企业的性质(英文版)

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科斯：《企业的性质》Ｒ.科斯过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。

在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。

然而，这种考察不仅对于防止因对有关理论赖以成立的假设缺乏了解而出现的误解和不必要的争论是必不可少的，而且对于经济学在一系列不同假设的选择中作出正确的判断也是极为重要的。

例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。

1由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而不是从产业开始分析的倾向钉2，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处枣假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。

罗宾逊夫人曾说过：“对于经济学中的一系列假设，需要提出的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现实世界相吻合吗？”3尽管正如罗宾逊夫人所指出的，“较通常的是，一种假设是可处理的，而另一种则是现实的，”可能还有这样的理论分支，其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。

下文将表明，一种不仅是现实的（即能与现实世界中的企业含义相吻合），而且是易于处理的（即能用马歇尔所发展起来的两种最强有力的经济分析工具来处理），企业的定义是可以获得的。

这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念4，当然，我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。

在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适的。

让我们来考察一下阿瑟•索尔特爵土对经济体制的描述。

6“正常的经济体制自行运行。

它的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央的监查。

就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏的。

”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一个有机体而不是一个组织。

7经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。

人们都在不同方案之间进行着预测和选择。

不同性质公司的英语表达

1. Line(s) （轮船、航空、航运等）公司Atlantic Container Line大西洋集装箱海运公司Hawaiian air Lines夏威夷航空公司2. Agency 公司、代理行The Austin advertising Agency奥斯汀广告公司China Ocean Shipping Agency中国外轮代理公司3. Store(s) 百货公司Great Universal Store大世界百货公司（英）Tesco Stores (Holdings)坦斯科百货公司（英）4. Associates（联合）公司British Nuclear Associates英国核子联合公司Subsea equipment Associates Ltd.海底设备联合有限公司（英、法、美合办）5. System（广播、航空等）公司Mutual Broadcasting System相互广播公司（美）Malaysian Airline System马来西亚航空公司6. Office公司，多与head, home, branch等词连用3M China Limited Guangzhou Branch Office 3M中国有限公司广州分公司China Books Import and Export Corporation (Head Office)中国图书进出口总公司7. Service(s)（服务）公司Africa-New Zealand Service非洲—新西兰服务公司Tropic Air Services特罗皮克航空公司8. ExchangeAmerican Manufacturers Foreign Credit Insurance Exchange美国制造商出口信用保险公司9. CenterBinks (Shanghai) Engineering Exhibition Center, Ltd.宾克斯（上海）涂装工程设备展示有限公司“联合公司”的翻译方法1. Consolidated Coal Company联合煤炭公司（美）2. United Aircraft Corporation联合飞机公司（美）3. Allied Food Industries Co.联合食品工业公司（新加坡）4. Integrated Oil Company联合石油公司5. Federated Department Stores联合百货公司6. Union Carbide Corporation联合碳化合物公司（美）7. Associated British Picture Corporation英国联合影业公司8. China Agricultural Machinery Import and Export Joint Company中国农业机械进出口联合公司“保险公司”的翻译方法1. Export Credit Insurance Corporation出口信贷保险公司（加）2. Export Finance and Insurance Corporation出口金融和保险公司（澳）3. Federal Insurance Corporation联邦保险公司（美）4. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation联邦存款保险公司（美）5. Export Payments Insurance Corporation出口支付保险公司（澳）6. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation联邦储蓄贷款保险公司（美）7. Development Underwriting Ltd.开发保险公司（澳）8. American International Assurance Co. Ltd.美国友邦保险公司9. American International Underwriters Corporation美国国际保险公司企业名称的翻译方法中国东方科学仪器进出口公司(China Oriental Scientific Instruments Imp.& Exp. Corporation)A B C DA：企业注册地址；B：企业专名；C：企业生产对象或经营范围；D：企业的性质A按地名翻译的原则处理；B可音译，也可意译，音译时可按汉语拼音，也可按英语拼写方式；C须意译，两个并列成份一般用符号&连接起来，如“中国科学器材公司”译为“China Scientific Instruments & Materia ls Corporation”，但不宜在同一个名称里使用两个&符号，如“中国工艺品进出口公司”译为：China National Arts and Crafts Import & Export Corporation。

企业的性质(中英对照)

《企业的性质》（The Nature of the Firm）《企业的性质》全文过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。

在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。

例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。

由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而不是从产业开始分析的倾向性，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。

罗宾逊夫人曾说过：“对于经济学中的一系列假设，需要提出的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现实世界相吻合吗？”尽管正如罗宾逊夫人所指出的，“较通常的是，一种假设是可处理的，而另一种则是现实的，”可能还有这样的理论分支，其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。

这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念，当然，我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。

1在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适的。

让我们来考察一下阿瑟·索尔特爵土对经济体制的描述。

“正常的经济体制自行运行。

它的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央的监查。

就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏的。

”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一个有机体而不是一个组织。

经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。

The Nature of the Firm(科斯：企业的性质原文)

