hand,let's begin to test itand to examine itby turning to another case,another story, but this time,not a hypothetical story,a real life story,the case of the Queenversus Dudley and was a th centuryBritish law casethat's famous and much debatedin law 's what happened in the 'll summarize the storythen I want to hearhow you would rule,imagining that you were the newspaper account of the timedescribed the sadder story of disasterat sea was never toldthan that of the survivorsof the yacht, ship flounderedin the South Atlantic, miles from the were four in the crew,Dudley was the captain,Stevens was the first mate,Brooks was a sailor,all men of excellent characteror so the newspaper account tells fourth crew memberwas the cabin boy,Richard Parker, years was an orphan,he had no family,and he was on his firstlong voyage at went,the news account tells us,rather against the adviceof his went in the hopefulnessof youthful ambition,thinking the journeywould make a man of , it was not to facts of the casewere not in wave hit the shipand the Mignonette went four crew membersescaped to a only food they hadwere two cans ofpreserved turnips,no fresh the first three days,they ate the fourth day,they opened oneof the cans of turnipsand ate next daythey caught a with the othercan of turnips,theturtle enabled themto subsist for the next few then for eight days,they had food. No yourselfin a situation like that,what would you do?Here's what they now the cabin boy, Parker,is lying at the bottomof the lifeboatin the cornerbecause he had drunk seawateragainst the advice of the othersand he had become illand he appeared to be on the th day,Dudley, the captain,suggested that they should allhave a lottery,that they should draw lotsto see who would dieto save the didn't like the lottery don't knowwhether this wasbecause he didn't wantto take the chanceor because he believedin categorical moral in any case,no lots were next daythere was still no ship in sightso Dudley told Brooksto avert his gazeand he motioned to Stevensthat the boy, Parker,had better be offered a prayer,he told the boy his time had come,and he killed himwith a pen knife,stabbing himin the jugular emergedfrom his conscientious objectionto sharein the gruesome four days,the three of them fedon the body and bloodof the cabin then they were describes their rescuein his diary with staggering euphemism."On the th day,as we were having our breakfast,a ship appeared at last."The three survivorswere picked up by a German were taken backto Falmouth in Englandwhere they were arrestedand turned state's and Stevens went to didn't dispute the claimed they hadacted out of necessity;that was their argued in effectbetter that one should dieso that three could prosecutor wasn't swayedby that said murder is murder,and so the case went to imagine you are the just to simplify the discussion,put aside the question of law,let's assume that you as the juryare charged with decidingwhether what they didwas morally permissible or many would vote'not guilty',that what they didwas morally permissible?And how manywould vote 'guilty',what they did wasmorally wrong?A pretty sizeable let's see what people's reasons areand let me begin with thosewho are in the 's hear first from the defenseof Dudley and would you morallyexoneratethem?What are your reasons? think it is morallyreprehensiblebut I think thatthere is a distinctionbetween what's morally reprehensibleand what makes someonelegally other words,as the judge said,what's always moralisn't necessarily against the lawand while I don't thinkthat necessity justifies theftor murder or any illegal act,at some point your degreeof necessity does, in fact,exonerate you from any . Good. Other voices for the justificationsfor what they did. just feel likein the situation that desperate,you have to dowhat you have to do to have to dowhat you have to , you've got to dowhat you've got to you've been going days without any food, you know,someone just has to take the sacrifice,someone has to make the sacrificeand people can furthermore from that,let's say they surviveand then they become productivemembers of societywho go home and startlike a million charity organizationsand this and thatand this and mean they benefited everybodyin the end. , I mean I don't knowwhat they did afterwards,they might have gone and like,I don't know,killed more people, I don't but. -What?Maybe they were if they went homeand they turned out to be assassins?What if they'd gone homeand turned out to b e assassins? Well…You'd want to knowwho they 's true too. That's 's fair. I would want to knowwho they right. That's 's your name?. All 've heard a defense,a couple of voicesfor the we need to hearfrom the people thinkwhat they did was wrong. Why?Yes. -One of the first thingsthat I was thinking wasthey haven't been eatingfor a really long timemaybe they're mentallylike affected and sothen that could be usedas a defense,a possible argumentthat they weren'tin the proper state of mind,they weren't making decisionsthey might otherwise be if that's an appealing argumentthat you have to bein an altered mindsetto do something like that,it suggests that peoplewho find that argument convincingdo think that they wereacting what do you-I want to knowwhat you defend 'm sorry, you vote to convict, right?Yeah, I don't thinkthatthey acted in a morallyappropriate why not?What do you say,here's Marcus,he just defended said –you heard what he you've got to dowhat you've got to doin a case like that. do you say to Marcus?That there'sno situation that would allowhuman beings to take the ideaof fate orthe other people's livesin their own hands,that we don't havethat kind of . what's your name?. Okay. Who else?What do you say? Stand 'm wonderingif Dudley and Stevenhad asked for Richard Parker'sconsent in you know, dying,if that would exonerate themfrom an act of murderand if so,is that still morally justifiable?That's right. wait, hang 's your name? sayssuppose they had that,what would thatscenario look like?So in the story Dudley is there,pen knife in hand,but instead of the prayeror before the prayer,he says "Parker, would you mind?""We're desperately hungry",as Marcus empathizes with,"we're desperately 're not going to last long anyhow."-Yeah. You can be a martyr."Would you be a martyr?How about it Parker?"Then what do you think?Would it be morally justified then?Suppose Parkerin his semi-stupor says "Okay."I don't think it would bemorally justifiable but I'm wondering if –Even then, even then it wouldn't be? don't think thateven with consentit would be morally justified?Are there people who thinkwho want to take upKathleen's consent ideaand who think thatthat would make itmorally justified?Raise your handif it would, if you think it 's very would consentmake a moral difference?Why would it? , I just thinkthat if he was makinghis own original ideaand it was his ideato start with,then that would bethe only situationin which I would see itbeing appropriate in any waybecause that wayyou couldn't make the argumentthat he was pressured,you know it's three-to-oneor whatever the ratio . -And I think that if he wasmaking a decisionto give his lifeand he took on the agencyto sacrifice himselfwhich some peoplemight see as admirableand other people might disagreewith that if he came upwith the idea,that's the only kindofconsent we could haveconfidence in morallythen it would be , it would be kind ofcoerced consentunder the circumstances,you there anyone who thinksthat even the consent of Parkerwould not justify their killing him?Who thinks that? us why. Stand think that Parkerwould be killed with the hopethat the other crew memberswould be rescued so there's nodefinite reason thathe should be killedbecause you don't knowwhen they're going to get rescuedso if you kill him,it's killing him in vain,do you keep killing a crew memberuntil you're rescuedand then you're left with no onebecause someone's goingto die eventually?Well, the moral logicof the situation seems to be that,that they would keep onpicking off the weakest maybe,one by one,until they were in this case, luckily,they were rescued when three at leastwere still , if Parker did give his consent,would it be all right,do you think or not?No, it still wouldn't be tell us whyit wouldn't be all of all, cannibalism,I believe, is morally incorrectso you shouldn't beeating human cannibalism is morallyobjectionable as such so then,even on the scenario ofwaiting until someone died,still it would be , to me personally,I feel like it all dependson one's personal moralsand like we can't sit here and just,like this is just my opinion,of course other peopleare going to disagree, but –Well we'll see,let's see what their disagreements areand then we'll seeif they have reasons that canpersuade you or 's try that. All , is there someonewho can explain,those of you who aretempted by consent,can you explain whyconsent makes sucha moral difference?What about the lottery idea?Does that count as consent?Remember at the beginning,Dudley proposed a lottery,suppose that they had agreedto a lottery,then how many would then sayit was all right?Suppose there were a lottery,cabin boy lost,and the rest of the story unfolded,then how many people would sayit was morally permissible?So the numbers are risingif we had a 's hear from one of youfor whom the lotterywould make a moral would it?I think theessential element,in my mind,that makes it a crimeis the idea that they decidedat some point that their liveswere more important than his,and that, I mean, that's kind ofthe basis for really any ? It's like my needs,my desires are more importantthan yours and minetake if they had done a lotterywhere everyone consentedthat someone should dieand it's sort of like they're allsacrificing themselvesto save the it would be all right?A little grotesque but–.-But morally permissible? what's your name? Matt, for you,what bothers you isnot the cannibalismbut the lack of due guess you could say ? And can someone who agreeswith Matt say a little bit moreabout why a lottery would make it,in your view, morally way I understood itoriginally was thatthat was the whole issueis that the cabin boywas never consultedabout whether or notsomething was goingto happen to him,even with the original lotterywhether or nothe would bea part of that,it was just decidedthat he was the onethat was going to , that's what happenedin the actual if there were a lotteryand they'd all agreed to the procedure,you think that would be okay?Right, because then everyoneknows that there's going to be a death,whereas the cabin boy didn't know thatthis discussion was even happening,there was no forewarningfor him to know that"Hey, I may be the one that's dying."All , suppose everyone agreesto the lottery, they have the lottery,the cabin boy loses,and he changes his 've already decided,it's like a verbal can't go back on that,you've decided,the decision was you know that you're dyingfor the reason of others to someone else had died,you know that you wouldconsume them so –Right. But then you could say,"I know, but I lost".I just think thatthat's the whole moral issueis that there was no consultingof the cabin boyand that's what makes itthe most horribleis that he had no ideawhat was even going had he knownwhat was going on,it would be a bit right. I want to hear –so there are some who thinkit's morally permissiblebut only about %,led by there are some。
幸福课哈佛公开课第一课中文字幕
第一课 各位，早上好。
很高 兴 能回到 这里。
高兴见 到你们。
我教授 这门课是因 为在我读本科阶段时非常希望能学 习这样 一门课程。
可能这门课 并不是你希望的那 样也可能并不适合你。
一切都很 顺利除了一点我不快 乐。
而且我不明白 为什么。
也就是在那 时我决定要找出原因 变得快 乐。
于是我将研究方向仍 计算机科学 转 向了哲学及心理学。
目标只有一个 :怎么 让自己开心起来。
渐渐的，我的确 变得更快 乐了主要是因 为我接触了一个新的 领域，那 时并未正式命名。
但本质上属于积枀心理学范畴。
研究 积枀心理学把其理念 应用到生活中 让我无比快 乐。
而且这种快乐继续 着。
于是我决定将其与更多的人分享。
选择教授 这门学科。
这就是积枀心理学， 1504 号心理学 课程。
我们将一起探索 这一全新相 对新兴令人 倾倒的 领域。
希望同 时还 能探索我 们自己。
我第一次开 设这门课 程是在。
是以讨论会的形式，只有 8 名学生。
两名退出了只剩我和其他六个人。
一年后学生稍微多了点。
有 到了第三年，也就是上一次开 课。
有 850 名参加是当 时哈佛大学人数最多的 课 程。
这 引起了媒体的注意。
因 为 他 们想知道 为什么。
他们对这 一奇特 现象非常好奇竟然有比 经济学导论 更热门 的课程。
怎么可能呢？ 于是我被 请去参加各类媒体采 访，报纸 ，广播， 电视。
在这些采访中，我 发现了一种有趣的模式。
我前去参加采 访。
进行采 访。
结束后，制片人或主持人会送我出来。
说些诸如 Tal 多谢你抽空参加采 访 。
不 过 你跟我想象的不太一样 的 话。
我漫不 经心的 问。
我无所 谓，不过总 得回应“有何不同？” 他们会说“这个嘛，我 们会以 为你很外向”。
下一次采 访结束时仌是如此“多 谢接受采 访”。
不过 Tal ，你跟我想象得不太一 样。
又一次，我漫不 经心地 问有何不同。
这个嘛，我 们没想到你会 这 么内向”。
但希望几堂 课 后，你能有个大概印象 我 1992 年来到哈佛求学，一开始主修 大二期 间，突然 顿 悟了。
哈佛大学公开课-公正-justice 02-Putting a Price Tag on Life How to Measure Pleasure 给生命一个价格标
Justice 02 Putting a Price Tag on Life / How to Measure Pleasure 给生命一个价格标签/如何衡量快乐Last time, we argued about the case of The Queen v. Dudley & Stephens, the lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism at sea.And with the arguments about the lifeboat in mind, the arguments for and against what Dudley and Stephens did in mind, let's turn back to the philosophy, the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham.Bentham was born in England in 1748.At the age of 12, he went to Oxford.At 15, he went to law school.He was admitted to the Bar at age 19 but he never practiced law.Instead, he devoted his life to jurisprudence and moral philosophy.Last time, we began to consider Bentham's version of utilitarianism.The main idea is simply stated and it's this: The highest principle of morality, whether personal or political morality, is to maximize the general welfare, or the collective happiness, or the overall balance of pleasure over pain; in a phrase, maximize utility.Bentham arrives at this principle by the following line of reasoning: We're all governed by pain and pleasure, they are our sovereign masters, and so any moral system has to take account of them.How best to take account?By maximizing.And this leads to the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number.What exactly should we maximize?Bentham tells us happiness, or more precisely, utility - maximizing utility as a principle not only for individuals but also for communities and for legislators."What, after all, is a community?" Bentham asks.It's the sum of the individuals who comprise it.And that's why in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the law should be, in deciding what's just, citizens and legislators should ask themselves the question if we add up all of the benefits of this policy and subtract all of the costs, the right thing to do is the one that maximizes the balance of happiness over suffering.That's what it means to maximize utility.Now, today, I want to see whether you agree or disagree with it, and it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under the name of cost-benefit analysis, which is used by companies and by governments all the time.And what it involves is placing a value, usually a dollar value, to stand for utility on the costs and the benefits of various proposals.Recently, in the Czech Republic, there was a proposal to increase the excise tax on smoking.Philip Morris, the tobacco company, does huge business in the Czech Republic.They commissioned a study, a cost-benefit analysis of smoking in the Czech Republic, and what their cost-benefit analysis found was the government gains by having Czech citizens smoke.Now, how do they gain?It's true that there are negative effects to the public finance of the Czech government because there are increased health care costs for people who develop smoking-related diseases.On the other hand, there were positive effects and those were added up on the other side of the ledger.The positive effects included, for the most part, various tax revenues that the government derives from the sale of cigarette products, but it also included health care savings to the government when people die early, pension savings -- you don't have to pay pensions for as long - and also, savings in housing costs for the elderly.And when all of the costs and benefits were added up, the Philip Morris study found that there is a net public finance gain in the Czech Republic of $147,000,000, and given the savings in housing, in health care, and pension costs, the government enjoys savings of over $1,200 for each person who dies prematurely due to smoking.Cost-benefit analysis.Now, those among you who are defenders of utilitarianism may think that this is an unfair test.Philip Morris was pilloried in the press and they issued an apology for this heartless calculation.You may say that what's missing here is something that the utilitarian can easily incorporate, namely the value to the person and to the families of those who die from lung cancer.What about the value of life?Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate a measure for the value of life.One of the most famous of these involved the Ford Pinto case.Did any of you read about that?This was back in the 1970s.Do you remember what the Ford Pinto was, a kind of car?Anybody?It was a small car, subcompact car, very popular, but it had one problem, which is the fuel tank was at the back of the car and in rear collisions, the fuel tank exploded and some people were killed and some severely injured.Victims of these injuries took Ford to court to sue.And in the court case, it turned out that Ford had long since known about the vulnerable fuel tank and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it would be worth it to put in a special shield that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it from exploding.They did a cost-benefit analysis.The cost per part to increase the safety of the Pinto, they calculated at $11.00 per part.And here's -- this was the cost-benefit analysis that emerged in the trial.Eleven dollars per part at 12.5 million cars and trucks came to a total cost of $137 million to improve the safety.But then they calculated the benefits of spending all this money on a safer car and they counted 180 deaths and they assigned a dollar value, $200,000 per death, and then the costs to repair, 105 the replacement cost for 2,000 vehicles, it would be destroyed without the safety device $700 per vehicle.So the benefits turned out to be only $49.5 million and so they didn't install the device.Needless to say, when this memo of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came out in the trial, it appalled the jurors, who awarded a huge settlement.Is this a counterexample to the utilitarian idea of calculating?Because Ford included a measure of the value of life.Now, who here wants to defend cost-benefit analysis from this apparent counterexample?Who has a defense?Or do you think this completely destroys the whole utilitarian calculus?Yes?Well, I think that once again, they've made the same mistake the previous case did, that they assigned a dollar value to human life, and once again, they failed to take account things like suffering and emotional losses by the families.I mean, families lost earnings but they also lost a loved one and that is more valued than $200,000.Right and -- wait, wait, wait, that's good. What's your name?Julie Roteau .So if $200,000, Julie, is too low a figure because it doesn't include the loss of a loved one and the loss of those years of life, what would be - what do you think would be a more accurate number?I don't believe I could give a number.I think that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to issues of human life.I think it can't be used monetarily.So they didn't just put too low a number, Julie says.They were wrong to try to put any number at all.All right, let's hear someone who - You have to adjust for inflation.You have to adjust for inflation.All right, fair enough.So what would the number be now?This was 35 years ago.Two million dollars.Two million dollars?You would put two million?And what's your name?Voytek Voytek says we have to allow for inflation.We should be more generous.Then would you be satisfied that this is the right way of thinking about the question?I guess, unfortunately, it is for - there needs to be a number put somewhere, like, I'm not sure what that number would be, but I do agree that there could possibly be a number put on the human life.All right, so Voytek says, and here, he disagrees with Julie.Julie says we can't put a number on human life for the purpose of acost-benefit analysis.Voytek says we have to because we have to make decisions somehow.What do other people think about this?Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit analysis here as accurate as desirable?Yes? Go ahead.I think that if Ford and other car companies didn't use cost-benefit analysis, they'd eventually go out of business because they wouldn't be able to be profitable and millions of people wouldn't be able to use their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table, to feed their children.So I think that if cost-benefit analysis isn't employed, the greater good is sacrificed, in this case.All right, let me add.What's your name?Raul.Raul, there was recently a study done about cell phone use by a driver when people are driving a car, and there was a debate whether that should be banned.Yeah.And the figure was that some 2,000 people die as a result of accidents each year using cell phones.And yet, the cost-benefit analysis which was done by the Center for Risk Analysis at Harvard found that if you look at the benefits of the cell phone use and you put some value on the life, it comes out about the same because of the enormous economic benefit of enabling people to take advantage of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals and talk to friends and so on whilethey're driving.Doesn't that suggest that it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures on questions of human life?Well, I think that if the great majority of people try to derive maximum utility out of a service, like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones provide, that sacrifice is necessary for satisfaction to occur.You're an outright utilitarian.Yes. Okay.All right then, one last question, Raul.- Okay.And I put this to Voytek, what dollar figure should be put on human life to decide whether to ban the use of cell phones?Well, I don't want to arbitrarily calculate a figure, I mean, right now.I think that - You want to take it under advisement?Yeah, I'll take it under advisement.But what, roughly speaking, would it be?You got 2,300 deaths. - Okay.You got to assign a dollar value to know whether you want to prevent those deaths by banning the use of cell phones in cars. - Okay.So what would your hunch be?How much? A million?Two million?Two million was Voytek's figure. - Yeah.Is that about right?- Maybe a million.A million?- Yeah.You know, that's good.Thank you. -Okay.So, these are some of the controversies that arise these days from cost-benefit analysis, especially those that involve placing a dollar value on everything to be added up.Well, now I want to turn to your objections, to your objections not necessarily to cost-benefit analysis specifically, because that's just one version of the utilitarian logic in practice today, but to the theory as a whole, to the idea that the right thing to do, the just basis for policy and law is to maximize utility.How many disagree with the utilitarian approach to law and to the common good?How many agree with it?So more agree than disagree.So let's hear from the critics.Yes?My main issue with it is that I feel like you can't say that just because someone's in the minority, what they want and need is less valuable than someone who is in the majority.So I guess I have an issue with the idea that the greatest good for the greatest number is okay because there are still - what about people who are in the lesser number?Like, it's not fair to them.They didn't have any say in where they wanted to be.All right.That's an interesting objection.You're worried about the effect on the minority.Yes.What's your name, by the way?Anna.Who has an answer to Anna's worry about the effect on the minority?What do you say to Anna?Um, she said that the minority is valued less.I don't think that's the case because individually, the minority's value is just the same as the individual of the majority.It's just that the numbers outweigh the minority.And I mean, at a certain point, you have to make a decision and I'm sorry for the minority but sometimes, it's for the general, for the greater good.For the greater good.Anna, what do you say?What's your name?Yang-Da.What do you say to Yang-Da?Yang-Da says you just have to add up people's preferences and those in the minority do have their preferences weighed.Can you give an example of the kind of thing you're worried about when you say you're worried about utilitarianism violating the concern or respect due the minority?And give an example.Okay. So, well, with any of the cases that we've talked about, like for the shipwreck one, I think the boy who was eaten still had as much of a right to live as the other people and just because he was the minority in that case, the one who maybe had less of a chance to keep living, that doesn't mean that the others automatically have a right to eat him just because it would give a greater amount of people a chance to live.So there may be certain rights that the minority members have, that the individual has that shouldn't be traded off for the sake of utility?Yes.Yes, Anna? You know, this would be a test for you.Back in Ancient Rome, they threw Christians to the lions in the Colosseum for sport.If you think how the utilitarian calculus would go, yes, the Christian thrown to the lions suffers enormous excruciating pain.But look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans!Yang-Da.Well, in that time, I don't -- if -- in modern day of time, to value the -- to give a number to the happiness given to the people watching, I don't think any, like, policymaker would say the pain of one person, of the suffering of one person is much, much -- is, I mean, in comparison to the happiness gained, it's - No, but you have to admit that if there were enough Romans delirious enough with happiness, it would outweigh even the most excruciating pain of a handful of Christians thrown to the lion.So we really have here two different objections to utilitarianism.One has to do with whether utilitarianism adequately respects individual rights or minority rights, and the other has to do with the whole idea of aggregating utility or preferences or values.Is it possible to aggregate all values to translate them into dollar terms?There was, in the 1930s, a psychologist who tried to address this second question.He tried to prove what utilitarianism assumes, that it is possible to translate all goods, all values, all human concerns into a single uniform measure, and he did this by conducting a survey of young recipients of relief, this was in the 1930s, and he asked them, he gave them a list of unpleasant experiences and he asked them, "How much would you have to be paid to undergo the following experiences?" and he kept track.For example, how much would you have to be paid to have one upper front tooth pulled out?Or how much would you have to be paid to have one little toe cut off?Or to eat a live earthworm six inches long?Or to live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas?Or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands?Now, what do you suppose was the most expensive item on that list? - Kansas!Kansas?You're right, it was Kansas.For Kansas, people said they'd have to pay them - they have to be paid $300,000.What do you think was the next most expensive?Not the cat.Not the tooth.Not the toe.The worm!People said you'd have to pay them $100,000 to eat the worm.What do you think was the least expensive item?Not the cat.The tooth.During the Depression, people were willing to have their tooth pulled for only $4,500.What?Now, here's what Thorndike concluded from his study.Any want or a satisfaction which exists exists in some amount and is therefore measurable.The life of a dog or a cat or a chicken consists of appetites, cravings, desires, and their gratifications.So does the life of human beings, though the appetites and desires are more complicated.But what about Thorndike's study?Does it support Bentham's idea that all goods, all values can be captured according to a single uniform measure of value?Or does the preposterous character of those different items on the list suggest the opposite conclusion that maybe, whether we're talking about life or Kansasor the worm, maybe the things we value and cherish can't be captured according to a single uniform measure of value?And if they can't, what are the consequences for the utilitarian theory of morality?That's a question we'll continue with next time.All right, now, let's take the other part of the poll, which is the highest experience or pleasure.How many say Shakespeare?How many say Fear Factor?No, you can't be serious.Really?Last time, we began to consider some objections to Jeremy Bentham's version of utilitarianism.People raised two objections in the discussion we had.The first was the objection, the claim that utilitarianism, by concerning itself with the greatest good for the greatest number, fails adequately to respect individual rights.Today, we have debates about torture and terrorism.Suppose a suspected terrorist was apprehended on September 10th and you had reason to believe that the suspect had crucial information about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over 3,000 people and you couldn't extract the information.Would it be just to torture the suspect to get the information or do you say no, there is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights?In a way, we're back to the questions we started with about Charlie Carson organ transplant.So that's the first issue.And you remember, we considered some examples of cost-benefit analysis, but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit analysis when it came to placing a dollar value on human life.And so that led us to the second objection.It questioned whether it's possible to translate all values into a single uniform measure of value.It asks, in other words, whether all values are commensurable.Let me give you one other example of an experience.This actually is a true story.It comes from personal experience that raises a question at least about whether all values can be translated without loss into utilitarian terms.Some years ago, when I was a graduate student, I was at Oxford in England and they had men's and women's colleges.They weren't yet mixed and the women's colleges had rules against overnight male guests.By the 1970s, these rules were rarely enforced and easily violated, or so I was told.By the late 1970s, when I was there, pressure grew to relax these rules and it became the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College, which was one of these all-women's colleges.The older women on the faculty were traditionalists.They were opposed to change unconventional moral grounds.But times have changed and they were embarrassed to give the true grounds for their objection and so they translated their arguments into utilitarian terms."If men stay overnight", they argued, "the costs to the college will increase." "How?" you might wonder."Well, they'll want to take baths and that'll use up hot water," they said.Furthermore, they argued, "We'll have to replace the mattresses more often." The reformers met these arguments by adopting the following compromise.Each woman could have a maximum of three overnight male guests each week.They didn't say whether it had to be the same one or three different provided, and this was the compromise, provided the guest paid 50 pence to defray the cost to the college.The next day, the national headline in the national newspaper read, "St. Anne's Girls, 50 Pence A Night." Another illustration of the difficulty of translating all values, in this case, a certain idea of virtue, into utilitarian terms.So, that's all to illustrate the second objection to utilitarianism, at least the part of that objection, that questions whether utilitarianism is right to assume that we can assume the uniformity of value, the commensurability of all values and translate all moral considerations into dollars or money.But there is a second aspect to this worry about aggregating values and preferences.Why should we weigh all preferences that people have without assessing whether they're good preferences or bad preferences?Shouldn't we distinguish between higher pleasures and lower pleasures?Now, part of the appeal of not making any qualitative distinctions about the worth of people's preferences, part of the appeal is that it is nonjudgmental and egalitarian.The Benthamite utilitarian says everybody's preferences count and they count regardless of what people want, regardless of what makes different people happy.For Bentham, all that matters, you'll remember, are the intensity and the duration of a pleasure or pain.The so-called "higher pleasures or nobler virtues" are simply those, according to Bentham, that produce stronger, longer pleasure.Yet a famous phrase to express this idea, the quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry.What was pushpin?It was some kind of a child's game, like tiddlywinks."Pushpin is as good as poetry", Bentham says.And lying behind this idea, I think, is the claim, the intuition, that it's a presumption to judge whose pleasures are intrinsically higher or worthier or better.And there is something attractive in this refusal to judge.After all, some people like Mozart, others Madonna.Some people like ballet, others bowling.Who's to say, a Benthamite might argue, who is to say which of these pleasures, whose pleasures are higher, worthier, nobler than others?But is that right, this refusal to make qualitative distinctions?Can we altogether dispense with the idea that certain things we take pleasure in are better or worthier than others?Think back to the case of the Romans in the Colosseum.One thing that troubled people about that practice is that it seemed to violate the rights of the Christian.Another way of objection to what's going on there is that the pleasure that the Romans take in this bloody spectacle, should that pleasure, which is abased, kind of corrupt, degrading pleasure, should that even be valorized or weighed in deciding what the general welfare is?So here are the objections to Bentham's utilitarianism and now, we turn to someone who tried to respond to those objections, a latter-day utilitarian, John Stuart Mill.So what we need to examine now is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing reply to these objections to utilitarianism.John Stuart Mill was born in 1806.His father, James Mill, was a disciple of Bentham's, and James Mill set about giving his son, John Stuart Mill, a model education.He was a child prot®¶g®¶, John Stuart Mill.He knew Greek at the age of three, Latin at eight, and age 10, he wrote "A History of Roman Law." At age 20, he had a nervous breakdown.This left him in a depression for five years, but at age 25, what helped lift him out of this depression is that he met Harriet Taylor.She and Mill got married, they lived happily ever after, and it was under her influence that John Stuart Mill tried to humanize utilitarianism.What Mill tried to do was to see whether the utilitarian calculus could be enlarged and modified to accommodate humanitarian concerns, like theconcern to respect individual rights, and also to address the distinction between higher and lower pleasures.In 1859, Mill wrote a famous book on liberty, the main point of which was the importance of defending individual rights and minority rights, and in 1861, toward the end of his life, he wrote the book we read as part of this course, "Utilitarianism." He makes it clear that utility is the only standard of morality, in his view, so he's not challenging Bentham's premise.He's affirming it.He says very explicitly, "The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do desire it." So he stays with the idea that our de facto actual empirical desires are the only basis for moral judgment.But then, page eight, also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish higher from lower pleasures.Now, for those of you who have read Mill already, how, according to him, is it possible to draw that distinction?How can a utilitarian distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures from lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones? Yes?If you've tried both of them and you prefer the higher one, naturally, always.That's great.That's right.What's your name?- John.So as John points out, Mill says here's the test.Since we can't step outside actual desires, actual preferences that would violate utilitarian premises, the only test of whether a pleasure is higher or lower is whether someone who has experienced both would prefer it.And here, in chapter two, we see the passage where Mill makes the point that John just described."Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it -- in other words, no outside, no independent standard -- then, that is the more desirable pleasure." What do people think about that argument?Does it succeed?How many think that it does succeed of arguing within utilitarian terms for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures?How many think it doesn't succeed?I want to hear your reasons.But before we give the reasons let's do an experiment of Mill's claim.In order to do this experiment, we're going to look at three short excerpts of popular entertainment.The first one is a Hamlet soliloquy.It'll be followed by two other experiences.See what you think.What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in faculties, in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how like an angel, in apprehension how like a god!The beauty of the world, the paragon of animals - and yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?Man delights not me.Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality.Ahh! They're biting me!Each show, six contestants from around the country battle each other in three extreme stunts.Ow!These stunts are designed to challenge the contestants both physically and mentally.Six contestants, three stunts, one winner.Yes! Whooo!Fear Factor.Hi-diddily-ho, pedal-to-the-metal-o-philes.Flanders, since when do you like anything cool?Well, I don't care for the speed but I can't get enough of that safety gear.Helmets, roll bars, caution flags...I like the fresh air...and looking at the poor people in the infield.Dang, Cletus, why'd you have to park by my parents?Now, Honey, they's my parents too.I don't even have to ask which one you liked most.The Simpsons, how many liked The Simpsons most?How many Shakespeare?What about Fear Factor?How many preferred Fear Factor?。
哈佛公开课-公正课中英字幕_第一课
