管理层持股和公司绩效外文翻译文献

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绩效考核外文文献及翻译

绩效考核外文文献及翻译外文文献 1.Performance appraisals - purpose and how to make it easier Performance appraisals are essential for the effective management and evaluation of staff. Appraisals help develop individuals, improve organizational performance, and feed into business planning. Formal performance appraisals are generally conducted annually for all staff in the organization. His orher line manager appraises each staff member. Directors are appraised by the CEO, who is appraised by the chairman or company owners, depending on the size and structure of the organization. Annual performance appraisals enable management and monitoring of standards, agreeing expectations and objectives, and delegation of responsibilities and tasks. Staff performance appraisals also establish individual training needs and enable organizational training needs analysis and planning. Performance appraisals also typically feed into organizational annual pay and grading reviews, which commonly also coincide with the business planning for the next trading year. Performance appraisals generally review each individual's performance against objectives and standards for the trading year, agreed at the previous appraisal meeting. Performance appraisals are also essential for career and succession planning - for individuals, crucial jobs, and for the organization as a whole. Performance appraisals are important for staff motivation, attitude and behavior development, communicating and aligning individual and organizational aims, and fostering positive relationships between management and staff. Performance appraisals provide a formal, recorded, regular review of an individual's performance, and a plan for future development. Job performance appraisals - in whatever form they take - are therefore vital for managing the performance of people and organizations. Managers and appraises commonly dislike appraisals and try to avoid them. To these people the appraisal is daunting and time-consuming. The process is seen as a difficult administrative chore and emotionally challenging. The annual appraisal is maybe the only time since last year that the two people have sat down together for a meaningful one-to-one discussion. No wonder then that appraisals are stressful - which then defeats the whole purpose. Appraisals are much easier, and especially more relaxed, if the boss meets each of the team members individually and regularly for one-to-one discussion throughout the year. Meaningful regular discussion about work, career, aims, progress, development, hopes and dreams, life, the universe, the TV, common interests, etc., whatever, makes appraisals so much easier because people then know and trust each other - which reduces all the stress and the uncertainty. Put off discussions and of course they loom very large. So don't wait for the annual appraisal to sit down and talk. The boss or the appraises can instigate this. Ifyou are an employee with a shy boss, then take the lead. If you are a boss who rarely sits downand talks with people - or whose people are not used to talking with their boss - then set about relaxing the atmosphere and improving relationships. Appraisals (and work) all tend to be easier when people communicate well and know each other. So sit down together and talk as often asyou can, and then when the actual formal appraisals are due everyone will find the whole processto be far more natural, quick, and easy - and a lot more productive too. 2.Appraisals, social responsibility and whole-person development There is increasingly a need for performance appraisals of staff and especially managers, directors and CEO's, to include accountabilities relating to corporate responsibility, represented by various converging corporate responsibility concepts including: the “Triple Bottom Line”; c orporate social responsibility (CSR); Sustainability; corporate integrity and ethics; Fair Trade, etc. The organization must decide the extent to which these accountabilities are reflected in job responsibilities, which would then。

上市公司高管薪酬与公司绩效的实证研究外文翻译

文献出处：Asia Pacific Journal of Management volume 36, pages1111–1164(2019)原文：Interactive effects of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance: Evidence from an Asian marketAbstract：Much of the management compensation literature focuses either on the level and structure of executives’ pay or the pay-for-performance sensitivity in a set of corporate governance structure in the Western economies. In this study, we examine the interactive effect of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in different institutional and governance settings of an emerging market economy. Capturing monitoring and incentive alignment aspects as suggested in agency theory, we argue that in a markedly different executive compensation system in Thailand, the interrelationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance would exhibit some similarities to those found in developed economies. While there remains sparse research on how these relationships operate in Thailand, using data for 432 publicly listed Thai firms between 2000 and 2011, we find evidence of a reciprocal positive significant relationship between compensation and performance, as well as between corporate governance and performance. However, a reciprocal relationship is not found between corporate governance and compensation, which shows a mono-directional positive significant relationship running from corporate governance to compensation. These findings show similarities with those of developed economies and provide support for the need for an effective governance system to determine optimal executive compensation that will enhance firm performance and value. Our findings thus add some potentially noteworthy dimensions to the compensation literature that are especially important to policy makers and other stakeholders, and aiming to shape an optimal governance system in the emerging markets around the world.The relationship between executive compensation, firm performance andcorporate governance is a topical research area in contemporary governance literature. As predicted by agency theory, governance scholars have long proposed methods for monitoring and designing incentive alignment for executive compensation contracts in modern corporations to address agency problems, whereby ownership is separated from control (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Sanchez-Marin & Baixauli-Soler, 2014). Much of the literature on management compensation focuses either on the level and structure of executive compensation or compensation-for-performance sensitivity in a set of corporate governance structures in Western economies (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1999; Bryan, Hwang, & Lilien, 2000; Frydman & Saks, 2010a; Grundy & Li, 2010; Goergen & Renneboog, 2011; Pepper, Gore, & Crossman, 2013; Reddy, Abidin, & You, 2015). Other studies highlight the mono-directional relationship between firm performance and executive compensation, between internal governance mechanisms and firm performance, and between internal corporate governance and executive compensation (Cyert, Sok-Hyon, & Kumar, 2002; Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; Lee, Lev, & Yeo, 2008; Sapp, 2008; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010; Conyon & He, 2011; Ozkan, 2011;Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012; Schultz, Tian, & Twite, 2013).While a few studies explore the ‘bi-directional’ relationships between firm performance and executive compensation with complementary corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. Lee et al., 2008; Huang & Chen, 2010; Smirnova & Zavertiaeva, 2017; Buachoom, 2017), only one study uses 1 year contemporaneous data and a three stage least squared (3SLS) approach to investigate the ‘tri-directional’ relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in the South African market (e.g. Ntim, Lindop, Osei, & Thomas, 2015). Despite the voluminous research in this field, the extant literature reports mixed and inconclusive findings and there is a lack of clear evidence of robust relationships. The diversity and inconsistencies in the empirical findings are possibly due to not addressing the causal relationships between the governance mechanisms that are endogenously determined in a firm’s contracting and operating environments (Liu, Miletkov, Wei, & Yang, 2015) and to differences in country-specific institutionalfactors/characteristics and methodological approaches/choices (i.e. assumptions and hypotheses adopted, sample periods and size, and variables selected etc.) adopted by researchers (Farooque, 2010). However, the tri-directional (i.e. simultaneous/causal/endogenous) relationships between compensation, performance and governance have never been investigated in the literature using the dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM).In this paper, we investigate the reciprocal and dynamic relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in listed firms in Thailand – an Asian emerging market.Footnote1 Unlike prior studies, we attempt to provide a more nuanced view of the broader interactive (i.e. tri-directional) relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in Thailand. In fact, the issue of interactive relationships between them is heavily under researched in the literature, both in developed and emerging-market countries. Compared to Western countries, emerging countries typically have distinct institutional and governance characteristics, along with less developed legal and other public institutions and enforcement mechanisms for the protection of investor rights. Our study is largely motivated by the fact that Thailand has a poor institutional environment with weak legal rights and weak investor protection. Although Thailand adopted the key elements of the corporate governance principles of OECD countries after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, compared to the U.S. and other OECD countries, Thailand typically has a less-developed and weaker institutional environment where protection of investor rights is poor. As a result, minority shareholders are less well protected from expropriation by controlling shareholders. Therefore, it is unclear whether the relationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in prior studies can be generalised to Thailand due to the unique characteristics of its listed firms that are derived from its development status, social background and political environment. To date, few studies have examined the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Thailand, as wellas the success of the corporate governance system in protecting shareholders’ interests (Alba, Claessens, & Djankov, 1998; Wiwattanakantang, 2001; Kim, Kitsabunnarat, & Nofsinger, 2004; Yammeesri & Herath, 2010; Meeamol, Rodpetch, Rueangsuwan, & Lin, 2011). The current study attempts to fill this research gap by examining the interrelationships between executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance in Thai listed firms.Theory, literature and hypotheses：Theoretical perspectiveAlthough the vast majority of the literature grounded in agency theory reports that the agency problem may arise between principals and agents (Type I), a limited yet growing stand of studies show that conflicts between principals and principals (Type II) are also common in certain contexts, particularly in emerging markets. Agency theory explains that when control is separated from ownership, it generally leads to some conflicts of interest between owners and executives or agents, as well as between majority/controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, especially in the case where some majority shareholders become executives of the firm (Anderson et al., 2007; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) contend that the private benefits from control rights (opportunism) are frequent manifestations of the agency problem that need to be addressed. Both types of agency problem typically incur huge costs to corporations that result from the controller’s private benefits being detrimental to the value of the firm. To protect the interests of owners, to ensure interest alignment and to deter the non-stewardship behaviour of the controlling party, agency theory suggests that an effective governance system is a suitable strategy for reducing agency costs (Conheady, McIlkenny, Opong, & Pignatel, 2015). That is, in order to enhance performance, firms need to establish some governance mechanisms as a monitoring system (for protecting owners’ interest) and incentive (for convergence of interest) instruments to mitigate conflicts of interest among participants of the firm (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). Corporate governance protects shareholders’ interests by setting up these mechanisms to effectively reduce the impact of the agency problem(Nam & Nam, 2004; Velnampy, 2013). There are two strategies to address conflicts, ‘regulatory’ and ‘governance’: regulatory strategies rely on rules, standards, or laws to eliminate the conflicts between agents and principals of the firm, and governance strategies include ‘monitoring’ and ‘incentive’ provisions (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2004).译文：高管薪酬、公司绩效与公司治理的互动效应:来自亚洲市场的证据摘要：许多管理薪酬文献关注的要么是高管薪酬的水平和结构，要么是西方经济体一套公司治理结构中的绩效薪酬敏感性。

绩效管理外文翻译外文文献中英翻译

Performance management-how to appraise employee performance AbstractPerformance appraisal is an important content of human resource management in modern enterprises. According to the problems existing at the present stage Chinese enterprise performance evaluation, put forward the improvement measures to improve the performance appraisal. Performance management is the responsibility between managers and employees and improve the communication performance of the ongoing. The partners should understand why they become partners, thereby supporting the work. Performance evaluation is a part of performance management, do not confuse the twoIntroductionChallenges of performance managementReasons to avoid performance management: Manager: reports and program has no meaning; no time; afraid of conflict; feedback and observation. (performance management, prevent problems in investment in time, ensure the managers have the time to do the thing you should do staff: bad experience; what was about to happen no bottom; do not understand the significance of performance management; don't like received criticism. Criterion two, performance management, organizational success: 1 Factors: coordination among units means, towards a common goal; problem, find the problems, find problems or prevent problems; obey the law, be protected by the law; make major decisions, a way of getting information; improve the quality of staff, to make the organization more competitive., performance management of organization,must be useful to managers, the only reason of performance management is to help employees to success. to understand better how to design and what made him act. , the performance management challenge is how to find practical,meaningful ways to finish it, which need thought and wisdom.Performance management is a systemThe performance plan -- starting point of performance management:employees and managers to work together, as employees do what, do what degree of problem identification, understanding.Continuous performance communication: both trackingprogress, find the obstacles that affect performance and process so that the two sides success required information. Communication methods: (1) around were observed;(2)employees; (3) allow employees to work review;Performance diagnosis: to identify individuals, departments and organizational performance by the real reason for the problem of communication and problem solving process.Performance management is a small system in the large system. If you want to get the maximum profit, must complete the performance management process,and not a part of.Performance management and strategic planning, budget, staff ,employee salary incentive system, improve the quality of plans are related. Do the performance management process to do the preparation of 1, there are two key points: with the staff to collect meaningful, to establish the information needed to measurable goals; to do some basic work, so that in the whole process of performance management and employee can fully cooperation. In part, access to information and data of performance management effect is it can help organizations, units and employees towards a direction some "target"information each employee's job description; (2) employee last performance review data and related documents.The performance plan three steps: preparation, meeting, finalize plans. your job, you should do what, how to measure your success, sets threat mosphere and seize the key; to review the relevant information, ask more,talk less; the job duties and specific goal; determine the success criteria; discuss what are the difficulties and need what help; discuss the importance level and authorized to ask problem; 4, note: in the performance management process, should pay attention to communication with staff thought is the action guide, to carry out effective performance communication, we must pay attention to in the thought. All aspects of the performance communication throughout the performance cycle, plays an important role in any one link in the chain, leaving the performance communication, any unilateral decisions managers will affect the enthusiasm of the staff, performance management. No performance communication there is no performance management. In order to make the performance management on the right track, truly play its role,enterprises mustput the supervisor and employee performance communication as a priority among priorities to research and development, through the system specification, performance management become competent habit, the habit of employees, to solve the performance problem employees work for dialogue and exchanges, the performance management into effect.Three methods of performance evaluation: Predicament 1, individual performance evaluation --: the best opera actor and amateur orchestra concert.The opera actors play the extreme, but the effect is very bad. No one is isolated,only focus on the individual, can not solve the problem. We call on an individual basis on employee performance evaluation, but if we emphasize individual performance but not the antecedents and consequences and conditions of performance, we do not progress, because we did not find the real reason -- may be because employees can not control things and punish employees, may also be because of the wrong reason 2, regardless of the what way to assess performance, avoid two traps are important: 1) don't do performance problems or"always the fault of employees" this hypothesis; 2) without any assessment can give the "why" and "what is happening in the picture". Evaluation is just the beginning, is a further discussion as well as the starting point of diagnosis. Three methods of performance evaluation: 3, 1) rating method:: features, to and behavior project; identify each project performance level gauge and other ways. Advantages: easy to finish the work of assessment. Disadvantages:forget why do this work; too vague, in the performance plan, prevention,protection and development staff and so did not what role in improving methods:with employees regularly write brief conversation; evaluation; interpretation and evaluation project meaning; together with the staff rating 2) ranking method:forcing staff to compete with each other, have stimulation can be short term, long term may cause internal malicious competition. 3) target and standard evaluation method: Standard: according to the prior and employees a series of established criteria to measure the performance of employees. Advantages: the personal goals and work together to reduce the possibility of target; both sides disagree;defect: need more time; text work more; more energy.Communication method and communication technologyWay of thinking: the process of performance management is the process of communication.Relationship with the staff is not only reflected in the behavior on performance management, but also should reflect the daily and how successful way of thinking: A, the process of performance management is a complete process together with the staff, not a for staff B, except for some unilateral disciplinary action, performance plan, communication and assessment should adopt a cooperative mode; C, most of the staff, once you understand what they are asked to do things, will try the method can meet the requirements D,performance management is not the purpose of staring past mistakes, clear posibility, but in the problem solving problems and possible e, performance deficit to be clear, the cause of the deficit, whether for personal reasons or the system reason; F, in most cases, if the manager will support staff as their work,so that each employee 2, must set some skills communication skills: Manager here guide employees to participate in the discussion process and understand the process of responsibility. Purpose: don't most probably it did not actually happen. Be prepared to establish a common responsibility and each stage all contribute to the relationship, the target. Clear the common responsibility: to improve the performance is not only the responsibility of the staff. Clear procedures: prevent conflict resolution skills: clear individual responsibility, invites employees to take advice. For the people of the criticism and comments: avoid if you don't listen, you don't know what you talking about,could you be quiet for a while, you read the report in the past did not remarks:avoid such as how many years, you always can't finish the job on time, we have ried that, there is no with the need need making guide guilty intent: to avoid if you really care about the team, you should work harder; I guess you don't care about this project not appropriate advice and sure: avoid as I know the project is late, but I'm sure you'll catch up; you will do well. You will understand the need,need to unsolicited advice and sure: avoid you must do it; this is the only way; to finish this today, and put it on my desk. A provocative question: Why did you say those who avoid. What you think; is the need to need; what is you get this conclusion? Don't trust to avoid language: are you sure you can finish on time?I've heard you need to exaggerate these need: avoid you never finish the work on time; you always try to reject my proposal. The cooling technique of fierce debate.The performance of a, discuss the process of dispute, we should pay attention to two goals: must make suggestions on conflict; avoid damage relations, cause new problems in the future performance. B, give employees a vent frustration and anger for feeling, not very fast counter attack. C, remember the people when they do appear conflict. D, the way of handling conflicts: conflicts through persuasion, won the right to try to understand the means; staff positions, find a solution. E, conflict is the most effective treatment technology is active listening.F, and be confused in mind or angry employees dealing, the basic principle is the first concern of his emotional. G, disputes arise, request the dispute settle ment measures, but never from the subject. H, too excited, communication should be suspended.The performance of communication is the core of performance management, is refers to between the employers and employees performance evaluation reflects the problems and evaluation mechanism itself to conduct substantive interviews,and tries to seek countermeasures, a management method for service in the later stage of enterprise and employee performance, improve and enhance the.A process of performance management is on the lower level on the performance target setting and implementation and ongoing two-way communication.绩效管理——如何考评员工表现摘要绩效考核是现代企业人力资源管理的重要内容。

资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效外文翻译

资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效外文翻译中文2825字1868单词外文文献：Capital structure, equity ownership and firm performanceDimitris Margaritis, Maria Psillaki 1Abstract：This paper investigates the relationship between capital structure, ownership structure and firm performance using a sample of French manufacturing firms. We employ non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) methods to empirically construct the industry’s ‘best practice’frontier and measure firm efficiency as the distance from that frontier. Using these performance measures we examine if more efficient firms choose more or less debt in their capital structure. We summarize the contrasting effects of efficiency on capital structure in terms of two competing hypotheses: the efficiency-risk and franchise value hypotheses. Using quantile regressions we test the effect of efficiency on leverage and thus the empirical validity of the two competing hypotheses across different capital structure choices. We also test the direct relationship from leverage to efficiency stipulated by the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost model. Throughout this analysis we consider the role of ownership structure and type on capital structure and firm performance.Firm performance, capital structure and ownershipConflicts of interest between owners-managers and outside shareholders as well as those between controlling and minority shareholders lie at the heart of the corporate governance literature (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). While there is a relatively large literature on the effects of ownership on firm performance (see for example, Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Himmelberg et al., 1999), the relationship between ownership structure and capital structure remains largely unexplored. On the other hand, a voluminous literature is devoted to capital structure and its effects on corporate performance –see the surveys by Harris and Raviv (1991) and Myers (2001). An emerging consensus that comes out of the corporate governance literature (see Mahrt-Smith, 2005) is that the interactions between capital structure and ownership structure impact on firm values. Yet theoretical arguments alone cannot unequivocally predict these relationships (see Morck et al., 1988) and the empirical evidence that we have often appears to be contradictory. In part these conflicting results arise from difficulties empirical researchers face in obtaining direct measures of the magnitude of agency costs that are not confounded by factors that are beyond the control of management (Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). In the remainder of this section we briefly review the literature in this area focusing on the main hypotheses of interest for this study.Firm performance and capital structureThe agency cost theory is premised on the idea that the interests of the company’s managers and its shareholders are not perfectly aligned. In their seminal paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasized the importance of the agency costs of equity arising from the separation of ownership and control of firms whereby managers tend to maximize their own utility rather than the value of the firm. These conflicts may occur in situations where managers have incentives to take1来源：Journal of Banking & Finance , 2010 (34) : 621–632，本文翻译的是第二部分excessive risks as part of risk shifting investment strategies. This leads us to Jensen’s (1986) “free cash flow theory”where as stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323) “the pro blem is how to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it on organizational inefficiencies.”Thus high debt ratios may be used as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flow waste through the threat of liquidation (Grossman and Hart, 1982) or through pressure to generate cash flows to service debt (Jensen, 1986). In these situations, debt will have a positive effect on the value of the firm.Agency costs can also exist from conflicts between debt and equity investors. These conflicts arise when there is a risk of default. The risk of default may create what Myers (1977) referred to as an“underinvestment”or “debt overhang”problem. In this case, debt will have a negative effect on the value of the firm. Building on Myers (1977) and Jensen (1986), Stulz (1990) develops a model in which debt financing is shown to mitigate overinvestment problems but aggravate the underinvestment problem. The model predicts that debt can have both a positive and a negative effect on firm performance and presumably both effects are present in all firms. We allow for the presence of both effects in the empirical specification of the agency cost model. However we expect the impact of leverage to be negative overall. We summarize this in terms of our first testable hypothesis. According to the agency cost hypothesis (H1) higher leverage is expected to lower agency costs, reduce inefficiency and thereby lead to an improvement in firm’s performance.Reverse causality from firm performance to capital structure But firm performance may also affect the choice of capital structure. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) stipulate that more efficient firms are more likely to earn a higher return for a given capital structure, and that higher returns can act as a buffer against portfolio risk so that more efficient firms are in a better position to substitute equity for debt in their capital structure. Hence under the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2), more efficient firms choose higher leverage ratios because higher efficiency is expected to lower the costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. In essence, the efficiency-risk hypothesis is a spin-off of the trade-off theory of capital structure whereby differences in efficiency, all else equal, enable firms to fine tune their optimal capital structure.It is also possible that firms which expect to sustain high efficiency rates into the future will choose lower debt to equity ratios in an attempt to guard the economic rents or franchise value generated by these efficiencies from the threat of liquidation (see Demsetz, 1973; Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006). Thus in addition to a equity for debt substitution effect, the relationship between efficiency and capital structure may also be characterized by the presence of an income effect. Under the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) more efficient firms tend to hold extra equity capital and therefore, all else equal, choose lower leverage ratios to protect their future income or franchise value.Thus the efficiency-risk hypothesis (H2) and the franchise-value hypothesis (H2a) yield opposite predictions regarding the likely effects of firm efficiency on the choice of capital structure. Although we cannot identify the separate substitution andincome effects our empirical analysis is able to determine which effect dominates the other across the spectrum of different capital structure choices.Ownership structure and the agency costs of debt and equity.The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance dates back to Berle andMeans (1932) who argued that widely held corporations in the US, in which ownership of capital is dispersed among small shareholders and control is concentrated in the hands of insiders tend to underperform. Following from this, Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop more formally the classical owner-manager agency problem. They advocate that managerial share-ownership may reduce managerial incentives to consume perquisites, expropriate shareholders’wealth or to engage in other sub-optimal activities and thus helps in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders which in turn lowers agency costs. Along similar lines, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that large external equity holders can mitigate agency conflicts because of their strong incentives to monitor and discipline management.In contrast Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that a rise in insider share-ownership stakes may also be associated with adverse ‘entrenchment’effects tha t can lead to an increase in managerial opportunism at the expense of outside investors. Whether firm value would be maximized in the presence of large controlling shareholders depends on the entrenchment effect (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Dow and McGuire, 2009). Several studies document either a direct (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Claessens et al., 2002; Hu and Zhou, 2008) or a non-monotonic (e.g., Morck et al., 1988;McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Davies et al., 2005) relationship between ownership structure and firm performance while others (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001) find no relation between ownership concentration and firm performance.Family firms are a special class of large shareholders with unique incentive structures. For example, concerns over family and business reputation and firm survival would tend to mitigate the agency costs of outside debt and outside equity (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003) although controlling family shareholders may still expropriate minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Several studies (e.g., Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Maury, 2006; King and Santor, 2008) report that family firms especially those with large personal owners tend to outperform non-family firms. In addition, the empirical findings of Maury (2006) suggest that large controlling family ownership in Western Europe appears to benefit rather than harm minority shareholders. Thus we expect that the net effect of family ownership on firm performance will be positive.Large institutional investors may not, on the other hand, have incentives to monitor management (Villalonga and Amit, 2006) and they may even coerce with management (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Claessens et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2007). In addition, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and La Porta et al. (2002) argue that equity concentration is more likely to have a positive effect on firm performance in situations where control by large equity holders may act as a substitute for legal protection in countries with weak investor protection and less developed capital markets where they also classify Continental Europe.We summarize the contrasting ownership effects of incentive alignment and entrenchment on firm performance in terms of two competing hypotheses. Under the ‘convergence-of-interest hypothesis’(H3) more concentrated ownership should have a positive effect on firm performance. And under the ownership entrenchment hypothesis (H3a) the effect of ownership concentration on firm performance is expected to be negative.The presence of ownership entrenchment and incentive alignment effects also has implications for the firm’s capital structure choice. We assess these effects empirically. As external blockholders have strong incentives to reduce managerial opportunism they may prefer to use debtas a governance mechanism to control management’s consumption of perquisites (Grossman and Hart, 1982). In that case firms with large external blockholdings are likely to have higher debt ratios at least up to the point where the risk of bankruptcy may induce them to lower debt. Family firms may also use higher debt levels to the extent that they are perceived to be less risky by debtholders (Anderson et al., 2003). On the other hand the relation between leverage and insider share-ownership may be negative in situations where managerial blockholders choose lower debt to protect their non-diversifiable human capital and wealth invested in the firm (Friend and Lang, 1988). Brailsford et al. (2002) report a non-linear relationship between managerial share-ownership and leverage. At low levels of managerial ownership, agency conflicts necessitate the use of more debt but as managers become entrenched at high levels of managerial ownership they seek to reduce their risks and they use less debt. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that insider ownership by managers or families has no effect on leveragewhile King and Santor (2008) report that both family firms and firms controlled by financial institutions carry more debt in their capital structure.外文翻译：资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效摘要：本文通过对法国制造业公司的抽样调查，研究资本结构、所有权结构和公司绩效的关系。