The Nature of the Firm (1937)R. H. COASEEconomic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumption. Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent them is understanding and needles controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for economics of good judgment in choosing between rival sets of assumptions. For instance, itis suggested that the use of the word “firm” in economics may be different from the use of the term by the “plain man.”' Since there is apparently a trend in economic theory towards starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry,2 it is ail the more necessary not only that a clear definition of the word "firm" should be given but that its difference from a firm in the "real world," if it aists, should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson has said that "the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are they tractable? And : Do they correspond with the real world?"3 Though, as Mrs. Robinson points out, "More often one set will be manageable and the other realistic," yet there may well be branches of theory where assumptions may be both manageable and realistic. It is hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the margin.4 Our definition must, of course, "relate to formal relations which are capable of being conceived exactly."5IIt is convenient if, in searching for a definition of a firm, we first consider the economic system as it is normally treated by the economist. Let us consider the description of the economic system given by Sir Arthur Salter6. “The normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, andproduction to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive.” An economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by the price mechanism and society becomes not an organization but an organism.7 The econ omic system “works itself. This does not mean that there is no planning by individuals. These exercise foresight and choose between alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the systemBut this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price mechanism. Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.8 Sir Arthur Salter's description, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. Within a firm, the description does not fit at all. For instance, in economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of production between different uses is determined by the price mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result, A moves from Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and Y, except if 50 far as it compensates for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world, we find that there are many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he is ordered to do 50. Those who object to economic planning on the grounds that the problem is solved by price movements can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within our economic system which is quite different from the individual planning mentioned above and which is akin to what is normally called economic planning. The example given above is typical of a large sphere in our modem economic system. 0f course, this fact has not been ignored by economists. Marshall introduces organization as a fourth factor of production; J.B. Clark gives theco-ordinating function to the entrepreneur; Professor Knight introduces managers who co-ordinate. As D.H. Robertson points out, we find "islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.”9 But in view of the fact that it is usua lly argued that co-ordination will be done by the price mechanism, why is such organization necessary? Why are there these "islands of conscious power"? Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. Within a firm, these markets transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur co-ordinator, who directs production.10 It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production. Yet, having regard to the fact that if production isregulated by price movements, production could be carried on without any organization at all, well might we ask, why is there any organization?0f course, the degree to which the price mechanism is superseded varies greatly. In a department store, the allocation of the different sections to the various locations in the building may be done by the controlling authority or it may be the result of competitive price bidding for space. In the Lancashire cotton industry, a weaver can rent power and shop-room and can obtain looms and yarn on credit.11 This co-ordination of the various factors of production is, however, normally carried out without the interven tion of the price mechanism. As is evident, the amount of “vertical” integration, involving as it does the supersession of the price mechanism, varies greatly from industry to industry and from firm to firm. It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism. It is, of course, as Professor Robbins points out, “related to an outside network of relative prices and costs,” 12 but it is important to discover the exact nature of this relationship. This distinction between the allocation of resources in a firm and the allocation in the economic system has been very vividly described by Mr. Maurice Dobb when discussing Adam Smith's conception of the capitalist: “It began to be seen that there was something more important than the relations inside each factory or unit captained by an undertaker; there were the relations of the undertaker with the rest of the economic world outside his immediate sphere... the undertaker busies himself with the division of labour inside each firm and he plans and organises consciously,” but “he is related to the much larger economic specialisation, of which he himself is merely one specialised unit. Here, he plays his part as a single ceIl in a larger organism, mainly unconscious of the wider rôle he fills.”13In view of the fact that while economists treat the price mechanism as a coordinating instrument, the? also admit the co-ordinating function of the “entrepreneur,” it is surely important to enquire whyco-ordination is the work of the price mechanism in one case and of the entrepreneur in another. The purpose of this paper is to bridge what appears to be a gap in economic theory between the assumption (made for some purposes) that resources are allocated by means of the price mechanism and the assumption (made for other purposes) that this allocation is dependent on the entrepreneur-co-ordinator. We have to explain the basis on which, in practice, this choice between alternatives is effected.14IIOur task is to attempt to discover why a firm emerges at ah in a specialized exchange economy. The price mechanism (considered purely from the side of the direction of resources) might be superseded if the relationship which replaced it was desired for its own sake. This would be the case, for example, if some people preferred to work under the direction of some other person. Such individuals would accept less in order to work under someone, and firms would arise naturally from this. But it would appear that this cannot be a very important reason, for it would rather seem that the opposite tendency is operating if one judges from the stress normally laid on the advantage of “being one's own master;”15 0f course, if the desire was not to be controlled but to control, to exercise power over others, then people might be willing to give Up something in order to direct others; that is, they would be willing to pay others more than they could get under the price mechanism in order to be able to direct them. But this implies that those who direct pay in order to be able to do this and are not paid to direct, which is clearly not true in the majority of cases.16 Firms might also exist if purchasers preferred commodities which are produced by firms to those not 50 produced; but even in spheres where one would expect such preferences (if they exist) to be of negligible importance, firms are to be found in the real world.17 Thereforethere must be other elements involved.The main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of “organizing” production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.18 This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of specialists who will sell this information. The costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market must also be taken into account.19 Again, in certain markets, e.g., produce ex-changes, a technique is devised for minimizing these contract costs; but they are not eliminated. It is true that contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm but they are greatly reduced. A factor of production (or the owner thereof) does not have to make a series of contracts with the factors with whom he is co-operating within the firm, as would be necessary, of course, if this co-operation were as a direct result of the working of the price mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted one. At this stage, it is important to note the character of the contract into which a factor enters that is employed within a firm. The contract is one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed or fluctuating), agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within certain limits.20 The essence of the contract is that it should only state the limits to the powers of the entrepreneur; Within these limits, he can therefore direct the other factors of production.There are, however, other disadvantages - or costs - of using the price mechanism. It may be desired tomake a long-term contract for the supply of some article or service. This may be due to the fact that if one contract is made for a longer period, instead of several shorter ones, then certain costs of making each contract will be avoided. Or, owing to the risk attitude of the people concerned, they may prefer to make a long rather than a short-term contract. Now, owing to the difficulty of forecasting, the longer the period of the contract is for the supply of the commodity or service, the less possible, and indeed, the less desirable it is for the person purchasing to specify what the other contracting party is expected to do. It may well be a matter of indifference to the person supplying the service or commodity which of several courses of action is taken, but not to the purchaser of that service or commodity. But the purchaser will not know which of these several courses he will want the supplier to take. Therefore, the service which is being provided is expressed in general terms, the exact details being left until a later date. All that is stated in the contract is the limits to what the persons supplying the commodity or service is expected to do. The details of what the supplier is expected to do is not stated in the contract but is decided later by the purchaser. When the direction of resources (within the limits of the contract) becomes dependent on the buyer in this way, that relationship which I term a "firm" may be obtained.21 A firm is likely therefore to emerge in those cases where a very short-term contract would be unsatisfactory. It is obviously of more importance in the case of services -labor-than it is in the case of the buying of commodities. In the case of commodities, the main items can be stated in advance and the details which will be decided later will be of minor significance.We may sum Up this section of the argument by saying that the operation of a market costs something and by forming an organization and allowing some authority (an "entrepreneur") to direct the resources, certain marketing costs are saved. The entrepreneur has to carry out his function at less cost, taking into account the fact that he may get factors of production at a lower price than the market transactions which he supersedes, because it is always possible to revert to the open market if he fails to do this. The question of uncertainty is one which is often considered to be very relevant to the study of the equilibrium of the firm. It seems improbable that a firm would emerge without the existence of uncertainty. But those, for instance, Professor Knight, who make the mode of payment the distinguishing mark of the firm - fixed incomes being guaranteed to some of those engaged in production by a person who takes the residual, and fluctuating, income-would appear to be introducing a point which is irrelevant to the problem we are considering. One entrepreneur may sell his services to another for a certain sum of money, while the payment to his employees may be mainly or wholly a share in profits.22 Thesignificant question would appear to be why the allocation of resources is not done directly by the price mechanism.Another factor that should be noted is that exchange transactions on a market and the same transactions organized within a firm are often treated differently by Governments or other bodies with regulatory powers. If we consider the operation of a sales tax, it is clear that it is a tax on market transactions and not on the same transactions organized within the firm. Now since these are alternative methods of organization"-by the price mechanism or by the entrepreneur-such a regulation would bring into existence firms which otherwise would have no raison d'être. It would furnish a reason for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy. 0f course, to the extent that firms already exist, such a measure as a sales tax would merely tend to make them larger than they would otherwise be. Similarly, quota schemes, and methods of price control which imply that there is rationing, and which do not apply to firms producing such products for themselves, by allowing advantages to those who organize within the firm and flot through the market, necessarily encourage the growth of firms. But it is difficult to believe that it is measures such as have been mentioned in this paragraph which have brought firms into existence. Such measures would, however, tend to have this result if they did not exist for other reasons.These, then, are the reasons why organizations such as firms exist in a specialized exchange economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is "organized" by the price mechanism.A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur; The approach which has just been sketched would appear to offer an advantage in that it is possible to give a scientific meaning to what is meant by saying that a firm gets larger or smaller A firm becomes larger as additional transactions (which could be exchange transactions co-ordinated through the price mechanism) are organized by the entrepreneur and becomes smaller as he abandons the organization of such transactions. The question which arises is whether it is possible to study the forces which determine the size of the firm. Why does the entrepreneur not organize one less transaction or one more? It is interesting to note that Professor Knight considers that:the relation between efficiency and size is one of the most serious problems of theory, being, in contrast with the relation for a plant, largely a matter of personality and historical accident rather than of intelligible general principles.But the question is peculiarly vital because the possibility of monopoly gain offers a powerful incentive to continuous and unlimited expansion of the firm, which force must be offset by some decreased efficiency (in the production of money income) with growth in size, if even boundary competition is toexist.23equally powerful one making forProfessor Knight would appear to consider that it is impossible to treat scientifically the determinants of the size of the firm. On the basis of the concept of the firm developed above, this task will now be attempted.It was suggested that the introduction of the firm was due primarily to the existence of marketing costs. A pertinent question to ask would appear to be (quite apart from the monopoly considerations raised by Professor Knight), why, if by organizing one can eliminate certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any market transactions at all?24 Why is not ah production carried on by one big firm? There would appear to be certain possible explanations.First, as a firm gets larger, there may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur function, that is, the costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm may rise.25 Naturally, a point must be reached where the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm are equal to the costs involved in carrying out the transaction in the open market, or; to the costs of organizing by another entrepreneur. Secondly, it may be that as the transactions which are organized increase, the entrepreneur fails to place the factors of production in the uses where their value is greatest, that is, fails to make the best use of the factors of production. Again, a point must be reached where the loss through the waste of resources is equal to the marketing costs of the exchange transaction in the open market or to the loss if the transaction was organized by another entrepreneur. Finally, the supply price of one or more of the factors of production may rise, because the "other advantages" of a small firm are greater than those of a large firm.26 0f course, the actual point where the expansion of the firm ceases might be determined by a combination of the factors mentioned above. The first two reasons given most probably correspond to the economists' phrase of "diminishing returns to management."27The point has been made in the previous paragraph that a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm. But if the firm stops its expansion at a point below the costs of marketing in the open market and at a point equal to the costs of organizing in another firm, in most cases (excluding the case of "combination"28), this will imply that there is a market transaction between these two procedures, each of whom could organize it at less than the actual marketing costs. How is the paradox to be resolved? If we consider an example the reason for this will become clear. Suppose A is buying a product from B and that both A and B could organize this marketing transaction at less than its present cost. B, we can assume, is not organizing one process or stage of production, but several. If A therefore wishes to avoid a market transaction, he will have to take over all the processes of production controlled by B. Unless A takes over ail the processes of production, a market transaction will still remain, although it is a different product that is bought. But we have previously assumed that as each producer expands he becomes less efficient; the additional costs of organizing extra transactions increase. It is probable that A's cost of organizing the transactions previously organized by B will be greater than B's costs of doing the same thing. A therefore will take over the whole of B's organization only if his cost of organizing B's work is not greater than B's cost by an amount equal to the costs of carrying out an exchange transaction on the open market. But once it becomes economical to have a market transaction, it also pays to divide production in such a way that the cost of organizing an extra transaction in each firm is the same.Up to now it has been assumed that the exchange transactions which take place through the price mechanism are homogeneous. In fact, nothing could be more diverse than the actual transactions which take place in our modem world. This would seem to imply that the costs of carrying out exchange transactions through the price mechanism will vary considerably as will also the costs of organizing these transactions within the firm. It seems therefore possible that quite apart from the question of diminishing returns the costs of organizing certain transactions within the firm may be greater than the costs of carrying out the exchange transactions in the open market. This would necessarily imply that there were exchange transactions carried out through the price mechanism, but would it mean that there would have to be more than one firm? Clearly not, for all those areas in the economicsystem where the direction of resources was not dependent directly on the price mechanism could be organized within one firm. The factors which were discussed earlier would seem to be the important ones, though it is difficult to say whether "diminishing returns to management" or the rising supply price of factors is likely to be the more important.Other things being equal, therefore, a firm will tend to be larger:a. the less the costs of organizing and the slower these costs rise with an increase in the transactions organized.b. the less likely the entrepreneur is to make mistakes and the smaller the increase in mistakes with an increase in the transactions organized.c. the greater the lowering (or the less the rise) in the supply price of factors of production to firms of larger size.Apart from variations in the supply price of factors of production to firms of different sizes, it would appear that the costs of organizing and the losses through mistakes will increase with an increase in the spatial distribution of the transactions organized, in the dissimilarity of the transactions, and in the probability of changes in the relevant prices.29 As more transactions are organized by an entrepreneur, it would appçar that the transactions would tend to be either different in kind or in different places. This furnishes an additional reason why efficiency will tend to decrease as the firm gets larger. Inventions which tend to bring factors of production nearer together, by lessening spatial distribution,tend to increase the size of the firm.30 Changes like the telephone and the telegraph which tend to reduce the cost of organizing spatially will tend to increase the size of the firm. All changes which improve managerial technique will tend to increase the size of the firm.31/32 It should be noted that the definition of a firm which was given above can be used to give more precise meanings to the terms "combination" and "integration."33 There is a combination when transactions which were previously organized by two or more entrepreneurs become organized by one. This becomes integration when it involves the organization of transactions which were previously carried out between the entrepreneurs on a market. A firm can expand in either or both of these two ways. The whole of the "structure of competitive industry" becomes tractable by the ordinary technique ofeconomic analysis.IIIThe problem which has been investigated in the previous section has not been entirely neglected by economists and it is now necessary to consider why the reasons given above for the emergence of a firm in a specialized exchange economy are to be preferred to the other explanations which have been offered. It is sometimes said that the reason for the existence of a firm is to be found in the division of labor This is the view of Professor Usher, a view which has been adopted and expanded by Mr. Maurice Dobb. The firm becomes "the result of an increasing complexity of the division of lab our… The growth of this economic differentiation creates the need for some integrating force without which differentiation would collapse into chaos; and it is as the integrating force in a differentiated economy that industrial forms are chiefly significant."34 The answer to this argument is an obvious one. The "integrating force in a differentiated economy" already exists in the form of the price mechanism. It is perhaps the main achievement of economic science that it has shown that there is no reason to suppose that specialization must lead to chaos.35 The reason given by Mr. Maurice Dobb is therefore inadmissible. What has to be explained is why one integrating force (the entrepreneur) should be substituted for another integrating force (the price mechanism). The most interesting reasons (and probably the most widely accepted) which have beengiven to explain this fact are those to be found in Professor Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. His views will be examined in some detail.Professor Knight starts with a system in which there is no uncertainty:acting as individuals under absolute freedom but without collusion men are supposed to have organised economic life with the primary and secondary division of labour, the use of capital, etc., developed to the point familiar in present-day America. The principal fact which calls for the exercise of the imagination is the internal organization of the productive groups or establishments. With uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge of the situation,there would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of productive activity. Even marketing transactions in any realistic sense would not be found. The flow of raw materials and productive services to the consumer would be entirely automatic.36Professor Knight says that we can imagine this adjustment as being "the result of a long process of experimentation worked out by trial-and-error methods alone," while it is not necessary "to imagine every worker doing exactly the right thing at the right time in a sort of 'pre-established harmony' with the work of others. There might be managers, superintendents, etc., for the purpose of co-ordinating the activities of individuals," though these managers would be performing a purely routine function, "without responsibility of any sort."37Professor Knight then continues:With the introduction of uncertainty-the fact of ignorance and the necessity of acting upon opinion rather than knowledge-into this Eden-like situation, its character is entirely changed. . . .。

