新巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议三中英对照
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital s t a n d a r d s12 September 2010At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements and fully endorsed the agreements it reached on 26 July 2010. These capital reforms, together with the introduction of a global liquidity standard, deliver on the core of the global financial reform agenda and will be presented to the Seoul G20 Leaders summit in November.The Committee's package of reforms will increase the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to %. In addition, banks will be required to hold a capital conservation buffer of % to withstand future periods of stress bringing the total common equity requirements to 7%. This reinforces the stronger definition of capital agreed by Governors and Heads of Supervision in July and the higher capital requirements for trading, derivative and securitisation activities to be introduced at the end of 2011.Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank and Chairman of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, said that "the agreements reached today are a fundamental strengthening of global capital standards." He added that "their contribution to long term financial stability and growth will be substantial. The transition arrangements will enable banks to meet the new standards while supporting the economic recovery." Mr Nout Wellink, Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and President of the Netherlands Bank, added that "the combination of a much stronger definition of capital, higher minimum requirements and the introduction of new capital buffers will ensure that banks are better able to withstand periods of economic and financial stress, therefore supporting economic growth."Increased capital requirementsUnder the agreements reached today, the minimum requirement for common equity, the highest form of loss absorbing capital, will be raised from the current 2% level, before the application of regulatory adjustments, to % after the application of stricter adjustments. This will be phased in by 1 January 2015. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and other qualifying financial instruments based on stricter criteria, will increase from 4% to 6% over the same period. (Annex 1 summarises the new capital requirements.)The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed that the capital conservation buffer above the regulatory minimum requirement be calibrated at % and be met with common equity, after the application of deductions. The purpose of the conservation buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions. This framework will reinforce the objective of sound supervision and bank governance and address the collective action problem that has prevented some banks from curtailing distributions such as discretionary bonuses and high dividends, even in the face ofdeteriorating capital positions.A countercyclical buffer within a range of 0% - % of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital will be implemented according to national circumstances. The purpose of the countercyclical buffer is to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth. For any given country, this buffer will only be in effect when there is excess credit growth that is resulting in a system wide build up of risk. The countercyclical buffer, when in effect, would be introduced as an extension of the conservation buffer range.These capital requirements are supplemented by a non-risk-based leverage ratio that will serve as a backstop to the risk-based measures described above. In July, Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.Systemically important banks should have loss absorbing capacity beyond the standards announced today and work continues on this issue in the Financial Stability Board and relevant Basel Committee work streams. The Basel Committee and the FSB are developing a well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which could include combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt. In addition, work is continuing to strengthen resolution regimes. The Basel Committee also recently issued a consultative document Proposal to ensure the loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability. Governors and Heads of Supervision endorse the aim to strengthen the loss absorbency of non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments.Transition arrangementsSince the onset of the crisis, banks have already undertaken substantial efforts to raise their capital levels. However, preliminary results of the Committee's comprehensive quantitative impact study show that as of the end of 2009, large banks will need, in the aggregate, a significant amount of additional capital to meet these new requirements. Smaller banks, which are particularly important for lending to the SME sector, for the most part already meet these higher standards.The Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed on transitional arrangements for implementing the new standards. These will help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital standards through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending to the economy. The transitional arrangements, which are summarised in Annex 2, include:National implementation by member countries will begin on 1 January 2013. Member countries must translate the rules into national laws and regulations before this date. As of 1 January 2013, banks will be required to meet the following new minimum requirements in relation to risk-weighted assets (RW As):% common equity/RW As;% Tier 1 capital/RW As, and% total capital/RWAs.The minimum common equity and Tier 1 requirements will be phased in between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2015. On 1 January 2013, the minimum common equity requirementwill rise from the current 2% level to %. The Tier 1 capital requirement will rise from 4% to %. On 1 January 2014, banks will have to meet a 4% minimum common equity requirement and a Tier 1 requirement of %. On 1 January 2015, banks will have to meet the % common equity and the 6% Tier 1 requirements. The total capital requirement remains at the existing level of % and so does not need to be phased in. The difference between the total capital requirement of % and the Tier 1 requirement can be met with Tier 2 and higher forms of capital.The regulatory adjustments (ie deductions and prudential filters), including amounts above the aggregate 15% limit for investments in financial institutions, mortgage servicing rights, and deferred tax assets from timing differences, would be fully deducted from common equity by 1 January 2018.In particular, the regulatory adjustments will begin at 20% of the required deductions from common equity on 1 January 2014, 40% on 1 January 2015, 60% on 1 January 2016, 80% on 1 January 2017, and reach 100% on 1 January 2018. During this transition period, the remainder not deducted from common equity will continue to be subject to existing national treatments.The capital conservation buffer will be phased in between 1 January 2016 and year end 2018 becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019. It will begin at % of RW As on 1 January 2016 and increase each subsequent year by an additional percentage points, to reach its final level of % of RWAs on 1 January 2019. Countries that experience excessive credit growth should consider accelerating the build up of the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. National authorities have the discretion to impose shorter transition periods and should do so where appropriate.Banks that already meet the minimum ratio requirement during the transition period but remain below the 7% common equity target (minimum plus conservation buffer) should maintain prudent earnings retention policies with a view to meeting the conservation buffer as soon as reasonably possible.Existing public sector capital injections will be grandfathered until 1 January 2018. Capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-common equity Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital will be phased out over a 10 year horizon beginning 1 January 2013. Fixing the base at the nominal amount of such instruments outstanding on 1 January 2013, their recognition will be capped at 90% from 1 January 2013, with the cap reducing by 10 percentage points in each subsequent year. In addition, instruments with an incentive to be redeemed will be phased out at their effective maturity date.Capital instruments that no longer qualify as common equity Tier 1 will be excluded from common equity Tier 1 as of 1 January 2013. However, instruments meeting the following three conditions will be phased out over the same horizon described in the previous bullet point: (1) they are issued by a non-joint stock company 1 ; (2) they are treated as equity under the prevailing accounting standards; and (3) they receive unlimited recognition as part of Tier 1 capital under current national banking law.Only those instruments issued before the date of this press release should qualify for the above transition arrangements.Phase-in arrangements for the leverage ratio were announced in the 26 July 2010 press release of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision. That is, the supervisorymonitoring period will commence 1 January 2011; the parallel run period will commence 1 January 2013 and run until 1 January 2017; and disclosure of the leverage ratio and its components will start 1 January 2015. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments will be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.After an observation period beginning in 2011, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The revised net stable funding ratio (NSFR) will move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The Committee will put in place rigorous reporting processes to monitor the ratios during the transition period and will continue to review the implications of these standards for financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, addressing unintended consequences as necessary.The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. It seeks to promote and strengthen supervisory and risk management practices globally. The Committee comprises representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision is the governing body of the Basel Committee and is comprised of central bank governors and (non-central bank) heads of supervision from member countries. The Committee's Secretariat is based at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.Annex 1: Calibration of the Capital Framework (PDF 1 page, 19 kb)Annex 2: Phase-in arrangements (PDF 1 page, 27 kb)Full press release (PDF 7 pages, 56 kb)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 Non-joint stock companies were not addressed in the Basel Committee's 1998 agreement on instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital as they do not issue voting common shares.最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议3全文最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团[1]宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成局部.9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识.这些资本监管改革举措一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来开展产生重大的影响.一、会议的根本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2021年9月12日的会议上[2],宣布增强对现有资本金要求的持续监管, 并对在2021年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可.这些银行资本改革举措和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交.巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股〔含留存收益,下同〕将从2%增至%. 另外,银行需持有%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力.此次资本改革稳固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2021年底前提升对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要.此次会议达成了一个从根本上增强全球资本标准的协议.这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的奉献.安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏.更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增长.二、增加的资本要求〔一〕最低普通股要求.根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严风格整到%.这一调整将分阶段实施到2021年1月1日结束.同一时期,一级资本〔包括普通股和其他建立在更严格标准之上的合格金融工具〕也要求由4%调整到6%.〔附件一概述了新的资本要求〕〔二〕建立资本留存超额资本[3].央行行长和监管当局负责人集团一致认为,在最低监管要求之上的资本留存超额资本将应到达%,以满足扣除资本扣减项后的普通股要求.留存超额资本的目的是保证银行维持缓冲资金以弥补在金融和经济压力时期的损失.当银行在经济金融出于压力时期,资本充足率越接近监管最低要求,越要限制收益分配.这一框架将强化良好银行监管目标并且解决共同行动的问题,从而阻止银行即使是在面对资本恶化的情况下仍然自主发放奖金和分配高额红利的〔非理性的〕分配行为.〔三〕建立反周期超额资本[4].反周期超额资本,比率范围在0%%的普通股或者是全部用来弥补损失的资本,将根据经济环境建立.反周期超额资本的建立是为了到达保护银行部门承受过度信贷增长的更广的宏观审慎目标.对任何国家来说,这种缓冲机制仅在信贷过度增长导致系统性风险累积的情况下才产生作用.反周期的缓冲一旦生效,将被作为资本留存超额资本的扩展加以推行.〔四〕运行期限规定.上述这些资本比例要求是通过在风险防范举措之上建立非风险杠杆比率.7月,央行行长和监管机构负责人同意对平行运行期间3%的最低一级资本充足率进行测试.基于平行运行期测试结果,任何最终的调整都将在2021年上半年被执行,并通过适当的方法和计算带入2021年1月起的最低资本要求中.〔五〕其他要求.对金融系统至关重要的银行应具备超过今天所提标准的弥补资产损失的水平,并继续就金融稳定委员会和巴塞尔委员会工作小组出台的意见进行进一步讨论.巴塞尔委员会和金融稳定委员会正在研发一种对这类银行非常好的包括资本附加费,核心资金和担保金在内的综合的方法.另外,增强制度决议的工作还将继续.巴塞尔委员会最近也发表了一份咨询文件,建议确保监管资本在非正常环境下的损失弥补水平.央行行长和监管机构负责人赞同增强非普通一级资本和二级资本工具的损失弥补水平.三、过渡时期安排自危机开始,银行为提升资本水平已经采取了很多努力.但是,巴塞尔委员会的综合定量影响研究结果显示,截至2021年底,大型银行从总体上考虑仍需要相当大量的额外资本才能满足新的监管要求.那些对中小企业贷款尤为重要的规模较小的银行,大局部已经满足了更高的资本要求.央行行长和监管当局负责人还就执行新的资本标准做出了过渡性的安排.这将有助于保证银行通过合理的收益留存和提升资本金以满足更好资本金治理要求的同时,仍能通过信贷投放支持经济的开展.过渡时期的安排在附件二中有概括,包括:〔一〕2021年到达的最低资本要求.在巴塞尔委员会各成员国国内执行新的资本监管要求将从2021年1月1日开始,各成员国必须在执行之前将关于资本新的要求以法律法规的形式予以确立.自2021年1月1日起,银行应符合以下新的相对于风险加权资产〔RWAs〕的最低资本要求:%,普通股/风险加权资产;%,一级资本/风险加权资产;%,总资本/风险加权资产.〔二〕普通股和一级资本过渡期要求.最低普通股和一级资本要求将在2021 年1月至2021年1月逐步实施.到2021年1月1日,最低普通股要求将由2%提升到%,一级资本将由4%提升到%.到2021年1月1日,银行将必须达到普通股4%和一级资本%的最低要求.到2021年1月1日,银行将必须到达普通股%和一级资本6%的最低要求.总资本一直要求保持8%的水平,因此不需要分阶段实施.8%的总资本要求和一级资本要求之间的区别在于二级资本和更高形式的资本.〔二〕扣减项比例过渡期安排.监管的调整〔即扣减项和审慎过滤器〕,包括金融机构超过资本总额15%的投资、抵押效劳权、所得税时间上有差异的递延资产,从2021年1月1日起,将完全从普通股中扣除.特别是,监管调整将从2021年1月1日从普通股中减去扣减项的20%,到2021年1月1日的40%, 到2021年1月1日的60%, 2021年1月1日的80%,最后到2021年的1月1 日100%.在这段过渡时期,其余未从普通股中扣除的资本将继续视同为资本.〔三〕资本留存超额资本过渡期安排.将在2021年1月到2021年1月间分阶段实施,并从2021年正式生效.在2021年,计提风险加权资产的%,随后每年增加个百分点,直到到达2021年的风险加权资产的%.经历过信贷过度增长的国家应尽快考虑建立资本留存超额资本和反周期超额资本.国家有关部门应根据实际情况酌情缩短这一过渡期.那些在过渡阶段已经满足最低比例要求,但是普通股〔最低资本加上资本留存超额资本〕仍低于7%的银行,应该实行审慎地实行收益留存政策以使资本留存超额资本到达合理的范围.〔四〕资本中需要取消的工程过渡期安排.现有的政府部门的资本注入将到2021年1月1日后被取消.从2021年1月1日起,不再作为核心资本或者附属资本的非普通权益的资本工具将通过10年逐步取消.从2021年1月1日起,在确定这类资本工具的名义价金融工具的增值局部的计算将在其到期后逐步取消.不符合核心资本条件的资本工具将自2021年1月1日起从核心资本中扣除.然而,同时满足下面三个条件的金融工具会不包括在上述扣除对象之中:一是由非关联股份公司发行;二是作为资本符合现行的会计标准;三是在现在银行法律下,被成认可以作为核心资本.仅有那些在本文发表之前的金融工具符合上述过渡时期的安排.〔五〕监督检测期安排.央行行长和监管当局负责人集团于2021年7月26 日发表了对资本充足率比例的阶段性安排.监督性监测期间开始于2021年1月1日,并行运行期从2021年1月1日一直持续到2021年1月1日.披露资本充足率和资本构成将于2021年1月1日开始.基于并行运行期的结果,任何最终调整都将在2021年上半年执行,并在采取适当的方法和计算的情况下,作为2021年1月1日正式执行时的最低资本要求.〔六〕对LCR和NSFR的时间安排.在2021年观察一段时间后,流动资金覆盖率〔LCR〕将于2021年1月1日被引入.修订后的净稳定资金比率〔NSFR〕将变动到2021年1月1日执行的最低标准.巴塞尔委员会将实施严格的报告程序,以监测在过渡时期的资本充足率比例,并会继续检验这些标准对金融市场、信贷扩张和经济增长以及解决意外事件的意义.附件一资本划分框架附件二:阶段性实施安排附件一资本划分框架资本要求和超额资本〔所有数字用百分比表示〕普通股权益〔扣减后〕一级资本总资本最低标准资本留存超额资本最低标准加资本留存超额资本反周期超额资本范围*0 -*普通股或其他完全损失弥补资本附件二阶段性实施安排〔阴影局部表示过渡期〕〔所有数据都从1月1日起〕2021 年2021 年2021 年2021 年2021 年2021 年2021 年2021 年2021 年 1 月1日以后杠杆比例监督性检测平行运行期2021年1月1 0-2021年1月1日2021年1月1日开始信息披露迁徙至第一支柱最低普通股比率%%%%%%%资本留存超额资本%%%%最低普通股加上资本留存超额资本%%%%%%%分阶段从核心一级资本扣除的工程〔包括超过递延所得税资产、抵押效劳权和财务额度的金额〕20%40%60%80%100%100%最低一级资本%%%%%%%最低资本总额%%%%%%%最低资本总额加资本留存超额资本%%%%%%%不符合核心一级资本或二级资本条件的资本工具从2021年开始逐步取消流动资金覆盖率观察期开始实施最低标准净稳定资金比率观察期开始实施最低标准原文来自于:央行行长和监管当局负责人集团是巴塞尔委员会中的监管机构,是由成员国央行行长和监管当局负责人组成的.该委员会的秘书处设在瑞士巴塞尔国际清算银行.[2]巴塞尔银行监督委员会提供了有关银行监管合作问题的定期论坛.它旨在促进和增强全球银行监管和风险治理.[3]本文将the capital conservation buffer 译为资本留存超额资本.[4]本文将A countercyclical buffer 译为反周期超额资本。
巴塞尔新资本协议第三版(中文版)
第一支柱:最低资本要求 ..........................................................................11 信用风险标准法 ................................................................................11 内部评级法(Internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches).................12 公司、银行和主权的风险暴露...........................................................13 零售风险暴露....................................................................................14 专业贷款(Specialised lending) .....................................................14
巴塞尔委员会
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
征求意见稿(第三稿)
巴塞尔新资本协议 The New Basel Capital Accord
中国银行业监督管理............................................................................................ 10
巴塞尔协议3
《巴塞尔资本协议III》:2010年9月12日,巴塞尔银行监管委员会宣布,各方代表就《巴塞尔协议III》的内容达成一致。
根据这项协议,商业银行的核心资本充足率将由目前的4%上调到6%,同时计提2.5%的防护缓冲资本和不高于2.5%的反周期准备资本,这样核心资本充足率的要求可达到8.5%-11%。
总资本充足率要求仍维持8%不变。
此外,还将引入杠杆比率、流动杠杆比率和净稳定资金来源比率的要求,以降低银行系统的流动性风险,加强抵御金融风险的能力。
新协议将普通股权益/风险资产比率的要求由原来的2%提高到 4.5%,核心资本充足率的要求也由4%提高到6%,加上2.5%的防护缓冲资本,核心资本充足率的要求达到8.5%。
同时也提出各国可根据情况要求银行提取0%-2.5%的反周期缓冲资本,以便银行可以对抗过度放贷所带来的风险。
此外,还提出了3%的最低杠杆比率以及100%的流动杠杆比率和净稳定资金来源比率要求。
为最大程度上降低新协议对银行贷款供给能力以及宏观经济的影响,协议给出了从2013-2019年一个较长的过渡期。
全球各商业银行5年内必须将一级资本充足率的下限从现行要求的4%上调至6%,过渡期限为2013年升至4.5%,2014年为5.5%,2015年达6%。
同时,协议将普通股最低要求从2%提升至4.5%,过渡期限为2013年升至3.5%,2014年升至4%,2015年升至4.5%。
截至2019年1月1日,全球各商业银行必须将资本留存缓冲提高到2.5%。
中国监管层目前尚未公布相关计划。
《巴塞尔协议III》将降低银行的杠杆率,这无疑将降低股东的回报水平以及长远可持续的资产增速。
根据我们测算,在核心资本充足率8.5%的要求下,中国银行业在资产收益率为0.9%的情况下可获得的净资产收益率为16.8%,可持续的资产增速为10%。
早在2011年5月初,银监会下发了《中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》,正式公布了资本充足率、杠杆率、流动性及贷款损失准备的四大监管工具。
巴塞尔新资本协议第三版(中文版)-232页
巴塞尔委员会Basel Committeeon Banking Supervision征求意见稿(第三稿)巴塞尔新资本协议The NewBasel Capital Accord 中国银行业监督管理委员会翻译目录概述 (10)导言 (10)第一部分新协议的主要内容 (11)第一支柱:最低资本要求 (11)信用风险标准法 (11)内部评级法(Internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches) (12)公司、银行和主权的风险暴露 (13)零售风险暴露 (14)专业贷款(Specialised lending) (14)股权风险暴露(Equity exposures) (14)IRB法的实施问题 (15)证券化 (15)操作风险 (16)第二支柱和第三支柱:监管当局的监督检查和市场纪律 (17)监管当局的监督检查 (17)市场纪律 (18)新协议的实施 (18)朝新协议过渡 (18)有关前瞻性问题 (19)跨境实施问题 (20)今后的工作 (20)第二部分: 对QIS3技术指导文件的修改 (21)导言 21允许使用准备 (21)合格的循环零售风险暴露(qualifying revolving retail exposures,QRRE)..22住房抵押贷款 (22)专业贷款(specialised lending, SL) (22)高波动性商业房地产(high volatility commercial real estate ,HVCRE).23信用衍生工具 (23)证券化 (23)操作风险 (24)缩写词 (26)第一部分:适用范围 (28)A.导言 (28)B.银行、证券公司和其他附属金融企业 (28)C.对银行、证券公司和其他金融企业的大额少数股权投资 (29)D.保险公司 (29)E.对商业企业的大额投资 (30)F.根据本部分的规定对投资的扣减 (31)第二部分:第一支柱-最低资本要求 (33)I. 最低资本要求的计算 (33)II.信用风险-标准法(Standardised Approach) (33)A.标准法 — 一般规则 (33)1.单笔债权的处理 (34)(i)对主权国家的债权 (34)(ii)对非中央政府公共部门实体(public sector entities)的债权 (35)(iii)对多边开发银行的债权 (35)(iv) 对银行的债权 (36)(v)对证券公司的债权 (37)(vi)对公司的债权 (37)(vii)包括在监管定义的零售资产中的债权 (37)(viii) 对居民房产抵押的债权 (38)(ix)对商业房地产抵押的债权 (38)(x)逾期贷款 (39)(xi)高风险的债权 (39)(xii)其他资产 (40)(xiii) 资产负债表外项目 (40)2.外部评级 (40)(i)认定程序 (40)(ii)资格标准 (40)3.实施中需考虑的问题 (41)(i)对应程序(mapping process) (41)(ii)多方评级结果的处理 (42)(iii)发行人评级和债项评级(issuer versus issues assessment) (42)(iv)本币和外币的评级 (42)(v)短期和长期评级 (43)(vi)评级的适用范围 (43)(vii)被动评级(unsolicited ratings) (43)B. 标准法—信用风险缓释(Credit risk mitigation) (44)1.主要问题 (44)(i)综述 (44)(ii) 一般性论述 (44)(iii)法律确定性 (45)2.信用风险缓释技术的综述 (45)(i)抵押交易 (45)(ii) 表内净扣(On-balance sheet netting) (47)(iii)担保和信用衍生工具 (47)(iv) 期限错配 (47)(v) 其他问题 (48)3.抵押品 (48)(i)合格的金融抵押品 (48)(ii) 综合方法 (49)(iii)简单方法 (56)(iv) 抵押的场外衍生工具交易 (57)4.表内净扣 (57)5.担保和信用衍生工具 (58)(i)操作要求 (58)(ii)合格的担保人/信用保护提供者的范围 (60)(iii)风险权重 (60)(iv)币种错配 (60)(v)主权担保 (61)6.期限错配 (61)7.与信用风险缓释相关的其他问题的处理 (62)(i)对信用风险缓释技术池(pools of CRM techniques)的处理 (62)(ii) 第一违约的信用衍生工具 (62)(iii)第二违约的信用衍生工具 (62)III. 信用风险——IRB法 (62)A.概述 (62)B.IRB法的具体要求 (63)1.风险暴露类别 (63)(i) 公司暴露的定义 (63)(ii) 主权暴露的定义 (65)(iii) 银行暴露的定义 (65)(iv) 零售暴露的定义 (65)(v)合格的循环零售暴露的定义 (66)(vi) 股权暴露的定义 (67)(vii)合格的购入应收账款的定义 (68)2.初级法和高级法 (69)(i)公司、主权和银行暴露 (69)(ii) 零售暴露 (70)(iii) 股权暴露 (70)(iv) 合格的购入应收账款 (70)3. 在不同资产类别中采用IRB法 (70)4.过渡期安排 (71)(i)采用高级法的银行平行计算资本充足率 (71)(ii) 公司、主权、银行和零售暴露 (72)(iii) 股权暴露 (72)C.公司、主权、及银行暴露的规定 (73)1.公司、主权和银行暴露的风险加权资产 (73)(i)风险加权资产的推导公式 (73)(ii) 中小企业的规模调整 (73)(iii) 专业贷款的风险权重 (74)2.风险要素 (75)(i)违约概率 (75)(iii)违约风险暴露 (79)(iv) 有效期限 (80)D.零售暴露规定 (82)1.零售暴露的风险加权资产 (82)(i) 住房抵押贷款 (82)(ii) 合格的循环零售贷款 (82)(iii) 其他零售暴露 (83)2.风险要素 (83)(i)违约概率和违约损失率 (83)(ii) 担保和信贷衍生产品的认定 (83)(iii) 违约风险暴露 (83)E.股权暴露的规则 (84)1.股权暴露的风险加权资产 (84)(i)市场法 (84)(ii) 违约概率/违约损失率方法 (85)(iii) 不采用市场法和违约概率/违约损失率法的情况 (86)2. 风险要素 (87)F. 购入应收账款的规则 (87)1.违约风险的风险加权资产 (87)(i)购入的零售应收账款 (87)(ii) 购入的公司应收账款 (87)2.稀释风险的风险加权资产 (89)(i)购入折扣的处理 (89)(ii) 担保的认定 (89)G. 准备的认定 (89)H.IRB法的最低要求 (90)1.最低要求的内容 (91)2.遵照最低要求 (91)3.评级体系设计 (91)(i)评级维度 (92)(ii) 评级结构 (93)(iv) 评估的时间 (94)(v)模型的使用 (95)(vi) 评级体系设计的记录 (95)4.风险评级体系运作 (96)(i) 评级的涵盖范围 (96)(ii) 评级过程的完整性 (96)(iii) 推翻评级的情况(Overrides) (97)(iv) 数据维护 (97)(v)评估资本充足率的压力测试 (98)5. 公司治理和监督 (98)(i)公司治理(Corporate governance) (98)(ii) 信用风险控制 (99)(iii) 内审和外审 (99)6. 内部评级的使用 (99)7.风险量化 (100)(i)估值的全面要求 (100)(ii) 违约的定义 (101)(iii) 重新确定帐龄(Re-ageing) (102)(iv) 对透支的处理 (102)(v) 所有资产类别损失的的定义 (102)(vi) 估计违约概率的要求 (102)(vii) 自行估计违约损失率的要求 (104)(viii) 自己估计违约风险暴露的要求 (104)(ix) 评估担保和信贷衍生产品成熟性效应的最低要求 (106)(x)估计合格的购入应收账款违约概率和违约损失率的要求 (107)8. 内部评估的验证 (109)9. 监管当局确定的违约损失率和违约风险暴露 (110)(i)商用房地产和居民住房作为抵押品资格的定义 (110)(ii) 合格的商用房地产/居民住房的操作要求 (110)(iii) 认定金融应收账款的要求 (111)10.认定租赁的要求 (113)11.股权暴露资本要求的计算 (114)(i)内部模型法下的市场法 (114)(ii) 资本要求和风险量化 (114)(iv) 验证和形成文件 (116)12.披露要求 (118)IV.信用风险--- 资产证券化框架 (119)A.资产证券化框架下所涉及交易的范围和定义 (119)B. 定义 (120)1. 银行所承担的不同角色 (120)(i)银行作为投资行 (120)(ii) 银行作为发起行 (120)2. 通用词汇 (120)(i) 清收式赎回(clean-up call) (120)(ii) 信用提升(credit enhancement) (120)(iii) 提前摊还(early amortisation) (120)(iv) 超额利差(excess spread) (121)(v)隐性支持(implicit support) (121)(vi) 特别目的机构(Special purpose entity (SPE)) (121)C. 确认风险转移的操作要求 (121)1.传统型资产证券化的操作要求 (121)2.对合成型资产证券化的操作要求 (122)3.清收式赎回的操作要求和处理 (123)D. 对资产证券化风险暴露的处理 (123)1.最低资本要求 (123)(i)扣减 (123)(ii) 隐性支持 (123)2. 使用外部信用评估的操作要求 (124)3. 资产证券化风险暴露的标准化方法 (124)(i) 范围 (124)(ii) 风险权重 (125)(iii) 对于未评级资产证券化风险暴露一般处理方法的例外情况 (125)(iv) 表外风险资产的信用转换系数 (126)(v)信用风险缓释的确认 (127)(vi) 提前摊还规定的资本要求 (128)(viii)对于非控制型具有提前摊还特征的风险暴露的信用风险转换系数的确定 (130)4.资产证券化的内部评级法 (131)(i)范围 (131)(ii) KIRB定义 (131)(iii) 各种不同的方法 (132)(iv) 所需资本最高限 (133)(v) 以评级为基础的方法 (133)(vi) 监管公式 (135)(vii)流动性便利 (137)(viii) 合格服务人现金透支便利 (138)(ix) 信用风险缓释的确认 (138)(x) 提前摊还的资本要求 (138)V. 操作风险 (139)A. 操作风险的定义 (139)B. 计量方法 (139)1.基本指标法 (139)2.标准法 (140)3.高级计量法(Advanced Measurement Approaches ,AMA) (141)C.资格标准 (142)1.一般标准 (142)2.标准法 (142)3. 高级计量法 (143)D.局部使用 (147)VI.交易账户 (148)A.交易账户的定义 (148)B.审慎评估标准 (149)1.评估系统和控制手段 (149)2.评估方法 (149)3.计值调整(储备) (150)C.交易账户对手信用风险的处理 (151)D.标准法对交易账户特定风险资本要求的处理 (152)1.政府债券的特定风险资本要求 (152)2.对未评级债券特定风险的处理原则 (152)3. 采用信用衍生工具套做保值头寸的专项资本要求 (152)4.信用衍生工具的附加系数 (153)第三部分:监督检查 (155)A.监督检查的重要性 (155)B.监督检查的四项主要原则 (155)C.监督检查的具体问题 (161)D:监管检查的其他问题 (167)第四部分:第三支柱——市场纪律 (169)A.总体考虑 (169)1.披露要求 (169)2.指导原则 (169)3.恰当的披露 (169)4. 与会计披露的相互关系 (169)5.重要性(Materiality) (170)6.频率 (170)B.披露要求 (171)1.总体披露原则 (171)2.适用范围 (171)3.资本 (173)4.风险暴露和评估 (175)(i)定性披露的总体要求 (175)(ii)信用风险 (175)(iii)市场风险 (183)(iv)操作风险 (184)(v)银行账户的利率风险 (184)附录1 创新工具在一级资本中的上线为15% (185)附录2 标准法-实施对应程序 (186)附录3 IRB法风险权重的实例 (190)附录4 监管当局对专业贷款设定的标准 (193)附录5 按照监管公式计算信用风险缓释的影响 (207)附录 6 (211)附录7 损失事件分类详表 (215)附录8 (220)概 述导言1.巴塞尔银行监管委员会(以下简称委员会)现公布巴塞尔新资本协议(Basel II, 以下简称巴塞尔II)第三次征求意见稿(CP3,以下简称第三稿)。
巴塞尔协议三