管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研究【外文翻译】

外文翻译原文Salary affect how performanceMaterial Source：Executive Compensation; 2010/2011 Supplement, Author：ModernHealth The SEC has amended its disclosure rules to require, among other matters, a discussion about a company’s compensation policies and pra ctices for all employees if they create risks that are “reasonably likely” to have a material adverse effect on the company, taking into account program features and other factors that mitigate or counteract such risks.The SEC referred in adopting the amendments, indicates that the “reasonably likely” is higher than “possible” but lower than “more likely than not.”That said, a conclusion that the disclosure trigger is not met necessarily rests on an assessment of the balance of risk and reward implied by the company’s compensation program design and incentives, taken as a whole. As with many SEC rules in the post-SOX era, process will be key. A predicate for analyzing the disclosure question will be an inventory and review of the operation of compensation programs for all employees, which should be undertaken promptly in light of the effective date of the rules.In light of regulatory and investor interest arising out of the turbulent climate of 2009, we believe that a focus on the relationship between compensation and risk-at the executive and broad-based levels—will continue. Because this relationship may not always be obvious, even though it is implicit in virtually all significant compensation decisions, we suggest below practical considerations relevant to compensation committee deliberations about these matters.Core Compensation Committee Responsibilities and Risk Compensation committees have four principal responsibilities that intersect with risk, as discussed below.(1) Determining compensation program design.Diversity of compensation opportunities and metrics is the most effective tool to cabin risk implied by a company’s compensation program. A balanced mix of short-and long-term elements ties compensation to the company’s performance, While reflecting the perspective that near-term actions are not only important in and of themselves, but also can have material long-term consequences. A combination of incentives to reward different aspects of the company’s performance also avoids a myopic focus on a single aspect of performance at the expense of other considerations that concern and impact business risk. With in this framework, long-term compensation elements ( e.g. , plans with multi-year targets or performance vesting conditions) generally shoul d have a horizon tied to the company’s business planning cycle to ensure that the committee and management are driven by a common perspective about the company’s prospects and challenges within the context of a board-vetted business plan. In considering plan design, the compensation committee should take into account other features of the compensation program that mitigate the risk of management misconduct or inappropriately risky behavior. These include claw backs and long-term stock ownership requirements. These features of compensation programs have become common in recent years. They should be re-examined periodically and in connection with material changes in business circumstances or compensation plan design. Are the claw back triggers calibrated to th e company’s circumstances and business-rather than being a photocopy of another company’s policy or someone else’s idea of best practice? Are they clear in their operation, while preserving the committee’s ability to exercise its business judgment in deter mining whether to seek compensation recoupment? Given the level of equity incentives granted or to be granted, should stock ownership guidelines be revised to include a “hold through retirement” provision?Moreover, the committee should consider whether the categories of employees covered by specific compensation programs are appropriate in light of overall pay elements and job responsibility and function. For example, if authority to make decisions that may have material risk consequences for the business extends to a relatively broad group of employees, it may be appropriate to incorporate diverse company-wide performance criteria with respect to a similarly broad group of employees, as compared to relatively narrow business unit performance criteria, in order to mitigate the incentive of employees to take inappropriate business unit risks.The committee also should consider the role of its discretionary judgment in determining the amount of performance-based compensation to be paid, as contrasted with strict adherence to objective performance-based formulas. Focus on therequirements of Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 generally has oriented committees towards a more formulaic approach to compensation decisions. While such an approach arguably should result in a closer correlation of pay to performance, persuasive arguments can be made that the exercise of committee discretion can be consistent with a pay-for-performance program while at the same time mitigating inappropriate business risks that might otherwise arise from certain performance based compensation programs. In many circumstances, there are approaches to Section 162(m) compliance that permit committees significant discretion to adjust payouts, upwards or downwards relative to objective formulas, to reflect subjective evaluations of performance.Committees also regularly exercise discretion to adjust final awards if the results of strictly formulaic metrics would be either too low or too high.Finally, in reviewing the risk- appropriateness of its compensation program, the committee should invite its compensation consultant and other advisors to provide perspectives about whether and how well the company’s compensation program operates to balance risk and reward and whether other design features are appropriate in light of the company’s particular circumstances and peer group practices.(2) Setting the performance matrix for incentive plans.The compensation committee may be charged with approving threshold, target, and maximum le vels of performance and payout “curves” under the company’s incentive plans, depending on their terms. Determining these plan design features is critical in translating strategic goals into incentives that are calibrated to promote the right kind, and the right amount, of risk-taking by executives. Given the significance and complexity of this responsibility, we discuss setting the performance matrix in more detail below.(3) Understanding compensation-related risk in the context of other mitigating controls and procedures.The compensation committee must refl ect on risk implied by the company’s compensation program through the lens of other risk-mitigating controls and procedures. While listed last, this may in fact be the best first step in the committee’s process, so that the overall “risk lens” is in place on an early and ongoing basis. Other mitigating controls and procedures can include the board’s own risk oversight mechanisms, whether in the form of “enterprise risk management” initiatives, an annua l strategic review or the work of the board’s other key standing committees,such as the audit committee or, if they exist, the risk, compliance, or finance committees. Also relevant are the operation and effectiveness of the company’s internal control over financial reporting, financial policies( e.g. , those addressing leverage, capital allocation, and use of derivatives), controls around areas of subjective judgment within the financial statements and dedicated management functions directed to risk.To the extent that this information is not available to the compensation committee either directly or through the work of the full board, it should consider other means to assure an appropriate ongoing understanding of these risk, such as through overlapping membership or other formal interaction among the board committees that bear responsibility for elements of risk oversight, or by those committees and the full board.译文管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研究资料来源：薪酬补偿 2010/2011 增补作者：摩登.海瑟美国证券交易委员会已修订其披露规则要求，关于一个公司的薪酬政策和做法，对所有员工进行讨论，如果他们创造的是“合理地可能”有对公司造成重大不利影响，可以同时考虑到方案特征和其他因素，减轻或抵消这种风险。

外文翻译--董事会结构,高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例

本科毕业论文（设计）外文翻译原文二：Board Composition, Executive Remuneration,And CorporatePerformance: The Case Of ReitsIntroductionStockholders in modern corporations are the residual risk bearers. As they don't have the expertise to run their firms, stockholders must rely on the firm'smanagement team. Jensen and Ruback (1983) defined the management team as the top managers as well as the board of directors of the firm. The separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation creates the incentives for managers to pursue their self-interest goals and not to maximize the shareholders’ wealth in what is termed in the literature as the agency conflict.Researchers have suggested many mechanismsby which managers are curbed from maximizingsolely their own utilities.These mechanisms (seeAgarwal and Knoeber 1996) can be either externalones, such as market for corporate control or internalones, such as the board of directors. The board ofdirectors is a basic element of corporate governance.The main functions of corporate boards are evaluating and approving strategies formulated by managers, providing an appropriate vehicle for stock holders desiring representation in company boards, and performing vigorous monitoring of managers’ actions to make sure that d ecisions by top managers come in line with shareholders’ interests. The literature is rich with studies that have shown the positive effect of the outside board members on firm value .The theory says that the way a board of directors is formed is intended to minimize the agency conflict costs. Also, some studies have shown how the size of the board affects corporate value (Yermack 1996; Zahra et al. 1989; Eisenberg et al. 1998). Consequently, the board of directors is an important governance mechanism that ensures that the interests ofshareholders and management are closely aligned, which would have its effects on corporate performance.In addition to the internal mechanisms that mitigate agency conflicts, managerial remuneration is an important device that can be used effectively to align the interests of stockholders and managers. The extent to which the remuneration package can achieve that alignment of interests is an empirical question. From a theoretical point of view, managerial remuneration should correlate weakly with corporate performance. The annual bonus usually is given in good as well as bad performance times. Good performance pushes the bonus up while bad performance does not depress the bonus. However, empirically, the relationship between management remuneration and corporate performance was detected and shown to exist. Generally, studies have found that there is a positive relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance (Hamid 1995; Davis et al. 1994; Finnerty et al. 1993). Managerial remuneration and corporate performanceThe issue of managerial incentives has been heavily researched in financial economics. Managerial incentives, at least from a theoretical point of view, have an energetic effect on mitigating the moral hazard problem inherited in individual contracts. This would have a major impact upon firm's financial performance. Hamid (1995) examined the relationship between CEO compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. He mainly focused upon the equity type of compensation not the cash compensation. His results confirmed a significant positive relationship between CEO equity compensation and firm Performance.Other types of compensation also have a positive effect on corporate performance even after considering some control variables. Davis and Shelor (1995) also documented a significant relationship between executive total compensation, firm size, and firm performance. Cannon and V ogt (1995) used Jensen’s measure to proxy for REITs financial performance and examined how severe the agency costs in REITs are. They find that advisor REITs with lowdirector ownership tend to underperform and pay higher advisor payments than do their counterparts with high ownership. They find no such relationship for self-administered REITs. These results show thatself-administered REITs make better use of marketbased performance compensation than do advisor REITs. Lewellen, Loderer, Martin, and Blum (1992) found that there is a significant relationship between managerial compensation and firm economic performance. Their results confirmed that compensation packages are designed to mitigate the agency conflict costs. In most previous studies, the relation between managerial remuneration and corporate performance was examined and shown to be positive when using total remuneration package, which includes usually (1) base cash remuneration, (2) incentive cash remuneration, (3) stock options, and (4) relative performance remuneration. This study, however, is concerned only with cash remuneration since it represents about 80% of total remuneration package.Board composition and financial performanceThe issue of board composition has deep roots in financial economics literature. Whether the way board of directors is formed can affect the economic value and performance of a firm has been investigated by a lot of researchers.The empirical evidence not solidly convincing regarding this issue when considering the entire literature, although many empirical studies support a positive relationship between boards dominated by outside directors and corporate performance. Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) documented evidence showing the positive effect of the outside directors on corporate performance as they found that shareholders’ gains fro m tender offers would be greater for targets with independent board members than for other targets. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) examined the wealth effects when an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another corporation. They find that the nonfinancial sending firms experience negative returns while the receiving firms do not gain from these appointments. This suggests that when executives join boards of other corporations, they become distracted from shareholders wealth maximization objective. The financial sending firms experience positive returns when sending their officers to other firms. Barnhart et al. (1994) investigated the effect of board composition on company performance. When they do not control for variables that have effects on company performance, the relationship between corporate performance, proxied by market-to-book ratio of equity, and board composition issignificant. When they account for managerial ownership and variation across industries, board composition is found to be related to market-to-book ratio in a nonlinear fashion. Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson (1992) revealed the effectiveness of the board of directors in enhancing firm performance by showing that stock prices of firms whose boards are dominated by independent directors are associated with larger abnormal returns than those of companies whose boards are dominated by less independent directors. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reviewed the literature and supported the conjecture of the positive relationship between corporate profitability and boards dominated by outside independent directors. Gilson (1990) also confirmed the idea that board composition is related to financial performance of firms as he documented an evidense that after company default, board composition is altered significantly by creditors who tend to appoint their representatives to the board. Byrd and Hickman (1990) showed that the stocks of firms whose at least 50% of their board members are independent are associated with higher returns for stockholders in case of acquisitions. They noted, however, that these results are sensitive to the method used to classify directors. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) also showed that the addition of an outside director increased corporate value. In a theoretical paper, Zahra and Pearce (1989) developed a theoretical integrative model which specifies important relationships between board variables and company performance. They noted that these relationships depend on several internal (industry factors, legal aspects, etc.) and external (ownership structure, company life cycle, complexity of operation, etc.) contingencies identified in their model. All these attributes play an important role in determining directors’ success in executing their contro l and monitoring roles, which is a prerequisite for a glamourous company performance.Molz’s (1988) findings do not support the association between firm performance and the managerial dominated boards.Weisbach (1988) shows that companies with outside-dominated boards are more likely to replace a CEO based on performance than companies with insider-dominated boards. The bulk of the previous literature shows a positive relationship between outside directors and corporate performance. The premise that is brought up by this study is that effective monitoring does notcome from all outside directors as hypothesized by some previous studies in the literature, but it comes only from that group of directors that is able to ask the hard questions. Previous literature in corporate governance classifies outside directors into two categories: gray outsiders and pure (independent) outsiders. The gray outsiders have some type of affiliation with the company on whose board they sit, which could limit their capability to exercise effective monitoring on management. These affiliations include legal, banking, consultancy, and other relationships. Pure outside directors, on the other hand, have no relationship with the company other than their directorship and, hence, bear no costs from challenging managers. Byrd and Hichman (1990) showed that the method of classifying board of directors causes the relationship between board composition and corporate performance to change. Board size and corporate performanceTheoretically, it is expected that coordination and communication will be more effective and decisionmaking problems will be less in relatively small boards, which might positively affect board performance. On the other hand, large boards have the tendency to include directors with diverse expertise and skills. These two contradicted premises deserve more inspection in the REITs industry due to their different control system. On top of that, there is a scarcity in the literature regarding studies of the relation between board size and corporate performance. This study conjectures that, in general, the ideal board size varies with firm size. Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) used accounting figures to measure firm performance. They found evidence that small boards had positive effects on corporate performance. Yermack (1996) adopted the point of view of a negative association between board size and performance. He founds an inverse relationship between the two variables. This suggests that the small size of a board of directors helps to improve the efficiency of the decision making process and, hence, promotes shareholders, interests. Brown and Maloney (1992) also found that smaller boards of directors are associated with better firm performance. Given that the previous studies have cross-sectionally examined many industries, the documented relationship might be altered when studying one industry with unique features regarding the control system.Performance measureThe literature is filled with different types of financial performance measures. All these measures can be categorized as either accounting-based measures or market-oriented measures. Usually, accounting measures that are constructed from financial statements data are highly criticized in the finance community. Also, these measures usually do not account for differences in systematic risk; hence, they diverge from the economic market value of firms (see Benston 1985). That is why financial analysts sometimes reclassify some balance sheet items in order to judge the precise liquidity of a firm.On the other hand, the market-based performance measures are determined solely and collectively by the market participants who interpret managers’ signals correctly, assuming efficient financial markets, and usually firm managers have no discretion over these measures. Based upon that, and because the sample firms are publicly owned companies and hence their securities are priced in financial markets, this study will use a market-based financial performance measure to measure REI Ts’ financial performance. Tobin’s Q, as a market-based performance measure, represents a sharp measure of corporate value. Since it incorporates the value of all assets, it is supposed to reflect both the quality of monitoring practiced by pure directors and the degree to which shareholders’ interests and those of managers are aligned, assuming that REITs’ securities are priced in efficient capital markets. Tobin’s Q can be defined as the ratio of the firm value to its assets replacement costs. The literature is filled with different versions of Tobin’s Q. Since no consensus is reached as to the best Tobin’s Q ratio, three different ratios of Tobin’s Q will be used in this study. This procedure serves two purposes. The first is to test the sensitivity of the results to different definitions of corporate performance proxied by Tobin’s Q. Second, the effect of employing different versions of Tobin’s Q on the results of many different studies in the literature is partly resolved. The three versions of Tobin’s Q employed in this study are as follows:Q1=(MVE+TA-EQ1)/TAwhere MVE is the product of stock price (year close) by the common stocksoutstanding .TA is total asset, and EQ is the book value of equity.Q2=(MVE/ book value of Net Assets)^2Q3=((MVE+LTD+STE+ PSALV)/TA)^3Where LTD is the book value of long term debt.STD is the book value of the short-term debt, and PSALV is the preferred stock at liquidation value. For the sake of illustration, the correlation among the three versions of Tobin’s Q was calculat ed and was shown to be very high. Therefore, it is expected to have similar results as far as our analysis is concerned.ConclusionThis study has investigated the effect of the composition of the board of directors (a monitoring mechanism) and managerial remuneration (bonding mechanism) on the corporate performance of REITs. The results indicate that there is a negative relationship between cash managerial remuneration and firm performance. Also, unlike some previous studies, this paper shows that only pure directors are able to practice effective monitoring and gray directors have no significant effect on firm performance. The outside directors, both gray and pure, have no impact upon finance performance in the REITs industry. Moreover, this paper tackled the board size effect investigated previously in the literature. The findings of this study confirm a nonlinear relationship between board size and firm performance. The relationship is negative when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows.Source:Turki Alshimmiri,2004.“Board Composition, Executive Remuneration, And Corporate Performance: The Case Of Reits”.Corporate Ownership & Control August.pp.104-112.译文：董事会结构，高管薪酬和公司绩效：以房地产投资信托基金为例简介股东是现代公司的的剩余风险承担者。