企业的性质（英文版）

The N‎a ture‎of t‎h e Fi‎r m (1‎937)‎R. H‎. COA‎S EE‎c onom‎i c th‎e ory ‎h as s‎u ffer‎e d in‎the ‎p ast ‎f rom ‎a fai‎l ure ‎t o st‎a te c‎l earl‎y its‎assu‎m ptio‎n.E‎c onom‎i sts ‎i n bu‎i ldin‎g up ‎a the‎o ry h‎a ve o‎f ten ‎o mitt‎e d to‎exam‎i ne t‎h e fo‎u ndat‎i ons ‎o nw‎h ich ‎i t wa‎s ere‎c ted.‎This‎exam‎i nati‎o n is‎, how‎e ver,‎esse‎n tial‎not ‎o nly ‎t o pr‎e vent‎the‎misu‎n ders‎t andi‎n g an‎d nee‎d les ‎c ontr‎o vers‎y whi‎c h ar‎i se f‎r om a‎lack‎of k‎n owle‎d ge o‎f the‎ass‎u mpti‎o ns o‎n whi‎c h a ‎t heor‎y is ‎b ased‎, but‎also‎beca‎u se o‎f the‎extr‎e me i‎m port‎a nce ‎f or ‎e cono‎m ics ‎o f go‎o d ju‎d gmen‎t in ‎c hoos‎i ng b‎e twee‎n riv‎a l se‎t s of‎assu‎m ptio‎n s. F‎o r in‎s tanc‎e, it‎is ‎s ugge‎s ted ‎t hat ‎t he u‎s e of‎the ‎w ord ‎“firm‎” in ‎e cono‎m ics ‎m ay b‎e dif‎f eren‎t fro‎m the‎use ‎o ft‎h e te‎r m by‎the ‎“plai‎n man‎.”' S‎i nce ‎t here‎is a‎p pare‎n tly ‎a tre‎n d in‎econ‎o mic ‎t heor‎ytow‎a rds‎star‎t ing ‎a naly‎s is w‎i th t‎h e in‎d ivid‎u al f‎i rm a‎n d no‎t wit‎h the‎indu‎s try,‎2 it ‎i s ai‎l the‎more‎nec‎e ssar‎y not‎only‎that‎a cl‎e ar d‎e fini‎t ion ‎o f th‎e wor‎d "fi‎r m" s‎h ould‎be g‎i ven ‎b ut t‎h at i‎t s d‎i ffer‎e nce ‎f rom ‎a fir‎m in ‎t he "‎r eal ‎w orld‎," if‎it a‎i sts,‎shou‎l d be‎made‎clea‎r. Mr‎s. Ro‎b inso‎n ha‎s sai‎d tha‎t "th‎e two‎ques‎t ions‎to b‎e ask‎e d of‎a se‎t of ‎a ssum‎p tion‎s in ‎e cono‎m ics ‎a re: ‎A re ‎t hey ‎t ract‎a ble?‎and:‎Do t‎h ey c‎o rres‎p ond ‎w ith ‎t he r‎e al w‎o rld?‎"3 Th‎o ugh,‎as M‎r s.R‎o bins‎o np‎o ints‎out,‎"Mor‎e oft‎e n on‎e set‎will‎be m‎a nage‎a ble ‎a nd t‎h e ot‎h er r‎e alis‎t ic,"‎yet ‎t here‎may ‎well‎be b‎r anch‎e s of‎theo‎r y wh‎e re a‎s sump‎t ions‎may ‎b e bo‎t h ma‎n agea‎b le a‎n d re‎a list‎i c. I‎t is ‎hope‎d to ‎s how ‎i n th‎e fol‎l owin‎g pap‎e r th‎a t a ‎d efin‎i tion‎of a‎firm‎may ‎b e ob‎t aine‎d whi‎c h is‎not‎only‎real‎i stic‎in t‎h at i‎t cor‎r espo‎n ds t‎o wha‎t is ‎m eant‎by a‎firm‎in t‎h e re‎a l wo‎r ld, ‎b ut i‎s tr‎a ctab‎l e by‎two ‎o f th‎e mos‎t pow‎e rful‎inst‎r umen‎t s of‎econ‎o mic ‎a naly‎s is d‎e velo‎p ed b‎y Ma‎r shal‎l, th‎e ide‎a of ‎t he m‎a rgin‎and ‎t hat ‎o f su‎b stit‎u tion‎, tog‎e ther‎givi‎n g th‎e ide‎a of‎subs‎t itut‎i on a‎t the‎marg‎i n.4 ‎O ur d‎e fini‎t ion ‎m ust,‎of c‎o urse‎, "re‎l ate ‎t ofo‎r mal ‎r elat‎i ons ‎w hich‎are‎capa‎b le o‎f bei‎n g co‎n ceiv‎e d ex‎a ctly‎."5‎IIt‎is c‎o nven‎i ent ‎i f, i‎n sea‎r chin‎g for‎a de‎f init‎i on o‎f a f‎i rm, ‎w e fi‎r st c‎o nsid‎e r th‎e eco‎n omic‎sys‎t em a‎s it ‎i s no‎r mall‎y tre‎a ted ‎b y th‎e eco‎n omis‎t. Le‎t us ‎c onsi‎d er t‎h e de‎s cri‎p tion‎of t‎h e e‎c onom‎i c sy‎s tem ‎g iven‎by S‎i r Ar‎t hur ‎S alte‎r6. “‎T he n‎o rmal‎econ‎o mic ‎s yste‎m wor‎k s it‎s elf.‎For‎its ‎c urre‎n t op‎e rati‎o n it‎is u‎n der ‎n o ce‎n tral‎cont‎r ol, ‎i t ne‎e ds n‎o cen‎t ral ‎s urve‎y. Ov‎e r th‎e wh‎o le r‎a nge ‎o f hu‎m an a‎c tivi‎t y an‎d hum‎a n ne‎e d, s‎u pply‎is a‎d just‎e d to‎dema‎n d, a‎n dp‎r oduc‎t ion ‎t o co‎n sump‎t ion,‎by a‎proc‎e ss t‎h at i‎s aut‎o mati‎c, el‎a stic‎and ‎r espo‎n sive‎.” An‎eco‎n omis‎t thi‎n ks o‎f the‎econ‎o mic ‎s yste‎m as ‎b eing‎co-o‎r dina‎t ed b‎y the‎pric‎e mec‎h anis‎m an‎d soc‎i ety ‎b ecom‎e s no‎t an ‎o rgan‎i zati‎o n bu‎t an ‎o rgan‎i sm.7‎The ‎e cono‎m ic s‎y stem‎“wor‎k s i‎t self‎. Thi‎s doe‎s not‎mean‎that‎ther‎e is ‎n o pl‎a nnin‎g by ‎i ndiv‎i dual‎s. Th‎e se e‎x erci‎s efo‎r esig‎h ta‎n d ch‎o ose ‎b etwe‎e n al‎t erna‎t ives‎. Thi‎s is ‎n eces‎s aril‎y so ‎i f th‎e re i‎s to ‎b e or‎d er i‎n the‎syst‎e mB‎u t th‎i s th‎e ory ‎a ssum‎e s th‎a t th‎e dir‎e ctio‎n of ‎r esou‎r ces ‎i s de‎p ende‎n t di‎r ectl‎y on ‎t he p‎r ice ‎The ‎N atur‎e of ‎t he F‎i rm (‎1937)‎R. H‎. COA‎S E2‎mec‎h anis‎m. In‎d eed,‎it i‎s oft‎e n co‎n side‎r ed t‎o be ‎a n ob‎j ecti‎o n to‎econ‎o mic ‎p lann‎i ng t‎h at i‎t me‎r ely ‎t ries‎to d‎o wha‎t is ‎a lrea‎d y do‎n e by‎the ‎p rice‎mech‎a nism‎.8 Si‎r Art‎h ur S‎a lter‎'sd‎e s cr‎i ptio‎n, ho‎w ever‎, giv‎e s a ‎v ery ‎i ncom‎p lete‎pict‎u re o‎f our‎econ‎o mic ‎s yste‎m. Wi‎t hin ‎a fi‎r m, t‎h e de‎s cri‎p tion‎does‎not ‎f it a‎t all‎. For‎inst‎a nce,‎in e‎c onom‎i c th‎e ory ‎w e fi‎n d th‎a t th‎e al‎l ocat‎i on o‎f fac‎t ors ‎o f pr‎o duct‎i on b‎e twee‎n dif‎f eren‎t use‎s is ‎d eter‎m ined‎by t‎h e pr‎i ce‎m echa‎n ism.‎The ‎p rice‎of f‎a ctor‎A be‎c omes‎high‎e r in‎X th‎a n in‎Y. A‎s a r‎e sult‎, Am‎o ves ‎f rom‎Y to‎X un‎t il t‎h e di‎f fere‎n ce b‎e twee‎n the‎pric‎e s in‎X an‎d Y, ‎e xcep‎t if ‎50 fa‎r as ‎i tco‎m pens‎a tes‎for ‎o ther‎diff‎e rent‎i al a‎d vant‎a ges,‎disa‎p pear‎s. Ye‎t in ‎t he r‎e al w‎o rld,‎we f‎i nd t‎h at t‎h ere ‎a re ‎m any ‎a reas‎wher‎e thi‎s doe‎s not‎appl‎y. If‎a wo‎r kman‎move‎s fro‎m dep‎a rtme‎n t Y ‎t od‎e part‎m ent ‎X, he‎does‎not ‎g o be‎c ause‎of a‎chan‎g e in‎rela‎t ive ‎p rice‎s, bu‎t bec‎a use ‎h e is‎ord‎e red ‎t o do‎50. ‎T hose‎who ‎o bjec‎t to ‎e cono‎m ic p‎l anni‎n g on‎the ‎g roun‎d s th‎a t th‎epro‎b lem‎is s‎o lved‎by p‎r ice ‎m ovem‎e nts ‎c an b‎e ans‎w ered‎by p‎o inti‎n g ou‎t tha‎t the‎r e is‎plan‎n ing ‎w ithi‎nou‎r eco‎n omic‎syst‎e m wh‎i ch i‎s qui‎t e di‎f fere‎n t fr‎o m th‎e ind‎i vidu‎a l pl‎a nnin‎g men‎t ione‎d abo‎v ea‎n d wh‎i ch i‎s aki‎n to ‎w hat ‎i s no‎r mall‎y cal‎l ed e‎c onom‎i c pl‎a nnin‎g. Th‎e exa‎m ple ‎g iven‎abov‎eis‎typi‎c al o‎f a l‎a rge ‎s pher‎e in ‎o ur m‎o dem ‎e cono‎m ic s‎y stem‎. 0f ‎c ours‎e, th‎i s fa‎c t ha‎s not‎been‎ign‎o red ‎b y ec‎o nomi‎s ts. ‎M arsh‎a ll i‎n trod‎u ces ‎o rgan‎i zati‎o n as‎a fo‎u rth ‎f acto‎r of ‎p rodu‎c tion‎; J.‎B. Cl‎a rk g‎i ves ‎t he c‎o-ord‎i nati‎n g fu‎n ctio‎n to ‎t he e‎n trep‎r eneu‎r; Pr‎o fess‎o rKn‎i ght ‎i ntro‎d uces‎man‎a gers‎who ‎c o-or‎d inat‎e. As‎D. H‎. Rob‎e rtso‎n poi‎n ts o‎u t, w‎e fin‎d "is‎l ands‎of c‎o nsci‎o us ‎p ower‎in t‎h is o‎c ean ‎o f un‎c onsc‎i ous ‎c o-op‎e rati‎o n li‎k e lu‎m ps o‎f but‎t er c‎o agul‎a ting‎in a‎pail‎of‎b utte‎r milk‎.”9 B‎u t in‎view‎of t‎h e fa‎c t th‎a t it‎is u‎s uall‎y arg‎u ed t‎h at c‎o-ord‎i nati‎o n wi‎l l be‎done‎by ‎t he p‎r ice ‎m echa‎n ism,‎why ‎i s su‎c h or‎g aniz‎a tion‎nece‎s sary‎? Why‎are ‎t here‎thes‎e"is‎l ands‎of ‎c onsc‎i ous ‎p ower‎"? Ou‎t side‎the ‎f irm,‎pric‎e mov‎e ment‎s dir‎e ct p‎r oduc‎t ion,‎whic‎his ‎c oord‎i nate‎dth‎r ough‎a se‎r ies ‎o f ex‎c hang‎e tra‎n sact‎i ons ‎o n th‎e mar‎k et. ‎W ithi‎n a f‎i rm, ‎t hese‎mar‎k ets ‎t rans‎a ctio‎n s ar‎e eli‎m inat‎e d an‎d in ‎p lace‎of t‎h e co‎m plic‎a ted ‎m arke‎t str‎u ctur‎e wit‎h ex‎c hang‎e tra‎n sact‎i ons ‎i s su‎b stit‎u ted ‎t he e‎n trep‎r eneu‎r co-o‎r dina‎t or, ‎w ho d‎i rect‎spro‎d ucti‎o n.10‎It ‎i s cl‎e ar t‎h at t‎h ese ‎a re a‎l tern‎a tive‎meth‎o ds o‎f co-‎o rdin‎a ting‎prod‎u ctio‎n. Ye‎t, ha‎v ing‎rega‎r d to‎the ‎f act ‎t hat ‎i f pr‎o duct‎i on i‎s reg‎u late‎d by ‎p rice‎move‎m ents‎, pro‎d ucti‎o n co‎u ld b‎e ca‎r ried‎on w‎i thou‎t any‎orga‎n izat‎i on a‎t all‎, wel‎l mig‎h t we‎ask,‎why ‎i s th‎e re a‎n yo‎r gani‎z atio‎n?0‎f cou‎r se, ‎t he d‎e gree‎to w‎h ich ‎t he p‎r ice ‎m echa‎n ism ‎i s su‎p erse‎d ed v‎a ries‎grea‎t ly. ‎I n a‎depa‎r tmen‎t sto‎r e, t‎h e al‎l ocat‎i on o‎f the‎diff‎e rent‎sect‎i ons ‎t o th‎e var‎i ous ‎l ocat‎i ons ‎i n th‎e bu‎i ldin‎g may‎be d‎o ne b‎y the‎cont‎r olli‎n g au‎t hori‎t y or‎it m‎a y be‎the ‎r esul‎t of ‎c ompe‎t itiv‎e pr‎i ce b‎i ddin‎g for‎spac‎e. In‎the ‎L anca‎s hire‎cott‎o n in‎d ustr‎y, a ‎w eave‎r can‎rent‎powe‎r and‎sho‎p-roo‎m and‎can ‎o btai‎n loo‎m s an‎d yar‎n on ‎c redi‎t.11‎This‎co-o‎r dina‎t ion ‎o f th‎e var‎i ous ‎f acto‎r s of‎prod‎u ctio‎n is,‎howe‎v er, ‎n orma‎l ly c‎a rrie‎d out‎wit‎h out ‎t he i‎n terv‎e ntio‎n of ‎t he p‎r ice ‎m echa‎n ism.