The Basel III Capital Framework:a decisive breakthroughHervé HannounDeputy General Manager, Bank for International Settlements1BoJ-BIS High Level Seminar onFinancial Regulatory Reform: Implications for Asia and the PacificHong Kong SAR, 22 November 2010IntroductionTen days ago, the Basel III framework was endorsed by the G20 leaders in South Korea. Basel III is the centrepiece of the financial reform programme coordinated by the Financial Stability Board.2 This endorsement represents a critical step in the process to strengthen the capital rules by which banks are required to operate. When the international rule-making process is completed and Basel III has been implemented domestically, we will have considerably reduced the probability and severity of a crisis in the banking sector, and by extension enhanced global financial stability.The title of my intervention, “The Basel III Capital Framework: a decisive breakthrough”, sounds like a military metaphor, which may be surprising in the context of a speech on banking regulation. But indeed, the supervisory community had to fight a fierce battle to require more capital and less leverage in the financial system in the face of significant resistance from some quarters of the banking industry.I will highlight nine key breakthroughs in Basel III, from a focus on tangible equity capital to a reduced reliance on banks’ internal models and a greater focus on stress testing, that will increase the safety and soundness of banks individually and the banking system more broadly.1This speech was prepared together with Jason George and Eli Remolona, and benefited from comments by Robert McCauley, Frank Packer, Ilhyock Shim, Bruno Tissot, Stefan Walter and Haibin Zhu.2Basel III: towards a safer financial system, speech by Mr Jaime Caruana, General Manager of the BIS, at the 3rd Santander International Banking Conference, Madrid, 15 September 2010Restricted3Thirty years of bank capital regulation11/2010G20 endorsement of Basel III06/2004Basel II issued 12/1996Market risk amendmentissued 07/1988Basel Iissued 01/2019Full implementation of Basel III12/1997 Market risk amendmentimplemented 12/1992Basel I fullyimplemented 12/2009Basel III consultative document issued 12/2006Basel II implemented 07/2009Revised securitisation & trading book rulesissued 12/2007Basel II advanced approaches implemented 01/2013Basel III implementation begins12/2011Trading book rules implementedTo understand the importance of the Basel III reforms and where we are headed in terms of capital regulation, I think it is instructive if we briefly look back to see where we have come from.Basel I, the first internationally agreed capital standard, was issued some 22 years ago in 1988. Although it only addressed credit risk, it reflected the thinking that we continue to subscribe to today, namely, that the amount of capital required to protect against losses in an asset should vary depending upon the riskiness of the asset. At the same time, it set 8% as the minimum level of capital to be held against the sum of all risk-weighted assets.Following Basel I, in 1996 market risk was added as an area for which capital was required. Then, in 2004, Basel II was issued, adding operational risk, as well as a supervisory review process and disclosure requirements. Basel II also updated and expanded upon the credit risk weighting scheme introduced in Basel I, not only to capture the risk in instruments and activities that had developed since 1988, but also to allow banks to use their internal risk rating systems and approaches to measure credit and operational risk for capital purposes. What could more broadly be referred to as Basel III began with the issuance of the revised securitisation and trading book rules in July 2009, and then the consultative document in December of that year. The trading book rules will be implemented at the end of next year and the new definition of capital and capital requirements in Basel III over a six-year period beginning in January 2013. This extended implementation period for Basel III is designed to give banks sufficient time to adjust through earnings retention and capital-raising efforts.Restricted5The Basel III reform of bank capital regulationCapital ratio =Capital Risk-weighted assets Enhancing risk coverage ●Securitisation products●Trading book●Counterparty credit riskNew capital ratios●Common equity●Tier 1●Total capital●Capital conservation buffer Raising the quality of capital ●Focus on common equity ●Stricter criteria for Tier 1●Harmonised deductions from capital Macroprudential overlay Mitigating procyclicality●Countercyclical bufferLeverage ratio Mitigating systemic risk(work in progress)●Systemic capitalsurcharge for SIFIs●Contingent capital●Bail-in debt●OTC derivativesIn my remarks today I will try to illustrate the fundamental change introduced by Basel III, that of marrying the microprudential and the macroprudential approaches to supervision. Basel III builds upon the firm-specific, risk based frameworks of Basel I and Basel II by introducing a system-wide approach. I will structure my remarks around these two approaches and, in so doing, will demonstrate how Basel III is BOTH a firm-specific, risk based framework and a system-wide, systemic risk-based framework.I. Basel III: a firm-specific, risk-based frameworkLet us look first at the microprudential, firm-specific approach, and consider in turn the three elements of the capital equation: the numerator of the new solvency ratios, ie capital, the denominator, ie risk-weighted assets, and finally the capital ratio itself.A. The numerator: a strict definition of capitalRegarding the numerator, the Basel III framework substantially raises the quality of capital. Basically, in the old definition of capital, a bank could report an apparently strong Tier 1 capital ratio while at the same time having a weak tangible common equity ratio. Prior to the crisis, the amount of tangible common equity of many banks, when measured against risk-weighted assets, was as low as 1 to 3%, net of regulatory deductions. That’s a risk-based leverage of between 33 to 1 and 100 to 1. Global banks further increased their leverage by infesting the Tier 1 part of their capital structure with hybrid “innovative” instruments with debt-like features.In the old definition, capital comprised various elements with a complex set of minimums and maximums for each element. We had Tier 1 capital, innovative Tier 1, upper and lower Tier 2, Tier 3 capital, each with their own limits which were sometimes a function of other capital elements. The complexity in the definition of capital made it difficult to determine what capital would be available should losses arise. This combination of weaknesses permitted tangible common equity capital, the best form of capital, to be as low as 1% of risk-weighted assets.In addition to complicated rules around what qualifies as capital, there was a lack of harmonisation of the various deductions and filters that are applied to the regulatory capital calculation. And finally there was a complete lack of transparency and disclosure on banks’ structure of capital, making it impossible to compare the capital adequacy of global banks.As we learned again during the crisis, credit losses and writedowns come directly out of retained earnings and therefore common equity. It is thus critical that banks’ risk exposures are backed by a high-quality capital base. This is why the new definition of capital properly focuses on common equity capital.The concept of Tier 1 that we are familiar with will continue to exist and will include common equity and other instruments that have a loss-absorbing capacity on a “going concern” basis,3 for example certain preference shares. Innovative capital instruments which were permitted in limited amount as part of Tier 1 capital will no longer be permitted and those currently in existence will be phased out.Tier 2 capital will continue to provide loss absorption on a “gone concern” basis1 and will typically consist of subordinated debt. Tier 3 capital, which was used to cover a portion of a bank’s market risk capital charge, will be eliminated and deductions from capital will be harmonised. With respect to transparency, banks will be required to provide full disclosure and reconciliation of all capital elements.The overarching point with respect to the numerator of the capital equation is the focus on tangible common equity, the highest-quality component of a bank’s capital base, and therefore, the component with the greatest loss-absorbing capacity. This is the first breakthrough in Basel III.B. The denominator: enhanced risk coverageRegarding the denominator, Basel III substantially improves the coverage of the risks, especially those related to capital market activities: trading book, securitisation products, counterparty credit risk on OTC derivatives and repos.In the period leading up to the crisis, when banks were focusing their business activities on these areas, we saw a significant increase in total assets. Yet under the Basel II rules, risk-weighted assets showed only a modest increase. This point is made clear in the following chart showing the increase in both total assets and risk-weighted assets for the 50 largest banks in the world from 2004 to 2010. This phenomenon was more pronounced for some countries and regions than for others.3Tier 1 capital is loss-absorbing on a “going concern” basis (ie the financial institution is solvent). Tier 2 capital absorbs losses on a “gone concern” basis (ie following insolvency and upon liquidation).Restricted9I. Firm specific framework (microprudential)B. The denominator: enhanced risk coverage1. From 2004 to 2009, total assets at the top 50 banks have increased at a more rapid pace than risk weighted assets2. The need to monitor the relationship between risk weighted assets and total assets which varies greatly across countriesand underscores the importance of consistent implementation of theglobal regulatory standards across jurisdictionsFor global banks the enhanced risk coverage under Basel III is expected to cause risk-weighted assets to increase substantially. This, combined with a tougher definition and level of capital, may tempt banks to understate their risk-weighted assets. This points to the need in future to monitor closely the relationship between risk-weighted assets and total assets with a view to promoting a consistent implementation of the global capital standards across jurisdictions.Risk weighting challengesLet me now focus for a moment on the challenges of getting the risk weights right in a risk-based framework.Many asset classes may appear to be low-risk when seen from a firm-specific perspective. But we have seen that the system-wide build-up of seemingly low-risk exposures can pose substantial threats to broader financial stability. Before the recent crisis, the list of apparently low-risk assets included highly rated sovereigns, tranches of AAA structured products, collateralised repos and derivative exposures, to name just a few. The leverage ratio will help ensure that we do not lose sight of the fact that there are system-wide risks that need to be underpinned by capital.The basic approach of the Basel capital standards has always been to attach higher risk weights to riskier assets. The risk weights themselves and the methodology were significantly enhanced as we moved from Basel I to Basel II, and they have now been further refined under Basel III. Nonetheless, as the crisis has made clear, what is not so risky in normal times may suddenly become very risky during a systemic crisis. Something that looks risk-free may turn out to have rather large tail risk.Focusing a bit more on exposures with low risk weights, let me cite a few examples to illustrate the difficulty of getting the risk weights correct.Sovereigns: the sovereign debt crisis of 2010 has shown that the zero risk weightassumption for AAA and AA-rated sovereigns under the standardised approach of Basel II did not account for the dramatic deterioration in the fiscal and debt positionsof major advanced economies. These exposures are still considered as low-risk but certainly not totally risk-free.∙ OTC derivatives (under CSAs) and repos: the Lehman and Bear Stearns failuresdemonstrated that the very low capital charge on OTC derivatives and repos did not capture the systemic risk associated with the interconnectedness and potential cascade effects in these markets.