企业风险管理与公司绩效外文文献翻译中英文2020

企业风险管理与公司绩效外文翻译中英文2020英文Enterprise risk management and firm performance: Role of the riskcommitteeMuhammad Malik, Mahbub Zaman, Sherrena Buckby AbstractIn recent years, there have been increasing efforts in the corporate world to invest in risk management and governance processes. In this paper, we examine the impact of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) on firm performance by examining whether firm performance is strengthened or weakened by the establishment of a board-level risk committee (BLRC), an important governance mechanism that oversees ERM processes. Based on 260 observations from FTSE350 listed firms in the UK during 2012–2015, we find the effectiveness of ERM significantly and positively affects firm performance. We also find strong BLRC governance complements this relationship and increases the firm performance effects of ERM. Our findings suggest the mere formation of a BLRC is not a panacea for ERM oversight; however, existence of a structurally strong BLRC is crucial for effective ERM governance.Keywords: Enterprise risk management, Risk committee, Risk governance, Firm performanceIntroductionRecent events, including the corporate downfalls of the early 2000s and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007–09, have led to increased international regulatory efforts to enhance risk management (RM) practices. In the UK, the Walker Report (2009) and guidelines from the Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2011, FRC, 2014a, FRC, 2014b) suggest listed firms should adhere to sophisticated RM practices, including the creation of a holistic RM framework and greater involvement from boards of directors in risk governance. An increasing number of UK listed firms now adhere to these recommendations, which focus on the establishment of an Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) process and the establishment of a board-level risk committee (BLRC) to enhance the board’s risk oversight function. This paper contributes to the literature on ERM by examining the impact of ERM on UK firm performance, particularly whether this relationship is strengthened or weakened by the adoption of a BLRC. To date, research investigating the roles and outcomes of a BLRC is scarce. This study focuses on evidence from UK listed firms to provide key insights into this emerging issue.Our study, motivated by key corporate governance guidelines, considers the impact of ERM process adoption (including the structural strength of BLRC) on firm performance in UK FTSE350 firms. We apply Tobin’s Q as our firm performance measure based on prior resea rch(Baxter et al., 2013; Farrell and Gallagher, 2015, Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011, Lin et al., 2012, McShane et al., 2011) and adopt the Gordon et al. (2009) ERM index as a composite measure of the effectiveness of ERM processes. Previous studies measure the presence of ERM activity using a binary variable (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011, Lechner and Gatzert, 2018, Lin et al., 2012, Pagach and Warr, 2010). In contrast, the Gordon et al. (2009) index reflects the presence of an ERM function in a firm and measures the effectiveness of ERM processes regarding business strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance (COSO, 2004). BLRC structural strength is measured using six dimensions related to its structure and composition, drawing on risk governance guidelines and prior research on the effectiveness/efficacy of board-level committees with a similar monitoring role to the BLRC (Goodwin and Seow, 2002, Xie et al., 2003, Zaman et al., 2011).Our empirical findings suggest ERM is positively associated with UK firm performance. The results suggest ERM is an efficient form of “internal” RM and if overseen by the BLRC should maximize shareholders’ wealth. The findings suggest a structurally strong BLRC (a committee with high levels of monitoring and diligence comprised of financial experts exhibiting gender diversity) strengthens ERM impact on firm performance. This implies BLRC adoption by itself is insufficient to achieve ERM oversight. However, BLRC structural strength is identifiedas necessary for effective ERM governance. As BLRC formation is an emerging ERM practice (Brown et al., 2009, Hines et al., 2015), our study addresses a gap in current RM literature by examining whether a BLRC strengthens or weakens the impact of ERM on firm performance providing an important contribution to the field.BackgroundIn the UK, the Walker (2009) report and FRC guidelines (FRC, 2011, FRC, 2014a, FRC, 2014b) recommend UK listed firms should adopt a holistic approach to ERM. The guidelines suggest UK listed firms adopt a multifaceted approach to risk identification and risk assessment, and consider all the principal risks faced by the entity. An effective RM infrastructure adopted and governed by a high-level risk governance structure (a BLRC) promotes a strong risk culture at all levels of the firm, approves enterprise risk strategy and risk appetite, and monitors organisational risk mitigation plans. Taken together, the FRC (2014b) suggests listed firms should adopt a robust and effective RM system to safeguard against major risks that could seriously affect organisational performance, future prospects, or damage firm reputation. As a result of the clear guidance provided for risk committees in the UK, our study focuses on revealing whether BLRCs in listed firms are found to be structurally sufficient to support the ERM oversight functions outlined in the Walker (2009) report. We are motivated to gather evidenceof the relationship between ERM and firm performance using UK data for the following reasons. After the GFC, demand for firm-level risk oversight increased in the UK and internationally. The Walker (2009) report contributed to this demand by encouraging the formation of a BLRC and driving the adoption of an ERM function in listed UK firms.In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) also mandated similar requirements for US listed firms but did not provide the same level of detailed prescription regarding the role, responsibilities, and processes of a BLRC compared to UK regulations. Prior research has examined this relationship in US settings using various proxies for ERM. ERM research has not reached a consensus to date, with results indicating ERM is both value relevant (Gordon et al., 2009, Grace et al., 2015, McShane et al., 2011) and not value relevant (Beasley et al., 2008, Lin et al., 2012, Pagach and Warr, 2010). In Europe, two recent studies (Florio and Leoni, 2017, Lechner and Gatzert, 2018) find ERM is positively associated with firm performance. Due to this lack of consensus in the literature, we are motivated to examine the impact of ERM on firm performance using UK data to consider whether ERM is value relevant and whether it is associated with improved firm performance, especially when related to the adoption of a BLRC as an ERM governance mechanism.In a US based study, Gordon et al. (2009) propose the impact ofERM-driven firm performance is dependent upon the proper match between monitoring by the board4 and ERM processes. They posit how participation and encouragement from the board is essential for effective ERM adoption, a perspective shared by Kleffner et al., 2003, Sobel and Reding, 2004. Our study contributes by extending the findings of Gordon et al. (2009) across two dimensions. First, we recognise responsibility for ERM oversight is usually delegated to the BLRC, a sub-committee of the full board. Second, we examine how risk committee structural characteristics influence ERM effectiveness and consequently firm performance.Prior literature suggests a newly emerging BLRC generally assists the board in carrying out its ERM responsibilities, such as risk oversight, fostering risk culture, and improving the quality of risk monitoring and reporting (Aebi et al., 2012, Brown et al., 2009, COSO, 2004). RM literature in the UK provides evidence of risk reporting patterns in listed firms (Linsley and Shrives, 2005, Linsley and Shrives, 2006). However, the links between corporate governance and risk reporting (Abraham and Cox, 2007), and the effects of traditional RM on firm value (Panaretou, 2014), demonstrate there is a paucity of UK empirical evidence investigating the impact of ERM practices and the influence of a BLRC oversight on firm performance.Our paper contributes to international RM literature in the followingways. First, UK RM research focused on the incentives of risk reporting (Elshandidy et al., 2018). Our paper extends prior research by focusing on the informativeness of UK ERM practices (Baxter et al., 2013, Gordon et al., 2009, Florio and Leoni, 2017, Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011, Lechner and Gatzert, 2018, Pagach and Warr, 2010). RM has received considerable attention from both professional and regulatory UK bodies, including improved RM guidelines from the FRC (FRC, 2011, FRC, 2014b). Panaretou (2014) examines the valuation impacts of derivative usage (a practice in financial RM) in UK firms and finds hedging practices are weakly or non-significantly associated with firm performance. We extend the study of Panaretou (2014) by examining the valuation impacts of the effectiveness of ERM processes. Our study contributes to the literature examining the risk-related corporate governance mechanisms that affect firm performance (Aebi et al., 2012, Ames et al., 2018, Brown et al., 2009, Florio and Leoni, 2017, Tao and Hutchinson, 2013). Previous studies suggest the presence of a BLRC represents strong RM (Aebi et al., 2012), indicating greater levels of ERM implementation and integration of RM in corporate governance mechanisms (Florio and Leoni, 2017). We extend these studies by investigating the impact of six key structural characteristics of a BLRC on firm performance effects of ERM.Discussion and conclusionIn recent years, there have been increased efforts in the UK to improve risk governance mechanisms. In this paper, we investigate whether a firm’s RM, particularly ERM processes, is linked to firm performance. We also examine the interaction role of the BLRC, as a risk governance mechanism, in this relationship. We find effective ERM processes improve firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q, thus giving support to the theoretical claims by prior researchers regarding performance implications associated with the implementation of ERM (Baxter et al., 2013, Brown et al., 2009, Florio and Leoni, 2017, Gordon et al., 2009, Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003, Nocco and Stulz, 2006). This result infers the higher the effectiveness of a firm’s ERM, the greater the ability of the firm to achieve its strategic objectives i.e. strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance (COSO, 2004). We find that a BLRC improves the ERM and firm performance relationship. In particular, the existence of a strong BLRC is essential for ERM processes to be effective enough to increase market performance.Our study contributes to the empirical research on RM and has clear practical implications. First, the results demonstrate ERM is positively related to firm performance, and the adoption of ERM processes is more attractive for UK firms who have not yet implemented ERM. However, adoption is not sufficient – an effective ERM system needs to efficiently achiev e organisational objectives and positively impact shareholders’wealth creation. Unlike traditional silo-based RM, which is isolated, fragmented, and uncoordinated (task-by-task or department-by-department) with a focus solely on financial RM, the holistic approach of ERM incorporates and integrates decision-making at multiple levels and prevents risk aggregation within the organisation. By adopting an effective ERM, a firm can create value through: 1) strategy (by maximizing its market position relative to its competitors); 2) operations (by increasing operational efficiency); 3) reliable financial reporting system; and 4) compliance with applicable laws and regulations. COSO (2004) describes ERM best practice as including (but not be limited to) a holistic method of RM, standardization of risk measures, formalization of risk ownership at all levels of the organisation, engagement of all employees in RM processes, localization of risk culture, and assurance of proper recording, documentation and communication of risks and opportunities. We identify how adopting ERM practices in UK listed firms should more efficiently implement FRC guidelines on RM (FRC, 2011, FRC, 2014a, FRC, 2014b). Second, since ERM is a holistic approach embedded throughout the organisation, it provides a multifaceted platform for corporate governance when focusing on value maximization through RM. We find with regard to risk governance, the BLRC supports the function of ERM. Our results indicate the valuation outcomes of ERM are affected by the structure and composition of theBLRC.One of the key contributions of our study is how a structurally strong BLRC, larger in size, more active, and with higher independent, financial, female, and inter-committee directorships, supports a stronger ERM and firm performance relationship. Conversely, a weak BLRC could adversely affect this relationship and reduce the performance implications of ERM. Our study identifies that UK corporate regulatory bodies should introduce detailed guidelines in relation to BLRC formation and structure to promote better quality risk governance. Walker (2009) encourages firms to establish a BLRC and details their responsibilities, but does not stipulate clear guidelines on the committee’s structure and composition and interactions.Finally, our findings have international implications. Since COSO (2004) provides a globally accepted international level ERM framework (Florio and Leoni, 2017, Lechner and Gatzert, 2018), we suggest that to improve the effectiveness of ERM proces ses to meet a firm’s strategic objectives, it is crucial to improve firm performance implications. We expect the effectiveness of ERM processes supplements the important features of ERM identified by previous researchers, such as CRO appointment (Beasley et al., 2008), ERM ratings from external agencies (McShane et al., 2011), ERM program maturity (Farrell and Gallagher, 2015), and the level of ERM implementation (Florio and Leoni, 2017). Inaddition, as the adoption of BLRCs is increasing globally for the oversight of RM processes (Al-Hadi et al., 2016, Florio and Leoni, 2017, Hines and Peters, 2015, Ng et al., 2013, Tao and Hutchinson, 2013) we suggest structural balance of the BLRC is important for effective risk governance.As with all research, this study is not free from limitations. First, the small sample size limits the power of our analysis and generalizability of findings. As investments in RM and governance are continuing to increase; future researchers will be able to employ larger samples to ext end this study’s analysis and generalizations. Second, this study employs the Gordon et al. (2009) ERM index to measure the ERM effectiveness of a firm. This index focuses on the COSO (2004) framework and measures the strength of an ERM program, however, the index is unable to capture the maturity of the ERM program of a firm. Future studies could assist with developing a more sophisticated ERM index. Third, we ignore the independence of the ERM function. The Walker (2009) report requires an independent CRO to participate in the BLRC and the risk oversight process ultimately be accountable to the full board. A future study could further examine the risk-reporting framework of UK firms in terms of CRO reporting, accountability, and efficiency of the ERM function and BLRC monitoring.中文企业风险管理与公司绩效：风险委员会的作用穆罕默德·马利克马布卜·扎曼谢雷娜·巴克比摘要近年来，企业界在投资风险管理和治理流程方面做出了越来越多的努力。

管理层薪酬对公司绩效的研究【外文翻译】

股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译(可编辑)

股权结构与公司业绩外文翻译外文翻译Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from IsraelMaterial Source: Journal of Management and Governance Author: Beni Lauterbach and Alexander Vaninsky1.IntroductionFor many years and in many economies, most of the business activity was conducted by proprietorships, partnerships or closed corporations. In these forms of business organization, a small and closely related group of individuals belonging to the same family or cooperating in business for lengthy periods runs the firm and shares its profits.However, over the recent century, a new form of business organization flourished as non-concentrated-ownership corporations emerged. The modern diverse ownership corporation has broken the link between the ownership and active management of the firm. Modern corporations are run by professional managers who typically own only a very small fraction of the shares. In addition, ownership is disperse, that is the corporation is owned by and its profits are distributed among many stockholders.The advantages of the modern corporation are numerous. It relievesfinancing problems, which enables the firm to assume larger-scale operations and utilize economies of scale. It also facilitates complex-operations allowing the most skilled or expert managers to control business even when they the professional mangers do not have enough funds to own the firm. Modern corporations raise money sell common stocks in the capital markets and assign it to the productive activities of professional managers. This is why it is plausible to hypothesize that the modern diverse-ownership corporations perform better than the traditional “closely held” business forms.Moderating factors exist. For example, closely held firms may issue minority shares to raise capital and expand operations. More importantly, modern corporations face a severe new problem called the agency problem: there is a chance that the professional mangers governing the daily operations of the firm would take actions against the best interests of the shareholders. This agency problem stems from the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation, and it troubled many economists before e.g., Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen andMeckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983. The conclusion was that there needs to exist a monitoring system or contract, aligning the manager interests and actions with the wealth and welfare of the owners stockholdersAgency-type problems exist also in closely held firms becausethere are always only a few decision makers. However, given the personal ties between the owners and mangers in these firms, and given the much closer monitoring, agency problems in closely held firms seem in general less severe.The presence of agency problems weakens the central thesis that modern open ownership corporations are more efficient. It is possible that in some business sectors the costs of monitoring and bonding the manager would be excessive. It is also probable that in some cases the advantages of large-scale operations and professional management would be minor and insufficient to outweigh the expected agency costs. Nevertheless, given the historical trend towards diverse ownership corporations, we maintain the hypothesis that diverse-ownership firms perform better than closely held firms. In our view, the trend towards diverse ownership corporations is rational and can be explained by performance gains.2. Ownership Structure and Firm PerformanceOne of the most important trademarks of the modern corporation is the separation of ownership and control. Modern corporations are typically run by professional executives who own only a small fraction of the shares.There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the impact and merit of the separation of ownership and control. Early theorists such as Williamson 1964 propose that non-owner managers prefer their owninterests over that of the shareholders. Consequently, non-owner managed firms become less efficient than owner-managed firms.The more recent literature reexamines this issue and prediction. It points out the existence of mechanisms that moderate the prospects of non-optimal and selfish behavior by the manager. Fama 1980, for example, argues that the availability and competition in the managerial labor markets reduce the prospects that managers would act irresponsibly. In addition, the presence of outside directors on the board constrains management behavior. Others, like Murphy 1985, suggest that executive compensation packages help align management interests with those of the shareholders by generating a link between management pay and firm performanceHence, non-owner manager firms are not less efficient than owner-managed firms. Most interestingly, Demsetz and Lehn 1985 conclude that the structure of ownership varies in ways that are consistent with value imization. That is, diverse ownership and non-owner managed firms emerge when they are more worthwhile.The empirical evidence on the issue is mixed see Short 1994 for a summaryPart of the diverse results can be attributed to the difference across the studies in the criteria for differentiation between owner and non-owner manager controlled firms. These criteria, typically based on percentage ownership by large stockholders, are less innocuous and more problematic than initially believed because, as demonstrated by Morck,Shleifer and Vishny 1988 and McConnell and Servaes 1990, the relation between percentage ownership and firm performance is nonlinear. Further, percent ownership appears insufficient for describing the control structure. Two firms with identical overall percentage ownership by large blockholders are likely to have different control organizations, depending on the identity of the large stockholders.In this study, we utilize the ownership classification scheme proposed by Ang, Hauser and Lauterbach 1997. This scheme distinguishes between non-owner managed firms, firms controlled by concerns, firms controlled by a family, and firms controlled by a group of individuals partners. Obviously, the control structure in each of these firm types is different. Thus, some new perspectives on the relation between ownership structure and firm performance might emerge.3. DataWe employ data from a developing economy, Israel, where many forms of business organization coexist. The sample includes 280 public companies traded on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange TASE during 1994. For each company we collect data on the 1992?1994 net income profits after tax, 1994 total assets, 1994 equity, 1994 top management remuneration, and 1994 ownership structure. All data is extracted from the companies financial reports except for the classification of firms according to their ownership structure, which is based on the publica tions, “Holdings ofInterested Parties” issued by the Israel Securities Authority, “Meitav Stock Guide,” and “Globes Stock Exchange Yearbook”.The initial sample included all firms traded on the TASE about 560 at the time. However, sample size shrunk by half because: 1 according to the Israeli Security Authority the Israeli counterpart of the US SEC only 434 companies provided reliable compensation reports; 2 147 companies have a negative 1992?94 average net income, which makes them unsuitable for the methodology we employ; and 3 for 7 firms we could not determine the ownership structure.The companies in the sample represent a rich variety of ownership structures, as illustrated in Figure 1. Nine percent of the firms do not have any majority owner. Among majority owned firms, individuals family firms or partnerships of individuals own 72% and the rest are controlled by concerns. About half 49% of the individually-controlled firms are dominated by a partnership of individuals and the rest 51% are dominated by families. Professional non-owner CEOs are found in about 15% of the individually controlled firms.4. Methodology: Data Envelopment AnalysisIn this study, we measure relative performance using Data Envelopment Analysis DEA. Data Envelopment Analysis is currently a leading methodology in Operations Research for performance evaluations see Seiford and Thrall, 1990, and previous versions of it have been usedin Finance by Elyasiani andMehdian, 1992, for example.The main advantage of Data Envelopment Analysis is that it is a parameter-free approach. For each analyzed firm, DEA constructs a “twin” comparable virtual firm consisting of a portfolio of other sample firms. Then, the relative performance of the firm can be determined. Other quantitative techniques such as regression analysis are parametric, that is it estimates a “production function” and assesses each firm performance according to its residual relative to the fitted fixed parameters economy-wide production function. We are not claiming that parametric methods are inadequate. Rather, we attempt a different and perhaps more flexible methodology, and compare its results to the standard regression methodology Findings.The equity ratio variable represents expectation that given the firm size, the higher the investments of stockholders equity, the higher their return net income. Finally, the CEO and top management compensation variables are controlling for the managers’ input. One of our central points is that top managers’ actions and skills affect firm output. Hence, higher pay mangers who presumably are also higher-skill are expected to yield superior profits. Rosen 1982 relates executives’ pay and rank in the organization to their skills and abilities, and Murphy 1998 discusses in de tail the structure of executive pay and its relation to firm’s performance.The DEA analysis and the empirical estimation of the relative performance of different organizational forms are repeated in four separate subsets of firms: Investment companies, Industrial companies, Real-estate companies, and Trade and services companies. This sector analysis controls for the special business environment of the firms and facilitates further examination of the net effect of ownership structure on firm performance.5.Empirical Results The main results of the empirical findings reviewed above are that majority Control by a few individuals diminishes firm performance, and that professional non-owner managers promote performance. The conclusions about individual control and professional management are reinforced by two other findings. First, it appears that firms without professional managers and firms controlled by individuals are more likely to exhibit negative net income.Second, Table IV also presents results of regressions of net income, NET INC, on leverage, size, professional manager dummy, and individual control dummy.6. ConclusionsThe empirical analysis of 280 firms in Israel reveals that ownership structure impacts firm performance, where performance is estimated as the actual net income of the firm divided by the optimal net income given the firm’s inputs. We find that:Out of all organizational forms, family owner-managed firms appearleast efficient in generating profits. When all firms are considered, only family firms with owner managers have an average performance score of less than 30%, and when performance is measured relative to the business sector, only family firms with owner-managers have an average score of less than 50%.2Non-owner managed firms perform better than owner-managed firms. These findings suggest that the modern form of business organization, namely the open corporation with disperse ownership and non-owner managers, promotes performance Critical readers may wonder how come “efficient” and “less-efficient” organizational structures coexist. The answer is that we probably do not document a long-term equilibrium situation. The lower-performing family and partnership controlled firms are likely, as time progresses, to transform into public-controlled non-majority owned corporations.A few reservations are in order. First, we do not contend that every company would gain by transforming into a disperse ownership public firm. For example, it is clear that start-up companies are usually better off when they are closely held. Second, there remain questions about the methodology and its application Data Envelopment Analysis is not standard in Finance. Last, we did not show directly that transforming into a disperse ownership public firm improves performances. Future research should further explore any performance gains from the separation ofownership and control.译文股权结构与公司业绩资料来源:管理治理杂志作者:贝尼?劳特巴赫和亚历山大?范尼斯基多年来,在许多经济体中的大多数商业活动是由独资企业、合伙企业或者非公开企业操作管理的。

企业绩效管理外文翻译文献综述

企业绩效管理外文翻译文献综述企业绩效管理外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Can Performance Management Foster Intelligent Behavior?Bjarte BogsnesThe world has changed, not just in increasingly fast-changing and unpredictable ways, but also the competence and expectations of people in our organizations. Unfortunately, too few seem to understand or accept that these developments call for radically new and different ways of leading and managing. Traditional management practices do not make usthe agile organizations we need to be.The problem starts with the label, "Performance Management" implying, "If I don't manage you, there will be no performance."We need a new mindset, one that is less about managing performance and more about creating conditions for great performance to occur. We need self-regulating models, requiring less management, but more leadership from everyone.Think about traffic, where we want good performance and a safe good flow. Traffic authorities have different ways of making this happen. The traffic light is a popular choice, but those managing the process (programmers) are not in the situation; information used in their process is not fresh, which is clear as you wait in front of that red light.The roundabout is a very different alternative. Those managing are the drivers themselves. The information used isreal time, coming from own observations. While that information is also available in front of the traffic light, drivers do not have the authority to act on it. By the way, the "zipper" or "every second car through" is not a rule, but a guiding principle.The roundabout normally is more efficient than the traffic light, because of two significant differences in the decision-making process, information and authority. A third element is also required for the roundabout to be more efficient: while the traffic light is a simple-rulesbased system, the roundabout is values-based. A value-set based on, "Me first, I don't care about the rest," is not a big a problem in front of the red light, but is a serious problem in a roundabout. Here, a positive common purpose of wanting a safe and good flow is critical. Drivers must be more considerate, open about own intentions while trying to understand the intentions of peers. Instead of managing performance, traffic authorities have created conditions for self-managed performance to occur.What would the implications be for the loathed performance review? The principles and practices described at Return Path are sensible and interesting. I like the concept of horizontal commitments toward peers, instead of vertical commitments to higher management. At the same time, we need to broaden our definition of performance. In traditional performance, a commitment is too often about "hitting the number." This is too narrow. We need to ask questions such as, how are we doing compared to peers? How are we using KPIs to reflect on performance, or using hindsight and management assessment to verify results? Did we really move toward our longer-term ambitions? How sustainable are the results? Last but not least, there has to be room for values if performance systems are tofoster intelligent behavior; we need to ask, how where those results achieved?At Statoil our integrated performance management approach links ambitions to actions. Our targets reflect a broad set of ambitions,including people, health, safety, environment, operations and financial performance. Read more about our management model and how we apply a holistic and values-based approach to this broader performance agenda.The words of Dee Hock, former GEO of Visa, should guide the design of our management processes, including our performance reviews: "Simple, clear purpose and principles give rise to complex, intelligent behavior. Complex rules and regulations give rise to simple, stupid behavior."While researching my book. Talent Economics, I interviewed employees about what really motivates today's workforce. I discovered a disconnect between the performance support my interviewees wanted versus how managers recounted their contribution to these conversations.Over the last 20 years, the employee mindset has evolved faster than has the art and science of management. Nowhere is this starker than in the area of performance management practices, particularly the annual review. In both the developed and developing world, employees report that this end-of-year activity breeds stress, anxiety and mistrust. How ironic that a process aimed at improving organizational performance, is itself underperforming!It's time to "reboot" our performance management operating system, installing two specific system updates: l. The "Democracy" update. As much as we try to make theperformance appraisal a two way dialogue, we cannot run away from the fact that at its core, the conversation today is often a top-down review. My research shows that many 21st century employees are rejecting conversations that are one-way: in hot job markets today, managers must realize "who is appraising whom." With other offers readily available, many employees enter a performance dialogue privately considering if their manager is worth another year of their career. The performance management conversation now reflects a company's Employee Value Proposition, much as we learn in the lead Perspective.The Democracy update means that managers only gain the right to give feedback when they first genuinely seek the same on their own performance as leaders. Not just through 360-degree reviews, but also through authentic conversations asking, "How am I performing as your manager? " and "How can I help you succeed?" Only then can the conversation shift to, "How you can improve?"and "This is what you should focus on."2. The Success module. Greater employee autonomy and empowerment also changes the meaning of management. We have gone from a "supervisor of task and outcomes" to an "enabler of performance, innovative thinking and collective success." To make this shift, we must give up the judge's robes for the coach's uniform. If employees don't succeed, managers are on the hook, too.This is particularly relevant when coaching a team to success. People bring different skills to a team and how well they work together really matters. If team reviews work better to achieve a goal, so be it. The Return Path story illustrates how review processes can be designed and executed around what matters most, and where everyone dons the uniforms of player and coach.What if, instead of making the heart of a performance conversation the evaluation, it became a vehicle to improve success of the individual, the team and the business? What if performance feedback was paired with dialogue about transforming the business, the product or customer experience? This genuinely reboots and upgrades performance management to focus on individual and organizational success.It is indeed time to upgrade performance management practices: we can no longer manage a 21st century employee using 20th century mindsets.People & Strategy. 2013, V ol. 36 Issue 2, p12-13. 2p.译文：绩效管理能促进自我管理行为吗?Bjarte Bogsnes世界随着时间的推移而变化莫测，连那些与时变化而不可预测的通道也随之改变，与此同时组织人员的能力和期望也顺应时代潮流。