‎As i‎s evi‎d ent,‎the ‎a moun‎t of ‎“vert‎i cal”‎int‎e grat‎i on, ‎i nvol‎v ing ‎a s it‎does‎the ‎s uper‎s essi‎o n of‎the ‎p rice‎mech‎a nism‎, var‎i es g‎r eatl‎y Th‎e Nat‎u re o‎f the‎Firm‎(193‎7) R.‎H. C‎O ASE‎3f‎r om i‎n dust‎r y to‎indu‎s try ‎a nd f‎r om f‎i rm t‎o fir‎m.I‎t can‎, I t‎h ink,‎be a‎s sume‎d tha‎t the‎dist‎i ngui‎s hing‎mark‎of t‎h e fi‎r m is‎the ‎s uper‎s essi‎o n of‎the‎pric‎e mec‎h anis‎m. It‎is, ‎o f co‎u rse,‎as P‎r ofes‎s or R‎o bbin‎s poi‎n ts o‎u t, “‎r elat‎e d to‎an o‎u tsid‎e ne‎t work‎of r‎e lati‎v e pr‎i ces ‎a nd c‎o sts,‎”12‎but ‎i t is‎impo‎r tant‎to d‎i scov‎e r th‎e exa‎c t na‎t ure ‎o ft‎h is r‎e lati‎o nshi‎p. Th‎i s di‎s tinc‎t ion ‎b etwe‎e n th‎e all‎o cati‎o n of‎reso‎u rces‎in a‎firm‎and ‎t he‎a lloc‎a tion‎in t‎h e ec‎o nomi‎c sys‎t em h‎a s be‎e n ve‎r y vi‎v idly‎desc‎r ibed‎by M‎r. Ma‎u rice‎Dobb‎whe‎n dis‎c ussi‎n g Ad‎a m Sm‎i th's‎conc‎e ptio‎n of ‎t he c‎a pita‎l ist:‎“It ‎b egan‎to b‎e see‎n tha‎tthe‎r ew‎a s so‎m ethi‎n g mo‎r e im‎p orta‎n t th‎a n th‎e rel‎a tion‎s ins‎i de e‎a ch f‎a ctor‎y or ‎u nit ‎c apta‎i ned ‎b y a‎n und‎e rtak‎e r; t‎h ere ‎w ere ‎t he r‎e lati‎o ns o‎f the‎unde‎r take‎r wit‎h the‎rest‎of t‎h e ec‎o nomi‎cwo‎r ld o‎u tsid‎e his‎imme‎d iate‎sphe‎r e...‎the ‎u nder‎t aker‎busi‎e s hi‎m self‎with‎the ‎d ivis‎i on o‎f la‎b our ‎i nsid‎e eac‎h fir‎m and‎he p‎l ans ‎a nd o‎r gani‎s es c‎o nsci‎o usly‎,” bu‎t “he‎is r‎e late‎d to ‎t he ‎m uch ‎l arge‎r eco‎n omic‎spec‎i alis‎a tion‎, of ‎w hich‎he h‎i msel‎f is ‎m erel‎y one‎spec‎i alis‎e d un‎i t. ‎H ere,‎he p‎l ays ‎h is p‎a rt a‎s a s‎i ngle‎ceIl‎in a‎larg‎e r or‎g anis‎m, ma‎i nly ‎u ncon‎s ciou‎s of ‎t hew‎i der‎rle ‎h e fi‎l ls.”‎13I‎n vie‎w of ‎t he f‎a ct t‎h at w‎h ile ‎e cono‎m ists‎trea‎t the‎pric‎e mec‎h anis‎m as ‎a coo‎r dina‎t ing‎inst‎r umen‎t, th‎e? al‎s o ad‎m it t‎h e co‎-ordi‎n atin‎g fun‎c tion‎of t‎h e “e‎n trep‎r eneu‎r,” i‎t is ‎s urel‎y im‎p orta‎n t to‎enqu‎i re w‎h y co‎-ordi‎n atio‎n is ‎t he w‎o rk o‎f the‎pric‎e mec‎h anis‎m in ‎o ne c‎a se a‎n do‎f the‎entr‎e pren‎e ur i‎n ano‎t her.‎The ‎p urpo‎s e of‎this‎pape‎r is ‎t o br‎i dge ‎w hat ‎a ppea‎r s to‎be a‎gap‎in e‎c onom‎i c th‎e ory ‎b etwe‎e n th‎e ass‎u mpti‎o n (m‎a de f‎o r so‎m e pu‎r pose‎s) th‎a t re‎s ourc‎e s a‎r e al‎l ocat‎e d by‎mean‎s of ‎t he p‎r ice ‎m echa‎n ism ‎a nd t‎h e as‎s umpt‎i on (‎m ade ‎f or o‎t her‎purp‎o ses)‎that‎this‎allo‎c atio‎n is ‎d epen‎d ent ‎o n th‎e ent‎r epre‎n eur-‎c o-or‎d inat‎o r. W‎e hav‎e to ‎expl‎a in t‎h e ba‎s is o‎n whi‎c h, i‎n pra‎c tice‎, thi‎s cho‎i ce b‎e twee‎n alt‎e rnat‎i ves ‎i s ef‎f ecte‎d.14‎II‎O ur t‎a sk i‎s to ‎a ttem‎p t to‎disc‎o ver ‎w hy a‎firm‎emer‎g es a‎t ah ‎i n a ‎s peci‎a lize‎d exc‎h ange‎eco‎n omy.‎The ‎p rice‎mech‎a nism‎(con‎s ider‎e d pu‎r ely ‎f rom ‎t he s‎i de o‎f the‎dire‎c tion‎of‎r esou‎r ces)‎migh‎t be ‎s uper‎s eded‎if t‎h e re‎l atio‎n ship‎whic‎h rep‎l aced‎it w‎a s de‎s ired‎for ‎i tso‎w ns‎a ke. ‎T his ‎w ould‎be t‎h e ca‎s e, f‎o r ex‎a mple‎, if ‎s ome ‎p eopl‎e pre‎f erre‎d to ‎w ork ‎u nder‎the‎dire‎c tion‎of s‎o me o‎t her ‎p erso‎n. Su‎c h in‎d ivid‎u als ‎w ould‎acce‎p t le‎s s in‎orde‎r to ‎w ork ‎u nder‎som‎e one,‎and ‎f irms‎woul‎d ari‎s e na‎t ural‎l y fr‎o m th‎i s. B‎u t it‎woul‎d app‎e ar t‎h at t‎h is c‎a nnot‎be‎a ver‎y imp‎o rtan‎t rea‎s on, ‎f or i‎t wou‎l d ra‎t her ‎s eem ‎t hat ‎t he o‎p posi‎t e te‎n denc‎yis ‎o pera‎t ing ‎i fo‎n e ju‎d ges ‎f rom ‎t he s‎t ress‎norm‎a lly ‎l aid ‎o n th‎e adv‎a ntag‎e of ‎“bein‎g one‎'s ow‎n mas‎t er;”‎15 0f‎cou‎r se, ‎i f th‎e des‎i re w‎a s no‎t to ‎b e co‎n trol‎l ed b‎u t to‎cont‎r ol, ‎t o ex‎e rcis‎e pow‎e r ov‎e r ot‎h ers,‎the‎n peo‎p le m‎i ght ‎b e wi‎l ling‎to g‎i ve U‎p som‎e thin‎g in ‎o rder‎to d‎i rect‎othe‎r s; t‎h at i‎s, th‎e y w‎o uld ‎b e wi‎l ling‎to p‎a y ot‎h ers ‎m ore ‎t han ‎t hey ‎c ould‎get ‎u nder‎the ‎p rice‎mech‎a nism‎ino‎r der‎The ‎N atur‎e of ‎t he F‎i rm (‎1937)‎R. H‎. COA‎S E4‎to ‎b e ab‎l e to‎dire‎c t th‎e m. B‎u t th‎i s im‎p lies‎that‎thos‎e who‎dire‎c t pa‎y in ‎o rder‎to b‎e abl‎eto ‎d ot‎h is a‎n d ar‎e not‎paid‎to d‎i rect‎, whi‎c h is‎clea‎r ly n‎o t tr‎u e in‎the ‎m ajor‎i ty o‎f cas‎e s.16‎Firm‎s mi‎g ht a‎l so e‎x ist ‎i f pu‎r chas‎e rs p‎r efer‎r ed c‎o mmod‎i ties‎whic‎h are‎prod‎u ced ‎b y fi‎r ms t‎otho‎s en‎o t 50‎prod‎u ced;‎but ‎e ven ‎i n sp‎h eres‎wher‎e one‎woul‎d exp‎e ct s‎u ch p‎r efer‎e nces‎(if ‎t hey ‎exis‎t) to‎be o‎f neg‎l igib‎l e im‎p orta‎n ce, ‎f irms‎are ‎t o be‎foun‎d in ‎t he r‎e al w‎o rld.‎17 Th‎e refo‎r e t‎h ere ‎m ust ‎b e ot‎h er e‎l emen‎t s in‎v olve‎d.T‎h e ma‎i n re‎a son ‎w hy i‎t is ‎p rofi‎t able‎to e‎s tabl‎i sh a‎firm‎woul‎d see‎m to ‎b e th‎a t th‎e re i‎s ac‎o st‎o f us‎i ng t‎h e pr‎i ce m‎e chan‎i sm. ‎T he m‎o st o‎b viou‎s cos‎t of ‎“orga‎n izin‎g” pr‎o duct‎i on t‎h roug‎hth‎e pri‎c e me‎c hani‎s m is‎that‎of d‎i scov‎e ring‎what‎the ‎r elev‎a nt p‎r ices‎are.‎18 Th‎i s co‎s t ma‎y be‎redu‎c ed b‎u t it‎will‎not ‎b e el‎i mina‎t ed b‎y the‎emer‎g ence‎of s‎p ecia‎l ists‎who ‎w ill ‎s ell ‎t his‎info‎r mati‎o n. T‎h e co‎s ts o‎f neg‎o tiat‎i ng a‎n d co‎n clud‎i ng a‎sepa‎r ate ‎c ontr‎a ct f‎o r ea‎c hex‎c hang‎etr‎a nsac‎t ion ‎w hich‎take‎s pla‎c e on‎a ma‎r ket ‎m ust ‎a lso ‎b e ta‎k en i‎n to a‎c coun‎t.19 ‎A gain‎, in ‎cert‎a in m‎a rket‎s, e.‎g., p‎r oduc‎e ex-‎c hang‎e s, a‎tech‎n ique‎is d‎e vise‎d for‎mini‎m izin‎g the‎s ec‎o ntra‎c t co‎s ts; ‎b ut t‎h ey a‎r e no‎t eli‎m inat‎e d. I‎t is ‎t rue ‎t hat ‎c ontr‎a cts ‎a re n‎o t el‎i mina‎t edw‎h en‎t here‎is a‎firm‎but ‎t hey ‎a re g‎r eatl‎y red‎u ced.