不平等的民主

"Unequal Democracy" presents the results of a six-year exploration of the political causes and consequences of economic inequality in America. It was inspired by the substantial escalation of this inequality in recent years. Total income going to the top 0.1% of income earners has more than tripled, from 3.2% in the late 1950s to 10.9% in 2005; that going to the top 1% rose from 10.2% to 21.8%. Further, this widening is accelerating. Despite this trend, 80% believe that though you may start out poor, if you work hard you can make lots of money - more than any other developed nation. This belief undermines motivation for change.
Bartels believes that the most significant domestic policy initiative of the past decade has been a massive government-engineered transfer of additional wealth from the lower and middle classes to the rich via substantial reduction in federal income taxes for the rich.
Economists have found little evidence that large disparities promote growth, or that progressive tax rates retard growth by discouraging economic effort.
Meanwhile, political campaigns have become dramatically more expensive, increasing the reliance of elected officials on those who can afford to help finance their re-election bids. At the same time, membership in labor groups, a previously countervailing force, has substantially declined.
On average over the past half century, real incomes of middle-class families grew 2X under Democrats vs. Republicans, and working poor families grew 6X faster under Democrats - even after allowing for differences in economic circumstances.
So why do those with lower incomes vote for Republicans? Bartels tells us that contrary to the theme of "What Happened to Kansas," moral values do not trump economics as a basis for
lower-income voting behavior. Bartels offers evidence that the contradiction is explained by confusion generated by mixing "working class" (defined often as those w/o a college education) with lower-income. The working class has a lot of relatively high earners that are influenced by the moral values issues.
Bartels then contends that Republican success in presidential races is due to voters' overemphasis on election-year economic growth, vs. the superior longer-term performance of Democratic presidents, but lesser achievement during the last year of their terms.
Finally, its on to the estate ("death") tax. Actions to reduce and eliminate it during the early Bush II years represent about 15% of the impact of the overall tax reduction package. Bartels asserts that there is enormous misunderstanding about this tax regarding the wideness of its applicability. As a result, it is a wonder that it still exists.
Bottom Line: "Unequal Democracy" presents a carefully documented set of conclusions about an important and timely topic; its only drawback is that sometimes the statistics get too deep.
2. Format: Hardcover
Larry Bartels's book is one of the most important written works on economic inequality issues over the last 25 years. Anyone discussing economic inequality in the U.S. will have to deal with Bartels's arguments and evidence, even if you disagree with his findings and how he interprets those findings.
Among the evidence and arguments of Bartels's books are the following:
*** Since World War II, Democratic Presidents have been associated with modestly progressive patterns of real per family income growth, that is the income growth during Democratic Presidents' terms has been somewhat higher for lower income families than for upper income families. Republican Presidents have been associated with highly regressive patterns of real per family income growth, that is income growth has been much higher for upper income families than for other families. However, all income groups have on average
gained more under Democratic Presidents.
*** The Democratic Presidents' better performance has been concentrated during the second year of Presidential terms. Republican Presidents have done better during the 4th year of Presidential terms, that is the election year. This may help explain Presidential election results, as voters appear to respond more to election year economic performance than the economic performance of prior years.
*** Economic issues still are key for working class voters in the U.S.
*** Political leaders appear to be much more responsive to upper class and middle class voters in their state than to lower class voters. However, even more of voting behavior is explained by the ideology of a politician's political party. This is true both for the Democrats, who have ignored most voters' opposition to estate taxes, and for Republicans, who have ignored most voters' support for higher minimum wages.
Bartels's work is only a start. He really does not have even close to a complete theory about WHY economic growth for different income families has the correlations he finds with Presidential political party. We would need to know more about this to more completely judge the relative economic performance under different political parties.
In addition, his book raises the issue of how we can improve the quality of the political debate in the U.S. over issues of economic inequality. There is considerable resistance in the U.S. to openly discussing these issues. Politicians who discuss these issues risk being accused of promoting "class warfare". As Bartels points out, there is some tendency to want to assume that somehow the income distribution is determined by unchanging economic laws that are impervious to political influence. Bartels presents new evidence that in fact the income distribution can be influenced by public policy to a very large extent. But the question is, how do we make this understanding part of the mainstream political debate?
格式：精装
Larry Bartels的书是一个最重要的作品在经济上的不平等的问题在过去的25年。

