Understanding Valuation-A Venture Investor's Perspective

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The interaction between product market and financing strategy the role of venture capital

The Interaction Between ProductMarket and Financing Strategy:The Role of Venture CapitalThomas HellmannManju PuriStanford UniversityVenture capitalﬁnancing is widely believed to be inﬂuential for new innovative compa-nies.We provide empirical evidence that venture capitalﬁnancing is related to product market strategies and outcomes of ing a unique hand-collected database of Silicon Valley high-tech start-ups weﬁnd that innovatorﬁrms are more likely to obtain venture capital than imitatorﬁrms.Venture capital is also associated with a signiﬁcant reduction in the time to bring a product to market,especially for innovators.Our results suggest signiﬁcant interrelations between investor types and product market dimensions, and a role of venture capital for innovative companies.Venture capital is widely believed to contribute to the competitive strength of the U.S.economy by promoting the development of innovative start-ups. Yet little is known about what kind of companies are most likely to receive venture capital and what its impact is on these companies.It is commonly argued that a distinguishing feature of venture capital is the close involve-ment of investor’s with the companies theyﬁnance.If one thinks ofﬁnancial institutions on a spectrum from“arm’s length”to“relational”investors,ven-ture capital is typically viewed as lying at the latter extreme.It is generally believed that venture capitalists are extensively involved in the businesses theyﬁnance,not only closely monitoring their activities,but also providing valuable support and governance.The natural question to ask then is whether the involvement of a venture capitalist makes a difference in the development path of the entrepreneurial companies.We thank Anat Admati,Bill Barnett,Chris Barry,Jim Brander,Bruno Cassiman,Darrell Dufﬁe,Paul Gompers, Steve Kaplan,Josh Lerner,Robert McDonald,Paul Pﬂeiderer,William Sahlman,Andrea Shepard,Jim Van Horne,and seminar participants at the American F inance Association,New York,Arizona State University, Bocconi University in Milano,Humbolt University in Berlin,University of British Columbia,University of Chicago,University of Dresden,University of Maryland,University of Munich,Stanford University,Tilburg University,and the Western F inance Association,Monterey,for helpful comments.We received particularly helpful and insightful comments from Sheridan Titman(the editor)and an anonymous referee.We also thank Jim Baron,Diane Burton,and Michael Hannan for their generous permission to access their data,and Ali Hortacsu,Vlasta Pokladnik,Shu Wu,Mu Yang,and Muhamet Yildiz for excellent research assistance. We thank the Center for Entrepreneurial Studies at the Stanford Graduate School of Business forﬁnancial support.All errors are ours.Address correspondence to Manju Puri,Graduate School of Business,Stanford University,Stanford,CA94305-5015,or e-mail:mpuri@.The Review of Financial Studies Winter2000V ol.13,No.4,pp.959–984©2000The Society for Financial StudiesThe Review of Financial Studies/v13n42000The issue of what kind of investor might help to promote innovativeﬁrms is also important in the context of the emerging literature on the interaction betweenﬁnancing and product market behavior.This literature has focused mainly on the relationship between debt levels and product market behavior.1 However,the impact of equity investors,or more broadly,the importance of the investor type has received little attention.Hence the role of involved equity investors,such as venture capitalists,on product market dimensions is an interesting but unexplored avenue for research.A large informal literature discusses the beneﬁts and costs of venture cap-italﬁnancing.Venture capitalists are said to beneﬁt their companies through a variety of activities such as mentoring,strategic advice,monitoring,cer-tiﬁcation to outside stakeholders,corporate governance,professionalization of the company,and recruitment of senior management.On the other hand, obtaining venture capitalﬁnancing also has its costs.The close involvement of the venture capitalist can be time consuming for the entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurs can also experience a signiﬁcant loss of control.Moreover, venture capital is said to be an expensive source of capital(which in turn reﬂects the beneﬁts of having an involved investor).In thinking about the product market dimension,we can draw on the large industrial organization literature.Among the competitive strategies of new companies,an important distinction is made in this literature between inno-vator and imitator strategies.Innovators are thoseﬁrms that are theﬁrst to introduce new products or services for which no close substitute is yet offered in the market.Imitators are also engaged in relatively new products and tech-nologies,but they are not theﬁrst movers in their markets,and therefore tend to compete on aspects other than innovation.2There is no general presuppo-sition that one strategy is systematically better than the other.3However,the choice of an innovator or imitator strategy has implications for the relative importance of strategic actions,such as the importance of being aﬁrst-mover or being quick to market.1Brander and Lewis(1986),for example,examine the relationship between capital structure and pricing of an oligopolist.Other important theoretical contributions to this literature include Poitevin(1989)and Bolton and Scharfstein(1990),who examine endogenousﬁnancial constraints in predatory action games,Maksimovic and Titman(1991),who examine howﬁnancial policy affectsﬁrms’incentive to maintain their product reputation; and Gertner,Gibbons,and Scharfstein(1988),who examine signaling across markets.Chevalier(1995a,b), Philips(1995),and Allen and Phillips(1999)provide some empirical evidence.See Ravid(1988)for a survey. Investors can be either equity or debt investors.F urther,they can be arm’s length or relational investors[see, e.g.,F ama(1985),Sharpe(1990),Diamond(1991),and Rajan(1992)].2In a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature,Lieberman and Montgomery(1988)broadly classify the advantages of being aﬁrst-mover in terms of leadership in product and process technology,preemption of assets,and the development of buyer switching costs;the disadvantages of being aﬁrst-mover relate mainly to free-rider problems and to lock-in effects and sluggish responses ofﬁrst-movers.See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996)and Tirole(1988)for some of the game-theoretic foundations of theﬁrst-mover advantages.3Maggi(1996)shows that even with identical players there may be asymmetric equilibria where someﬁrms pursue innovator and otherﬁrms pursue imitator strategies;expected proﬁts,however,are equalized across companies.A similar conclusion emerges from the literature on the endogenous timing of innovation,sum-marized in Reinganum(1989).960Interaction Between Product Market and FinancingStrateg y With this distinction between innovator and imitator strategies,a number of questions arise relating to venture capitalﬁnancing.F irst,does the choice of a product market strategy inﬂuence the type ofﬁnancing obtained by a start-up company?There are a number of alternative hypotheses.For exam-ple,one alternative would be that the marginal value of obtaining venture capital is greater for innovator companies so that innovators obtain venture capital in equilibrium.This could be because innovators have a wider set of challenges on many fronts(e.g.,development of new business concepts,prod-uct and technological innovation,and development of new markets)and the business expertise provided by venture capitalists can be particularly help-ful in addressing some of these issues.An alternative hypothesis would be that innovators have greater difﬁculties in attracting venture capital,because venture capitalists themselves are accountable to a set of investors who pre-fer more easily understood products.Second,does the choice of an investor affect outcomes in the product market?F or instance,venture capitalists may affect the time it takes a company to bring its product to market.Again,a number of alternative hypotheses are possible.One alternative would be that venture capitalists focus the entrepreneurs on the key strategic challenges and exert inﬂuence in order to speed up the time to market.Alternatively,ven-ture capitalists could be more patient investors that provide the entrepreneurs with additional breathing room,thus slowing down time to market.Because the theoretical considerations suggest that there might be various interac-tion effects pointing in different directions,it is appropriate to submit these questions to an empirical analysis.One of the difﬁculties that typically plagues this line of research is the dearth of available datasets.In order to research these questions we use a unique hand-collected dataset of high-technology companies in Silicon Valley,where the high incidence of entrepreneurial activity provides a rich setting for studying our hypotheses.We use a variety of instruments,includ-ing surveys,interviews,and commercial databases,as well as any publicly available information.The sample design enables us to observe a timeline of events for each company,including whether it obtains venture capital,and if so,when,and how long it takes to bring its product to market.In our data we can hence compare venture capital-and non-venture capital-backed companies.Through interviews,we are also able to obtain product market information that is usually not available,such as a founder’s initial prod-uct market panies are classiﬁed into two groups according to whether their initial strategy is best described as an innovator strategy or an imitator strategy.The criterion for being an innovator is that the company is either creating a new market,is introducing a radical innovation in an existing market,or is developing a technology that will lead to products that satisfy either of the above criteria.44Imitators typically still have a certain amount of inventiveness,but they seek their competitive advantages not through innovation itself,but rather through differentiation,typically in terms of product features or marketing.961The Review of Financial Studies/v13n42000Theﬁrst part of the analysis examines the relationship between the product market strategy and the investor type.In a probit model,controlling for age and industry effects,weﬁnd that innovators are more likely to beﬁnanced by venture capital than are imitators.5In a Cox proportional hazard duration model we alsoﬁnd that innovators obtain venture capital earlier in the life cycle than do imitators.These results refute the sometimes voiced criticisms that venture capital does not support the most innovative start-ups,or that venture capitalists invest in innovative companies only when they are already older and less risky.In the second part of the analysis,we examine the relationship between venture capitalﬁnancing and the time it takes a company to bring its prod-uct to market.In a duration model with time-varying covariates that keeps track of when a company obtains venture capital,weﬁnd that the presence of venture capital is associated with faster time to market.This effect is par-ticularly strong for innovators but statistically insigniﬁcant for imitators.One interpretation of these results is that venture capitalists inﬂuence companies to bring their product to market faster,and this effect is more pronounced for innovators,for whom this might be particularly valuable.This also explains ourﬁrstﬁnding,that innovators are more likely to obtain venture capital.The third part of the analysis considers some alternative interpretations and additional robustness checks.F irst,we ask whetherﬁrms themselves consid-ered obtaining venture capital important.In surveys,ﬁrms were asked to list signiﬁcant milestones in the company’s history.Weﬁnd thatﬁrms are more likely to consider venture capital a milestone event than obtainingﬁnanc-ing from some other kind ofﬁnancier.Second,we then examine whether ourﬁnding of a faster time to market could be due to only companies with certain characteristics obtaining venture capital in equilibrium.It could be that venture capitalists selectﬁrms with certain characteristics,or thatﬁrms with certain characteristics select venture capital.Because we examine equi-librium outcomes,the same basic estimation procedure applies irrespective of who selects whom.However,for ease of exposition,in what follows we word the selection effect as selection by venture capitalists.We test for selec-tion by venture capitalists based on observable information,selection based on expert(predictive)industry knowledge by venture capitalists,and selec-tion based on product announcements,either publicly known or anticipated within the year.In all cases,weﬁnd that after controlling for these effects, venture capital is still associated with a faster time to market,particularly for innovators,suggesting that selection based on these aspects is not driving the results.F inally,we ask why imitators obtain venture capital,given that there5Insofar as ex ante measures of innovation are likely to be correlated to ex post measures,our results are con-sistent with Kortum and Lerner(1998),who,in a somewhat different context,ﬁnd that venture capital-backed ﬁrms are more likely to innovate(through ex post patenting activity)than are non-venture capital-backed ﬁrms.962Interaction Between Product Market and FinancingStrateg y are also costs associated with venture capital,as discussed above.Weﬁnd that venture capital is associated with signiﬁcantly greater amounts of exter-nalﬁnancing for imitators,but not for innovators.This result suggests that venture capital can play different roles in different companies.For imitators the provision of funds may be the more important aspect of venture capital, whereas for innovators,the product market dimension can be more important.The remainder of the article is organized as follows.Section1provides some institutional background on venture capital.Section2lays out the hypotheses.Section3describes the data.Section4examines the effect of the founding strategy on the type ofﬁnancing.Section5examines the rela-tionship between venture capitalﬁnancing and product market outcomes. Section6discusses alternative