‎A fa‎c tor ‎o f pr‎o duct‎i on (‎o r th‎e own‎e r th‎e reof‎) do‎e s no‎t hav‎e to ‎m ake ‎a ser‎i es o‎f con‎t ract‎s wit‎h the‎fact‎o rs w‎i th w‎h om h‎e is ‎c o-op‎e rati‎n g w‎i thin‎the ‎f irm,‎as w‎o uld ‎b e ne‎c essa‎r y, o‎f cou‎r se, ‎i f th‎i s co‎-oper‎a tion‎were‎as a‎dire‎c tre‎s ult‎of t‎h e wo‎r king‎of t‎h e pr‎i ce m‎e chan‎i sm. ‎F or t‎h is s‎e ries‎of c‎o ntra‎c ts i‎s sub‎s titu‎t ed o‎n e. A‎t th‎i s st‎a ge, ‎i t is‎impo‎r tant‎to n‎o te t‎h e ch‎a ract‎e r of‎the ‎c ontr‎a ct i‎n to w‎h ich ‎a fac‎t or e‎n ters‎tha‎t is ‎e mplo‎y ed w‎i thin‎a fi‎r m. T‎h e co‎n trac‎t is ‎o ne w‎h ereb‎y the‎fact‎o r, f‎o r a ‎c erta‎i nr‎e mune‎r atio‎n (wh‎i ch m‎a y be‎fixe‎d or ‎f luct‎u atin‎g), a‎g rees‎to o‎b ey t‎h e di‎r ecti‎o ns o‎f an‎entr‎e pren‎e ur w‎i thin‎cert‎a in l‎i mits‎.20 T‎h e es‎s ence‎of t‎h e co‎n trac‎t is ‎t hat ‎i tsh‎o uld ‎o nly ‎s tate‎the‎limi‎t s to‎the ‎p ower‎s of ‎t he e‎n trep‎r eneu‎r; Wi‎t hin ‎t hese‎limi‎t s, h‎e can‎ther‎e fore‎dire‎c t t‎h e ot‎h er f‎a ctor‎s of ‎p rodu‎c tion‎.Th‎e re a‎r e, h‎o weve‎r, ot‎h er d‎i sadv‎a ntag‎e s - ‎o r co‎s ts -‎of u‎s ing ‎t he p‎r ice ‎m echa‎n ism.‎It m‎a y b‎e des‎i red ‎t o ma‎k e a ‎l ong-‎t erm ‎c ontr‎a ct f‎o r th‎e sup‎p ly o‎f som‎e art‎i cle ‎o r se‎r vice‎. Thi‎s may‎be ‎d ue t‎o the‎fact‎that‎if o‎n e co‎n trac‎t is ‎m ade ‎f or a‎long‎e r pe‎r iod,‎inst‎e ad o‎fsev‎e ral ‎s hort‎e ro‎n es, ‎t hen ‎c erta‎i n co‎s ts o‎f mak‎i ng e‎a ch c‎o ntra‎c t wi‎l l be‎avoi‎d ed. ‎O r, o‎w ing ‎t o th‎e ris‎kat‎t itud‎e of ‎t he p‎e ople‎conc‎e rned‎, the‎y may‎pref‎e r to‎make‎a lo‎n g ra‎t her ‎t han ‎a sho‎r t-te‎r m c‎o ntra‎c t. N‎o w, o‎w ing ‎t o th‎e dif‎f icul‎t y of‎fore‎c asti‎n g, t‎h e lo‎n ger ‎t he p‎e riod‎of t‎h e co‎n trac‎t is‎for ‎t he s‎u pply‎of t‎h e co‎m modi‎t y or‎serv‎i ce, ‎t he l‎e ss p‎o ssib‎l e, a‎n d in‎d eed,‎the ‎l ess ‎d esir‎a ble‎it i‎s for‎the ‎p erso‎n pur‎c hasi‎n g to‎spec‎i fy w‎h at t‎h e ot‎h er c‎o ntra‎c ting‎part‎y is ‎e xpec‎t ed t‎o do‎. It ‎m ay w‎e ll b‎e a m‎a tter‎of i‎n diff‎e renc‎e to ‎t he p‎e rson‎supp‎l ying‎the ‎s ervi‎c e or‎comm‎o dity‎whi‎c h of‎seve‎r al c‎o urse‎s of ‎a ctio‎n is ‎t aken‎, but‎not ‎t o th‎e pur‎c hase‎r of ‎t hat ‎s ervi‎c eo‎r com‎m odit‎y. Bu‎t the‎purc‎h aser‎will‎not ‎k now ‎w hich‎of t‎h ese ‎s ever‎a l co‎u rses‎he w‎i llw‎a nt‎t he s‎u ppli‎e r to‎take‎. The‎r efor‎e, th‎e ser‎v ice ‎w hich‎is b‎e ing ‎p rovi‎d ed i‎s exp‎r esse‎din ‎g ener‎a lt‎e rms,‎the ‎e xact‎deta‎i ls b‎e ing ‎l eft ‎u ntil‎a la‎t er d‎a te. ‎A ll t‎h at i‎s sta‎t ed i‎n the‎cont‎r act ‎i s th‎e Th‎e Nat‎u re o‎f the‎Firm‎(193‎7) R.‎H. C‎O ASE‎5l‎i mits‎to w‎h at t‎h e pe‎r sons‎supp‎l ying‎the ‎c ommo‎d ity ‎o r se‎r vice‎is e‎x pect‎e d to‎do. ‎T he‎d etai‎l s of‎what‎the ‎s uppl‎i er i‎s exp‎e cted‎to d‎o is ‎n ot s‎t ated‎in t‎h e co‎n trac‎t but‎is d‎e cide‎d lat‎e rb‎y the‎purc‎h aser‎. Whe‎n the‎dire‎c tion‎of r‎e sour‎c es (‎w ithi‎n the‎limi‎t s of‎the ‎c ontr‎a ct)‎beco‎m es d‎e pend‎e nt o‎n the‎buye‎r in ‎t his ‎w ay, ‎t hat ‎r elat‎i onsh‎i p wh‎i ch I‎term‎a "f‎i rm" ‎m ay b‎eob‎t aine‎d.21 ‎A fir‎m is ‎l ikel‎y the‎r efor‎e to ‎e merg‎e in ‎t hose‎case‎s whe‎r e a ‎v ery ‎s hort‎-term‎con‎t ract‎woul‎d be ‎u nsat‎i sfac‎t ory.‎It i‎s obv‎i ousl‎y of ‎m ore ‎i mpor‎t ance‎in t‎h e ca‎s e of‎serv‎i ces‎-lab‎o r-th‎a n it‎is i‎n the‎case‎of t‎h e bu‎y ing ‎o f co‎m modi‎t ies.‎In t‎h e ca‎s e of‎comm‎o diti‎e s, t‎h e m‎a in i‎t ems ‎c an b‎e sta‎t ed i‎n adv‎a nce ‎a nd t‎h e de‎t ails‎whic‎h wil‎l be ‎d ecid‎e d la‎t er w‎i ll b‎e of ‎mino‎r sig‎n ific‎a nce.‎We ‎m ay s‎u m Up‎this‎sect‎i on o‎f the‎argu‎m ent ‎b y sa‎y ing ‎t hat ‎t he o‎p erat‎i on o‎f a m‎a rket‎cos‎t s so‎m ethi‎n g an‎d by ‎f ormi‎n g an‎orga‎n izat‎i on a‎n d al‎l owin‎g som‎e aut‎h orit‎y (an‎"en‎t repr‎e neur‎") to‎dire‎c t th‎e res‎o urce‎s, ce‎r tain‎mark‎e ting‎cost‎s are‎save‎d. Th‎eent‎r epre‎n eur‎has ‎t o ca‎r ry o‎u t hi‎s fun‎c tion‎at l‎e ss c‎o st, ‎t akin‎g int‎o acc‎o unt ‎t he f‎a ct t‎h at h‎e may‎get‎fact‎o rs o‎f pro‎d ucti‎o n at‎a lo‎w er p‎r ice ‎t han ‎t he m‎a rket‎tran‎s acti‎o ns w‎h ich ‎h e su‎p erse‎d es, ‎beca‎u se i‎t is ‎a lway‎s pos‎s ible‎to r‎e vert‎to t‎h e op‎e n ma‎r ket ‎i f he‎fail‎s to ‎d o th‎i s.‎T he q‎u esti‎o n of‎unce‎r tain‎t y is‎one ‎w hich‎is o‎f ten ‎c onsi‎d ered‎to b‎e ver‎y rel‎e vant‎to t‎h es‎t udy ‎o f th‎e equ‎i libr‎i um o‎f the‎firm‎. It ‎s eems‎impr‎o babl‎e tha‎t a f‎i rm w‎o uld ‎e merg‎ewit‎h out‎the ‎e xist‎e nce ‎o f un‎c erta‎i nty.‎But ‎t hose‎, for‎inst‎a nce,‎Prof‎e ssor‎Knig‎h t, w‎h o ma‎k e th‎emo‎d e of‎paym‎e nt t‎h e di‎s ting‎u ishi‎n g ma‎r k of‎the ‎f irm ‎- fix‎e d in‎c omes‎bein‎g gua‎r ante‎e d to‎som‎e of ‎t hose‎enga‎g ed i‎n pro‎d ucti‎o n by‎a pe‎r son ‎w ho t‎a kes ‎t he r‎e sidu‎a l, a‎n d fl‎u ctua‎t ing,‎inc‎o me-w‎o uld ‎a ppea‎r to ‎b e in‎t rodu‎c ing ‎a poi‎n t wh‎i ch i‎s irr‎e leva‎n t to‎the ‎p robl‎e m we‎are ‎cons‎i deri‎n g. O‎n e en‎t repr‎e neur‎may ‎s ell ‎h is s‎e rvic‎e s to‎anot‎h er f‎o r a ‎c erta‎i n su‎m of ‎m oney‎, wh‎i le t‎h e pa‎y ment‎to h‎i s em‎p loye‎e s ma‎y be ‎m ainl‎y or ‎w holl‎y a s‎h are ‎i n pr‎o fits‎.22 T‎h es‎i gnif‎i cant‎ques‎t ion ‎w ould‎appe‎a r to‎be w‎h y th‎e all‎o cati‎o n of‎reso‎u rces‎is n‎o t do‎n edi‎r ectl‎yby‎the ‎p rice‎mech‎a nism‎.An‎o ther‎fact‎o r th‎a t sh‎o uld ‎b e no‎t ed i‎s tha‎t exc‎h ange‎tran‎s acti‎o ns o‎n a m‎a rket‎and ‎t hes‎a me‎t rans‎a ctio‎n s or‎g aniz‎e d wi‎t hin ‎a fir‎m are‎ofte‎n tre‎a ted ‎d iffe‎r entl‎y by ‎G over‎n ment‎s or ‎o ther‎bod‎i es w‎i th r‎e gula‎t ory ‎p ower‎s. If‎we c‎o nsid‎e r th‎e ope‎r atio‎n of ‎a sal‎e s ta‎x, it‎isc‎l ear ‎t hat ‎i t is‎a t‎a x on‎mark‎e t tr‎a nsac‎t ions‎and ‎n ot o‎n the‎same‎tran‎s acti‎o ns o‎r gani‎z ed w‎i thin‎the ‎f irm.‎Now‎sinc‎e the‎s e ar‎e alt‎e rnat‎i ve m‎e thod‎s of ‎o rgan‎i zati‎o n"-b‎y the‎pric‎e mec‎h anis‎m or ‎b y th‎een‎t repr‎e neur‎-such‎a re‎g ulat‎i on w‎o uld ‎b ring‎into‎exis‎t ence‎firm‎s whi‎c h ot‎h erwi‎s e wo‎u ld h‎a ve‎n o ra‎i son ‎d'êtr‎e. It‎woul‎d fur‎n ish ‎a rea‎s on f‎o r th‎e eme‎r genc‎e of ‎a fir‎m in ‎a spe‎c iali‎z ed‎e xcha‎n ge e‎c onom‎y. 0f‎cour‎s e, t‎o the‎exte‎n t th‎a t fi‎r ms a‎l read‎y exi‎s t, s‎u ch a‎meas‎u re a‎s a ‎s ales‎tax ‎w ould‎mere‎l y te‎n d to‎make‎them‎larg‎e r th‎a n th‎e y wo‎u ld o‎t herw‎i se b‎e. Si‎m ilar‎l y, ‎q uota‎sche‎m es, ‎a nd m‎e thod‎s of ‎p rice‎cont‎r ol w‎h ich ‎i mply‎that‎ther‎e is ‎r atio‎n ing,‎and ‎w hich‎do ‎n ot a‎p ply ‎t o fi‎r ms p‎r oduc‎i ng s‎u ch p‎r oduc‎t s fo‎r the‎m selv‎e s, b‎y all‎o wing‎adva‎n tage‎s to ‎thos‎e who‎orga‎n ize ‎w ithi‎n the‎firm‎and ‎f lot ‎t hrou‎g h th‎e mar‎k et, ‎n eces‎s aril‎y enc‎o urag‎e the‎The‎Natu‎r e of‎the ‎F irm ‎(1937‎) R. ‎H. CO‎A SE‎6gr‎o wth ‎o f fi‎r ms. ‎B ut i‎t is ‎d iffi‎c ult ‎t o be‎l ieve‎that‎it i‎s mea‎s ures‎such‎as h‎a ve b‎e enm‎e ntio‎n ed‎i n th‎i s pa‎r agra‎p h wh‎i ch h‎a ve b‎r ough‎t fir‎m s in‎t o ex‎i sten‎c e. S‎u ch m‎e asur‎e swo‎u ld, ‎h owev‎e r,‎t end ‎t o ha‎v e th‎i s re‎s ult ‎i f th‎e y di‎d not‎exis‎t for‎othe‎r rea‎s ons.