有人在讨论美国的经济不平等将不得不应对Bartels的论点和证据，即使你不同意他的结论，他如何解释这些结果。

证据和巴特尔的书争论如下：
＊＊＊＊自二战以来，民主党总统已与温和渐进式的实际家庭收入增长，即收入增长在民主党总统的条件是有点高收入较低收入家庭比上收入家庭。

共和党总统已经与实际的家庭收入增长的高度倒退的模式相关联，即收入增长比其他家庭收入的收入要高得多。

然而，所有的收入群体都在民主党总统的平均下获得了更多的收入。

**民主党总统在总统任期的第二年表现的更好。

共和党总统在第四年的总统任期内做得更好，这是选举年。

这可能有助于解释总统选举结果，因为选民们似乎对选举年的经济表现比前几年的经济表现有所反应。

* *经济问题仍然是美国工人阶级选民的关键
＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊。

然而，甚至更多的投票行为是由一个政治党派的意识形态来解释的。

对于民主党人来说，这是正确的，他们忽视了大多数选民对遗产税的反对，而对共和党人来说，他们忽略了大多数选民对提高最低工资的支持。

巴特尔的工作只是一个开始。

他真的没有一个完整的理论，关于为什么不同收入家庭的经济增长有关系，他认为总统政党。

我们需要更多地了解这一关系，更能更全面地评价不同政治党派的相对经济表现。

此外，他的著作提出了我们如何提高美国经济不平等问题的政治辩论的质量问题。

美国公开讨论这些问题是有相当大的阻力的。

政治家们讨论这些问题的风险被指责为推动“阶级斗争”。

如巴特尔指出，有一些倾向，要承担多少的收入分配是以不变的经济规律，不受政治影响的测定。

他还提出了新的证据，事实上，收入分配可以影响公共政策在很大程度上。

但问题是，我们如何使这一理解的主流政治辩论的一部分？
3. This is a quite amazing book for its wealth of fascinating and often counter intuitive information, particularly income distribution stats and political survey information. There is definitely a form of political delusion at work in the USA, based on voters so consistently voting against their own interests. For example voters favoring abolition of the estate tax when it only affects the top 2% of tax payers or favoring the Bush 2001 tax cuts without knowing anything much about them. More interestingly he shows how, while increasing political knowledge (measured by simple questions on who is what position in US politics) increases Democrats awareness of economic inequality; the same increasing political knowledge makes
Republicans LESS knowledgeable or more in denial that inequality has increased, let alone whether it is a problem. He also nails the idea that the blue collar have shifted against their interests. Republican voting is still largely a matter of the better off supporting them, especially the less well educated and religious better off The Democrats lost power because of the defection of the South that now merely reflects the national picture (rather than hugely Democratic as before Civil Rights circa 1964) and the growth of reasonably well off, non college educated, religious voters who vote on economic AND values grounds, though still against their economic interests. Since 1948 economic growth has been on average significantly higher and unemployment lower for all social groups under Democrat presidents; inflation has been only slightly higher. And income equality much better under Democrats. Ultimately I suppose a worrying and somewhat pessimistic book, but a necessary tough tonic before thinking of solutions. Voters tend to vote on the economy in election year and the Republicans have done better in election years and voters don't seem to remember the other years when things were much worse. I hope both Presidential Candidates read it but doubt it will have the necessary impact. That will take a gutsy new FDR to put the country back together again after a collapse like the 1930s. Interestingly my conservative friends go into huge denial about this book: they can't even consider it; it is so threatening to their world view.
I am open to doubt about its data and arguments, but the author provides plentiful source and precise survey question detail so intelligent engagement with the book is really easy, whether you agree or not with his fundamental premises. The author hasn't voted since 1984 he says and then voted Reagan, so this is not another move book for the choir. The evidence drove him to his conclusions rather than the other way round. I wish there were more books this insightful.
这是一本相当惊人的书，其丰富的迷人和经常反直觉的信息，特别是收入分配统计和政治调查信息。

在美国，有一种政治妄想的形式，在美国的基础上，对他们的利益一致投票反对他们自己的利益。

例如，选民赞成取消遗产税，当它只影响纳税人的前2%，或有利于不了解他们的情况下，
就不知道这2001个税。

更有趣的是，他展示了如何增加政治知识（通过简单的问题来衡量，谁是在美国政治的立场），增加民主意识的经济不平等；相同的政治知识，使共和党不太了解或更多的否认，不平等的增加，更不用说，是否是一个问题。