interpretations and robustness checks. Section7concludes.1.Institutional BackgroundIt is frequently argued that venture capitalists are a distinct type of investor for entrepreneurial companies.In this section we give a brief description of venture capitalists,and the alternatives to venture capital.Venture capitalists are full-time professional investors who invest for their partnership funds.Venture capitalists tend to closely follow the technol-ogy and market developments in their area of expertise in order to stay in the dealﬂow and to be able to make an informed investment decision [F enn,Liang,and Prowse(1995)].Before making an investment,they care-fully scrutinize the founders and their business concepts[Fried and Hisrich (1994),Garmaise(1999)].When making the investment,they bringﬁnancial expertise to structuring the deal and setting appropriate incentive and com-pensation systems[Sahlman(1988,1990),Kaplan and Stromberg(1999)]. After the initial investment,venture capitalists tend to be very active in the process of raising additional funds for their portfolio companies[Gorman and Sahlman(1989)].They also continuously monitor their companies,both formally through participation at the board level and informally[Rosenstein (1988),Lerner(1995)].As monitors and through their access to private infor-mation,like banks,they can help provide certiﬁcation to outside stakeholders [James(1987),Puri(1996,1999),The Economist(1997)].They can provide valuable mentoring and strategic advice for the entrepreneurs and they fre-quently assist companies in providing business contacts and recruiting senior managers[Bygrave and Timmons(1992)].They tend to play an important role in corporate governance,frequently replacing the original founder as CEO[Hellmann(1998)].They help professionalize the company,both within the organization and at the CEO level[for empirical evidence,see Hell-mann and Puri(2000)].F inally,they often take an active role in guiding the exit decision,such as inﬂuencing a company’s initial public offering[Lerner (1994),Gompers(1995)].963The Review of Financial Studies/v13n42000The main alternatives to venture capitalﬁnancing are so-called angels(i.e., private individuals),corporations,banks,government,and self-ﬁnancing. Sahlman(1990)emphasizes the high-powered incentives of venture capi-talists and their high degree of specialization to theﬁnancing of young com-panies,often within only a very limited number of industry segments.Angel investors are independently wealthy individuals who diversify part of their wealth by investing in young companies.Typically they do not have any staff for supervising their investments and tend to rely on their preexisting net-works toﬁnd new deals.Although there is considerable heterogeneity within the angel community,many exercise some other position as their main pro-fessional activity[Benjamin and Sandles(1998),F enn,Liang and Prowse (1998)].Corporations also invest in entrepreneurial companies,either as part of an organized venture capital fund,or on an ad hoc basis.In addition to seekingﬁnancial gains,they frequently also pursue strategic objectives. Hellmann(1997a)shows that entrepreneurs may be quite reluctant to receive funding from corporations if there are potential conﬂicts of interest.More generally,while a corporate investor may,in principle,be in a good posi-tion to add value to an entrepreneurial company,incentive problems and bureaucracy are frequently believed to limit the usefulness of a corporate investor[Block and McMillan(1993),Gompers and Lerner(1998)].Com-mercial banks are an infrequent provider of funding to entrepreneurial com-panies.Apart from occasional loan commitments,banks sometimes engage in venture capital investments through wholly owned subsidiaries.Regula-tory constraints tend to make banks more conservative investors[Fiet and F raser(1994),Hellmann(1997b)].Some investment banks also make ven-ture capital investments,typically with an eye on future transactions,such as underwriting the initial public offering(IPO).Puri(1996,1999),Gande et al.(1997),and Gompers and Lerner(1999)examine the potential con-ﬂict of interest when investors are also ernmentﬁnancing is entirely passive by nature and consists mainly of grants[Lerner(1996)]. Self-ﬁnancing comprisesﬁnancing from the founders,their families,and their friends[F luck,Holtz-Eakin,and Rosen(1998)].Hence it seems reasonable to conjecture that venture capitalists are a somewhat distinct type of investor who specialize in theﬁnancing of entrepreneurial companies.2.The HypothesesIn this section we brieﬂy outline the hypotheses that underlie our analy-sis.Very little is known about the interaction between the product market attributes and the type of investor,particularly in theﬁnancing of start-up companies.Therefore an important question is whether any such inter-actions exist.In testing for interactions we will be careful to account for the timing structure of events.In particular,we distinguish between ex ante strategy prior toﬁnancing,theﬁnancing itself,and the ex post product mar-ket outcome.Thus we examine the interrelationship of the ex ante strategy964Interaction Between Product Market and FinancingStrateg y (innovator or imitator)and the type ofﬁnancing(venture capital or other) on the one hand,and the interrelationship of the type ofﬁnancing and sub-sequent product market outcomes(in particular time to market)on the other.Ourﬁrst null hypothesis is that the type ofﬁnancing is independent of product market strategy,that is,there is no relationship between the ex ante strategy and the type ofﬁnancing of a start-up company.There are at least two alternative hypotheses.Theﬁrst alternative is that venture capitalists prefer to invest in innovator companies,because they have a comparative advantage in identifying and then assisting innovator companies.In particular, their business experience may be particularly helpful to sort through the greater ambiguity that surrounds an innovator company.A second alternative is that venture capitalists,being accountable to their own investors,may prefer to invest in imitator companies,for which the business concepts are easier to comprehend and communicate.Under this view,venture capitalists may shy away from the uncertainty of an innovator company,but are eager to free ride on the learning of other companies by funding mainly imitator companies.6Our second null hypothesis postulates that the type ofﬁnancing is product market neutral,that is,there is no relation between the type ofﬁnancing and product market outcomes of a start-up company.Arguably for start-ups one of the most important product market outcomes is the time it takes to bring a product to market.The null hypothesis would then argue that the type of ﬁnancing(or investor type)does not affect time to market.Again there are at least two alternate hypotheses.Theﬁrst alternative is that the knowledge and the involvement of venture capitalists allow them to better identify promising companies and then assist them in their quest to quickly bring a product to market.Here we would thenﬁnd venture capital being associated with faster time to market.This effect might be particularly strong for innovators whose strategy is predicated on being aﬁrst mover.Alternatively,it could be the case that venture capitalists are patient investors with a higher tolerance for long development cycles that would slow down entrepreneurs.In this case, venture capitalists would be associated with a longer time to market.3.The DataIn order to test our hypotheses we need a sample ofﬁrms chosen indepen-dently ofﬁnancing(so that we have both venture and non-venture capital-backedﬁrms).F urther,we need data on ex ante strategies ofﬁrms,the kind and timing ofﬁnancing(venture capital or not)received,and the timing of bringing a product to market.Our task is complicated by the fact that existing commercial databases such as Venture Economics and Venture One contain data only on venture capital-backedﬁrms,hence we cannot use these6Bylinsky(1995)and Deger(1996)suggest such behavior for the venture capital industry.965The Review of Financial Studies/v13n42000databases to identify a sample ofﬁrms to study.F urther,these databases have scant data on the timeline of events and ex ante strategies ofﬁrms.To conduct this study we therefore use a unique hand-collected dataset of start-ups in Silicon Valley culled from a combination of survey data as well as from publicly available data.This dataset is collated from com-bining two independent research efforts conducted over a period of several years,starting in1994.The initial sample selection of Silicon Valleyﬁrms and data collection was organized by Baron,Burton,and Hannan(1996a,b) which we supplemented in1996and1997with an additionalﬁnancing sur-vey and related data collection.7To generate the initial list of companies three main datasources were used.Theﬁrst two databases that listedﬁrms in Silicon Valley were Rich’s Everyday Sales ProspectingGuide,published by Rich’s Guide,and Technology Resource Guide to Greater Silicon Valley, published by CorpTech.A stratiﬁed random sample was selected in which ﬁrms could have a legal age no older than10years and had to have more than10employees.Moreover,young and largeﬁrms were oversampled and foreignﬁrms were excluded.The Silicon Valley business press was used as a third data source to identify very youngﬁrms that were not even listed in the two databases mentioned above.The purpose of doing this was to alleviate concerns that relying exclusively on guidebooks such as Rich’s and CorpTech to construct the sample might underrepresent new start-ups since there is sometimes a considerable time lag before newly createdﬁrms appear in these guidebooks.Hence the sample was supplemented by adding on22 very youngﬁrms identiﬁed through the Silicon Valley business press.Our sample consists of173start-up companies that are located in California’s Silicon Valley.In order to collect the data,a number of sur-veys were sent to key people in eachﬁrm,covering a wide range of questions about historic and current aspects of the companies.The overall response rate was80%.F urther,trained MBA and Ph.D.students conducted semistruc-tured interviews with key informants of the sample companies.An effort was made to interview the founders,the current CEO,and a human resource manager for each company.This data was then augmented with any infor-mation provided by the company.In addition,publicly available information about each of theﬁrms in the study was gathered from on-line data sources such as Lexis/Nexis,Dialog,Business Connection,or ABI Inform.F urther, forﬁrms that had gone public,annual reports and10-K or IPO prospec-tuses(where available)were also collected and used to augment the data. To obtainﬁnancing data,between autumn1996to October1997we sent out7A more detailed description of the sampling procedures and their rationale can be found in Burton(1996) and in Baron,Burton,and Hannan,(1996a,b).These articles are based on aﬁrst round of interviews of some 100companies that were performed in the summer of1994.A second round of interviews was conducted in the summer of1995,and follow-up interviews were conducted in the summer of1996.This article obviously uses the updated information.Where possible,we also augmented the publicly available information up to the end of our observation period,which we deﬁned to be October1997.966Interaction Between Product Market and FinancingStrateg y a survey addressed to the most senior member of the company in charge of ﬁnance.The survey asked for a completeﬁnancing history of the company since the time of founding.The information was augmented with data avail-able from two commercial databases,Venture Economics and Venture One, largely for the purpose of ascertaining whichﬁrms in our sample received venture capital.8We performed additional cross checks on the data by using the interview transcripts,researching public sources,and placing calls to the companies to resolve remaining ambiguities.We also continued to augment the data coming in from the companies,again using public information as well as the interview and survey material.Considerable emphasis was put on measuring the timing of events such as the date of founding,the date of the ﬁrst product sale,and the timing of allﬁnancing rounds.This experiment design has three distinct advantages.F irst,the sampling is independent of the form ofﬁnancing.One-third of the sample is non-venture-backedﬁrms,allowing us to compare and contrast the behavior of venture-backedﬁrms with non-venture-backedﬁrms.Second,we obtain a clear timeline of events.The design of the study allows us to observe compa-nies over time,including retrospective data all the way back to the founding events.Third,the use of surveys and interviews,though imperfect for the usual reasons,allows us to obtain data,such as the founding strategy,that is normally not available to researchers.In addition,Silicon Valley is an inter-esting environment to study since it has the highest start-up activity in the United States.The narrow focus of our sample,speciﬁcally technology com-panies in Silicon Valley,has the advantage that we can control for common economic conditions,such as geography,labor markets,or regulation.The disadvantage is that the results may,obviously,have limited applicability for companies under different economic base conditions.3.1The variablesIn what follows,we describe the main variables and the way they are deﬁned and collated.Table1shows the descriptive statistics.AGE is the age of the company in October1997measured from the birth date of the company.The date of legal incorporation is often taken as the birth date for companies and would appear to be a natural choice.However, for entrepreneurialﬁrms this is far from obvious.In particular,in our sample, over half of the companies had some other signiﬁcant event that preceded the date of incorporation,such as the beginning of normal business operations or the hiring of aﬁrst employee.Moreover,there does not appear to be any clear sequence of events that these companies follow in this initial period of creation.In this article we therefore take a conservative approach and use the8See Lerner(1994,1995)for a discussion of the Venture Economics database and Gompers and Lerner(1997) for a discussion of the Venture One database.We found107of the sample companies in Venture One and95 in Venture Economics.Some66companies(38%)replied to ourﬁnancing survey.967。