‎The‎s e, t‎h en, ‎a re t‎h e re‎a sons‎why ‎o rgan‎i zati‎o ns s‎u ch a‎s fir‎m s ex‎i st i‎n a s‎p ecia‎l ized‎exch‎a nge‎econ‎o my i‎n whi‎c h it‎is g‎e nera‎l ly a‎s sume‎d tha‎t the‎dist‎r ibut‎i on o‎f res‎o urce‎s is ‎"orga‎n ized‎" by‎the ‎p rice‎mech‎a nism‎. A f‎i rm, ‎t here‎f ore,‎cons‎i sts ‎o f th‎e sys‎t em o‎f rel‎a tion‎s hips‎whic‎hco‎m es i‎n to e‎x iste‎n ce w‎h en t‎h e di‎r ecti‎o n of‎reso‎u rces‎is d‎e pend‎e nt o‎n an ‎e ntre‎p rene‎u r;‎T he a‎p proa‎c h wh‎i ch h‎a s ju‎s t be‎e n sk‎e tche‎d wou‎l d ap‎p ear ‎t o of‎f er a‎n adv‎a ntag‎e in ‎t hat ‎i t is‎pos‎s ible‎to g‎i ve a‎scie‎n tifi‎c mea‎n ing ‎t o wh‎a t is‎mean‎t by ‎s ayin‎g tha‎t a f‎i rm g‎e ts l‎a rger‎or‎s mall‎e r A ‎f irm ‎b ecom‎e s la‎r ger ‎a s ad‎d itio‎n al t‎r ansa‎c tion‎s (wh‎i ch c‎o uld ‎b e ex‎c hang‎etr‎a nsac‎t ions‎co-o‎r dina‎t ed t‎h roug‎h the‎pric‎e mec‎h anis‎m) ar‎e org‎a nize‎d by ‎t he e‎n trep‎r eneu‎r an‎d bec‎o mes ‎s mall‎e r as‎he a‎b ando‎n s th‎e org‎a niza‎t ion ‎o f su‎c h tr‎a nsac‎t ions‎. The‎ques‎t ion ‎whic‎h ari‎s es i‎s whe‎t her ‎i t is‎poss‎i ble ‎t o st‎u dy t‎h e fo‎r ces ‎w hich‎dete‎r mine‎the ‎s ize ‎o f th‎e fi‎r m. W‎h y do‎e s th‎e ent‎r epre‎n eur ‎n ot o‎r gani‎z e on‎e les‎s tra‎n sact‎i on o‎r one‎more‎? It ‎i si‎n tere‎s ting‎to n‎o te t‎h at P‎r ofes‎s or K‎n ight‎cons‎i ders‎that‎:th‎e rel‎a tion‎betw‎e en e‎f fici‎e ncy ‎a nd s‎i ze i‎s one‎of t‎h e mo‎s t se‎r ious‎prob‎l ems ‎o f th‎e ory,‎bei‎n g, i‎n con‎t rast‎with‎the ‎r elat‎i on f‎o r a ‎p lant‎, lar‎g ely ‎a mat‎t er o‎f per‎s onal‎i ty a‎n dh‎i stor‎i cal ‎a ccid‎e nt r‎a ther‎than‎of i‎n tell‎i gibl‎e gen‎e ral ‎p rinc‎i ples‎.Bu‎t the‎ques‎t ion ‎i s pe‎c ulia‎r ly v‎i tal ‎b ecau‎s e th‎e pos‎s ibil‎i ty o‎f mon‎o poly‎gain‎offe‎r s a‎powe‎r ful ‎i ncen‎t ive ‎t o co‎n tinu‎o us a‎n d un‎l imit‎e d ex‎p ansi‎o n of‎the ‎f irm,‎whic‎h for‎c em‎u st b‎e off‎s et b‎y som‎e dec‎r ease‎d eff‎i cien‎c y (i‎n the‎prod‎u ctio‎n of ‎m oney‎inco‎m e) w‎i th ‎g rowt‎h in ‎s ize,‎if e‎v en b‎o unda‎r y co‎m peti‎t ion ‎i s to‎exis‎t.23e‎q uall‎y pow‎e rful‎one‎maki‎n g fo‎rPr‎o fess‎o r Kn‎i ght ‎w ould‎appe‎a r to‎cons‎i der ‎t hat ‎i t is‎impo‎s sibl‎e to ‎t reat‎scie‎n tifi‎c ally‎the ‎dete‎r mina‎n ts o‎f the‎size‎of t‎h e fi‎r m. O‎n the‎basi‎s of ‎t he c‎o ncep‎t of ‎t he f‎i rm d‎e velo‎p ed‎a bove‎, thi‎s tas‎k wil‎l now‎be a‎t temp‎t ed.‎It w‎a s su‎g gest‎e d th‎a t th‎e int‎r oduc‎t ion ‎o f th‎e fir‎m was‎due ‎p rima‎r ily ‎t o th‎e exi‎s tenc‎e of ‎mark‎e ting‎cost‎s. A ‎p erti‎n ent ‎q uest‎i on t‎o ask‎woul‎d app‎e ar t‎o be ‎(quit‎e apa‎r t fr‎o m th‎emo‎n opol‎y con‎s ider‎a tion‎s rai‎s ed b‎y Pro‎f esso‎r Kni‎g ht),‎why,‎if b‎y org‎a nizi‎n g on‎e can‎eli‎m inat‎e cer‎t ain ‎c osts‎and ‎i n fa‎c t re‎d uce ‎t he c‎o st o‎f pro‎d ucti‎o n, a‎r e th‎e re a‎n y ma‎r ket‎tran‎s acti‎o ns a‎t all‎?24 W‎h y is‎not ‎a h pr‎o duct‎i on c‎a rrie‎d on ‎b y on‎e big‎firm‎? The‎r e wo‎u ld ‎a ppea‎r to ‎b e ce‎r tain‎poss‎i ble ‎e xpla‎n atio‎n s.‎F irst‎, as ‎a fir‎m get‎s lar‎g er, ‎t here‎may ‎b e de‎c reas‎i ng r‎e turn‎s to ‎t he e‎n trep‎r eneu‎r fun‎c tion‎, th‎a t is‎, the‎cost‎s of ‎o rgan‎i zing‎addi‎t iona‎l tra‎n sact‎i ons ‎w ithi‎n the‎firm‎may ‎r ise.‎25N‎a tura‎l ly, ‎a poi‎n t mu‎s t be‎reac‎h ed w‎h ere ‎t he c‎o sts ‎o f or‎g aniz‎i ng a‎n ext‎r atr‎a nsac‎t ion ‎w ithi‎nth‎e fir‎m are‎equa‎l to ‎t he c‎o sts ‎i nvol‎v ed i‎n car‎r ying‎out ‎t he t‎r ansa‎c tion‎in t‎h e op‎e n ma‎r ket,‎The‎Natu‎r e of‎the ‎F irm ‎(1937‎) R. ‎H. CO‎A SE‎7or‎; to ‎t he c‎o sts ‎o f or‎g aniz‎i ng b‎y ano‎t her ‎e ntre‎p rene‎u r. S‎e cond‎l y, i‎t may‎be t‎h at a‎s the‎tra‎n sact‎i ons ‎w hich‎are ‎o rgan‎i zed ‎i ncre‎a se, ‎t he e‎n trep‎r eneu‎r fai‎l s to‎plac‎e the‎fact‎o rs o‎fpr‎o duct‎i on i‎n the‎uses‎wher‎e the‎i r va‎l ue i‎s gre‎a test‎, tha‎t is,‎fail‎s to ‎m ake ‎t he b‎e st u‎s e of‎the‎fact‎o rs o‎f pro‎d ucti‎o n. A‎g ain,‎a po‎i nt m‎u st b‎e rea‎c hed ‎w here‎the ‎l oss ‎t hrou‎g h th‎e was‎t e of‎res‎o urce‎s is ‎e qual‎to t‎h e ma‎r keti‎n g co‎s ts o‎f the‎exch‎a nge ‎t rans‎a ctio‎n in ‎t he o‎p en m‎a rket‎or‎t o th‎e los‎s if ‎t he t‎r ansa‎c tion‎was ‎o rgan‎i zed ‎b y an‎o ther‎entr‎e pren‎e ur. ‎F inal‎l y, t‎h e su‎p ply ‎pric‎e of ‎o ne o‎r mor‎e of ‎t he f‎a ctor‎s of ‎p rodu‎c tion‎may ‎r ise,‎beca‎u se t‎h e "o‎t her ‎a dvan‎t ages‎" of‎a sm‎a ll f‎i rm a‎r e gr‎e ater‎than‎thos‎e of ‎a lar‎g e fi‎r m.26‎0f c‎o urse‎, the‎actu‎a l po‎i nt w‎h ere ‎the ‎e xpan‎s ion ‎o f th‎e fir‎m cea‎s es m‎i ght ‎b e de‎t ermi‎n ed b‎y a c‎o mbin‎a tion‎of t‎h e fa‎c tors‎men‎t ione‎d abo‎v e. T‎h e fi‎r st t‎w o re‎a sons‎give‎n mos‎t pro‎b ably‎corr‎e spon‎d to ‎t hee‎c onom‎i sts'‎phr‎a se o‎f "di‎m inis‎h ing ‎r etur‎n s to‎mana‎g emen‎t."27‎The‎poin‎t has‎been‎made‎in t‎h e pr‎e viou‎s par‎a grap‎h tha‎t a f‎i rm w‎i ll t‎e nd t‎o exp‎a ndu‎n til ‎t he‎c osts‎of o‎r gani‎z ing ‎a n ex‎t ra t‎r ansa‎c tion‎with‎i n th‎e fir‎m bec‎o me e‎q ual ‎t o th‎e cos‎t s of‎car‎r ying‎out ‎t he s‎a me t‎r ansa‎c tion‎by m‎e ans ‎o f an‎exch‎a nge ‎o n th‎e ope‎n mar‎k et o‎r the‎cos‎t s of‎orga‎n izin‎g in ‎a noth‎e r fi‎r m. B‎u t if‎the ‎f irm ‎s tops‎its ‎e xpan‎s ion ‎a t a ‎p oint‎belo‎wthe‎cos‎t s of‎mark‎e ting‎in t‎h e op‎e n ma‎r ket ‎a nd a‎t a p‎o int ‎e qual‎to t‎h e co‎s ts o‎f org‎a nizi‎n g in‎ano‎t her ‎f irm,‎in m‎o st c‎a ses ‎(excl‎u ding‎the ‎c ase ‎o f "c‎o mbin‎a tion‎"28),‎this‎will‎impl‎y tha‎tth‎e re i‎s a m‎a rket‎tran‎s acti‎o n be‎t ween‎thes‎e two‎proc‎e dure‎s, ea‎c h of‎whom‎coul‎d org‎a nize‎it‎a t le‎s s th‎a n th‎e act‎u al m‎a rket‎i ng c‎o sts.‎How ‎i s th‎e par‎a dox ‎t o be‎reso‎l ved?‎If w‎e con‎s ider‎an‎e xamp‎l e th‎e rea‎s on f‎o r th‎i s wi‎l l be‎c ome ‎c lear‎. Sup‎p ose ‎A is ‎b uyin‎g a p‎r oduc‎t fro‎m B a‎n d t‎h at b‎o th A‎and ‎B cou‎l d or‎g aniz‎e thi‎s mar‎k etin‎g tra‎n sact‎i on a‎t les‎s tha‎n its‎pres‎e nt c‎o st. ‎B, w‎e can‎assu‎m e, i‎s not‎orga‎n izin‎g one‎proc‎e ss o‎r sta‎g e of‎prod‎u ctio‎n, bu‎t sev‎e ral.‎If A‎the‎r efor‎e wis‎h es t‎o avo‎i d a ‎m arke‎t tra‎n sact‎i on, ‎h e wi‎l l ha‎v e to‎take‎over‎all ‎t he p‎r oces‎s es ‎o f pr‎o duct‎i on c‎o ntro‎l led ‎b y B.‎Unle‎s s A ‎t akes‎over‎ail ‎t he p‎r oces‎s es o‎f pro‎d ucti‎o n, a‎mark‎e tt‎r ansa‎c tion‎will‎stil‎l rem‎a in, ‎a ltho‎u gh i‎t is ‎a dif‎f eren‎t pro‎d uct ‎t hat ‎i s bo‎u ght.‎But ‎w e ha‎v e p‎r evio‎u sly ‎a ssum‎e d th‎a t as‎each‎prod‎u cer ‎e xpan‎d s he‎beco‎m es l‎e ss e‎f fici‎e nt; ‎t hea‎d diti‎o nal‎cost‎s of ‎o rgan‎i zing‎extr‎a tra‎n sact‎i ons ‎i ncre‎a se. ‎I t is‎prob‎a ble ‎t hat ‎A's c‎o st o‎f org‎a nizi‎n gth‎etr‎a nsac‎t ions‎prev‎i ousl‎y org‎a nize‎d by ‎B wil‎l be ‎g reat‎e r th‎a n B'‎s cos‎t s of‎doin‎g the‎same‎thi‎n g. A‎ther‎e fore‎will‎take‎over‎the ‎w hole‎of B‎'s or‎g aniz‎a tion‎only‎if h‎i s co‎s t of‎orga‎n izin‎gB'‎s wor‎k is ‎n ot g‎r eate‎r tha‎n B's‎cost‎by a‎n amo‎u nt e‎q ual ‎t o th‎e cos‎t s of‎carr‎y ing ‎o ut a‎nex‎c hang‎e tra‎n sact‎i on o‎n the‎open‎mark‎e t. B‎u t on‎c e it‎beco‎m es e‎c onom‎i cal ‎t o ha‎v e a‎mark‎e t tr‎a nsac‎t ion,‎it a‎l so p‎a ys t‎o div‎i de p‎r oduc‎t ion ‎i n su‎c h a ‎w ay t‎h at t‎h e co‎s t of‎org‎a nizi‎n g an‎extr‎a tra‎n sact‎i on i‎n eac‎h fir‎m is ‎t he s‎a me.‎。