制作人：心舟 QQ:1129441083第一讲《杀人的道德侧面》这是一门讨论公正的课程This is a course about justice我们以一则故事作为引子and we begin with a story.假设你是一名电车司机\Suppose you're the driver of a trolley car你的电车以60英里小时的速度\and your trolley car is hurtling down the track 在轨道上飞驰\at 60 miles an hour.突然发现在轨道的尽头\And at the end of the track you notice有五名工人正在施工\five workers working on the track.你无法让电车停下来\You try to stop but you can't因为刹车坏了\your brakes don't work.你此时极度绝望\You feel desperate因为你深知\because you know如果电车撞向那五名工人\that if you crash into these five workers他们全都会死\they will all die.假设你对此确信无疑\Let's assume you know that for sure.你极为无助\And so you feel helpless直到你发现在轨道的右侧until you notice that there is off to the right有一条侧轨\ a side track而在侧轨的尽头\and at the end of that track只有一名工人在那施工\there is one worker working on the track.而你的方向盘还没坏\Your steering wheel works只要你想\so you can turn the trolley car就可以把电车转到侧轨上去\if you want to onto the side track牺牲一人挽救五人性命\killing the one but sparing the five.下面是我们的第一个问题:\Here's our first question:何为正确的选择\what's the right thing to do?换了你会怎么做\What would you do?我们来做个调查\Let's take a poll.有多少人会把电车开到侧轨上去\How many would turn the trolley car onto the side track?请举手\Raise your hands.有多少人会让电车继续往前开\How many wouldn't? How many would go straight ahead? 选择往前开的请不要把手放下\Keep your hands up those of you who would go straight ahead.只有少数人选择往前开\A handful of people would绝大多数都选择转弯\the vast majority would turn.我们先来听听大家的说法\Let's hear first探究一下为何\now we need to begin to investigate the reasons你们会认为这是正确的选择\why you think it's the right thing to do.先从大多数选择了转向侧轨的同学开始\Let's begin with those in the majority whowould turn to go onto the side track.为何会这样选择\Why would you do it?理由是什么\What would be your reason?有没有自告奋勇的\Who's willing to volunteer a reason?你来站起来告诉大家\Go ahead. Stand up.我认为当可以只牺牲一个人时\Because it can't be right to kill five people牺牲五人不是正确之举\when you can only kill one person instead.当可以只牺牲一人时牺牲五人不是正确之举\It wouldn't be right to kill five if you could kill one person instead.这理由不错\That's a good reason.不错\That's a good reason.还有其他人吗\Who else?人人都赞同这个理由\Does everybody agree with that reason?你来\Go ahead.我认为这和9·11的时候是一种情况\Well I was thinking it's the same reason on9 11 那些让飞机在宾州坠毁的人被视为英雄\with regard to the people who flew the plane into the Pennsylvania field as heroes因为他们选择了牺牲自己\because they chose to kill the people on the plane而不是让飞机撞向大楼牺牲更多人\and not kill more people in big buildings.这么看来这条原则和9·11的是一样的\So the principle there was the same on 9 11. 虽然是悲剧\It's a tragic circumstance但牺牲一人保全五人依然是更正确的选择\but better to kill one so that five can live 这就是大多数人选择把电车开上侧轨的理由吗\is that the reason most of you had those of you who would turn? Yes?现在我们来听听少数派的意见\Let's hear now from those in the minority那些选择不转弯的\those who wouldn't turn.你来\Yes.我认为这与为种族灭绝以及极权主义正名\Well I think that's the same type of mentality that justifies genocide是同一种思维模式\and totalitarianism.为了一个种族能生存下来\In order to save one type of race以灭绝另一个种族为代价\you wipe out the other.那换了是你在这种情况下会怎么做\So what would you do in this case?为了避免骇人听闻的种族灭绝\You would to avoid the horrors of genocide你打算直接开上去把这五个人撞死吗\you would crash into the five and kill them? 大概会吧\Presumably yes.-真的会吗 -对\- You would? - Yeah.好吧还有谁\Okay. Who else?很有勇气的回答谢谢\That's a brave answer. Thank you.我们来考虑一下另一种情况的例子\Let's consider another trolley car case看看你们\and see whether大多数的人\those of you in the majority会不会继续坚持刚才的原则\want to adhere to the principle即"牺牲一人保全五人是更好的选择"\"better that one should die so that five should live."这次你不再是电车司机了\This time you're not the driver of the trolley car只是一名旁观者\you're an onlooker.你站在一座桥上俯瞰着电车轨道\You're standing on a bridge overlooking a trolley car track.电车沿着轨道从远处驶来\And down the track comes a trolley car轨道的尽头有五名工人\at the end of the track are five workers电车刹车坏了\the brakes don't work这五名工人即将被撞死\the trolley car is about to careen into the five and kill them.但你不是电车司机你真的爱莫能助\And now you're not the driver you really feel helpless直到你发现在你旁边\until you notice standing next to you靠着桥站着的\leaning over the bridge是个超级大胖子\is a very fat man.你可以选择推他一把\And you could give him a shove.他就会摔下桥\He would fall over the bridge onto the track正好摔在电车轨道上挡住电车\right in the way of the trolley car.他必死无疑但可以救那五人的性命\He would die but he would spare the five. 现在\Now有多少人会选择把那胖子推下桥\how many would push the fat man over the bridge?请举手\Raise your hand.有多少人不会\How many wouldn't?大多数人不会这么做\Most people wouldn't.一个显而易见的问题出现了\Here's the obvious question.我们"牺牲一人保全五人"的这条原则\What became of the principle到底出了什么问题呢\"better to save five lives even if it means sacrificing one?" 第一种情况时\What became of the principle大多数人赞同的这条原则怎么了\that almost everyone endorsed in the first case? 两种情况中都属多数派的人你们是怎么想的\I need to hear from someone who was in the majority in both cases.应该如何来解释这两种情况的区别呢\How do you explain the difference between the two?你来\Yes.我认为第二种情况\The second one I guess牵涉到主动选择推人\involves an active choice of pushing a person down而被推的这个人\which I guess that person himself本来跟这事件一点关系都没有\would otherwise not have been involved in thesituation at all.所以从这个人自身利益的角度来说\And so to choose on his behalf I guess他是被迫卷入这场无妄之灾的\to involve him in something that he otherwise would have escaped is而第一种情况不同\I guess more than what you have in the first case第一种情况里的三方电车司机及那两组工人\where the three parties the driver and the two sets of workers之前就牵涉进这事件本身了\are already I guess in the situation.但在侧轨上施工的那名工人\But the guy working the one on the track off to the side 他并不比那个胖子更愿意牺牲自我不是吗\he didn't choose to sacrifice his life any more than the fat man did he?对但谁让他就在那侧轨上而且...\That's true but he was on the tracks and... 那胖子还在桥上呢\This guy was on the bridge.如果你愿意可以继续说下去\Go ahead you can come back if you want.好吧这是一个难以抉择的问题\All right. It's a hard question.你回答得很不错\You did well. You did very well.真的难以抉择\It's a hard question.还有谁能来为两种情况中\Who else can find a way of reconciling大多数人的不同选择作出合理解释\the reaction of the majority in these two cases? 你来\Yes.我认为在第一种情况中是撞死一个还是五个\Well I guess in the first case where you have the one worker and the five你只能在这两者中选择\it's a choice between those two不管你做出的是哪一个选择\and you have to make a certain choice总得有人被电车撞死\and people are going to die because of the trolley car而他们的死并非你的直接行为导致\not necessarily because of your direct actions.电车已失控而你必须在那一瞬间做出选择\The trolley car is a runaway thing and you're making a split second choice.而反之把胖子推下去则是你自己的直接谋杀行为\Whereas pushing the fat man over is an actual act of murder on your part.你的行为是可控的\You have control over that而电车则是不可控的\whereas you may not have control over the trolley car.所以我认为这两种情况略有不同\So I think it's a slightly different situation. 很好有没谁来回应的有人吗\All right who has a reply? That's good. Who has a way?有人要补充吗刚才那个解释合理吗\Who wants to reply? Is that a way out of this? 我认为这不是一个很好的理由\I don't think that's a very good reason因为不论哪种情况你都得选择让谁死\because you choose to- either way you have to choose who dies或者你是选择转弯撞死一名工人\because you either choose to turn and kill theperson这种转弯就是种有意识的行为\which is an act of conscious thought to turn或者你是选择把胖子推下去\or you choose to push the fat man over这同样是一种主动的有意识的行为\which is also an active conscious action.所以不管怎样你都是在作出选择\So either way you're making a choice.你有话要说吗\Do you want to reply?我不太确定情况就是这样的\I'm not really sure that that's the case.只是觉得似乎有点不同\It just still seems kind of different.真的动手把人推到轨道上让他死的这种行为\the act of actually pushing someone over onto the tracks and killing him就等于是你亲手杀了他\you are actually killing him yourself.你用你自己的手推他\You're pushing him with your own hands.是你在推他这不同于\You're pushing him and that's different操控方向盘进而导致了他人死亡...\than steering something that is going to cause death into another...现在听起来好像不太对头了\You know it doesn't really sound right saying it now. 不你回答得不错叫什么名字\No no. It's good. It's good. What's your name? 安德鲁\Andrew.我来问你一个问题安德鲁\Andrew. Let me ask you this question Andrew.您问\Yes.假设我站在桥上胖子就在我旁边\Suppose standing on the bridge next to the fat man我不用去推他\I didn't have to push him假设他踩在一扇活板门上方\suppose he was standing over a trap door而活板门可以通过转动方向盘来开启\that I could open by turning a steering wheel like that.你会转动方向盘吗\Would you turn?出于某种原因我觉得这样似乎错上加错\For some reason that still just seems more wrong.是吗\Right?如果是你不小心靠着方向盘导致活门开启\I mean maybe if you accidentally like leaned into the steering wheel或是发生之类的情况\or something like that.但是...或者是列车飞驰而来时\But... Or say that the car is hurtling正好可以触发活门开关\towards a switch that will drop the trap.-那我就赞同 -没关系好了\- Then I could agree with that. - That's all right. Fair enough.反正就是不对\It still seems wrong in a way而在第一种情况这样做就是对的是吧\that it doesn't seem wrong in the first case to turn you say.换个说法就是在第一种情况中\And in another way I mean in the first situation你是直接涉及其中的\you're involved directly with the situation.而第二种情况中你只是旁观者\In the second one you're an onlooker as well.-好了 -所以你有权选择是否把胖子推下去\- All right. - So you have the choice of becoming involved or not-从而牵涉其中 -好了\- by pushing the fat man. - All right.先不管这个情况\Let's forget for the moment about this case.你们很不错\That's good.我们来想象一个不同的情况\Let's imagine a different case.这次你是一名急诊室的医生\This time you're a doctor in an emergency room有天送来了六个病人\and six patients come to you.他们遭受了一次严重的电车事故\They've been in a terrible trolley car wreck.其中五人伤势不算严重\Five of them sustain moderate injuries另外一人受重伤你可以花上一整天时间\one is severely injured you could spend all day来医治这一名受重伤的病人\caring for the one severely injured victim但那另外五个病人就会死\but in that time the five would die.你也可以选择医治这五人\Or you could look after the five restore them to health 但那样的话那名受重伤的病人就会死\but during that time the one severely injured person would die.有多少人会选择救那五人\How many would save the five?作为医生又有多少人选择救那一人\Now as the doctor how many would save the one? 只有极少数人\Very few people just a handful of people.我猜理由还是一样\Same reason I assume.牺牲一个保全五个\One life versus five?现在来考虑一下另外一种情况\Now consider another doctor case.这次你是一名器官移植医生你有五名病人\This time you're a transplant surgeon and you have five patients每名病人都急需器官移植才能存活\each in desperate need of an organ transplant in order to survive.分别需要心脏移植肺移植肾移植\One needs a heart one a lung one a kidney肝移植以及胰腺移植\one a liver and the fifth a pancreas.没有器官捐赠者\And you have no organ donors.你只能眼睁睁看他们死去\You are about to see them die.然后你突然想起\And then it occurs to you在隔壁病房\that in the next room有个来做体检的健康人\there's a healthy guy who came in for a check-up.而且他...\And he's...你们喜欢这剧情吧\you like that...而且他正在打盹\... and he's taking a nap你可以悄悄地进去取出那五个器官\you could go in very quietly yank out the five organs这人会死但你能救那另外五人\that person would die but you could save the five. 有多少人会这么做\How many would do it?有吗\Anyone?选择这么做的请举手\How many? Put your hands up if you would do it.楼座上的呢\Anyone in the balcony?我会\I would.你会吗小心别太靠着那栏杆\You would? Be careful don't lean over too much.有多少人不会\How many wouldn't?很好你来\All right. What do you say?楼座上那位\Speak up in the balcony就是支持取出那些器官的为什么这么做\you who would yank out the organs. Why? 其实我想知道可否稍微变通一下\I'd actually like to explore a slightly alternate possibility就是选择五人中最先死的那人\of just taking the one of the five who needs an organ who dies first利用他的器官来救其他四人\and using their four healthy organs to save the other four.这想法很赞\That's a pretty good idea.想法不错\That's a great idea只不过\except for the fact你避开了我们今天要谈论的哲学问题\that you just wrecked the philosophical point. 让我们暂时先不忙讨论这些故事以及争论\Let's step back from these stories and these arguments来关注一下这些争论是怎样展开的\to notice a couple of things about the way the arguments have begun to unfold.某些道德原则已经随着我们讨论的展开\Certain moral principles have already begun to emerge逐渐开始浮现出来了\from the discussions we've had.我们来细想下这些道德原则都是怎样的\And let's consider what those moral principles look like.在讨论中出现的第一条道德原则\The first moral principle that emerged in the discussion正确的选择道德的选择\said the right thing to do the moral thing to do取决于你的行为所导致的后果\depends on the consequences that will result from your action.最终结论: 牺牲一人保全五人是更好的选择\At the end of the day better that five should live even if one must die.这是后果主义道德推理的一则例子\That's an example of consequentiality moral reasoning.后果主义道德推理\Consequentiality moral reasoning认为是否道德取决于行为的后果\locates morality in the consequences of an act取决于你的行为对外界所造成的影响\in the state of the world that will result from the thing you do.但随着谈论的深入我们发现在其他情况中\But then we went a little further we considered those other cases人们不再对后果主义道德推理那么确定了\and people weren't so sure about consequentialist moral reasoning.当人们开始犹豫是否要推胖子下桥\When people hesitated to push the fat man over the bridge或者是否切取无辜病人的器官时\or to yank out the organs of the innocent patient 他们更倾向于去评判行为本身的动机\people gestured toward reasons having to do with the intrinsic quality of the act itself而不是该行为的后果\consequences be what they may.人们动摇了\People were reluctant.他们认为杀掉一个无辜的人\People thought it was just wrong categorically wrong 是绝对错误的\to kill a person an innocent person哪怕是为了拯救五条生命\even for the sake of saving five lives.至少在每个故事的第二种情况中是这样认为的\At least people thought that in the second version of each story we considered.这表明有第二种绝对主义方式的道德推理\So this points to a second categorical way of thinking about moral reasoning.绝对主义道德推理认为\Categorical moral reasoning是否道德取决于特定的绝对道德准则\locates morality in certain absolute moral requirements取决于绝对明确的义务与权利\certain categorical duties and rights而不管后果如何\regardless of the consequences.我们将用以后的几天到几周时间来探讨\We're going to explore in the days and weeks to come后果主义与绝对主义道德原则的差别\the contrast between consequentiality and categorical moral principles.后果主义道德推理中最具影响的就是功利主义\The most influential example of consequential moral reasoning is utilitarianism由18世纪英国政治哲学家杰里米·边沁提出\a doctrine invented by Jeremy Bentham18th century English political philosopher而绝对主义道德推理中最为著名的\The most important philosopher of categorical moral reasoning则是18世纪德国哲学家康德\is the18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant. 我们将着眼于这两种迥异的道德推理模式\So we will look at those two different modes of moral reasoning评价它们还会考虑其他模式\assess them and also consider others.如果你有留意教学大纲就能发现\If you look at the syllabus you'll notice教学大纲里列出了不少人的著作\that we read a number of great and famous books包括亚里士多德约翰·洛克伊曼努尔·康德\books by Aristotle John Locke Immanuel Kant约翰·斯图尔特·穆勒及其他哲学家的著作\John Stewart Mill and others.在教学大纲中还能看到\You'll notice too from the syllabus我们不仅要读这些著作\that we don't only read these books;还会探讨当代政治及法律争议\we also take up contemporary political and legal controversies所引发的诸多哲学问题\that raise philosophical questions.我们将讨论平等与不平等\We will debate equality and inequality平权行动自由言论与攻击性言论同性婚姻\affirmative action free speech versus hate speech same-sex marriage兵役制等一系列现实问题\military conscription a range of practical questions. 为什么呢\Why?不仅是为了将这些深奥抽象的著作形象化\Not just to enliven these abstract and distant books还为了让我们通过哲学辨明\but to make clear to bring out what's at stake日常生活包括政治生活中什么才是最关键的\in our everyday lives including our political lives for philosophy.所以我们要读这些著作讨论这些议题\And so we will read these books and we will debate these issues并了解两者是怎样互相补充互相阐释的\and we'll see how each informs and illuminates the other.也许听起来蛮动人不过我要事先提个醒\This may sound appealing enough but here I have to issue a warning.那就是通过用这样的方式阅读这些著作\And the warning is thisto read these books in this way来训练自我认知\as an exercise in self knowledge必然会带来一些风险\to read them in this way carries certain risks包括个人风险和政治风险\risks that are both personal and political每位学政治哲学的学生都知道的风险\risks that every student of political philosophy has known.这风险源自于以下事实\These risks spring from the fact即哲学就是让我们面对自己熟知的事物\that philosophy teaches us and unsettles us 然后引导并动摇我们原有的认知\by confronting us with what we already know.这真是讽刺\There's an irony.这门课程的难度就在于\The difficulty of this course consists in the fact传授的都是你们已有的知识\that it teaches what you already know.它将我们所熟知的毋庸置疑的事物\It works by taking what we know from familiar unquestioned settings变得陌生\and making it strange.正如我们刚举的例子\That's how those examples worked那些严肃而又不乏趣味的假设性问题\the hypotheticals with which we began with their mix of playfulness and sobriety.这些哲学类著作亦然\It's also how these philosophical books work.哲学让我们对熟知事物感到陌生\Philosophy estranges us from the familiar不是通过提供新的信息\not by supplying new information而是通过引导并激发我们用全新方式看问题\but by inviting and provoking a new way of seeing但这正是风险所在\but and here's the risk一旦所熟知的事物变得陌生\once the familiar turns strange它将再也无法回复到从前\it's never quite the same again.自我认知就像逝去的童真 \Self knowledge is like lost innocence不管你有多不安\however unsettling you find it;你已经无法不去想或是充耳不闻了\it can never be un-thought or un-known.这一过程会充满挑战又引人入胜\What makes this enterprise difficult but also riveting因为道德与政治哲学就好比一个故事\is that moral and political philosophy is a story你不知道故事将会如何发展\and you don't know where the story will lead.你只知道这个故事与你息息相关\But what you do know is that the story is about you. 以上为我提到的个人风险\Those are the personal risks.那么政治风险是什么呢\Now what of the political risks?介绍这门课程时可以这样许诺:\One way of introducing a course like this would be to promise you通过阅读这些著作讨论这些议题\that by reading these books and debating these issues你将成为更优秀更有责任感的公民\you will become a better more responsible citizen;你将重新审视公共政策的假定前提\you will examine the presuppositions of public policy你将拥有更加敏锐的政治判断力\you will hone your political judgment你将更有效地参与公共事务\you will become a more effective participant in public affairs.但这一许诺也可能片面而具误导性\But this would be a partial and misleading promise.因为绝大多数情况下政治哲学\Political philosophy for the most part并不是那样的\hasn't worked that way.你们必须承认政治哲学\You have to allow for the possibility可能使你们成为更糟的公民\that political philosophy may make you a worse citizen 而不是更优秀的\rather than a better one至少在让你成为更优秀公民前先让你更糟\or at least a worse citizen before it makes you a better one因为哲学使人疏离现实甚至可能弱化行动力\and that's because philosophy is a distancing even debilitating activity.追溯到苏格拉底时代就有这样一段对话\And you see this going back to Socrates there's a dialogue在《高尔吉亚篇》中苏格拉底的一位朋友\the Gorgias in which one of Socrates' friends《高尔吉亚篇》柏拉图著古希腊哲学家卡里克利斯试图说服苏格拉底放弃哲学思考\Callicles tries to talk him out of philosophizing.他告诉苏格拉底:\Callicles tells Socrates如果一个人在年轻时代\"Philosophy is a pretty toy有节制地享受哲学的乐趣那自然大有裨益\if one indulges in it with moderation at the right time of life.但倘若过分沉溺其中那他必将走向毁灭\But if one pursues it further than one should it is absolute ruin."听我劝吧卡里克利斯说收起你的辩论\"Take my advice" Callicles says "abandon argument.学个谋生的一技之长\Learn the accomplishments of active life别学那些满嘴谬论的人\take for your models not those people who spend their time on these petty quibbles要学那些生活富足声名显赫及福泽深厚的人\but those who have a good livelihood and reputation and many other blessings."言外之意则是\So Callicles is really saying to Socrates放弃哲学现实一点去读商学院吧\"Quit philosophizing get real go to business school."卡里克利斯说得确有道理\And Callicles did have a point.因为哲学的确将我们与习俗\He had a point because philosophy distances us from conventions既定假设以及原有信条相疏离\from established assumptions and from settled beliefs.以上就是我说的个人以及政治风险\Those are the risks personal and political. 面对这些风险有一种典型的回避方式\And in the face of these risks there is a characteristic evasion.这种方式就是怀疑论大致的意思是\The name of the evasion is skepticism it's the idea...It goes something like this.刚才争论过的案例或者原则\We didn't resolve once and for all没有一劳永逸的解决方法\either the cases or the principles we were arguing when we began如果亚里士多德洛克康德以及穆勒\and if Aristotle and Locke and Kant and Mill 花了这么多年都没能解决这些问题\haven't solved these questions after all of these years那今天我们齐聚桑德斯剧院\who are we to think that we here in Sanders Theatre 仅凭一学期的课程学习就能解决了吗\over the course of a semester can resolve them?也许这本就是智者见智仁者见仁的问题\And so maybe it's just a matter of each person having his or her own principles多说无益也无从论证\and there's nothing more to be said about it no way of reasoning.这就是怀疑论的回避方式\That's the evasion the evasion of skepticism对此我给予如下回应\to which I would offer the following reply.诚然这些问题争论已久\It's true these questions have been debated for a very long time但正因为这些问题反复出现\but the very fact that they have recurred and persisted也许表明虽然在某种意义上它们无法解决\may suggest that though they're impossible in one sense但另一种意义上却又无可避免\they're unavoidable in another.它们之所以无可避免无法回避\And the reason they're unavoidable the reason they're inescapable是因为在日常生活中我们一次次地在回答这些问题\is that we live some answer to these questions every day.因此怀疑论让你们举起双手放弃道德反思\So skepticism just throwing up your hands and giving up on moral reflection这绝非可行之策\is no solution.康德曾很贴切地描述了怀疑论的不足\Immanuel Kant described very well the problem with skepticism他写道怀疑论是人类理性暂时休憩的场所\when he wrote "Skepticism is a resting place for human reason}参见康德的《纯粹理性批判》是理性自省以伺将来做出正确抉择的地方\where it can reflect upon its dogmatic wanderings但绝非理性的永久定居地\but it is no dwelling place for permanent settlement." 康德认为简单地默许于怀疑论\"Simply to acquiesce in skepticism" Kant wrote 永远无法平息内心渴望理性思考之不安\"can never suffice to overcome the restlessness of reason."以上我是想向大家说明这些故事和争论\I've tried to suggest through these stories and these arguments展示的风险与诱惑挑战与机遇\some sense of the risks and temptations of the perils and the possibilities.简而言之这门课程旨在\I would simply conclude by saying that the aim of this course唤醒你们永不停息的理性思考探索路在何方\is to awaken the restlessness of reasonand to see where it might lead.谢谢\Thank you very much.在那样的绝境之下\Like in a situation that desperate为了生存你不得不那样做\you have to do what you have to do to survive.。