他还钉了这个想法，蓝领已经转移对他们的利益。

共和党的投票仍然是主要的问题的更好的支持，尤其是没有受过良好教育和宗教更好的民主党人因为南方的缺陷，现在只是反映了国家的画面失去动力（而不是巨大的民主在公民权利约1964）和合理的断增长，非大学教育宗教的选民投票，对经济价值的理由，但仍然对他们的经济利益。

由于1948的经济增长在民主党总统的所有社会团体中的平均水平显著高于失业率，通货膨胀率仅略高于。

和收入平等，更好的民主党。

最后我想，一本令人担忧、有点悲观的书，但在解决问题之前，必须先进行一次必要的严厉的思考。

选民倾向于投票选举年经济，共和党在选举年做得更好，选民似乎不记得其他几年事情更糟的时候。

我希望总统候选人都能读到它，但它会有必要的影响。

将一个勇敢的新的罗斯福把国家重新团结在一起的崩溃与上世纪30年代后。

有趣的是我保守的朋友进入巨大的否认这本书：他们甚至不会考虑它；它是如此威胁着他们的世界观。

我对它的数据和参数有怀疑，但作者提供了丰富的来源和精确的调查问题，所以聪明的接触与这本书是非常容易的，不管你同意或不同意他的基本前提。

作者还没有投自1984他说再投里根，所以这不是一个移动书为合唱团。

有证据使他得出结论，而不是一路。

我希望有更多的书，这有见地。

4. Democrats are better for the economy, says Larry Bartels, and they're better for the poor. He backs this up with an arsenal of data on rates and causes of inequality over the last 50 years under Republican and Democratic presidents. Inequality systematically increases under Republicans and decreases under Democrats. Bartels doesn't linger much over the mechanism which might make this true; he hypothesizes that Republicans emphasize inflation-lowering policies that help mostly businessmen, while Democrats fight unemployment that largely afflicts the poor.
So if Republicans are bad for the majority of us, why do they win elections? A good part of the
answer, says Bartels, is that Americans have short memories: they respond much more intensely to economic gain in the year right before an election than they do to economic loss in the preceding three. And American political opinion suffers from an unfortunate inconsistency: people claim to be in favor of reducing inequality at the same time that they support policies which further it. No matter how you frame it, for instance, Americans have overwhelmingly supported ending the estate tax since the 1930's, even though it demonstrably only affects the wealthiest 1% or 2% of the population. And this inconsistency doesn't go away with education: virtually every way you cut the data, clear majorities support doing away with the tax on inherited estates.
"Unequal Democracy" is, unfortunately, a highly academic book: it seems very concerned to establish ideas rigorously that the rest of the world has long since taken for granted, out of the sheer analytical joy of doing so. Thus we wait 250 pages to see Bartels announce: "I find that senators in this period were vastly more responsive to affluent consistuents than to constituents of modest means." This is why we pay political scientists the big bucks. And yet to read Bartels, political science as a discipline only understands democracies as a collection of autonomous equals. So "Unequal Democracy" constitutes an *advance*. So much the worse for political science. I have my doubts that anyone outside of political science will get much from the book.
In particular -- once again, assuming Bartels has summarized the literature propertly -- political science seems to have missed out on the collective-action problem in economics. As Mancur Olson noted in "The Logic of Collective Action" in 1965 (and I don't think he was the first), there's a problem when policies stand to benefit one group while they spread their harms across the whole population: the group will lobby intensely for the policy, while the rest of the population stands mute. Compact interest groups are really important, if only for this reason.
Yet Bartels doesn't even start to discuss their effect on policy. He also never stops to touch on the disfranchisement of the poor. This was a large part of "The Conscience of a Liberal": Krugman asserts that our nation's growing inequality stems in large part from weakened labor unions, which used to help bring the poor to the polls.
In short, Bartels is looking at the American political scene from a high statistical level, never descending to the foundations. And his book will not help us change the situation.
In a world where "The Conscience of a Liberal" and Paul Farmer exist, I can't recommend "Unequal Democracy".
民主党人对经济更好，Larry Bartels说，他们对穷人好。

在过去50年中，共和党和民主党总统在过去的年里，他支持这一数据，并导致了不平等的数据。

不平等的系统增加在共和党和民主党下减少。

巴特尔不徘徊在机制可能使这个真实的多；他假设共和党强调通货膨胀政策，帮助降低主要是商人，而民主党对抗失业，很大程度上折磨着穷人。

因此，如果共和党对我们大多数人来说是不好的，为什么他们会赢得选举？好的回答，一部分说巴特尔，是美国人有短期记忆：他们的反应更强烈的经济利益在选举前一年就要比在前三的经济损失。