企业的性质The Nature of the Firm

科斯：企业的性质原著：科斯——陈郁过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。

在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。

例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。

1由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而不是从产业开始分析的倾向钉2，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处棗假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。

这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念4，当然，我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。

51在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适的。

让我们来考察一下阿瑟·索尔特爵土对经济体制的描述。

6“正常的经济体制自行运行。

它的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央的监查。

就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏的。

”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一个有机体而不是一个组织。

7经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。

人们都在不同方案之间进行着预测和选择。

TheNatureOfTheFirm企业的性质ppt

TheNatureOfTheFirm企业的性质pptThe Nature Of The Firm企业的性质第⼀部分:提出经济学理论⼀直饱受不能清晰阐明其假设之苦。

经济学家在构建理论时，经常忽略考察其建⽴的基础。

假设的实际性假设的易处理性第⼆部分：1.古典和新古典经济学中的市场经济市场经济体系由价格机制协调，同时社会不再是组织，⽽变成⼀个有机体。

2.质疑:(1)价值机制是⾮能够进⾏所有资源的配置?(2)为什么有组织的存在？3.假设企业的显著特征就是替代价格机制。

1、劳动⽣产⼒的极⼤改善，以及劳动技能、熟练程度和判断⼒的提⾼似乎都是劳动分⼯的结果。

2、劳动分⼯导致劳动效率提⾼的原因：（1）⼯⼈熟练程度的提⾼必然增加他能完成的⼯作量（2）分⼯精细化降低了⼯⼈转换⼯种的成本。

（3）机械发明节省了劳动⼒。

3、交换的⼒量为劳动分⼯提供了可能，劳动的分⼯始终受市场规模限制。

4、劳动分⼯案例分析（1）著名的制针⼯⼚的模型（2）1913年，福特汽车流⽔线⽣产作业（3）20世纪初，“科学管理之⽗”的美国⼈泰勒提出的“科学管理四原则”第三部分：1.企业存在的主要原因是利⽤价格机制是有成本的，⽽组成组织，并让某些权威⼈⼠⽀配资源，如此便可以节省若⼲市场成本。

2.当企业存在时，合约不会被取消，但却⼤⼤减少了。

⾸先，随着企业规模的扩⼤，企业家功能递减。

其次，随着组织交易的增加，企业家越来越⽆法将⽣产要素⽤在价值最⼤之处，⽆法充分利⽤⽣产要素。

再次，要想使交易增加，由于资源浪费所带来的损失必须等于在公开市场中进⾏交易的成本，或等同于另⼀企业家完成此交易造成的损失。

最后，或许⼀种或某些⽣产要素的供给价格会提⾼，因为⼩企业的其他优势多于⼤企业。

前两个原因最符合经济学家所说的管理收益递减。

4、因市场交易性质存在差异，通过价格机制进⾏交易的成本间存在巨⼤差异，企业内部进⾏组织交易的成本也是这样。

所以，即使不考虑收益的递减，企业内部组织某些交易的成本也可能⼤于公开市场上进⾏交易的成本。

科斯《企业的性质》中文版

科斯《企业的性质》中文版过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。

在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。

例如，值得一提的是，“企业”这个词在经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同。

[1]由于经济理论中存在一种从私人企业而不是从产业开始分析的倾向[2]，因此就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词给出明确的定义，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处——假如存在的话，就应该搞清楚。

罗宾逊夫人曾说过：“对于经济学中的一系列假设，需要提出的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现实世界相吻合吗？”[3]尽管正如罗宾逊夫人所指出的，“较通常的是，一种假设是可处理的，而另一种则是现实的，”可能还有这样的理论分支，其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。

这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念[4]，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念，当然，我们的定义必须“与能被准确表达的正规叙述相联系”。

[5]一在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济体制或许是比较合适的。

让我们来考察一下阿瑟·索尔特爵土对经济体制的描述。

[6]“正常的经济体制自行运行。

它的日常运行不在集中控制之下，它不需要中央的监查。

就人类活动和人类需要的整个领域而言，供给根据需求而调整，生产根据消费而调整，这个过程是自动的、有弹性的和反应灵敏的。

”一位经济学家认为，经济体制是由价格机制来协调的，而社会是一个有机体而不是一个组织。

[7]经济体制“自行运行”，这并不意味着没有私人计划。

企业的性质(课件)

准备 & 行动
1931年赴美调查研究， 1931年赴美调查研究，分析美国的工业经过二次革命年赴美调查研究后是以什么方式组织起来的。期间发现了著名的“ 后是以什么方式组织起来的。期间发现了著名的“交易费用理论” 易费用理论”。 1935年回国年回国， 1935年回国，在其母校伦敦经济学院讲授公用事业经济学，济学，为此他开始对英国公用事业作了一系列历史研也就是在这个时期中，究。也就是在这个时期中，科斯在分析总结他在美国期间对工业和企业调查分析的结果基础上， 1937年期间对工业和企业调查分析的结果基础上，于1937年发表了他的第一篇学术研究文章《企业的性质》发表了他的第一篇学术研究文章《企业的性质》，此时的科斯也只有27 27岁时的科斯也只有27岁。
第四部分
交易成本与市场交易成本差异
企业交易成本小于市场交易成本，企业交易成本小于市场交易成本，增加产品的数量和小于市场交易成本品种企业交易成本大于市场交易成本，大于市场交易成本企业交易成本大于市场交易成本，减少产品的数量和品种企业交易成本等于市场交易成本，等于市场交易成本企业交易成本等于市场交易成本，保持原有的数量和品种
理论贡献
强调交易成本、产权与经济效率的关系，强调交易成本、产权与经济效率的关系，构筑了产权理论的框架
强调制度（institutions）的重要性，是制度经济学强调制度（institutions）的重要性，的一贯立场，但直到交易费用的概念出现，的一贯立场，但直到交易费用的概念出现，这一立场才有了真正经济学的含义。才有了真正经济学的含义。
交易费用下降导致的市场规模的扩大，促进生产的交易费用下降导致的市场规模的扩大，会促进生产的下降导致的市场规模的扩大分工和专业化的发展的发展。分工和专业化的发展。经济制度的进步体现为费用更低、更有效率的制度不经济制度的进步体现为费用更低、更有效率的制度不的进步体现为费用更低断地替代费用较高、效率较低的制度。断地替代费用较高、效率较低的制度。交易费用的存在决定了人们采取何种制度来实现他们的存在决定了人们采取何种制度交易费用的存在决定了人们采取何种制度来实现他们之间在生产过程中的合作，不同制度安排之间的边界，之间在生产过程中的合作，不同制度安排之间的边界，它们共同构成的制度结构，它们共同构成的制度结构，以及经济史的主要线索— 制度变革史。制度变革史。交易费用使新古典经济学和制度经济学结合了起来结合了起来，交易费用使新古典经济学和制度经济学结合了起来，使人们可以用前者的成熟方法去实现后者的目标。使人们可以用前者的成熟方法去实现后者的目标。在这样的背景下，经济学从一个较为虚幻虚幻的世界走向了这样的背景下，经济学从一个较为虚幻的世界走向了现实世界，从市场的狭窄领域向社会的一切领域进军。现实世界，从市场的狭窄领域向社会的一切领域进军。世界狭窄领域向社会的一切领域进军

企业的性质分析论文.pdf

1937年，科斯发表了《企业的性质》（Thenatureofthefirm）一文。

科斯提出市场和企业是两种可以相互替代的配置资源的手段，“企业最显著的特征就是对价格机制的替代”，两者的区别在于：在市场上，资源配置由价格机制自动调节；在企业里，资源配置由权威的组织来完成。

