有关资本市场研究的若干英文文献(1)
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献在研究中小企业融资问题时，寻找相关的英文文献是获取国际经验和最佳实践的重要途径。
以下是一些值得参考的英文文献，涵盖了中小企业融资的理论背景、现状分析、政策建议以及案例研究等方面。
“Financing Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: A Global Perspective”, by P.K. Agarwal, A.K. Dixit, and J.C. Garmaise. This book provides an comprehensive overview of the issues and challenges related to financing small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) around the world. It presents an analytical framework for understanding the different dimensions of SME financing and outlines best practices and policy recommendations for improving access to finance for these businesses.“The Financing of SMEs: A Review of the Literature and Empirical Evidence”, by R. E. Cull, L. P. Ciccantelli, and J. Valentin. This paper provides a comprehensive literature review on the financing challenges faced by SMEs, exploring the various factors that influence their access to finance,including information asymmetries, lack of collateral, and limited access to formal financial markets. The paper also presents empirical evidence on the impact of different financing strategies on SME performance and outlines policy recommendations for addressing these challenges.“The Role of Microfinance in SME Finance: A Review of the Literature”, by S. Hossain, M.A. Iftekhar, and N. Choudhury. This paper focuses on the role of microfinance in financing SMEs and explores the advantages and disadvantages of microfinance as a financing option for SMEs. It also outlines the potential for microfinance to play a greater role in supporting SME development in emerging markets and provides policy recommendations for achieving this objective.“The Political Economy of SME Finance: Evidence fromCross-Country Data”, by D.J. Mullen and J.R. Roberts. This paper examines the political economy of SME finance, exploring the relationship between government policies, market institutions, and SME financing constraints. Usingcross-country data, the paper finds evidence that government policies can have a significant impact on SME access to finance and that countries with better market institutions are more successful in supporting SME development. The paper provides policy recommendations for improving SME financing in different political and institutional settings.“Financing SMEs in Developing Countries: A Case Study of India”, by S. Bhattacharya, S. Ghosh, and R. Panda. This case study explores the financing challenges faced by SMEs in India and identifies the factors that limit their access to finance, including government policies, market institutions, and cultural traditions. It also presents an in-depth analysis of the various financing options available to SMEs in India, such as informal credit markets, microfinance institutions, and banks, and outlines policy recommendations for enhancing access to finance for these businesses.这些文献提供了对中小企业融资问题的多维度理解，并提供了实用的政策建议和案例研究，有助于更好地解决中小企业的融资需求。
资本信息披露外文文献
资本信息披露外文文献
根据您的要求，以下是一些关于资本信息披露的外文文献，供
参考。
1. 弗吉尼亚州立大学的研究报告：《企业的资本信息披露对投
资者的影响》。
该研究探讨了企业在资本信息披露方面的实践与效果，以及对投资者的影响。
报告提供了一些例证和建议，帮助理解
和改进资本信息披露的作用。
2. International Journal of Accounting的研究论文：《公司治理、资本信息披露和股价敏感性之间的关系》。
该论文研究了公司治理、资本信息披露和股价敏感性之间的关系，并探讨了如何通过加强资
本信息披露来提高公司治理和股价的表现。
3. 伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳-香槟分校的学位论文：《美国公司的
资本信息披露规定和实践》。
该论文回顾了美国公司的资本信息披
露规定和实践，并分析了这些规定和实践对公司绩效和投资者保护
的影响。
请注意，以上文献的引用仅供参考，具体内容可能因版权、准确性或其他因素而有所变化。
建议您直接查阅相关文献以获取更详细和准确的信息。
希望以上信息对您有所帮助。
如有任何进一步的问题，请随时向我咨询。
资本结构英文参考文献
Evaluating A Company's Capital StructureFor stock investors that favor companies with good fundamentals, a "strong" balance sheet is an important consideration for investing in a company's stock. The strength of a company' balance sheet can be evaluated by three broad categories of investment-quality measurements: working capital adequacy, asset performance and capital structure. In this article, we'll look at evaluating balance sheet strength based on the composition of a company's capital structure..A company's capitalization (not to be confused with market capitalization) describes the composition of a company's permanent or long-term capital, which consists of a combination of debt and equity. A healthy proportion of equity capital, as opposed to debt capital, in a company's capital structure is an indication of financial fitness.Clarifying Capital Structure Related TerminologyThe equity part of the debt-equity relationship is the easiest to define. In a company's capital structure, equity consists of a company's common and preferred stock plus retained earnings, which are summed up in the shareholders' equity account on a balance sheet. This invested capital and debt, generally of the long-term variety, comprises a company's capitalization, i.e. a permanent type of funding to support a company's growth and related assets.A discussion of debt is less straightforward. Investment literature often equates a company's debt with its liabilities. Investors should understand that there is a difference between operational and debt liabilities - it is the latter that forms the debt component of a company's capitalization - but that's not the end of the debt story.Among financial analysts and investment research services, there is no universal agreement as to what constitutes a debt liability. For many analysts, the debt component in a company's capitalization is simply a balance sheet's long-term debt. This definition is too simplistic. Investors should stick to a stricter interpretation of debt where the debt component of a company's capitalization should consist of the following: short-term borrowings (notes payable), the current portion of long-termdebt, long-term debt, two-thirds (rule of thumb) of the principal amount of operating leases and redeemable preferred stock. Using a comprehensive total debt figure is a prudent analytical tool for stock investors.It's worth noting here that both international and U.S. financial accounting standards boards are proposing rule changes that would treat operating leases and pension "projected-benefits" as balance sheet liabilities. The new proposed rules certainly alert investors to the true nature of these off-balance sheet obligations that have all the earmarks of debt. (To read more on liabilities, see Off-Balance-Sheet Entities: The Good, The Bad And The Ugly and Uncovering Hidden Debt.) Is there an optimal debt-equity relationship?In financial terms, debt is a good example of the proverbial two-edged sword. Astute use of leverage (debt) increases the amount of financial resources available to a company for growth and expansion. The assumption is that management can earn more on borrowed funds than it pays in interest expense and fees on these funds. However, as successful as this formula may seem, it does require that a company maintain a solid record of complying with its various borrowing commitments. (For more stories on company debt loads, see When Companies Borrow Money, Spotting Disaster and Don't Get Burned by the Burn Rate.)A company considered too highly leveraged (too much debt versus equity) may find its freedom of action restricted by its creditors and/or may have its profitability hurt as a result of paying high interest costs. Of course, the worst-case scenario would be having trouble meeting operating and debt liabilities during periods of adverse economic conditions. Lastly, a company in a highly competitive business, if hobbled by high debt, may find its competitors taking advantage of its problems to grab more market share.Unfortunately, there is no magic proportion of debt that a company can take on. The debt-equity relationship varies according to industries involved, a company's line of business and its stage of development. However, because investors are better off putting their money into companies with strong balance sheets, common sense tells us that these companies should have, generally speaking, lower debt and higher equitylevels.Capital Ratios and IndicatorsIn general, analysts use three different ratios to assess the financial strength of a company's capitalization structure. The first two, the so-called debt and debt/equity ratios, are popular measurements; however, it's the capitalization ratio that delivers the key insights to evaluating a company's capital position.The debt ratio compares total liabilities to total assets. Obviously, more of the former means less equity and, therefore, indicates a more leveraged position. The problem with this measurement is that it is too broad in scope, which, as a consequence, gives equal weight to operational and debt liabilities. The same criticism can be applied to the debt/equity ratio, which compares total liabilities to total shareholders' equity. Current and non-current operational liabilities, particularly the latter, represent obligations that will be with the company forever. Also, unlike debt, there are no fixed payments of principal or interest attached to operational liabilities.The capitalization ratio (total debt/total capitalization) compares the debt component of a company's capital structure (the sum of obligations categorized as debt + total shareholders' equity) to the equity component. Expressed as a percentage, a low number is indicative of a healthy equity cushion, which is always more desirable than a high percentage of debt. (To continue reading about ratios, see Debt Reckoning.)Additional Evaluative Debt-Equity ConsiderationsCompanies in an aggressive acquisition mode can rack up a large amount of purchased goodwill in their balance sheets. Investors need to be alert to the impact of intangibles on the equity component of a company's capitalization. A material amount of intangible assets need to be considered carefully for its potential negative effect as a deduction (or impairment) of equity, which, as a consequence, will adversely affect the capitalization ratio. (For more insight, read Can You Count On Goodwill? and The Hidden Value Of Intangibles.)Funded debt is the technical term applied to the portion of a company's long-termdebt that is made up of bonds and other similar long-term, fixed-maturity types of borrowings. No matter how problematic a company's financial condition may be, the holders of these obligations cannot demand payment as long the company pays the interest on its funded debt. In contrast, bank debt is usually subject to acceleration clauses and/or covenants that allow the lender to call its loan. From the investor's perspective, the greater the percentage of funded debt to total debt disclosed in the debt note in the notes to financial statements, the better. Funded debt gives a company more wiggle room. (To read more on financial statement footnotes, see Footnotes: Start Reading The Fine Print.)Lastly, credit ratings are formal risk evaluations by credit-rating agencies - Moody's, Standard & Poor's, Duff & Phelps and Fitch –of a company's ability to repay principal and interest on debt obligations, principally bonds and commercial paper. Here again, this information should appear in the footnotes. Obviously, investors should be glad to see high-quality rankings on the debt of companies they are considering as investment opportunities and be wary of the reverse.ConclusionA company's reasonable, proportional use of debt and equity to support its assets is a key indicator of balance sheet strength. A healthy capital structure that reflects a low level of debt and a corresponding high level of equity is a very positive sign of investment quality.To continue learning about financial statements, read What You Need To Know About Financial Statements and Advanced Financial Statement Analysis.。
国际金融市场参考文献
国际金融市场参考文献引言：国际金融市场作为全球经济体系的重要组成部分，在全球化和经济发展的背景下，发挥着日益重要的作用。
为了更好地理解和分析国际金融市场，研究者们广泛运用了各种研究方法和理论框架。
本文将就国际金融市场的参考文献进行探讨，以帮助读者更好地了解和研究这一领域。
一、经典文献：1. Robert C. Merton (1973) - "The Theory of Rational Option Pricing"本文被公认为是金融衍生品定价理论的奠基之作，对金融市场的研究产生了深远的影响。
通过对期权定价的理论研究，Merton提出了一种基于风险中性概率的期权定价模型，为金融市场的理论研究和实践应用提供了重要的理论基础。
2. Eugene F. Fama (1970) - "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work"本文系统地回顾了关于有效资本市场理论的研究成果，提出了信息效率市场假说。
该假说认为，在有效市场中，资产的价格会反映所有可获取的信息，投资者无法通过分析已有信息来获得超额利润。
这一假说对金融市场的理论研究和实践应用产生了重要的影响。
二、实证研究文献：1. John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo, and Craig MacKinlay (1997) - "The Econometrics of Financial Markets"该书综合了金融市场中的实证研究成果，包括股票、债券和外汇市场等。
通过运用计量经济学的方法，作者们对金融市场的波动性、收益率预测和市场效率等问题进行了深入研究，为金融市场的实证分析提供了重要的参考。
2. Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny (1997) - "The Limits of Arbitrage"该文研究了市场的套利机会是否会被有效利用，以及套利行为对市场效率的影响。
国外有关资本结构的文献综述
国外有关资本结构的文献综述以下是一些国外关于资本结构的文献综述：1. Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment. The American economic review, 48(3), 261-297.这篇经典的文献提出了“Modigliani-Miller定理”，论证了资本结构对公司价值的影响，并认为公司的价值不受资本结构的影响。
2. Myers, S. C. (1984). The capital structure puzzle. The Journal of finance, 39(3), 575-592.这篇文章提出了“资本结构之谜”，探讨了为什么不同公司的资本结构存在差异，并提出了相关的理论解释。
3. Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What do we know about capital structure? Some evidence from international data. The journal of finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.这篇文章通过国际数据的分析，探讨了不同国家和行业的公司资本结构的差异，并提出了一些相关的解释和结论。
4. Frank, M. Z., & Goyal, V. K. (2009). Capital structure decisions: Which factors are reliably important? Financial Management, 38(1), 1-37.这篇文章综述了过去的研究，讨论了影响公司资本结构决策的各种因素，并提出了一些可靠的结论。
5. Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2001). The theory and practice of corporate finance: Evidence from the field. Journal of financial economics, 60(2-3), 187-243.这篇文章通过对大量实证研究的综述，总结了公司资本结构的理论和实践，并提出了一些建议和结论。
关于经济的外文文献
关于经济的外文文献1."Capital in the Twenty-First Century" by Thomas Piketty（《21世纪的资本》 - 托马斯·皮凯蒂）2."Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything" by Steven D.Levitt and Stephen J.Dubner （《怪诞经济学：一个叛逆经济学家揭示一切的隐藏面》 - 史蒂文·D·列维特和斯蒂芬·J·邓纳）3."The Wealth of Nations" by Adam Smith（《国富论》 - 亚当·斯密）4."Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness" by Richard H.Thaler and Cass R.Sunstein （《推动力：关于健康、财富和幸福的决策改进》 - 理查德·H·塞勒和卡斯·R·桑斯坦）5."Thinking, Fast and Slow" by Daniel Kahneman（《思考，快与慢》 - 丹尼尔·卡尼曼）6."The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time" by Karl Polanyi（《伟大转型：我们时代的政治与经济起源》 - 卡尔·波兰尼）7."The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle" by Joseph A.Schumpeter（《经济发展理论：对利润、资本、信用、利息和商业周期的探究》 - 约瑟夫·A·熊彼特）8."The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time" by Jeffrey D.Sachs（《贫困的终结：我们时代的经济可能性》 - 杰弗里·D·萨克斯）9."Development as Freedom" by Amartya Sen（《自由发展》 - 阿马蒂亚·森）。