一文读懂股权融资常用的24个英文术语

以下是股权融资中常用的24个英文术语：Equity：股本，公司所有者拥有的资产。

Stock：股票，代表公司的一部分所有权。

Shares：股份，股票的一部分，代表公司的一部分所有权。

Board of Directors：董事会，公司的最高决策机构，由股东选举产生。

Shareholder：股东，持有公司股票的人。

Management：管理层，负责公司的日常运营和决策。

Initial Public Offering (IPO)：首次公开募股，公司首次向公众出售股票。

Secondary Offering：二次发行，公司在首次公开募股后再次向公众出售股票。

Private Equity (PE)：私募股权，非公开交易的股权投资。

Venture Capital (VC)：风险投资，提供给初创企业的股权投资。

11.天使投资人（Angel Investor）：提供种子期资金的人，通常是个人投资者。

12.兼并（Merger）：两家或多家公司合并为一个新的公司。

收购（Acquisition）：一家公司购买另一家公司的全部或部分股权。

反收购（Anti-Takeover）：公司采取措施防止被其他公司收购。

股权稀释（Equity Dilution）：由于新发行股票或其他方式导致现有股东所持股份比例下降。

估值（Valuation）：对公司的价值进行评估。

优先股（Preferred Stock）：具有特殊权利的股票，通常在分红和投票方面优于普通股。

可转债（Convertible Bonds）：可以转换为股票的债券。

尽职调查（Due Diligence）：在交易前对潜在投资目标进行详细的调查和分析。

路演（Roadshow）：向投资者展示公司或产品的推广活动。

招股说明书（Prospectus）：包含公司详细信息的文件，用于吸引投资者购买股票。

基石投资者（Cornerstone Investors）：在首次公开募股中承诺购买大量股票的投资者。

估值的英语单词

估值的英语单词Valuation is an essential concept in finance, representing the process of determining the worth of an asset or a company. It involves various methods, each with its own intricacies and assumptions.Understanding the nuances of valuation is crucial for investors, as it helps them make informed decisions about buying, selling, or holding assets. The art of valuation requires a blend of quantitative analysis and qualitative judgment.In the corporate world, valuation is often used to assess mergers and acquisitions, ensuring that the price paid isfair and in line with the potential future value of the business.For individual investors, learning the vocabulary of valuation can empower them to evaluate stocks and bonds more effectively. Terms like 'discounted cash flow' and 'price-to-earnings ratio' are key to this financial literacy.Moreover, the field of valuation is dynamic, with new models and techniques emerging as markets evolve. Keeping up with these developments can give one an edge in the financial arena.In essence, mastering the language of valuation is notjust about knowing the words; it's about grasping the concepts that drive financial decisions and market outcomes.。

高盛财经词典-英汉对照

高盛财经词典- 英汉对照AEnglish Terms中文翻译详情解释/例子Accelerated Depreciation 加快折旧任何基于会计或税务原因促使一项资产在较早期以较大金额折旧的折旧原则Accident and Health Benefits 意外与健康福利为员工提供有关疾病、意外受伤或意外死亡的福利。

这些福利包括支付医院及医疗开支以及有关时期的收入。

Accounts Receivable (AR) 应收账款客户应付的金额。

拥有应收账款指公司已经出售产品或服务但仍未收取款项Accretive Acquisition 具增值作用的收购项目能提高进行收购公司每股盈利的收购项目Acid Test 酸性测试比率一项严谨的测试，用以衡量一家公司是否拥有足够的短期资产，在无需出售库存的情况下解决其短期负债。

计算方法：(现金+ 应收账款+短期投资)‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾‾流动负债Act of God Bond 天灾债券保险公司发行的债券，旨在将债券的本金及利息与天然灾害造成的公司损失联系起来Active Bond Crowd 活跃债券投资者在纽约股票交易所内买卖活跃的定息证券Active Income 活动收入来自提供服务所得的收入，包括工资、薪酬、奖金、佣金，以及来自实际参与业务的收入Active Investing 积极投资包含持续买卖行为的投资策略。

主动投资者买入投资，并密切注意其走势，以期把握盈利机会Active Management 积极管理寻求投资回报高于既定基准的投资策略Activity Based Budgeting 以活动为基础的预算案一种制定预算的方法，过程为列举机构内每个部门所有牵涉成本的活动，并确立各种活动之间的关系，然后根据此资料决定对各项活动投入的资源Activity Based Management 以活动为基础的管理利用以活动为基础的成本计算制度改善一家公司的运营Activity Ratio 活动比率一项用以衡量一家公司将其资产负债表内账项转为现金或营业额的能力的会计比率Actual Return 实际回报一名投资者的实际收益或损失，可用以下公式表示：预期回报加上公司特殊消息及总体经济消息Actuary 精算保险公司的专业人员，负责评估申请人及其医疗纪录，以预测申请人的寿命Acquisition 收购一家公司收购另一家公司的多数股权Acquisition Premium 收购溢价收购一家公司的实际成本与该公司收购前估值之间的差额Affiliated Companies 联营公司一家公司拥有另一家公司少数权益（低于50%）的情况，或指两家公司之间存在某些关联Affiliated Person 关联人士能影响一家企业活动的人士，包括董事、行政人员及股东等After Hours Trading 收盘后交易主要大型交易所正常交易时间以外进行的买卖交易After Tax Operating Income - ATOI 税后营运收入一家公司除税后的总营运收入。

与创新思维引领潮流有关的英语作文

Innovation is the driving force behind progress and development in todays rapidly evolving world.It is the key to unlocking new opportunities and leading the way in various fields.Here are some key aspects of how innovative thinking can lead the trend:1.Embracing Change:Innovative thinking encourages individuals and organizations to embrace change rather than resist it.This mindset is crucial in adapting to the everchanging landscape of technology,consumer preferences,and market demands.2.Problem Solving:Innovators approach problems with a fresh perspective,seeking unconventional solutions that can revolutionize industries.This problemsolving approach often leads to breakthroughs that set new standards.3.Risk Taking:Leading trends requires the courage to take risks.Innovators are often the first to venture into uncharted territories,and their willingness to take calculated risks can lead to significant advancements.4.CrossDisciplinary Collaboration:Innovative thinking often involves drawing from multiple disciplines to create unique solutions.This crosspollination of ideas can lead to unexpected and innovative outcomes.5.Adopting Technology:Staying at the forefront of technological advancements is essential for trendsetting.Embracing new tools and platforms can provide a competitive edge and open up new possibilities.erCentric Design:Innovations that focus on user experience and satisfaction are more likely to gain traction.Understanding and anticipating the needs of users can lead to the creation of products and services that resonate with the market.7.Sustainability:As society becomes more environmentally conscious,innovative thinking that incorporates sustainability is increasingly important.Ecofriendly solutions can lead the trend in various sectors,from manufacturing to energy production.8.Continuous Learning:Innovators never stop learning.They stay informed about the latest trends,research,and developments in their field and beyond,which allows them to continuously innovate and adapt.9.Creativity and Imagination:The ability to think creatively and imagine new possibilities is at the heart of innovation.This imaginative thinking can lead to the development of products,services,and ideas that were previously unimagined.10.Collaborative Mindset:Innovation often thrives in environments that encourage collaboration.By working together,diverse teams can combine their unique perspectives and skills to create innovative solutions.In conclusion,innovative thinking is not just about creating new products or services its about a mindset that is open to change,willing to take risks,and focused on creating value for users and society as a whole.By fostering such a mindset,individuals and organizations can lead the trend and shape the future.。

伟大投资者的策略英文

6
Nature Of Investment Strategies
What is Your Advantage?
Superior Information Receive market-moving material before others
(difficult in the Internet Age and in the presence of Insider Trading laws.) Use of relevant information sources with limited distribution (e.g. obscure website, bulletin board, newsgroup, newsletter, etc.)
9
Nature Of Investment Strategies (cont’d)
Length of Strategy Effectiveness (Fleeting vs. Eternal, Static vs. Dynamic)
Successful strategies often self-destruct. Successful investors attract attention. People reverse engineer successful strategies. Too much money chasing too few investment
Sanford Grossman, Renowned Wharton Finance Professor and successful hedge fund manager.
13
Benjamin Graham
Q: Who is this person? A: Benjamin Graham is known as the father of

寻找投资价值英文作文

寻找投资价值英文作文英文：Investment value is a subjective topic and can vary greatly depending on individual preferences and goals. However, there are certain factors that can be considered when determining whether an investment has potential value.One important factor is the current and future market demand for the product or service being offered by the company. For example, if a company is offering a product that is in high demand and has the potential for growth, then it may be a good investment opportunity.Another factor to consider is the financial stability of the company. This includes analyzing the company's financial statements, such as its balance sheet and income statement, to determine its profitability and financial health. A company with a strong financial position is more likely to provide a good return on investment.In addition, it is important to consider the management team of the company. A strong and experienced management team can help ensure the success and growth of the company, while a weak or inexperienced team may lead to poor performance.Finally, it is important to consider the valuation of the investment. This includes analyzing the price-to-earnings ratio, price-to-book ratio, and other financial metrics to determine whether the investment is priced appropriately and has potential for growth.Overall, when looking for investment value, it is important to consider a variety of factors and do thorough research before making any investment decisions.中文：投资价值是一个主观的话题，取决于个人的偏好和目标。