美国的政治观点受到了一个不幸的不一致：人们声称有利于减少不平等的同时，他们支持政策，进一步。

不管你如何的框架，例如，美国人压倒性的支持结束地产税自1930年代以来，尽管它只对最富有的1%或2%的人口。

而这种不一致不去教育：几乎所有的方式把数据，绝大多数人支持废除继承遗产税。

不幸的是，“不平等的民主”是一本很有学术性的著作：它似乎很关心建立思想，认为世界其他国家早就理所当然了，出于纯粹的分析喜悦。

因此，我们等待250页看到巴特尔宣布：“我发现在这一时期，参议员比中等富裕consistuents成分更敏感。

“这就是为什么我们付出政治科学家一掷千金。

然而读巴特尔，政治学作为一门学科只懂得民主自治等于集合。

因此“不平等的民主”就构成了一个* * *。

如此多的政治学更糟。

我有我的怀疑，任何人以外的政治科学将从这本书。

特别是——再一次，假设Bartels总结了文学与政治科学——似乎已经错过了经济学中的集体行动的问题。

正如奥尔森在“1965集体行动的逻辑”说（我不认为他是第一个），有一个问题的时候，政策受益的一组，他们把危害整个人口：集团将游说强烈的政策，而其余的人保持沉默。

紧凑的利益集团是非常重要的，如果只是为了这个原因。

然而，他甚至没有开始讨论他们对政策的影响。

他还不停的触摸对穷人的剥夺。

这是“自由主义者的良知”的很大一部分：克鲁格曼断言，我们国家日益增长的不平等，在很大程度上是来自于被削弱的工会，这是用来帮助穷人的投票。

总之，他是看美国的政治舞台上从一个高的统计水平，从来没有降到基础。

他的书不帮助我们改变现状。

在一个“自由主义者的良知”和保罗农民的世界里，我不能推荐“不平等的民主”。

5. I am 6 pages into the book and I already feel extreme enmity toward the author. He cites results like "the real incomes of middle-class families have grown twice as fast under Democrats as they have under Republicans, while the real incomes of working poor families have grown six times as fast under Democrats as they have under Republicans." Even if he argues that he is not trying to smear the Republicans, he has achieved it. Equity and efficiency are always in conflict, and the two parties tend to pick opposite sides of the coin. Both have its merits. Therefore, under Republicans, the system probably grew more as a whole but was more unequal. The author does not seem to see any merit in a higher aggregate growth in income. On page 5, he has the horrible one-liner "in this case the determined elites [are] conservative Republicans intent on protecting the free market (and low-wage employers) from the predations of people earning $5.15 per hour." Anyone not schooled in economics would think, after reading this line, that the Republicans are greedy and irrational because they fear people who cannot even make enough for a Big Mac. But the author fails to mention that there
is another common opinion that the economy is seriously hurt when you set a minimum wage because people who would be willing to work for less would not have room to be hired.
Page 13, Mr. Bartels makes a really dirty transfer association. He says, "current levels of inequality rival those of the Roaring Twenties, before the Great Depression wiped out much of the financial wealth of the nation's reigning upper class." Maybe I'm reading too much into this, but he is manipulating readers to make them think that the current inequality is only going to lead to another bad stock market downturn. Readers will feel vindicated because it seemed like his prediction came true (we are still feeling its aftereffects with what the government calls a "jobless recovery"). And don't get me started about how both the great depression and the great recession were caused by government intervention (not solely greedy people). On page 14, he absolutely misreads Rawls. He paraphrases Rawls and says that "inequality is just insofar as it contributes to the well-being of the least well-off members of society." But Rawls never said that. Rawls said that a just society maximizes the minimum, in other words, the least well-off members are in the best state they can be (which makes me think the maximin principle inevitably leads to complete egalitarianism). So Rawls is actually in support of Bartels's political leanings, but Bartels misreads him and uses him to represent the other side.
A little later, Mr. Bratels says, "economists who have studied the relationship between inequality and economic growth have found little evidence that large disparities in income and wealth promote growth." If you look at who he cites for this claim, the economists are all Keynesians. Of course they are going to make such a claim, they distrust the free market and want to steer markets.
But I have to agree with his point about mobility, and I think he should have just gone straight into that without being all liberal about pure income inequality. Mobility is the epitome of America, and if that is becoming less and less of a truth for hardworking individuals, then there is definitely something wrong with the system. And the mismatch between skills and economic rewards gives evidence for the idea (not mine) of the higher education bubble. People have