资本结构中英文对照外文翻译文献
中英文对照外文翻译(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)The effect of capital structure on profitability : an empirical analysis of listed firms in Ghana IntroductionThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on a firm’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. The capital structure of a firm is actually a mix of different securities. In general, a firm can choose among many alternative capital structures. It can issue a large amount of debt or very little debt. It can arrange lease financing, use warrants, issue convertible bonds, sign forward contracts or trade bond swaps. It can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations; however, it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes its overall market value.A number of theories have been advanced in explaining the capital structure of firms. Despite the theoretical appeal of capital structure, researchers in financial management have not found the optimal capital structure. The best that academics and practitioners have been able to achieve are prescriptions that satisfy short-term goals. For example, the lack of a consensus about what would qualify as optimal capital structure has necessitated the need for this research. A better understanding of the issues at hand requires a look at the concept of capital structure and its effect on firm profitability. This paper examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of companies listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange during the period 1998-2002. The effect of capital structure on the profitability of listed firms in Ghana is a scientific area that has not yet been explored in Ghanaian finance literature.The paper is organized as follows. The following section gives a review of the extant literature on the subject. The next section describes the data and justifies the choice of the variables used in the analysis. The model used in the analysis is then estimated. The subsequent section presents and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section summarizes the findings of the research and also concludes the discussion.Literature on capital structureThe relationship between capital structure and firm value has been the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the literature, debate has centered on whether there is an optimal capital structure for an individual firm or whether the proportion of debt usage is irrelevant to the individual firm’s value. The capital structure of a firm concerns the mix of debt and equity the firm uses in its operation. Brealey and Myers (2003) contend that the choice of capital structure is fundamentally a marketing problem. They state that the firm can issue dozens of distinct securities in countless combinations, but it attempts to find the particular combination that maximizes market value. According to Weston and Brigham (1992), the optimal capital structure is the one that maximizes the market value of the firm’s outstanding shares.Fama and French (1998), analyzing the relationship among taxes, financing decisions, and the firm’s value, concluded that the debt does not concede tax b enefits. Besides, the high leverage degree generates agency problems among shareholders and creditors that predict negative relationships between leverage and profitability. Therefore, negative information relating debt and profitability obscures the tax benefit of the debt. Booth et al. (2001) developed a study attempting to relate the capital structure of several companies in countries with extremely different financial markets. They concluded thatthe variables that affect the choice of the capital structure of the companies are similar, in spite of the great differences presented by the financial markets. Besides, they concluded that profitability has an inverse relationship with debt level and size of the firm. Graham (2000) concluded in his work that big and profitable companies present a low debt rate. Mesquita and Lara (2003) found in their study that the relationship between rates of return and debt indicates a negative relationship for long-term financing. However, they found a positive relationship for short-term financing and equity.Hadlock and James (2002) concluded that companies prefer loan (debt) financing because they anticipate a higher return. Taub (1975) also found significant positive coefficients for four measures of profitability in a regression of these measures against debt ratio. Petersen and Rajan (1994) identified the same association, but for industries. Baker (1973), who worked with a simultaneous equations model, and Nerlove (1968) also found the same type of association for industries. Roden and Lewellen (1995) found a significant positive association between profitability and total debt as a percentage of the total buyout-financing package in their study on leveraged buyouts. Champion (1999) suggested that the use of leverage was one way to improve the performance of an organization.In summary, there is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice. Different views have been put forward regarding the financing choice. The present study investigates the effect of capital structure on profitability of listed firms on the GSE.MethodologyThis study sampled all firms that have been listed on the GSE over a five-year period (1998-2002). Twenty-two firms qualified to be included in the study sample. Variables used for the analysis include profitability and leverage ratios. Profitability is operationalized using a commonly used accounting-based measure: the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to equity. The leverage ratios used include:. short-term debt to the total capital;. long-term debt to total capital;. total debt to total capital.Firm size and sales growth are also included as control variables.The panel character of the data allows for the use of panel data methodology. Panel data involves the pooling of observations on a cross-section of units over several time periods and provides results that are simply not detectable in pure cross-sections or pure time-series studies. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and formulate the differences in the behavior of thecross-section elements is adopted. The relationship between debt and profitability is thus estimated in the following regression models:ROE i,t =β0 +β1SDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (1) ROE i,t=β0 +β1LDA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (2) ROE i,t=β0 +β1DA i,t +β2SIZE i,t +β3SG i,t + ëi,t (3)where:. ROE i,t is EBIT divided by equity for firm i in time t;. SDA i,t is short-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. LDA i,t is long-term debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. DA i,t is total debt divided by the total capital for firm i in time t;. SIZE i,t is the log of sales for firm i in time t;. SG i,t is sales growth for firm i in time t; and. ëi,t is the error term.Empirical resultsTable I provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the sample of firms. This shows the average indicators of variables computed from the financial statements. The return rate measured by return on equity (ROE) reveals an average of 36.94 percent with median 28.4 percent. This picture suggests a good performance during the period under study. The ROE measures the contribution of net income per cedi (local currency) invested by the firms’ stockholders; a measure of the efficiency of the owners’ invested capital. The variable SDA measures the ratio of short-term debt to total capital. The average value of this variable is 0.4876 with median 0.4547. The value 0.4547 indicates that approximately 45 percent of total assets are represented by short-term debts, attesting to the fact that Ghanaian firms largely depend on short-term debt for financing their operations due to the difficulty in accessing long-term credit from financial institutions. Another reason is due to the under-developed nature of the Ghanaian long-term debt market. The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (LDA) also stands on average at 0.0985. Total debt to total capital ratio(DA) presents a mean of 0.5861. This suggests that about 58 percent of total assets are financed by debt capital. The above position reveals that the companies are financially leveraged with a large percentage of total debt being short-term.Table I.Descriptive statisticsMean SD Minimum Median Maximum━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ROE 0.3694 0.5186 -1.0433 0.2836 3.8300SDA 0.4876 0.2296 0.0934 0.4547 1.1018LDA 0.0985 0.1803 0.0000 0.0186 0.7665DA 0.5861 0.2032 0.2054 0.5571 1.1018SIZE 18.2124 1.6495 14.1875 18.2361 22.0995SG 0.3288 0.3457 20.7500 0.2561 1.3597━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Regression analysis is used to investigate the relationship between capital structure and profitability measured by ROE. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results are presented in Table II. The results from the regression models (1), (2), and (3) denote that the independent variables explain the debt ratio determinations of the firms at 68.3, 39.7, and 86.4 percent, respectively. The F-statistics prove the validity of the estimated models. Also, the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence of 99 percent.The results in regression (1) reveal a significantly positive relationship between SDA and profitability. This suggests that short-term debt tends to be less expensive, and therefore increasing short-term debt with a relatively low interest rate will lead to an increase in profit levels. The results also show that profitability increases with the control variables (size and sales growth). Regression (2) shows a significantly negative association between LDA and profitability. This implies that an increase in the long-term debt position is associated with a decrease in profitability. This is explained by the fact that long-term debts are relatively more expensive, and therefore employing high proportions of them could lead to low profitability. The results support earlier findings by Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), Graham (2000) and Booth et al. (2001). Firm size and sales growth are again positively related to profitability.The results from regression (3) indicate a significantly positive association between DA and profitability. The significantly positive regression coefficient for total debt implies that an increase in the debt position is associated with an increase in profitability: thus, the higher the debt, the higher the profitability. Again, this suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. This supports the findings of Hadlock and James (2002), Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Roden and Lewellen (1995) that profitable firms use more debt. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent)of debt is represented by short-term debt. The results also show positive relationships between the control variables (firm size and sale growth) and profitability.Table II.Regression model results━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Profitability (EBIT/equity)Ordinary least squares━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━Variable 1 2 3SIZE 0.0038 (0.0000) 0.0500 (0.0000) 0.0411 (0.0000)SG 0.1314 (0.0000) 0.1316 (0.0000) 0.1413 (0.0000)SDA 0.8025 (0.0000)LDA -0.3722(0.0000)DA -0.7609(0.0000)R²0.6825 0.3968 0.8639SE 0.4365 0.4961 0.4735Prob. (F) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ConclusionsThe capital structure decision is crucial for any business organization. The decision is important because of the need to maximize returns to various organizational constituencies, and also because of the impact such a decision has on an organization’s ability to deal with its competitive environment. This present study evaluated the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms on the GSE during a five-year period (1998-2002). The results revealed significantly positive relation between SDA and ROE, suggesting that profitable firms use more short-term debt to finance their operation. Short-term debt is an important component or source of financing for Ghanaian firms, representing 85 percent of total debt financing. However, the results showed a negative relationship between LDA and ROE. With regard to the relationship between total debt and profitability, the regression results showed a significantly positive association between DA and ROE. This suggests that profitable firms depend more on debt as their main financing option. In the Ghanaian case, a high proportion (85 percent) of the debt is represented in short-term debt.译文加纳上市公司资本结构对盈利能力的实证研究论文简介资本结构决策对于任何商业组织都是至关重要的。
资本市场运作相关外文文献翻译中英文
