不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献

不良贷款管理中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)
Non-performing Loans Management and Recovery
William J. Bauman and Alan S. Blinder
Abstract
With the deepening of China's economic system reform development and continuous improvement of the system of the market economy, banks ' lending business becomes completely open to individuals, personal loans of business growing, continues to expand the scope of business, especially the development of individual housing loan more quickly. Personal housing loan business in China at the time of its development, there are bad credit risks as well as the competitive situation is not optimistic, to a certain extent, hamper the development of individual housing loans, to sustainable development, research management must be strengthened on a number of issues. This article from the current development status of individual housing loan business to start, pointed out that because of the existing problems as well as problems and focus on how to develop personal housing loan bad credit risk reduction, foreign experiences and lessons learned, and thoughts and countermeasures for management, to promote the healthy and rapid development of the business.
Key words:Housing loans to individuals; Bad credit risks; present situation; problem; Countermeasure
1. Introduction
Under the five-category loan classification, substandard, doubtful and loss loans are defined as non-performing loans. Because the reasons behind non-performing loans formation are different, credit associates must take effective measures to manage, recover and dispose of these parts of asset according to their different characteristics. The bank should first find out the responsibilities of the guarantor and dispose of the security in time. Only when they confirm that the guarantor has lost the guarantee abilities and the security is not sufficient to pay off the loan, can they begin to dispose of the non-performing loans.
2. Reasons
There are many reasons why banks have poorly performing loan portfolios. Irrespective of these causes, banks have an obligation to shareholders, depositors and creditors to maximize cash flow from assets, the most troublesome aspect of which has been the poor record of banks in recovering loans. It is this factor that has contributed the most to bank insolvency, and liquidity constraints.
There are several complementary options available to banks to restructure problem loans and portfolios, including:
•Exercise of collateral (liens against property, inventories) through judicial or extra-judicial means.
•Out-of-court settlement that may focus exclusively on debt negotiation, restructuring and repayment, or lead to the financial, physical and operational restructuring of the enterprise.
•Bankruptcy/liquidation procedures through formal court proceedings. This may involve liquidation, reorganization or privatization of an enterprise to enforce partial or total loan repayment.
(Besides the bank itself, sometimes government also leads a restructuring program to help the bank to solve the problem of NPL in order to stabilize the banking industry or the whole economy, for example, Asset Management Company (AMC), a special purpose company, buys or exchanges NPL from bank and disposes of them).
3. Work-Out Unit
With aggregate loan portfolios universally troubled by delinquencies and defaults, some banks have opted to develop work-out units to improve loan portfolio quality. When work-out units are established, they are usually set up to deal with most of a bank's problem loans, effectively sectioning off non-performing loans from the broader bank portfolio of performing loans. The benefits expected from work-out units include;
•Concentrated focus on the recovery of problem loans;
•More developed banking expertise and credit risk evaluation skills;
•Improved internal bank system (early warning systems, collateral requirements, credit information needs).
Work-out units can make a significant difference in restructuring loan portfolios, particularly when supported by effective technical assistance.
4.Loan Restructuring and Loan "Rollover"
Case-by-case loan restructuring is common in market-oriented economies, particularly
when borrowers are unable to meet the original terms of the loan agreement due to external factors. These restructuring invariably changes in the amount, terms and /or schedule of interest rates, principal repayment, and collateral values. Loan covenants ( ratios, report requirements) often change to facilitate compliance. In some cases, radical measures such as replacing management are involved.
This approach is similar to what work-out units attempt to do: recover portions of loan portfolios which have deteriorated and are non-performing. However, workout units are often organized on the basis of sector, location or bank exposure. Case-by-case loan restructuring is conducted on an individualized basis. The benefits of individual case-by-case loan restructurings include:
•Reinforcement of the bank-client relationship.
•Retention of the loan by the bank on its balance sheet, even if provisions are made for possible losses.
•Preservation of the firm's relations with other parties (trade creditors, other banks, buyers, employees), thereby maintaining its reputation without embarrassing and costly bankruptcy / liquidation procedures.
As with debt-equity swaps, the risk to the bank is that it is overly optimistic about prospects, and that additional resources are committed to the borrower adding to bank losses and reduced loan able funds at a future date. This has occurred frequently in transition economies (such as China, East European countries, former Soviet Union).
In transition economy banks, the closest approximation to the Western loan restructuring has been the loan "rollover" which has been a common practice. Rollovers generally involve the following two techniques:
•Simple rollover of principal on/before the due date, with the enterprise meeting interest obligations.
•Rollover of principal on/before due date, with interest added back to the principal amount (“interest capitalization").