Legality and venture capital governance around the world

Legality and venture capital governance around the worldDouglas Cumming a ,Daniel Schmidt b ,Uwe Walz c ,⁎a York University -Schulich School of Business,4700Keele Street,Toronto,Ontario,Canada M3J 1P3b Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main and CEPRES Mertonstraße 7,D-60054Frankfurt am Main,Germany cGoethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main,Schumannstr.60,D-60054Frankfurt/Main,Germanya r t i c l e i n f o ab s t r ac tArticle history:Received 14January 2007Received in revised form 4June 2008Accepted 2July 2008We analyze governance with a new dataset on investments of venture capitalists in 3848portfolio ﬁrms in 39countries from North and South America,Europe and Asia spanning 1971–2003.We provide evidence that cross-country differences in legality,including legal origin and accounting standards,have a signi ﬁcant impact on the governance structure of investments in the VC industry:better laws facilitate faster deal screening and deal origination,a higher probability of syndication and a lower probability of potentially harmful co-investment,and facilitate investor board representation of the investor.We also show that country-speci ﬁc differences exist apart from legal and economic development.©2008Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.JEL classi ﬁcation:G24G31G32Keywords:Venture capitalCorporate governance SyndicationEntrepreneurial ﬁnance1.Executive summaryVenture capital is distinct from other forms of ﬁnancial intermediation primarily through the governance and value-added that the investor provides to the investee.While the oldest and most successful venture capital market has been in the U.S.,venture capital activities have spread across the globe with increasing vigour in the latter part of the 20th century.Nevertheless,massive differences remain in the size and success of venture capital markets around the world.The de ﬁning characteristic of venture capital as a form of ﬁnancial intermediation is the governance provided to their entrepreneurial investees.As such,the source of international differences in venture capital markets is most likely attributable to the impact of laws and institutions on venture capital governance structures.In this paper,we focus on international differences in governance structures and investment patterns in venture capital in three related and equally important categories:(1)time from fundraising to deal origination (which re ﬂects screening and due diligence),(2)syndication and co-investment,and (3)board seats and security choice.To fully understand the structure and governance of venture capitalists vis-à-vis their entrepreneurial investees,it is useful to examine each of these complementary and interrelated aspects in unison.Further,a joint analysis of each of these governance mechanisms which address the various stages throughout the investment cycle of the venture capitalist facilitates a fairly comprehensive picture of the source of international differences in venture capital markets.We thereby add to the literature and build on prior work on international differences in VC markets based on aggregate industry data.Journal of Business Venturing 25(2010)54–72⁎Corresponding author.E-mail addresses:Douglas@ (D.Cumming),daniel.schmidt@cepres.de (D.Schmidt),uwe.walz@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de (U.Walz).URL's:http://www.schulich.yorku.ca/, (D.Cumming),http://www.wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de/profs/walz (U.Walz).0883-9026/$–see front matter ©2008Elsevier Inc.All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.jbusvent.2008.07.001Contents lists available at ScienceDirectJournal of Business VenturingThe ﬁrst main pillar of our analysis focuses on the screening process,which is of vital importance to venture capitalists.For instance,venture capitalists in the U.S.receive more than 1000requests for ﬁnancing each year,but complete at most only a couple of deals in a typical year.In terms of cross-country differences in venture capital ﬁnance,where the legal and institutional framework impedes the due diligence and investment process (e.g.,through slow bureaucracies,risk of contract repudiation etc.)this slows down the rate of investment and ability of a fund to properly manage deal ﬂow and the ﬁnancing of meritorious entrepreneurial ﬁrms.The screening and due diligence process is in turn closely connected to syndication and co-investment,or the interaction among different investors within any investment.This is the second main pillar of our analysis.Prior research has established the notion that syndication enhances venture capitalist screening,monitoring and value-added.By contrast,co-investment (i.e.,the investment of different funds of the same VC ﬁrm into the same entrepreneurial ﬁrm)does not facilitate these governance mechanisms and may re ﬂect an agency problem vis-à-vis the institutional investors if one VC fund is using capital to bail out the bad investments of another VC fund within the same VC organizational structure.We extend the literature by exploring the issue of whether successful legal and institutional structures facilitate syndication relations and inhibit co-investment by VCs in a very broad international context.Our third and ﬁnal pillar invokes an analysis of the interaction between venture capitalists and their investees.We study cash ﬂow and control rights that focus on the substantive aspect of governance as opposed to the form of governance.In regard to the control rights,we investigate the question of whether the venture capitalist has a seat on the board of directors of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm.We are able to add to prior research by studying a broader array of data and countries than that which has previously been possible with prior datasets.In regard to cash ﬂow rights,we extend prior work by examining whether the ﬁnancial contract between the VC and entrepreneur involves just upside potential for the investor,or whether there is both period cash ﬂows provided to the investor prior to exit,as well as upside potential.That is,we have speci ﬁc details on the contract that get beyond the form of the contract and go more closely at the substantive structure of the contract.In view of the fact that contracts of different forms may be functionally equivalent,and speci ﬁc contractual forms that are immaterial to their substantive content may be attributable to hidden practice level concerns that are of ﬁrst order importance;this is an important new dimension of our analysis.In each of the three main areas of our analysis we analyze the impact of different legal systems and thereby consider the Legality index.We also consider the robustness of the legality results to legal origin variables (English,French,German and Scandinavian)as prior work is consistent with the view that English legal origin facilitates capital raising through stronger legal protections afforded to investors.We further consider accounting standards,as they directly relate to information asymmetries faced by investors,which are particularly pronounced for early stage investments in high-tech companies.The effect of laws is considered while controlling for economic conditions (GNP per capita,MSCI index performance,etc.).A key component of our analysis rests with the introduction of a very large international dataset of 3828venture capitalist investments from 39countries (from North and South America,Europe and Asia)and 33years (1971–2003).We show that the legal framework has a strong impact on each of these closely related areas of governance,and signi ﬁcantly build on and extend the literature on international differences of venture capital.The new data introduced herein reveal a number of key results with respect to international differences in time to investment and deal origination,syndication,co-investment,board seats,and the functional form of the ﬁnancing instrument chosen.Our ﬁrst central result indicates that better laws facilitate faster deal screening and origination.Second,we show that better laws lead to a higher probability of syndication and a lower probability of potentially harmful co-investment.Third,we show that better laws also facilitate board representation of the investor.We also ﬁnd evidence that law matters in terms of in ﬂuencing the probability of using securities which involve periodic cash ﬂows prior to exit,albeit this latter ﬁnding is not as statistically robust.Overall,however,we do note that law plays an important role in the extensive venture capital data introduced herein for a wide variety of robustness checks,such as inclusion or exclusion of the US from the dataset.Legal conditions are an important condition for enabling venture capitalist governance structures that facilitate the ﬁnancing of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures,and the success of a country's venture capital market.2.IntroductionVenture capital is distinct from other forms of ﬁnancial intermediation primarily through the governance and value-added that the investor provides to the investee (see e.g.,Sapienza,1992;Manigart et al.,1996,2002;Gompers and Lerner,1999;Kanniainen and Keuschnigg,2003,2004).While the oldest and most successful venture capital market has been in the U.S.,venture capital activities have spread across the globe with increasing vigour in the latter part of the 20th century (see e.g.,Lerner,2000;Hege et al.,2003;Mayer et al.,2005;Lerner and Schoar,2005).Nevertheless,massive differences remain in the size and success of venture capital markets around the world.The de ﬁning characteristic of venture capital as a form of ﬁnancial intermediation is in the governance provided to their entrepreneurial investees.As such,the source of international differences in venture capital markets is most likely attributable to the impact of laws and institutions on venture capital governance structures.In this paper,we focus on international differences in governance structures and investment patterns in venture capital in three related and equally important categories:(1)time from fundraising to deal origination (which re ﬂects screening and due diligence),(2)syndication and co-investment,and (3)board seats and security choice.To fully understand the structure and governance of venture capitalists vis-à-vis their entrepreneurial investees,it is useful to examine each of these complementary and interrelated aspects in unison.Further,a joint analysis of each of these governance mechanisms which address the various stages throughout the investment cycle of the venture capitalist facilitates a fairly comprehensive picture of the source of international55D.Cumming et al./Journal of Business Venturing 25(2010)54–7256 D.Cumming et al./Journal of Business Venturing25(2010)54–72differences in venture capital markets.We thereby add to the literature and build on prior work on international differences in VC markets based on aggregate industry data(e.g.,Leleux and Surlemont,2003).Our empirical analysis also adds to a growing body of theoretical studies on the role of different legal contexts and policy towards venture capital and entrepreneurship(Keuschnigg, 2003,2004;Keuschnigg and Nielsen,2001,2003a,b,2004a,b).We develop hypotheses that relate law quality to each of our three categories of venture capital governance.Inefﬁcient legal systems might hamper the rate of investment and ability of a fund to properly manage dealﬂow and theﬁnancing of meritorious entrepreneurialﬁrms.The screening and due diligence process is in turn closely connected to syndication and co-investment,or the interaction among different investors within any investment.We consider whether successful legal and institutional structures facilitate syndication relations and inhibit co-investment by VCs in a very broad international context.We also analyze the role of legal systems in facilitating the interaction between VCs and their investees in terms of the allocation of cashﬂow and control rights.In each of the three main areas of our analysis we analyze the impact of different legal systems and thereby consider the Legality index(Berkowitz et al.,2003).The Legality index is a weighted average of the legal index variables introduced by La Porta et al. (1997,1998),as deﬁned by Berkowitz et al.(2003).Each of the components of the Legality index is highly pertinent to venture ﬁnance,as discussed in detail in Section2of this paper.We also consider the robustness of the legality results to legal origin variables(English,French,German and Scandinavian)as prior work is consistent with the view that English legal origin facilitates capital raising through stronger legal protections afforded to investors(La Porta et al.,1998;see also Beck et al.,2005;Dyck and Zingales,2004).We further consider accounting standards(Bhattacharya et al.,2003),as they directly relate to information asymmetries faced by investors,which are particularly pronounced for early stage investments in high-tech companies.The effect of laws is considered while controlling for economic conditions(GNP per capita,MSCI index performance,etc.).We also show country-speciﬁc differences exist apart from legal and economic development.A key component of our analysis rests with the introduction of a very large international dataset of3828venture capitalist investments from39countries(from North and South America,Europe and Asia)and33years(1971–2003).We show that the legal framework has a strong impact on each of these closely related areas of governance.The new data introduced herein reveal a number of key results with respect to international differences in time to investment and deal origination,syndication,co-investment,board seats,and the functional form of theﬁnancing instrument chosen.First,we show that better laws facilitate faster deal screening and origination.Second,weﬁnd that better laws lead to a higher probability of syndication and a lower probability of potentially harmful co-investment.Third,we show that better laws facilitate board representation of the investor.We furtherﬁnd evidence that legal systems inﬂuence the probability that the investor requires periodic cashﬂows,albeit this latter evidence is less robust.Overall,the data indicate that Legality plays a crucial role in venture capitalist governance structures that facilitate theﬁnancing of high-tech entrepreneurial ventures,and the success of a country's venture capital market.This paper is organized as follows.Section2provides a brief overview of the literature on law and entrepreneurialﬁnance. Section3introduces the data and provides summary statistics.The econometric analyses are provided in Section4.The last section concludes.3.Legality and venture governanceOur focus in this paper is on the relation between Legality and venture capital governance in terms of(1)time from fundraising to deal origination,(2)syndication and co-investment,and(3)board seats and security choice.1One of the primary explanations for the very existence of venture capital funds is in fact the pronounced degree of information asymmetries and agency costs which makes investment in small high-tech entrepreneurialﬁrms infeasible for banks(Sahlman,1990;Gompers and Lerner,1999).Time to deal origination is therefore important to consider in venture capitalﬁnance because it reﬂects screening and due diligence. Elements of the investment structure(syndication,co-investment,board seats and security choice)are also important to consider for the purpose of mitigating information asymmetries and agency costs in venture investment.Seminal work on law andﬁnance(La Porta et al.,1997,1998)has shown that law has a role in affecting the ability of the entrepreneur to enjoy private beneﬁts and the investor's costs and beneﬁts associated with monitoring the entrepreneur.Brieﬂy stated,‘better’legal systems lower the costs associated with monitoring the entrepreneur and thereby reduce the scope for the entrepreneur to maximize private beneﬁts.We transfer this notion to the relationship between VCs and their portfolioﬁrm.3.1.Different measures of law qualityThere are a variety of indices of law quality around the world.In this paper we use a number of different indices to illustrate robustness to alternative speciﬁcations.The most widely legal instruments,following La Porta et al.