资本市场运作相关外文文献翻译中英文英文THE ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL MARKETOPERATION ON INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN NIGERIAADEGBITE ADEJARE, AZEEZ AMINATABSTRACTThis study examined the effects of capital market operation on industrial growth in Nigeria from 1981 to 2015. Secondary data were sourced from Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Statistical Bulletins from 1981 to 2015. Multiple regressions analysis and Pearson product moment correlation were employed to examine the relationship, and the effect of independent variables (market capitalization, Market volume, exchange rate, and All-Share index) and dependent variable (INDGRT). Findings reveals that there is a positive effect of Market capitalization on industrial growth, and economic growth (β = .0762594; .3638583; p ≤ 0.05) in Nigeria. All share index (ASI) has negative significant effect on industrial growth (β = -.0197857; p ≤ 0.05) and economic growth (β = -.2413219; p ≤ 0.05) in Nigeria. Also, exchange rate (EXCHNG) has negative significant effect on industrial growth (β =--.124867; p ≤ 0.05). It is concluded that there is a positive significant impact of capital market on industrial and economic growth in Nigeria. Exchange rate has negativeeffect on industrial growth in Nigeria. It is now recommended that government should find all means to reduce exchange rate in Nigeria so that the cost of raw materials imported by industrial sector is reduced so that it will ultimately enhance their performance. Government should also increase the liquidity of capital market in order to quench the financial thirst of the industrial sector in Nigeria.Keywords: Capital Market; Industrial growth; Economic growth; Exchange rate; NigeriaINTRODUCTIONBackground to the studyGovernments and industry raise long-term capital for financing and expanding new projects through capital market in Nigeria. If capital resources are not provided to those economic areas, especially industries where demand is growing and which are capable of increasing production and productivity, the rate of expansion of the economy often suffers. A unique benefit of the stock market to corporate entities is provision of long-term, debt financing and non-debt financial capital. Through the issuance of equity securities, companies acquire perpetual capital for development. In fact, the provision of equity capital in the market enables companies to avoid over-reliance on debt financing which ultimately improving corporate debt-to-equity ratio. Capital formation, however, can only be achieved through conscious efforts at savings mobilization andaccumulation of resources by both the public and private sectors of an economy. Financial markets generally provide avenue for savings of various tenors that are made available for utilization by various economic agents. The capital market, which is a major section of financial markets, has been identified as an institution which contributes to the socioeconomic growth and development of emerging and developed economies. This is made possible through some of the vital roles it play such as channeling resources, promoting reforms to modernize the financial intermediation capacity sector to link deficit to the surplus sector of the economy, mobilization and allocation of savings among competitive uses which are critical to local investment (Alile, 1984). Capital market also channels capital or long-term resources to firms with relatively high and increasing productivity, thus enhancing industrial expansion and growth.The scarcity of long-term capital has caused a great challenge to industrial development in Nigeria. But capital market is the driver of any economy to growth and development which is embedded with industrialization because it is essential for the long-term growth capital formation. It is crucial in the mobilization of savings and channeling of such savings to profitable self-liquidating investment. The liquidity of a stock market relates to the degree of access, which investors have in buying, and selling of stocks in such a market. The more liquid a stockmarket is, the more investors will be interested in trading in the market. The lack of adequate number of investors in the Nigerian stock market is a reflection of problem of illiquidity in the market (Usman and Adegbite 2012)). With this assertion, this study examines the extent at which Nigeria capital market has contributed immensely to industrial development in Nigeria.Objectives of the studyTo examine the effects of capital market operation on industrial growth in Nigeria.To evaluate the impact of capital market on economic growth in Nigeria.(iii) To determine the relationship between Capital market, Industrial and Economic growth in NigeriaLITERATURE REVIEWCapital market, Industrial Development, and Economic growth in NigeriaThe Nigeria capital market is sub-divided into primary and secondary markets. New securities are issued in the primary market and companies issuing these securities receive the proceeds for the sale. The secondary market provides a forum for the sale of existing securities by one investor to another investor. Thus, the efficient functioning of the market paves way for the primary market by making investors morewilling to purchase new securities in anticipation of selling such in the secondary market. These securities are the major instrument used to raise funds at the capital market. Capital market according to Akingboungbe (1996) is a market where medium to long-term finance can be raised.). Ekezie (2002) asserted that capital market is the market for dealings (that is, Lending and Borrowing) in longer-term loan-able funds. The development of the capital market and apparently the stock market provides opportunities for greater funds mobilization, improved efficiency in resource allocation and provision of relevant information for appraisal (Inanga and Emenuga, 1997).Mbat (2001) describes capital market as a forum through which long-term funds are made available by the surplus to the deficit economic units. It must, however be noted that although all the surplus economic units have access to the capital market, not all the deficit economic units have the same easy access to it. The restriction on the part of the borrowers is meant to enforce the security of the fund provided by the lenders. In order to ensure that lenders are not subjected to undue risk, borrowers in the capital market need to satisfy certain basic requirement. Companies can finance their operations by raising funds through issuing equity (ownership) or debenture bond. Securities are structured to mature in period of years from the medium to the long-term of usually between five and twenty-five years. Capital market offers access to a variety offinancial instruments that enable economic agents to pool, price and exchange risk. It encourages savings in financial form. This is very essential for government and other institutions in need of longterm funds and for suppliers of long-term funds (Nwankwo, 1991).Industrialization has been paid optimum attention to and various development economists have described it to be the prime mover of the economy and potent factor in the development process. Industrialization enhances rapid growth in developing countries such as Nigeria. Industrialization is the system of production that has arisen from the steady development study and use of scientific knowledge. It is based on the division of labour and on specialization and uses mechanical, chemical and power aids in production. All viable, efficient and effective industries must be listed in Nigerian capital market, and their performance can also be measured through the capital market. According to Adewuyi and Olowokere (2011) Capital market has a great impact on the development of Nigeria economy; it promotes an efficient and provides opportunities for investment diversification. The improved delivery and settlement processes has reflected positively on the liquidity of the capital market, as well as put the Nigerian stock market on the same pedestal with some of the leading international stock exchanges. The automation of the clearing, depository and settlement system and the transition to Automated Trading System (ATS) have enhance theopportunity for price discovery in our market and raised overall market efficiency. In the same vein, automation has made our capital market truly international and emerging market, giving the nation a strong and dynamic capital market, which can be relied upon by foreign investors for efficient portfolio management. Moreover, industrialisation is very germane to the development of any nation most especially the underdeveloped ones. Manufacturing activity can only flourish in a good investment climate with the following features in place :physical infrastructure ,financial markets and creation of the enabling environment for investment and determine the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest productively, create job and expand business (Malik,Teal and Baptist 2004). Well-functioning financial markets are an important ingredient for promoting economic growth. Developed financial markets allow access of firms to new markets, and help to promote greater competition, innovation and productivity in the economy. Even when faced with profitable investment opportunities, many firms lack the resources to exploit these. With financial markets unwilling to lend, investment decisions of firms become more dependent on internally generated cash flow or resources from family, friends and the informal sector (Malik,Teal and Baptist 2004).METHODOLOGYMethod of data collectionSecondary data was used in this study. The relevant data were sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) statistical Bulletin from 1981 to 2015. The variables for which data were sourced include: industrial growth, Market capitalisation, All-Share index, market volume, Exchange rate, and Gross Domestic Product from 1981 to 2015.Method of Data AnalysisRegression analysis technique was used to measure the effect of independent variables (Market capitalisation, All-Share index, Market volume and Exchange rate) on dependent variable (Industrial growth). While Pearson product moment correlation was used to measure the relationship between a dependent variable (Industrial growth) and independent variables (Market capitalisation, All-Share index, Market volume and Exchange rate).Model specificationTwo models were employed in this study. The first model examined the effects of the capital market on Industrial growth in Nigeria. Industrial growth was the explained variable while the explanatory variables are market capitalization, real exchange rate, and All-Share index. The second model examined the effects of the capital market on Economic growth in Nigeria. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was the explained variable while the explanatory variables are market capitalisation, All-Share index, and market volume.Table 2 shows the effect of capital market on Industrial growth in Nigeria, 1% increase in all share index (ASI) reduces industrial growth (INDGRT) by 0.19%, this shows that there is a negative insignificant effect of All share index (ASI) on industrial growth. Also, 1% increase in Market capitalization (MCAP) increases industrial growth by 0.076%, this shows that there is positive significant effect of Market capitalization (MCAP) on industrial growth. More so, 1% increase in Market volume (MVOLM) reduces industrial growth (INDGRT) by 0.09%, this shows that there is a negative significant effect of market volume (MVOLM) on industrial growth. In the same vein, 1% increase in Exchange rate (EXCHNG) reduces industrial growth by 0.12%, this indicates that there is a negative significant effect of Exchange rate (EXCHNG) on industrial growth.The R2 coefficient is 0.7183 (71.8%) which is the coefficient of determination indicates that the explanatory variables (All share index , Market capitalization, Market volume and Exchange rate ) accounted for 71.8% of the variation that influence industrial growth, but the remaining 28.2% are for stochastic error. Given the adjusted R2 as 0.6671 (66.7%), it predicts the independence variables incorporated into this model were able to determine the effect of capital market performance on Industrial growth (INDGRT) to 71.96%. It is also indicates that capital market performance accounted for 66.7% of the variation in the influence onIndustrial growth (INDGRT).Table 3 shows the effect of capital market on economic growth in Nigeria, 1% increase in All share index (LOGASI) reduces LOGGDP by 0.24%, this shows that there is a negative significant effect of All share index (LOGASI) on Economic growth (LOGGDP). Also, 1% increases in Market volume (LOGMVOLM) reduces LOGGDP by 0.04%. This specifies that there is an inverse effect of Market volume on Economic growth (LOGGDP). Conversely, 1% increase in Market capitalization (LOGMCAP) increases LOGGDP by 0.36%, this advocates that there is a positive significant effect of Market capitalization (LOGMCAP) on Economic growth (LOGGDP) in Nigeria. More so, 1% increase in Exchange rate (LOGEXCHNG) increases GDP by 0.06%, this shows that there is a positive insignificant effect of exchange rate on Economic growth (LOGGDP).Given the R2 which is the coefficient of determination as 66.4% with high value of Adjusted R2 as 65.8%, it indicates that the independent variables incorporated into this model were able to determine the effect of capital market on economic growth in Nigeria to 65.8%. The F Probability statistic ( Prob > F = 0.0000) also confirms the significant of this model.Table 4 shows the relationship between Capital market, Industrial and Economic growth in Nigeria. The result in table 4 shows thatindustrial growth (INDGRT) has positive significant relationship with Economic growth (GDP) with the value 0.3899*, this implies that an increase in industrial growth (INDGRT) leads to increase in Economic growth (GDP) in Nigeria. All share index (ASI) also has positive significant relationship with Economic growth in Nigeria with the value of 0.9067*. This also indicates that an increase in All share index brings increase in Economic growth (GDP) in Nigeria. Also, Market V olume (MVOLUM) has positive and significant correlation with Economic growth (0.9363*) in Nigeria. This result implies that an increase in Market V olume also leads to increase in Economic growth (GDP) in Nigeria. In the same vein, Market capitalisation also has positive significant relationship with Economic growth (0.9471*) in Nigeria. In addition, Exchange rate also has positive significant relationship with Economic growth (0.8389*) in Nigeria. The table also revealed that all the predictor variables have a positive significant relationship with economic growth in Nigeria.More so, from table 4, All share index (ASI) also has positive relationship with industrial growth (INDGRT) in Nigeria with the value of 0.4029*. This also indicates that an increase in All –share index increases industrial growth (INDGRT) in Nigeria. Also, Market V olume (MVOLUM) has positive correlation with industrial growth (0.2305) in Nigeria. This result implies that an increase in Market V olume alsoincreases industrial growth (INDGRT) in Nigeria. In the same vein, Market capitalisation also has positive significant relationship with industrial growth (0.4132*) in Nigeria. In addition, Exchange rate also has positive relationship with industrial growth (0.6244*) in Nigeria. All the predictor variables have a positive significant relationship with industrial growth (INDGRT) in Nigeria with the exception of Market volume.Summary and ConclusionThis study examined the extent at which Nigeria capital market has contributed immensely to industrial growth in Nigeria, and also investigated the effects of capital market operation on Economic growth in Nigeria from 1981 to 2015. The study used multiple regression analysis technique to estimate the empirical models of the study. However, the results showed that there is a positive effect Market capitalization on industrial growth. All share index (ASI) and market volume also have negative significant on industrial growth in Nigeria. Also, exchange rate (EXCHNG) has negative significant effect on industrial growth. In addition, Market capitalization also has positive significant effect on economic growth in Nigeria. Market volume impacted economic growth negatively.Based on the findings, it is concluded that there is a positive significant effect of capital market on industrial and economic growth inNigeria. Exchange rate has negative significant effect on industrial growth in Nigeria. It is now recommended that government should find all means to reduce exchange rate in Nigeria so that the cost of raw material imported by industrial sector will be reduced which will ultimately enhance the profitability and performance of industrial sector in Nigeria. Also, Government should increase the liquidity of capital market in order to quench the financial thirst of the industrial sector in Nigeria.中文资本市场运营对尼日利亚工业增长的影响分析ADEGBITE ADEJARE，AZEEZ AMINAT摘要这项研究调查了1981年至2015年间资本市场运营对尼日利亚工业增长的影响。