绩效管理外文翻译外文文献中英翻译

企业绩效管理外文文献翻译译文

外文文献翻译译文一、外文原文CorporatePerformanceManagementAbstractTwo of the most important duties of a chief executive officer are (1) toformulates t rat egy and(2)tomanage h i s c ompany’s p er f orm ance.Inthisa r ticlewe e xaminethe second of these tasks and discuss how corporate performance should be modeledand managed.Webeginbyconsideringtheenvironmentin whichacompanyoperates,which includes, besides outside stakeholders, the industry it belongs and the marketit supplies, and then proceed to explain how the functioning of a company can beu nder s t ood by a nex a m i nationof i ts bus i n ess,o per a ti ona landperform a nce managementmod els.Nextwedescribethestructurerecommendedby theauthorsforacorporateplanning,controlandevaluationsystem,themostimportantpartofa corp orate performance management system. The core component of theplanningsystem is the corporate performance evaluation model, the structure of which ism apped i nt o the pl anning sys t em’s da ta b ase,si m ula t ion modelsandbudgeting t ool s’structures, andalsousedtoshapeinformationcontainedinthe system’s products,besidesbeingthenucleusoft helanguageusedbythe system’s agentstotalkabout corporateperformance.Theontologyofplann ing,theguidingprinciplesofcorporate planningandthehistoryof”M ADE”,thecorporateperform ancemanagementsystem di scus s e d inthisarti c le,arere vi ew e dn e xt,before w ep ro cee d todisc us s i nde t ailt h e structural components of the corporate planning and control system introduced before.We conclude the article by listing the main steps which should be followedwhen implementing aperformance planning, control and evaluation system for a company.1.IntroductionTwo of the most important corporate tasks for which a chief executive officeris primarilyresponsibleare(1)toformulatestrategyand(2)tomanagethecompany’s p erf ormance. In thisarticle we examine the second of these tasks and discuss howcorporateperformance should be modeled andmanaged.T operfo r mistoac c ompli s h,t o a chieve(de s i r ed)r e s u ltsoroutc om es.So,whe n talkingabo utcorporateperformance,wearereferringtothedegreebywhichdesired resultsoroutcomesarea chievedbyacompany.Managingcorporateperformance involves planning, controlling, analyzing and evaluating, not only the resultsachieved bythecompany,butalsothemeansbywhichtheseresultsarereached.Amongthe re sults,orgoals,pursuedbymostcompanieswecanmentiongrowth,marketshare,profitabilityan dvaluecreation;andthemeanstoachievetheseresultsincludep roductivi ty,effect i veness,innova t iona nd c ompetiti ve nes s.T hos e a rethe t y p eofthings we should have in mind when specifying a corporate performancemanagement system.Before discussing how to model corporate performance, it is convenienttoconsider the environment in which a company operates, which includes, besides out s i de sta ke holde rs, the indust r y i t be l ongs and the marke t it suppli e s. Themain aspectsofanindustrytobelookedatwhen consideringitsinfluenceoncorporateperformancearestructureandregulation,themaincompetito rs,entrybarriers,substituteproductsand supplier’s negotiatingpower.Associatedquestionsare :How production is organized, vertically or horizontally? How much competitive isthe i ndustry and who are the m a in competitors, t h ose tha t ca pt ure th e l a rges t part oft hemarketshare?Is itunregulated,self-regulatedorregulatedbyagovernmentagency?Howstrongarebarrierstotheentryofnewcompetito rs?Canproductsfromother industries function as substitutes for the ones produced in the industry? Whataboutthe power industry suppliers have when negotiating prices and tradeconditions?At the opposite side of the industry in the corporate environment we havethe marketwherethecompanytradesitsproducts,itsmainattributesbeingsize,growth rate,segmentation,exitbarriersand consumers’negotiating power.Typicalquest ions thatshouldbeaskedwhenassessingitseffectoncorporateperformanceare:Whatis the marketsize,indollars,foreach of the company’s products?Whatarethe short-term and long-term market growth rates? Is it a wholesaleor a retailmarket?Are the sales cyclical? How can the market be segmented (by geography, purchasingpower,customerage,etc.)?Whichbarriersdoesaclientrunintowhenchangings uppli e rs? D o c l ients ha v e t he power t o impose pric e s and t ra de conditions?Wecallthepeoplewhohaveinterestinorareaffectedbya company’s performanceits“stak eholders”,andgroupthemin thecategoriesof“insiders”and“outsiders”.Theinsidersarethe company’s entrepreneursorcontr ollingshareholders and its managers and employees. The outsiders include customers, suppliers, minority shareholders, debt holders, the government in its roles of public goodssupplier,regulatorandtaxcollector,andalsothecommunitieswherethecompany doesbus i ne s s.It isim port ant t onote t hats t a kehol de rs,bes i desbeinga f fecte db y,al s oinfluencecorporateperformanceanditisoftennec essarytosearchfortheeffectsof this influencewhen appraisingperformance.That is meant to increase the depth of this brief analysis of corporatestructureand external relations.Microeconomictheory considers the company as asocial p roductionunittha t uses a certa i ntechnolo g ytop r oducea s eto f outputsfromas e tof inputs.Thefunctionthatmapsi nputquantitiesintomaximumoutputquantities obtainablefromtheinputsiscalledthe“productio n function”or“productionfrontier”.Knowledge of this function is important for measuring the technical efficiency ofaproduction unit, a very significant performance metric. Several techniques existfort hespe c ifi c at i on of pro duc tion funct i ons or fro nt iers, gr oupe d und e r the nam e so f“Data Envelopment Analysis”and“S tochasticFrontier Analysis”.Companies are created by entrepreneurs, the agents that organize andcoordinate production with the help of professional managers. Entrepreneurs play a crucialrolein shaping corporate performance. On oneside, recognized entrepreneurial capacity─and also large contact networks ─are vital for raising the financial capitalnecessary tobuildstructuralorphysicalcapital. On anotherside,the entrepreneurs’reputation and contacts are essential to attract the intellectual capital that, together withthe structural capital, is the foundation of innovation capacity.A business model is a conceptual representation of the way a companydoes business.Itsmaincomponents,are:the company’s valueproposition;thetargetedmarket segments; the distribution, marketing communications, and customerrelationshipchannels;the core competenciesneeded;operating and managementt echnol og ies;t hepar t ner s’ne tw ork;andtherevenue,costand va lue creat i on m ode ls.Understandingthe business modelis the first step to implement acorporate performancemanagementsystem.The modelshould indicate whether the company has a broad customer base or targets specific market segments, and in the secondcase,identifythesesegments.Thegoodsandservicesprovidedbythecompanyandthe com mercial conditions under which they are sold (including such things asguarantees,technicalassistance, etc.), comprise the valueproposition.The channelused forp roductdistr i buti on ca n bea di re c t-t oc ustomer s a l esc ha nnelthroughthe I nte r net,orbe comprised of bricks and mortar companyownedstores, wholesale agents,retail companies,etc.Thecompanycanuseseveralmarketingchannelstogetmessages thro ughtoitscustomers,suchasTVandprintedmedia,andemployacallcentertogive support and receive complaints and suggestions from them. Core competencies ar e t heon e sthecomp an y ne edstomas t erinorde r toga i nac om pet i tivead va nta g ei n relation to other companies in the same marketplace. These competenciesshould restonproperoperationalandmanagementtechnologies,andbe supplemented by a network of partners, if necessary. As a final point, a business model must includea revenue,acostandavaluecreationmodelinordertobeprofitabletothe company’s s hare h old e rs.We can think of the operational model of a companyasencompassinganorganizationalmodel,afunctionalmodelandacorporatedatamodel. The organizationalmodeldepicts,inaninvertedhierarchicaltree,therolesoftheagents involve dinthe company’s operation.Thefunctionalmodelportraysall theactivitiesthattogetherformthewholetowhichwereferbytheexpression“company’s operations”,structuredinlogical,sequentialsteps formingoperationalprocesses.At last, the corporate data model is an entity-relationship diagram that shows themain entitiesaboutwhichthecompanycollectsdatawithitsattributesandtherelationshipsbetw eenthem.Thelastmodelweneedtoexamineinordertounderstandthefunctioningofacorporation is the performance management model it uses, which is, ingeneral,composedoffourbuildingblocks.Thecorporategovernancesystem,thecorporatep e rfo rmanc ep la nnin g,control a nde va lua t ionsyste m,t he individual m anage r sperformance planning, control and evaluation system and the managementvariable compensation system (or bonus system). The corporate governance systemcomprises three well knownactors, the chief executive officer, the directors and theshareholders,andisdesignedtomediatetherelationsbetweenthem.Underthegovernancesyste m,we find two planning and control systems, having as its targets the performance ofthe company(asawholeandofitsdivisions)andtheperformanceofitsindividualm ana g ers,re s p e ct i vely.L i nking t heset w osyste m sw e finda com p ensa t ions y st e mthat assigns fractions of a bonus pool, which is a function of the aggregatecompany performance,toitsmanagersonthebasisoftheirindividualperformances.An e ffective management model should be forward-looking, that is, centered ontheimprovement of future performance, and focused on valuecreation.A thorough understanding o f a ll t he m od e l s des c ribed above is anec e s s ary prerequisiteforone tobeabletoplan,monitor,analyze,evaluateand controlcorporate performance.Inthenextsectionwewillexamineinmoredetailacrucial component of the management model previously described: the corporateperformance planning, control and evaluationsystem.2.The C orporate P erf o rmanc e Planni ng,C ontrolan d Eva l u at io n System.That shows the structure recommended by the authors for acorporateplanning,controlandevaluationsystem,themostimportantpartofacorporateperforma nce management system. The core component of the planning system, as can bededucedfrom its central position in the mentioned figure, is the performance evaluationmodel.Thestructureofthismodelismappedintothe system’s database,simulationm odels and budgeting tools’structures, and also used to shape information contained in the system’s products,besidesbeingthenucleusofthelanguageusedbythe system’s agentstotalkaboutcorporateperformance.Thecorporateplanningand controlprocessisformedbythecoordinatedactionsoftheplanningandcontrolagents,whoseaimist hegenerationofthe system’s outputs,which includeassumptions,goals,forecasts, plans, budgets, investment projects, performance valuations, varianceanalysis,etc.Theseproductstaketheformofpaperandelectronicdocumentsands pread s heets,a nd of PowerPointpresent a t i ons.T he a gents fol lowanagreedupontime schedule and rely on a business intelligence (BI) software to support theiractions.TheBIsoftwareimplementstheperformanceevaluationmodelforthepurposesof rep resenting and simulating corporate performance and provides the necessarytools forthe system’s agentstoproducethe system’soutputs.Datausedbythesystem comes from the accounting and other corporate databases. In the following sectionsof thisarticlewewillexamineindetaileachoftheaforementionedplanningsystemc ompon ents.Before proceeding, however, we will make a pause to discuss the ontologyof planning. One can readily identify in this figure three major structures: the strategic,the motivation and the action frameworks. In the strategic framework, which ischiefly related to the risk versus return dialectics, we can identify theexternal i nf l uence s to corporat e performa n ce, c om pris i ng both opportuni ti es a nd threats, and the internal ones, materialized by strengths and weaknesses. Suppliers and consumersnegotiatingpower,entryandexitbarriers,competitorsandsubstituteproductsarethe ma in determinants of external influences. Technological change has also apervasiveinfluence on corporate performance. Comparing the motivation (ends) andaction(means) fr a meworks, we can as s ociate v a rious levels or l ayers in w hich c or po ra t e aimsaredefinedtothecorrespondingactionclasses,thatis,visiontomission,longtermgo alstostrategy,shorttermgoalstotacticsandactualresultstoactualactions.Policy and business rules are restrictionsunder which strategy and tactics,respectively, must be formulated, and actual action carriedout.It may be convenient, at this point, to give a general definition of theterms“planning”and“control”.Corporateplanningis a processbywhichmanagement define the desired future performance of a corporation, and identify and decide onthe actionsthatneedtobetakeninordertoachievethatperformance.Themainstepscomprisingap lanningcycleareexposed.Corporatecontrol,ontheotherhand,isan operational process which aims to check whether the actual performance isinaccordance with the plannedone, and, eventually, to modify the planned actionsinordertoguaranteethatthefinaldesiredperformancewillbe met. The corporatebudg etisoneo f themostim port antoutputs o fthec orpor atepl a nninga n dcont rol proces s.Itistheprimemanagementtoolusedtoimprovecorporateperformanceand toalignmanageme ntinterests withthoseoftheshareholders.Wecanconcludethis section by stating the nine guiding principles of corporate planning and control:i.Planning is concerned in first place with results and in second placewiththe means to achieve theseresults.ii.Planning is concerned with the present value of costsand benefits to bei ncurred in the f ut u re a s a cons e quence of dec i s i ons undertaken in t he pres e nt.iii.Themainobjectiveofplanningis to createvalueforthe corporation’s shareholders.iv.Fortheabovegoal to bemet,itisnecessarytofulfill customers’expectations concerning quantity, price and quality of marketed products at the least possiblecost,and to m ai nta i n a skilled and full y m otivat ed w or k force.v.Planning and control activities should be organized through a systemwhosecomponents are the planning and control agents, process, time schedule,products,models&tools,anddatabase.vi.Thecorporatebudgetshouldbe the planningandcontrol system’s product t hat consol i dat e s t he r es ul ts w hi ch the company p lans to achi ev e i n the next period and the actions it should undertake in order to meetthem.vii.The corporate budget must contain all the information necessary forthe evaluation of the short term planned performance of the company, itsmarketing,operational, economic, patrimonial and financial aspects being dullyconsidered.viii.The corporate budget should not be viewed exclusively as a means ofcost reductionorcontrol,butmainlyasatooltoenhanceperformanceandincreasethe company’s economicvalue.ix.The planning process in itself is as important as its outputs, andshould contributetoleverage management’s knowledgeabout the company’s i nternal workings, and also to help focus its efforts on the critical areas ofcorporateperformance.S ource: Pedro Góes MonteirodeOliveira STARPLAN ConsultoriaEmpresarial Ltda.,2009.“Corporate Performance Management”.WorkingP aper,vol.41,no.4,pp.1-7..二、翻译文章译文：企业绩效管理摘要行政总裁两个最重要的职责是：制定战略和处理他的公司表现。

企业绩效管理外文翻译文献综述

企业绩效管理外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Can Performance Management Foster Intelligent Behavior?Bjarte BogsnesThe world has changed, not just in increasingly fast-changing and unpredictable ways, but also the competence and expectations of people in our organizations. Unfortunately, too few seem to understand or accept that these developments call for radically new and different ways of leading and managing. Traditional management practices do not make usthe agile organizations we need to be.The problem starts with the label, "Performance Management" implying, "If I don't manage you, there will be no performance."We need a new mindset, one that is less about managing performance and more about creating conditions for great performance to occur. We need self-regulating models, requiring less management, but more leadership from everyone.Think about traffic, where we want good performance and a safe good flow. Traffic authorities have different ways of making this happen. The traffic light is a popular choice, but those managing the process (programmers) are not in the situation; information used in their process is not fresh, which is clear as you wait in front of that red light.The roundabout is a very different alternative. Those managing are the drivers themselves. The information used is real time, coming from own observations. While that information is also available in front of the traffic light, drivers do not have the authority to act on it. By the way, the "zipper" or "every second car through" is not a rule, but a guiding principle.The roundabout normally is more efficient than the traffic light, because of two significant differences in the decision-making process, information and authority. A third element is also required for the roundabout to be more efficient: while the traffic light is a simple-rulesbased system, the roundabout is values-based. A value-set based on, "Me first, I don't care about the rest," is not a big a problem in front of the red light, but is a serious problem in a roundabout. Here, a positive common purpose of wanting a safe and good flow is critical. Drivers must be more considerate, open about own intentions while trying to understand the intentions of peers. Instead of managing performance, traffic authorities have created conditions for self-managed performance to occur.What would the implications be for the loathed performance review? The principles and practices described at Return Path are sensible and interesting. I like the concept of horizontal commitments toward peers, instead of vertical commitments to higher management. At the same time, we need to broaden our definition of performance. In traditional performance, a commitment is too often about "hitting the number." This is too narrow. We need to ask questions such as, how are we doing compared to peers? How are we using KPIs to reflect on performance, or using hindsight and management assessment to verify results? Did we really move toward our longer-term ambitions? How sustainable are the results? Last but not least, there has to be room for values if performance systems are to foster intelligent behavior; we need to ask, how where those results achieved?At Statoil our integrated performance management approach links ambitions to actions. Our targets reflect a broad set of ambitions,including people, health, safety, environment, operations and financial performance. Read more about our management model and how we apply a holistic and values-based approach to this broader performance agenda.The words of Dee Hock, former GEO of Visa, should guide the design of our management processes, including our performance reviews: "Simple, clear purpose and principles give rise to complex, intelligent behavior. Complex rules and regulations give rise to simple, stupid behavior."While researching my book. Talent Economics, I interviewed employees about what really motivates today's workforce. I discovered a disconnect between the performance support my interviewees wanted versus how managers recounted their contribution to these conversations.Over the last 20 years, the employee mindset has evolved faster than has the art and science of management. Nowhere is this starker than in the area of performance management practices, particularly the annual review. In both the developed and developing world, employees report that this end-of-year activity breeds stress, anxiety and mistrust. How ironic that a process aimed at improving organizational performance, is itself underperforming!It's time to "reboot" our performance management operating system, installing two specific system updates:l. The "Democracy" update. As much as we try to make theperformance appraisal a two way dialogue, we cannot run away from the fact that at its core, the conversation today is often a top-down review. My research shows that many 21st century employees are rejecting conversations that are one-way: in hot job markets today, managers must realize "who is appraising whom." With other offers readily available, many employees enter a performance dialogue privately considering if their manager is worth another year of their career. The performance management conversation now reflects a company's Employee Value Proposition, much as we learn in the lead Perspective.The Democracy update means that managers only gain the right to give feedback when they first genuinely seek the same on their own performance as leaders. Not just through 360-degree reviews, but also through authentic conversations asking, "How am I performing as your manager? " and "How can I help you succeed?" Only then can the conversation shift to, "How you can improve?"and "This is what you should focus on."2. The Success module. Greater employee autonomy and empowerment also changes the meaning of management. We have gone from a "supervisor of task and outcomes" to an "enabler of performance, innovative thinking and collective success." To make this shift, we must give up the judge's robes for the coach's uniform. If employees don't succeed, managers are on the hook, too.This is particularly relevant when coaching a team to success. People bring different skills to a team and how well they work together really matters. If team reviews work better to achieve a goal, so be it. The Return Path story illustrates how review processes can be designed and executed around what matters most, and where everyone dons the uniforms of player and coach.What if, instead of making the heart of a performance conversation the evaluation, it became a vehicle to improve success of the individual, the team and the business? What if performance feedback was paired with dialogue about transforming the business, the product or customer experience? This genuinely reboots and upgrades performance management to focus on individual and organizational success.It is indeed time to upgrade performance management practices: we can no longer manage a 21st century employee using 20th century mindsets.People & Strategy. 2013, V ol. 36 Issue 2, p12-13. 2p.译文：绩效管理能促进自我管理行为吗?Bjarte Bogsnes世界随着时间的推移而变化莫测，连那些与时变化而不可预测的通道也随之改变，与此同时组织人员的能力和期望也顺应时代潮流。