(1997,1998),are the variables for English,French,German and Scandinavian legal origin.French,German and Scandinavian legal origin countries follow the civil law tradition,while English legal origin countries follow the common law tradition.Civil laws give investors weaker legal 1Prior work in ventureﬁnance has not studied in any context and/or country the time to deal origination.Existing studies in ventureﬁnance have analyzedsyndication and co-investment in the US,but there has been limited international evidence and no prior empirical work on the relation between syndication and legality.Concurrent work has considered VC board seats and security choice in international contexts with smaller datasets(of around200observations;see Kaplan et al.,2007;Lerner and Schoar,2005;Allen and Song,2003).Further,our deﬁnition of security design in this paper differs signiﬁcantly from all prior venture capital studies in that we focus on the functional form of the security,as discussed below.protection than common law mon law countries never enable rules that block shares for block shareholder meetings,more often have laws protecting oppressed minorities,require relatively little share capital to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting,and enable stronger enforcement of these and other shareholder rights (La Porta et al.,1998).This allows for better protection of VCs even when they only possess minority stakes in the company.Similarly,common law countries offer creditors stronger legal protections against managers in terms of being more likely to guarantee priority rules in bankruptcy for secured creditors and precluding managers from unilaterally seeking court protection from creditors (La Porta et al.,1998).In short,investor rights are stronger in common law countries.In other words,theory and evidence in La Porta et al.(1997,1998)is consistent with the view that English legal origin countries offer superior legal regimes that facilitate ﬁnancing and access to capital.Furthermore,common law systems afford greater ﬂexibility and react faster to new developments and governance mechanisms (such as novel contract design instruments used by venture capitalists)relative to civil law systems.This facilitates the set up of appropriately designed contracts to act as crucial governance devices in VC ﬁnancing,and makes contractual relationships between VCs in the course of syndicated deals easier.As well,within the families of civil and common law countries,law quality varies a lot.Measures of law quality have been devised for the ef ﬁciency of the judicial system (the ef ﬁciency and integrity of the legal environment produced by the country risk rating agency Business International Corporation),the rule of law (the assessment of the law and order tradition in the country,produced by the country risk rating agency International Country Risk (ICR)),corruption (the extent of government corruption in a country,produced by ICR),risk of expropriation (the risk of outright con ﬁscation or forced nationalization,produced by ICR),and risk of contract repudiation (the risk of contract modi ﬁcation,produced by ICR).These indices are presented in La Porta et al.(1998)and generally refer to the averages for the years 1982–1995.It is noteworthy that these variables are highly correlated and hence impossible to simultaneously use in a regression equation.Berkowitz et al.(2003)constructed a measure which they refer to as the Legality index which is a weighted average of these legal indices.A higher Legality index indicates better substantive legal content pertaining to investing,the quality and likelihood of enforcement.For example,with a higher Legality index the enforcement of contracts and the veri ﬁability of elements of VC contracts is clearly facilitated,thereby making it easier,more valuable and faster to implement such corporate governance mechanism in VC ﬁnancing.Note that Legality appropriately refers to the laws of the country of residence of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm.2In addition to the civil/common law,legal origin and Legality index,we also consider differences in accounting standards (Bhattacharya et al.,2003).Superior accounting standards (Bhattacharya et al.,2003)offer superior regimes that facilitate entrepreneurial ﬁnance,particularly since they directly relate to information asymmetries faced by rmation asymmetries are especially pronounced for early stage investments in high-tech companies.Regarding this,it is particularly relevant to consider the extent to which ﬁrms exaggerate their ﬁnancial prospects (their ‘earnings aggressiveness ’,de ﬁned by Bhattacharya et al.,2003as average ﬁrms'accruals divided by lagged assets in a country)in terms of reporting prospective income and deferring expenses.This measure is intended to capture exaggerated growth prospects and more pronounced informational problems faced by VCs.Finally,we also consider legal indices for creditor and anti-director rights (based on La Porta et al.,1998).The Creditor Rights Index adds 1whenever (1)the country imposes restrictions,such as creditors'consent or minimum dividends to ﬁle for reorganization,(2)secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved,(3)secured creditors are ranked ﬁrst in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt ﬁrm and (4)the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the resolution of the reorganization.The Antidirector Rights (or Shareholder Rights)Index adds 1whenever (1)the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the ﬁrm,(2)shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general shareholders'meeting,(3)cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed,(4)an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place,(5)the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders'meeting is less than or equal to 10percent (the sample median),or (6)shareholders have pre-emptive rights that can be waived only by a shareholders'vote.It is perhaps natural to expect that these speci ﬁc indices will have more direct bearing on whether investors sit on the board of directors and the type of security selected,and hence these variables are considered in the empirical analyses.3.2.Venture capital governance in relation to law qualityVCs in the U.S.receive more than 1000requests for ﬁnancing each year,but complete at most only a couple of deals in a typical year (Sahlman,1990).3In terms of cross-country differences in venture capital ﬁnance,where the legal and institutional framework impedes the due diligence and investment process (e.g.,through slow bureaucracies,risk of contract repudiation,etc.),this slows down the rate of investment and ability of a fund to properly manage deal ﬂow and the ﬁnancing of meritorious entrepreneurial ﬁrms.Hence,the ﬁrst dimension of our analyses focuses on the time to investment (relative to the date at which2In the vast majority of cases in our dataset the VC and entrepreneur were resident in the same country.Of the total population in our data (3848entrepreneurial ﬁrms),266involved a VC that was not resident in the same country.This aspect of the data is not part of our group of explanatory variables,as there is no clear causal connection from choice of foreign/domestic investing and our dependent variables of interest in this paper.3Different venture capitalists in 2005report statistics indicating that they receive a few hundred per year to a few thousand per year.Venture capitalists often report in 2005that they do detailed due diligence on 20%of such plans.See,e.g.,http://www.so ﬁnnova.fr/scripts/so ﬁnnova.php?tpl=so ﬁnnova05&choix_lan-gue=en for a venture fund in France that reports receiving 1500business plans per year,and /bizbasics/gettingstarted/vcs_bizplan.html for a venture capital fund in Tampa that reports receiving approximately 300business plans per year.By comparison,in Germany Deutsche Venture Capital http://www.dvcg.de/gb/investment-criteria/faq.asp reports receiving 6–7requests for venture ﬁnancing per working day (or 1560–1820per year).57D.Cumming et al./Journal of Business Venturing 25(2010)54–7258 D.Cumming et al./Journal of Business Venturing25(2010)54–72the fundraising was completed and the fund commenced).Although this is not a direct measure of the exact amount of time that the investors spent screening a particular deal,4it is nevertheless a useful proxy for the screening time.While imprecise,we believe this offers an interesting new dimension in which we may infer the role of Legality in venture capitalist due diligence,among other things,and hope this inspires further data collection for future research.While no direct theoretical analysis exists,at a general level the multitude of analyses in Gompers and Lerner(1999)on the U.S.market is consistent with the view that better laws reduce the costs of informationﬂow and therefore reduce the time required to screen and originate a deal.Lerner(1994)and others have pointed out signiﬁcant potential problems among syndicated investors.In particular,where there exists a lead inside investor and follow-on outside investors with less information about the quality of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm,the lead investor may induce the follow-on investor to invest at excessively high deal prices,and/orﬁnance negative NPV projects,and/or ask for a larger capital contribution than necessary.Since contracts by themselves can at best mitigate and not completely eliminate agency problems among syndicated investors(and require a sufﬁciently strong legal system in order to be enforceable),there is a complementary role for the country's legal system in facilitating the syndication process.Where successfully carried out,there is a signiﬁcant role for syndication to enhance the value-added provided by the investors to the investees and to spreadﬁnancial risk associated with venture capital investments by allowing syndicating VCs to share the risk of individual projects among themselves(Lerner,1994;Lockett and Wright,1999,2001;Cumming,2005;Meuleman and Wright, 2006).5In contrast to syndication,co-investment is generally viewed as undesirable as discussed in Gompers and Lerner(1996,1999). Gompers and Lerner explain that venture fund managers have incentives to co-invest where the funds from one VC fund within a VC organization are useful to bail out the bad investments of another fund within the same organization or can be used to inﬂate valuations of unexited investments.Obviously,there are potential beneﬁts of co-investment such as synergies between different funds of the sameﬁrm as well.However,these positive effects are typically outweighed by the negative effects due to opportunistic behaviour.On the one hand,the positive effects can be realized via syndication while avoiding the negative effects.On the other hand,and more importantly,the fact that contract covenants between the venture capital fund and the investors typically restrict these co-investments quite rigorously(see Gompers and Lerner,1999,p.39)can be considered as a clear indication that investors put more weight on the negative than on the positive effects.In terms of cross-country differences,we would expect the ability of institutional investors and venture fund managers to have an enhanced ability to write enforceable limited partnership agreements that bar co-investment in those countries with better legal structure,as found in Cumming and Johan(2006).If so,co-investment itself should be observed less frequently in countries with better laws.In a similar way,control rights should also naturally be related to legality.With respect to control rights,we examine the representation by the VC on the entrepreneurialﬁrm's board of directors.While this is certainly not the only dimension of control at the hands of the VC,this element of control tends to be highly correlated with other means by which a VC can exercise control (Kaplan and Strömberg,2003),and therefore provides a useful indication as to the effect of Legality on control.On the one hand, we might expect board seats to be more frequently used among countries with worse legal systems since board representation substitutes for poor legal protection(see e.g.,Klapper and Love,2004).Better legal systems increase pledgeable income(Aghion and Bolton,1992)making the allocation of control rights to the VC less important and likely.Relatedly,we may predict that better legal systems reduce the cost of information generation for all sources of information,but probably most for external investors, thereby making a board seat less necessary.On the other hand,we might expect board seats to be more effective in countries with higher Legality indices,because better legal systems enhance the marginal beneﬁt and lower the costs to sitting on the board of directors with more transparent and complete access to information pertaining to the entrepreneur's activities.Without examining a broad array of data,it is difﬁcult to know which effect dominates.Finally,we examine cashﬂow rights in terms of the security choice.Research in venture capitalﬁnance has predominantly focused on the form of the security,with a view towards concluding that convertible preferred equity is optimal.6In short,this literature indicates convertible preferred equity securities are predominant in the United States,whereas a variety of instruments are used more often in other countries.7Again,the focus in this literature has been on the form of the contract,as opposed to its function in practice.Merton(1995)(among others)has shown that neutral mutation exists among different securities such that they may replicate one another in practice.We focus on whether or not the security chosen provided for periodic cashﬂows from the investee back to the investor(alongside the upside potential).All else being equal,in countries with poor laws(in terms of investor protection,etc.),we would expect the investor to require periodic cash payments in addition to the possibility of an upside potential upon exit in order to mitigate the pronounced risks associated with investing in countries with poor laws.4The exact time spent screening would require knowledge of the date at which the particular dealﬁrst came to the attention of the venture capitalist(and most venture capitalists we spoke with could not even provide approximations of such dates).To the best of our knowledge,such private conﬁdential data has never been obtainable for any academic VC study.With the vast array of data in our sample across39countries and32years,this was likewise not possible in our paper to obtain such speciﬁcs.Nevertheless,we believe our details and analyses are signiﬁcant new extensions to the literature.5While we focus on the positive view of syndication it should be noted that syndication could also potentially harm investors.This is the case if syndication is used for“window dressing”purposes only(see Lerner,1994,on this issue).6See e.g.,Bascha and Walz(2001),Berglöf(1994),Bergmann and Hege(1998),and Casamatta(2003).In the US debt is often used in conjunction with venture capitalﬁnancing with convertible preferred shares(Barry and Mihov,2006).7See e.g.,Cumming(2006,2008),Gilson and Schizer(2003),Gompers and Lerner(2001a,b),Hege et al.(2003),Kaplan and Strömberg(2003),Kaplan et al. (2007),and Lerner and Schoar(2005).With our data(Section3)we are able to assess a much broader array of countries and time periods with a much greater volume of data than that which is considered in comparable international studies(Kaplan et al.,2007;Lerner and Schoar,2005).Therefore we complement the prior work on this speciﬁc topic(without going into the same detail in terms of different speciﬁc control rights).We also consider our work to be complementary to Lerner's(1995)detailed analysis of board seat structure(and impact)of venture-ﬁnancedﬁrms.。