哈佛大学公开课《公正：该如何做是好》：全五课：英文字幕
THE MORAL SIDE OF MURDER This is a course about justiceand we begin with a story. Suppose you're the driverof a trolley car,and your trolley caris hurtling down the trackat 60 miles an hour.And at the end of the trackyou notice five workersworking on the track.You try to stopbut you can't,your brakes don't work.You feel desperatebecause you knowthat if you crashinto these five workers,they will all die.Let's assumeyou know that for sure.And so you feel helplessuntil you noticethat there is,off to the right,a side track and at the endof that track,there is one workerworking on the track.Your steering wheel works,so you can turn the trolley car,if you want to,onto the side trackkilling the one but sparing the five. Here's our first question:what's the right thing to do?What would you do?Let's take a poll.How many would turnthe trolley caronto the side track?Raise your hands.How many wouldn't?How many would go straight ahead? Keep your hands up those of youwho would go straight ahead.A handful of people would,the vast majority would turn.Let's hear first,now we need to beginto investigate the reasonswhy you thinkit's the right thing to do.Let's begin with those in the majority who would turn to goonto the side track.Why would you do it?What would be your reason?Who's willing to volunteer a reason? Go ahead. Stand up.Because it can't be rightto kill five peoplewhen you can onlykill one person instead.It wouldn't be rightto kill five if you could killone person instead.That's a good reason.That's a good reason.Who else?Does everybody agreewith that reason? Go ahead.Well I was thinking it's the same reason on 9/11 with regardto the people who flew the planeinto the Pennsylvania fieldas heroes because they choseto kill the people on the planeand not kill more peoplein big buildings.So the principle therewas the same on 9/11.It's a tragic circumstancebut better to kill oneso that five can live,is that the reasonmost of you had,those of youwho would turn? Yes?Let's hear nowfrom those in the minority, those who wouldn't turn. Yes. Well, I think that'sthe same type of mentality that justifies genocideand totalitarianism.In order to saveone type of race,you wipe out the other.So what would you doin this case?You would, to avoidthe horrors of genocide,you would crashinto the five and kill them? Presumably, yes.You would?-Yeah.Okay. Who else?That's a brave answer.Thank you.Let's consideranother trolley car caseand see whether those of you in the majoritywant to adhereto the principle"better that one should dieso that five should live."This time you're not the driver of the trolley car,you're an onlooker.You're standing on a bridge overlooking a trolley car track. And down the track comesa trolley car,at the end of the trackare five workers,the brakes don't work,the trolley caris about to careeninto the five and kill them. And now, you're not the driver,you really feel helplessuntil you noticestanding next to you,leaning over the bridgeis a very fat man.And you couldgive him a shove.He would fall over the bridgeonto the track right in the wayof the trolley car.He would diebut he would spare the five.Now, how many would pushthe fat man over the bridge?Raise your hand.How many wouldn't?Most people wouldn't.Here's the obvious question.What became of the principle "better to save five liveseven if it means sacrificing one?" What became of the principlethat almost everyone endorsedin the first case?I need to hear from someonewho was in the majorityin both cases.How do you explainthe difference between the two? Yes. The second one, I guess,involves an active choiceof pushing a person downwhich I guess that person himself would otherwise not have been involved in the situation at all.And so to choose on his behalf,I guess, to involve himin something that heotherwise would have escaped is,I guess, more than whatyou have in the first casewhere the three parties,the driver and the two sets of workers,are already, I guess,in the situation.But the guy working,the one on the trackoff to the side,he didn't chooseto sacrifice his life any morethan the fat man did, did he?That's true, but he wason the tracks and...This guy was on the bridge.Go ahead, you can come backif you want. All right.It's a hard question. You did well.You did very well.It's a hard question.Who else can find a wayof reconciling the reactionof the majorityin these two cases? Yes.Well, I guess in the first casewhere you have the one workerand the five,it's a choice between those twoand you have to makea certain choice and peopleare going to diebecause of the trolley car,not necessarily becauseof your direct actions.The trolley car is a runaway thingand you're making a split second choice. Whereas pushing the fat man overis an actual actof murder on your part.You have control over thatwhereas you may not have controlover the trolley car.So I think it's a slightlydifferent situation.All right, who has a reply?That's good. Who has a way?Who wants to reply?Is that a way out of this? I don't think that'sa very good reasonbecause you choose to-either way you have to choosewho dies because you eitherchoose to turn and kill the person, which is an actof conscious thought to turn,or you choose to pushthe fat man overwhich is also an active,conscious action.So either way,you're making a choice.Do you want to reply?I'm not really surethat that's the case.It just still seemskind of different.The act of actually pushing someone over onto the tracksand killing him,you are actually killing him yourself. You're pushing himwith your own hands.You're pushing himand that's differentthan steering somethingthat is going to causedeath into another.You know, it doesn't really sound right saying it now.No, no. It's good. It's good.What's your name?Andrew.Andrew.Let me ask you this question, Andrew. Yes.Suppose standing on the bridgenext to the fat man,I didn't have to push him,suppose he was standing overa trap door that I could openby turning a steering wheel like that.Would you turn?For some reason,that still just seems more wrong. Right?I mean, maybe if you accidentally like leaned into the steering wheel or something like that.But... Or say thatthe car is hurtlingtowards a switchthat will drop the trap.Then I could agree with that.That's all right. Fair enough.It still seems wrong in a waythat it doesn't seem wrongin the first case to turn, you say. And in another way, I mean,in the first situationyou're involved directlywith the situation.In the second one,you're an onlooker as well.All right. -So you have the choiceof becoming involved or notby pushing the fat man.All right. Let's forget for the moment about this case.That's good.Let's imagine a different case.This time you're a doctorin an emergency roomand six patientscome to you.They've been in a terribletrolley car wreck.Five of themsustain moderate injuries,one is severely injured,you could spend all daycaring for the oneseverely injured victimbut in that time,the five would die.Or you could look after the five, restore them to healthbut during that time,the one severely injured person would die.How many would save the five? Now as the doctor,how many would save the one? Very few people,just a handful of people.Same reason, I assume.One life versus five?Now consider another doctor case. This time, you're a transplant surgeon and you have five patients,each in desperate needof an organ transplantin order to survive.One needs a heart,one a lung, one a kidney,one a liver,and the fifth a pancreas.And you have no organ donors.You are about to see them die.And then it occurs to youthat in the next roomthere's a healthy guywho came in for a check-up.And he's – you like that –and he's taking a nap,you could go in very quietly,yank out the five organs,that person would die,but you could save the five.How many would do it?Anyone? How many?Put your hands upif you would do it.Anyone in the balcony?I would.You would? Be careful,don't lean over too much.How many wouldn't?All right. What do you say?Speak up in the balcony,you who would yank outthe organs. Why?I'd actually like to explore aslightly alternate possibilityof just taking the oneof the five who needs an organwho dies first and usingtheir four healthy organsto save the other four.That's a pretty good idea.That's a great ideaexcept for the factthat you just wreckedthe philosophical point.Let's step back from these storiesand these argumentsto notice a couple of thingsabout the way the argumentshave begun to unfold.Certain moral principleshave already begun to emergefrom the discussions we've had.And let's considerwhat those moral principles look like. The first moral principlethat emerged in the discussionsaid the right thing to do,the moral thing to dodepends on the consequencesthat will result from your action.At the end of the day,better that five should liveeven if one must die.That's an exampleof consequentialist moral reasoning. Consequentialist moral reasoning locates moralityin the consequences of an act,in the state of the worldthat will result from the thing you do. But then we went a little further,we considered those other casesand people weren't so sureabout consequentialist moral reasoning. When people hesitatedto push the fat manover the bridgeor to yank out the organsof the innocent patient,people gestured toward reasons having to do withthe intrinsic qualityof the act itself,consequences be what they may. People were reluctant.People thought it was just wrong, categorically wrong,to kill a person,an innocent person,even for the sakeof saving five lives.At least people thoughtthat in the second versionof each story we considered.So this pointsto a second categorical wayof thinking about moral reasoning. Categorical moral reasoning locates moralityin certain absolutemoral requirements,certain categorical duties and rights, regardless of the consequences. We're going to explorein the days and weeks to comethe contrast between consequentialist and categorical moral principles.The most influential exampleof consequential moral reasoningis utilitarianism,a doctrine inventedby Jeremy Bentham,the 18th centuryEnglish political philosopher.The most important philosopherof categorical moral reasoningis the 18th centuryGerman philosopher Immanuel Kant.So we will lookat those two different modesof moral reasoning,assess them,and also consider others.If you look at the syllabus,you'll notice that we reada number of greatand famous books,books by Aristotle, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, John Stewart Mill, and others.You'll notice toofrom the syllabusthat we don't onlyread these books;we also take up contemporary, political, and legal controversiesthat raise philosophical questions.We will debate equality and inequality, affirmative action, free speech versus hate speech, same sex marriage, military conscription,a range of practical questions. Why? Not just to enliventhese abstract and distant booksbut to make clear,to bring out what's at stakein our everyday lives,including our political lives,for philosophy.And so we will read these booksand we will debate these issues,and we'll see how each informsand illuminates the other.This may sound appealing enough, but here I have to issue a warning. And the warning is this,to read these booksin this way as an exercisein self knowledge,to read them in this waycarries certain risks, risks that are both personaland political,risks that every studentof political philosophy has known. These risks spring from the factthat philosophy teaches usand unsettles usby confronting us withwhat we already know.There's an irony.The difficulty of this courseconsists in the factthat it teacheswhat you already know.It works by taking what we know from familiar unquestioned settings and making it strange.That's how those examples worked, the hypotheticals with which we began, with their mix of playfulnessand sobriety.It's also how thesephilosophical books work. Philosophy estranges usfrom the familiar,not by supplying new informationbut by inviting and provokinga new way of seeing but,and here's the risk,once the familiar turns strange,it's never quite the same again.Self knowledge is like lost innocence, however unsettling you find it;it can never be un-thoughtor un-known.What makes this enterprise difficult but also rivetingis that moral and political philosophy is a story and you don't knowwhere the story will lead.But what you do knowis that the story is about you.Those are the personal risks.Now what of the political risks?One way of introducing a courselike this would be to promise you that by reading these booksand debating these issues,you will become a better,more responsible citizen;you will examine the presuppositions of public policy,you will hone your political judgment, you will become a moreeffective participant in public affairs. But this would be a partialand misleading promise.Political philosophy,for the most part,hasn't worked that way.You have to allow for the possibility that political philosophymay make you a worse citizenrather than a better oneor at least a worse citizenbefore it makes you a better one,and that's becausephilosophy is a distancing,even debilitating, activity.And you see this,going back to Socrates,there's a dialogue,the Gorgias, in whichone of Socrates' friends, Callicles, tries to talk him out of philosophizing.Callicles tells Socrates "Philosophy is a pretty toyif one indulges in itwith moderationat the right time of life. But if one pursues it further than one should,it is absolute ruin.""Take my advice," Callicles says, "abandon argument.Learn the accomplishmentsof active life, take for your modelsnot those people who spendtheir time on these petty quibblesbut those who have a good livelihood and reputation and manyother blessings."So Callicles is really saying to Socrates "Quit philosophizing, get real,go to business school."And Callicles did have a point.He had a point because philosophy distances us from conventions,from established assumptions,and from settled beliefs.Those are the risks,personal and political.And in the faceof these risks,there is a characteristic evasion.The name of the evasionis skepticism, it's the idea –well, it goes something like this –we didn't resolve once and for all either the cases or the principleswe were arguing when we beganand if Aristotle and Lockeand Kant and Millhaven't solved these questionsafter all of these years,who are we to think that we,here in Sanders Theatre,over the course of a semester,can resolve them?And so, maybe it's just a matterof each person having his or her own principles and there's nothing moreto be said about it,no way of reasoning.That's the evasion,the evasion of skepticism,to which I would offerthe following reply.It's true, these questions have beendebated for a very long timebut the very factthat they have recurred and persistedmay suggest that thoughthey're impossible in one sense,they're unavoidable in another.And the reason they're unavoidable,the reason they're inescapableis that we live some answerto these questions every day.So skepticism, just throwing up your hands and giving up on moral reflectionis no solution.Immanuel Kant described very wellthe problem with skepticismwhen he wrote"Skepticism is a resting placefor human reason,where it can reflect uponits dogmatic wanderings,but it is no dwelling placefor permanent settlement.""Simply to acquiesce in skepticism,"Kant wrote,"can never suffice to overcomethe restlessness of reason."I've tried to suggestthrough these storiesand these argumentssome sense of the risksand temptations,of the perils and the possibilities.I would simply conclude by sayingthat the aim of this courseis to awaken the restlessness of reason and to see where it might lead.Thank you very much.Like, in a situation that desperate,you have to dowhat you have to do to survive.-You have to do what you have to do? You got to dowhat you got to do, pretty much.If you've been going 19 days without any food, you know, someone just hasto take the sacrifice.Someone has to make the sacrifice and people can survive.Alright, that's good.What's your name?Marcus.-Marcus, what do you say to Marcus? Last time,we started out last timewith some stories,with some moral dilemmasabout trolley carsand about doctorsand healthy patientsvulnerable to being victimsof organ transplantation.We noticed two thingsabout the arguments we had,one had to do with the waywe were arguing.We began with our judgmentsin particular cases.We tried to articulate the reasonsor the principles lying behindour judgments.And then confrontedwith a new case,we found ourselvesreexamining those principles, revising eachin the light of the other.And we noticed thebuilt in pressureto try to bring into alignmentour judgmentsabout particular casesand the principleswe would endorseon reflection.We also noticed somethingabout the substanceof the argumentsthat emerged from the discussion.We noticed that sometimeswe were tempted to locatethe morality of an actin the consequences, in the results,in the state of the worldthat it brought about.And we called this consequentialist moral reasoning.But we also noticedthat in some cases,we weren't swayedonly by the result.Sometimes, many of us felt,that not just consequencesbut also the intrinsic qualityor characterof the act matters morally.Some people arguedthat there are certain thingsthat are just categorically wrong even if they bring abouta good result,even if they saved five peopleat the cost of one life.So we contrasted consequentialist moral principles with categorical ones. Today and in the next few days,we will begin to examineone of the most influential versionsof consequentialist moral theory.And that's the philosophyof utilitarianism.Jeremy Bentham,the 18th centuryEnglish political philosophergave first the first clearsystematic expressionto the utilitarian moral theory.And Bentham's idea,his essential idea,is a very simple one.With a lot of morallyintuitive appeal, Bentham's ideais the following,the right thing to do;the just thing to dois to maximize utility.What did he mean by utility?He meant by utilitythe balance of pleasure over pain, happiness over suffering.Here's how he arrivedat the principle of maximizing utility. He started out by observingthat all of us,all human beings are governedby two sovereign masters:pain and pleasure.We human beingslike pleasure and dislike pain.And so we should base morality, whether we're thinking aboutwhat to do in our own livesor whether as legislators or citizens, we're thinking aboutwhat the laws should be.The right thing to do individuallyor collectively is to maximize,act in a way that maximizesthe overall level of happiness. Bentham's utilitarianismis sometimes summed upwith the slogan"The greatest goodfor the greatest number."With this basic principleof utility on hand,let's begin to test itand to examine itby turning to another case,another story, but this time,not a hypothetical story,a real life story,the case of the Queenversus Dudley and Stevens.This was a 19th centuryBritish law casethat's famous and much debatedin law schools.Here's what happened in the case.I'll summarize the storythen I want to hearhow