资本结构、股权结构与公司绩效的外文翻译

Capital Structure and Firm Performance1. IntroductionAgency costs represent important problems in corporate governance in both financial and nonfinancial industries. The separation of ownership and control in a professionally managed firm may result in managers exerting insufficient work effort, indulging in perquisites, choosing inputs or outputs that suit their own preferences, or otherwise failing to maximize firm value. In effect, the agency costs of outside ownership equal the lost value from professional managers maximizing their own utility, rather than the value of the firm. Theory suggests that the choice of capital structure may help mitigate these agency costs. Under the agency costs hypothesis, high leverage or a low equity/asset ratio reduces the agency costs of outside equity and increases firm value by constraining or encouraging managers to act more in the interests of shareholders. Since the seminal paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976), a vast literature on such agency-theoretic explanations of capital structure has developed (see Harris and Raviv 1991 and Myers 2001 for reviews). Greater financial leverage may affect managers and reduce agency costs through the threat of liquidation, which causes personal losses to managers of salaries, reputation, perquisites, etc. (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1982, Williams 1987), and through pressure to generate cash flow to pay interest expenses (e.g., Jensen 1986). Higher leverage can mitigate conflicts between shareholders and managers concerning the choice of investment (e.g., Myers 1977), the amount of risk to undertake (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976, Williams 1987), the conditions under which the firm is liquidated (e.g., Harris and Raviv 1990), and dividend policy (e.g., Stulz 1990).A testable prediction of this class of models is that increasing the leverage ratio should result in lower agency costs of outside equity and improved firm performance, all else held equal. However, when leverage becomes relatively high, further increases generate significant agency costs of outside debt –including higher expected costs of bankruptcy or financial distress –arising from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.1 Because it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the two sources of agency costs, we follow the literature and allow the relationship between total agency costs and leverage to be nonmonotonic.Despite the importance of this theory, there is at best mixed empirical evidence in the extant literature (see Harris and Raviv 1991, Titman 2000, and Myers 2001 for reviews). Tests of the agency costs hypothesis typically regress measures of firm performance on the equity capital ratio or otherindicator of leverage plus some control variables. At least three problems appear in the prior studies that we address in our application. In the case of the banking industry studied here, there are also regulatory costs associated with very high leverage.First, the measures of firm performance are usually ratios fashioned from financial statements or stock market prices, such as industry-adjusted operating margins or stock market returns. These measures do not net out the effects of differences in exogenous market factors that affect firm value, but are beyond management’s control and therefore cannot reflect agency costs. Thus, the tests may be confounded by factors that are unrelated to agency costs. As well, these studies generally do not set a separate benchmark for each firm’s performance that would be realized if agency costs were minimized.We address the measurement problem by using profit efficiency as our indicator of firm performance.The link between productive efficiency and agency costs was first suggested by Stigler (1976), and profit efficiency represents a refinement of the efficiency concept developed since that time.2 Profit efficiency evaluates how close a firm is to earning the profit that a best-practice firm would earn facing the same exogenous conditions. This has the benefit of controlling for factors outside the control of management that are not part of agency costs. In contrast, comparisons of standard financial ratios, stock market returns, and similar measures typically do not control for these exogenous factors. Even when the measures used in the literature are industry adjusted, they may not account for important differences across firms within an industry – such as local market conditions – as we are able to do with profit efficiency. In addition, the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a reasonable benchmark for how the firm would be expected to perform if agency costs were minimized.Second, the prior research generally does not take into account the possibility of reverse causation from performance to capital structure. If firm performance affects the choice of capital structure, then failure to take this reverse causality into account may result in simultaneous-equations bias. That is, regressions of firm performance on a measure of leverage may confound the effects of capital structure on performance with the effects of performance on capital structure.We address this problem by allowing for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We discuss below two hypotheses for why firm performance may affect the choice of capital structure, the efficiency-risk hypothesis and the franchise-value hypothesis. We construct a two-equation structural model and estimate it using two-stage least squares (2SLS). An equation specifying profit efficiency as a function of the 2 Stigler’s argu ment was part of a broader exchange over whether productive efficiency (or X-efficiency) primarily reflects difficulties in reconciling the preferences of multiple optimizing agents – what is today called agency costs –versus “true”inefficiency, or failureto optimize (e.g., Stigler 1976, Leibenstein 1978). firm’s equity capital ratio and other variables is used to test the agency costs hypothesis, and an equation specifying the equity capital ratio as a function of the firm’s profit efficiency and other variables is used to test the net effects of the efficiency-risk and franchise-value hypotheses. Both equations are econometrically identified through exclusion restrictions that are consistent with the theories.Third, some, but not all of the prior studies did not take ownership structure into account. Under virtually any theory of agency costs, ownership structure is important, since it is the separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs (e.g., Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1985). Greater insider shares may reduce agency costs, although the effect may be reversed at very high levels of insider holdings (e.g., Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988). As well, outside block ownership or institutional holdings tend to mitigate agency costs by creating a relatively efficient monitor of the managers (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Exclusion of the ownership variables may bias the test results because the ownership variables may be correlated with the dependent variable in the agency cost equation (performance) and with the key exogenous variable (leverage) through the reverse causality hypotheses noted aboveTo address this third problem, we include ownership structure variables in the agency cost equation explaining profit efficiency. We include insider ownership, outside block holdings, and institutional holdings.Our application to data from the banking industry is advantageous because of the abundance of quality data available on firms in this industry. In particular, we have detailed financial data for a large number of firms producing comparable products with similar technologies, and information on market prices and other exogenous conditions in the local markets in which they operate. In addition, some studies in this literature find evidence of the link between the efficiency of firms and variables that are recognized to affect agency costs, including leverage and ownership structure (see Berger and Mester 1997 for a review).Although banking is a regulated industry, banks are subject to the same type of agency costs and other influences on behavior as other industries. The banks in the sample are subject to essentially equal regulatory constraints, and we focus on differences across banks, not between banks and other firms. Most banks are well above the regulatory capital minimums, and our results are based primarily on differences at the mar2. Theories of reverse causality from performance to capital structureAs noted, prior research on agency costs generally does not take into account the possibility ofreverse causation from performance to capital structure, which may result in simultaneous-equations bias. We offer two hypotheses of reverse causation based on violations of the Modigliani-Miller perfect-markets assumption. It is assumed that various market imperfections (e.g., taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information) result in a balance between those favoring more versus less equity capital, and that differences in profit efficiency move the optimal equity capital ratio marginally up or down.Under the efficiency-risk hypothesis, more efficient firms choose lower equity ratios than other firms, all else equal, because higher efficiency reduces the expected costs of bankruptcy and financial distress. Under this hypothesis, higher profit efficiency generates a higher expected return for a given capital structure, and the higher efficiency substitutes to some degree for equity capital in protecting the firm against future crises. This is a joint hypothesis that i) profit efficiency is strongly positively associated with expected returns, and ii) the higher expected returns from high efficiency are substituted for equity capital to manage risks.The evidence is consistent with the first part of the hypothesis, i.e., that profit efficiency is strongly positively associated with expected returns in banking. Profit efficiency has been found to be significantly positively correlated with returns on equity and returns on assets (e.g., Berger and Mester 1997) and other evidence suggests that profit efficiency is relatively stable over time (e.g., DeYoung 1997), so that a finding of high current profit efficiency tends to yield high future expected returns.The second part of the hypothesis –that higher expected returns for more efficient banks are substituted for equity capital –follows from a standard Altman z-score analysis of firm insolvency (Altman 1968). High expected returns and high equity capital ratio can each serve as a buffer against portfolio risks to reduce the probabilities of incurring the costs of financial distress bankruptcy, so firms with high expected returns owing to high profit efficiency can hold lower equity ratios. The z-score is the number of standard deviations below the expected return that the actual return can go before equity is depleted and the firm is insolvent, zi = (μi +ECAPi)/σi, where μi and σi are the mean and standard deviation, respectively, of the rate of return on assets, and ratios for those that were fully owned by a single owner-manager. This may be an improvement in the analysis of agency costs for small firms, but it does not address our main issues of controlling for differences in exogenous conditions and in setting up individualized firm benchmarks for performance.ECAPi is the ratio of equity to assets. Based on the first part of the efficiency-risk hypothesis, firms with higher efficiency will have higher μi. Based on the second part of the hypothesis, a higher μi allows the firm to have a lower ECAPi for a ven z-score, so that more efficient firms may choose lower equity capital ratios.文章出处：Raposo Clara C. Capital Structure and Firm Performance . Journal of Finance. Blackwell publishing. 2005, (6): 2701-2727.资本结构与企业绩效1.概述代理费用不管在金融还是在非金融行业，都是非常重要的企业治理问题。

绩效考核与管理外文翻译文献

绩效考核与管理外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：The Dilemma of Performance AppraisalPeter Prowse and Julie ProwseMeasuring Business Excellence,V ol.13 Iss:4,pp.69 - 77AbstractThis paper deals with the dilemma of managing performance using performance appraisal. The authors will evaluate the historical development of appraisals and argue that the critical area of line management development that was been identified as a critical success factor in appraisals has been ignored in the later literature evaluating the effectiveness of performance through appraisals.This paper willevaluatethe aims and methodsof appraisal, thedifficulties encountered in the appraisalprocess. It also re-evaluates the lack of theoretical development in appraisaland move from he psychological approachesof analysistoamorecritical realisation ofapproaches before re-evaluating the challenge to remove subjectivity and bias in judgement of appraisal.13.1IntroductionThis paper will define and outline performance management and appraisal. It will start byevaluating what form of performance is evaluated, then develop links to the development of different performance traditions (Psychological tradition, Management by Objectives, Motivation and Development).It will outline the historical development of performance management then evaluate high performance strategies using performance appraisal. It will evaluate the continuing issue of subjectivity and ethical dilemmas regarding measurement and assessment of performance. The paper will then examine how organisations measure performance before evaluation of research on some recent trends in performance appraisal.This chapter will evaluate the historical development of performance appraisal from management by objectives (MBO) literature before evaluating the debates between linkages between performance management and appraisal. It will outline the development of individual performance before linking to performance management in organizations. The outcomes of techniques to increase organizational commitment, increase job satisfaction will be critically evaluated. It will further examine the transatlantic debates between literature on efficiency and effectiveness in the North American and the United Kingdom) evidence to evaluate the HRM development and contribution of performance appraisal to individual and organizational performance.13.2 What is Performance Management?The first is sue to discuss is the difficulty of definition of Performance Management. Armstrong and Barron(1998:8) define performance management as: A strategic and integrated approach to delivering sustained success to organisations by Improving performance of people who work in them by developing the capabilities of teams And individual performance.13.2.1 Performance AppraisalAppraisal potentially is a key tool in making the most of an organisation’s human resources. The use of appraisal is widespread estimated that 80–90%of organizations in the USA and UK were using appraisal and an increase from 69 to 87% of organisations between 1998 and 2004 reported a formal performance management system (Armstrong and Baron, 1998:200).There has been little evidence of the evaluation of the effectiveness of appraisal but more on the development in its use. Between 1998 and 2004 a sample from the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD, 2007) of 562 firms found 506 were using performance appraisal in UK.What is also vital to emphasise is the rising use of performance appraisal feedback beyond performance for professionals and managers to nearly 95% of workplaces in the 2004 WERS survey (seeTable 13.1).Clearly the use of Appraisals has been the development and extension of appraisals to cover a large proportion of the UK workforce and the coverage of non managerial occupations and the extended use in private and public sectors.13.2.2 The Purpose of AppraisalsThe critical issue is what is the purpose of appraisals and how effective is it ？Researched and used in practice throughout organizations? The purpose of appraisals needs to be clearly identified. Firstly their purpose. Randell (1994) states they are a systematic evaluation of individual performance linked to workplace behaviour and/or specific criteria. Appraisals often take the form of an appraisal interview,usually annual,supported by standardised forms/paperwork.The key objective of appraisal is to provide feedback for performance is provided by the linemanager.The three key questions for quality of feedback:1. What and how are observations on performance made?2. Why and how are they discussed?3. What determines the level of performance in the job?It has been argued by one school of thought that these process cannot be performed effectively unless the line manager of person providing feedback has the interpersonal interviewing skills to providethat feedback to people being appraised. This has been defined as the “Bradford Approach” which places a high priority on appraisal skills development (Randell, 1994). This approach is outlined in Fig. 13.1 whichidentifies the linkages betweeninvolving,developing, rewarding and valuing people at work..13.2.3 Historical Development of AppraisalThe historical development of performance feedback has developed from a range of ap proaches.Formal observation of individual work performance was reported in Robert Owens’s Scottish factory inNew Lanarkin the early 1800s (Cole, 1925). Owen hung over machines a piece of coloured wood over machines to indicate the Super intendent’s assessment of the previous day’s conduct (white forexcellent, yellow, blue and then black for poor performance).The twentieth centuryled to F.W. Taylor and his measured performance and the scientific management movement (Taylor, 1964). The 1930sTraits Approaches identified personality and performance and used feedback using graphic rating scales, a mixed standard of performance scales noting behaviour in likert scale ratings.This was used to recruit and identify management potential in the field of selection. Later developments to prevent a middle scale from 5 scales then developed into a forced-choice scale which forced the judgement to avoid central ratings.The evaluation also included narrative statements and comments to support the ratings (Mair, 1958).In the 1940s Behavioural Methods were developed. These included Behavioural Anchored Rating Scales (BARS); Behavioural Observation Scales (BOS); Behavioural Evaluation Scales (BES); critical incident;job simulation. All these judgements were used to determine the specific levels of performance criteria to specific issues such as customer service and rated in factors such asexcellent,average or needs to improve or poor.These ratings are assigned numerical values and added to a statement or narrative comment by the assessor. It would also lead to identify any potential need for training and more importantly to identify talent for careers in linemanagement supervision and future managerial potential.Post1945 developed into the Results-oriented approaches and led to the development of management by objectives (MBO). This provided aims and specific targets to be achievedand with in time frames such as pecific sales, profitability,and deadlines with feedback on previous performance (Wherry, 1957).The deadlines may have required alteration and led to specific performance rankings of staff. It also provided a forced distributionof rankingsof comparative performance and paired comparison ranking of performance and setting and achieving objectives.In the 1960s the developmentof Self-appraisal by discussion led to specific time and opportunity for the appraisee to reflectively evaluate their performance in the discussion and the interview developed into a conversation on a range of topics that the appraise needed to discuss in the interview. Until this period the success of the appraisal was dependent on skill of interviewer.In the 1990s the development of 360-degree appraisal developed where information was sought from a wider range of sources and the feedback was no longer dependent on the manager-subordinate powerrelationship but included groups appraising the performance of line managers and peer feedback from peer groups on individual performance (Redman and Snape, 1992). The final development of appraisal interviews developed in the 1990s with the emphasis on the linking performance with financial reward which will be discussed later in the paper.13.2.4 Measures of PerformanceThe dilemma of appraisal has always to develop performance measures and the use of appraisal is the key part of this process. Quantitative measure of performance communicated as standards in the business and industry level standards translated to individual performance. The introduction of techniques such as the balanced score card developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992).Performance measures and evaluation included financial, customer evaluation, feedback on internal processes and Learning and Growth. Performance standards also included qualitative measures Which argue that there is an over emphasis on metrics of quantitative approach above the definitions of quality services and total quality management.In terms of performance measures there has been a transformation in literature and a move in the 1990s to the financial rewards linked to the level of performance.The debates will be discussed later in the paper.13.3 Criticism of AppraisalsCritiques of appraisal have continued as appraisal shave increased in use and scope across sectors and occupations. The dominant critique is the management framework using appraisal as an orthodox technique that seeks to remedy the weakness and propose of appraisals as a system to develop performance.This “orthodox” approach argues there are conflicting purposes of appraisal (Strebler et al, 2001). Appraisal can motivate staff by clarifying objectives and setting clear future objectives with provision for training and development needs to establish the performance objective. These conflicts with assessing past performance and distribution of rewards based on past performance (Bach, 2005:301).Employees are reluctant to confide any limitations and concerns on their current performance as this could impact on their merit related reward or promotion opportunities(Newton and Findley, 1996:43).This conflicts with performance as a continuum as appraisers are challenged with differing roles as both monitors and judges of performance but an understanding counsell or which Randell(1994)argues few manager shave not received the raining to perform.Appraisal Manager’s reluctance to criticise also stems from classic evidence fromMcGregor that managers are reluctant to make an egative judgement on an individual’s performance a si t could be demotivating,leadto accusationsoftheirown supportand contributiontoindividual poor performance and to also avoid interpersonal conflict (McGregor, 1957).One consequence of this avoidance of conflict is to rate all criterion as central and avoid any conflict known as the central tendency.In a study of senior managers by Long neckeretal.(1987),they found organisational politics influenced ratings of 60 senior executives.The findings were that politics involved deliberate attempts by individuals to enhance or protect self-interests when conflicting courses of action are possible and that ratings and decisions were affected by potential sources of bias or inaccuracy in their appraisal ratings (Longeneckeret al., 1987).There are methods of further bias beyond Longenecker’s evidence. The political judgements andthey have been distorted further by overrating some clear competencies in performance rather than being critical across all rated competencies known as the halo effect and if some competencies arelower they may prejudice the judgment acrossthe positive reviews known as the horns effect (ACAS, 1996).Some ratings may only cinclude recent events and these are known as the recency effects. In this case only recent events are noted compared to managers gathering and using data throughout the appraisal period .A particular concern is the equity of appraisal for ratings which may be distorted by gender ,ethnicity and the ratings of appraisers themselves .A range of studies in both the US and UK have highlighted subjectivity in terms of gender (Alimo-Metcalf, 1991;White, 1999) and ethnicity of the appraise and appraiser(Geddes and Konrad, 2003). Suggestions and solutions on resolving bias will be reviewed later.The second analysis is the radical critique of appraisal. This is the more critical management literature that argues that appraisal and performance management are about management control(Newton and Findley, 1996;Townley, 1993). It argues that tighter management control over employee behaviour can be achieved by the extension of appraisal to manual workers, professional as means to control. This develops the literature of Foucault using power and surveillance. This literature uses cases in examples of public service control on professionals such a teachers (Healy, 1997) and University professionals(Townley, 1990).This evidence argues the increased control of public services using appraisal as a method of control and that the outcome of managerial objectives ignores the developmental role of appraisal and ratings are awarded for people who accept and embrace the culture and organizational values . However, this literature ignores the employee resistance and the use of professional unions to challenge the attempts to exert control over professionals and staff in the appraisal process (Bach, 2005:306).One of the different issues of removing bias was the use of the test metaphor (Folgeretal.,1992).This was based on the assumption that appraisal ratings were a technical question of assessing “true” performance and there needed to be increased reliability and validity of appraisal as an instrument to develop motivation and performance. The sources of rater bias and errors can be resolved by improved organisational justice and increasing reliability of appraiser’s judgement.However there were problems such as an assumption that you can state job requirements clearly and the org anization is “rational” with objectives that reflect values and that the judgment by appraisers’ are value free from political agendas and personal objectives. Secondly there is the second issue of subjectivity if appraisal ratings where decisions on appra isal are rated by a “political metaphor”(Hartle, 1995).This “political view” argues that a appraisal is often done badly because there is a lack of training for appraisers and appraisers may see the appraisal as a waste of time. This becomes a process which managers have to perform and not as a potential to improve employee performance .Organisations in this context are “political” and the appraisers seek to maintain performance from subordinates and view appraises as internal customers to satisfy. This means managers use appraisal to avoid interpersonal conflict and develop strategies for their own personal advancement and seek a quiet life by avoiding censure from higher managers.This perception means managers also see appraisee seeks good rating and genuine feedback and career development by seeking evidence of combining employee promotion and pay rise.This means appraisal ratings become political judgements and seek to avoid interpersonal conflicts. The approaches of the “test” and “political” metapho rs of appraisal are inaccurate and lack objectivity and judgement ofemployee performance is inaccurate and accuracy is avoided.The issue is how can organisations resolve this lack of objectivity?13.3.1 Solutions to Lack of Objectivity of AppraisalGrin t(1993)argues that the solutions to objectivity lies in part with McGregor’s (1957) classic critique by retraining and removal of “top down” ratings by managers and replacement with multiple rater evaluation which removes bias and the objectivity by upward performance appraisal. The validity of upward appraisal means there moval of subjective appraisal ratings.This approach is also suggested to remove gender bias in appraisal ratings against women in appraisals (Fletcher, 1999). The solution of multiple reporting(internal colleagues, customers and recipients of services) will reduce subjectivity and inequity of appraisal ratings. This argument develops further by the rise in the need to evaluate project teams and increasing levels of teamwork to include peer assessment. The solutions also in theory mean increased closer contact with individual manager and appraises and increasing services linked to customer facing evaluations.However, negative feedback still demotivates and plenty of feedback and explanation by manager who collates feedback rather than judges performance andfail to summarise evaluations.There are however still problems with accuracy of appraisal objectivity asWalker and Smither (1999)5year studyof 252 managers over 5 year period still identified issues with subjective ratings in 360 degree appraisals.There are still issues on the subjectivity of appraisals beyond the areas of lack of training.The contribution of appraisal is strongly related to employee attitudes and strong relationships with job satisfaction(Fletcher and Williams, 1996). The evidence on appraisal still remains positive in terms of reinvigo rating social relationships at work (Townley,1993)and the widespread adoption in large public services in the UK such as the national health Service (NHS)is the valuable contribution to line managers discussion with staff on their past performance, discussing personal development plans and training and development as positive issues.One further concern is the openness of appraisal related to employee reward which we now discuss.13.3.2 Linking Appraisals with Reward ManagementAppraisal and performance management have been inextricably linked to employee reward since the development of strategic human resource management in the 1980s. The early literature on appraisal linked appraisal with employee control (Randell, 1994;Grint, 1993;Townley, 1993, 1999) and discussed the use of performance related reward to appraisals. However therecent literature has substituted the chapter titles employ ee “appraisal” with “performance management”(Bach, 2005; Storey, 2007) and moved the focus on performance and performance pay and the limits of employee appraisal. The appraisal and performance pay link has developed into debates to three key issues:The first issue is has performance pay related to appraisal grown in use?The second issue is what type of performance do we reward?and the final issue is who judges management standards?The first discussion on influences of growth of performance pay schemes is the assumption that increasing linkage between individual effort and financial reward increases performance levels. This linkage between effort and financial reward increasing levels of performance has proved an increasing trend in the public and private sector (Bevan and Thompson, 1992;Armstrong and Baron, 1998). The drive to increase public sector performance effort and setting of targets may even be inconsistent in the experiences of some organizational settings aimed at achieving long-term targets(Kessler and Purcell,1992;Marsden, 2007). The development of merit based pay based on performance assessed by a manager is rising in the UK Marsden (2007)reported that the: Use of performance appraisals as a basis for merit pay are used in65 percent of public sector and 69 percent of the private sector employees where appraisal covered all nonmanagerial staff(p.109).Merit pay has also grown in use as in 1998 20% of workplaces used performance related schemes compared to 32% in the same organizations 2004 (Kersley et al., 2006:191). The achievements of satisfactory ratings or above satisfactory performance averages were used as evidence to reward individual performance ratings in the UK Civil Service (Marsden, 2007).Table 13.2 outlines the extent of merit pay in 2004.The second issue is what forms of performance is rewarded. The use of past appraisal ratings as evidence of achieving merit-related payments linked to achieving higher performance was the predominant factor developed in the public services. The evidence on Setting performance targets have been as Kessler (2000:280) reported “inconsistent within organizations and problematic for certain professional or less skilled occupations where goals have not been easily formulated”. There has been inconclusive evidence from organizations on the impact of performance pay and its effectiveness in improving performance. Evidence from a number of individual performance pay schemes report organizations suspending or reviewing them on the grounds that individual performance reward has produced no effect in performance or even demotivates staff(Kessler, 2000:281).More in-depth studies setting performance goals followed by appraisal on how well they were resulted in loss of motivation whilst maintaining productivity and achieved managers using imposing increased performance standards (Marsden and Richardson, 1994). As Randell(1994) had highlighted earlier, the potential objectivity and self-criticism in appraisal reviews become areas that appraisees refuse to acknowledge as weaknesses with appraisers if this leads to a reduction in their merit pay.Objectivity and self reflection for development becomes a weakness that appraises fail to acknowledge as a developmental issue if it reduces their chances of a reduced evaluation that will reduce their merit reward. The review of civil service merit pay (Makinson, 2000)reported from 4 major UK Civil Service Agencies and the National Health Service concluded that existing forms of performance pay and performance management had failed to motivate many staff.The conclusions were that employees found individual performance pay divisive and led to reduced willingness to co-operate with management ,citing managerial favorites and manipulation of appraisal scores to lower ratings to save paying rewards to staff (Marsden and French, 1998).This has clear implications on the relationship between line managers and appraises and the demotivational consequences and reduced commitment provide clear evidence of the danger to linking individual performance appraisal to reward in the public services. Employees focus on the issues that gain key performance focus by focusing on specific objectives related to key performance indicators rather than all personal objectives. A study of banking performance pay by Lewis(1998)highlighted imposed targets which were unattainable with a range of 20 performance targets with narrow short term financial orientatated goals. The narrow focus on key targets and neglect of other performance aspects leads to tasks not being delivered.This final issue of judging management standards has already highlighted issues of inequity and bias based on gender (Beyer, 1990; Chen and DiTomasio, 1996; Fletcher, 1999). The suggested solutions to resolved Iscrimination have been proposed as enhanced interpersonal skills training are increased equitable use of 360 degree appraisal as a method to evaluate feedback from colleagues asthis reduces the use of the “political metaphor”(Randell, 1994;Fletcher, 1999).On measures linking performance to improvement require a wider approach to enhanced work design and motivation to develop and enhance employee job satisfaction and the design of linkages between effort and performance are significant in the private sector and feedback and awareness in the public sector (Fletcher and Williams, 1996:176). Where rises be in pay were determined by achieving critical rated appraisal objectives, employees are less self critical and open to any developmental needs in a performance review.13.4 ConclusionAs performance appraisal provides a major potential for employee feedback that could link strongly to increasing motivation ,and a opportunity to clarify goals and achieve long term individual performance and career development why does it still suffers from what Randell describes as a muddle and confusion which still surrounds the theory and practice?There are key issues that require resolution and a great deal depends on the extent to which you have a good relationship with your line manager . Barlow(1989)argued `if you get off badly with your first two managers ,you may just as well forget it (p. 515).The evidence on the continued practice of appraisals is that they are still institutionally elaborated systems of management appraisal and development is significant rhetoric in the apparatus of bureaucratic control by managers (Barlow, 1989). In reality the companies create, review, change and even abolish appraisals if they fail to develop and enhance organisational performance(Kessler, 2000). Despite all the criticism and evidence the critics have failed to suggest an alternative for a process that can provide feedback, develop motivation, identify training and potential and evidence that can justify potential career development and justify reward(Hartle, 1997).译文：绩效考核的困境Peter Prowse and Julie Prowse摘要本文旨在用绩效考核方法来解决绩效管理的困境。