this irrational exuberance that going to college is a positive investment in the future (whether it's greater income or greater returns to subjective well-being). This exuberance has lead to a speculative enrollment in college for people who would have been better not going to college (people of the more entrepreneurial mind, people who learn better on their own, etc.). What this bubble has created is a surplus of graduates in many professions where the demand isn't as high. But the bubble still gets bigger because everyone not in college still holds the notion that going to college will make the price of your labor rise. So maybe what we need is another crash, not of any physical bubbles like housing, but of this mental bubble called higher education. Then maybe the market will adjust correctly and we'll see social and economic mobility rise as people aren't limited by their school loans and limited set of useless skills learned from their useless college majors (I'm generalizing , of course. Many people go into college because they enjoy research and want to go into academia, not as an investment into their future incomes. I respect that.).
I like Bartel's anecdote about the people who read books about income inequality during their trip to the Cayman Islands. Many modern liberals are affluent and privileged. That is the ultimate irony because they oftentimes have not been hardworking and seen what it's like to get your salary taxed to shreds (I'm generalizing again, of course).
So now I'm at chapter 6, and again, and the author contradicts himself. He seems angry that the Bush tax cuts were favorable to investment income. But I remember in chapter 1 he is decrying conspicuous consumption; well investment is what prevents conspicuous consumption. Because by investing in banks and other things, you accrue interest for yourself and let others use your money. This encourages economic growth and prevents spending money on yachts or hiding the money away in foreign banks. I do get that rich people would have more money to invest, so the tax cut would be used by the rich more. But I will not go back to the income inequality rant of previous paragraphs. On page 175, Mr. Bartels mentions Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, which makes me wonder, why are you caring about income
inequality anyways? Arrow's Impossibility Theorem will occur whether or not the income levels of everyone are completely equal. But let's forget about that and look at another good point he makes. It seems many people supported the tax cuts even though they did not know anything about what it or any tax cut entails. And the ignorance that Bartels highlights is very enlightening. But maybe the real problem here is government itself. The government was created to be small, but it has bloated into a horribly parasitic organism. Political scientists spend years and can only hope to understand a small part of the federal government. What makes you think the general public will have time to learn about the ins and outs? We're still debating what caused the great depression and it has been over 80 years.
So now I'm at his conclusion. He tries very hard to appeal to the pathos. But he fails. One of the better points he makes is that it can become a debilitating feedback cycle where increasing economic inequality produces increasing inequality in political responsiveness, which then produces public policies that increase economic inequality even more. But this does not mean we have to push for egalitarianism. Maybe the problem here is government because government ingrains and institutionalizes these inequalities and always will. Then Mr. Bartels cites Joseph Schumpeter to make his case. Schumpeter was an advocate of the free market and is a contemporary of the Austrian School of Economics. Nice going, Mr. Bartels. He then makes one more good point. The success of the minimum wage increase was definitely due to Bush screwing up on Iraq and Republicans in Congress "going Bill" on the interns. Then Mr. Bartels makes the worst generalization ever. He says, "Democratic officials have provided strong support for policies favoring the `have nots' --expanding the economy...while Republican officials have pursued policies favoring the `haves'--fighting inflation...." Now wait a second. How does expanding the economy favor the have nots? Expanding the economy favors everyone because the haves are the ones doing the expanding while the have nots are the ones getting jobs. How does fighting inflation favor the haves? Fighting inflation favors the have nots because they are the ones who do not have the resources to inflation-proof their
portfolios. But I'll end on a good note. A great point that Bartels makes is that racially and ethnically homogeneous society have more generous social policies. It is very unfortunate that welfare in America does have the stigma of being black. One day in four hundred years, we will get past it when we all become a shade of grey.
我是6页的书，我已经感到极端的敌意向作者。

他列举的结果是：“中产阶级家庭的实际收入增长了民主党人的两倍，而民主党人的实际收入增长了六倍，而民主党人则增长了倍的速度，”即使他说他不想诋毁共和党，他也取得了成效。