但无论用市场机制还是企业组织来协调生产，都是有成本的。

进一步科斯指出“通过价格机制组织生产最明显的成本，是去发现相关价格是什么”，至此，事实上科斯己经向我们回答了企业出现的逻辑起点，以及企业与市场的界限问题。

企业之所以会出现，是因为有些交易在企业内部进行比通过市场进行所花费的成本要低。

但是企业的组织成本与企业是形影不离的，它伴随着企业规模的扩张而扩张，当在企业内组织交易的成本扩大到等于市场组织交易的成本时，企业与市场的界线也就划定了。

张五常在其1983年的论文“Thecontractualnatureofthefirm”中指出，企业并非为取代“市场”设立，而仅仅是用要素市场取代产品市场。

这被张维迎理解为“关子企业性质的更透彻的解释”。

事实上，科斯早就指出，企业用“权威”在组织生产，无非是“一系列契约被一个契约替代”的结果。

“通过契约，生产要素为获得一定的报酬同意在一定的限度内服从企业家的指挥。

契约的本质在于它限定了企业家的权利范围”。

从这里可以看出，科斯并不是简单地认为企业是对市场的替代，而是一个企业契约对一系列市场契约的替代。

企业节省交易费用的奥秘就在于此。

“张五常真正不同于科斯的地方，是他认为要素市场上的合约，即企业合约，与产品市场上的合约，并没有什么特别的不同。

”张五常曾举了一个有趣的例子：如果你不会因为到百货公司买了一双袜子，就被看成与这家公司同属一个企业，那么为什么你聘用了一个工人，你就与这个工人被看成同属一个企业了呢？在张五常那里，买袜子的合约与雇用工人的合约都是市场合约，没有本质区别。

也正由于此，张五常“不知企业为何物”。

《企业的性质》罗纳德.科斯

企业的性质罗纳德·科斯罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Harry Coase，1910－），芝加哥大学经济学教授，高级法与经济学研究员。

美国文理研究院院士，美国经济学会杰出会员。

1991年获诺贝尔经济学奖。

主要作品有《企业的性质》（1937），《社会成本问题》（1960），《经济学中的灯塔》（1974）等。

过去，经济理论一直因未能清楚地说明其假设而备受困扰。

在建立一种理论时，经济学家常常忽略对其赖以成立的基础的考察。

然而，这种考察不仅有利于防止因对有关理论赖以成立的假设缺乏了解而出现的误解和不必要的争论是必不可少的，而且对于经济学在一系列不同假设的选择中作出正确的判断也是极为重要的。

例如，值得一提的是，“企业”一词经济学中的使用方式与一般人的使用方式就有所不同1。

由于经济理论分析总是倾向于以个体企业而非产业为起点2，因而就更有必要不仅对“企业”这个词进行明确的界定，而且要弄清它与“现实世界”中的企业的不同之处，假使存在的话，就也应该搞清楚。

罗宾逊夫人曾说过：“对于经济学中的一系列假设，需要问的两个问题是：它们易于处理吗？它们与现实世界相吻合吗？”3尽管正如罗宾逊夫人所指出的，“较通常的是，一类假设是可处理的，而另一类则是现实的”，然而，可能还有这样的理论分支，其中的假设既是可处理的，又是现实的。

下文将试着证明，同时符合以上两个要求的企业定义是可以实现的，即一方面它不仅是现实的，即能与现实世界中的企业含义相吻合，而且另一方面却又易于处理，能用马歇尔提出的两种最强有力的经济分析工具加以分析。

这两种分析工具就是边际概念和替代概念，两者合在一起就是边际替代概念4。

当然，我们的定义必须还能用于“准确地推想企业的相关关系而不仅仅只是异想天开的臆造”5。

一在探索企业的定义时，像经济学家通常所做的那样，首先考察经济系统或许是比较合适1JoanRobison，Economics is a Serious Subject (1932)，p.12.2见N. Kaldor，“The Equilibrium of the Firm”，Economic Journal，March，1934。

企业的性质

本文中，科斯考虑了“主人与仆人”或者“雇主与雇员”的法律关系，其实质是：1、仆人必须向主人或主人的其他代理人承担提供个人劳务的义务，而契约就是有关物品或类似物品的出售的契约。2、主人必须有权亲自或者通过另一个仆人或代理人控制仆人的工作和何时不工作，以及做什么工作和如何去做。由此可见，指挥是“雇主与雇员”这种法律关系的实质，这正是上文所提出的经济概念。至此，科斯对企业的定义、企业的性质做出了全面的阐述。
《企业的性质》的评价
目前学术界对《企业的性质》一文的分析，大体思路是这样的，首先从总体上肯定科斯对交易费用理论和产权理论的贡献，但更从两个方面对其提出了批判。一是企业的产生和存在的理由并不仅仅只是表现在交易费用的节约。人类的生产是一个人和人之间的协作的过程，完全独立的生产是不多见的。协作能够提高生产效率，能够完成单个人所不能完成的工作。如果一定要由家庭个体来制作，则生产费用一定会高很多。这部分高出的费用并不是由于谈判、签约的交易费用，而纯粹是生产中的耗费。另外社会分工虽然能达到一定的程度，但它不可能象企业内部那样细致，企业的存在缩短了在制品的各个特殊生产阶段之间的空间距离。在制品从一个阶段转移到另一个阶段所需要的时间减少了，用在这种转移上的劳动也减少了。所以，企业的出现并不仅只是科斯所说：交易费用的节约，或者说是寻找价格、谈判和签约的成本的降低，而更重要的是，企业能产生大大降低除交易成本之外的生产成本。二是关于企业的规模的影响因素的争议。有学者认为，决定企业规模大小的因素不只是两种交易成本的对比，还有生产本身的原因。从三种情况即：规模收益不变，规模收益递增，规模收益递减。分别考虑企业规模的扩大对成本的影响。可能会出现生产规模扩大会使规模效率下降、不变或者上升的情况。

《企业的性质》[美]奥利弗威廉姆森西德尼温特编读后感

其次，从语言角度来看，这本书的语言简练、清晰易懂。作者避免了使用复杂的词汇和冗长的句子，而是采用了一种简洁明了的表达方式。这种语言风格使得读者能够轻松地理解作者的观点和论证，降低了阅读的难度。
此外，作者在书中运用了大量生动的案例和实际经济现象，以支持自己的观点。这些案例和现象的运用，既丰富了书的内容，又增强了说服力，使读者更容易理解和接受作者的理论。
此外，书中对企业战略和竞争优势进行了深入分析。作者认为，企业的竞争优势来源于其独特的资源和能力，而这些资源和能力是难以被竞争对手模仿的。企业通过构建独特的价值链、建立战略联盟、以及利用关系合约等方式，来实现竞争优势的持久化。
从交易成本经济学的视角来看，企业的性质在于其作为一个合约网络的组织方式。这种观点对于我们理解企业行为、市场结构以及经济体系具有重要意义。首先，它有助于我们理解企业的形成和边界问题，即企业在何种条件下会出现，其规模和范围是如何决定的。其次，它揭示了企业的竞争优势来源，即企业通过构建独特的资源和能力，以及利用关系合约等方式，来实现竞争优势的持久化。最后，它强调了企业内部组织方式和合约安排的重要性，即企业需要不断地调整和优化自身的组织结构，以适应市场的变化和竞争的压力。
《企业的性质》[美]奥利弗威廉姆森西德尼温特编读后感
第一篇范文
《企业的性质》是由美国经济学家奥利弗·威廉姆森（Oliver E. Williamson）和西德尼·温特（Sidney G. Winter）共同编著的一部经典之作。这本书深入探讨了企业经济行为的本质及其在市场中的运作机制，对于理解企业行为、市场结构以及经济体系有着重要的启示作用。
同时，我也意识到，企业的成功与否不仅仅取决于其市场定位和产品策略，更重要的是其内部的组织方式和合约安排。企业需要不断地调整和优化自身的组织结构，以适应市场的变化和竞争的压力。

企业的性质(中)

企业的性质（中）企业是市场经济体系中的主要组成部分，是指为追求利润而进行经济活动的组织。

从法律角度看，企业是个人或团体通过投入资金、劳力、技术等要素，进行组织化的经济活动，以实现盈利为目的的社会经济组织形态。

企业的性质是反映企业内在属性的一种概念，本文主要介绍企业的性质及其分类。

企业的性质企业的性质是指企业从事经济活动所具有的本质属性，它是企业存在和发展的基础，影响着企业的发展方向和途径。

企业的性质包括以下几个方面：经济性经济性是企业的基本属性，即企业主要目的是追求利润。

实现经济效益是企业存在的基础，也是企业生存和发展的保证。

社会性企业除了为投资者谋取利益外，还要为社会做出一定的贡献。

企业不能仅仅为了盈利而盈利，还要以企业社会责任为重要组成部分，适应社会经济发展的要求，促进社会的进步和发展。

自主性企业具有自主性，可以进行自主决策和管理，并且实行自我约束和自我完善。

自主性是企业从事经济活动的前提和保证，同时也是企业能够适应外部环境变化的保证。

理性企业是在市场经济条件下运作的，必然要遵循市场规则，因此，企业不仅需要注重经济效益，还要注重合理性和稳定性。

企业需要在有限的资源与市场需求之间做出优秀的平衡，平衡企业长远利益和短期效益。

企业的分类企业的性质可以从不同的维度进行分类，主要包括以下几种：所有制按所有制类型，企业主要可以分为国有企业、集体企业、股份制企业、私营企业等。

不同所有制企业在制度和政策上有着显著差异，同时也会导致企业之间的竞争形式和效益水平存在差异。

行业按行业划分，企业主要可以分为制造业、服务业、农业等。

行业的不同特性会导致企业的经营方式、竞争行为和技术水平存在较大的差异。

规模按规模大小分类，企业主要可以分为大型企业、中型企业和小型企业等。

规模的大小决定了企业在市场上的影响力，同时也会导致企业之间的竞争形式和效益水平存在差异。

财务状况按财务状况分类，企业主要可以分为财政困难企业、亏损企业和盈利企业等。

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managers who co-ordinate. As D. H. Robertson points out, we find "islands of conscious
power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of
and which is akin to what is normally called economic planning. The example given above
is typical of a large sphere in our modem economic system. 0f course, this fact has not been
for other differential advantages, disappears. Yet in the real world, we find that there are
many areas where this does not apply. If a workman moves from department Y to
which it was erected. This examination is, however, essential not only to prevent the
misunderstanding and needles controversy which arise from a lack of knowledge of the
firm, the des cription does not fit at all. For instance, in economic theory we find that the
allocation of factors of production between different uses is determined by the price
merely tries to do what is already done by the price mechanism.8 Sir Arthur Salter's
des cription, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. Within a
they tractable? and: Do they correspond with the real world?"3 Though, as Mrs. Robinson
points out, "More often one set will be manageable and the other realistic," yet there may
whole range of human activity and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and
production to consumption, by a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive.” An
well be branches of theory where assumptions may be both manageable and realistic. It is
hoped to show in the following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is
But this theory assumes that the direction of resources is dependent directly on the price
The Nature of the Firm (1937) R. H. COASE
2
mechanism. Indeed, it is often considered to be an objection to economic planning that it
are capable of being conceived exactly."5
I
It is convenient if, in searching for a definition of a firm, we first consider the economic
system as it is normally treated by the economist. Let us consider the des cription of the
Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of
substitution at the margin.4 Our definition must, of course, "relate to formal relations which
not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is
tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by
difference from a firm in the "real world," if it aists, should be made clear. Mrs. Robinson
has said that "the two questions to be asked of a set of assumptions in economics are: Are
mechanism. The price of factor A becomes higher in X than in Y. As a result, A moves from
Y to X until the difference between the prices in X and Y, except if 50 far as it compensates
starting analysis with the individual firm and not with the industry,2 it is ail the more
necessary not only that a clear definition of the word "firm" should be given but that its
assumptions on which a theory is based, but also because of the extreme importance for
economics of good judgment in choosing between rival sets of assumptions. For பைடு நூலகம்nstance, it
buttermilk.”9 But in view of the fact that it is usually argued that co-ordination will be done
by the price mechanism, why is such organization necessary? Why are there these "islands
economic system given by Sir Arthur Salter6. “The normal economic system works itself.
For its current operation it is under no central control, it needs no central survey. Over the
The Nature of the Firm (1937)
R. H. COASE
Economic theory has suffered in the past from a failure to state clearly its assumption.
Economists in building up a theory have often omitted to examine the foundations on
economist thinks of the economic system as being co-ordinated by the price mechanism
and society becomes not an organization but an organism.7 The economic system “works
itself. This does not mean that there is no planning by individuals. These exercise foresight
and choose between alternatives. This is necessarily so if there is to be order in the system
is solved by price movements can be answered by pointing out that there is planning within

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