外文翻译--股权结构与公司绩效以印度为例

中文4200字，2650单词，14800英文字符出处：Srivastava A. Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from India[J]. International Journal of Humanities & Social Science, 2011, 7(3):209–233.原文Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance: Evidence from IndiaAuthor: Aman SrivastavaAbstractOwnership structure of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance has been widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. This paper is a moderate attempt to address the relationship of ownership structure of the firm and its performance. It investigates whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. The 98 most actively listed companies on BSE 100 indices of Bombay Stock Exchange of India, which constitute the bulk of trading, were chosen to constitute the sample of the study as of end of 2009-10. The findings indicate the presence of highly concentrated ownership structure in the Indian market. The results of the regression analyses indicate that the dispersed ownership percentage influences certain dimensions of accounting performance indicators (i.e. ROA and ROE) but not stock market performance indicators (i.e. P/E and P/BV ratios), which indicate that there might be other factors (economic, political, contextual) affecting firms performance other than ownership structure. Keywords: Ownership structure, corporate performance, corporate governance, India1. IntroductionOwnership structure of any company has been a serious agenda for corporate governance and that of performance of a firm. Thus, who owns the firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades. Thus, the impact of ownership structure on firm performance has been widely tackled in various developed markets and more recently in emerging markets, but was less discussed before, in India in recent changing environment. Though the modern organization emphasizes the divorce of management and ownership; in practice, the interests of group managing the company can differ from the interests of those that supply the capital to the firm. Corporate governance literature has devoted a great deal of attention to the ownership structure of corporations. Shareholders of publicly held corporations are so numerous and small that they are unable to effectively control the decisions of the management team, and thus cannot be assured that the management team represents their interests. Many solutions to this problem have been advanced, as stated previously i.e. the disciplining effect of the takeover market, the positive incentive effects of the management shareholding stake and the benefits of large monitoring shareholders. A different problem, however, arises in firms with large controlling shareholders. Since a large controlling shareholder has both the incentives and the power to control the management team's actions, management's misbehavior is a second order problem when such a large shareholder exists. Instead, the main problem becomes controlling the large shareholder's abuse of minority shareholders. In other words, holders of a majority of the voting shares in a corporation, through their ability to elect and control a majority of the directors and to determine the outcome of shareholders' votes on othermatters, have tremendous power to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. Thus, the type of owners as well as the distribution of ownership stakes will undoubtedly have an impact on the performance of firms. Most of the empirical literature studying the link between corporate governance and firm performance usually concentrates on a particular aspect of governance, such as board of directors, share holders’ activism, compensation, anti-takeover provisions, investor protection etc. This paper is a moderate attempt to examine the relationship of ownership structure and performance of firms in India.The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses on the literature review, where both theoretical and empirical studies on previous works are looked into. It also incorporates the corporate governance mechanism in India. In section 3, the methodology of this study is considered. Empirical results and discussions are made in section 4, while section 5 concludes the study.2. Literature ReviewThe firm’s equity and how does ownership affect firm value has been a topic investigated by researchers for decades; however, most of the studies in this context are conducted outside of India. The study failed to document any relevant study on the topic in Indian context. Fama and Jensen (1983 a & b) addresses the agency problems and they explained that a major source of cost to shareholders is the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Even in developed countries, these agency problems continue to be sources of large costs to shareholders1.Demstez and Lehn (1985) argued both that the optimal corporate ownership structure was firm specific, and that market competition would derive firms toward that optimum. Because ownership was endogenous to expected performance, they cautioned, any regression of profitability on ownership patterns should yield insignificant results. Morck. (1988) by taking percentage of shares held by the board of directors of the company as a measure of ownership concentration and holding both Tobin’s Q and accounting profit as performance measure of 500 Fortune companies and using piece-wise linear regression, found a positive relation between Tobin’s Q and board ownership ranging from 0% to 5%, a negative relation for board ownership ranging from 5% to 25%, and again a positive relation for the said ownership above 25%. It is argued that the separation of ownership from control for a corporate firm creates an agency problem that results in conflicts between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).The interests of other investors can generally be protected through contractual arrangements between the company and concerned stakeholders, leaving shareholders as the residual claimants whose interests can adequately be protected only through the institutions of corporate governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Loderer and Martin (1997) took shareholding by the insiders (i.e., director’s ownership) as a measure of ownership. Taking the said measure as endogenous variable and Tobin’s Q as performance measure, they found (through simultaneous equation model) that ownership does not predict performance, but performance is a negative predictor of ownership. Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen (1997) examine the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in the largest companies from 12 European nations. According to their findings the positive marginal effect of ownership ties to financial institutions is stronger in the market-based British system than in continental Europe. Cho (1998) found that firm performance affects ownership structure (signifying percentage of shares held by directors), but not vice versa. Jürgen Weigand (2000) documented that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, and (2) the high degree of ownership concentrationseems to be a sub-optimal choice for many of the tightly held German corporations. Their results also imply ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively.Their empirical evidence suggests that representation of owners on the board of executive directors does not make a difference. Yoshiro Miwa and Mark Ramseyer (2001) stated with a sample of 637 Japanese firms and confirmed the equilibrium mechanism behind Demstez-Lehn. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) investigated the relation between the ownership structure and the performance (average Tobin’s Q for five years-1976-80) of the corporations if ownership is made multidimensional and also treated it as an endogenous variable. By using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-stage Least Squares (2 SLS) regression model, they found no significant systematic relation between the ownership structure and firm performance. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), examined the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance of Australian listed companies. Her OLS results suggest that ownership of shares by the top management is significant in explaining the performance measured by accounting rate of return, but not significant ifperformance is measured by Tobin’s Q. However, when ownership is treated as endogenous, the same is not dependent upon any of the performance measures. Lins (2002) investigates whether management ownership structures and large non-management block holders are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets .He finds that large non-management control rights block holdings (having more control rights) are positively related to firm value measured by Tobin’s Q. Michael L Lemmon and Karl V Lins (2003) use a sample of 800 firms in eight East Asian countries to study the effect of ownership structure on value during the region’s financial crisis.The crisis negatively impacted firm’s investment opportunities, raising the incentives of controlling shareholders to expropriate minority investors. The evidence is consistent with the view that ownership structure plays an important role in determining whether insiders expropriate minority shareholders. Using a sample of 144 Israeli firms, Beni Lauterbach and Efrat Tolkowsky (2004) find that Tobin's Q is maximized when control group vote reaches 67%. This evidence is strong when ownership structure is treated as exogenous and weak when it is considered endogenous. Christoph Kaserer and Benjamin Moldenhauer (2005) address the question whether there is any empirical relationship between corporate performance and insider ownership. Using a data set of 245 Germen firms for the year 2003 they find evidence for a positive and significant relationship between corporate performance, as measured by stock price performance as well as by Tobin’s Q, and insider ownership. Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) tried the model of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for 175 Greek firms for the year 2000 and found that higher firm profitability requires less diffused ownership structure He also provides evidence that large non management block holders can mitigate the valuation discounts associated with the expected agency problem.3. Data and MethodologyThe study aims to explore the disciplinary effect of the market in a context with concentrated ownership structure and weak investor protection. The paper aims to explore if there are dominant certain types of owners of actively listed and traded companies on Indian Stock Exchanges. Further, it investigates whether the ownership type affects some key accounting and market performance indicators of listed firms. It shows that there might be other reasons that have affected the performance of the listed companies of BSE 100, other than ownership structure.The data set consists of detailed trading and financial information and indicators about the 98most actively traded BSE 100 listed companies on the Bombay Stock Exchange of India (BSE) during 2009-2010. The ninety eight companies cover a broad spectrum of sectors or industries totaling 18, which are: Finance, Oil & Gas, Information Technology, Metal, Metal Products & Mining, Capital Goods, FMCG, Transport Equipments, Power, Housing Related, Healthcare, Telecom, Diversified, Chemical & Petrochemical, Miscellaneous, Media & Publishing, Transport Services, Tourism and Agriculture. The details and proportion of these sectors in BSE 100 is given in table 1.The main financial indicators obtained from the companies financial statements included Total Revenues or Turnover, Gross Profit, Net Income or Earnings After Taxes, Current Assets, Fixed Assets, Long Term Debt and Shareholders Equity. Finally, the third subset consists of companies’ stock performance indicators obtained from CMIE PROWESS database including value traded, volume traded, number of transactions, market capitalization, market price as well as some calculated ratios using both CMIE PROWESS database as well as items reported in financial statements of sample companies such as debt to equity ratio, return on equity, return on assets, price earnings ratio and price to book value. The empirical investigation is conducted using known Ordinary Least Square Estimation methodology using both Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Investment (ROI) variables - representing accounting performance measures, and Price-Earning Ratio (P/E) and Price to Book Value (P/BV) –representing stock market performance measures; separately as dependent variables. The following formula was used for modeling:Yij = α + xff, j + xde,j + xdph,j + xfp,j + xnpi,j + xnpni,j + ε (i)Where ε ~ ND (0, σ2)Yij : i corresponds to ROE, ROI, P/E or P/B for company j (j=1...98)xff, j : represents the percentage of free float in company j capital structure,xde,j : represents the debt to equity ratio for company j,xdph,j and xfp,j : represents the domestic promoter and foreign promoter holding in the companyxnpi,j and xnpni,j : represents non promoter institutional and non promoter non institutional holding of the company.The independent variables are represented by the percentage of Free Floated shares (FF), Debt to Equity ratio (D/E) and four variables representing promoters and non promoters stake representing the ownership structure in sampled companies, namely; Tables (2) and (3), (4) and (5) in the appendix summarize the regression analysis.4. Results and analysisThe sampled companies of BSE 100 were analyzed on the basis of their free floats and the findings are given below in table 2. Table 2 clearly depict that majority of the sampled companies have less than 75% of the free float. Even 13% companies have a free float of less than 25%. Only 13% of the companies have a free float of greater than 75%. Table three gives the details about the ownership structure of the sampled firms. Data clearly depicts that the stake of Indian promoters I the sampled company varies from 0% to 99% with a average holding of 41%. That means on an average the sampled companies are dominated by Indian promoter’s holdings. While the average foreign promoters holding is just 7.51%. That clearly confirms the belief that the Indian companies are dominated by families and promoter’s stakes. Data related with debt equity profile of sampled companies is givenThe results clearly indicates that majority of the sampled companies are in first category of 0-2 which clearly depicts that the majority of the sampled companies are not highly levered.Performance measures in the paper are represented by two sets of variables accounting measures are ROA and ROE while the market measures are P/E and P/BV ratio. Table five depicts that average ROE, ROA, P/E and P/BV values are 17.36%, 12.77%, 34.8 and 3.8 respectively.The results of OLS regression analysis are given in table 6 below. The empirical results reflect at 5% level of significance the ownership characteristic does not reflect any relationship with either accounting performance measures ROA and ROE or show any significant relationship between ownership structure and stock market indicators P/E and P/BV ratios, as shown in Table (6) below. But at 10% level of significance all sampled variables shows significant relationship with ROA, ROE, P/E and P/BV for performance of any company. Insert table (6) about here5. Findings and ConclusionThe significance of ownership characteristics and accounting performance measures i.e. ROA and ROE could be explained by the fact that the fundamental evaluation of companies, measured by, its financial indicators such as (ROA and ROE) are the most important factors used by investors in India to assess company’s performance. In India, althou gh earlier investors have culturally placed more emphasis on accounting performance measures, not stock market indicators, due to the inactivity and stagnation of the stock market for a long period (till early 1990’s). Furthermore, Indian investors always favored payment of dividends rather than stock price appreciation, due to inactivity of market. Accordingly, the dividends yield paid by Indian companies are always very high (10%-13%) compared to other emerging and developed markets (3%-5%). Thus the author did not consider dividend yield in the stock market indicators since it will be a distorted measure since issuers in India always pay a high dividends yield, sometimes, irrespective of earnings, since they are valued by investors according to dividends not price appreciation. Furthermore, the type of ownership had an insignificant impact on stock market performance measures, which might imply that the stock performance was mainly affected by economic and market conditions rather than ownership concentration. Furthermore, the results could be related to the market inefficiency of the Indian stock market, given its small and thin characteristics, as well as the lack of prompt disclosure by listed companies, even the active ones, at the Indian stock market. Stock prices therefore may not appropriately reflect the costs and benefits of diversification as shown.References[1]Beni Lauterbach, and Efrat Tolkowsky, 2004, “Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure when Investor Protection is Weak”, Discussion Paper No. 8-200[2]Cho M H (1998), “Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis”,Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 103-121.[3]Demsetz H and Lehn K (1985), “The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences”,Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93, No. 6, pp. 1155-1177[4]Demsetz H and Villalonga B (2001), “Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance”, Journal of Corporate Finance, V ol. 7, No. 3, pp. 209-233.[5]Erik Lehmann en Jurgen Weigand, Does the governed corporation perform better Governance structures and corporate performance in Germany, European Finance Review, 2000, no. 4, p. 157–195.[6] Fama, E and Jensen, M, 1983a, 1983b. Separation of ownership and control, Journal ofLaw &Economics 26, 301-325 and 327-349.[7]Jensen, M and Meckling, W, 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.[8]Kapopoulas P and Lazaretou S (2007), “Corporate Ownership Structure and Firm Performance:Evidence from Greek Firms”, Corporate Governance: An International Review,V ol. 15, No. 2, pp. 144-158.[9]Kaserer Christoph, and Benjamin Moldenhauer, 2005, “Insider Ownership and Corporate Performance -Evidence from Germany”, Working Paper”, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS) and Department for Financial Management and Capital Market[10]Lins, K, 2000, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, Working paper, University of Utah.[11]Loderer C and Martin K (1997), “Executive Stock Ownership and Performance Tracking Faint Traces”,Journal of Financial Economics, V ol. 45, No. 2, pp. 595-612.[12]Michael L Lemmon, and Karl V Lins, 2003, “Ownership Structure, Corpora te Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis” The Journal of Finance, Vol LVIII No. 4, August 2004[13]Miwa Yoshiro, and Mark Ramseyer, 2001, “Does ownership matter?” Discussion Paper, University of Tokyo[14]Morck, R, Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R, 1988. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economic 20, 293-315.[15]Pedersen,T and Thompson, S, 1997, European Patterns of Corporate Ownership: A twelve country study, Journal of International Business Studies, 759-778[16]Shleifer, A and Vishny, R, 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.译文股权结构与公司绩效: 以印度为例资料来源: 人文和社会科学国际性杂志作者: Monir Zaman摘要任何一家公司的股权结构已经成为公司监管与公司绩效的重要事项。

上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献

上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献上市公司高管股权激励计划外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Investor pricing of CEO equity incentivesJeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. RamanAbstractThe main purpose of this paper is to explore CEO compensation in the form of stock and options.The objective of CEO compensation is to better align CEO-shareholder interests by inducing CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions. However, recent research suggests that these incentives have a significant down-side (i.e., they motivate executives to manipulate reported earnings and lower information quality). Given the conflict between the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional information quality effect, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. We examine whether CEO equity incentives are priced in the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium over the 1992–2007 time period. Our analysis controls for two potential structural changes over this time period. The first is the 1995 Delaware Supreme Court ruling which increased protection from takeovers (and decreased risk)for Delaware incorporated firms. The second is the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act which impacted corporate risk taking, equity incentives, and earnings management. Collectively, our findings suggest that CEO equity incentives, despite being associated with lower information quality, increase firm value through a cost ofequity capital channel.Keywords：CEO equity incentives，Information quality，Cost of equity capitalIntroductionIn this study, we investigate investor pricing of CEO equity incentives for a large sample of US firms over the period 1992–2007.Because incentives embedded in CEO compensation contracts may be expected to influence policy choices at the firm level, our objective is to examine whether CEO equity incentives influence firm value through a cost of equity capital channel.Prior research (e.g., Jensen et al. 2004; Jensen and Murphy 1990) suggests that equity- based compensation, i.e., CEO compensation in the form of stock and options, provides the CEO a powerful inducement to take actions to increase shareholder value (by investing in more risky but positive net present value projects). Put differently, equity incentives are expected to help mitigate agency costs by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders, and otherwise help communicate to investors the important idea that the firm’s objective is to maximize shareholder wealth (Hall and Murphy 2003).However, recent research contends that equity incentives also have a perverse or dysfunctional downside. In particular, equity-based compensation makes managers more sensitive to the firm’s stock p rice, and increases their incentive to manipulate reported earnings—i.e., to create the appearance of meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (such as analysts’ forecasts)—in an attempt to bolster the stock price and their personal wealth invested in the fi rm’s stock and options (Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Burns and Kedia 2006; Cheng and Warfield 2005). Stated in another way, CEO equity incentivescan have an adverse effect on the quality of reported accounting information. As noted by Bebchuk and Fried (2003) and Jensen et al. (2004), by promoting perverse financial reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information, equity-based compensation can be a source of, rather than a solution for, the agency problem.Despite these arguments about the putative ill effects of equity incentives, equity-based compensation continues to be a salient component of the total pay packages for CEOs. Still, given the conflict between the positive incentive alignment effect and the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality, it is an open empirical question whether CEO equity incentives increase firm value. To our knowledge, prior research provides mixed evidence on this issue. For example, Mehran (1995) examines 1979–1980 compensation data and finds that equity-based compensation is positively related to the firm’s T obin’s Q. By contrast, Aboody (1996) examines compensation data for a sample of firms for years 1980 through 1990, and finds a negative correlation between the value of outstanding opt ions and the firm’s share price, suggesting that the dilution effect dominates the options’ incentive alignment effect. Moreover, both these studies are based on dated (i.e., pre-1991) data.In our study, we examine whether CEO equity incentives are related to the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium, i.e., the exc ess of the firm’s ex ante cost of equity capital over the risk-free interest rate (a metric discussed by Dhaliwal et al. 2006).Consistent with Core and Guay (2002), we measure CEO equity inc entives as the sensitivity of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio to a 1 percent change in the stock price. Based on a sample of 16,502 firm-year observations over a 16 year period(1992–2007), we find CEO equity incentives to be negatively related to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, suggesting that th e positive incentive alignment effect dominates the dysfunctional effect of lower information quality.In other analysis, we attempt to control for two regulatory (structural) changes that occurred during the 1992–2007 time period of our study.As pointed out by Daines (2001), regulatory changes can have an impact on firm values and returns as well as the structure of executive compensation. First, Low (2009) finds that following the 95 Delaware Supreme Court ruling that resulted in greater takeover protection, managers reduced firm risk by turning down risk-increasing (albeit positive NPV) projects. In response, firms increased CEO equity incentives to mitigate the risk aversion. Potentially, the impact of the Delaware ruling on managers’ risk aversio n and the follow-up increase in equity incentives (to mitigate the increase in managers’ risk aversion following the ruling) may have resulted in a structural change in our sample at least for firms incorporated in Delaware. T o control for this potential structural impact, we perform our analysis for Delaware incorporated firms for 1996–2007 separately. Our results suggest that the favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (asreflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium) is similar for Delaware firms and other firms.Second, a number of studies (e.g., Cohen et al. 2007, 2008; Li et al. 2008) indicate that the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) lowered equity incentives (i.e., reduced the proportion of equity incentives to total compensation post-SOX), reduced managerial risk taking, decreased spending on R&D and capital expenditures, and reduced accruals-based earnings management whileincreasing real earnings management. Since real earnings management is potentially more difficult for investors to detect than accruals-based earnings management, a possible consequence of SOX could be an increase in agency costs since 2002. To control for the potential structural changes imposed by SOX both in terms of expected returns and the level of equity incentives, we perform our analysis for the pre-SOX and post-SOX time periods separately. For each of the two time periods, our results suggest a favorable effect of CEO equity incentives on firm value (as reflected in the lower ex ante equity risk premium), although the effect appears to be stronger in the post-SOX period.Our study contributes to the literature on the valuation of equity incentives. We provide (to our knowledge) first-time evidence on the relation between CEO equity incentives and the ex ante cost of equity capital. Prior research has focused by and large on the consequences of managerial equity incentives for firm performance (Mehran 1995; Hanlon et al.2003) and risk taking (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Hanlon et al. 2004) rather than on valuation per se. As noted previously, to our knowledge only two prior studies (Aboody1996 and Mehran 1995, both based on pre-1991 data) have examined the pricing of managerial equity incentives, with mixed results.In our study, we provide evidence on the valuation effects of CEO equity incentives based on more recent (1992–2007) data. By focusing on more recent data, our findings relate to a growing line of research on the association between equity-based compensation and accounting information quality. Specifically, Coffee (2004) suggests that the $1 million limit on the tax deductibility of cash compensation for senior executivesimposed by Congress in 1993 motivated firms to make greater use of equity compensation which, in turn, increased the sensitivity of managers to the firm’s stock price. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) provide evidence which suggests that equity incentives are positively related to the magnitudeof accruals-based earnings management. Similarly, Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) report CEO equity incentives to be positively related to accounting irregularities and the subsequent restatement of previously issued financial statements. Thus, prior research suggests that equity-based compensation has a negative effect on the quality of earnings reported by firms. Consistent with several published empirical studies that support the notion that lower information quality is priced in a higher cost of equity capital (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Francis et al. 2005), CEO equity incentives could potentially lower firm value by increasing the firm-specific equity risk premium.As noted previously, we document that CEO equity incentives (despite the associated lower informat ion quality) are related negatively to the firm’s ex ante equity risk premium, implying that equity incentives increase firm value by lowering the firm’s cost of equity capital.Thus, our findings suggest that the positive CEO-shareholder incentive alignment effect associated with equity incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect.Since 1992, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated the public disclosure of executive compensation data to promote informed decision making by investors. Our ?ndings provide further evidence that these disclosuresincrease the informativeness of stock prices in competitive securities markets. Collectively, given that CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest (Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007), our ?ndings indicate that CEO equity incentives in?uence ?rm value favorably through a cost of equity capital channel.Concluding remarksPrior research (e.g., Goldman and Slezak 2006; Jensen et al. 2004) suggests that CEO equity incentives can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, these incentives can mitigate the agency problem by aligning the interests of the CEO with those of the shareholders (i.e., by inducing CEOs to prefer more optimal, albeit risky, investment choices). On the other hand, these incentives can lead to excessive sensitivity to share price performance and induce executives to manipulate reported earnings with an eye on the stock price. In other words, by promoting perverse reporting incentives and lowering the quality of accounting information pertinent to investor pricing decisions, CEO equity incentives can potentially be a part of, not a remedy for, the agency problem. However, to our knowledge there is little to no prior evidence to suggestwhich effect—the positive incentive alignment effect or the perverse information quality effect—dominates.We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we show that CEO equity incentives are negatively related to the firm-specific equity risk premium, i.e., the positive incentive alignment effect associated with these incentives dominates the dysfunctional information quality effect in the pricing of the firm-specific ex ante equity risk premium. Second, since equity incentives are intended to induce CEOs to make more optimal (albeit risky) investment decisions, the effect of these incentiveson shareholder wealth in the post-SOX time period is of particular interest. Our results suggest that the economic significance of these incentives (i.e., the payoff for shareholders in terms of a lower ex ante equity risk premium and a higher firm value) was in fact higher in the post-SOX time period. Finally, our findings provide further evidence that the SEC mandated disclosures (since 1992) of executive compensation data increases the informativeness of stock prices with respect to the potential implications of CEO equity incentives for the cost of equity capital and firm value. At this time, CEO compensation is a topic of ongoing interest for regulators and investors (Jensen et al. 2004; Reich 2007). Collectively, our findings complement and extend prior research on equity incentives. They are potentially useful in better informing regulators and investors faced with questions about the possible consequences of CEO equity incentives for shareholder wealth.译文：总裁股权激励的投资者定价Jeff P. Boone Inder K. Khurana K. K. Raman摘要本论文的主要目的是探讨首席执行官以股票和期权形式的报酬问题。