资本结构外文文献
Optimal Capital Structure: Reflections on economic and other valuesBy Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11. IntroductionDespite a vast literature on the capital structure of the firm (see Harris and Raviv, 1991, Graham and Harvey, 2001, Brav et al., 2005, for overviews) there still is a big gap between theory and practice (see e.g. Cools, 1993, Tempelaar, 1991, Boot & Cools, 1997). Starting with the seminal work by Modigliani & Miller (1958, 1963), much attention has been paid to the optimality of capital structure from the shareholders’ point of view.Over the last few decades studies have been produced on the effect of other stakeholders’interests on capital structure. Well-known examples are the interests of customers who receive product or service guarantees from the company (see e.g. Grinblatt & Titman, 2002). Another area that has received considerable attention is the relation between managerial incentives and capital structure (Ibid.). Furthermore, the issue of corporate control2 (see Jensen & Ruback, 1983) and, related, the issue of corporate governance3 (see Shleifer & Vishney, 1997), receive a lion’s part of the more recent academic attention for capital structure decisions.From all these studies, one thing is clear: The capital structure decision (or rather, the management of the capital structure over time) involves more issues than the maximization of the firm’s market value alone. In this paper, we give an overview of the different objectives and considerations that have been proposed in the literature. We make a distinction between two broadly defined situations. The first is the traditional case of the firm that strives for the maximization of the value of the shares for the current shareholders. Whenever other considerations than value maximization enter capital structure decisions, these considerations have to be instrumental to the goal of value maximization. The second case concerns the firm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating finance literature. An example of the latter is the co-operation, a legal entity which can be found in a.o. many European countries. For a discussion on why firms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk (2002a, 2002b).In Section 2 we will describe objectives and considerations that, directly or indirectly, clearly help to create and maintain a capital structure which is 'optimal' for the value maximizing firm. The third section describes other objectives and considerations. Some of these may have a clear negative effect on economic value, others may be neutral and in some cases the effect on economic value is not always completely clear. Section 4 shows how, for both cases, capital structure decisions can be framed as multiple criteria decision problems which can then benefit from multiple criteria decision support tools that are now widely available.2. Maximizing shareholder valueAccording to the neoclassical view on the role of the firm, the firm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the firm and are thus entitled to decide what the firm should aim for. Since shareholders only have oneobjective in mind - wealth maximization - the goal of the firm is maximization of the firm's contribution to the financial wealth of its shareholders. The firm can accomplish this by investing in projects with positive net present value4. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate financing decision5. Two theories about the capital structure of the firm - the trade-off theory and the pecking order theory - assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate financing decision in this essentially neoclassical view.The original proposition I of Miller and Modigliani (1958) states that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure, i.e. the debt-equity ratio6. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued firm and sell shares of the overvalued shares in such a way that identical income streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal.When corporate taxes are introduced, proposition I changes dramatically. Miller and Modigliani (1958, 1963) show that in a world with corporate tax the value of firms is a.o. a function of leverage. When interest payments become tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes firm value involves a hundred percent debt financing. By increasing leverage, the payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash flow for the providers of capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered firm (G u ) and an identical levered firm (G l ) is the present value of tax shields (PVTS). Figure 1 depicts the total value of an unlevered and a levered firm7. The higher leverage, the lower G l , the higher G u - G l(=PVTS). In the traditional trade-off models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that firms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields8 against marginal direct costs of financial distress or direct bankruptcy costs.9 Additional factors can be included in this trade-off framework. Other costs than direct costs of financial distress are agency costs of debt (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977)10, the asset substitution problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 and Galai & Masulis, 1976), the 'play for time' game by managers, the 'unexpected increase of leverage (combined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact)', the 'refusal to contribute equity capital' and the 'cash in and run' game (Brealey, Myers & Allan, 2006). These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs of financial distress. Another benefit of debt is the reduction of agency costs between managers and external equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986, 1989). Jensen en Meckling (1976) argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity is reduced by the use of debt, increases managerial effort to work. In addition, Jensen (1986) argues that high leverage reduces free cash with less resources to waste on unprofitable investments as a result.11 The agency costs between management and external equity are often left out the trade-off theory since it assumes managers not acting on behalf of the shareholders (only)which is an assumption of the traditional trade-off theory.In Myers' (1984) and Myers and Majluf's (1984) pecking order model12 there is no optimal capital structure. Instead, because of asymmetric information and signalling problems associated with external financing13, firm's financing policies follow a hierarchy, with a preference for internal over external finance, and for debt over equity. A strict interpretation of this model suggests that firms do not aim at a target debt ratio. Instead, the debt ratio is just the cumulative result of hierarchical financing over time. (See Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999.) Original examples of signalling models are the models of Ross (1977) and Leland and Pyle (1977). Ross (1977) suggests that higher financial leverage can be used by managers to signal an optimistic future for the firm and that these signals cannot be mimicked by unsuccessful firms14. Leland and Pyle (1977) focus on owners instead of managers. They assume that entrepreneurs have better information on the expected cash flows than outsiders have. The inside information held by an entrepreneur can be transferred to suppliers of capital because it is in the owner's interest to invest a greater fraction of his wealth in successful projects. Thus the owner's willingness to invest in his own projects can serve as a signal of project quality. The value of the firm increases with the percentage of equity held by the entrepreneur relative to the percentage he would have held in case of a lower quality project. (Copeland, Weston & Shastri, 2005.)The stakeholder theory formulated by Grinblatt & Titman (2002)15 suggests that the way in which a firm and its non-financial stakeholders interact is an important determinant of the firm's optimal capital structure. Non-financial stakeholders are those parties other than the debt and equity holders. Non-financial stakeholders include firm's customers, employees, suppliers and the overall community in which the firm operates. These stakeholders can be hurt by a firm's financial difficulties. For example customers may receive inferior products that are difficult to service, suppliers may lose business, employees may lose jobs and the economy can be disrupted. Because of the costs they potentially bear in the event of a firm's financial distress, non-financial stakeholders will be less interested ceteris paribus in doing business with a firm having a high(er) potential for financial difficulties. This understandable reluctance to do business with a distressed firm creates a cost that can deter a firm from undertaking excessive debt financing even when lenders are willing to provide it on favorable terms (Ibid., p. 598). These considerations by non-financial stakeholders are the cause of their importance as determinant for the capital structure. This stakeholder theory could be seen as part of the trade-off theory (see Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2006, p.481, although the term 'stakeholder theory' is not mentioned) since these stakeholders influence the indirect costs of financial distress.16As the trade-off theory (excluding agency costs between managers and shareholders) and the pecking order theory, the stakeholder theory of Grinblatt and Titman (2002) assumes shareholder wealth maximization as the single corporate objective.17Based on these theories, a huge number of empirical studies have been produced. See e.g. Harris & Raviv (1991) for a systematic overview of this literature18. More recent studies are e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers (1999), testing the trade-off theory against the pecking order theory, Kemsley & Nissim (2002) estimating the present value of tax shield, Andrade & Kaplan (1998) estimating the costs of financial distress and Rajan & Zingales (1995) investigating the determinants of capital structure in the G-7 countries. Rajan & Zingales(1995)19 explain differences in leverage of individual firms with firm characteristics. In their study leverage is a function of tangibility of assets, market to book ratio, firm size and profitability. Barclay & Smith (1995) provide an empirical examination of the determinants of corporate debt maturity. Graham & Harvey (2001) survey 392 CFOs about a.o. capital structure. We come back to this Graham & Harvey study in Section 3.20Cross sectional studies as by Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan & Zingales (1995) and Barclay & Smith (1995) and Wald (1999) model capital structure mainly in terms of leverage and then leverage as a function of different firm (and market) characteristics as suggested by capital structure theory21. We do the opposite. We do not analyze the effect of several firm characteristics on capital structure (c.q. leverage), but we analyze the effect of capital structure on variables that co-determine shareholder value. In several decisions, including capital structure decisions, these variables may get the role of decision criteria. Criteria which are related to the trade-off and pecking order theory are listed in Table 1. We will discuss these criteria in more detail in section 4. Figure 2 illustrates the basic idea of our approach.3. Other objectives and considerationsA lot of evidence suggests that managers act not only in the interest of the shareholders (see Myers, 2001). Neither the static trade-off theory nor the pecking order theory can fully explain differences in capital structure. Myers (2001, p.82) states that 'Yet even 40 years after the Modigliani and Miller research, our understanding of these firms22 financing choices is limited.' Results of several surveys (see Cools 1993, Graham & Harvey, 2001, Brounen et al., 2004) reveal that CFOs do not pay a lot of attention to variables relevant in these shareholder wealth maximizing theories. Given the results of empirical research, this does not come as a surprise.The survey by Graham and Harvey finds only moderate evidence for the trade-off theory. Around 70% have a flexible target or a somewhat tight target or range. Only 10% have a strict target ratio. Around 20% of