股票的估值与股利政策外文文献翻译

外文文献翻译原文+译文文献出处：Amidu M. THE STUDY ON VALUATION OF SHARESAND DIVIDEND POLICY[J]. The journal of risk finance, 2017, 2(2): 136-145.原文THE STUDY ON VALUATION OF SHARES AND DIVIDENDPOLICYAmidu MAlthough these questions of fact have been the subject of many empirical studies in recent years no consensus has yet been achieved. One reason appears to be the absence in the literature of a complete and reasonably rigorous statement of those parts of the economic theory of valuation bearing directly on the matter of dividend policy. Lacking such a statement, investigators have not yet been able to frame their tests with sufficient precision to distinguish adequately between the various contending hypotheses. Nor have they been able to give a convincing explanation of what their test results do imply about the underlying process of valuation. EFFECT OF DIVIDEND POLICY WITH PERFECT MARKETS, RATIONAL BEHA/IOR, AND PERFECT CERTAINTYThe meaning of the basic assumptions. -Although the terms" perfect markets," "rational behavior," and "perfect certainty" are widely usedthroughout economic theory, it may be helpful to start by spelling out the precise meaning of these assumptions in the present context.1.In "perfect capital markets," no buyer or seller (or issuer) of securities is large enough for his transactions to have an appreciable impact on the then ruling price. All traders have equal and costless access to information about the ruling price and about all other relevant characteristics of shares (to be detailed specifically later). No brokerage fees, transfer taxes, or other transaction costs are incurred when securities are bought, sold, or issued, and there are no tax differentials either between distributed and undistributed profits or between dividends and capital gains.2."Rational behavior" means that investors always prefer more wealth to less and are indifferent as to whether a given increment to their wealth takes the form of cash payments or an increase in the market value of their holdings of shares.3."Perfect certainty" implies complete assurance on the part of every investor as to the future investment program and the future profits of every corporation. Because of this assurance, there is, among other things, no need to distinguish between stocks and bonds as sources of fund sat this stage of the analysis. We can, therefore, proceed as if there were only a single type of financial instrument which, for convenience, we shall refer to as shares of stock.The fundamental principle of valuation.- Under' these assumptions the valuation of all shares would be governed by the following fundamental principle: the price of each share must be such that the rate of return (dividends plus capital gains per dollar invested) on every share will be the same throughout the market over any given interval of time. WHAT DOES THE MARKET "REALLY" CAPITALIZE?In the literature on valuation one can find at least the following four more or less distinct approaches to the valuation of shares: (1) the discounted cash flow approach;(2) the current earnings plus future investment opportunities approach; (3) the stream of dividends approach; and (4) the stream of earnings approach. To demonstrate that these approaches are, in fact, equivalent it will be helpful to begin by first going back to equation (5) and developing from it a valuation formula to serve as a point of reference and comparisonEARNINGS, DIVIDENDS, AND GROWTH RATESThe convenient case of constant growth rates.-The relation between the stream of earnings of the firm and the stream of dividends and of returns to the stock- holders can be brought out most clearly by specializing(12) to the case in which investment opportunities are such as to generate a constant rate of growth of profits in perpetuity. Admittedly, this case has little empirical significance, but it is convenient for illustrative purposes and has received much attention in the literature.The growth of dividends and the growth of total profits.-Given that total earnings (and the total value of the firm) are growing at the rate kp* what is the rate of growth of dividends per share and of the price per share? Clearly, the answer will vary depending on whether or not the firm is paying out a high percentage of its earnings and thus relying heavily on outside financing. We can show the nature of this dependence explicitly by making use of the fact that whatever the rate of growth of dividends per share the present value of the firm by the dividend approach must be the same as by the earnings approach. The special case of exclusively internal financing.-As noted above the growth rate of dividends per share is not the same as the growth rate of the firm except in the special case in which all financing is internal. This is merely one of a number of peculiarities of this special case on which, unfortunately, many writers have based their entire analysis. The reason for the preoccupation with this special case is far from clear to us. Certainly no one would suggest that it is the only empirically relevant case. Even if the case were in fact the most common, the theorist would still be under an obligation to consider alternative assumptions. We suspect that in the last analysis, the popularity of the internal financing model will be found to reflect little more than its ease of manipulation combined with the failure to push the analysis far enough to disclose how special and how treacherous a case it really is.THE EFFECTS OF DIVIDEND POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTYUncertainty and the general theory of valuation.-In turning now from the ideal world of certainty to one of uncertainty our first step, alas, must be to jettison the fundamental valuation principle as given, say, in our equation .DIVIDEND POLICY AND MARKET IMPERFECTIONSTo complete the analysis of dividend policy, the logical next step would presumably be to abandon the assumption of perfect capital markets. This is, however, a good deal easier to say than to do principally because there is no unique set of circumstances that constitutes "imperfection. "We can describe not one but a multitude of possible departures from strict perfection, singly and in combinations. Clearly, to attempt to pursue the implications of each of these would only serve to add inordinately to an already overlong discussion. We shall instead, therefore, limit ourselves in this concluding section to a few brief and genera lob serrations about imperfect markets that we hope may prove helpful to those taking up the task of extending the theory of valuation in this direction.It is important to keep in mind that from the standpoint of dividend policy, what counts is not imperfection per se but only imperfection that might lead an investor to have a systematic preference as between a dollar of current dividends and a dollar of current capital gains. Whereon such systematic preference is produced, we can subsume the imperfection in the (random) error term always carried along when applying propositions derivedfrom ideal models to real world events.译文股票的估值与股利政策研究Amidu M近年来，虽然有很多关于这些问题的实证探索研究，但是并未研究出有效地结果，专家学者们也未达成一致。

understanding actuarial practice

understanding actuarial practiceActuarial practice refers to the specific field of work that actuaries engage in. Actuaries are professionals who use mathematical and statistical techniques to assess and manage risks in various industries, particularly insurance and finance.Understanding actuarial practice involves gaining knowledge and expertise in several key areas:1. Risk assessment: Actuaries analyze data and use mathematical models to evaluate the potential risks and uncertainties faced by individuals and organizations. This includes assessing the likelihood and potential impact of various events such as accidents, illnesses, or natural disasters.2. Pricing and product design: Actuaries play a crucial role in determining the pricing of insurance products. They consider various factors such as the probability of claims, expected costs, and market trends to determine the appropriate premium rates for insurance policies. Actuaries also contribute to the design and development of new insurance products to meet customer needs.3. Reserving and financial reporting: Actuaries areresponsible for estimating and setting aside funds, known as reserves, to cover future insurance claims and liabilities. These reserves ensure that insurance companies can fulfill their obligations to policyholders. Actuaries also provide financial reporting to regulatory bodies and stakeholders by assessing the financial health and stability of insurance companies.4. Risk management: Actuaries assist organizations in identifying, assessing, and mitigating various risks. This includes developing risk management strategies, recommending appropriate insurance coverage, and implementing risk control measures to minimize potential losses.5. Actuarial modeling: Actuaries use sophisticated mathematical models and statistical techniques to analyze and forecast future events and their potential impact on insurance portfolios. They develop and maintain actuarial models to support decision-making processes and help organizations understand and manage their risks effectively.6. Regulatory compliance: Actuaries ensure that their work complies with relevant laws, regulations, and professional standards. They may be required to provide actuarial opinions and reports to regulatory bodies and adhere to ethicalguidelines set by actuarial associations.7. Communication and collaboration: Actuaries often work as part of multidisciplinary teams, collaborating with professionals from various fields such as underwriting, finance, and data analysis. Effective communication skills are essential for actuaries to explain complex concepts and findings to non-technical stakeholders.Overall, understanding actuarial practice requires a deep understanding of mathematics, statistics, and risk management principles. Actuaries use these skills to provide valuable insights and recommendations to help individuals and organizations make informed decisions and mitigate risks effectively.。

从无到有如何赚钱的英语作文

从无到有如何赚钱的英语作文In the vast expanse of entrepreneurial ventures, the journey from nothing to something is often as thrilling as it is challenging. Imagine the exhilaration of transforming a mere concept into a tangible business empire. It all begins with a spark of an idea, a vision that dances in the mind's eye, beckoning the ambitious to seize the reins of destiny. The path to financial freedom is paved with determination, innovation, and a dash of calculated risk-taking.First and foremost, the birth of a business idea must be nurtured with meticulous planning. This involves conducting thorough market research, identifying a gap in the market, and crafting a unique selling proposition that sets your venture apart. The next step is to develop a robust business plan, a blueprint that outlines your objectives, strategies, and financial projections. This document serves as your compass, guiding you through the treacherous waters of entrepreneurship.Securing the necessary funding is the lifeblood of any start-up. This can be achieved through various means, such as bootstrapping, seeking angel investors, or launching a crowdfunding campaign. Each method has its merits and drawbacks, and the choice often depends on the nature of your business and your personal risk tolerance.Once the financial foundation is laid, the focus shiftsto building a brand that resonates with your target audience. This involves creating a compelling narrative, crafting a memorable logo, and developing a cohesive brand identity. In today's digital age, a strong online presence is non-negotiable. This means investing in a user-friendly website, engaging in social media marketing, and leveraging search engine optimization to increase visibility.As your business begins to take shape, the importance of customer service cannot be overstated. Cultivating a loyal customer base hinges on delivering exceptional experiences at every touchpoint. This means being responsive to feedback, addressing concerns promptly, and always striving to exceed expectations.The road to wealth creation is not without its obstacles. There will be setbacks, and there will be failures. However, it is in these moments of adversity that the true mettle of an entrepreneur is tested. Resilience, adaptability, and a relentless pursuit of excellence are the hallmarks of those who not only survive but thrive in the cutthroat world of business.In conclusion, the art of making money from scratch is a complex tapestry woven from threads of creativity, strategy, and perseverance. It is a journey that demands courage, vision, and an unwavering commitment to excellence. For those who dare to dream and have the fortitude to see their dreams through, the rewards are not just financial but also deeply personal, as they carve their niche in the annals of business history.。

风险投资常用术语英文解释《一》

风险投资常⽤术语英⽂解释《⼀》Plan: Type of qualified retirement plan in which employees make salary reduced, pre-tax contributions to an employee trust. In many cases, the employer will match employee contributions up to a specified level.- A -"A" Round : A financing event whereby venture capitalists invest in a company that was previously financed by founders and/or angels. The "A" is from Series "A" Preferred stock. See "B" round.Accredited Investor: Defined by Rule 501 of Regulation D, an individual （i.e. non-corporate） "accredited investor" is either a natural person who has individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person's spouse, that exceeds $1 million at the time of the purchase OR a natural person with income exceeding $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year. For the complete definition of accredited investor, see the SEC website.Accrued Interest: The interest due on preferred stock or a bond since the last interest payment was made.Acquisition: The process of gaining control, possession or ownership of a private portfolio company by an operating company or conglomerate.ACRS: Accelerated Cost Recovery System. The IRS approved method of calculating depreciation expense for tax purposes. Also known as Accelerated Depreciation.Adjustment Condition: An adjustment condition occurs if the company does not close on an equity investment in the company for a minimum of $xxx, net of brokerage fees, on or before a series of other predetermined events, i.e. delivery of term sheet to preferred stockholders.ADR: American Depositary Receipt （ADR's）. A security issued by a U.S. bank in place of the foreign shares held in trust by that bank, thereby facilitating the trading of foreign shares in U.S. markets.Advisory Board: A group of external advisors to a private equity group or portfolio company. Advice provided varies from overall strategy to portfolio valuation. Less formal than a Board of Directors.Allocation: The amount of securities assigned to an investor, broker, or underwriter in an offering. An allocation can be equal to or less than the amount indicated by the investor during the subscription process depending on market demand for the securities.Alternative Assets: This term describes non-traditional asset classes. They include private equity, venture capital, hedge funds and real estate. Alternative assets are generally more risky than traditional assets, but they should, in theory, generate higher returns for investors.Amortization: An Accounting procedure that gradually reduces the book value of a tangible or a definite intangible asset through periodic charges to income.AMT: Alternative Minimum Tax. A tax designed to prevent wealthy investors from using tax shelters to avoid income tax. The calculation of the AMT takes into account tax preference items.Angel Financing: Capital raised for a private company from independently wealthy investors. This capital is generally used as seed financing.Angel Groups: Organizations, funds and networks formed for the specific purpose of facilitating angel investments in start-up companies.Angel Investor : A person who provides backing to very early-stage businesses or business concepts. Angel investors are typically entrepreneurs who have become wealthy, often in technology-related industries.Antidilution provisions: Contractual measures that allow investors to keep a constant share of a firm's equity in light of subsequent equity issues. These may give investors preemptive rights to purchase new stock at the offering price. [See Full Ratchet and weighted Average]Archangel : Usually an outsider hired by a syndicate of angel investors to perform due diligence on investment opportunities and coordinate allotment of investment duties among members. Archangels typically have no financial commitment to the syndicate.Asset-backed loan: Loan, typically from a commercial bank, that is backed by asset collateral, often belonging to the entrepreneurial firm or the entrepreneur.Automatic conversion: Immediate conversion of an investor's priority shares to ordinary shares at the time of a company's underwriting before an offering of its stock on an exchange.Average IRR: The arithmetic mean of the internal rate of- B -"B" Round: A financing event whereby professional investors such as venture capitalists are sufficiently interested in a company to provide additional funds after the "A" round of financing. Subsequent rounds are called "C", "D", and so on.Balance Sheet: A condensed financial statement showing the nature and amount of a company's assets, liabilities, and capital on a given date.Bankruptcy: An inability to pay debts. Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code deals with reorganization, which allows the debtor to remain in business and negotiate for a restructuring of debt.Barbell Strategy: Investment strategy by limited partners that primarily make commitments to buyout firms on （1） the micro/small and （2） the large/mega ends of the market; while mostly eschewing the vast array of middle-market opportunities.BATNA （best alternative to a negotiated agreement）: A no-agreement alternative reflecting the course of action a party to a negotiation will take if the proposed deal is not possible.Bear Hug: An offer made directly to the Board of Directors of a target company. Usually made to increase the pressure on the target with the threat that a tender offer may follow.Benchmarking: Comparing returns of a portfolio to the returns of its peers; in private equity, fund performance is benchmarked against a sample of funds formed in the same vintage year with the same investment focus.Best Efforts: An offering in which the investment banker agrees to distribute as much of the offering as possible, and return any unsold shares to the issuer.Blue Sky Laws: A common term that refers to laws passed by various states to protect the public against securities fraud. The term originated when a judge ruled that a stock had as much value as a patch of blue sky.Book Value: Book value of a stock is determined from a company's balance sheet by adding all current and fixed assets and then deducting all debts, other liabilities and the liquidation price of any preferred issues. The sum arrived at is divided by the number of common shares outstanding and the result is book value per common share.Bootstrapping: Means of financing a small firm by employing highly creative ways of using and acquiring resources without raising equity from traditional sources or borrowing money from the bank.Bridge Financing: A limited amount of equity or short-term debt financing typically raised within 6-18 months of an anticipated public offering or private placement meant to "bridge" a company to the next round of financing.Broad-Based Weighted Average Ratchet: A type of anti-dilution mechanism. A weighted average ratchet adjusts downward the price per share of the preferred stock of investor A due to the issuance of new preferred shares to new investor B at a price lower than the price investor A originally received. Investor A's preferred stock is repriced to a weighed average of investor A's price and investor B's price. A broad-based ratchet uses all common stock outstanding on a fully diluted basis （including all convertible securities, warrants and options） in the denominator of the formula for determining the new weighed average price. Compare Narrow-Based Weighted Average ratchet and Chapter 2.9.4.d.ii of the Encyclopedia. Brokers: Private individuals or firms retained by early-stage companies to raise funds for a finder's fee. （compare, broker-dealer）Burn Out / Cram Down: Extraordinary dilution, by reason of a round of financing, of a non-participating investor's percentage ownership in the issuer.Burn Rate: The rate at which a company expends net cash over a certain period, usually a month.Business Development Company （BDC）: A vehicle established by Congress to allow smaller, retail investors to participate in and benefit from investing in small private businesses as well as the revitalization of larger private companies. Business Plan: A document that describes the entrepreneur's idea, the market problem, proposed solution, business andrevenue models, marketing strategy, technology, company profile, competitive landscape, as well as financial data for coming years. The businessplan opens with a brief executive summary, most probably the most important element of the document due to the time constraints of venture capital funds and angels.。