外文翻译--股权结果与公司绩效一个描述性探讨

外文题目：Ownership Structure,Corporate Performance And Failure:Evidence From Panel Data ofEmerging Market The Case of Jordan出处：Corporate Ownership & Control作者：Rami Zeitun原文：2. Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: a Descriptive Discussion2.1 Ownership Structure (Mix) and Firm PerformanceSince the establishment of the ASE in the 1970s，the number of listed companies，trading volume，and total market capitalisation have increased drastically．Table 1 reports the ownership structure of listed companies by sectors．Despite its privatisation program，the government still holds a large stake in Media，Utility and Energy，and Steel，Mining and Heavy Engineering companies (43.20%，33.70 %，and 22.04 %，respectively) because they are considered strategic industries．Institutional ownership is very high in transportation，real estate，and trade and commercial services and rental，and communication (44.80%，44.00%，and 36.89%，respectively)．Individual citizens as a group are the largest shareholder of Educational Services，Medical Pharmacies，Textiles and Clothing，and Construction and Engineering．The largest foreign ownership stakes are in Steel，Mining and Heavy Engineering，followed by Tobacco (16.05% and 13.41%，respectively)，foreign ownership is also high in the Insurance sector．Table 2 presents the basic statistics of the ownership structure for defaulted and non-defaulted firms．The individual (citizen) owns an average of 51.42 percent of defaulted firms，a figure which is larger than 45.36 percent in non-defaulted firms．The fractions of government and foreigner ownership have their lowest median in the defaulted firms，0.58 and 1.21 percent respectively，compared with 2.37 and 4.20 percent in non-defaulted firms for government and foreigner respectively．There are several notable differences．First of all，defaulted firms have a lowermedian of government ownership．Also，the median of institutional ownership is lower，as is the median of foreigner ownership．Table 2 suggests that Jordanian firms with government，institutional，and foreign ownership have a lower risk of failure (default) (in this analysis，we will concentrate on the joint factor of Arab and foreign ownership rather than taking each one separately as both of them are considered foreign owners)．The next section discusses the characteristics of defaulted firms in terms of ownership concentration．Table 1. Ownership Structure by Sector2.2 Ownership ConcentrationIt was established in that the ownership structure in the ASE is highly concentrated (the median largest shareholder in Jordan is large by Anglo-American standards but within the range of those in France and Spain，20 and 34 percent respectively．Table 3 sheds more light on the ownership concentration for Jordanian companies by sectors using five measures of ownership concentration across all firm-years．The largest shareholder (C1) owns the highest percentage in the Hotel and Tourism sector and Media sector (35.32 percent and 35.50 percent respectively)．The largest shareholder C1 owns the lowest percentage in the Educational sector (7.86 percent)．The data also reveals that there is a substantial variation across firms and sectors in ownership concentration．Given that the holding of the largest shareholder (C1) is so large，the other shareholders are small．As shown in Table 3，the cumulative percentage of ownership tapers rapidly，and there is little difference between C3 and C5 in all sectors．The average of C3 is highest in the Media sector followed by the Transportation sector with 49.53 percent and 45.94 percent in each sector respectively．The Educational, Medical Pharmacy，Tobacco，and Paper，Glass，and Packaging sectors have the lowest ownership concentration in terms of the largest five shareholders (C5)，compared with highest stake in Transportation，Media，and Trade，Commercial Services，Rental and Communication．The variation could relate to the capital required in these sectors，and also the importance of the sector，often there is high state ownership in sectors regarded as strategic．Table 4 presents the basic statistics of ownership concentration for defaulted and non-defaulted firms．Considering the median，the largest shareholder (C1) owns20 percent in the defaulted firms, a figure which is larger than the 18.86 percent in the non-defaulted firms．The largest two shareholders (C2) own 29.09 percent in the defaulted firms，a figure which is only marginally larger than 28.60 percent in the non-defaulted firms．The other measures of concentration C3，C5，and HERF are all larger in defaulted than non-defaulted firms．The data also reveals that there is a substantial variation across firms in ownership concentration：despite the high average, the largest owner’s value varies between 0 and 100 percent．In this study，we used C5 and HERF indexes as indictors of ownership concentration to investigate whether ownership concentration increased the firm’s performance and contributed to the firm’s defau lt．Table 3. Ownership Concentration by Sector：Cumulative percentage of shares controlled by4. Empirical ResultsThe analysis of the results is presented here in separate subsections．It begins with an analysis of the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance，where ownership concentration and mix are used in the analysis．The analysis then moves to examining the effect of ownership structure (mix and concentration) on corporate failure．This includes an analysis of the statistical significance of each variable．The random-effects model is used to examine the effect of ownership structure and control for the effect of industrial sectors on corporate performance．4.1 Ownership Structure and Corporate PerformanceIn order to explore the appropriateness of a random-effects model，a Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test is conducted to determine the overall significance of these effects．According to the Breusch-Pagan test the null hypothesis is that random components are equal to zero．This test also provided support for the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) over a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression．In all models，the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test supported the use of the random-effects model．Also，the Hausman test failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the coefficients of the random- and the fixed-effects models．For example，the Chi2(4) = 0.36，P=0.98 and Chi2(4) = 3.4，P=0.49 for Tobin’s Q and MBVR，respectively．Our model also contains time-invariant variables which cannot be estimated using the fixed-effects model．The overall goodness of fit (R2) for the random-effects model，using both ownership mix and concentration and industrial sector variables，is greater than the goodness of fit for the random-effects model using only ownership concentration．A general test for serial autocorrelation in panel data has been conducted using the test developed by Wooldridge (2002)．The null hypothesis is that there is no serial autocorrelation for the data examined．The hypothesis is strongly accepted as ((F1，134) =0.847，P=0.3591)．Therefore，our models do not have a serialautocorrelation．The overall significance of the models was tested using the Wald test，which has a Chi-square (2χ) distribution under the null hypothesis that all the exogenous variables are equal to zero．For all models，the value of the 2χstatistic is significant at least at the 1 % level of significance using ROA．The estimation results of Equation (1) are presented in Table 5 and Table 6 using the random-effects model．Table 7 and Table 8 report the results for the estimation of Equation 2．To examine the robustness of our results，the model included dummy variables to control for industry effects，and the results are reported in Appendix 1．Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 report the result of the cross-sectional analysis for the matched sample to provide more evidence on the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance．The regression model using price per share to earnings per share，ROE，is not significant and，hence，is not reported using the panel data analysis．4.1.1 Ownership Concentration ResultsFrom Hypothesis 1，the variables representing ownership concentration are expected not to have any significant impact on corporate performance．Two variables are used，C5 and HERF．From the regression results in Table 5，the variable C5 was found to have a negative and significant impact on ROA at the 10% level of significance，while it has a positive and significant impact on MBVR．The estimated coefficient of the HERF indicates that it does not have a significant impact on any measure of firm performance or value．Neither the HERF nor the C5 have any significant impact on Tobin’s Q (although the sign of the coefficient was positive in both equations)．The result for Tobin’s Q and MBVR are more robust as proved by the R-square and Waled test．Hypothesis 1 is thus rejected as C5 is significantly different from zero in regressions of ROA and MBVR．As concentration is immensely different from industry to industry，this gives rise to the potential for industry effects of ownership concentration on a firm’s value(see Table 4)．It can be argued that the effect of ownership concentration may be different from one industry to another．To control for potential industry effects，15 industrial dummy variables were taken and Equation (1) was re-estimated．The results，reported in Table 6，almost changed the significance of C5．The largest five shareholders，C5，becameinsignificant in ROA，while the significance of C5 increased in MBVR．Furthermore，of the 15 industrial dummy variables，only that for sector 8 was found to have a positive impact on a firm’s performance ROA．Also，all the coefficients of the industrial variables were found to have a negative and significan t impact on a firm’s value measured by Tobin’s Q．It should be noted that the significance of these industrial sectors may imply presence of industry sector．The significant impact of concentration ratios on MBVR supports the Shleifer and Vishny hypothesis (1986) that large shareholders may reduce the problem of small investors and，hence，increase the firm’s performance．The finding of a positive and significant relationship between ownership concentration and corporate performance is consistent with prior research based on advanced capital markets including Hill and Snell (1988，1989)，Kaplan and Minton (1994)，and Morck，Nakamura and Shivdasani (2000)，among others．However，this finding is inconsistent with the result of Wu and Cui (2002) that there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and accounting profits (indicated by ROA)，but consistent with the result of Leech and Leahy (1991) and Mudambi and Nicosia (1998)．The insignificant result for concentration variable in the Tobin’s Q equation cou ld suggest that the Jordanian equity market is inefficient (or there could be other factors that affect the market performance measure，which were missed in our models)．These results are consistent with Abdel Shahid (2003)，that ROA is the most important factor used by investors rather than the market measure of performance．外文题目：Ownership Structure,Corporate Performance And Failure:Evidence From Panel Data ofEmerging Market The Case of Jordan出处：Corporate Ownership & Control作者：Rami Zeitun译文：2.股权结果与公司绩效:一个描述性探讨2.1股权结构(组合)和公司绩效美国证券交易所自二十世纪70年代建立以来,在其交易所上市的公司的交易量及市值大幅增加。

管理层持股和公司绩效外文翻译文献

管理层持股和公司绩效外⽂翻译⽂献⽂献信息：⽂献标题：Managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence of listed companies in the Baltics（管理层持股和公司绩效：波罗的海上市公司的证据）国外作者：Berke-Berga A, Dovladbekova I, Abula M⽂献出处：《Polish Journal of Management Studies》,2017,15 (2):273-283 字数统计：英⽂3709单词，20051字符；中⽂6331汉字外⽂⽂献：Managerial ownership and firm performance:evidence of listed companies in the Baltics Abstract This paper focuses on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, which appears to be an important issue in corporate governance literature.We conduct regression analysis employing a sample of listed companies in the stock exchanges of the Baltic States. We test whether increased managerial ownership has effect on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). The results reveal that there is positive relationship between managerial ownership and internal performance measure (ROA) while it does not significantly affect the market performance measure (Tobin’s Q). We conclude that management mainly focuses on firm fundamental factors and ratios like profitability, sales growth, investment –they have positive relation with managerial ownership. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference in market-related factors for companies with or without managerial ownership, as these factors in the Baltics are more influenced by other considerations like economics, politics and high liquidity premium.Keywords:managerial ownership, firm performance, Tobin’s Q, ROA, Baltic StatesIntroduction and Literature ReviewRelationship between managerial ownership and firm performance has received much attention in corporate governance literature since the mid-70-ties, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explored the principal-agent theory, ownership structure, managerialbehaviourandagencycosts.Theidea of managerial ownership was present since the Baltics regained their independence (early90-ties).Duringtheprivatizationprocessinearlynineties,thanks to favourable legislative framework, many ex-ante state-owned companies offered shares to their management or all employees on beneficial conditions. In last decades, there is a trend for international companies operating in the Baltic market to implement their global human resource policy measures. Many of them have employee share ownership plans either broad- or narrow-(i.e., management only) based. Legislative framework and taxation according to employee share ownership in the Baltics has not been supportive.The institutionalframeworkunderwhichcompaniesoperateinBalticStatesis quite similar, with some exceptions. In Latvia and Estonia there are no specialregulations regarding employee share ownership. For example, there are two obstacles in Latvian Commercial Code for implementation of employee share ownership. Firstly, it is impossible for companies registered in Latvia to acquire their own shares. Secondly, it provides for priority rights for shareholders if the share capital is increased, without exception in case of employee shares. Better situation is in Lithuania where employee share ownership is regulated in Law of Companies and the Law of the Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal property. According to regulations companies may issue ordinary shares having the status of employee shares and employees have the same rights as regular shareholders. At the same time there is no specific regulation on profit sharing.In Estonia Commercial Code and Securities Market Law does not contain any special regulation on employee share ownership or profit-sharing. In general, legal framework on employee share ownerships in the Baltic States is complicated and does not support equal and efficient use of employee shareownership.The main goal of our research is to evaluate the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance in listedcompaniesoftheBalticStates.Thepercentage of shares of Baltic listed companies held by management varies from 0% to 94.4%, with median value of 27.1% in 2015. We can saythatitiscomparativelyhighlevelofmanagerialownership,asotherresearchershavefoundthatinAustraliait is 12.54%, 12.4% in the United States and 13.02% in the United Kingdom (Khan et al., 2014).Turning to measuring firm performance, we can see that there are different approaches of how to ascertain, define and evaluate it. Many studies researching companies listed in Anglo-Saxon markets (but not only) concentrate on ratios including firm’s market value. Companies of these countries excel with equity- based financing sources dominance over bankfinancing, rather diversified ownership structures and large number of minority shareholders. Thus, firm performance is reflected in its stock price. A common approach to analyse the link between managerial ownership and firm performance is regressing Tobin’s Q ratio on percentage share of managerial ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Florackis et al., 2009; Benson and Davidson, 2009; and others).Nevertheless, there are factors affecting share price, like economic environment, policy and indicators, market sentiment, industry performance and specifics, investor activity and other (we will call them non-managerial factors). In most cases, these are very important factors not depending of management performance. However, these factors influence the market related firm performance ratios, suc h as Tobin’s Q. Thus, in order to separate the impact of non-managerial factors on firm performance, it is useful to include other variables for performance measurement that are not affected by the share price. Other researchers use accounting profit (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), earnings (in terms of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation or EBITDA) and accrual adjusted earnings (Khan et al., 2014), return on assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Chenget al., 2012; Peni, 2014; Wahba, 2013), return on equity (Gosh, 2006; Short and Keasey, 1999), sales to assets ratio (Singh and Davidson, 2003) and other. Manyauthors,includingtheabovementionedforfirmperformanceevaluationuse a combination of several different ratios of both types – market value b ased (like Tobin’s Q) and firm based (like profit measures and profitability ratios).Turning back to the very often used Tobin’s Q ratio –a number of empirical studies reveal non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, as this link is impacted by two opposite effects: the manager’s incentive as shareholder and entrenchment effect. Usually, at high managerial ownership levels, the latter effect overpowers the former. Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) were the first ones that found the so-called “hump-shaped” or “inverted-U” relation between the mentioned variables. Other studies have also found the “hump-shaped” relationship. The findings regarding the most optimal level of managerial ownership differ across studies. Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) find that the maximum point of the hump-shaped relationship between Tobin’s Q andCEOownership is20.0%. Maximum leveldiscoveredby Benson and Davidson (2009) where the ownership-performance relation turns from positive to negative 28.24%. The evidence of Florackis, Kostakis and Ozkan (2009) research reveals strong and positive link between managerial ownership and firm performance at rather low levels of managerial ownership –lower than 15%. Khan, Mather and Balachandran (2014) researched Australian companies and found that at 20%-30% of ownership level there is a relation consistent with incentive alignment. Mueller and Spitz-Oener (2006) find positive managerial ownership – firm performance relation in German SMEs up to 40% of managerial shares. However, due to non-listed status of surveyed companies, the performance measure they use is slightly different from others – net number of times the reported quarter profit has increased.Other researchers create exponential models and raising the managerial ownership to several degrees. They have found double and more hump-shaped curves of managerial ownership and firm performance relation with different turning points. Double-humped curves were found by Morck et al. (1988) at 5% and 25% level; Short and Keasey (1999) at 13% and 42% level; Faccio and Lasfer (1999) at 19.7% and 54.1% level, and others. Florackis et al. (2009) in their model with quantic level of managerial ownership find four turning points at 13%, 25%, 49% and 72% levels. These results are rather close to what Davies et al. (2005) have found – 7%, 26%, 51% and 76%.Our paper adds to existing literature by providing empirical evidence of managerial ownership on firm performance in the Baltic States.This paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes data and methodology, Section 3 presents the results of empiricaltests, and Section 4 is for discussionand conclusions.Data and MethodologyOur data were mainly taken from financial reports of companies listed on Baltic stock exchanges (Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius) Official and Second list. Total number of companies listed in these lists as of September 2016 is 70. Our sample contains information from 52 companies’ reports from 2010 until 2015. Fifteen of these companies are listed in Latvia (LV, Riga), 15 –in Estonia (EE, Tallinn), and 22 – in Lithuania (LT, Vilnius). We obtained the total sample of 312 firm-year observations.For our survey, we selected companies that comply with the following criteria: (1) the company must be quoted on at least one of the Nasdaq Baltic market stock exchanges at least since year 2010; (2) firms that did not disclose information regarding management ownership were excluded from our survey. Thus, we excluded 18 companies from our sample due to the two reasons:1)Newcomers, i.e., companies first listed after 2011, so they do not have sufficientreporteddata.Therewere7suchcompanies,1Estonian,1Latvianand 5 Lithuanian;2)Insufficient disclosed information regarding managerial ownership. Eleven companies did not include information about shareholdings of the top management in their financial reports. Ten of them are based in Latvia, and one– in Lithuania.The data from financial reports and stock exchange homepage were manually selected.Table 1 presents the sample distribution by ownership share of management,industry, and stock exchange location.Table 1. Crosstables of the dataset: managerial ownership by industry and countryWe used Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ) and return on assets as the dependent variables for corporate performance measurement. Tobin’s Q is very widely used by researchers inspecting the relation between managerial ownershipandfirmperformance.Our Tobin’s Q ratio means relation of enterprise value to the book value of assets.We find enterprise value by taking market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash and cash equivalents. We must mention that the surveyed companies have no preference shares, thus they are excluded from the enterprise value formula. The Tobin’s Q ratio is measured for year 2015. We assume Tobin’s Qto capture both external and internal firm performance factors.The second dependent variable will be proxy for internal firm performance, more related to managerial performance and decisions. The return on assets ratio (ROA) is expressed as net profit to the book value of assets ratio. For return on assets,we will use average values over the period of 2011-2015.The independent variable - managerial ownership (Mgr_O) is expressed as sum of percentage share of total equity owned by all executive and non-executive directors [all members of Management Board and Supervisory Board ] and their close relatives (family members) and/or other companies-owners controlled by the directors. For independent and control variables, we use average values over the period of 2010-2014.In order to capture company size, we used such controlvariables [our selectionof control variables was based on information availability and variables considered inother research papers] as:-Turnover (Ln_S) expressed as natural logarithm of company’s sales;-Natural logarithm ofmarketvalue of equity (Ln_MVEq) which is expressedas natural logarithm of average share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding;-Natural logarithm of enterprise value (Ln_EV)Control variables for capturing ownership concentration are:-Ownershipconcentration[Largeshareholdershaveincentiveandabilityto monitor management (Florackis, 2009)] (O_Conc) –the cumulative amount (in percent) of shares of all shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more percent;-Number of large shareholders (NLS) –number of shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more percent;In order to control for other important aspects of firm financial management (level of investment, leverage, expenses and profitability) we use these variables: -Investment (INV) expressed as relation of capital expenditures to the book value of assets;-Leverage (LEV) – the ratio of book value of debt to the book value of assets;-SGA proportion (SGA) – ratio of selling, generaland administrative expenses to sales;-Payout ratio (PO_R) is for current dividend payout proportion of previous year’s net profit;-Sales growth (S_Gr) –percentage change in sales compared to previous year’s sales;-Return on capital (ROC) – the ratio is found taking earnings before interest and taxes of previous year divided by current year’s book value of equity and debt minus cash.In this paper, we are looking whether there is any relation between managerial ownershipandfirmperformanceinlistedcompaniesoftheBalticStates.In previous studies, we find quite different results of this relation, found in other countries and regions. Thus, our null hypothesis is non-directional:thereexistsno relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in the listed companies of the Baltic States.Empirical ResultsDescriptive Statistics and CorrelationsTable 2 presents the descriptive statistics information of selected variables in our dataset. The descriptive analysis reveals that the managerial ownership variable during 2010-2014 was relatively large –on average 30.64% with a maximum and minimum value of 94.41% and 0% respectively. Our proxies for market performance are Tobin’s Q with a mean value of0.966, return on assets (mean 3.37%), sales growth (mean 4.25%) and return on capital (mean: 5.57%). Average firm size measured as natural log of enterprise value is 17.515 (equivalent to 40.4 million euro).Table 2. Descriptive statistics (N=52)Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dataset variables. It reveals that only a few of the selected variables correlate with managerial ownership – return on assets (ROA) and sales growth (S_GR) have low degree of positive correlation. Positive correlation among managerial ownership and ROA suggeststhat improvement the internal growth factor performance might be of more importance to management than the market value factors.Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix for the key variables in the sample (N=52)*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the0.01 level (2-tailed)The correlation matrix reveals that market value related variables (Tobin’s Q, market value of equity and enterprise value) are most affected by return on assets, return on capital and payout ratio. Investment variable correlates with the internal growth ratios and payout ratio. Overall, correlations among the independent variables are rather low.Regression ResultsThis paper conducts a regression analysis using Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm performance. In Table 4, managerial ownership proportion serves as the main explanatory variable together with the control variables: natural logarithm of sales, leverage and investment.Table 4. OLS Regression results with Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables (N=52),unstandardized coefficientsIn the regression where Tobin’s Q serves as the dependent variable (Model 1) we can see that the variable of managerial ownership is not significantly different from zero in terms of error size together with natural logarithm of sales and leverage. The investment variable is significant. When we test the significance of the regression as a whole, the F-test indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that jointly equal to zero at 0.05 probability level.The regression with ROA as the dependent variable (Model 2) has larger explanatory power. We reject the null hypothesis for all the independent variables of being equal to zero. The regression coefficients such as sales, investment and managerial ownership have positive influence on the return on assets, while higher level of leverage affects the return negatively.We also carried out the regression equations with squared and cubed Mgr_O variable in order to check whether the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance might be non-linear. Nevertheless, it did not change the result, meaning that increase of ownership proportion would not have significant impact on firm performance.Results DiscussionSince 1976, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling revealed the principal-agent theory, there has developed a parallel scientific discussion about managerial ownership and employee ownership, and its features of aligning interests of managers and employees with investors’ interests and goals. From the other side, there is the entrenchment effect that, in case of comparatively large share of managerial ownership, penetrates and management avoids more profitable projects insteadof less, fearing from risk.Large portion of existing literature concerning managerial ownership and firm performance finds the mentioned two contrary impact factors ownership- performance relation. These factors induce a hump-shaped relation of the above- mentionedvariables with the highest point at 15–30 percent level of managerial ownership, depending on the study specifics (Morck et al., 1988; Coles et al., 2012; Benson and Davidson, 2009; Khan et al., 2014). The evidence mainly relies on data from listedcompanies in large developed capital markets, most of them originated in Anglo-Saxon countries (especially the UK and US). A study in German SMEs (Mueller and Spitz-Oener, 2006) reveals a 40% managerial ownership optimum promoting the best performance results. Nevertheless, this study uses different methodology.The results of our study do not support the findings regarding managerial ownership link with firm performance in other markets worldwide, measuredby Tobin’s Q. Thus, contrary to other studies, we did not detect a particular optimum of managerial ownership proportion in companies listed on the Baltic stock exchanges nor a hump-shaped ownership-performance relation. We assume that Tobin’s Q in our case is an inappropriate measure for firm performance only, as the firm’s market value is highly affected by external factors (macroeconomics, politics, investor sentiment) and highstockliquiditypremium (Lieksnis,2010) in Baltic stock markets. The management of companies – neither owners, nor non- owners – cannot directly affect these factors. For this reason, we used our datato create a parallel model using more firm-related ratios.We carried outaregressionwithROAasthedependentvariable(Model2). It showed better results with higher explanatory power. The model includes such independent variables as managerial ownership, natural logarithm of sales,leverage and investment. Managerial ownership appears to be statistically significant only in Model 2, although with a very low coefficient (0.01), and onlyat 0.05 probability level. These results are consistent with findings of other researchers as well – Khan et al. (2014) in a study of Australian companies; Cheng et al. (2012) find that in Hong Kong market firm performance is negatively related with managerial ownership if its share is less than 22.18% or more than 78.02%.Researching companies in Egypt, Wahba (2013) concludes that neither Tobin’s Q nor ROA give statistically significant relation between managerial ownership and firm performance.ConclusionsIn this paper, we estimate the managerial ownership and firm performance parameters using data from 2010–2015 financial reports of 52 companies listedon Nasdaq Riga, Nasdaq Tallinn and Nasdaq Vilnius stock exchanges. This is the first such attempt to measure managerial ownership impact on firm performance for listed companies in the Baltics.One of the reasons why there is no significant relation between managerial ownership and firm’s market performance (Tobin’s Q) is that due to historical and sociological factors, management of the listed companies in the Baltics is not focused on the market value of stocks. The stock markets are relatively small and illiquid, and ownership is more concentrated than in the developed markets, where itismoredispersed.Rathermanagers’motivatorsandbonusesdependon fundamental results of the company and their profits.There also can be other reasons for the difference in results regarding ownership- performance relation compared to findings from other countries, such as the relatively small sample size, scope of the study, performance variables selection, regional corporate governance and culture specifics, methodological approach andmanyother.Thisleadsustoimplicationsforfurtherresearchthatshouldbe developed in theofcorporategovernancemattersintheBaltics–itcanbe focused on more detailed ownership structure including institutional owners, government and/or family ownership matters and their influence on variousbusiness performance measures. The geography of the survey can be extended including other countries located in Eastern Europe.中⽂译⽂：管理层持股和公司绩效：波罗的海上市公司的证据摘要本⽂重点介绍了管理层持股与公司绩效之间的关系，这似乎是公司治理⽂献中的⼀个重要课题。