∙ Senior tranches of securitisation exposures: financial engineering produced AAA-rated tranches of complex products, such as the super-senior tranches of ABS CDOs. These proved much more risky than what would be expected from a AAA exposure. The preferential risk weight of 7% for those super-senior tranches was too low, and the risk weight has now been raised to 20%.For assets with medium risk weights, one could cite the following examples: ∙ Residential mortgages: 35% risk weight under the standardised approach. For highest-quality mortgages: 4.15% risk weight (IRB approach)∙ Highly rated corporates: 20% risk weight under the standardised approach. For best-quality corporates: 14.4% risk weight (IRB approach)∙ Highly rated banks: 20% risk weight (standardised approach)For assets with high risk weights, the following examples can be considered:∙ HVCRE (high volatility commercial real estate)∙ Mezzanine tranches of ABS/CDOs∙ Hedge fund equity stakes: 400% risk weight ∙ Claims on unrated corporates: 100% risk weight Restricted3I. Firm specific framework (microprudential)●●B. The denominator: risk weighting challengesWeak correlation between risk-weights and crisis-related losses Low risk-weights may have contributed to the build-up of system wide risksThe chart above shows how different asset classes fared during the crisis. Relative to their Basel II risk weights, equity stakes in hedge funds, claims on corporates and some retailexposures experienced modest losses during the crisis. By contrast, mortgages, highly rated banks, AAA-rated CDO tranches and sovereigns inflicted rather heavy losses on banks. These cases show that there is a rather weak correlation between risk weights and crisis-related losses during periods of system-wide stress. Moreover, we have also discovered that low risk weights can lead to an excessive build-up of system-wide risks. Recognising this problem, the Basel Committee has now introduced a backstop simple leverage ratio, which will require a minimum ratio of capital to total assets without any risk weights. I will come back to this later.The trading book and securitisationsTwo areas the crisis has revealed as needing enhanced risk coverage are the trading book and securitisations. Here capital charges fell short of risk exposures. Basel II focused primarily on the banking book, where traditional assets such as loans are held. But the major losses during the 2007–09 financial crisis came from the trading book, especially the complex securitisation exposures such as collateralised debt obligations. As shown in the table below, the capital requirements for trading assets were extremely low, even relative to banks’ own economic capital estimates. The Basel Committee has addressed this anomaly.Restricted15Trading assetsand marketriskcapitalrequirements¹The revised framework now requires the following:∙Introduction of a 12-month stressed VaR capital charge; ∙Incremental risk capital charge applied to the measurement of specific risk in credit sensitive positions when using VaR; ∙Similar treatment for trading and banking book securitisations; ∙Higher risk weights for resecuritisations (20% instead of 7% for AAA-rated tranches); ∙ Higher credit conversion factors for short-term liquidity facilities to off-balance sheetconduits and SIVs (the shadow banking system); andMore rigorous own credit analyses of externally rated securitisation exposures with less reliance on external ratings.As a result of this enhanced risk coverage, banks will now hold capital for trading book assets that, on average, is about four times greater than that required by the old capital requirements. The Basel Committee is also conducting a fundamental review of the market risk framework rules, including the rationale for the distinction between banking book and trading book. This is the second Basel III breakthrough: eradicate the trading book loophole, ie eliminate the possibility of regulatory arbitrage between the banking and trading books.Counterparty credit risk on derivatives and reposThe Basel Committee is also strengthening the capital requirements for counterparty credit risk on OTC derivatives and repos by requiring that these exposures be measured using stressed inputs. Banks also must hold capital for mark to market losses (credit valuation adjustments – CVA) associated with the deterioration of a counterparty’s credit quality. The Basel II framework addressed counterparty credit risk only in terms of defaults and credit migrations. But during the crisis, mark to market losses due to CVA (which actually represented two thirds of the losses from counterparty credit risk, only one third being due to actual defaults) were not directly capitalised.C. Capital ratios: calibration of the new requirementsWith a capital base whose quality has been enhanced, and an expanded coverage of risks both on- and off-balance sheet, the Basel Committee has made great strides in strengthening capital standards. But in addition to the quality of capital and risk coverage, it also calibrated the capital ratio such that it will now be able to absorb losses not only in normal times, but also during times of economic stress.To this end, banks will now be required to hold a minimum of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets in tangible common equity versus 2% under Basel II. In addition, the Basel Committee is requiring a capital conservation buffer – which I will discuss in just a moment – of 2.5%. Taken together, this means that banks will need to maintain a 7% common equity ratio. When one considers the tighter definition of capital and enhanced risk coverage, this translates into roughly a sevenfold increase in the common equity requirement for internationally active banks. This represents the third breakthrough.Restricted18I. Firm-specific framework (microprudential)C. Capital ratio: the new requirementsIncreases under Basel III are even greater when one considersthe stricter definition of capital and enhanced risk-weighting10.588.567.02.54.5Basel IIINewdefinition andcalibration Equivalent to around 2% for an average international bank underthe new definition Equivalent to around 1% for an averageinternational bank under the new definition Memo:842Basel II RequiredMinimum Required Minimum Required Conservationbuffer Minimum Total capital Tier 1 capital Common equityCapital requirementsAs a percentageof risk-weightedassets Third breakthrough: an average sevenfold increase in the common equityrequirements for global banksThis higher level of capital is calibrated to absorb the types of losses associated with crises like the previous one.The private sector has complained that these new requirements will cause them to curtail lending or increase the cost of borrowing. In an effort to address some of the industry’s concerns, the Basel Committee has agreed upon extended transitional arrangements that will allow the banking sector to meet the higher capital standards through earnings retention and capital-raising.The new standards will take effect on 1 January 2013 and for the most part will become fully effective by January 2019.D. Capital conservationA fourth key breakthrough of Basel III is that banks will no longer be able to pursue distribution policies that are inconsistent with sound capital conservation principles. We have learned from the crisis that it is prudent for banks to build capital buffers during times of economic growth. Then, as the economy begins to contract, banks may be forced to use these buffers to absorb losses. But to offset the contraction of the buffer, banks could have the ability to restrict discretionary payments such as dividends and bonuses to shareholders, employees and other capital providers. Of course they could also raise additional capital in the market.In fact, what we witnessed during the crisis was a practice by banks to continue making these payments even as their financial condition and capital levels deteriorated. This practice, in effect, puts the interest of the recipients of these payments above those of depositors, and this is simply not acceptable.To address the need to maintain a buffer to absorb losses and restrict the ability of banks to make inappropriate distributions as their capital strength declines, the Basel Committee will now require banks to maintain a buffer of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. This buffer must be held in tangible common equity capital.As a bank’s capital ratio declines and it uses the conservation buffer to absorb losses, the framework will require banks to retain an increasingly higher percentage of their earnings and will impose restrictions on distributable items such as dividends, share buybacks and discretionary bonuses. Supervisors now have the power to enforce capital conservation discipline. This is a fundamental change.II. Basel III: A system-wide, systemic risk-based frameworkOverviewReturning to the theme of my discussion, Basel III is not only a firm-specific risk-based framework, it is also a system-wide, systemic risk-based framework. The so-called macroprudential overlay is designed to address systemic risk and is an entirely new way of thinking about capital.This new dimension of the capital framework consists of five elements. The first is a leverage ratio, a simple measure of capital that supplements the risk-based ratio and which constrains the build-up of leverage in the system. The second is steps taken to mitigate procyclicality, including a countercyclical capital buffer and, although outside a strict discussion of capital, efforts to promote a provisioning framework based upon expected losses rather than incurred losses. The third element of the macroprudential overlay is steps to address the externalities generated by systemically important financial institutions through higher loss-absorbing capacity. The fourth is a framework to address the risk arising from systemically important markets and infrastructures. In particular, I am referring to the OTC derivatives markets. And finally, the macroprudential overlay aims to better capture systemic risk and tail events in the banks’ own risk management framework, including through risk modelling, stress testing and scenario analysis.ratioA. LeverageIn the lead up to the crisis many banks reported strong Tier 1 risk based ratios while, at the same time, still being able to build up high levels of on and off balance sheet leverage.In response to this, the Basel Committee has introduced a simple, non-risk-based leverage ratio to supplement the risk-based capital requirements. The leverage ratio has the added benefit of serving as a safeguard against model risk and any attempts to circumvent the risk-based capital requirements.The leverage ratio will be a measure of a bank’s Tier 1 capital as a percentage of its assets plus off balance sheet exposures and derivatives.For derivatives, regulatory net exposure will be used plus an add-on for potential future exposure. Netting of all derivatives will be permitted. In so doing, the Basel Committee has successfully solved the difficulty resulting from the divergence between the main accounting frameworks. (Bank leverage is significantly lower under US GAAP than under IFRS due to the netting of OTC derivatives allowed under the former. Given that banks may hold offsetting contracts, US GAAP allows banks to report their net exposures while IFRS does not allow netting. As a result, the size of a bank‘s total assets can vary significantly based on the treatment of this one accounting item.)The leverage ratio will also include off-balance sheet items in the measure of total assets. These off-balance sheet items, including commitments, letters of credit and the like, unless they are unconditionally cancellable, will be converted using a flat 100% credit conversion factor.To highlight the importance of the leverage ratio we need look no further than the increase in total assets in the years leading up to the crisis versus the increase in risk-weighted assets. It is obvious that balance sheets were being leveraged, but the risk-based framework failed tocapture this dynamic, as suggested by the following chart depicting risk-weighted and totalassets for the top 50 banks.Restricted5II. System-wide approach (macroprudential)A. Leverage ratiothe importance of the banking sector building up additional capital defences in periods where the risks of system-wide stress are growing markedly.While some in the financial community are sceptical about the usefulness of a leverage ratio, the Basel Committee’s Top-down Capital Calibration Group recently completed a study that showed that the leverage ratio did the best job of differentiating between banks that ultimately required official sector support in the recent crisis and those that did not.This leads me to the fifth breakthrough: Basel III is a framework that remains risk-based but now includes – through the Tier 1 leverage ratio – a backstop