the firms declare not to have an optimal or target debt-equity ratio at all.In general, the corporate tax advantage seems only moderately important in capital structure decisions. The tax advantage of debt is most important for large regulated and dividend paying firms. Further, favorable foreign tax treatment relative to the US is fairly important in issuing foreign debt decisions23. Little evidence is found that personal taxes influence the capital structure24. In general potential costs of financial distress seem not very important although credit ratings are. According to Graham and Harvey this last finding could be viewed as (an indirect) indication of concern with distress. Earnings volatility also seems to be a determinant of leverage, which is consistent with the prediction that firms reduce leverage when the probability of bankruptcy is high. Firms do not declare directly that (the present value of the expected) costs of financial distress are an important determinant of capital structure, although indirect evidence seems to exist. Graham and Harvey find little evidence that firms discipline managers by increasing leverage. Graham and Harvey explicitly note that ‘1) managers might be unwilling to admit to using debt in this manner, or 2) perhaps a low rating on this question reflects an unwillingness of firms to adopt Jensen’s solution more than a weakness in Jensen’s argument'.The most important issue affecting corporate debt decisions is management’s desire for financial flexibility (excess cash or preservation of debt capacity). Furthermore, managers arereluctant to issue common stock when they perceive the market is undervalued (most CFOs think their shares are undervalued). Because asymmetric information variables have no power to predict the issue of new debt or equity, Harvey and Graham conclude that the pecking order model is not the true model of the security choice25.The fact that neoclassical models do not (fully) explain financial behavior could be explained in several ways. First, it could be that managers do strive for creating shareholder value but at the same time also pay attention to variables other than the variables listed in Table 1. Variables of which managers think that they are (justifiably or not) relevant for creating shareholder value. Second, it could be that managers do not (only) serve the interest of the shareholders but of other stakeholders as well26. As a result, managers integrate variables that are relevant for them and or other stakeholders in the process of managing the firm's capital structure. The impact of these variables on the financing decision is not per definition negative for shareholder value. For example if ‘value of financial rewards for managers’ is one the goals that is maximized by managers – which may not be excluded – and if the rewards of managers consists of a large fraction of call options, managers could decide to increase leverage (and pay out an excess amount of cash, if any) to lever the volatility of the shares with an increase in the value of the options as a result. The increase of leverage could have a positive effect on shareholder wealth (e.g. the agency costs between equity and management could be lower) but the criterion 'value of financial rewards' could (but does not have to) be leading. Third, shareholders themselves do possibly have other goals than shareholder wealth creation alone. Fourth, managers rely on certain (different) rules of thumb or heuristics that do not harm shareholder value but can not be explained by neoclassical models either27. Fifth, the neoclassical models are not complete or not tested correctly (see e.g. Shyum-Sunder & Myers, 1999).Either way, we do expect variables other than those founded in the neoclassical property rights view are or should be included explicitly in the financing decision framework. To determine which variables should be included we probably need other views or theories of the firm than the neoclassical alone. Zingales (2000) argues that ‘…corporate finance theory, empirical research, practical implications, and policy recommendations are deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm.’ (Ibid., p. 1623.) Examples of attempts of new theories are 'the stakeholder theory of the firm' (see e.g. Donaldson and Preston, 1995), 'the enlightened stakeholder theory' as a response (see Jensen, 2001), 'the organizational theory' (see Myers, 1993, 2000, 2001) and the stakeholder equity model (see Soppe, 2006).We introduce an organizational balance sheet which is based on the organizational theory of Myers (1993). The intention is to offer a framework to enhance a discussion about criteria that could be relevant for the different stakeholders of the firm. In Myers' organizational theory employees (including managers) are included as stakeholders; we integrate other stakeholders as suppliers, customers and the community as well. Figure 3 presents the adjusted organizational balance sheet.Pre-tax value is the maximum value of the firm including the maximum value of the present value of all stakeholders' surplus. The present value of the stakeholders' surplus (ES plus OTS) is the present value of future costs of perks, overstaffing, above market prices for inputs (including above market wages), above market services provided to customers and the community etc.28 Depending on the theory of the firm, the pre-tax value can be distributedamong the different stakeholders following certain 'rules'. Note that what we call 'surplus' in this framework is still based on the 'property rights' principle of the firm. Second, only distributions in market values are reflected in this balance sheet. Neutral mutations are not29. Based on the results of Graham and Harvey (2001) and common sense we formulate a list of criteria or heuristics that could be integrated into the financing decision framework. Some criteria lead to neutral mutations others do not. We call these criteria 'quasi non-economic criteria'. Non-economic, because the criteria are not based on the neoclassical view. Quasi, because the relations with economic value are not always clear cut. We include criteria that lead to neutral mutations as well, because managers might have good reasons that we overlook or are relevant for other reasons than financial wealth.The broadest decision framework we propose in this paper is the one that includes both the economic and quasi non-economic variables. Figure 4 illustrates the idea. The additional quasi non-economic variables are listed in Table 2. This list is far from complete.flexibility could be relevant for at least employees and the suppliers of resources needed for these projects. As long as managers only would invest in zero net present value projects this variable would have no value effect in the organizational balance sheet. But if it influences the value of the sum of the projects undertaken this will be reflected in this balance sheet. Of course, financial flexibility is also valued for economic reasons, see Section 2 and 4.The probability of bankruptcy influences job security for employees and the duration of a 'profitable' relationship with the firm for suppliers, customers and possibly the community. For managers (and other stakeholders without diversified portfolios) the probability of default could be important. The cost of bankruptcy is for them possibly much higher than for shareholders with diversified portfolios. As with financial flexibility, the probability of default influences shareholder value as well. In Section 2 and 4 we discuss this variable in relation to shareholder value. Here the variable is relevant, because it has an effect on the wealth or other 'valued' variables of stakeholders other than equity (and debt) holders. We assume owner-managers dislike sharing control of their firms with others. For that reason, debt financing could possibly have non-economic advantages for these managers. After all, common stock carries voting rights while debt does not. Owner-managers might prefer debt over new equity to keep control over the firm. Control is relevant in the economic framework as well, see Section 2 and 4.In practice, earnings dilution is an important variable effecting the financing decision. Whether it is a neutral mutations variable or not30, the effect of the financing decision on the earnings per share is often of some importance. If a reduction in the earnings per share (EPS) is considered to be a bad signal, managers try to prevent such a reduction. Thus the effect on EPS becomes an economic variable. As long as it is a neutral mutation variable, or if it is relevant for other reasons we treat EPS as a quasi non-economic variable.The reward package could be relevant for employees. If the financing decision influences the value of this package this variable will be one of the relevant criteria for the manager. If it is possible to increase the value of this package, the influence on shareholder value is ceteris paribus negative. If the reward package motivates the manager to create extra shareholder value compared with the situation without the package, this would possibly more than offset this negative financing effect.优化资本结构：思考经济和其他价值By Marc Schauten & Jaap Spronk11。
资本结构外文文献翻译
How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of2008has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage.There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis.Indeed,evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks(e.g.,through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations)and the so-called“shadow banking system”may be the underlying cause of the recent economic and financial dislocation.Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms.To date,problems in the U.S.non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis. For example,non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the1930s.In fact,bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S.industries(e.g.,automotive manufacturing,newspapers,and real estate)that faced fundamental economic pressures prior to the financial crisis.This surprising fact begs the question,“How important is financial risk for non-financial firms?”At the heart of this issue is the uncertainty about the determinants of total firm risk as well as components of firm risk.StudyRecent academic research in both asset pricing and corporate finance has rekindled an interest in analyzing equity price risk.A current strand of the asset pricing literature examines the finding of Campbell et al.(2001)that firm-specific(idiosyncratic)risk has tended to increase over the last40years.Other work suggests that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor(see Goyal and Santa-Clara,2003,among others).Also related to these studies is work by Pástor and Veronesi(2003)showing how investor uncertainty about firm profitability is an important determinant of idiosyncratic risk and firm value.Other research has examined the role of equity volatility in bond pricing (e.g.,Dichev,1998,Campbell,Hilscher,and Szilagyi,2008).However,much of the empirical work examining equity price risk takes the risk of assets as given or tries to explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk.In contrast,this paper takes a different tack in the investigation of equity price risk.First,we seek tounderstand the determinants of equity price risk at the firm level by considering total risk as the product of risks inherent in the firms operations(i.e.,economic or business risks)and risks associated with financing the firms operations(i.e.,financial risks). Second,we attempt to assess the relative importance of economic and financial risks and the implications for financial policy.Early research by Modigliani and Miller(1958)suggests that financial policy may be largely irrelevant for firm value because investors can replicate many financial decisions by the firm at a low cost(i.e.,via homemade leverage)and well-functioning capital markets should be able to distinguish between financial and economic distress. Nonetheless,financial policies,such as adding debt to the capital structure,can magnify the risk of equity.In contrast,recent research on corporate risk management suggests that firms may also be able to reduce risks and increase value with financial policies such as hedging with financial derivatives.However,this research is often motivated by substantial deadweight costs associated with financial distress or other market imperfections associated with financial leverage.Empirical research provides conflicting accounts of how costly financial distress can be for a typical publicly traded firm.We attempt to directly address the roles of economic and financial risk by examining determinants of total firm risk.In our analysis we utilize a large sample of non-financial firms in the United States.Our goal of identifying the most important determinants of equity price risk(volatility)relies on viewing financial policy as transforming asset volatility into equity volatility via financial leverage.Thus, throughout the paper,we consider financial leverage as the wedge between asset volatility and equity volatility.For example,in a static setting,debt provides financial leverage that magnifies operating cash flow volatility.Because financial policy is determined by owners(and managers),we are careful to examine the effects of firms’asset and operating characteristics on financial policy.Specifically,we examine a variety of characteristics suggested by previous research and,as clearly as possible, distinguish between those associated with the operations of the company(i.e.factors determining economic risk)and those associated with financing the firm(i.e.factors determining financial risk).We then allow economic risk to be a determinant of financial policy in the structural framework of Leland and Toft(1996),or alternatively, in a reduced form model of financial leverage.An advantage of the structural modelapproach is that we are able to account for both the possibility of financial and operating implications of some factors(e.g.,dividends),as well as the endogenous nature of the bankruptcy decision and financial policy in general.Our proxy for firm