英语作文-金融资产管理公司创新投资策略,提高市场竞争力

英语作文-金融资产管理公司创新投资策略，提高市场竞争力In the dynamic world of finance, asset management companies (AMCs) are constantly seeking innovative investment strategies to stay ahead in a highly competitive market. The key to success lies in the ability to adapt, predict market trends, and offer unique value propositions to clients.Innovation in investment strategies often begins with a comprehensive analysis of current market conditions and a forward-looking approach to portfolio management. AMCs are increasingly leveraging advanced analytics and big data to inform their investment decisions. By harnessing the power of machine learning algorithms, they can identify patterns and predict market movements with greater accuracy than traditional methods.Another aspect of innovation is the incorporation of Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) criteria into investment decisions. As awareness of sustainability issues grows, investors are showing a preference for portfolios that not only yield financial returns but also contribute positively to society and the environment. AMCs that integrate ESG factors into their investment strategies are likely to attract a broader client base and enhance their market competitiveness.Diversification is a timeless strategy, but innovation comes in the form of cross-asset diversification and exploring alternative investments. This includes venturing into emerging markets, investing in cryptocurrencies, or supporting start-ups through venture capital. Such moves can potentially offer higher returns and set an AMC apart from its peers.Client-centric innovation is also crucial. Tailoring investment products to meet the specific needs and risk profiles of individual clients can lead to higher satisfaction and retention rates. This personalized approach, supported by robust technology platforms, enables clients to have a more interactive and engaging investment experience.Risk management is an integral part of any investment strategy. Innovative AMCs are developing more sophisticated risk assessment tools to better manage and mitigate potential losses. This proactive stance on risk not only protects the client's assets but also reinforces the company's reputation as a prudent and trustworthy manager.In conclusion, AMCs that embrace innovation in their investment strategies are well-positioned to enhance their market competitiveness. By leveraging technology, incorporating ESG principles, diversifying portfolios, focusing on client needs, and strengthening risk management, these companies can deliver superior value to their clients and secure a leading edge in the financial landscape. The future of asset management is bright for those who innovate wisely and with the client's best interests at heart. 。

金融投资策略：理财专家的秘密方法

金融投资策略：理财专家的秘密方法1. Introduction1.1 OverviewIn this article, we will explore the secret methods used by financial experts in their investment strategies. Investing in the financial market can be a complex and daunting task, especially for those without adequate knowledge and experience. Therefore, understanding the techniques employed by financial professionals can provide valuable insights for individuals seeking to improve their own investment skills.1.2 Article StructureThis article is structured as follows:- In Section 2, we will provide a comprehensive overview of financial investment, including its definition, its importance, and an introduction to the current state of the financial market.- Section 3 will delve into the secret methods employed by finance professionals. We will discuss diversification strategies for investment portfolios, risk management techniques, and striking a balance betweentime and profitability.- In Section 4, we will offer practical advice on how to select suitable investment products, allocate assets within an investment portfolio, and analyze market dynamics effectively.- Finally, in Section 5, we will summarize the secret methods discussed throughout the article and provide an outlook on future trends in financial investing. We will conclude with insights and recommendations for personal financial planning.1.3 PurposeThe purpose of this article is to demystify the strategies employed by financial experts in their investment decisions. By revealing these secret methods and explaining their significance, readers will gain a deeper understanding of successful investing techniques. Ultimately, this knowledge can empower individuals to make informed choices while devising their own personalized financial plans.With this introductory section complete, we are now ready to proceed to Section 2: "Overview of Financial Investment."2. 金融投资概述2.1 什么是金融投资金融投资是指将资金投入到不同的金融工具或资产中，以期望实现财务增长和获取收益的行为。

深度投资英语

深度投资英语Deep InvestingInvesting is a fundamental aspect of personal and financial management. It involves allocating resources, typically financial capital, with the aim of generating a return or profit. The concept of deep investing, however, goes beyond the traditional approach of simply seeking financial gains. It encompasses a more comprehensive and strategic approach to investing, one that considers the long-term implications and the broader impact of investment decisions.At the heart of deep investing lies the recognition that investment decisions have far-reaching consequences, both for the individual investor and the wider community. It involves a holistic understanding of the economic, social, and environmental factors that influence the performance and sustainability of investments. By delving deeper into these interconnected elements, deep investors can make more informed and responsible decisions that align with their personal values and contribute to the greater good.One of the key principles of deep investing is the emphasis on long-term thinking. Rather than being driven by short-term gains or the pursuit of immediate gratification, deep investors focus on building wealth and creating lasting value over an extended period. They understand that true prosperity is not measured solely by financial returns, but by the positive impact that their investments can have on the world around them.This long-term perspective encourages deep investors to carefully consider the potential risks and opportunities associated with their investments. They analyze not only the financial metrics but also the environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors that can influence the performance and sustainability of their investments. By incorporating these broader considerations into their decision-making process, deep investors can identify investment opportunities that not only generate financial returns but also contribute to the creation of a more equitable and sustainable future.Another crucial aspect of deep investing is the emphasis on diversification. Deep investors recognize that relying solely on a single asset or industry can expose them to significant risks. Instead, they strive to build a well-diversified portfolio that encompasses a range of investment options, including traditional financial instruments as well as alternative investments such as real estate, renewable energy, and social impact projects.This diversification strategy serves multiple purposes. It helps to mitigate risk by spreading the investment across different sectors and asset classes, reducing the overall volatility of the portfolio. Additionally, it allows deep investors to participate in the growth and development of various industries and initiatives that align with their values and priorities.One of the most compelling aspects of deep investing is its potential to create positive change. By directing their capital towards investments that prioritize environmental sustainability, social responsibility, and good governance, deep investors can contribute to the development of a more equitable and resilient economic system. This can include supporting companies and projects that are actively addressing pressing global challenges, such as climate change, income inequality, and access to education and healthcare.Furthermore, deep investors often engage in active stewardship of their investments. This involves ongoing monitoring, engagement, and, if necessary, advocacy to ensure that the companies or projects they have invested in are operating in a manner that is consistent with their values and principles. This level of involvement and accountability helps to hold these entities accountable and encourages them to adopt more sustainable and socially responsible practices.The benefits of deep investing extend beyond the individual investor. By prioritizing long-term, sustainable, and socially conscious investment strategies, deep investors can contribute to the creation of a more prosperous and equitable society. Their investments can drive innovation, create jobs, and support the development of communities, ultimately leading to a more inclusive and resilient economic ecosystem.In conclusion, deep investing represents a significant shift in the way we approach investment decisions. It goes beyond the pursuit of short-term financial gains and embraces a more holistic and responsible approach to wealth creation. By considering the broader implications of their investments, deep investors can not only build personal wealth but also contribute to the greater good and the creation of a more sustainable and equitable future. As the world faces complex global challenges, the principles of deep investing offer a compelling path forward, one that aligns individual financial goals with the collective well-being of our society.。

从中收益英文作文

从中收益英文作文Title: Maximizing Returns: Strategies for Generating Income。

In today's dynamic financial landscape, the quest for maximizing returns is a pursuit shared by investors worldwide. Whether you're a seasoned professional or a novice in the realm of finance, the objective remains the same: to generate substantial income from your investments. In this essay, we will explore various strategies and avenues to achieve this goal.1. Diversification: The age-old adage of not puttingall your eggs in one basket holds true in the realm of investing. Diversification across different asset classes such as stocks, bonds, real estate, and commodities helps mitigate risk and enhances the potential for consistent returns. By spreading investments across various sectors and geographies, investors can cushion themselves against downturns in any particular market.2. Dividend Stocks: Investing in dividend-paying stocks can be a lucrative strategy for income generation. Companies that distribute a portion of their earnings to shareholders in the form of dividends provide investors with a steady stream of income, regardless of fluctuations in the stock price. Dividend stocks are particularly attractive for those seeking regular cash flow without necessarily having to sell their underlying investments.3. Bond Investments: Bonds are often considered a safer alternative to stocks, offering fixed interest payments over a specified period. Government bonds, municipal bonds, and corporate bonds each carry varying levels of risk and return potential. Investors can tailor their bondportfolios to suit their risk tolerance and income requirements. Additionally, bonds can serve as a hedge against volatility in equity markets, providing stability to overall investment portfolios.4. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs): REITs allow individuals to invest in real estate assets without thehassle of property management. These investment vehicles typically distribute a significant portion of their rental income to shareholders in the form of dividends. Investing in REITs provides exposure to various real estate sectors, including residential, commercial, and industrial properties, thereby diversifying investment portfolios and enhancing income potential.5. Peer-to-Peer Lending: With the rise of financial technology, peer-to-peer lending platforms have emerged as an alternative investment avenue for income seekers. These platforms connect borrowers with individual investors, allowing the latter to earn interest income on their loans. While peer-to-peer lending offers attractive returns compared to traditional fixed-income investments, investors should be mindful of the associated risks, includingdefault rates and lack of liquidity.6. Preferred Stocks: Preferred stocks blend features of both equity and debt instruments, offering investors afixed dividend payment similar to bonds while also providing potential for capital appreciation. Unlike commonstocks, preferred stocks typically have priority claim on company assets and dividends, making them less volatile in turbulent market conditions. Investing in preferred stocks can thus serve as a reliable source of income with lower risk compared to pure equity investments.7. Options Trading: For more sophisticated investors willing to take on additional risk, options trading strategies can be employed to generate income. Selling covered calls or cash-secured puts on underlying stocks allows investors to collect premiums, thereby boostingtheir overall returns. However, options trading requires a thorough understanding of market dynamics and risk management techniques to avoid potential losses.In conclusion, the pursuit of maximizing returns through income generation is a multifaceted endeavor that requires careful planning and strategic decision-making. By diversifying across asset classes, investing in dividend-paying securities, and exploring alternative avenues such as REITs and peer-to-peer lending, investors can enhance their income potential while managing risk effectively. Itis essential to align investment strategies with individual financial goals and risk tolerance levels to achieve long-term success in wealth accumulation.。