approach that also captures risks arising from total assets. The risk-based and leverage ratios reinforce each other.For all of these reasons, public policymakers and legislators must resist the intense lobbying effort of the industry to water down the leverage ratio to merely a Pillar 2 instrument. Giving in to this lobbying would increase the exposure of taxpayers to future bank failures and hurt long-term growth over a full credit cycle since sustainable credit growth cannot be achieved through excessive leverage.B. Countercyclical capital bufferWe have learned that procyclicality, which is inherent in banking, has exacerbated the impact of the crisis. While we will not eliminate cyclicality, what we would like to do is prevent its amplification through the banking sector, particularly that caused by excessive credit growth. This can be achieved through the new countercyclical capital buffer.As the volume of loans grows, if asset price bubbles burst or the economy subsequently enters a downturn and loan quality begins to deteriorate, banks will adopt a very conservative stance when it comes to the granting of new credit. This lack of credit availability only serves to exacerbate the problem, pushing the real economy deeper into trouble with asset prices declining further and the level of non-performing loans increasing further. This in turn causes bank lending to become scarcer still. These interactions highlights of stress, but it helps to ensure that by leading to the build-up of ed in each of the jurisdictions in which the bank has credit exposures.th breakthrough in Basel III.As you know, there is considerable work being done by the Financial Stability Board on how tions, ework for identifying SIFIs and a study of the magnitude of se to the global financial ically infrastructures. This is clearly illustrated ring and trade reporting on OTC derivatives. Derivative counterparty credit exposures to central counterparty clearing The countercyclical capital buffer not only protects the banking sector from losses resulting from periods of excess credit growth followed by period credit remains available during this period of stress. Importantly, during the build-up phase, as credit is being granted at a rapid pace, the countercyclical capital buffer may cause the cost of credit to increase, acting as a brake on bank lending.Each jurisdiction will monitor credit growth in relation to measures such as GDP and, using judgment, assess whether such growth is excessive, there system-wide risk. Based on this assessment they may put in place a countercyclical buffer requirement ranging from 0 to 2.5%. This requirement will be released when system-wide risk dissipates.For banks that are operating in multiple jurisdictions, the buffer will be a weighted average of the buffers appli To give banks time to adjust to a buffer level, jurisdictions will preannounce their countercyclical buffer decisions by 12 months.The introduction of a countercyclical capital charge to mitigate the procyclicality caused by excessive credit growth is the six C. Systemically important financial institutions: additional loss-absorbing capacityto design the best framework for the oversight of systemically important financial institu or SIFIs.4 It is broadly recognised that systemically important banks should have loss-absorbing capacity beyond the basic Basel III standards. This can be achieved by a combination of a systemic capital charge, contingent bonds that convert to equity at a certain trigger point and bail-in debt.Although the work on SIFIs is incomplete at this time, the Basel Committee has committed to complete by mid-2011 a fram additional loss absorbency that global systemically important banks should have. Also by mid-2011, the Basel Committee will complete its assessment of going-concern loss absorbency in some of the various contingent capital structures.What is clear, and this is the seventh breakthrough, is that SIFIs need higher loss-absorbing capacity to reflect the greater risks that they po system. A systemic capital surcharge is the most straightforward, but not the only way to achieve this.D. Systemically important markets and infrastructures (SIMIs): the case of OTCderivativesJust as there are systemically important financial institutions, there are also system important markets and systemically important market by the case of OTC derivatives. In particular, the Lehman failure demonstrated that the very low capital charge on OTC derivatives did not capture the systemic risk associated with the interconnectedness and potential cascade effects in these markets.To address the problem of interconnectedness as it relates to derivatives, the Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board have endorsed central clea4 Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions , FSB Recommendations and Time Lines, 20 October 2010.。
新巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。
这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。
一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9月12日的会议上2,宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管,并对在2010年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可。
这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。
巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股(含留存收益,下同)将从2%增至4.5%。
另外,银行需持有2.5%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。
此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。
此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。
这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。
安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏。
更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增长。
1央行行长和监管当局负责人集团是巴塞尔委员会中的监管机构,是由成员国央行行长和监管当局负责人组成的。
该委员会的秘书处设在瑞士巴塞尔国际清算银行。
2巴塞尔银行监督委员会提供了有关银行监管合作问题的定期论坛。
它旨在促进和加强全球银行监管和风险管理。
二、增加的资本要求(一)最低普通股要求。
根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严格调整到4.5%。
巴塞尔协议3全文
巴塞尔协议3全文协议概述巴塞尔协议3全文》是一项针对全球银行业的监管框架协议。
该协议旨在提高银行业的资本充足性、风险管理和监管合规性,以确保金融体系的稳定性和可持续性。
协议的目的是通过制定一系列规则和标准,为银行业提供更加合理的风险管理和资本充足性要求。
它的实施将帮助银行更好地应对金融风险,并在面临未来金融危机的情况下保持稳定。
参与巴塞尔协议3的国家包括世界各地的重要经济体。
这些国家通过协议中设定的规定和指导方针来监管本国的金融机构,以确保其与全球标准的一致性。
巴塞尔协议3还提供了一种合作平台,使得各国金融监管机构能够共同努力,共享信息和经验,加强跨国合作。
除国家和金融机构外,巴塞尔协议3还涉及到许多相关方面,包括金融监管机构、国际金融组织和市场参与者等。
这些相关方面在协议的实施和监管过程中发挥着重要作用,共同维护金融体系的稳定和可持续发展。
巴塞尔协议3全文详细规定了资本充足性的计算方法、风险权重的确定、流动性风险管理、杠杆比率要求等内容。
它为银行业提供了明确的指导和规定,帮助银行更好地管理风险、提高资本充足性,并促进金融体系的稳定和健康发展。
请注意,本文档是《巴塞尔协议3全文》的概述,不涵盖具体内容的细节和实施细则。
如需了解详细信息,请参考原始文件或相关授权出版物。
巴塞尔协议3全文请注意,本文档是《巴塞尔协议3全文》的概述,不涵盖具体内容的细节和实施细则。
如需了解详细信息,请参考原始文件或相关授权出版物。
巴塞尔协议3全文协议内容协议内容本文详细描述《巴塞尔协议3全文》的具体内容,包括风险管理框架、资本要求、流动性要求、杠杆率要求等方面的规定。
请注意,本回答仅为简要描述《巴塞尔协议3全文》的主要内容,具体细节请参阅正式协议文本以获得准确信息。
本文讨论《巴塞尔协议3全文》的实施和应用,包括监管机构的角色、时间表、合规要求等方面的内容。
巴塞尔协议3的实施是为了确保银行业的稳定和健康。
监管机构在实施过程中扮演着重要的角色,他们负责监督银行的资本充足率以及监管流程的合规性。
新巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。
这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。
一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9月12日的会议上2,宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管,并对在2010年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可。
这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。
巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股(含留存收益,下同)将从2%增至4.5%。
另外,银行需持有2.5%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。
此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。
此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。
这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。
安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏。
更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增长。
1央行行长和监管当局负责人集团是巴塞尔委员会中的监管机构,是由成员国央行行长和监管当局负责人组成的。
该委员会的秘书处设在瑞士巴塞尔国际清算银行。
2巴塞尔银行监督委员会提供了有关银行监管合作问题的定期论坛。
它旨在促进和加强全球银行监管和风险管理。
二、增加的资本要求(一)最低普通股要求。
根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严格调整到4.5%。
最新巴塞尔协议三中英对照
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards12 September 2010At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements and fully endorsed the agreements it reached on 26 July 2010. These capital reforms, together with the introduction of a global liquidity standard, deliver on the core of the global financial reform agenda and will be presented to the Seoul G20 Leaders summit in November.The Committee's package of reforms will increase the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%. In addition, banks will be required to hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future periods of stress bringing the total common equity requirements to 7%. This reinforces the stronger definition of capital agreed by Governors and Heads of Supervision in July and the higher capital requirements for trading, derivative and securitisation activities to be introduced at the end of 2011.Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank and Chairman of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, said that "the agreements reached today are a fundamental strengthening of global capital standards." He added that "their contribution to long term financial stability and growth will be substantial. The transition arrangements will enable banks to meet the new standards while supporting the economic recovery." Mr Nout Wellink, Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and President of the Netherlands Bank, added that "the combination of a much stronger definition of capital, higher minimum requirements and the introduction of new capital buffers will ensure that banks are better able to withstand periods of economic and financial stress, therefore supporting economic growth."Increased capital requirementsUnder the agreements reached today, the minimum requirement for common equity, the highest form of loss absorbing capital, will be raised from the current 2% level, before the application of regulatory adjustments, to 4.5% after the application of stricter adjustments. This will be phased in by 1 January 2015. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and other qualifying financial instruments based on stricter criteria, will increase from 4% to 6% over the same period. (Annex 1 summarises the new capital requirements.)The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed that the capital conservation buffer above the regulatory minimum requirement be calibrated at 2.5% and be met with common equity, after the application of deductions. The purpose of the conservation buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital ratios approach theminimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions. This framework will reinforce the objective of sound supervision and bank governance and address the collective action problem that has prevented some banks from curtailing distributions such as discretionary bonuses and high dividends, even in the face of deteriorating capital positions.A countercyclical buffer within a range of 0% - 2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital will be implemented according to national circumstances. The purpose of the countercyclical buffer is to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth. For any given country, this buffer will only be in effect when there is excess credit growth that is resulting in a system wide build up of risk. The countercyclical buffer, when in effect, would be introduced as an extension of the conservation buffer range.These capital requirements are supplemented by a non-risk-based leverage ratio that will serve as a backstop to the risk-based measures described above. In July, Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.Systemically important banks should have loss absorbing capacity beyond the standards announced today and work continues on this issue in the Financial Stability Board and relevant Basel Committee work streams. The Basel Committee and the FSB are developing a well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which could include combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt. In addition, work is continuing to strengthen resolution regimes. The Basel Committee also recently issued a consultative document Proposal to ensure the loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability. Governors and Heads of Supervision endorse the aim to strengthen the loss absorbency of non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments.Transition arrangementsSince the onset of the crisis, banks have already undertaken substantial efforts to raise their capital levels. However, preliminary results of the Committee's comprehensive quantitative impact study show that as of the end of 2009, large banks will need, in the aggregate, a significant amount of additional capital to meet these new requirements. Smaller banks, which are particularly important for lending to the SME sector, for the most part already meet these higher standards.The Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed on transitional arrangements for implementing the new standards. These will help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital standards through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending to the economy. The transitional arrangements, which are summarised in Annex 2, include:National implementation by member countries will begin on 1 January 2013. Member countries must translate the rules into national laws and regulations before this date. As of 1 January 2013, banks will be required to meet the following new minimum requirements in relation to risk-weighted assets (RW As):3.5% common equity/RW As;4.5% Tier 1 capital/RW As, and8.0% total capital/RW As.The minimum common equity and Tier 1 requirements will be phased in between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2015. On 1 January 2013, the minimum common equity requirement will rise from the current 2% level to 3.5%. The Tier 1 capital requirement will rise from 4% to 4.5%. On 1 January 2014, banks will have to meet a 4% minimum common equity requirement and a Tier 1 requirement of 5.5%. On 1 January 2015, banks will have to meet the 4.5% common equity and the 6% Tier 1 requirements. The total capital requirement remains at the existing level of 8.0% and so does not need to be phased in. The difference between the total capital requirement of 8.0% and the Tier 1 requirement can be met with Tier 2 and higher forms of capital.The regulatory adjustments (ie deductions and prudential filters), including amounts above the aggregate 15% limit for investments in financial institutions, mortgage servicing rights, and deferred tax assets from timing differences, would be fully deducted from common equity by 1 January 2018.In particular, the regulatory adjustments will begin at 20% of the required deductions from common equity on 1 January 2014, 40% on 1 January 2015, 60% on 1 January 2016, 80% on 1 January 2017, and reach 100% on 1 January 2018. During this transition period, the remainder not deducted from common equity will continue to be subject to existing national treatments.The capital conservation buffer will be phased in between 1 January 2016 and year end 2018 becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019. It will begin at 0.625% of RW As on 1 January 2016 and increase each subsequent year by an additional 0.625 percentage points, to reach its final level of 2.5% of RWAs on 1 January 2019. Countries that experience excessive credit growth should consider accelerating the build up of the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. National authorities have the discretion to impose shorter transition periods and should do so where appropriate.Banks that already meet the minimum ratio requirement during the transition period but remain below the 7% common equity target (minimum plus conservation buffer) should maintain prudent earnings retention policies with a view to meeting the conservation buffer as soon as reasonably possible.Existing public sector capital injections will be grandfathered until 1 January 2018. Capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-common equity Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital will be phased out over a 10 year horizon beginning 1 January 2013. Fixing the base at the nominal amount of such instruments outstanding on 1 January 2013, their recognition will be capped at 90% from 1 January 2013, with the cap reducing by 10 percentage points in each subsequent year. In addition, instruments with an incentive to be redeemed will be phased out at their effective maturity date.Capital instruments that no longer qualify as common equity Tier 1 will be excluded from common equity Tier 1 as of 1 January 2013. However, instruments meeting the following three conditions will be phased out over the same horizon described in the previous bullet point: (1) they are issued by a non-joint stock company 1 ; (2) they are treated as equity under the prevailing accounting standards; and (3) they receive unlimited recognition as part of Tier 1 capital under current national banking law.Only those instruments issued before the date of this press release should qualify for the above transition arrangements.Phase-in arrangements for the leverage ratio were announced in the 26 July 2010 press release of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision. That is, the supervisory monitoring period will commence 1 January 2011; the parallel run period will commence 1 January 2013 and run until 1 January 2017; and disclosure of the leverage ratio and its components will start 1 January 2015. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments will be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.After an observation period beginning in 2011, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The revised net stable funding ratio (NSFR) will move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The Committee will put in place rigorous reporting processes to monitor the ratios during the transition period and will continue to review the implications of these standards for financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, addressing unintended consequences as necessary.The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. It seeks to promote and strengthen supervisory and risk management practices globally. The Committee comprises representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision is the governing body of the Basel Committee and is comprised of central bank governors and (non-central bank) heads of supervision from member countries. The Committee's Secretariat is based at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.Annex 1: Calibration of the Capital Framework (PDF 1 page, 19 kb)Annex 2: Phase-in arrangements (PDF 1 page, 27 kb)Full press release (PDF 7 pages, 56 kb)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 Non-joint stock companies were not addressed in the Basel Committee's 1998 agreement on instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital as they do not issue voting common shares.最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议 3 全文最新巴塞尔协议3 全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团[1] 宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。
这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。
一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9 月12 日的会议上[2] ,宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管,并对在2010 年7 月26 日达成的协议进行充分认可。
这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。
巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股(含留存收益,下同)将从2%增至%。
另外,银行需持有%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。
此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7 月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011 年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。
此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。
这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。
安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏。
更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增长。
、增加的资本要求(一)最低普通股要求。
根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严格调整到%。
这一调整将分阶段实施到2015年1月1日结束。
同一时期,一级资本(包括普通股和其他建立在更严格标准之上的合格金融工具)也要求由4%调整到6%。
(附件一概述了新的资本要求)(二)建立资本留存超额资本[3] 。
最新巴塞尔协议模板三中英对照
GroupofGovernorsandHeadsofSupervisionannounceshigherglobalminimumcapitalstandards12September2010Atits12September2010meeting,theGroupofGovernorsandHeadsofS upervision,theoversightbodyoftheBaselCommitteeonBankingSupentsfortrading,derivativeandsecuritisationactivitiestobeintroducedattheendof2011.MrJean-ClaudeTrichet,PresidentoftheEuropeanCentralBankandC hairmanoftheGroupofGovernorsandHeadsofSupervision,saidthat "theagreementsreachedtodayareafundamentalstrengtheningofglobalcapitalstandards."Headdedthat"theircontributiontolongt ermfinancialstabilityandgrowthwillbesubstantial.Thetransit ionarrangementswillenablebankstomeetthenewstandardswhilesu pportingtheeconomicrecovery."MrNoutWellink,ChairmanoftheBa selCommitteeonBankingSupervisionandPresidentoftheNetherlanmentsbasedonstrictercriteria,willincreasefrom4%to6%overthe sameperiod.(Annex1summarisesthenewcapitalrequirements.) TheGroupofGovernorsandHeadsofSupervisionalsoagreedthatthec apitalconservationbufferabovetheregulatoryminimumrequireme ntbecalibratedat2.5%andbemetwithcommonequity,aftertheapplicationofdeductions.Thepurposeoftheconservationbufferistoen surethatbanksmaintainabufferofcapitalthatcanbeusedtoabsorb lossesduringperiodsoffinancialandeconomicstress.Whilebanks areallowedtodrawonthebufferduringsuchperiodsofstress,thecl osertheirregulatorycapitalratiosapproachtheminimumrequiremcreditgrowththatisresultinginasystemwidebuildupofrisk.Thec ountercyclicalbuffer,whenineffect,wouldbeintroducedasanext ensionoftheconservationbufferrange. Thesecapitalrequirementsaresupplementedbyanon-risk-basedle verageratiothatwillserveasabackstoptotherisk-basedmeasuresdescribedabove.InJuly,GovernorsandHeadsofSupervisionagreed totestaminimumTier1leverageratioof3%duringtheparallelrunpe riod.Basedontheresultsoftheparallelrunperiod,anyfinaladjus tmentswouldbecarriedoutinthefirsthalfof2017withaviewtomigr atingtoaPillar1treatmenton1January2018basedonappropriatereommonTier1andTier2capitalinstruments.Transitionarrangements Sincetheonsetofthecrisis,bankshavealreadyundertakensubstan tialeffortstoraisetheircapitallevels.However,preliminaryre sultsoftheCommittee'scomprehensivequantitativeimpactstudyshowthatasoftheendof2009,largebankswillneed,intheaggregate, asignificantamountofadditionalcapitaltomeetthesenewrequire ments.Smallerbanks,whichareparticularlyimportantforlending totheSMEsector,forthemostpartalreadymeetthesehigherstandards.4.5%Tier1capital/RWAs,and8.0%totalcapital/RWAs. TheminimumcommonequityandTier1requirementswillbephasedinbe tween1January2013and1January2015.On1January2013,theminimum commonequityrequirementwillrisefromthecurrent2%levelto3.5%.TheTier1capitalrequirementwillrisefrom4%to4.5%.On1January 2014,bankswillhavetomeeta4%minimumcommonequityrequirementa ndaTier1requirementof5.5%.On1January2015,bankswillhavetome etthe4.5%commonequityandthe6%Tier1requirements.Thetotalcap italrequirementremainsattheexistinglevelof8.0%andsodoesnotctedfromcommonequitywillcontinuetobesubjecttoexistingnationaltreatments. Thecapitalconservationbufferwillbephasedinbetween1January2 016andyearend2018becomingfullyeffectiveon1January2019.Itwi llbeginat0.625%ofRWAson1January2016andincreaseeachsubsequentyearbyanadditional0.625percentagepoints,toreachitsfinall evelof2.5%ofRWAson1January2019.Countriesthatexperienceexce ssivecreditgrowthshouldconsideracceleratingthebuildupofthe capitalconservationbufferandthecountercyclicalbuffer.Natio nalauthoritieshavethediscretiontoimposeshortertransitionpecingby10percentagepointsineachsubsequentyear.Inaddition,in strumentswithanincentivetoberedeemedwillbephasedoutattheireffectivematuritydate. CapitalinstrumentsthatnolongerqualifyascommonequityTier1wi llbeexcludedfromcommonequityTier1asof1January2013.However,instrumentsmeetingthefollowingthreeconditionswillbephasedo utoverthesamehorizondescribedinthepreviousbulletpoint:(1)t heyareissuedbyanon-jointstockcompany1;(2)theyaretreatedase quityundertheprevailingaccountingstandards;and(3)theyrecei veunlimitedrecognitionaspartofTier1capitalundercurrentnatiAfteranobservationperiodbeginningin2011,theliquiditycovera geratio(LCR)willbeintroducedon1January2015.Therevisednetst ablefundingratio(NSFR)willmovetoaminimumstandardby1January 2018.TheCommitteewillputinplacerigorousreportingprocessest omonitortheratiosduringthetransitionperiodandwillcontinuetoreviewtheimplicationsofthesestandardsforfinancialmarkets, creditextensionandeconomicgrowth,addressingunintendedconsequencesasnecessary. TheBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervisionprovidesaforumforregu larcooperationonbankingsupervisorymatters.ItseekstopromoteAnnex1:CalibrationoftheCapitalFramework(PDF1page,19kb) Annex2:Phase-inarrangements(PDF1page,27kb)Fullpressrelease(PDF7pages,56kb)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1Non-jointstockcompanieswerenotaddressedintheBaselCommitte e's1998agreementoninstrumentseligibleforinclusioninTier1ca pitalastheydonotissuevotingcommonshares.最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的2%增至4.5%。
巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议3全文最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团[1]宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。
这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。
一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9月12日的会议上[2],宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管,并对在2010年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可。
这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。
巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股(含留存收益,下同)将从2%增至%。
另外,银行需持有%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。
此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。
此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。
这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。
安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏。
更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增长。
二、增加的资本要求(一)最低普通股要求。
根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严格调整到%。
这一调整将分阶段实施到2015年1月1日结束。
同一时期,一级资本(包括普通股和其他建立在更严格标准之上的合格金融工具)也要求由4%调整到6%。
(附件一概述了新的资本要求)(二)建立资本留存超额资本[3]。
央行行长和监管当局负责人集团一致认为,在最低监管要求之上的资本留存超额资本将应达到%,以满足扣除资本扣减项后的普通股要求。
最新巴塞尔协议三中英对照
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higherglobal minimum capital standards12 September 2010At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements and fully endorsed the agreements it reached on 26 July 2010. These capital reforms, together with the introduction of a global liquidity standard, deliver on the core of the global financial reform agenda and will be presented to the G20 Leaders summit in November.Increased capital requirementsThese capital requirements are supplemented by a non-risk-based leverage ratio that will serve as a backstop to the risk-based measures described above. In July, Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.Transition arrangementsThe Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed on transitional arrangements for implementing the new standards. These will help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital standards through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending to the economy. The transitional arrangements, which are summarised in Annex 2, include:National implementation by member countries will begin on 1 January 2013. Member countries must translate the rules into national laws and regulations before this date. As of 1 January 2013, banks will be required to meet the following new minimum requirements in relation to risk-weighted assets (RWAs):4.5% Tier 1 capital/RWAs, and8.0% total capital/RWAs.Only those instruments issued before the date of this press release should qualify for the above transition arrangements.After an observation period beginning in 2011, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The revised net stable funding ratio (NSFR) will move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The Committee will put in place rigorous reporting processes to monitor the ratios during the transition period and will continue to review the implications of these standards for financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, addressing unintended consequences as necessary.Annex 1: Calibration of the Capital Framework (PDF 1 page, 19 kb)Annex 2: Phase-in arrangements (PDF 1 page, 27 kb)Full press release (PDF 7 pages, 56 kb)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议3全文最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团[1]宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。
这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。
一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9月12日的会议上[2],宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管,并对在2010年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可。
这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。
巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股(含留存收益,下同)将从2%增至%。
另外,银行需持有%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。
此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。
此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。
这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。
安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏。
更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增长。
二、增加的资本要求(一)最低普通股要求。
根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严格调整到%。
这一调整将分阶段实施到2015年1月1日结束。
同一时期,一级资本(包括普通股和其他建立在更严格标准之上的合格金融工具)也要求由4%调整到6%。
(附件一概述了新的资本要求)(二)建立资本留存超额资本[3]。
央行行长和监管当局负责人集团一致认为,在最低监管要求之上的资本留存超额资本将应达到%,以满足扣除资本扣减项后的普通股要求。
巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议3全文最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团[1]宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。
这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。
一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9月12日的会议上[2],宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管,并对在2010年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可。
这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。
巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股(含留存收益,下同)将从2%增至%。
另外,银行需持有%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。
此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。
此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。
这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。
安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏。
更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增长。
二、增加的资本要求(一)最低普通股要求。
根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严格调整到%。
这一调整将分阶段实施到2015年1月1日结束。
同一时期,一级资本(包括普通股和其他建立在更严格标准之上的合格金融工具)也要求由4%调整到6%。
(附件一概述了新的资本要求)(二)建立资本留存超额资本[3]。
央行行长和监管当局负责人集团一致认为,在最低监管要求之上的资本留存超额资本将应达到%,以满足扣除资本扣减项后的普通股要求。
最新巴塞尔协议三中英对照
Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards12 September 2010At its 12 September 2010 meeting, the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, announced a substantial strengthening of existing capital requirements and fully endorsed the agreements it reached on 26 July 2010. These capital reforms, together with the introduction of a global liquidity standard, deliver on the core of the global financial reform agenda and will be presented to the Seoul G20 Leaders summit in November.The Committee's package of reforms will increase the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%. In addition, banks will be required to hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand future periods of stress bringing the total common equity requirements to 7%. This reinforces the stronger definition of capital agreed by Governors and Heads of Supervision in July and the higher capital requirements for trading, derivative and securitisation activities to be introduced at the end of 2011.Mr Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank and Chairman of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, said that "the agreements reached today are a fundamental strengthening of global capital standards." He added that "their contribution to long term financial stability and growth will be substantial. The transition arrangements will enable banks to meet the new standards while supporting the economic recovery." Mr Nout Wellink, Chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and President of the Netherlands Bank, added that "the combination of a much stronger definition of capital, higher minimum requirements and the introduction of new capital buffers will ensure that banks are better able to withstand periods of economic and financial stress, therefore supporting economic growth."Increased capital requirementsUnder the agreements reached today, the minimum requirement for common equity, the highest form of loss absorbing capital, will be raised from the current 2% level, before the application of regulatory adjustments, to 4.5% after the application of stricter adjustments. This will be phased in by 1 January 2015. The Tier 1 capital requirement, which includes common equity and other qualifying financial instruments based on stricter criteria, will increase from 4% to 6% over the same period. (Annex 1 summarises the new capital requirements.)The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed that the capital conservation buffer above the regulatory minimum requirement be calibrated at 2.5% and be met with common equity, after the application of deductions. The purpose of the conservation buffer is to ensure that banks maintain a buffer of capital that can be used to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. While banks are allowed to draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital ratios approach the minimum requirement, the greater the constraints on earnings distributions. This framework will reinforce the objective of sound supervision and bank governance and address the collective action problem that has prevented some banks from curtailing distributions such as discretionary bonuses and high dividends, even in the face of deteriorating capital positions.A countercyclical buffer within a range of 0% - 2.5% of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital will be implemented according to national circumstances. The purpose of the countercyclical buffer is to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth. For any given country, this buffer will only be in effect when there is excess credit growth that is resulting in a system wide build up of risk. The countercyclical buffer, when in effect, would be introduced as an extension of the conservation buffer range.These capital requirements are supplemented by a non-risk-based leverage ratio that will serve as a backstop to the risk-based measures described above. In July, Governors and Heads of Supervision agreed to test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments would be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.Systemically important banks should have loss absorbing capacity beyond the standards announced today and work continues on this issue in the Financial Stability Board and relevant Basel Committee work streams. The Basel Committee and the FSB are developing a well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which could include combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt. In addition, work is continuing to strengthen resolution regimes. The Basel Committee also recently issued a consultative document Proposal to ensure the loss absorbency of regulatory capital at the point of non-viability. Governors and Heads of Supervision endorse the aim to strengthen the loss absorbency of non-common Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital instruments.Transition arrangementsSince the onset of the crisis, banks have already undertaken substantial efforts to raise their capital levels. However, preliminary results of the Committee's comprehensive quantitative impact study show that as of the end of 2009, large banks will need, in the aggregate, a significant amount of additional capital to meet these new requirements. Smaller banks, which are particularly important for lending to the SME sector, for the most part already meet these higher standards.The Governors and Heads of Supervision also