公平和效率总是在冲突中，双方往往会选择硬币的反面。

两者都有其优点。

因此，在共和党下，该系统可能增长更为整体，但更不平等。

作者似乎并没有看到任何优点，在较高的总收入增长。

在5页，他有可怕的一套”，在这种情况下确定的精英[是]保守的共和党人要保护自由市场（和低工资的雇主）从盈利5.15美元每小时人掠夺。

“任何人都不懂经济学认为，在阅读这条线，说共和党人是贪婪的因为他们的恐惧和非理性的人甚至不能使足够大的MAC的人。

但是作者没有提及到另一种观点认为，当你设定最低工资时，经济受到严重的伤害，因为那些愿意为之工作的人不会有被雇佣的空间。

13页，巴特尔先生作真脏转移协会。

他说，“目前不平等的对手的咆哮的二十年代的水平，在伟大的抑郁症毁掉了这个国家的统治上层的财富。

“也许我读了太多，但他是操纵读者，使他们认为，当前的不平等只会导致另一个坏的股票市场低迷。

读者会觉得平反，因为似乎他的预言成真（我们仍然感觉它的后果与政府所称的“失业型复苏”）。

不要让我开始谈论大萧条和大萧条是由政府干预引起的（不仅仅是贪婪的人）。

在14页，他完全误读了罗尔斯。

他复述罗尔斯说：“不只是因为它有助于社会的最不富裕的成员的幸福感。

”但罗尔斯从来都不说。

罗尔斯说，一个公正的社会的最大最小值，换句话说，最不富裕的成员都在最佳状态，他们可以（这让我觉得最大最小原则，必然导致完全平均主义）。

所以，罗尔斯实际上是在Bartels的政治倾向支持，但是巴特尔斯误读他和使用他所代表的另一面。

晚一点，bratels先生说，“谁有了差距与经济增长关系的经济学家没有找到证据表明收入差距较大，财富推动增长。

“如果你看看他引用这一说法，经济学家都成了凯恩斯主义者。

他们当然会做出这样的要求，他们不信任自由市场，想要引导市场。

但我必须同意他关于流动性的观点，我认为他应该直接进入到这一点，而不必对纯粹的收入不平等进行自由的自由。

流动性是美国的一个缩影，如果这一点变得越来越少，对勤奋工作的人，那么系统肯定有问题。

技能和经济报酬之间的不匹配，为高等教育泡沫的理念（不是我）提供了依据。

人的这种非理性繁荣，上大学是未来的一个积极的投资（无论是更高的收入或更大的回报，主观幸福感）。

这种繁荣已导致人们会更好不去学院招生（投机性的创业精神的人，对自己的学习，更好的等）。

这个泡沫造就了许多职业的毕业生，而这些行业的需求并没有那么高。

但泡沫仍然会变得更大，因为每个人都不在大学仍然持有的概念，去大学将使你的劳动力价格上涨。

因此，也许我们需要的是另一个崩溃，而不是任何身体泡沫般的住房，但这种心理泡沫称为高等教育。

然后，也许市场会正确的调整，我们会看到社会和经济的流动性上升，因为人们不限于由他们的学校贷款和有限的一组无用的技能，从他们的无用的大学专业（我概括，当然。

许多人进入大学是因为他们喜欢研究，想进入学术界，而不是一个投资到他们将来的收入。

我尊重。

）。

我喜欢巴特尔的奇闻轶事的人读关于收入不平等的书他们在开曼群岛之旅。

许多现代的自由主义者都是富裕而享有特权的。

这是最终的讽刺，因为他们通常没有勤奋，看到什么是你的薪水被撕成碎片
我喜欢巴特尔的奇闻轶事的人读关于收入不平等的书他们在开曼群岛之旅。

许多现代的自由主义者都是富裕而享有特权的。

这是最终的讽刺，因为他们通常没有勤奋，看到什么是你的工资税以丝（我的概括了，当然）。

所以，现在我在6章，又一次，作者反驳了自己。

他似乎很生气，这对投资收入有利。

但我记得在1章，他谴责铺张浪费；良好的投资是什么阻止了炫耀性消费。

因为通过投资银行和其他的东西，你会感兴趣的自己，让别人用你的钱。

这会促进经济增长，防止在游艇上花钱或者将钱藏在外国银行里。

我确实会让富人有更多的钱来投资，所以减税会被富人所使用。

但我不会再回到前面的段落，收入不平等的咆哮。

在175页，巴特尔先生提到了阿罗不可能定理，这让我很好奇，你为什么关心收入不平等呢？箭头的不可能定理将发生是否每个人的收入水平是完全相等的。

但让我们忘记这一点，看看另一个好点，他使。

这似乎有许多人支持减税，尽管他们不知道它或任何减税所带来的任何东西。

这是很有启发的无知巴特尔集锦。

但也许真正的问题在于政府本身。

政府是小的，但它已经臃肿成一个可怕的寄生生物。

政治科学家花费数年时间，只能希望。