you would rule,imagining that you were the jury.A newspaper account of the time described the background.A sadder story of disasterat sea was never toldthan that of the survivorsof the yacht, Mignonette.The ship flounderedin the South Atlantic,1300 miles from the cape.There were four in the crew, Dudley was the captain,Stevens was the first mate,Brooks was a sailor,all men of excellent characteror so the newspaper account tells us. The fourth crew memberwas the cabin boy,Richard Parker,17 years old.He was an orphan,he had no family,and he was on his firstlong voyage at sea.He went,the news account tells us,rather against the adviceof his friends.He went in the hopefulnessof youthful ambition,thinking the journeywould make a man of him. Sadly, it was not to be.The facts of the casewere not in dispute.A wave hit the shipand the Mignonette went down. The four crew members escaped to a lifeboat.The only food they hadwere two cans ofpreserved turnips,no fresh water.For the first three days,they ate nothing.On the fourth day,they opened oneof the cans of turnipsand ate it.The next daythey caught a turtle. Together with the othercan of turnips,the turtle enabled themto subsist for the next few days. And then for eight days,they had nothing.No food. No water.Imagine yourselfin a situation like that,what would you do?Here's what they did.By now the cabin boy, Parker, is lying at the bottomof the lifeboatin the cornerbecause he had drunk seawater against the advice of the others and he had become illand he appeared to be dying. So on the 19th day,Dudley, the captain, suggested that they should all have a lottery,that they should draw lotsto see who would dieto save the rest.Brooks refused.He didn't like the lottery idea. We don't knowwhether this wasbecause he didn't wantto take the chanceor because he believedin categorical moral principles.But in any case,no lots were drawn.The next daythere was still no ship in sightso Dudley told Brooksto avert his gazeand he motioned to Stevensthat the boy, Parker,had better be killed.Dudley offered a prayer,he told the boy his time had come,and he killed himwith a pen knife,stabbing himin the jugular vein.Brooks emergedfrom his conscientious objectionto sharein the gruesome bounty.For four days,the three of them fedon the body and bloodof the cabin boy.True story.And then they were rescued.Dudley describes their rescuein his diary with staggering euphemism. "On the 24th day,as we were having our breakfast,a ship appeared at last."The three survivorswere picked up by a German ship. They were taken backto Falmouth in Englandwhere they were arrestedand tried.Brooks turned state's witness.Dudley and Stevens went to trial. They didn't dispute the facts.They claimed they had acted out of necessity;that was their defense.They argued in effectbetter that one should dieso that three could survive.The prosecutor wasn't swayedby that argument.He said murder is murder,and so the case went to trial.Now imagine you are the jury.And just to simplify the discussion, put aside the question of law,let's assume that you as the juryare charged with decidingwhether what they didwas morally permissible or not.How many would vote'not guilty',that what they didwas morally permissible?And how manywould vote 'guilty',what they did wasmorally wrong?A pretty sizeable majority.Now let's see what people's reasons are and let me begin with thosewho are in the minority.Let's hear first from the defenseof Dudley and Stevens.Why would you morallyexonerate them?What are your reasons?Yes.I think it is morallyreprehensiblebut I think thatthere is a distinctionbetween what's morally reprehensible and what makes someonelegally accountable.In other words,as the judge said,what's always moralisn't necessarily against the lawand while I don't thinkthat necessity justifies theftor murder or any illegal act,at some point your degreeof necessity does, in fact, exonerate you from any guilt. Okay. Good. Other defenders.Other voices for the defense.Moral justificationsfor what they did. Yes.Thank you.I just feel likein the situation that desperate,you have to dowhat you have to do to survive.You have to dowhat you have to do.Yeah, you've got to dowhat you've got to do.Pretty much.If you've been going19 days without any food, you know, someone just has to take the sacrifice, someone has to make the sacrifice and people can survive.And furthermore from that,let's say they surviveand then they become productive members of societywho go home and startlike a million charity organizations and this and thatand this and that.I mean they benefited everybodyin the end. -Yeah.So, I mean I don't knowwhat they did afterwards,they might have gone and like,I don't know,killed more people, I don't know. Whatever but. -What?Maybe they were assassins.What if they went home and they turned out to be assassins? What if they'd gone homeand turned out to be assassins? Well…You'd want to knowwho they assassinated.That's true too. That's fair.That's fair. I would want to know who they assassinated.All right. That's good.What's your name?Marcus.Marcus. All right.We've heard a defense,a couple of voicesfor the defense.Now we need to hearfrom the prosecution.Most people thinkwhat they did was wrong. Why? Yes. -One of the first thingsthat I was thinking wasthey haven't been eatingfor a really long timemaybe they're mentallylike affected and sothen that could be usedas a defense,a possible argumentthat they weren'tin the proper state of mind,they weren't making decisionsthey might otherwise be making. And if that's an appealing argument that you have to bein an altered mindsetto do something like that,it suggests that peoplewho find that argument convincing do think that they wereacting immorally.But what do you-I want to knowwhat you think.You defend them.。
哈佛大学公开课justice整理版
This is a course about justice and we begin with a story.这是一堂关于公平与正义的公共课，让我们先从一个故事讲起Suppose you’re the driver of a trolley car, and your trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 miles an hour.假设你现在是一辆有轨电车的司机而你的电车正在铁轨上以时速60英里疾驶And at the end of the track you notice five workers working on the track. 在铁轨末端，你发现有五个工人在铁轨上工作You try to stop but you can't, your brakes don’t work.你尽力想停下电车, 但是你做不到，电车的刹车失灵了You feel desperate because you know that if you crash into these five workers, they will all die.你觉得十分绝望,因为你知道如果你就这样撞向这5个工人,他们必死无疑Let’s assume you know that for sure. 假定你很清楚这一点And so you feel helpless until you notice that there is, off to the right, a side track and at the end of that track, there is one worker, working on the track.正当你感到无助的时候, 你突然发现就在右边一条岔道,那根轨道的尽头只有一个工人在那里工作Your steering wheel works, so you can turn the trolley car, if you want to, onto the side track killing the one but sparing the five.你的方向盘没有失灵, 只要你愿意你可以让电车转向到那条分叉铁轨上撞死一个工人但却因此救了另外5个人Here’s our first question: what’s the ri ght thing to do?现在提出第一个问题,我们该怎么做才对?What would you do? Let’s take a poll.你会怎么做? 我们做个调查看看How many would turn the trolley car onto the side track? Raise your hands.有多少人会选择让电车转向到分叉铁轨上,请举手How many wouldn’t? How many would go straight ahead?多少人不会?多少人选择就这样笔直开下去?Keep your hands up those of you, who would go straight ahead. 选笔直开下去的人先别放手A handful of people would, 少数人会the vast majority would turn.大多数人选择转向Let’s hear first, now we need to begin to investigate the reasons why you think让我们先听听看现在我们研究下你为什么觉得it's the right thing to do. 这样做是正确的Let’s begin with those in the majority who would turn to go让我们先从大多数人开始吧,谁选择转向的?onto the side track. Why would you do it? 你为什么这么选?What would be your reason? Who’s willing to volunteer a reason?你的理由是什么?谁愿意给我一个理由的?Go ahead. Stand up. 站起来说吧Because it can't be right to kill five people when you can only kill one person instead. 因为当你可以只撞死一个人时却去撞死5个人肯定是不对的It wouldn’t be right to kill five if you could kill one person instead. That’s a good reason.当可以只撞死一个人时却去撞死5个人肯定不对这是个好理由That’s a good reason. Who else?这是个好理由其他人呢?Does everybody agree with that reason? Go ahead.每个人都同意刚刚那个理由么? 你来Well I was thinking it’s the same reason on 9/11 with regard to the people who flew the plane into the Pennsylvania field as heroes because they chose to kill the people on the plane and not kill more people in big buildings.我觉得这和9.11的一项事件是同样原因,我们把那些将飞机撞向宾夕法尼亚空地的人视为英雄.因为他们选择只牺牲飞机里的人从而拯救了大楼里的更多生命So the principle there was the same on 9/11.所以原因和9.11事件中那些人的选择是相同的It’s a tragic circumstance but better to kill one so that five can live, is that the reason most of you had, those of you who would turn? Yes?虽然一定会发生悲剧但只撞死一个人好过撞死五个你们大多数人是不是都这么想选择转向的各位,是么?Let’s hear now from those in the minority, those who wouldn’t turn. Yes.现在让我们听听那些少数人的想法选择直行的人……Well, I think that’s the same type of mentality that justifies genocide and totalitarianism.我觉得这和对种族灭绝与极权主义的诡辩相似In order to save one type of race, you wipe out the other. So what would you do in this case?为了拯救一个种族,你抹去了其他的种族，那么在这个事例中你会怎么做?You would, to avoid the horrors of genocide, you would crash into the five and kill them?你会,为了避免骇人的种族灭绝主义而选择撞死那5个人么?Presumably, yes. 理论上,是这样You would? 真的?-Yeah. 是Okay. Who else? That’s a brave answer. 好吧,还有谁?这是个大胆的想法Thank you. 谢谢Let’s consider another trolley car case 让我们再考虑另一个有关电车的例子and see whether those of you in the majority want to adhere to the principle “better that one should die so that five should live.”看看是不是那些占多数的人仍然会坚持刚才的原则“牺牲一个人总好过撞死5个人.”This time you’re not the driver of the trolley car, 这次你不是电车的司机了you’re an onlooker. You’re standing on a bridge overlooking a trolley car track.你是个旁观者,你站在桥上俯瞰桥下电车的铁轨And down the track comes a trolley car, at the end of the track are five workers, the brakes don’t work, the trolley car is about to careen into the five and kill them.此时电车开过铁轨尽头有5个工人刹车失灵，电车马上就要冲向那5个人了And now, you’re not the driver, you really feel helpless until you notice standing next to you, leaning over the bridge is a very fat man.而这次,你不是司机你真的感到毫无办法直到你突然发现,你旁边一个非常非常胖的人靠在桥上And you could give him a shove. 你可以推他一下He would fall over the bridge onto the track right in the way of the trolleycar.他会摔下桥而且挡住电车的去路He would die but he would spare the five. 虽然他会被压死,但因此另外五个人将得救.Now, how many would push the fat man over the bridge? 这次,多少人会推一把桥上的胖子Raise your hand. 举起你的手How many wouldn’t? 多少人不会这样做?Most people wouldn’t. Here’s the obvious question. 绝大多数人不会问题显而易见What became of the principle “better to save five lives even if it means sacrificing one?” 刚才的原则发生了什么?牺牲一个人总比牺牲5个人好?What became of the principle that almost everyone endorsed in the first case? I need to hear from someone刚才第一个事例里几乎每个人都赞同的原则怎么了么?我要听听。
哈佛大学公开课《公正》课堂笔记
网易公开课《公正》课堂笔记1. 《杀人的道德侧面》如果必须选择杀死1人或者杀死5人，有多数的学生投票来赞成杀死1人，来保全其余五个人的性命。
如果在最后,可以有五个人活下来。
那么哪怕牺牲一个人的生命也是值得的。
这个例子体现了结果主义的道德推理.事情的正确以及道德与否，取决于你的行为所产生的后果.结果主义的道德准则中最著名的例子是功利主义功利主义不考虑一个人行为的动机与手段，仅考虑一个行为的结果对最大快乐值的影响。
能增加最大快乐值的即是善；反之即为恶。
即使是为了救回5条人命。
杀害一个无辜者.人们在考虑是不是要这么做的时候，会考虑到这个行为的本身，无论结果如何人们觉得这是错的，而且大错特错。
这就引出了第二种道德推理，绝对主义的道德推理。
绝对主义的道德推理认为：道德有其绝对的道德原则，有明确的责任和权利,而无论所造成的结果是怎么样的.2.《同类相残案》人们是否也有某些基本权利？如果不是来自较大群体的福祉，或者效用或幸福？那么这些权利从何而生？为什么同意以一定的程序，公平的程序，就可以用该程序的运作来为最终带来的结果辩护？得到同意的基本思想：得到同意产生的道德影响是什么？为什么一个得到许可的行为会产生道德上是否允许的不同，使未经许可杀死一个生命是错误的，而本人同意了，在道德上就是允许的？3.《给生命一个价格标签》边沁版本的功利主义其主要思想就是：道德的最高原则,无论个人或政治道德,就是将公共福利,或集体的幸福最大化,或在快乐与痛苦的平衡中倾向快乐;简而言之就是,功利最大化.从这个理论的整体出发,从做正确的事的观点出发,政策和法律的公正的基础就是将效用最大化两个反对功利主义的不同意见：一是功利主义是否充分尊重了个体权利或少数群体的权利；另一个则是聚集起来的所有效益或价值，是否能将聚集起来的所有价值转换成金钱?Thorndike从他的研究中得到的结论.任何愿望或满足感都存在一个量来度量它们，因此是可度量的.狗或猫或鸡的生活都是由欲望组成,渴望,欲望,以及他们的满足.人类的生活,也是如此,虽然人类的欲望和欲求更加复杂.4.《如何衡量快乐》功利主义哲学家密尔认为，所有人类的体验都可以量化，但某些快乐是更值得拥有，更有价值的。
哈佛公正课——第1讲《杀人的道德侧面》
哈佛公正课——第1讲《杀人的道德侧面》第1讲《杀人的道德侧面》提要：如果必须选择杀死1人或者杀死5人，你会怎么选？正确的做法是什么？教授Michael Sandel在他的讲座里提出这个假设的情景，有多数的学生投票来赞成杀死1人，来保全其余五个人的性命。
但是Sandel提出了三宗类似的道德难题----每一个都设计巧妙，以至于抉择的难度增加。
当学生站起来为自己的艰难抉择辩护时，Sandel 提出了他的观点。
我们的道德推理背后的假设往往是矛盾的，而什么是正确什么是错的问题，并不总是黑白分明的。
教授：我们以一个故事开始。
假设你是一个电车司机,你的电车在轨道上以每小时60英里的速度飞驰前行,在轨道的尽头,你发现五个工人在轨道上工作。
你尝试刹车，但力不从心，刹车失灵了。
你感到绝望，因为你知道：如果你冲向这五个工人，他们必死无疑。
假设你清楚地知道这一点。
所以你感到很无助，直到你看到，在轨道的右侧上，有一条侧轨，并在该轨道的尽头，只有一个工人在那条轨道上工作。
你的方向盘还能用，所以你可以把车转向，如果你愿意，转到岔道，撞死这名工人，但挽救了那边五个人。
以下是我们的第一个问题：究竟怎么做才是正确的选择？你会怎么办？让我们来调查一下。
多少人会把电车转到旁边的轨道？举手示意。
多少人不会？多少人会一直往前开？那些会一直往前开的人请举着你们的手。
少数人会一直往前开绝大多数人会转向旁边轨道。
让我们先听听，现在我们开始来探讨你们认为“这是正确的事”的原因。
让我们从那些大多数愿意转向旁边轨道的人开始。
为什么你会这么做呢？原因是什么呢？有谁愿意给我一个理由吗？来吧。
请站起来。
学生：因为在你能仅仅杀死一个人而非五个人的时候，杀死五个人是不正确的。
教授：如果你可以只杀死一个人却选择杀死五个人，这是不正确的。
这是一个很好的理由。
这是一个很好的理由。
还有谁要补充？大家是否同意这个解释？你来。
学生：嗯，我想在911事件中人们将那些驾驶着飞机飞往宾夕法尼亚州的飞行员看作英雄也是同样的道理，因为他们选择了牺牲飞机上的人，而不是选择大型建筑物而杀死更多的人。
哈佛幸福课第一课中英双语课件1504
―The one real object of education is to leave a man in the condition of continually asking questions.‖
Bishop Creighton
The Question of Questions问题的问题
Martin Seligman
Ellen Langer
Philip Stone
Meet 1504 1504教室诞生
It is not merely about information不仅 仅是信息 about transformation也关于转 It is also 变
• Covering less; uncovering more
How can we help ourselves and others— individuals, communities, and society— become happier? 怎样帮助我们自己和其 他人——个人，团体，和社会变得更幸福
It is not a survey of positive psychology它不 是积极心理学的调查 It is a selective exploration of the ‗question of questions.‘它是对问题的问题选择性的探 索
The Road to Positive Psychology 积极心理学的发展之路
• Humanistic Psychology (50‘s)人本主义
• The Third Force第三势力
– Reaction to behaviorism (First Force)行为主义 – Reaction to psychoanalysis (Second Force)精 神心理学
哈佛公开课公平与正义涉及的书目
哈佛公开课是哈佛大学开设的一系列可以上线免费观看的课程，涵盖了丰富多彩的学科和领域，其中也包括了“公平与正义”这一主题。
在这篇文章中，我们将深入探讨哈佛公开课中涉及公平与正义的书目，帮助您更好地了解这一重要主题。
1. 《公正》（Justice）- 迈克尔·桑德尔（Michael Sandel）本书作者迈克尔·桑德尔是哈佛大学政治学教授，他的公开课《公正》（Justice）深受学生和听众的喜爱。
在这本书中，桑德尔教授以深入浅出的方式探讨了公平与正义的重要性，并引导读者思考有关道德、政治和社会正义的问题。
2. 《正义是什么》（What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets）- 迈克尔·桑德尔迈克尔·桑德尔的另一部作品《正义是什么》（What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets）也是哈佛公开课中涉及公平与正义的重要书目之一。
在这本书中，桑德尔教授深入探讨了金钱在现代社会中的作用，以及金钱与公平正义之间的关系，引发了人们对道德和伦理问题的思考。
3. 《《公民不服从》（Civil Disobedience）- 亨利·戴维·梭罗（Henry David Thoreau）亨利·戴维·梭罗的《公民不服从》作为哈佛公开课中探讨公平与正义的重要阅读之一，帮助人们理解了公民不服从的概念，强调了对公平与正义的追求。
这本书不仅揭示了个人与政府、权威之间的关系，也引导人们思考社会正义和个人责任的问题。
4. 《自由论》（On Liberty）- 约翰·斯图尔特·密尔（John Stuart Mill）约翰·斯图尔特·密尔的《自由论》也是哈佛公开课中探讨公平与正义的重要书目之一。
在这本书中，密尔探讨了自由、权利以及个体与社会之间的关系，帮助人们更好地理解公平与正义的内涵和重要性。
哈佛大学公开课Justice-What's the right thing to do 07
Justice 07 A Lesson in Lying / A Deal is a DealFunding for this program is provided by Additional funding provided by Last time we began trying to we began by trying to navigate our way through Kant's moral theory.Now, fully to make sense of Kant moral theory in the groundwork requires that we be able to answer three questions.How can duty and autonomy go together?What's the great dignity in answering to duty?It would seem that these two ideas are opposed duty and autonomy.What's Kant's answer to that?Need someone here to speak up on Kant's behalf.Does he have an answer?Yes, go ahead, stand up.Kant believes you the only act autonomously when you are pursuing something only the name of duty and not because of your own circumstances such as ®C like you're only doing something good and moral if you're doing it because of duty and not because something of your own personal gain.Now why is that acting°≠what's your name?My name is Matt.Matt, why is that acting on a freedom?I hear what you're saying about duty?Because you choose to accept those moral laws in yourself and not brought on from outside upon onto you.Okay, good.Because acting out of duty ®C Yeah.- is following a moral law That you impose on yourself.That you impose on yourself.That's what makes duty compatible with freedom.- Yeah.Okay, that's good Matt.That is Kant's answer. That's great.Thank you. So, Kant's answer is it is not in so far as I am subject to the law that I have dignity but rather in so far as with regard to that very same law, I'm the author and I am subordinated to that law on that ground that I took it as much as at I took it upon myself.I willed that law.So that's why for Kant acting according to duty and acting freely in the sense of autonomously are one and the same.But that raises the question, how many moral laws are there?Because if dignity consists and be governed by a law that I give myself, what's to guarantee that my conscience will be the same as your conscience?Who has Kant's answer to that? Yes?Because a moral law trend is not contingent upon seductive conditions.It would transcend all particular differences between people and so would be a universal law and in this respect there'd only be one moral law because it would be supreme.Right. That's exactly right.What's your name?Kelly.Kelly. So Kelly, Kant believes that if we choose freely out of our own consciences, the moral law we're guarantee to come up with one and the same moral law. -Yes.And that's because when I choose it's not me, Michael Sandel choosing.It's not you, Kelly choosing for yourself?What is it exactly?Who is doing the choosing?Who's the subject? Who is the agent?Who is doing the choosing?Reason? - Well reason°≠Pure reason.Pure reason and what you mean by pure reason is what exactly?Well pure reason is like we were saying before not subject to any external conditions that may be imposed on that side.Good that's' great.So, the reason that does the willing, the reason that governs my will when I will the moral law is the same reason that operates when you choose the moral law for yourself and that's why it's possible to act autonomously to choose for myself, for each of us to choose for ourselves as autonomous beings and for all of us to wind up willing the same moral law, the categorical imperative.But then there is one big and very difficult question left even if you accept everything that Matt and Kelly had said so far.How is a categorical imperative possible?How is morality possible?To answer that question, Kant said we need to make a distinction.We need to make a distinction between two standpoints, two standpoints from which we can make sense of our experience.Let me try to explain what he means by these two standpoints.As an object of experience, I belong to the sensible world.There my actions are determined by the laws of nature and by the regularities of cause and effect.But as a subject of experience, I inhabit an intelligible world here being independent of the laws of nature I am capable of autonomy, capable of acting according to a law I give myself.Now Kant says that, "Only from this second standpoint can I regard myself as free for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world is to be free." If I were holy and empirical being as the utilitarian assume, if I were a being holy and only subject to the deliverances of my senses, to pain and pleasure and hunger and thirst and appetite, if that's all there were to humanity, we wouldn't be capable of freedom, Kant reasons because in that case every exercise of will would be conditioned by the desire for some object.In that case all choice would be heteronomous choice governed by the pursued of some external end."When we think of ourselves as free," Kant writes, "we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the autonomy of the will." That's the idea of the two standpoints.So how are categorical imperatives possible?Only because the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world?Now Kant admits we aren't only rational beings.We don't only inhabit the intelligible world, the realm of freedom.If we did -- if we did, then all of our actions would invariably accord with the autonomy of the will.But precisely because we inhabit simultaneously the two standpoints, the two realms, the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity precisely because we inhabit both realms there is always potentially a gap between what we do and what we ought to do between is and ought.Another way of putting this point and this is the point with which Kant concludes the groundwork, morality is not empirical.Whatever you see in the world, whatever you discover through science can't decide moral questions.Morality stands at a certain distance from the world, from the empirical world.And that's why no science could deliver moral truth.Now I want to test Kant's moral theory with the hardest possible case, a case that he raises, the case of the murderer at the door.Kant says that lying is wrong.We all know that.We've discussed why. Lying is at odds with the categorical imperative.A French Philosopher, Benjamin Constant wrote an article responding to the groundwork where he said, "This absolute probation online What if a murderer came to your door looking for your friend who was hiding in your house?And the murderer asked you point blank, "Is your friend in your house?" Constant says, "It would be crazy to say that the moral thing to do in that case is to tell the truth." Constant says the murderer certainly doesn't deserve the truth and Kant wrote to reply.And Kant stuck by his principle that lying even to the murderer at the door is wrong.And the reason it's wrong, he said is once you start taking consequences into account to carve out exceptions to the categorical imperative, you've given up the whole moral framework.You've become a consequentialist or maybe a rule utilitarian.But most of you and most to our Kant's readers think there's something odd and impossible about this answer.I would like to try to defend Kant on this point and then I want to see whether you think that my defense is plausible, and I would want to defend him within the spirit of his own account of morality.Imagine that someone comes to your door.You were asked that question by this murder.You are hiding your friend.Is there a way that you could avoid telling a lie without selling out your friend?Does anyone have an idea of how you might be able to do that?Yes? Stand up.I was just going to say if I were to let my friend in my house to hide in the first place, I'd probably make a plan with them so I'd be like, "Hey I'll tell the murderer you're here, but escape," and that's one of the options mentioned.But I'm not sure that's a Kantian option.You're still lying though.No because he's in the house but he won't be.Oh I see. All right, good enough.One more try.If you just say you don't know where he is because he might not be locked in the closet.He might have left the closet.You have no clue where he could be.So you would say, I don't know which wouldn't actually be a lie because you weren't at that very moment looking in the closet.Exactly.