(完整word版)绩效考核外文文献及其译文

The Dilemma of Performance AppraisalPeter Prowse and Julie Prowse Measuring Business Excellence，Vol。

13 Iss：4，pp。

69 — 77AbstractThis paper deals with the dilemma of managing performance using performance appraisal。

The authors will evaluate the historical development of appraisals and argue that the critical area of line management development that was been identified as a critical success factor in appraisals has been ignored in the later literature evaluating the effectiveness of performance through appraisals。

This paper willevaluatethe aims and methodsof appraisal， thedifficulties encountered in the appraisalprocess。

It also re-evaluates the lack of theoretical development in appraisaland move from he psychological approachesof analysistoamorecritical realisation ofapproaches before re-evaluating the challenge to remove subjectivity and bias in judgement of appraisal。

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文献信息：文献标题：Managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence of listed companies in the Baltics（管理层持股和公司绩效：波罗的海上市公司的证据）国外作者：Berke-Berga A, Dovladbekova I, Abula M文献出处：《Polish Journal of Management Studies》,2017,15 (2):273-283 字数统计：英文3709单词，20051字符；中文6331汉字外文文献：Managerial ownership and firm performance:evidence of listed companies in the Baltics Abstract This paper focuses on the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, which appears to be an important issue in corporate governance literature. We conduct regression analysis employing a sample of listed companies in the stock exchanges of the Baltic States. We test whether increased managerial ownership has effect on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). The results reveal that there is positive relationship between managerial ownership and internal performance measure (ROA) while it does not significantly affect the market performance measure (Tobin’s Q). We conclude that management mainly focuses on firm fundamental factors and ratios like profitability, sales growth, investment – they have positive relation with managerial ownership. Meanwhile, there is no significant difference in market-related factors for companies with or without managerial ownership, as these factors in the Baltics are more influenced by other considerations like economics, politics and high liquidity premium.Keywords:managerial ownership, firm performance, Tobin’s Q, ROA, Baltic StatesIntroduction and Literature ReviewRelationship between managerial ownership and firm performance has received much attention in corporate governance literature since the mid-70-ties, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) explored the principal-agent theory, ownership structure, managerial behaviour and agency costs. The idea of managerial ownership was present since the Baltics regained their independence (early 90-ties). During the privatization process in early nineties, thanks to favourable legislative framework, many ex-ante state-owned companies offered shares to their management or all employees on beneficial conditions. In last decades, there is a trend for international companies operating in the Baltic market to implement their global human resource policy measures. Many of them have employee share ownership plans either broad- or narrow- (i.e., management only) based. Legislative framework and taxation according to employee share ownership in the Baltics has not been supportive.The institutional framework under which companies operate in Baltic States is quite similar, with some exceptions. In Latvia and Estonia there are no special regulations regarding employee share ownership. For example, there are two obstacles in Latvian Commercial Code for implementation of employee share ownership. Firstly, it is impossible for companies registered in Latvia to acquire their own shares. Secondly, it provides for priority rights for shareholders if the share capital is increased, without exception in case of employee shares. Better situation is in Lithuania where employee share ownership is regulated in Law of Companies and the Law of the Privatisation of State-Owned and Municipal property. According to regulations companies may issue ordinary shares having the status of employee shares and employees have the same rights as regular shareholders. At the same time there is no specific regulation on profit sharing. In Estonia Commercial Code and Securities Market Law does not contain any special regulation on employee share ownership or profit-sharing. In general, legal framework on employee share ownerships in the Baltic States is complicated and does not support equal and efficient use of employeeshare ownership.The main goal of our research is to evaluate the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance in listed companies of the Baltic States. The percentage of shares of Baltic listed companies held by management varies from 0% to 94.4%, with median value of 27.1% in 2015. We can say that it is comparatively high level of managerial ownership, as other researchers have found that in Australia it is 12.54%, 12.4% in the United States and 13.02% in the United Kingdom (Khan et al., 2014).Turning to measuring firm performance, we can see that there are different approaches of how to ascertain, define and evaluate it. Many studies researching companies listed in Anglo-Saxon markets (but not only) concentrate on ratios including firm’s market value. Companies of these countries excel with equity- based financing sources dominance over bank financing, rather diversified ownership structures and large number of minority shareholders. Thus, firm performance is reflected in its stock price. A common approach to analyse the link between managerial ownership and firm performance is regressing Tobin’s Q ratio on percentage share of managerial ownership (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Florackis et al., 2009; Benson and Davidson, 2009; and others).Nevertheless, there are factors affecting share price, like economic environment, policy and indicators, market sentiment, industry performance and specifics, investor activity and other (we will call them non-managerial factors). In most cases, these are very important factors not depending of management performance. However, these factors influence the market related firm performance ratios, such as Tobin’s Q. Thus, in order to separate the impact of non-managerial factors on firm performance, it is useful to include other variables for performance measurement that are not affected by the share price. Other researchers use accounting profit (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), earnings (in terms of earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation or EBITDA) and accrual adjusted earnings (Khan et al., 2014), return on assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Cheng et al., 2012; Peni, 2014; Wahba, 2013), return on equity (Gosh, 2006; Short and Keasey, 1999), sales to assets ratio (Singh and Davidson, 2003) and other. Many authors, including the above mentioned for firmperformance evaluation use a combination of several different ratios of both types – market value based (like Tobin’s Q) and firm based (like profit measures and profitability ratios).Turning back to the very often used Tobin’s Q ratio – a number of empirical studies reveal non-linear relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, as this link is impacted by two opposite effects: the manager’s incentive as shareholder and entrenchment effect. Usually, at high managerial ownership levels, the latter effect overpowers the former.Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) were the first ones that found the so-called “hump-shaped” or “inverted-U” relation between the mentioned variables. Other studies have also found the “hump-shaped” relationship. The findings regarding the most optimal level of managerial ownership differ across studies. Coles, Lemmon and Meschke (2012) find that the maximum point of the hump-shaped relationship between Tobin’s Q and CEO ownership is 20.0%. Maximum level discovered by Benson and Davidson (2009) where the ownership-performance relation turns from positive to negative 28.24%. The evidence of Florackis, Kostakis and Ozkan (2009) research reveals strong and positive link between managerial ownership and firm performance at rather low levels of managerial ownership – lower than 15%. Khan, Mather and Balachandran (2014) researched Australian companies and found that at 20%-30% of ownership level there is a relation consistent with incentive alignment. Mueller and Spitz-Oener (2006) find positive managerial ownership – firm performance relation in German SMEs up to 40% of managerial shares. However, due to non-listed status of surveyed companies, the performance measure they use is slightly different from others – net number of times the reported quarter profit has increased.Other researchers create exponential models and raising the managerial ownership to several degrees. They have found double and more hump-shaped curves of managerial ownership and firm performance relation with different turning points. Double-humped curves were found by Morck et al. (1988) at 5% and 25% level; Short and Keasey (1999) at 13% and 42% level; Faccio and Lasfer (1999) at 19.7%and 54.1% level, and others. Florackis et al. (2009) in their model with quantic level of managerial ownership find four turning points at 13%, 25%, 49% and 72% levels. These results are rather close to what Davies et al. (2005) have found – 7%, 26%, 51% and 76%.Our paper adds to existing literature by providing empirical evidence of managerial ownership on firm performance in the Baltic States.This paper has the following structure: Section 2 describes data and methodology, Section 3 presents the results of empirical tests, and Section 4 is for discussion and conclusions.Data and MethodologyOur data were mainly taken from financial reports of companies listed on Baltic stock exchanges (Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius) Official and Second list. Total number of companies listed in these lists as of September 2016 is 70. Our sample contains information from 52 companies’ reports from 2010 until 2015. Fifteen of these companies are listed in Latvia (LV, Riga), 15 – in Estonia (EE, Tallinn), and 22 – in Lithuania (LT, Vilnius). We obtained the total sample of 312 firm-year observations.For our survey, we selected companies that comply with the following criteria: (1) the company must be quoted on at least one of the Nasdaq Baltic market stock exchanges at least since year 2010; (2) firms that did not disclose information regarding management ownership were excluded from our survey. Thus, we excluded 18 companies from our sample due to the two reasons:1)Newcomers, i.e., companies first listed after 2011, so they do not have sufficient reported data. There were 7 such companies, 1 Estonian, 1 Latvian and 5 Lithuanian;2)Insufficient disclosed information regarding managerial ownership. Eleven companies did not include information about shareholdings of the top management in their financial reports. Ten of them are based in Latvia, and one– in Lithuania.The data from financial reports and stock exchange homepage were manually selected.Table 1 presents the sample distribution by ownership share of management, industry, and stock exchange location.Table 1. Crosstables of the dataset: managerial ownership by industry and countryWe used Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ) and return on assets as the dependent variables for corporate performance measurement. Tobin’s Q is very widely used by researchers inspecting the relation between managerial ownership and firm performance. Our Tobin’s Q ratio means relation of enterprise value to the book value of assets.We find enterprise value by taking market value of equity plus book value of debt minus cash and cash equivalents. We must mention that the surveyed companies have no preference shares, thus they are excluded from the enterprise value formula. The Tobin’s Q ratio is measured for year 2015. We assume Tobin’s Q to capture both external and internal firm performance factors.The second dependent variable will be proxy for internal firm performance, more related to managerial performance and decisions. The return on assets ratio (ROA) is expressed as net profit to the book value of assets ratio. For return on assets, we will use average values over the period of 2011-2015.The independent variable - managerial ownership (Mgr_O) is expressed as sum of percentage share of total equity owned by all executive and non-executive directors [all members of Management Board and Supervisory Board ] and their close relatives (family members) and/or other companies-owners controlled by the directors. For independent and control variables, we use average values over the period of 2010-2014.In order to capture company size, we used such control variables [our selectionof control variables was based on information availability and variables considered in other research papers] as:-Turnover (Ln_S) expressed as natural logarithm of company’s sales;-Natural logarithm of market value of equity (Ln_MVEq) which is expressed as natural logarithm of average share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding;-Natural logarithm of enterprise value (Ln_EV)Control variables for capturing ownership concentration are:-Ownership concentration [Large shareholders have incentive and ability to monitor management (Florackis, 2009)] (O_Conc) – the cumulative amount (in percent) of shares of all shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more percent;-Number of large shareholders (NLS) – number of shareholders having ownership stake of 5 or more percent;In order to control for other important aspects of firm financial management (level of investment, leverage, expenses and profitability) we use these variables: -Investment (INV) expressed as relation of capital expenditures to the book value of assets;-Leverage (LEV) – the ratio of book value of debt to the book value of assets;-SGA proportion (SGA) – ratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to sales;-Payout ratio (PO_R) is for current dividend payout proportion of previous year’s net profit;-Sales growth (S_Gr) – percentage change in sales compared to previous year’s sales;-Return on capital (ROC) – the ratio is found taking earnings before interest and taxes of previous year divided by current year’s book value of equity and debt minus cash.In this paper, we are looking whether there is any relation between managerial ownership and firm performance in listed companies of the Baltic States. In previous studies, we find quite different results of this relation, found in other countries andregions. Thus, our null hypothesis is non-directional: there exists no relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance in the listed companies of the Baltic States.Empirical ResultsDescriptive Statistics and CorrelationsTable 2 presents the descriptive statistics information of selected variables in our dataset. The descriptive analysis reveals that the managerial ownership variable during 2010-2014 was relatively large – on average 30.64% with a maximum and minimum value of 94.41% and 0% respectively. Our proxies for market performance are Tobin’s Q with a mean value of 0.966, return on assets (mean 3.37%), sales growth (mean 4.25%) and return on capital (mean: 5.57%). Average firm size measured as natural log of enterprise value is 17.515 (equivalent to 40.4 million euro).Table 2. Descriptive statistics (N=52)Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation matrix for the dataset variables. It reveals that only a few of the selected variables correlate with managerial ownership – return on assets (ROA) and sales growth (S_GR) have low degree of positive correlation. Positive correlation among managerial ownership and ROA suggests that improvement the internal growth factor performance might be of more importance to management than the market value factors.Table 3. Pearson correlation matrix for the key variables in the sample (N=52)*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)The correlation matrix reveals that market value related variables (Tobin’s Q, market value of equity and enterprise value) are most affected by return on assets, return on capital and payout ratio. Investment variable correlates with the internal growth ratios and payout ratio. Overall, correlations among the independent variables are rather low.Regression ResultsThis paper conducts a regression analysis using Tobin’s Q and ROA to measure firm performance. In Table 4, managerial ownership proportion serves as the main explanatory variable together with the control variables: natural logarithm of sales, leverage and investment.Table 4. OLS Regression results with Tobin’s Q and ROA as the dependent variables (N=52),unstandardized coefficientsIn the regression where Tobin’s Q serves as the dependent variable (Model 1) we can see that the variable of managerial ownership is not significantly different from zero in terms of error size together with natural logarithm of sales and leverage. The investment variable is significant. When we test the significance of the regression as a whole, the F-test indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that jointly equal to zero at 0.05 probability level.The regression with ROA as the dependent variable (Model 2) has larger explanatory power. We reject the null hypothesis for all the independent variables of being equal to zero. The regression coefficients such as sales, investment and managerial ownership have positive influence on the return on assets, while higher level of leverage affects the return negatively.We also carried out the regression equations with squared and cubed Mgr_O variable in order to check whether the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance might be non-linear. Nevertheless, it did not change the result, meaning that increase of ownership proportion would not have significant impact on firm performance.Results DiscussionSince 1976, when M. Jensen and W. Meckling revealed the principal-agent theory, there has developed a parallel scientific discussion about managerial ownership and employee ownership, and its features of aligning interests of managers and employees with investors’ interests and goals. From the other side, there is the entrenchment effect that, in case of comparatively large share of managerial ownership, penetrates and management avoids more profitable projects instead of less, fearing from risk.Large portion of existing literature concerning managerial ownership and firm performance finds the mentioned two contrary impact factors ownership- performance relation. These factors induce a hump-shaped relation of the above-mentionedvariables with the highest point at 15–30 percent level of managerial ownership, depending on the study specifics (Morck et al., 1988; Coles et al., 2012; Benson and Davidson, 2009; Khan et al., 2014). The evidence mainly relies on data from listed companies in large developed capital markets, most of them originated in Anglo-Saxon countries (especially the UK and US). A study in German SMEs (Mueller and Spitz-Oener, 2006) reveals a 40% managerial ownership optimum promoting the best performance results. Nevertheless, this study uses different methodology.The results of our study do not support the findings regarding managerial ownership link with firm performance in other markets worldwide, measured by Tobin’s Q. Thus, contrary to other studies, we did not detect a particular optimum of managerial ownership proportion in companies listed on the Baltic stock exchanges nor a hump-shaped ownership-performance relation. We assume that Tobin’s Q in our case is an inappropriate measure for firm performance only, as the firm’s market value is highly affected by external factors (macroeconomics, politics, investor sentiment) and high stock liquidity premium (Lieksnis, 2010) in Baltic stock markets. The management of companies – neither owners, nor non- owners – cannot directly affect these factors. For this reason, we used our data to create a parallel model using more firm-related ratios.We carried out a regression with ROA as the dependent variable (Model 2). It showed better results with higher explanatory power. The model includes such independent variables as managerial ownership, natural logarithm of sales, leverage and investment. Managerial ownership appears to be statistically significant only in Model 2, although with a very low coefficient (0.01), and only at 0.05 probability level. These results are consistent with findings of other researchers as well – Khan et al. (2014) in a study of Australian companies; Cheng et al. (2012) find that in Hong Kong market firm performance is negatively related with managerial ownership if its share is less than 22.18% or more than 78.02%.Researching companies in Egypt, Wahba (2013) concludes that neither Tobin’s Q nor ROA give statistically significant relation between managerial ownership and firmperformance.ConclusionsIn this paper, we estimate the managerial ownership and firm performance parameters using data from 2010–2015 financial reports of 52 companies listed on Nasdaq Riga, Nasdaq Tallinn and Nasdaq Vilnius stock exchanges. This is the first such attempt to measure managerial ownership impact on firm performance for listed companies in the Baltics.One of the reasons why there is no significant relation between managerial ownership and firm’s market performance (Tobin’s Q) is that due to historical and sociological factors, management of the listed companies in the Baltics is not focused on the market value of stocks. The stock markets are relatively small and illiquid, and ownership is more concentrated than in the developed markets, where it is more dispersed. Rather managers’ motivators and bonuses depend on fundamental results of the company and their profits.There also can be other reasons for the difference in results regarding ownership-performance relation compared to findings from other countries, such as the relatively small sample size, scope of the study, performance variables selection, regional corporate governance and culture specifics, methodological approach and many other. This leads us to implications for further research that should be developed in the of corporate governance matters in the Baltics – it can be focused on more detailed ownership structure including institutional owners, government and/or family ownership matters and their influence on various business performance measures. The geography of the survey can be extended including other countries located in Eastern Europe.中文译文：管理层持股和公司绩效：波罗的海上市公司的证据摘要本文重点介绍了管理层持股与公司绩效之间的关系，这似乎是公司治理文献中的一个重要课题。

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