risk is the volatility of common stock returns derived from calculating the standard deviation of daily equity returns.Our proxies for economic risk are designed to capture the essential characteristics of the firms’operations and assets that determine the cash flow generating process for the firm.For example,firm size and age provide measures of line of-business maturity;tangible assets(plant,property,and equipment)serve as a proxy for the‘hardness’of a firm’s assets;capital expenditures measure capital intensity as well as growth potential.Operating profitability and operating profit volatility serve as measures of the timeliness and riskiness of cash flows. To understand how financial factors affect firm risk,we examine total debt,debt maturity,dividend payouts,and holdings of cash and short-term investments.The primary result of our analysis is surprising:factors determining economic risk for a typical company explain the vast majority of the variation in equity volatility. Correspondingly,measures of implied financial leverage are much lower than observed debt ratios.Specifically,in our sample covering1964-2008average actual net financial (market)leverage is about1.50compared to our estimates of between1.03and1.11 (depending on model specification and estimation technique).This suggests that firms may undertake other financial policies to manage financial risk and thus lower effective leverage to nearly negligible levels.These policies might include dynamically adjusting financial variables such as debt levels,debt maturity,or cash holdings(see,for example, Acharya,Almeida,and Campello,2007).In addition,many firms also utilize explicit financial risk management techniques such as the use of financial derivatives, contractual arrangements with investors(e.g.lines of credit,call provisions in debt contracts,or contingencies in supplier contracts),special purpose vehicles(SPVs),or other alternative risk transfer techniques.The effects of our economic risk factors on equity volatility are generally highly statistically significant,with predicted signs.In addition,the magnitudes of the effects are substantial.We find that volatility of equity decreases with the size and age of the firm.This is intuitive since large and mature firms typically have more stable lines of business,which should be reflected in the volatility of equity returns.Equity volatility tends to decrease with capital expenditures though the effect is weak.Consistent withthe predictions of Pástor and Veronesi(2003),we find that firms with higher profitability and lower profit volatility have lower equity volatility.This suggests that companies with higher and more stable operating cash flows are less likely to go bankrupt,and therefore are potentially less risky.Among economic risk variables,the effects of firm size,profit volatility,and dividend policy on equity volatility stand out. Unlike some previous studies,our careful treatment of the endogeneity of financial policy confirms that leverage increases total firm risk.Otherwise,financial risk factors are not reliably related to total risk.Given the large literature on financial policy,it is no surprise that financial variables are,at least in part,determined by the economic risks firms take.However, some of the specific findings are unexpected.For example,in a simple model of capital structure,dividend payouts should increase financial leverage since they represent an outflow of cash from the firm(i.e.,increase net debt).We find that dividends are associated with lower risk.This suggests that paying dividends is not as much a product of financial policy as a characteristic of a firm’s operations(e.g.,a mature company with limited growth opportunities).We also estimate how sensitivities to different risk factors have changed over time.Our results indicate that most relations are fairly stable. One exception is firm age which prior to1983tends to be positively related to risk and has since been consistently negatively related to risk.This is related to findings by Brown and Kapadia(2007)that recent trends in idiosyncratic risk are related to stock listings by younger and riskier firms.Perhaps the most interesting result from our analysis is that our measures of implied financial leverage have declined over the last30years at the same time that measures of equity price risk(such as idiosyncratic risk)appear to have been increasing. In fact,measures of implied financial leverage from our structural model settle near1.0 (i.e.,no leverage)by the end of our sample.There are several possible reasons for this. First,total debt ratios for non-financial firms have declined steadily over the last30 years,so our measure of implied leverage should also decline.Second,firms have significantly increased cash holdings,so measures of net debt(debt minus cash and short-term investments)have also declined.Third,the composition of publicly traded firms has changed with more risky(especially technology-oriented)firms becoming publicly listed.These firms tend to have less debt in their capital structure.Fourth,as mentioned above,firms can undertake a variety of financial risk management activities.To the extent that these activities have increased over the last few decades,firms will have become less exposed to financial risk factors.We conduct some additional tests to provide a reality check of our results.First,we repeat our analysis with a reduced form model that imposes minimum structural rigidity on our estimation and find very similar results.This indicates that our results are unlikely to be driven by model misspecification.We also compare our results with trends in aggregate debt levels for all U.S.non-financial firms and find evidence consistent with our conclusions.Finally,we look at characteristics of publicly traded non-financial firms that file for bankruptcy around the last three recessions and find evidence suggesting that these firms are increasingly being affected by economic distress as opposed to financial distress.ConclusionIn short,our results suggest that,as a practical matter,residual financial risk is now relatively unimportant for the typical U.S.firm.This raises questions about the level of expected financial distress costs since the probability of financial distress is likely to be lower than commonly thought for most companies.For example,our results suggest that estimates of the level of systematic risk in bond pricing may be biased if they do not take into account the trend in implied financial leverage(e.g.,Dichev,1998).Our results also bring into question the appropriateness of financial models used to estimate default probabilities,since financial policies that may be difficult to observe appear to significantly reduce stly,our results imply that the fundamental risks born by shareholders are primarily related to underlying economic risks which should lead to a relatively efficient allocation of capital.Some readers may be tempted to interpret our results as indicating that financial risk does not matter.This is not the proper interpretation.Instead,our results suggest that firms are able to manage financial risk so that the resulting exposure to shareholders is low compared to economic risks.Of course,financial risk is important to firms that choose to take on such risks either through high debt levels or a lack of risk management.In contrast,our study suggests that the typical non-financial firm chooses not to take these risks.In short,gross financial risk may be important,but firms can manage it.This contrasts with fundamental economic and business risks that are more difficult(or undesirable)to hedge because they represent the mechanism by which the firm earns economic profits.References[1]Shyam,Sunder.Theory Accounting and Control[J].An Innternational Theory on PublishingComPany.2005[2]Ogryezak,W,Ruszeznski,A.Rom Stomchastic Dominance to Mean-Risk Models:Semide-Viations as Risk Measures[J].European Journal of Operational Research.[3]Borowski,D.M.,and P.J.Elmer.An Expert System Approach to Financial Analysis:the Case of S&L Bankruptcy[J].Financial Management,Autumn.2004;[4]Casey, C.and ing Operating Cash Flow Data to Predict Financial Distress:Some Extensions[J].Journal of Accounting Research,Spring.2005;[5]John M.Mulvey,HafizeGErkan.Applying CVaR for decentralized risk management of financialcompanies[J].Journal of Banking&Finanee.2006;[6]Altman.Credit Rating:Methodologies,Rationale and Default Risk[M]．Risk Books,London.译文：财务风险的重要性引言2008年的金融危机对金融杠杆的作用产生重大影响。
资本结构外文文献
资本结构外文文献资本结构是一个公司的股权和负债的组合，可以通过权益比率和负债比率来描述。
资本结构的选择与公司的风险、财务灵活性、成本效益等有联系，因此，对于公司来说，资本结构的选择至关重要。
在本文中，我们将介绍两篇外国文献，以了解资本结构的现状和选择对公司的影响。
第一篇文献第一篇文献名为“Capital Structure and Corporate Performance in China: Evidence from Foreign Listed Firms”，作者为Sung C. Bae、Chang-Soo Kim和Akihiko Takahashi。
这篇文章研究了中国外资上市公司的资本结构与业绩之间的关系，并通过样本回归分析得出。
文章首先介绍了中国外资上市公司的资本结构情况，指出了其负债比率高、权益比率低的特点，这些特点也反映在其经营绩效上。
然后，文章对不同的资本结构与公司绩效之间的关系进行了实证研究。
分析发现，在外籍公司中，负债比率与公司绩效呈倒U型关系，而权益比率与公司绩效呈现正向关系。
同时，还发现公司规模和成长率对资本结构选择具有重要影响。
文章得出：在中国外资上市公司中，权益比率对公司绩效具有显著的正向作用；负债比率和公司绩效之间存在倒U型关系；公司规模和成长率都对资本结构选择有重要影响。
第二篇文献第二篇文献名为“Capital Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Malaysia”，作者为Chee-Wooi Hooy、Chin-Fei Goh和Yew-Ming Chia。
这篇文章研究了马来西亚公司的资本结构选择与公司绩效之间的关系。
文章首先介绍了马来西亚公司的资本结构特点，包括股权比例高、负债比例低的现象。
然后，文章通过样本回归分析研究了资本结构选择与公司绩效之间的关系。
分析发现，在马来西亚公司中，权益比率和公司绩效呈现正相关关系，负债比率与公司绩效之间没有显著关系。
[原创]研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献
![[原创]研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献](https://img.taocdn.com/s3/m/d2af560ee87101f69e3195f1.png)
研究中小企业融资要参考的英文文献英文图书和期刊类文献：[1]Allen N.Berger,Gregory F.Udell,“Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small FirmFinance,”Journal of Business,Vol.68,no.3.(1995),pp.351-381．[2]Aghion,P.,Incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting,Review of Economics Studies,1992,Vol.59,p473-494．[3]Albertode，M.&JulioPindado.Determinants of capital structure:new evidence from Spanish Panel data[J].Journal of Corporate Finance，2001，(7):77-99．[4]A.N.Berger，ler，M.A.Petersen，R.G.Rajan，J.C.Stein，2001，“Does Function Follow Organizational Form?Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks”,Board of Governors of Federal Reserve SystemWorking Paper．[5]Azam,J.P.,B.Biais,M.Dia and rmal and Formal Credit Marketsand Credit Rationing in Cote D’Ivoire,Oxford Review of Economic Policy,2001,17(4),520-532.[6]Bernanke,B.S.,M.Gerler.Inside the Black Box:The Credit Channel ofMonetary Policy Transmission[J].Journal of EconomicPerspectives,1995,(9);27-48．[7]Barbosa,E.&Moraes,C.,Determinants of the Firm’s Capital Structure:theCase of the Very Small Enterprises,Working Paper from Econpapers，2003,366-358。
资本结构外文文献翻译
How Important is Financial Risk?IntroductionThe financial crisis of 2008 has brought significant attention to the effects of financial leverage。
There is no doubt that the high levels of debt financing by financial institutions and households significantly contributed to the crisis。
Indeed，evidence indicates that excessive leverage orchestrated by major global banks (e。
g。
, through the mortgage lending and collateralized debt obligations）and the so-called “shadow banking system” may be the underlying cau se of the recent economic and financial dislocation。
Less obvious is the role of financial leverage among nonfinancial firms. To date, problems in the U.S. non-financial sector have been minor compared to the distress in the financial sector despite the seizing of capital markets during the crisis。
For example，non-financial bankruptcies have been limited given that the economic decline is the largest since the great depression of the 1930s. In fact，bankruptcy filings of non-financial firms have occurred mostly in U.S。
资本价格与经济结构外文文献翻译中英文2020
资本价格与经济结构外文文献翻译中英文2020英文The relative price of capital and economic structureRoberto SamaniegoAbstractAre trends in the price of capital technological in nature? First, we find that trends in the relative price of capital vary significantly across countries. We then show that a multi-industry growth model, calibrated to match differences in economic structure around the world and productivity growth rates across industries, accounts for this variation –mainly due to variation in the composition of capital. The finding indicates that the rate of change in the relative price of capital can be interpreted as investment-specific technical change – the extent to which productivity growth is relatively more rapid in the capital-producing sector. The model also accounts for the empirical dispersion of investment rates, but not of rates of economic growth.Keywords: Investment-specific technical change, Multi-sector growth models, Structural transformation, Capital goods prices IntroductionDeclines in the relative price of capital are viewed as an important factor of economic growth in the United States (US). See for example work by Hulten (1992), Greenwood et al. (1997), Cummins and Violante(2002) and Oulton (2007). These studies typically identify the decline in the price of capital as being technological in nature, reflecting faster productivity growth in the production of new capital than in the production of consumption and services – a phenomenon known as investment-specific technical change (ISTC). However, the extent to which the relative price of capital declines in other countries is not known. In addition, it is not known whether trends in the price of capital around the world can be given a technological interpretation, such as ISTC. An alternative hypothesis is that these differences are due to the presence of barriers to capital accumulation, as proposed by Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) to account for differences in levels of the price of capital.We begin by documenting that the rate at which the relative price of capital changes over time varies significantly across countries. We find that the median growth rate of the price of capital is zero. In addition, the price of capital increasesin as many places as it decreases. This indicates that, if there is a technological explanation for this phenomenon, technical progress in capital relative to other sectors must vary widely around the world.If the explanation is indeed technological, however, one would