-So it would be strictly speaking true.Yes.And yet possibly deceiving, misleading.-But still true.What's your name?-John.John. All right, John has...now John may be on to something.John you're really offering us the option of a clever evasion that is strictly speaking true. This raises the question whether there is a moral difference between an outright lie and a misleading truth.From Kant's point of view there actually is a world of difference between a lie and a misleading truth.Why is that even though both might have the same consequences?But then remember Kant doesn't base morality on consequences.He bases it on formal adherence to the moral law.Now, sometimes in ordinary life we make exceptions for the general rule against lying with the white lie.What is a white lie?It's a lie to make...you're well to avoid hurting someone's feelings for example.It's a lie that we think of as justified by the consequences.Now Kant could not endorse a white lie but perhaps he could endorse a misleading truth. Supposed someone gives you a tie, as a gift, and you open the box and it's just awful. What do you say? Thank you.You could say thank you.But they're waiting to see what you think of it or they ask you what do you think of it?You could tell a white lie and say it's beautiful.But that wouldn't be permissible from Kant's point of view.Could you say not a white lie but a misleading truth, you open the box and you say, "I've never seen a tie like that before.Thank you." You shouldn't have.That's good.Can you think of a contemporary political leader who engaged...you can?Who are you thinking of?You remember the whole carefully worded denials in the Monica Lewinsky affair of Bill Clinton.Now, those denials actually became the subject of very explicit debate in argument during the impeachment hearings.Take a look at the following excerpts from Bill Clinton.Is there something do you think morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and a misleading carefully couched truth?I want to say one thing to the American people.I want you to listen to me.I'm going to say this again.I did not have sexual relations with that woman Miss Lewinsky.I never told anybody to lie not a single time, never. These allegations are false.Did he lie to the American people when he said I never had sex with that woman?You know, he doesn't believe he did and because of the °≠Well he didn't explain it.He did explain that, explain congressman.What he said was to the American people that he did not have sexual relations and I understand you're not going to like this congressman because you will see it as a hair-splitting evasive answer.But in his own mind his definition was not...Okay, I understand that argument.-Okay.All right, so there you have the exchange.Now at the time, you may have thought this was just a legalistic hair-splitting exchange between a Republican who wanted to impeach Clinton and a lawyer who is trying to defend him.But now in the light of Kant, do you think there is something morally at stake in the distinction between a lie and an evasion, a true but misleading statement?I'd like to hear from defenders of Kant.People who think there is a distinction.Are you ready to defend Kant?Well I think when you try to say that lying and misleading truths are the same thing; you're basing it on consequentialist argument which is that they achieve the same thing.But the fact to the fact to the matter is you told the truth and you intended that people wouldbelieve what you are saying which was the truth which means it is not morally the same as telling a lie and intending that they believe it is the truth even though it is not true.Good. What's your name?-Diana.So Diana says that Kant has a point here and it's a point that might even come to the aid of Bill Clinton and that is °≠well what about that?There's someone over here.For Kant motivation is key, so if you give to someone because primarily you want to feel good about yourself Kant would say that has no moral worth.Well with this, the motivation is the same.It's to sort of mislead someone, it's to lie, it's to sort of throw them off the track and the motivation is the same.So there should be no difference.Okay, good. So here isn't the motive the same Diana?What do you say to this argument that well the motive is the same in both cases there is the attempt or at least the hope that one's pursuer will be misled?Well that ®C you could look it that way but I think that the fact is that your immediate motive is that they should believe you.The ultimate consequence of that is t hat they might be deceived and not find out what was going on.But that your immediate motive is that they should believe you because you're telling the truth.May I help a little?-Sure.You and Kant. Why don't you say...and what's your name, I'm sorry?Wesley.Why don't you say to Wesley it's not exactly the case that the motive in both cases is to mislead?They're hoping, they're hoping that the person will be misled by the statement "I don't know where they are" or "I never had sexual relations." You're hoping that they will be misled but in the case where you're telling the truth, you're motive is to mislead while at the same time telling the truth and honoring the moral law and staying within the bounds of the categorical imperative.I think Kant's answer would be Diana, yes?-Yes.You like that?-I do.Okay. So I think Kant's answer would be unlike a falsehood, unlike a lie, a misleading truth pays a certain homage to duty.And the homage it pays to duty is what justifies that the work of even the work of the evasion.And so there is something, some element of respect for the dignity of the moral law in the careful evasion because Clinton could have told an outright lie but he didn't.And so I think Kant's insight here is in the carefully couched but true evasion.There is a kind of homage to the dignity of the moral law that is not present in the outright lie and that, Wesley, is part of the motive.It's part of the motive.Yes, I hope he will be misled.I hope the murderer will run down the road or go to the mall looking for my friend instead at the closet.I hope that will be the effect.I can't control that.I can't control the consequences.But what I can control is standing by and honoring however I pursue the ends, I hope will unfold to do so in a way that is consistent with respect for the moral law.Wesley, I don't think, is entirely persuaded but at least this brings out, this discussion brings out some of what it's at stake, what's morally at stake in Kant's notion of the categorical imperative.As long as any effort this involved I would say that the contract is valid then.It should take effect.But why? What was...what morally can you point to?For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly called the other in two minutes say I changed my mind.Does the contract have obligation on both sides?Well I am tempted to say no.Fine.Last time we talked about Kant's categorical imperative and we considered the way he applied the idea of the categorical imperative to the case of lying.I want to turn briefly to one other application of Kant's moral theory and that's his political theory.Now Kant says that just laws arise from a certain kind of social contract.But this contract he tells us is of an exceptional nature.What makes the contract exceptional is that it is not an actual contract that happens when people come together and try to figure out what the constitution should be.It's not an actual contract among actual men and women gathered in a constitutional convention.Why not?I think Kant's reason is that actual men and women gathered in real constitutional convention would have different interests, values, aims, and it would also be differences of bargaining power and differences of knowledge among them.And so the laws that would result from their deliberations wouldn't necessarily be just, wouldn't necessarily conform to principles of right but would simply reflect the differences a bargaining power, the special interests the fact that some might know more than others about law or about politics.So Kant says, "A contract that generates principles of right is merely an idea of reason but it has undoubted practical reality because it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of the whole nation." So Kant is a contractarian, but he doesn't trace the origin or the rightness of law to any actual social contract.This contrives to an obvious question.What is the moral force of a hypothetical contract, a contract that never happened?That's the question we take up today but in order to investigate it, we need to turn to a modern philosopher, John Rawls, who worked out in his book, A Theory of Justice, in great detail and account of a hypothetical agreement as the basis for justice.Rawls' theory of justice in broad outline is parallel to Kant's in two important respects.Like Kant, Rawls was a critic of utilitarianism."Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice," Rawls' writes, "that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.The rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus social interests." The second respect in which Rawls' theory follows Kant's is on the idea that principles of justice properly understood can be derived from a hypothetical social contract. Not an actual one.And Rawls works this out in fascinating detail with the device of what he calls the "veil of ignorance".The way to arrive at the rights...the basic rights that we must respect, the basic framework of rights and duties is to imagine that we were gathered together trying to choose the principles to govern our collective lives without knowing certain important particular fact about ourselves.That's the idea of the veil of ignorance.Now what would happen if we gather together just as we are here and try to come up with principles of justice to govern our collective life?There would be a cacophony of proposals of suggestions reflecting people's different interests, some are strong, some are weak, some are rich, some are poor.what assures the equality is the veil of ignorance.Imagine that we are all behind a veil of ignorance which temporarily abstracts from or brackets, hides from us who in particular we are.Our race, our class, our place in society, our strengths, our weaknesses, whether we're healthy or unhealthy, then and only then Rawls says, the principles we would agree to would be principles of justice.That's how the hypothetical contract works.What is the moral force of this kind of hypothetical agreement?Is it stronger or weaker than a real agreement, an actual social contract?In order to answer that question, we have to look hard at the moral force of actual contracts.There are really two questions here.One of them is how do actual contracts bind me or obligate me?Question number one.And question number two, how do actual real life contracts justify the terms that they produce?If you think about it and this is in line with Rawls and Kant, the answer to the second question, how do actual contracts justify the terms that they produce, the answer is they don't.At least not on their own.Actual contracts are not self-sufficient moral instruments of any actual contract or agreement.It can always be asked, is it fair what they agreed to?The fact of the agreement never guarantees the fairness of the agreement and we know this by looking at our own constitutional convention.It produced a constitution that permitted slavery to persist.It was agreed to.It was an actual contract but that doesn't establish that the laws agreed to all of them were just.Well then what is the moral force of actual contracts?To the extent that they bind us, they obligate in two ways.Suppose, maybe here it would help to take an example.We make an agreement, a commercial agreement.I promise to pay you $100 if you will go harvest and bring to me 100 lobsters.We make a deal.You go out and harvest them and bring them to me.I eat the lobsters, served them to my friends, and then I don't pay.And you say, "But you're obligated." And I say, "Why?" What do you say? "Well we had a deal." And you benefited.You ate all those lobsters.Well that's a pretty strong argument.It's an argument that depends though and the fact that I benefited from your labor So, contracts sometimes bind us in so far as they are instruments of mutual benefit.I ate the lobsters. I owe you the $100 for having gathered them.But suppose, now take a second case.We make this deal, I'll pay you $100 for 380 before you've gone to any work I call you back and say I've changed my mind.Now, there's no benefit.There's no work on your part so there's no element of reciprocal exchange.What about in that case, do I still owe you merely in virtue of the fact that we had an agreement?Who says those of you who say, yes, I still owe you? Why? Okay, stand up.Why do I owe you?I called you back after two minutes.You haven't done any work.I think I spent the time and effort in drafting this contract with you and also have emotional expectation that I go through the work.So you took time to draft the contract but we did it very quickly.We just chatted on the phone.That wouldn't be a formal form of contract though.Well I faxed at you.It only took a minute.As long as any effort is involved, I would say that the contract is valid then.It should take effect.But why? What was...what morally can you point to that obligates me?I admit that I agreed but you didn't go to any work. I didn't enjoy any benefit.Because one might mentally go through all the work of harvesting the lobsters.You mentally went through the work of harvesting the lobsters.That's nothing is it?It's not much.Is it worth $100 that you were imagining yourself going and collecting lobsters?It may not worth $100, but it may worth something to some people.All right, I'll give you a buck for that.But what I ®C so you're still pointing...what's interesting you're still pointing to the reciprocal dimension of contracts.You did or imagined that you did or looked forward to doing something that might be had. For example two people agreed to be married and one suddenly calls the other in two minutes say, I've changed my mind, does the contract have obligation on both sides? Nobody has done any work or nobody has benefited yet.Well I'm tempted to say no.Fine.All, right. What's your name?-Julian.Thank you Julian.All right, that was good.Now is there anyone who has who agrees with Julian that I still owe the money?For any other reason now I have °≠go ahead, stand up.I think if you back out it sort of cheapens the institution of contracts.Good but why? Why does it?Well I think is kind of Kantian, but there's in almost there's a certain intrinsic value in being able to make contracts and having, you know, knowing people will expect that you'll go through with that.Good, there is some...it would cheapen the whole idea of contracts which has to do with taking in obligation on myself. Is that the idea?Yeah, I think so.What's your name?-Adam.So Adam points instead not to any reciprocal benefit or mutual exchange but to the mere fact of the agreement itself.We see here there are really two different ways in which actual contracts generate obligations.One has to do with the active consent as a voluntary act and it points...Adam said this was a Kantian idea and I think he is right because it points to the ideal of autonomy.When I make a contract, the obligation is one that is self-imposed and that carries a certain moral weight, independent of other considerations.And then there's a second element of the moral force of contract arguments which has to do with the sense in which actual contracts are instruments of mutual benefit and this points toward the ideal of reciprocity that obligation can arise, I can have an obligation to you in so far as you do something for me.Now, when investigating the moral force and also the moral limits of actual contracts and here I would like to advance an argument about the moral limits of actual contracts now that we know what moral ingredients do the work when people come together and say, "I will do this if you do that." I would like to argue first that the fact that two people agreed to some exchange does not mean that the terms of their agreement are fair.When my two sons were young they collected baseball cards and traded them.And one was...there was a two-year aged...there is a two-year aged difference between them and so I had to institute a rule about the trades that no trade was complete until I had approved it and the reason is obvious.The older one knew more about the value of these cards and so would take advantage of the younger one.So that's why I had to review it to make sure that the agreements were fair.Now you may say, "Well this is paternalism." Of course it was. That's what paternalism is for that kind of thing.So what does this show?What is the baseball cards example show?The fact of an agreement is not sufficient to establish the fairness of the terms.I read some years ago of a case in Chicago there was an elderly widow, an 84-year-old widow named Rose who had a problem in her apartment with a leaky toilet and she signed a contract with an unscrupulous contractor, who offered to repair her leaky toilet in exchange for $50,000.But she had agreed she was of sound mind, maybe terribly naive and unfamiliar with the price of plumbing, she had made this agreement.Luckily, it was discovered.She went to the bank and asked to withdraw $25,000.And the teller said, "Why do you need all of that money for?" And she said, "Well, I have a leaky toilet." And the teller called authorities and they discovered this unscrupulous contractor.。