创业价值的理论依据.ppt

Sales
$1,656,000 $2,000,000 $2,800,000
CGS
1,159,200 1,400,000 1,960,000
Gross Margin
496,800 600,000 840,000
Operating Expenses
Wage & Commission 317,400 383,334 536,667
Stepping stone year:明确预测期的第一年
first year after the explicit forecast period
4
Divide and Conquer: Terminal 创业企业的终值计算公式
T erminalValue VCFT r - g
where: VCFT current value of nextperiod's cash flow r constantdisount rate g growthrate
Total C/A Property, plant, & equip Equipmt, fixtures - Accum deprec Net P,P, & E
Total Assets
T ODAY 7/31/Y0
$23,000 $0
23,000 46,000 97,520
2,300 168,820
92,000 -34,040 57,960 226,780
6
More Useful Terms相关专业术语
Net Present Value (NPV): 净现值
present value of a set of future flows plus the current undiscounted flow

50字作文纸

专家关于投资话题的论述英文回答：Expert Insights on Investment.Investing is a crucial aspect of financial planning, enabling individuals to grow their wealth and secure their financial future. However, navigating the complexities of the investment landscape can be daunting. To shed light on this topic, we present expert insights that providevaluable guidance for investors of all levels.Diversification: Key to Long-Term Success.Diversification is a fundamental principle of investing, aiming to spread risk across different asset classes and investments. By investing in a mix of stocks, bonds, real estate, and other assets, investors can reduce the impactof volatility in any one particular sector or market. Diversification helps to balance risk and return, enhancingthe likelihood of achieving long-term investment goals.Asset Allocation: Tailoring Investments to Objectives.Asset allocation involves determining the optimal mix of different asset classes based on individual risk tolerance, time horizon, and financial goals. A properly designed asset allocation strategy aligns investments with the investor's risk appetite and investment objectives. For example, younger investors with a higher risk tolerance may choose a higher allocation to growth-oriented assets like stocks, while retirees may prefer a more conservative approach with a greater allocation to bonds.Time Horizon: Matching Investments to Goals.The time horizon is a critical consideration in investment decision-making. Short-term investments are typically less risky and provide lower returns, while long-term investments offer the potential for higher growth but also carry greater risk. Investors should align their investment choices with their financial goals and timehorizon. For instance, funds intended for retirement in 20 years can be invested with a long-term perspective, allowing for potential market fluctuations to smooth out over time.Understanding Risk: Balancing Return and Security.Risk is an inherent part of investing. Investors need to understand and assess the risks associated withdifferent investments before making any decisions. Risk can arise from market volatility, economic factors, political instability, or changes in interest rates. It is important to strike a balance between seeking high returns and managing risk tolerance. Investors can mitigate risk through diversification, asset allocation, and strategic investment choices.Professional Advice: Accessing Expert Guidance.Seeking professional financial advice can be invaluable for investors looking to make informed decisions. Financial advisors can provide personalized guidance, developtailored investment plans, and manage portfolios to align with individual financial objectives. They can also provide insights into market trends, investment opportunities, and risk management strategies, helping investors navigate the complexities of the investment landscape with confidence.持续投资的纪律。

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Understanding Valuation: A Venture Investor’s PerspectiveA. Dana Callow, Jr. Managing General Partner, Boston Millennia PartnersMichael Larsen, Senior Associate, Life SciencesIntroductionYou have met with several venture firms, responded to countless due diligence inquiries, and a strong lead investor is finally emerging with intent to submit a term sheet. Only one task remains—establishing a valuation.At the core of every venture capital financing is a mutually accepted valuation of the company by investor and entrepreneur. A valuation reflects both the entrepreneur’s determination of the acceptable amount of ownership that may be given in return for the venture firm’s capital and expertise, and the venture investor’s determination of the risks and rewards of the investment. This dynamic is often misunderstood—and with harmful consequences. Understanding valuation from the venture investor’s perspective is crucial. Realizing how valuations are determined and adjusted throughout the life of the company is critical to the investor-entrepreneur relationship and the ultimate success of the company. Valuation methodologies differ by the stage of investment and the availability of quantitative and qualitative data. However, the basic language and components of venture capital valuation are universal, simple, and should be well understood before you engage a discussion of valuation with a venture capital investor. This article will explain how venture investors consider, construct and justify valuations of early-stage companies, and will offer perspective on the dynamic role of valuation throughout the life of a company.The Basic MathAny private equity deal will focus on the “pre-money” valuation of the company. This is the estimated or notional value of the company as it stands prior to any purchase of equity. Determining the pre-money valuation of the company, combined with the amount of capital accepted by the company, determines the amount of equity ownership sold in exchange for capital. The resulting valuation after the investment of capital is called the “post-money” valuation. For example, in a company with a pre-money value of $5 million, a $5 million investment would buy a 50% ownership stake in the company.Pre-Money Valuation + Invested Capital = Post-Money ValuationPrice per Share = Pre-Money Valuation / Pre-Money SharesIt is important not to focus just on the valuation negotiation. Just as important as the negotiation of the “pre-money” valuation is the entrepreneur’s decision of the amount of capital to accept, which is predicated on how efficiently the company will use capital.MethodologyDifferentiating DataEarly stage investing is far from an exact science. Early-stage companies are often comprised of little more than an entrepreneur with an idea. Valuations at the “seed stage” are generally driven by factors that by their nature are subjective. These include appraisals of the CEO and management team, novelty of the value proposition, evaluation of intellectual property, expected time-to-market, expected path to profitability, estimated capital needs and burn rate, syndicate risk, sector volatility and deal structure. In post-seed investing, intermediate data points such as events demonstrating proof of principle and product validation will factor strongly in valuation determinations. As a company matures to a revenue stage, more quantifiable data is produced in the form of operating statistics and performance indicators. Actual results allow investors to more accurately model quarterly and annual revenue, EBITDA, cash burn, pipeline close rates, backlog, bookings and enterprise valuation.Valuation by StageFinancing Company Stage Data Risk/Uncertainty Value*(MM)Seed Incorporation; earlydevelopment Soft data; valueproposition, etc.Extremely high $1+Series A Development Validation, time tomarketVery high $3+ Series B Shipping Product Prelim revenue High $7.5+ Series C+ Shipping Product Predictive revenue Moderate $10+Later-stage/ Mezzanine Shipping Product, Profitable Hard data; EBITDA,net incomeLower $20-50+*Based on 2003 market informationThe chart above may be oversimplified (and should not be considered as a guide to minimum valuation levels) but it does indicate the valuation trend line of a typical investment as the company matures. Risk varies inversely with the quality and quantity of data. The high degree of uncertainty inherent in seed and early-stage investments translates into low pre-money valuations. Failure rates of startup companies are extraordinary, so investors must be compensated for placing their capital at such risk. Conversely, late-stage and mezzanine investors have the benefit of predictive financial models that help to mitigate risk. They “pay” for the reduced risk with higher pre-money valuations, allowing for less upside. Deconstructing a ForecastVenture investors see hundreds, if not thousands of business plans each year. Every plan includes an attractive budget and aggressive growth plan. Forecasts claim to be predicated on “conservative assumptions” including minimal market penetration, product pricing and gross margin. Regardless of how they are constructed, these forecasts are almost always over-optimistic in their assumptions. A venture investor will “scrub the numbers”, rationalize assumptions and run sensitivities based on varying degrees of execution, competitive pricing pressure, seasonality, etc. The resulting rationalized forecast may represent only a fraction of the original plan.“Scrubbing the Numbers”Discounting from the original forecast may reveal significantly greater capital requirements than first expected. As an entrepreneur, it is in your best interest to understand the short- and long-term capital requirements of your company. These capital requirements will provide the underpinning of your company’s long-term financing strategy. How much must be raised now? When will the next financing be needed? What significant milestones will be accomplished during that time? An understanding of the long-term financing strategy is crucial. A seasoned entrepreneur works with his investors to develop a financing strategy based on building value from one financing to the next and understanding how value will be measured.Staged Financing StrategyBuilding a company requires time and cash.Seed Financing: The seed financing will provide the capital needed to support salaries for founders/management, R&D, technology proof-of-concept, prototype development and testing,etc. Sources of capital may include personal funds, friends, family and angel investors. Capitalraised is limited due to its diluting impact at minimal valuations. The goal here is to assemble atalented team, achieve development milestones, proof of concept and anything else that willenable you to attract investors for your next financing.Series A Financing: Typically the Series A is the company’s first institutional financing—led by one or more venture investors. Valuation of this round will reflect progress made with seedcapital, the quality of the management team and other qualitative components. Generally, a SeriesA financing will purchase a 50% ownership stake. Typical goals of this financing are to continueprogress on development, hire top talent, achieve value-creating milestones, further validateproduct, initiate business development efforts and attract investor interest in the next financing (atan increased valuation)Series B Financing: The Series B is usually a larger financing than the Series A. At this point, we can assume development is complete and technology risk removed. Early revenue streams may betaking shape. Valuation is gauged on a blend of subjective and objective data—human capital,technical assets, IP, milestones achieved thus far, comparable company valuations, rationalizedrevenue forecasts. Goals of this financing may include operational development, scale-up, furtherproduct development, revenue traction and value creation for the next round of financing.Series C Financing: The Series B may be a later-stage financing designed to strengthen the balance sheet, provide operating capital to achieve profitability, finance an acquisition, developfurther products, or prepare the company for exit via IPO or acquisition. The company often haspredictable revenue, backlog and EBITDA at this point, providing outside investors with a breadthof hard data points to justify valuation. Valuation metrics, such as multiples of revenue andEBITDA, from comparable public companies can be compiled and discounted to approximatevalue.The graph above demonstrates the typical relationship between the post-money valuation as determined ina venture investment and the intrinsic market valuation of the enterprise that might be realized in a sale ofthe company. The implied pre-money valuations of the seed and Series A investments exceed the market valuations at the time of those investments. This early value premium is the result of qualitative data employed in the early-stage valuation methodology. The venture investor is valuing the intangibles of the “idea” and human capital. Moving forward to the Series B financing, pre-money valuations fall in relation to market value. Interim valuations are generally below market value; this affords investors a “riskpremium” in valuation to compensate for the illiquid nature of private equity.Applying PerspectiveThe example above illustrates the stepped function of valuation. Each financing is designed to provide capital for value-creating objectives. Assuming objectives are accomplished and value is created, financing continues at a higher valuation commensurate with the progress made and risk mitigated. However,problems can and will arise during this time that may adversely affect valuation. When a financing cannotbe raised at a step-up in valuation, investors may structure a “flat round” or a “down round” in which valuation is reduced. A down round can result from premature capital shortages from overspending, failure to achieve value-creating milestones or sub-optimal operating performance. Overpricing of a prior financing or softening capital markets may also play a role. Down-rounds are undesirable—they are cause for dilution and they undermine investor confidence. They also bring unwanted write-downs to venture investors’ portfolios. However, many companies have built success stories going through a down round. The valuation of a company at a discreet point in time is subject to a certain range of interpretation. Most seasoned venture investors will value a company within 10-15% range of each other if they have exhausted all quantitative and qualitative data available. Given the consistency that is generally seen in the market, the key factor in choosing one VC over another should rarely be based in valuation.In the long term, interim valuations will factor only modestly in the realization and distribution of proceeds upon exit. Investors will keep management incented. Remember to take the long view. Avoid arbitrary step-ups in valuation. Plan for the next financing and make sure there is ample justification for a step-up in valuation if milestones are achieved. In the end, the minutiae of valuation will matter very little. Valuation can make a good investment more attractive, but it will not salvage a poor one. A company will usually receive several financings before an exit is realized. Building value is the shared objective of entrepreneur and investor. A mutual understanding between investor and entrepreneur of the risks and rewards driving a valuation is crucial to starting a relationship on equal ground.。