expect such glaring differences in productivity to be evidence of draconian barriers to international technology transfer (or trade). The alternative possibility is that capital and consumption are themselveshighly disaggregated, and that there are substantial differences in the composition of capital and consumption around the world that account for the aggregate differences in the trends in the relative price of capital.We ask whether this variation can be accounted for by differences in industry composition. The reason we do this is as follows. It is well known that rates of technical progress in the US differ significantly not just between capital and non-capital, but also across types of consumption, services and capital. Thus, even if productivity growth rates are constant across countries for each industry, the rate of change in the relative price of capital may be different if the composition of capital –or the composition of consumption and services – is different. Indeed, we find that the composition of capital is skewed towards high-TFP growth capital types in countries where the price of capital declines rapidly. We therefore ask: to what extent can differences around the world in industry composition account for variation in the rate at which the relative price of capital changes?To this end, we employ a canonical multi-industry growth model. In the model, the composition of the economy evolves as a result of changes in prices of different goods or services that agents consume, as well as changes in the prices of different capital goods. In turn, these are determined by differences in productivity growth rates across industries.We calibrate the model using detailed productivity growth data from the US, as well as data on the initial composition of economies around the world in the year 1991. We use constant productivity growth rates for a given industry in all countries partly because of data limitations; however, as mentioned, significant barriers to technological transfer would have to exist to significantly deviate from this assumption. Composition is a key part of the “no barriers” hypothesis.Strikingly, we find that the model delivers a close match to the rate of change in the relative price of capital, as measured using the Penn World Tables (PWT) version 7.1. In a statistical sense, the model can account for the entirety of the magnitude of variation of the growth rate in the relative price of capital over the period from 1983 to 2011, simply based on industry TFP growth rate differences and on differences in industry composition across countries. Not only does the model match the extent of variation, but also the correlations between model-generated capital price growth rates and those in the data are highly significant. We conclude that differences in the relative price of capital around the world can be interpreted as a technological phenomenon –ISTC –and that a key factor behind these differences is industry composition.The link between composition and the decline in the relative price of capital could be for two reasons: differences in the composition of capital, or in the composition of non-capital. We refer to these possibilities asthe capital hypothesisand the consumption hypothesis, respectively. We study the importance of each hypothesis by removing productivity growth differences in the capital producing industries, and then separately removing them in the non-capital producing industries. We find that the capital hypothesis is mainly responsible for cross-country variation in ISTC: removing productivity growth in non-capital makes very little difference to the results, whereas removing productivity growth in capital-producing industries results in model-generated statistics that bear little relationship with the data.Finally, we ask to what extent a growth model driven solely by these factors can account for differences in aggregate behavior across countries over the sample period. Specifically, we look at investment rates and rates of economic growth. This is a non-trivial task, as it requires solving for investment patterns in a model where conditions for a balanced growth path do not hold in general. We find that the model generates investment rates that are strongly correlated with investment rates in the PWT 7.1 data and the PWT 9.1 data, although they underpredict the extent of empirical variation in investment rates. Thus, the model is able to capture cross-country variation in both ISTC and (to a lesser extent) investment rates, solely based on differences in industry composition. However, the model does not generate a good match to variation in rates of economic growth in the PWT 7.1 data, nor in the PWT 9.1 data. We conclude thatthere is widespread divergence in the rate of ISTC around the world, and that this accounts for variation in investment, but that economic growth rates are due to other factors. Interestingly, when we give each country an aggregate productivity trend that exactly matches its economic growth rate in the data, investment rates are no longer correlated with those in the data, suggesting that whatever factors do underlie rates of economic growth are not simply captured by a trend in productivity.The results contribute to a long-standing debate regarding whether or not changes in the efficiency of investment are an important factor of growth. This debate goes back to Solow (1962), Abramovitz (1962) and Denison (1964). Greenwood et al. (1997) find that, in the US, more than half of economic growth can be accounted for by ISTC in a general equilibrium growth accounting framework. We provide a clear answer to the question about whether differences in the relative price of capital can be attributed to barriers or to technological factors, indicating that changes in the efficiency of investment are an important factor affecting growth rates. This is not to say that there is no scope for barriers to be important for the relative price of capital; however, their impact might not be direct, but rather indirect, through their influence on economic composition. More broadly, this suggests that future work on the manner in which factors of economic growth might be affected by policy through the channel of economic composition could be fruitful.DiscussionComments on institutionsWe find that the model without barriers accounts well for the empirical magnitude and variation in loggq, solely on the basis of economic composition. On the other hand, our findings do leave the door open for institutional factors or other barriers to influence loggq indirectly, through any impact they might have on economic composition.What might these determinants be? There is a precedent in the literature for the idea that policy or institutional factors may affect composition. For example, Samaniego (2006) shows in an open-economy context that labor market regulationcan affect comparative advantage in industries depending on their rate of ISTC, skewing industrial composition towards industries that use capital types with low values of gi (an effect termed high-tech aversion). Also, Ilyina and Samaniego (2012) show that when technology adoption requires external financing, financial underdevelopment also skews industrial composition towards low-tech industries. This begs the question as to whether any policy or institutional indicators might be statistically related to our findings. Of course, there is a question of reverse causality: political economy considerations imply that countries that depend on technological transfer rather than de novo innovation for growth mightadopt particular kinds of institutions, see for example Boldrin and Levine (2004). Given this, we briefly explore whether there is suggestive evidence of a link between loggq in the data and institutions, without taking a stand on the direction of causality.Following Samaniego (2006) we look at firing costs (drawn from the World Bank, firing costs paid by workers with at least one year's tenure, FC). We also look at other forms of regulation that have been found to be important for aggregate outcomes – namely product market regulation, measured using entry costs paid as a share of GDP, EC, as reported by the World Bank. See Moscoso-Boedo and Mukoyama (2012). Another possibility suggested by Ilyina and Samaniego (2012)is financial development, which we measure using FD, the credit-to-GDP ratio, as in King and Levine (1993). Data on FC, EC and FD are from the World Bank 1960–2010.In addition, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and others argue that financial development is ultimately derived from the state of contracting institutions and property rights institutions. We measure the strength of contracting institutions using the negative of the index of legal system formality from Djankov et al. (2003), which we call CONT. We measure property rights enforcement using the index developed by the Property Rights Alliance (2008), PROP, averaged over the available period 2007–2013. Finally, we also look at intellectual property rights, whichhave been related to the generation and diffusion of technology, see Samaniego (2013) for a survey. We measure intellectual property rights IPR, using the patent enforcement method developed in Ginarte and Park (1997), as reported by the World Bank, averaging over the available sample. Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) find that copyright enforcement specifically is a form of IPR enforcement that bears the strongest relationship to financial development –see also Samaniego (2013). The BSA (Software Alliance) publishes the rate at which unlicensed software is used in different countries. Following the Property Rights Alliance (2008), we take this measure (times −1) as an indicator of copyright enforcement. Finally, we also look at human capital, HC, using the standard Barro and Lee (2013) schooling-based measure averaged over the period. While this is not an institutional measure as such it is an important country characteristic which could be related to the need or ability to produce or import high-tech capital goods.Comments on tradeThe model abstracts from international trade. Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that machinery is often imported by developing countries, which might suggest that the price of capital could be significantly affected by trade rather than by domestic output, and that domestic output shares might not be indicative of the composition of capital. However their data is for 1985, so it is not clear that their findings are relevant forthe relative price of capital in more recent data. Indeed, using data for 1995, Caselli and Wilson (2004) find that the composition of imported machinery is very highly correlated with the composition of domestically-produced capital, both in developed and developing countries. Nonetheless, it would certainly be interesting to explore the extent to which trends in the price of capital might be affected either by trade flows or by changes in trade costs. In particular, Mutreja et al. (2018) argue that reductions in trade costs may lower the relative price of capital by allowing countries to more easily access capital from countries that might produce them more efficiently. This suggests that one factor that might contribute to the dispersion in investment rates could be trade costs.Concluding remarksWe document extensive differences in the rate of change in the relative price of capital around the world. We then show that these differences can be accounted for on the basis of differences around the world in economic composition, without recourse to any barriers or frictions. We also find that a general equilibrium model economy accounts for a significant portion of the variation in the rate of change in the relative price of capital and for differences in investment rates around the world, although not for differences in rates of economic growth. We conclude that these differences can be given a technological interpretation,based on differences in composition among industries with different rates of technical progress. As a result, the term “investment-specific technical progress,” which the literature widely identifies with declines in the relative price of capital, is appropriate. Given the key role played by industry composition in this phenomenon it seems important to understand what are the deep determinants of industry composition. Is it due to comparative advantage or other trade-theoretic mechanisms? Is due to policy distortions, as suggested by Samaniego (2006) or Ilyina and Samaniego (2012)? Or does it result form hysteresis, for example, based on the date at which the process of development began in earnest and the speed of transition, as in Ngai (2004)? These are likely useful questions for further research.中文资本相对价格与经济结构罗伯托·萨曼涅戈摘要资本价格的趋势本质上是技术性的吗？首先，我们发现各国的资本相对价格趋势差异很大。
制度经济学 经典文献 英文文章
制度经济学经典文献英文文章制度经济学是一个广泛的领域，有许多经典文献和英文文章可供参考。
以下是一些制度经济学的经典英文文献：1. The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith: This book, published in 1776, is the foundational text of economics and a starting point for the study of institutional economics. Smith’s work considers the nature and causes of wealth accumulation and how institutions shape economic behavior.2. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization by Max Weber: This book, published in 1922, is a foundational text in sociology and economics that explores the role of institutions in organizing economic life. Weber’s work considers the nature and causes of formal organization and the relationship between economic and political power.3. The Constitution of Liberty by Friedrich Hayek: This book, published in 1960, is a foundational text in the field of Austrian economics that explores the role of institutions in supporting individual freedom and the operation of markets. Hayek’s workconsiders the nature and causes of knowledge and spontaneous order and their relationship to the rule of law.4. The New Institutional Economics by Oliver E. Williamson: This book, published in 1981, is a foundational text in the field of new institutional economics that explores the role of institutions in shaping economic rela tionships and performance. Williamson’s work considers the nature and causes of transaction costs and their relationship to organizational form and governance.5. Invisible Hands: Self-Organization and the Political Economy of Markets by Donald MacKenzie: This book, published in 2008, is a foundational text in the field of economic sociology that explores the role of institutions in shaping market outcomes. MacKenzie’s work considers the nature and causes of self-organization and the relationship between micro-level behavior and macro-level outcomes.这些文献只是制度经济学领域的一小部分，但它们都是经典之作，对于理解制度经济学的基本概念和理论有着重要的贡献。