哈佛公开课 公平
Harvard University - Justice Michael Sandel哈佛大学公开课----公平迈克尔·桑代尔教授主讲Y our trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 Mph.你的电车正以每小时60英里行驶。
Now we need to begin to investigate the reasons why you think is the right thing to do.我们还要研究你这样做的原因.Who is willing to volunteer a reason?谁愿意说说你的想法？Better to save five lives even if it means to sacrifice one.牺牲一个，救活更多人。
What became of the principle that almost everyone endorse in the first case?第一种情况几乎每个人都赞同，原因何在？Is there a way out of this?是否有更好的办法？Let‘s just forget a moment about this case.让我们暂时搁下这个故事。
Don‘t lean over.不要摔下来哦。
Let‘ step back from these stories, these arguments.让我们回过头来看这些故事和争论。
Certain moral principles have already begun to emerge from discussion we had.我们的谈论已经涉及到了一些道德的原则.Consequentialist moral reasoning locates morality in the consequences of an act in the state of the rule that we resolve from the thing you do.结果主义的道德推理取决于道德行为的后果,它取决于我们最后的结果。
幸福课_ 哈佛公开课_中英文对照 第一课 校对版
第一课Hi, good morning. It’s wonderful to be back here.各位，早上好。
很高兴能回到这里。
Wonderful to see you here.高兴见到你们。
I am teaching this class because I wish a class like this had been taught when I was sitting in your seat as an undergraduate here.我教授这门课是因为在我读本科阶段时非常希望能学习这样一门课程。
This does not mean it is a class you wish to be taught nor does it mean that it is the right class for you.可能这门课并不是你希望的那样也可能并不适合你。
But I hope to doing the next couple of lectures is giving you an idea what this class is about so that you can decide whether or not it is for you.但希望几堂课后，你能有个大概印象让你决定这门课程是否适合你。
I came here in 1992 and studied the computer science and concentrator.我1992年来到哈佛求学，一开始主修计算机科学。
And when I had I mini epiphany half way through my sophomore year.大二期间，突然顿悟了。
I realized that I was in a wonderful place with wonderful students around me, wonderful teachers.我意识到我身处让人神往大学校园周围都是出色的同学，优秀的导师。
哈佛大学公开课程-JUSTICE中英
哈佛大学公开课程-JUSTICEIntroduction哈佛大学公开课程-JUSTICE（公正）是哈佛大学著名哲学教授迈克尔·桑德尔斯（Michael Sandel）于2009年开设的一门课程。
JUSTICE课程探讨了道德和政治哲学中的核心问题，涵盖了伦理学、政治学、经济学和法学等多个学科领域。
这门课程通过案例分析和讨论来引导学生思考公正和道德问题，以期培养学生的批判性思维和逻辑推理能力。
Course StructureJUSTICE课程共分为12个单元，每个单元探讨一个基本问题，例如财富分配、权力、正义、人权等。
每个单元都包括教授的讲座、案例分析和学生的互动讨论环节。
这种教学方式旨在激发学生的积极参与，并通过讨论不同观点来促进学生的思考和辩论能力。
Course Highlights1. 公正的本质第一个单元的讨论着重探索公正的本质和意义。
课程将引导学生思考什么是公正，以及如何在不同背景下实现公正。
通过讨论相关案例，学生将了解不同的伦理观点和社会背景如何影响对公正的理解。
2. 平等与不平等第二个单元将探讨平等和不平等的问题。
课程将引导学生思考在不同领域如教育、财富和机会等中，平等的界定和实现。
通过讨论实际情况，学生将了解不同社会政策对平等与不平等的影响。
3. 个体权利与公共权利第三个单元将引导学生思考个体权利与公共权利之间的平衡。
课程将探讨当个人权利与公共利益存在冲突时，应如何权衡和解决。
通过分析真实案例，学生将学习如何判断个体权利与公共权利之间的关系。
4. 国际正义第四个单元将重点讨论国际正义的问题。
课程将引导学生思考国际关系中的公正和不公正现象，并探讨全球治理和政策制定中的道德问题。
通过讨论不同国家之间的争议和冲突，学生将了解不同国家之间的权力关系和利益冲突。
5. 公正与超越第五个单元将探讨超越公正的问题。
课程将引导学生思考公正的局限性和其他价值观的重要性。
通过引入宗教、道德和文化等方面的讨论，学生将思考公正之外的价值观在社会中的作用。
justice 08-哈佛大学公开课-公正What’s a Fair Start What Do We Deserve 什么是公平的起点？我们该得到
Justice 08 What’s a Fair Start? / What Do We Deserve? 什么是公平的起点？/我们该得到什么？Today, we turn to the question of distributive justice.How should income in wealth and power and opportunities be distributed? According to what principles?John Rawls offers a detailed answer to that question.And we're going to examine and assess his answer to that question, today.We put ourselves in a position to do so last time.By trying to make sense of why he thinks that principles of justice are best derived from a hypothetical contract.And what matters is that the hypothetical contract be carried out in an original position of equality, behind, what Rawls calls, the veil of ignorance.So that much is clear?Alright, then let's turn to the principles that Rawls says would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.First, he considered some of the major alternatives.What about utilitarianism?Would the people in the original position choose to govern their collective lives utilitarian principles, the greatest good for the greatest number?No, they wouldn't, Rawls says.And the reason is, that behind the veil of ignorance, everyone knows that once the veil goes up, and real life begins, we will each want to be respected with dignity.Even if we turn out to be a member of a minority.We don't want to be oppressed.And so we would agree to reject utilitarianism, and instead to adopt as our first principle, equal basic liberties.Fundamental rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the like.We wouldn't want to take the chance that we would wind up as members of an oppressed or a despised minority with the majority tyrannizing over us.And so Rawls says utilitarianism would be rejected."Utilitarianism makes the mistake", Rawls writes, "of forgetting, or at least not taking seriously, the distinction between persons." And in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, we would recognize that and reject utilitarianism.We wouldn't trade off our fundamental rights and liberties for any economic advantages.That's the first principle.Second principle has to do with social and economic inequalities.What would we agree to?Remember, we don't know whether we're going to wind up rich or poor.Healthy or unhealthy.We don't know what kind of family we're going to come from.Whether we're going to inherit millions or whether we will come from an impoverished family.So we might, at first thought, say, "Well let's require an equal distribution of income and wealth." Just to be on the safe side.But then we would realize, that we could do better than that.Even if we're unlucky and wind up at the bottom.We could do better if we agree to a qualified principle of equality.Rawls calls it "the Difference Principle".A principle that says, only those social and economic inequalities will be permitted that work to the benefit of the least well off.So we wouldn't reject all inequality of income and wealth.We would allow some.But the test would be, do they work to the benefit of everyone including those, or as he specifies, the principle, especially those at the bottom.Only those inequalities would be accepted behind the veil of ignorance.And so Rawls argues, only those inequalities that work to the benefit of the least well off, are just.We talked about the examples of Michael Jordan making 81 Of Bill Gates having a fortune in the tens of billions.Would those inequalities be permitted under the difference principle?Only if they were part of a system, those wage differentials, that actually work to the advantage of least well off.Well, what would that system be?Maybe it turns out that as a practical matter you have to provide incentives to attract the right people to certain jobs.And when you do, having those people in those jobs will actually help those at the bottom.Strictly speaking, Rawls's argument for the difference principle is that it would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.Let me hear what you think about Rawls's claim that these two principles would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.Is there anyone who disagrees that they would be chosen?Alright, let's start up in the balcony, if that's alright.Go ahead.OK, your argument depends upon us believing that we would argue in said policy, or justice from a bottom.For the disadvantaged.And I just don't see from a proof standpoint, where we've proven that.Why not the top?Right, and what's your name?- Mike.Mike, alright, good question.Put yourself behind the veil of ignorance.Enter into the thought experiment.What principles would you choose?How would you think it through?Well, I would say things like, even Harvard's existence is an example of preaching toward the top.Because Harvard takes the top academics.And I didn't know when I was born how smart I would be.But I worked my life to get to a place of this caliber.Now, if you had said Harvard's going to randomly take 1600 people of absolutely no qualification, we'd all be saying, "There's not much to work for." And so what principle would you choose?In that situation I would say a merit based one.One where I don't necessarily know, but I would rather have a system that rewards me based on my efforts.So you, Mike, behind the veil of ignorance, would choose a merit-based system, where people are rewarded according to their efforts?Alright, fair enough.What would you say?Go ahead.My question is, if the merit-based argument is based on when everyone is at a level of equality?Where from that position, you're rewarded to where you get, or is it regardless of what advantages you may have when you began your education to get where you are here?I think what the question you're asking is saying that if we want to look at, whatever, utilitarianism, policy, do you want to maximize world wealth.And I think a system that rewards merit is the one that we've pretty much all established, is what is best for all of us.Despite the fact that some of us may be in the second percentile and some may be in the 98th percentile.At the end of the day it lifts that lowest based level, a community that rewards effort as opposed to an differences.But, I don't understand how you're rewards someone's efforts who clearly has had, not you, but maybe myself, advantages throughout, to get where I am here.I mean, I can't say that somebody else who maybe worked as hard as I did would have had the same opportunity to come to a school like this.Alright, let's look at that point.What's your name?Kate. -Kate, you suspect that the ability to get into top schools may largely depend on coming from an affluent family.Having a favorable family background, social, cultural, economic advantages and so on?I mean, economic, but yes, social, cultural.All of those advantages, for sure.Someone did a study, of the 146 selective colleges and universities in the United States.And they looked at the students in those colleges and universities to try to find out what their background was, their economic background.What percentage do you think, come from the bottom quarter of the income scale?You know what the figure is?Only three percent of students, at the most selective colleges and universities come from poor backgrounds.Over 70 percent come from affluent families.Let's go one step further then, and try to address Mike's challenge.Rawls actually has two arguments, not one, in favor of his principles of justice.And in particular, of the difference principle.One argument is the official argument, what would be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.Some people challenge that argument, saying, "Maybe people would want to take their chances.Maybe people would be gamblers behind the veil of ignorance.Hoping that they would wind up on top." That's one challenge that has been put to Rawls.But backing up the argument from the original position is the second argument.And that is the straightforwardly moral argument.And it goes like this, it says, the distribution of income and wealth and opportunities should not be based on factors for which people can claim no credit.It shouldn't be based on factors that are arbitrary from a moral point of view.Rawls illustrates this by considering several rival theories of justice.He begins with the theory of justice that most everyone these days would reject.A feudal aristocracy.What's wrong with the allocation of life prospects in a feudal aristocracy?Rawls says, well the thing that's obviously wrong about it is that people's life prospects are determined by the accident of birth.Are you born to a noble family or to a family of peasants and serfs?And that's it.You can't rise.It's not your doing where you wind up or what opportunities you have.But that's arbitrary from a moral point of view.And so that objection to feudal aristocracy leads, and historically has lead, people to say, careers should be open to talents.There should be formal equality of opportunity regardless of the accident of birth.Every person should be free to strive, to work, to apply for any job in the society.And then, if you open up jobs, and you allow people to apply, and to work as hard as they can, then the results are just.So it's more or less the libertarian system that we've discussed in earlier weeks.What does Rawls think about this?He says it's an improvement.It's an improvement because it doesn't take as fixed the accident of birth.But even with formal equality of opportunity the libertarian conception doesn't extend that, doesn't extend its insight far enough.Because if you let everybody run the race, everybody can enter the race, but some people start at different starting points, that race isn't going to be fair.Intuitively, he says, the most obvious injustice of this system is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by factors arbitrary from a moral point of view.Such as, whether you got a good education or not.Whether you grew up in a family that support you and developed in you a work ethic and gave you the opportunities.So that suggests moving to a system of fair equality of opportunity.And that's really the system that Mike was advocating earlier on.What we might call a merit-based system.A meritocratic system.In a fair meritocracy the society sets up institutions to bring everyone to the same starting point before the race begins.Equal educational opportunities.Head start programs, for example.Support for schools in impoverished neighborhoods.So that everyone, regardless of their family background, has a genuinely fair opportunity.Everyone starts from the same starting line.Well, what does Rawls think about the meritocratic system?Even that, he says, doesn't go far enough in remedying, or addressing, the moral arbitrariness of the natural lottery.Because if you bring everyone to the same starting point and begin the race, who's going to win the race?Who would win?To use the runners example.The fastest runners would win.But is it their doing that they happen to be blessed with athletic prowess to run fast?So Rawls says, "Even the principle of meritocracy, where you bring everyone to the same starting point, may eliminate the influence of social contingencies and upbringing, ...but it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents." And so he thinks that the principle of eliminating morally arbitrary influences in the distribution of income and wealth requires going beyond what Mike favors, the meritocratic system.Now, how do you go beyond?Do you bring everyone to the same starting point and you're still bothered by the fact that some are fast runners and some are not fast runners, what can you do?Well, some critics of a more egalitarian conception say the only thing you can do is handicap the fast runners.Make them wear lead shoes.But who wants to do that?That would defeat the whole point of running the race.But Rawls says, you don't have to have a kind of leveling equality, if you want to go beyond a meritocratic conception.You permit, you even encourage, those who may be gifted, to exercise their talents.But what you do, is you change the terms on which people are entitled to the fruits of the exercise of those talents.And that really is what the difference principle is.You establish a principle that says, people may benefit from their good fortune, from their luck in the genetic lottery, but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.And so, for example, Michael Jordan can make 290 only under a system that taxes away a chunk of that to help those who lack the basketball skills that he's blessed with.Likewise, Bill Gates.He can make his billions.But he can't think that he somehow morally deserves those billions."Those who have been favored by nature, may gain from their good fortune but only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out." That's the difference principle.And it's an argument from moral arbitrarianists.Rawls claims, that if you're bothered by basing distributive shares on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view, you don't just reject a feudal aristocracy for a free market.You don't even rest content with a meritocratic system that brings everyone to the same starting point.You set up a system, where everyone, including those at the bottom, benefit from the exercise of the talents held by those who happen to be lucky.What do you think?Is that persuasive?Who finds that argument unpersuasive?The argument for moral arbitrarianists.Yes.I think that in the egalitarian proposition the more talented people, I think it's very optimistic to think that they would still work really hard, even if they knew that part of what they made would be given away.So I think that the only way for the more talented people to exercise their talents to the best of their ability is in the meritocracy.And in a meritocracy, what's your name?Kate.Kate, does it bother you, and Mike, does it bother you, that in a meritocratic system, that even with fair equality of opportunity, people get ahead, people get rewards that they don't deserve simply because they happen to be naturally gifted.What about that?I think that it is arbitrary.Obviously it's arbitrary.But I think that correcting for it would be detrimental.Because it would reduce incentives, is that why?It would reduce incentives, yeah.Mike, what do you say?We're all sitting in this room and we have undeserved, we have undeserved glory of some sort.So you should not be satisfied with the process of your life.Because you have not created any of this.And I think, from a standpoint of, not just this room, us being upset, but from a societal standpoint we should have some kind of a gut reaction to that feeling.The guy who runs the race, he doesn't...He actually harms us as opposed to maybe makes me run that last ten yards faster.And that makes the guy behind me run ten yards faster and the guy behind him ten yards faster.Alright, so Mike, let me ask you.You talked about effort before.Effort.Do you think when people work hard to get ahead, and succeed, that they deserve the rewards that go with effort?Isn't that the idea behind your defense?I mean, of course, bring Michael Jordan here, I'm sure you can get him, and have him come and defend himself about he makes 31 million dollars.And I think what you're going to realize is his life was a very, very tough one to get to the top.And that we are basically being the majority oppressing the minority in a different light.It's very easy to pick on him.Very easy.Alright, effort.You've got...I've got a few. I've got a few.But that's about it.Effort, you know what Rawls's answer to that is?Even the effort that some people expend, conscientious driving, the work ethic, even effort depends a lot on fortunate family circumstances.For which you, we, can claim no credit.Let's do the test.Let's do a test here.Never mind economic class, those differences are very significant.Put those aside.Psychologists say that birth order makes a lot of difference in work ethic, striving, effort.How many here, raise your hand, those of you here, who are first in birth order.I am too by the way.Mike, I noticed you raised your hand.If the case for the meritocratic conception is that effort should be rewarded, doesn't Rawls have a point that even effort striving, work ethic is largely shaped even by birth order?Is it your doing?Mike, is it your doing that you were first in birth order?Then why, Rawls says, of course not.So why should income and wealth and opportunities in life be based on factors arbitrary from a moral point of view?That's the challenge that he puts to market societies, but also to those of us at places like this.A question to think about for next time.A justice of the United States Supreme Court, what do they make?It's just under $200,000.But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor.Do you know who it is?