agreed on transitional arrangements for implementing the new standards. These will help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital standards through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending to the economy. The transitional arrangements, which are summarised in Annex 2, include:National implementation by member countries will begin on 1 January 2013. Member countries must translate the rules into national laws and regulations before this date. As of 1 January 2013, banks will be required to meet the following new minimum requirements in relation to risk-weighted assets (RW As):3.5% common equity/RW As;4.5% Tier 1 capital/RW As, and8.0% total capital/RW As.The minimum common equity and Tier 1 requirements will be phased in between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2015. On 1 January 2013, the minimum common equity requirement will rise from the current 2% level to 3.5%. The Tier 1 capital requirement will rise from4% to 4.5%. On 1 January 2014, banks will have to meet a 4% minimum common equity requirement and a Tier 1 requirement of 5.5%. On 1 January 2015, banks will have to meet the 4.5% common equity and the 6% Tier 1 requirements. The total capital requirement remains at the existing level of 8.0% and so does not need to be phased in. The difference between the total capital requirement of 8.0% and the Tier 1 requirement can be met with Tier 2 and higher forms of capital.The regulatory adjustments (ie deductions and prudential filters), including amounts above the aggregate 15% limit for investments in financial institutions, mortgage servicing rights, and deferred tax assets from timing differences, would be fully deducted from common equity by 1 January 2018.In particular, the regulatory adjustments will begin at 20% of the required deductions from common equity on 1 January 2014, 40% on 1 January 2015, 60% on 1 January 2016, 80% on 1 January 2017, and reach 100% on 1 January 2018. During this transition period, the remainder not deducted from common equity will continue to be subject to existing national treatments.The capital conservation buffer will be phased in between 1 January 2016 and year end 2018 becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019. It will begin at 0.625% of RW As on 1 January 2016 and increase each subsequent year by an additional 0.625 percentage points, to reach its final level of 2.5% of RWAs on 1 January 2019. Countries that experience excessive credit growth should consider accelerating the build up of the capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. National authorities have the discretion to impose shorter transition periods and should do so where appropriate.Banks that already meet the minimum ratio requirement during the transition period but remain below the 7% common equity target (minimum plus conservation buffer) should maintain prudent earnings retention policies with a view to meeting the conservation buffer as soon as reasonably possible.Existing public sector capital injections will be grandfathered until 1 January 2018. Capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-common equity Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital will be phased out over a 10 year horizon beginning 1 January 2013. Fixing the base at the nominal amount of such instruments outstanding on 1 January 2013, their recognition will be capped at 90% from 1 January 2013, with the cap reducing by 10 percentage points in each subsequent year. In addition, instruments with an incentive to be redeemed will be phased out at their effective maturity date.Capital instruments that no longer qualify as common equity Tier 1 will be excluded from common equity Tier 1 as of 1 January 2013. However, instruments meeting the following three conditions will be phased out over the same horizon described in the previous bullet point: (1) they are issued by a non-joint stock company 1 ; (2) they are treated as equity under the prevailing accounting standards; and (3) they receive unlimited recognition as part of Tier 1 capital under current national banking law.Only those instruments issued before the date of this press release should qualify for the above transition arrangements.Phase-in arrangements for the leverage ratio were announced in the 26 July 2010 press release of the Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision. That is, the supervisory monitoring period will commence 1 January 2011; the parallel run period will commence 1January 2013 and run until 1 January 2017; and disclosure of the leverage ratio and its components will start 1 January 2015. Based on the results of the parallel run period, any final adjustments will be carried out in the first half of 2017 with a view to migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment on 1 January 2018 based on appropriate review and calibration.After an observation period beginning in 2011, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The revised net stable funding ratio (NSFR) will move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The Committee will put in place rigorous reporting processes to monitor the ratios during the transition period and will continue to review the implications of these standards for financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, addressing unintended consequences as necessary.The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. It seeks to promote and strengthen supervisory and risk management practices globally. The Committee comprises representatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.The Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision is the governing body of the Basel Committee and is comprised of central bank governors and (non-central bank) heads of supervision from member countries. The Committee's Secretariat is based at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.Annex 1: Calibration of the Capital Framework (PDF 1 page, 19 kb)Annex 2: Phase-in arrangements (PDF 1 page, 27 kb)Full press release (PDF 7 pages, 56 kb)--------------------------------------------------------------------------------1 Non-joint stock companies were not addressed in the Basel Committee's 1998 agreement on instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital as they do not issue voting common shares.最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
新巴塞尔协议3全文
最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。
这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。
一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9月12日的会议上2,宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管,并对在2010年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可。
这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。
巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股(含留存收益,下同)将从2%增至4.5%。
另外,银行需持有2.5%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。
此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。
此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。
这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。
安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏。
更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增长。
1央行行长和监管当局负责人集团是巴塞尔委员会中的监管机构,是由成员国央行行长和监管当局负责人组成的。
该委员会的秘书处设在瑞士巴塞尔国际清算银行。
2巴塞尔银行监督委员会提供了有关银行监管合作问题的定期论坛。
它旨在促进和加强全球银行监管和风险管理。
二、增加的资本要求(一)最低普通股要求。
根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严格调整到4.5%。
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最新巴塞尔协议3全文央行行长和监管当局负责人集团1宣布较高的全球最低资本标准国际银行资本监管改革是本轮金融危机以来全球金融监管改革的重要组成部分。
9月12日的巴塞尔银行监管委员会央行行长和监管当局负责人会议就资本监管改革一些关键问题达成了共识。
这些资本监管改革措施一旦付诸实施将对全球银行业未来发展产生重大的影响。
一、会议的基本内容作为巴塞尔银行监管委员会中的监管机构,央行行长和监管当局负责人集团在2010年9月12日的会议上2,宣布加强对现有资本金要求的持续监管,并对在2010年7月26日达成的协议进行充分认可。
这些银行资本改革措施和全球银行业流动性监管标准的推行,履行了全球金融改革核心议程的诺言,并且将在11月份韩国首尔召开的G20领导峰会上提交。
巴塞尔委员会一揽子改革中,普通股(含留存收益,下同)将从2%增至4.5%。
另外,银行需持有2.5%的资本留存超额资本以应对未来一段时期对7%的普通股所带来的压力。
此次资本改革巩固了央行行长和监管当局负责人在7月份达成的关于强化资本约束和在2011年底前提高对市场交易、衍生产品和资产证券化的资本需要。
此次会议达成了一个从根本上加强全球资本标准的协议。
这些资本要求将对长期的财政稳定和经济增长有重大的贡献。
安排资本监管过渡期将使银行在满足新的资本标准的同时,支持经济复苏。
更强的资本定义,更高的最低资本要求和新的超额资本的结合将使银行可以承受长期的经济金融压力,从而支持经济的增1央行行长和监管当局负责人集团是巴塞尔委员会中的监管机构,是由成员国央行行长和监管当局负责人组成的。
该委员会的秘书处设在瑞士巴塞尔国际清算银行。
2巴塞尔银行监督委员会提供了有关银行监管合作问题的定期论坛。
它旨在促进和加强全球银行监管和风险管理。
长。
二、增加的资本要求(一)最低普通股要求。
根据巴塞尔委员会此次会议达成的协议,最低普通股要求,即弥补资产损失的最终资本要求,将由现行的2%严格调整到4.5%。
这一调整将分阶段实施到2015年1月1日结束。
同一时期,一级资本(包括普通股和其他建立在更严格标准之上的合格金融工具)也要求由4%调整到6%。
(附件一概述了新的资本要求)(二)建立资本留存超额资本3。
央行行长和监管当局负责人集团一致认为,在最低监管要求之上的资本留存超额资本将应达到2.5%,以满足扣除资本扣减项后的普通股要求。
留存超额资本的目的是确保银行维持缓冲资金以弥补在金融和经济压力时期的损失。
当银行在经济金融出于压力时期,资本充足率越接近监管最低要求,越要限制收益分配。
这一框架将强化良好银行监管目标并且解决共同行动的问题,从而阻止银行即使是在面对资本恶化的情况下仍然自主发放奖金和分配高额红利的(非理性的)分配行为。
(三)建立反周期超额资本4。
反周期超额资本,比率范围在0%-2.5%的普通股或者是全部用来弥补损失的资本,将根据经济环境建立。
反周期超额资本的建立是为了达到保护银行部门承受过度信贷增长的更广的宏观审慎目标。
对任何国家来说,这种缓冲机制仅在信贷过度增长导致系统性风险累积的情况下才产生作用。
反周期的缓冲一旦生效,将被作为资本留存超额资本的扩展加以推行。
(四)运行期限规定。
上述这些资本比例要求是通过在风险防范措施之上建立非风险杠杆比率。
7月,央行行长和监管机构负责人同意对平行运行期间3%的最低一级资本充足率进行测试。
基于平行运行期测试结果,任何最终的调整都将在2017年上半年被执行,并通过适当的方法和计算带入2018年1月起的最低资本要求中。
3 本文将the capital conservation buffer译为资本留存超额资本。
4 本文将A countercyclical buffer译为反周期超额资本(五)其他要求。
对金融系统至关重要的银行应具备超过今天所提标准的弥补资产损失的能力,并继续就金融稳定委员会和巴塞尔委员会工作小组出台的意见进行进一步讨论。
巴塞尔委员会和金融稳定委员会正在研发一种对这类银行非常好的包括资本附加费,核心资金和担保金在内的综合的方法。
另外,加强制度决议的工作还将继续。
巴塞尔委员会最近也发表了一份咨询文件,建议确保监管资本在非正常环境下的损失弥补能力。
央行行长和监管机构负责人赞同加强非普通一级资本和二级资本工具的损失弥补能力。
三、过渡时期安排自危机开始,银行为提高资本水平已经采取了很多努力。
但是,巴塞尔委员会的综合定量影响研究结果显示,截至2009年底,大型银行从总体上考虑仍需要相当大量的额外资本才能满足新的监管要求。
那些对中小企业贷款尤为重要的规模较小的银行,大部分已经满足了更高的资本要求。
央行行长和监管当局负责人还就执行新的资本标准做出了过渡性的安排。
这将有助于确保银行通过合理的收益留存和提高资本金以满足更好资本金管理要求的同时,仍能通过信贷投放支持经济的发展。
过渡时期的安排在附件二中有概括,包括:(一)2013年达到的最低资本要求。
在巴塞尔委员会各成员国国内执行新的资本监管要求将从2013年1月1日开始,各成员国必须在执行之前将关于资本新的要求以法律法规的形式予以确立。
自2013年1月1日起,银行应符合以下新的相对于风险加权资产(RWAs)的最低资本要求:3.5%,普通股/风险加权资产;4.5%,一级资本/风险加权资产;8.0%,总资本/风险加权资产。
(二)普通股和一级资本过渡期要求。
最低普通股和一级资本要求将在2013年1月至2015年1月逐步实施。
到2013年1月1日,最低普通股要求将由2%提高到3.5%,一级资本将由4%提高到4.5%。
到2014年1月1日,银行将必须达到普通股4%和一级资本5.5%的最低要求。
到2015年1月1日,银行将必须达到普通股4.5%和一级资本6%的最低要求。
总资本一直要求保持8%的水平,因此不需要分阶段实施。
8%的总资本要求和一级资本要求之间的区别在于二级资本和更高形式的资本。
(二)扣减项比例过渡期安排。
监管的调整(即扣减项和审慎过滤器),包括金融机构超过资本总额15%的投资、抵押服务权、所得税时间上有差异的递延资产,从2018年1月1日起,将完全从普通股中扣除。
特别是,监管调整将从2014年1月1日从普通股中减去扣减项的20%,到2015年1月1日的40%,到2016年1月1日的60%,2017年1月1日的80%,最后到2018年的1月1日100%。
在这段过渡时期,其余未从普通股中扣除的资本将继续视同为资本。
(三)资本留存超额资本过渡期安排。
将在2016年1月到2018年1月间分阶段实施,并从2019年正式生效。
在2016年,计提风险加权资产的0.625%,随后每年增加0.625个百分点,直到达到2019年的风险加权资产的2.5%。
经历过信贷过度增长的国家应尽快考虑建立资本留存超额资本和反周期超额资本。
国家有关部门应根据实际情况酌情缩短这一过渡期。
那些在过渡阶段已经满足最低比例要求,但是普通股(最低资本加上资本留存超额资本)仍低于7%的银行,应该实行审慎地实行收益留存政策以使资本留存超额资本达到合理的范围。
(四)资本中需要取消的项目过渡期安排。
现有的政府部门的资本注入将到2018年1月1日后被取消。
从2013年1月1日起,不再作为核心资本或者附属资本的非普通权益的资本工具将通过10年逐步取消。
从2013年1月1日起,在确定这类资本工具的名义价金融工具的增值部分的计算将在其到期后逐步取消。
不符合核心资本条件的资本工具将自2013年1月1日起从核心资本中扣除。
然而,同时满足下面三个条件的金融工具会不包括在上述扣除对象之中:一是由非关联股份公司发行;二是作为资本符合现行的会计标准;三是在现在银行法律下,被承认可以作为核心资本。
仅有那些在本文发表之前的金融工具符合上述过渡时期的安排。
(五)监督检测期安排。
央行行长和监管当局负责人集团于2010年7月26日发表了对资本充足率比例的阶段性安排。
监督性监测期间开始于2011年1月1日,并行运行期从2013年1月1日一直持续到2017年1月1日。
披露资本充足率和资本构成将于2015年1月1日开始。
基于并行运行期的结果,任何最终调整都将在2017年上半年执行,并在采取适当的方法和计算的情况下,作为2018年1月1日正式执行时的最低资本要求。
(六)对LCR和NSFR的时间安排。
在2011年观察一段时间后,流动资金覆盖率(LCR)将于2015年1月1日被引入。
修订后的净稳定资金比率(NSFR)将变动到2018年1月1日执行的最低标准。
巴塞尔委员会将实施严格的报告程序,以监测在过渡时期的资本充足率比例,并会继续检验这些标准对金融市场、信贷扩张和经济增长以及解决意外事件的意义。
附件一资本划分框架资本要求和超额资本(所有数字用百分比表示)*普通股或其他完全损失弥补资本附件二阶段性实施安排(阴影部分表示过渡期)(所有数据都从1月1日起)原文来自于:/press/p100912.htm据中国人民银行消息,2010年9月12日,巴塞尔银行监管委员会管理层会议在瑞士巴塞尔举行,会议通过了加强银行体系资本要求的改革方案,即《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》。
据介绍,该改革方案主要涉及最低资本要求水平和过渡期安排,包括将普通股最低要求从2%提升至4.5%,建立2.5%的资本留存缓冲和0%~2.5%的逆周期资本缓冲。
这意味着,银行必须持有7%的一级资本金比率,其中包含2.5%的缓冲。
换言之,银行每投资或放贷100美元,就需要留出7美元用作储备。
而贷款和投资的风险越高,要求的资本也越高。
据《巴塞尔协议III》规定,这些资本要求将逐步实施。
到2015年1月,全球各商业银行的一级资本充足率下限将从现行的4%上调至6%,由普通股构成的“核心”一级资本占银行风险资产的下限将从现行的2%提高至4.5%。
对此,交银国际发布的市场观点指出,由于大部份内地和香港银行的“普通股权益资本”比率均高于7%,本次协议对他们的影响甚微。
(baidu)“巴塞尔Ⅲ”是一套全面的改革措施,由巴塞尔银行监管委员会制定,加强管理,监督和银行部门的风险管理。
这些措施的目的是:提高银行业的承受能力,从金融和经济冲击所产生的压力,不管源加强风险管理和治理加强银行的透明度和披露。
这些改革的目标:银行水平,或microprudential,法规,这将有助于提高个人的银行机构抵御压力的时期。
宏观审慎,全系统的风险,可以建立跨银行部门以及这些风险随着时间的推移顺周期放大了。
这两种方法的监督作为在个人银行更大程度的弹性互补降低了系统宽幅震荡的风险。
流动性覆盖率(LCR,Liqudity Covered Ratio)= 优质流动性资产储备/未来30日的资金净流出量,流动性覆盖率的标准是不低于100%这个公式的意义:确保单个银行在监管当局设定的流动性严重压力情景下,能够将变现无障碍且优质的资产保持在一个合理的水平,这些资产可以通过变现来满足其30天期限的流动性需求。