20条金融论文英语参考文献
20条精选金融论文英语参考文献[1] nelson, c. r. & siegel, a. f. parsimonious modeling of yield curves [j], journal of business 1987(4): 473—489.[2] diebold，francis x and li, canlin..global yield curve dynamics and interactions: adynamic nelson-siegel approach[j],journal of econometrics,XX，10:351-363[3] bliss, r. r.. testing term structure estimation methods [j]. advances in futures and options research, 1997，9:197-231[4] tanner, e.，“exchange market pressures and moary policy: asia and latin america in the 1990s” [c]5 working papers, imf,XX.[5] so, r. w., “price and volatility spillovers between interest rate and exchange value of the usdollar”[j], global finance journal,XX (1) :95-107[6] y.sahalia. testing continuous-time models of the spot interest rate [j], review of financial studies. 1996，9:385-426[7] vasicek 0,fong h g term structure modeling using exponential splines. journal of finance[j], 1982，37:339-348[8] duffle，d. and r. kan. a yield factor model of interest rates[j]，mathematical finance, 1. 1996，6: 379-406[9] ait—sahalia,y and r. kimmel. estimating affine multifactor term structure models using closed-form likelihood expansions[c] ? working paper,nber,XX.[10] engle，robert e autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the variance of u. k inflation[j]. economica,1982，50:987—1008[10]chen，r.-r., and l. scott “maximum likelihood estimation for a multi-factor equilibrium model of the term structure of interest rates,”. journal of fixed ine, december, 1993，12: 14-31 .[11] vasicek o. an equilibrium characterization of the term structure [j] ? journal of financial economics, 1977，5:177-188.[12] j. c. cox, j. e. ingersoll，s. a. ross. a theory of the term structure of interest rates [j]. econometrica, 1985, 53： 385-407[13] edmund m. a. kwaw and yen, resolving economic conflict between the united states and japan[m] . massachusetts institute of technolog. 1997: 189-220.[14] swanson，r.，rogoff，k.was it real the exchange rate-interest differential relation over the modernfloating period[j] journal of finance, 1988，43: 359-382[15] chan, k.，chan, k.c.k karolyi, a.,intraday volatility in the stock index and stock index futures markets [j] review of financial studies 1991 (4) : 657-684.[16] kutan, j. and s. zhou，"mean reversion of interest rates in the eurocurrency market[j], oxford bulletin of economics and statistics,XX，63: 459-473.[17] park. information flows between non-deliverable forward (ndf ) and spot markets：evidence from korean currency [j]. pacific-basin finance journal，XX，9:363-377[18] roberta. michael f，exchange rate regimes in an increasingly integrated world [j]，economy，XX，34:109-132[19] prasad，e. ye. l the renminbi's role in the global moary system[r], global economy and development at brookings,XX (2) : 169-185[20] nelson c r, sigel a f. parsimonious modeling of yield curve [j]. journal of business, 1987，60:473- 489.。
关于企业投资的外文参考文献
关于企业投资的外文参考文献[1] Harry Markowitz. Portfolio Selection [J]. The Journal of Finance, 1952，7:77-91[2] William F. Sharpe. Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk [J]. The Journal of Finance, 1964，19:425?442[3] J. Lintner. The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets [J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1965，47:13?37[4] E. Fama, K. French. The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Finance, 1992，47:427?465[5] E. Fama, K. French. Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds [J], Jounal of Financial Economics, 1993，33:3?56[6] E. Fama，K. French. Dissecting Anomalies [J]. Journal of Finance, 2019:1653?1678[7] J. Berk, R. Green, V. Naik. Optimal Investment, Growth Options，and Security Returns [J]. Journal ofFinanc，1999，54:1553?1607[8] J. Gomes, L. Kogan, L. Zhang. Equilibrium Cross Section of Returns [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2019:693?732[9] M. Carlson, A. Fisher, R. Giammarino. Corporate Investment and Asset Price Dynamics: Implications for the Cross-section of Returns [J]. Journal of Finance, 2019, 59:2577?2603[10] I. Cooper. Asset Pricing Implications of Nonconvex Adjustment Costs and Irreversibility of Investment [J], Journal of Finance, 2019，61:139?170[11] C. Polk, P. Sapienza. The Stock Market and Corporate Investment: A Test of Catering Theory [J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2019, 22:187?217[12] I. Cooper, R. Priestley. Real Investment and Risk Dynamics [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2019, 101:182?205[13]辞海[M].上海：上海辞书出版社，1999:815[14]不列颠百科全书(第八卷)[M].北京：中国大百科全书出版社，2019:413[15] Samuelson, Nordhaus. Economics [M]. 19th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2019[16] Dougall, Corrigan [M]. 10th ed. N.J.: Prentice-Hall, cl978[17] R. Ibbotson. Price Performance of Common Stock New Issues [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1975，3:235?272[18] T. Loughran, J. Ritter. The New Issues Puzzle [J]. Journal of Finance, 1995, 50:23? 52[19] K. Spiess, J. Affleck-Graves. The Long-run Performance of Stock Returns Following Debt Offerings [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999. 54:45?73[20] M. Billet, M. Flannery, J. Garfmkel. Are Bank Loans Special? Evidence on the Post-announcement Performance of Bank Borrowers[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，2019，41:733?752[21] J. Lakonishok，A. Shleifer, R. Vishny. Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation，and Risk [J]. Journal of Finance, 1994，49:1541 ?1578[22] D. Ikenberry, J. Lakonishok, T. Vermaelen. Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases [J]. Journal of Financial Economics，1995，39:181 ?208[23] R. Michaely，R. Thaler, K. Womack. Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift? [J]. Journal of Finance，1995，50:573?608[24] C. Anderson，L. Garcia-Feijoo. Empirical Evidence on Capital Investment, Growth Options, and Security Returns [J]. Journal of Finance, 2019，61:171 ?194[25] P. M. Fairfield, J. S. Whisenant, T. L. Yohn. Accrued Earnings and Growth: Implications for Future Profitability and Market Mispricing[J]. The Accounting Review, 2019, 78:353?371[26] Zhang. Accruals，Investment, and The Accrual Anomaly [J]. Accounting Review, 2019，82:1333?1363[27] M. T. Bradshaw, S. A. Richardson, R. G. Sloan. The Relation between Corporate Financing Activities, Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2019, 42:53?85[28] J. Pontiff, A. Woodgate. Share Issuance and Cross-Sectional Returns [J]. Journal of Finance, 2019, 63:921 ?945[29] M. Cooper, H. Gulen, M. Schill. Asset Growth and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Finance, 2019, 68:1609?1651[30] P. Gray, J. Johnson. The Relationship between Asset Growth and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns [J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2019，35:670-680搜集整理仅供参考。
- 1、下载文档前请自行甄别文档内容的完整性，平台不提供额外的编辑、内容补充、找答案等附加服务。
- 2、"仅部分预览"的文档,不可在线预览部分如存在完整性等问题,可反馈申请退款(可完整预览的文档不适用该条件!)。
- 3、如文档侵犯您的权益，请联系客服反馈,我们会尽快为您处理(人工客服工作时间：9:00-18:30)。
有关资本市场研究的若干英文文献主要包括1952 Portfolio Selection；1953 The Analysis Of Economic Time-Series-Part I-Prices；1954 Existence Of An Equilibrium For A Competitive Economy；1958 Liquidity Preference As Behavior Toward Risk；1958 The Cost Of Capital, Corporation Finance And The Theory Of Investment；1959 Portfolio Selection-Efficient Diversification Of Investments；1959 Stock-Market Patterns And Financial Analysis-Methodological Suggestions；1963 Corporate Income Taxes And The Cost Of Capital-A Correction；1964 Capital Asset Prices-A Theory Of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions Of Risk；1965 Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly；1965 Random Walks In Stock Market Price；1965 Security Prices, Risk, And Maximal Gains From Diversification；1965 The Behavior Of Stock Market Prices；1966 Equilibrium In A Capital Asset Market；1966 Forecasts Of Future Prices, Unbiased Markets, And Martingale Models；1969 Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty-The Continuous-Time Case；1969 The Adjustment Of Stock Prices To New Information1970 Efficient Capital Markets-A Review Of Theory And Empirical Work；1972 The Efficient Market Model；1973 An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model；1973 Risk Aversion And The Martingale Property Of Stock Prices；1973 The Pricing Of Options And Corporate Liabilities；1973 Theory Of Rational Option Pricing；1974 On The Pricing Of Corporate Debt-The Risk Structure Of Interest Rates；1975 On The Difference Between Internal And External Market Efficiency；1975 The Efficient Market Hypothesis And The Value Of Traditional Security Analysis；1975 Warrant Price Movements And The Efficient Market Model；1976 Efficient Capital Markets-Comment；1976 Efficient Capital Markets-Reply；1976 Optimal Speculation Against An Efficient Market；1976 The Arbitrage Theory Of Capital Asset Pricing；1978 Asset Prices In An Exchange Economy；1978 Some Practical Applications Of The Efficient-Market Concept；1979 An Intertemporal Asset Pricing Model With Stochastic Consumption And Investment Opportunities；1979 Option Pricing-A Simplified Approach；1979 Testing For A Flat Spectrum On Efficient Market Price Data；1979 The Peter Principle And The Efficient Market Hypothesis；1979 The Sensitivity Of The Efficient Market Hypothesis To Alternative Specifications Of The Market Model;1980 Back On The Track With The Efficient Markets Hypothesis；1980 Inside Information, Market Information And Efficient Markets；1980 On The Impossibility Of Informationally Efficient Markets；1981 An Integrated View Of Tests Of Rationality, Market Efficiency, And The Short-Run Neutrality Of Monetary Policy；1981 Investing With Ben Graham-An Ex Ante Test Of The Efficient Markets Hypothesis；1981 Testing The Efficiency Of The Canadian-U.S. Exchange Market Under The Assumption Of No Risk Premium；1981 The Speculative Efficiency Hypothesis；1983 A Relationship Between Regression Tests And V olatility Tests Of Market Efficiency；1983 Arbitrage, Factor Structure, And Mean-Variance Analysis On Large Asset；1984 Efficient Markets And The Professional Investor；1984 Stock Market Panics-A Test Of The Efficient Market Hypothesis；1985 An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model Of Asset Prices；1986 Informational Efficiency And Information Subsets；1986 Noise；1986 The Efficient Market Hypothesis On Trial；1988 Permanent And Temporary Components Of Stock Prices；1989 Efficient Capital Markets And Martingales;1990 Habit Formation-A Resolution Of The Equity Premium Puzzle；1990 Predicting Stock Returns In An Efficient Market；1990 Price Reversals, Bid-Ask Spreads, And Market Efficiency；1991 Efficient Capital Markets-II；1992 Financial Market Efficiency Tests；1992 The Cross-Section Of Expected Stock Returns；1993 A Test Of Efficiency For The S&P Index Option Market Using Variance Forecasts；1993 Common Risk Factors In The Returns On Stocks And Bonds；1993 Privileged Traders And Asset Market Efficiency-A Laboratory Study；1993 Returns To Buying Winners And Selling Losers-Implications For Stock Market Efficiency；1993 Stock Markets V olatility Efficiency And Tests-A Survey；1994 Behavioral Capital Asset Pricing Theory；1994 Internal Versus External Capital Markets；1995 Measurement Of Market Integration And Arbitrage；1996 Evaluating Fund Performance In A Dynamic Market；1996 Multifactor Explanations Of Asset Pricing Anomalies；1996 The Spirit Of Capitalism And Stock-Market Prices；1997 Anomalies-The Equity Premium Puzzle；1997 Empirical Performance Of Alternative Option Pricing Models；1997 Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, And Behavioral Finance；1997 Measuring The Efficiency Of Capital Allocation In Commercial Banking；1997 Stock Market Efficiency And Economic Efficiency-Is There A Connection；1997 The Limits Of Arbitrage；1998 Market Efficiency, Long-Term Returns, And Behavioral Finance；1998 Nonparametric Efficiency Testing Of Asian Stock Markets Using Weekly Data;2000 Information, Nonexcludability, And Financial Market Structure；2000 Is The Stock Market Overvalued；2000 Rational Markets-Yes Or No-The Affirmative Case；2000 The Efficient Market Hypothesis；2001 A Surprising Development-Tests Of The Capital Asset Pricing Model And The Efficient Market Hypothesis In Turkey'S Securities Markets；2002 Market Timing And Capital Structure；2003 A Survey Of Behavioral Finance；2003 Modeling And Forecasting Realized V olatility；2003 The Efficient Market Hypothesis And Its Critics；2004 The Capital Asset Pricing Model-Theory And Evidence；2004 The Efficiency Of Canadian Capital Markets-Some Bank Of Canada Research；2005 Are Emerging Financial Markets Efficient-Some Evidence From The Models Of The Thai Stock Market；2005 Reflections On The Efficient Market Hypothesis-30 Years Later；2006 A Dynamic Characterization Of Efficiency；2006 An Alternative Definition Of Market Efficiency And Some Comments On Its Empirical Testing；2006 An Empirical Test Of The Efficiency Hypothesis On The Renminbi Ndf In Hong Kong Market；2006 Simulating Stock Returns Under Switching Regimes-A New Test Of Market Efficiency；2007 On The Importance Of Clean Accounting Measures For The Tests Of Stock Market Efficiency；2007 Weak Form Efficiency In Indian Stock Markets；2008 A Note On The Use Of Moving Average Trading Rules To Test For Weak Form Efficiency In Capital Markets；2008 Measuring The Functional Efficiency Of Capital Markets；2008 Testing Downside Risk Efficiency Under Market Distress；2009 Empirical Evidence On Indian Stock Market Efficiency In Context Of The Global Financial Crisis；2009 Testing The Predictability And Efficiency Of Securitized Real Estate Markets；2009 Testing The Semi-Strong Form Efficiency Of Indian Stock Market With Respect To Information Content Of Stock Split Announcement-A Study In It Industry。