- Judge Judy?Judge Judy.How did you know that?Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?$25 million.Now, is that just?Is it fair?We ended last time with that remarkable poll, do you remember?The poll about birth order.What percentage of people in this room raised their hands, was it, to say that they were the first born?403 And what was the significance of that?If you're thinking about these theories of distributive justice.Remember, we were discussing three different theories of distributive justice.Three different ways of answering the question, "How should income and wealth and opportunities and the good things in life, be distributed?" And so far we've looked at the libertarian answer.That says, the just system of distribution is a system of free exchange, a free market economy.Against a background of formal equality.Which simply means, that jobs and careers are open to anyone.Rawls says that this represents an improvement over aristocratic and caste systems, because everyone can compete for every job.Careers open to talents.And beyond that, the just distribution is the one that results from free exchange.Voluntary transactions.No more, no less.Then Rawls argues, if all you have is formal equality, jobs open to everyone, the result is not going to be fair.It will be biased in favor of those who happen to be born to affluent families, who happen to have the benefit of good educational opportunities.And that accident of birth is not a just basis for distributing life chances.And so, many people who notice this unfairness, Rawls argues, are lead to embrace a system of fair equality of opportunity.That leads to the meritocratic system.Fair equality of opportunity.But Rawls says, even if you bring everyone to the same starting point in the race, what's going to happen?Who's going to win?The fastest runners.So once you're troubled by basing distributive shares on morally arbitrary contingencies, you should, if you reason it through, be carried all the way to what Rawls calls, "the democratic conception".A more egalitarian conception of distributive justice that he defines by the difference principle.Now, he doesn't say that the only way to remedy or to compensate for differences in natural talents and abilities is to have a kind of, leveling equality.A guaranteed equality of outcome.But he does say there's another way to deal with these contingencies.People may gain, may benefit from their good fortune, but only on terms that work to the advantage of the least well off.And so, we can test how this theory actually works by thinking about some paid differentials that arise in our society.What does the average school teacher make in the United States, do you suppose?Roughly.-$35,000.It's a little more, 40, $42,000.What about David Letterman?How much do you think David Letterman makes?More than a school teacher?$31 million.David Letterman.Is that fair?That David Letterman makes that much more than a school teacher?Well, Rawls's answer would be, it depends whether the basic structure of society is designed in such a way that Letterman's $31 million is subject to taxation so that some of those earnings are taken to work for the advantage of the least well off.One other example of a paid differential.A justice of the United States Supreme Court.What do they make?It's just under $200,000.Here's Sandra Day O'Connor, for example. There she is.But there's another judge who makes a lot more than Sandra Day O'Connor.Do you know who it is?- Judge Judy.Judge Judy.How did you know that?You watch?You're right.Judge Judy, you know how much she makes?There she is.$25 million.Now, is that just?Is it fair?Well, the answer is, it depends on whether this is against a background system in line with the difference principle.Where those who come out on top, in terms of income and wealth are taxed in a way that benefits the least well off members of society.Now, we're going to come back to these wage differentials, pay differentials, between a real judge and a TV judge.The one Marcus watches all the time.What I want to do now, is return to these theories and to examine the objections to Rawls's more egalitarian theory.The difference principle.There are at least three objections to Rawls's difference principle.One of them came up last time in the discussion and a number of you raised this worry.What about incentives?Isn't there the risk, if taxes reach 506 that Michael Jordan won't play basketball?That David Letterman won't do late night comedy?Or that CEOs will go into some other line of work?Now, who among those who are defenders of Rawls who has an answer to this objection about the need for incentives?Yes. Go ahead, stand up.Rawls's idea is that there should only be so much difference that it helps the least well off the most.So if there's too much equality, then the least well off might not be able to watch late night TV, or might not have a job because their CEO doesn't want to work.So you need to find the correct balance where taxation still leaves enough incentive to least well off to benefit from the talents.- Good.And what's your name?- Tim.Tim. Alright, so Tim is saying, in effect, that Rawls is taking count of incentives.And could allow for pay differentials and for some adjustment in the tax rate to take account of incentives.But, Tim points out, the standpoint from which the question of incentives needs to be considered is not the effect on the total size of the economic pie.But instead from the standpoint of the effect of incentives, or disincentives, on the well-being of those on the bottom.Right?Good. Thank you.I think that is what Rawls would say.In fact, if you look in section 17, where he describes the difference principle, he allows for incentives."The naturally advantaged are not gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education andfor using their endowments in ways that help less fortunate as well." So you can have incentives.You can adjust the tax rate.If taking too much from David Letterman or from Michael Jordan, or from Bill Gates, winds up actually hurting those at the bottom.That's the test.So incentives, that's not a decisive objections against Rawls's difference principle.But there are two weightier, more difficult objections.One of them comes from defenders of a meritocratic conception.The argument that says, what about effort?What about people working hard having a right to what they earn because they've deserved it.They've worked hard for it.That's the objection from effort and moral desert.Then there's another objection.That comes from libertarians.And this objection has to do with reasserting the idea of self-ownership.Doesn't the difference principle, by treating our natural talents and endowments as common assets, doesn't that violate the idea that we own ourselves?Now, let me deal first, with the objection that comes from the libertarian direction.Milton Friedman writes, in his book, "Free to Choose," "Life is not fair.And it's tempting to believe that government can rectify what nature has spawned." But his answer is, "The only way to try to rectify that is to have a leveling equality of outcome." Everyone finishing the race at the same point.And that would be a disaster.This is an easy argument to answer.And Rawls addresses it.In one of the most powerful passages, I think, of the theory of justice.It's in Section 17."The natural distribution", and here he's talking about the natural distribution talents and endowments."...is neither just nor unjust."Nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position.These are simply natural facts.What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts." That's his answer to libertarian laissez faire economists like Milton Friedman who say, "Life is unfair but get over it." Get over it and let's see if we can, at least, maximize the benefits that flow from it.But the more powerful libertarian objection to Rawls is not libertarian from the libertarian economists like Milton Friedman.It's from the argument about self-ownership.Developed as we saw, in Nozick.And from that point of view, yes, it might be a good thing, to create head start programs and public schools so that everyone can go to a decent school and start the race at the same starting line.That might be good.But if you tax people to create public schools, if you tax people against their will, you coerce them.It's a form of theft.If you take some of Letterman's $31 million, tax it away to support public schools, against his will, the state is really doing no better than stealing from him.It's coercion.And the reason is, we have to think of ourselves as owning our talents and endowments.Because otherwise we're back to just using people and coercing people.That's the libertarian reply.What's Rawls's answer to that objection?He doesn't address the idea of self-ownership directly.But the effect, the moral weight of his argument for the difference principle is, maybe we don't own ourselves in that thoroughgoing sense after all.Now, he says, this doesn't mean that the state is an owner in me, in the sense that it can simply commandeer my life.Because remember, the first principle we would agree to behind the veil of ignorance, is the principle of equal basic liberties.Freedom of speech, religious liberty, freedom of conscience and the like.So the only respect in which the idea of self-ownership must give way, comes when we're thinking about whether I own myself in the sense that I have a privileged claim on the benefits that come from the exercise of my talents in a market economy.。
哈佛公开课Justice 第一课字幕 中英对照精解
JusEpisode OnPART ONE If you ha five oth would di What wou Professo After the to save conundru difficul becomes contradi always b PART TWO Sandel i Bentham,shipwrec decides the rest a classr doctrine for the stice: What’s One E: THE MORAL S ad to choose b ers and (2) d e right befor ld be the rig r Michael Sane majority of the lives of ms—each one t. As studen clear that th ctory, and th lack and whit O: THE CASE FO introduces the with a famou cked crew of f to kill the w t can feed on room debate ab e that the righ greatest numb s the Right T SIDE OF MURDE between (1) ki oing nothing re your eyes i ht thing to d ndel uses to l students vote five others, artfully desi nts stand up to he assumptions e question of te.OR CANNIBALISM e principles o us nineteenth four. After n weakest amongs his blood and bout the moral ht thing to do ber.Thing to Do?ER 谋杀的道德侧illing one per even though y f you did not o? That’s t launch his co es for killing Sandel prese igned to make o defend their s behind our m what is right SM 食人肉案件of utilitaria h century lega nineteen days st them, the d body to sur l validity of is whatever p侧面rson to save t you knew that thing—what wo the hypothetic urse on moral g the one pers nts three sim the decision r conflicting moral reasonin t and what is w an philosopher al case involv lost at sea, young cabin b rvive. The c f utilitariani produces the gr the lives of five people ould you do? cal scenariol reasoning. son in order milar moral n more choices, it ng are often wrong is not r, Jeremy ving a the captain boy, so that case sets up ism—and its reatest good episode ['epi moral ['m ɔr hypothetical ['scenario [si'na reasoning ['ri:vote [v əut] n conundrum [k artfully ['a:tful defend [di'fen conflict ['k ɔnfl conflicting [k defend [di'fen assumption [contradictory cannibalism ['utilitarian [.ju legal ['li:g əl]shipwrecked [crew [kru:] amongst [ə'm cabin ['kæbi survive [s ə'vdebate [di'be validity [væ'l doctrine ['d is əud] n. 插曲əl] adj. 道德的'haip əu'θetik əl]a:ri əu] n. 情节zni ŋ] n. 推论n. 投票, 选举v k ə'n ʌndr əm] n li] adv.艺术地,有d] v. 防护, 辩likt] n.冲突,矛ən'flikti ŋ] adj d] v. 防护, 辩护ə's ʌmp ʃən] n.假 [.k ɔntr ə'dikt əri 'kænib əliz əm] n u:tili't ɛəri ən] n.功 adj. 法律的, 合'ʃiprekt] adj. 失 n. 全体船员ʌŋst] prep. 在 n] n. 船舱, 机vaiv] 活下来, 幸eit] n.v. 辩论liditi] n. 有效性ɔktrin] n. 教义曲, 一段情节, 片的 ] adj.假设的,假节梗概, 剧本 论, 推理, 论证 v. 投票, 选举, n. 谜语, 难题 有技巧地,熟练地辩护, 防守 矛盾vi. 冲突,争. 相冲突的 护, 防守 假定,设想,担任(职i] adj. 矛盾的n n.吃人肉的习性功利主义者adj 合法的, 法定的失事的, 遭海难... 之中,在...之机舱, 小木屋幸存; 残留 论, 讨论 性, 正确性, 正当义, 主义, 学说片段, 轶事假定的,爱猜想的表决 地,狡诈地 争执 职责等),假装 n.矛盾 性, 同类相食 j.功利的,实用的的 难的 之间(=among) 当的Funding for this program is provided by... 此节目由以上公司 fund [fʌnd]资金,基金,专款Additional funding provided by... 以上人士提供赞助This is a course about justice 这是一堂关于公平与正义的公共课 course [kɔ:s]学科，课程，教程and we begin with a story. 让我们先从一个故事讲起 hurtle ['hə:tl] v.猛冲;飞驰,猛烈碰撞Suppose you’re the driver of a trolley car, 假设你现在是一辆有轨电车的司机 suppose [sə'pəuz] 假定; 设想，料想and your trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 miles an hour. 而你的电车正在铁轨上以时速60英里疾驶 trolley ['trɔli] 〔英〕手推车；〔美〕(有轨)电车And at the end of the track 在铁轨末端 brake [breik]制动器<->break [breik]毁坏,打破you notice five workers working on the track. 你发现有五个工人在铁轨上工作You try to stop but you can't, 你尽力想停下电车, 但是你做不到your brakes don’t work. 电车的刹车失灵了 美剧绝望的主妇Desperate HousewivesYou feel desperate because you know 你觉得十分绝望，因为你知道 desperate:绝望的,穷途末路的,拼命的that if you crash into these five workers, they will all die. 如果你就这样撞向这5个工人，他们必死无疑 crash into 碰到，撞在Let’s assume you know that for sure. 假定你很清楚这一点 assume [ə'sjuːm] 假定，想像，设想And so you feel helpless until you notice 正当你感到无助的时候, 你突然发现that there is, off to the right, 就在右边a side track and at the end of that track, 一条岔道，那根轨道的尽头there is one worker, working on the track. 只有一个工人在那里工作Your steering wheel works, so you can turn the trolley car, 你的方向盘没有失灵, 只要你愿意 steering ['stiəriŋ] 舵把,方向盘；掌舵,驾驶,转向。
哈佛大学公开课
哈佛大学公开课分析介绍作者：张宇（一）课程基本信息学校：哈佛大学（Harward University）课程名称：《公正：该如何做是好》（Justice）讲师：迈克尔.桑德尔（Michael.J.Sandel）课程数：12节时长：45分钟/节（二）课程内容《公正：该如何做是好》是为法学院学生开设的课程，出发点是谈公正和正义，分为12堂课。
本课程旨在引导观众一起评判性地思考关于公正、平等、民主与公民权利的一些基本问题。
每周，超过1000位学生来听哈佛教授兼作家的迈克尔.桑德尔的课，以拓展他们对于政治与道德哲学的认知理解，探究固有观念是与非。
（三）讲师介绍讲师：迈克尔.桑德尔（Michael.J.Sandel）职称：美国哈佛大学政府系讲座教授学位：英国牛津大学政治哲学博士简介：迈克尔.桑德尔（Michael.J.Sandel）是美国哲学家，美国哈佛大学政府系讲座教授，美国人文艺术与科学学院院士，当代西方社群主义（共同体主义）最著名的理论代表人物，哈佛大学“最受欢迎的课程讲席教授”之一。
（四）课程组织形式a.思考1哈佛大学对于此课程采用大课的形式，也就是西方大学里所说的“lecture”,一般是在1000人左右的大阶梯教室进行授课。
因为此课程是属于哲学、伦理类的课程，比较更适合“lecture”这种形式。
（这与我们学校的授课形式差不多，通常是几个行政班一块上，但是我们一堂课最多达到120人，而哈佛大学一堂课学生却接近1000人，讲师却没有授课压力，学生也听的乐在其中。
）b.思考2在视频中，我们可以明显感觉到，哈佛大学课堂气氛很轻松，很活跃，学生可以自由站起来发表看法、辩论，讲师具有幽默性能够吸引学生的听课兴趣。
（我们学校的有些课堂也能达到这种效果，课堂活跃、师生互动。
但是能像哈佛大学这样，课堂气氛极其活跃，学生积极发表看法，还是少的。
甚至我们的有些课堂非常沉闷，学生不知老师所云。
）c.思考3当我们被哈佛大学的名师公开课所感染的同时，回过头去思考一下：为什么我们很喜欢听哈佛大学的课？首先，讲师是相当优秀相当有名的，这也是公开课独具魅力之处。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
JusEpisode OnPART ONE If you ha five oth would di What wou Professo After the to save conundru difficul becomes contradi always b PART TWO Sandel i Bentham,shipwrec decides the rest a classr doctrine for the stice: What’s One E: THE MORAL S ad to choose b ers and (2) d e right befor ld be the rig r Michael Sane majority of the lives of ms—each one t. As studen clear that th ctory, and th lack and whit O: THE CASE FO introduces the with a famou cked crew of f to kill the w t can feed on room debate ab e that the righ greatest numb s the Right T SIDE OF MURDE between (1) ki oing nothing re your eyes i ht thing to d ndel uses to l students vote five others, artfully desi nts stand up to he assumptions e question of te.OR CANNIBALISM e principles o us nineteenth four. After n weakest amongs his blood and bout the moral ht thing to do ber.Thing to Do?ER 谋杀的道德侧illing one per even though y f you did not o? That’s t launch his co es for killing Sandel prese igned to make o defend their s behind our m what is right SM 食人肉案件of utilitaria h century lega nineteen days st them, the d body to sur l validity of is whatever p侧面rson to save t you knew that thing—what wo the hypothetic urse on moral g the one pers nts three sim the decision r conflicting moral reasonin t and what is w an philosopher al case involv lost at sea, young cabin b rvive. The c f utilitariani produces the gr the lives of five people ould you do? cal scenariol reasoning. son in order milar moral n more choices, it ng are often wrong is not r, Jeremy ving a the captain boy, so that case sets up ism—and its reatest good episode ['epi moral ['m ɔr hypothetical ['scenario [si'na reasoning ['ri:vote [v əut] n conundrum [k artfully ['a:tful defend [di'fen conflict ['k ɔnfl conflicting [k defend [di'fen assumption [contradictory cannibalism ['utilitarian [.ju legal ['li:g əl]shipwrecked [crew [kru:] amongst [ə'm cabin ['kæbi survive [s ə'vdebate [di'be validity [væ'l doctrine ['d is əud] n. 插曲əl] adj. 道德的'haip əu'θetik əl]a:ri əu] n. 情节zni ŋ] n. 推论n. 投票, 选举v k ə'n ʌndr əm] n li] adv.艺术地,有d] v. 防护, 辩likt] n.冲突,矛ən'flikti ŋ] adj d] v. 防护, 辩护ə's ʌmp ʃən] n.假 [.k ɔntr ə'dikt əri 'kænib əliz əm] n u:tili't ɛəri ən] n.功 adj. 法律的, 合'ʃiprekt] adj. 失 n. 全体船员ʌŋst] prep. 在 n] n. 船舱, 机vaiv] 活下来, 幸eit] n.v. 辩论liditi] n. 有效性ɔktrin] n. 教义曲, 一段情节, 片的 ] adj.假设的,假节梗概, 剧本 论, 推理, 论证 v. 投票, 选举, n. 谜语, 难题 有技巧地,熟练地辩护, 防守 矛盾vi. 冲突,争. 相冲突的 护, 防守 假定,设想,担任(职i] adj. 矛盾的n n.吃人肉的习性功利主义者adj 合法的, 法定的失事的, 遭海难... 之中,在...之机舱, 小木屋幸存; 残留 论, 讨论 性, 正确性, 正当义, 主义, 学说片段, 轶事假定的,爱猜想的表决 地,狡诈地 争执 职责等),假装 n.矛盾 性, 同类相食 j.功利的,实用的的 难的 之间(=among) 当的Funding for this program is provided by... 此节目由以上公司 fund [fʌnd]资金,基金,专款Additional funding provided by... 以上人士提供赞助This is a course about justice 这是一堂关于公平与正义的公共课 course [kɔ:s]学科，课程，教程and we begin with a story. 让我们先从一个故事讲起 hurtle ['hə:tl] v.猛冲;飞驰,猛烈碰撞Suppose you’re the driver of a trolley car, 假设你现在是一辆有轨电车的司机 suppose [sə'pəuz] 假定; 设想，料想and your trolley car is hurtling down the track at 60 miles an hour. 而你的电车正在铁轨上以时速60英里疾驶 trolley ['trɔli] 〔英〕手推车；〔美〕(有轨)电车And at the end of the track 在铁轨末端 brake [breik]制动器<->break [breik]毁坏,打破you notice five workers working on the track. 你发现有五个工人在铁轨上工作You try to stop but you can't, 你尽力想停下电车, 但是你做不到your brakes don’t work. 电车的刹车失灵了 美剧绝望的主妇Desperate HousewivesYou feel desperate because you know 你觉得十分绝望，因为你知道 desperate:绝望的,穷途末路的,拼命的that if you crash into these five workers, they will all die. 如果你就这样撞向这5个工人，他们必死无疑 crash into 碰到，撞在Let’s assume you know that for sure. 假定你很清楚这一点 assume [ə'sjuːm] 假定，想像，设想And so you feel helpless until you notice 正当你感到无助的时候, 你突然发现that there is, off to the right, 就在右边a side track and at the end of that track, 一条岔道，那根轨道的尽头there is one worker, working on the track. 只有一个工人在那里工作Your steering wheel works, so you can turn the trolley car, 你的方向盘没有失灵, 只要你愿意 steering ['stiəriŋ] 舵把,方向盘；掌舵,驾驶,转向。
if you want to, onto the side track 你可以让电车转向到那条分叉铁轨上 steer [stiə] 掌(舵)驾驶(船/车);指导领导操纵killing the one but sparing the five. 撞死一个工人但却因此救了另外5个人 spare [spɛə] 不伤害,不损害,使某人免遭(麻烦)。
Here’s our first question: what’s the right thing to do? 现在提出第一个问题，我们该怎么做才对?What would you do? Let’s take a poll. 你会怎么做? 我们做个调查看看 poll [pəul]投票，投票数；How many would turn the trolley car onto the side track? Raise your hands. 有多少人会选择让电车转向到分叉铁轨上,请举手take a poll:投票表决How many wouldn’t? How many would go straight ahead? 多少人不会?多少人选择就这样笔直开下去?Keep your hands up those of you, who would go straight ahead. 选笔直开下去的人先别放手A handful of people would, 少数人会 handful ['hændful] 少数,少量,一小撮;一把the vast majority would turn. 大多数人选择转向 majority [mə'dʒɔ:riti] 大多数,过半数,大部分Let’s hear first, now we need to begin 让我们先听听看to investigate the reasons why you think 现在我们研究下你为什么觉得 investigate [in'vestigeit] 研究，调查；审查。