The first technique is legitimate and rational unless the enterprise is unable to repay principal, and likely to remain impaired in the future. The second technique often reflects a troubled loan and enterprise, and has been typically practiced in transition economy banking systems. Further more, the latter technique has been accompanied by accounting treatment which mistakenly recognizes these assets as performing loans, artificially inflating income statements and balance sheet book values.
5. Debt-equity Swaps and Loan Sales / Asset Swap
Debt-equity swap results in bank ownership of enterprises occur with differing frequencies in different countries. In some countries, bank ownership of enterprises is common (German interlocking directorates), while in other countries it is strictly regulated (USA) or strictly prohibited (In China, debt-equity swap is done through asset management company). By swapping NPL for equity, banks can exercise more direct
control/supervision over enterprise management while the enterprise benefits from increased debt capacity. The risk to bank is excess exposure to a risky investment which may jeopardize deposit safety and bank capital, and demand scarce management time and resources.
Debt-equity swap represents nascent venture capital operation. Perhaps only one in 10 of these investments may succeed, but this should be sufficient to cover the risk of the other nine losing investment. Given existing low book values and the currently thin market that is likely to improve in the coming years, banks are prudent to allocate a small percentage of assets to enterprises they believe will generate significant profit at a later date. At that point, banks can sell their shares, and reap significant profit to bolster capital. All of this makes more sense given the current downside risk, which is limited, as most of these transactions are paper transactions that do not further impair bank liquidity.
But bank equity swap may be indicative of the failure of banks in some countries to properly define bank's roles as financial intermediaries, streamline their operations, specialize in a few key areas within the limit of their current managerial and staffing capabilities, write down their assets to more accurate values, and progress toward a more stable and prudently managed system devoid of excess risk. Investment in losing enterprises raises the risk of future liquidity being drained to prop up these enterprises in the hope of eventual profitability, which puts depositors and shareholders at risk.
In addition to debt-equity swaps, loan sales swaps are an option that could be used to restructure bank balance sheets. However, this option has not been commonly found in transition economy due to absence of secondary market development.
6. Securitization of Non-performing Loan
Non-performing loan securitization is a pooling of non-performing loans packaged and issued as securities to investors through arrangements of legal structure, cash flow, and credit rating mechanisms. Non-performing Loans are also known as bad loans, overdue loans, receivables under collection, and loans still under normal payment statuses, but with circulating bonds rated lower than CCC level. During the securitization period, the originator (seller) will select the most ideal portfolio based on a set of eligibility criteria, such as debtors' locations, credit period, currency, and overdue ratings from all available non-performing loans.
After the screening process, bank will proceed with the risk assessment, cash flow simulation and credit tranche. The securities are then offered to investors after confirmation from credit rating agencies and regulatory approval obtained. The asset management agency is particularly important to a non-performing loan securitization since the asset management agency's expertise is instrumental to increasing collection rates of these non-performing loans. Investors' risks are minimized through credit enhancement techniques; default risks, prepayment risks, etc. are also emphasized to evaluate the risk profile of non-performing loans.
7. In-court Bankruptcy / Liquidation Proceedings
Resorting to legal procedures to collect the repayment of non-performing loans is the last defense line. In practice, banks should grasp the timing of litigation. Because blind lawsuits will involve banks' time, energy, money and people. In addition, they could have negative impact on the relationship between banks and their clients.
Firstly, before litigation, banks should investigate the borrowers' income resources and asset categories and prevent them from hiding or transferring asset in this period of time. Banks can apply to the court for asset preservation. Secondly, banks should try best to correct the deficiencies of credit documents and win themselves advantageous conditions in litigation. Thirdly, banks should also prepare themselves for the results of reconciliation or failure.
Bankruptcy/liquidation is an effective complement to out-of-cnurt approaches, and serves as a last stage of debt collection, providing creditors with control over debtors in financial distress and prompting their restructuring. For this reason, many countries (transition economies) have developed and are seeking to expand the use of formal bankruptcy to broaden the array of dispute resolution mechanisms, provide banks with long needed recourse, and instill greater financial discipline on enterprises.
8. Exercise of Collateral
When a debt matures or is going to mature and the debtor has encountered serious operation difficulties, the debtor cannot repay the loan in cash and the guarantor cannot repay the loan in cash either. Maybe after negotiation, the two parties (the bank and the borrower) or three parties (the bank, the borrower and the guarantor) can reach a consensus. In line with the consensus or the ruling by the court, the debtor or the guarantor can make in-kind repayment of debts, which is one of the important means to dispose of non-performing loans.
9. Writing-off Bad Loans
In accordance with relevant state rules and regulation, if the principal of a loan is identified as unrecoverable, the bad loan can be written off. Writing-off of bad loans is the internal activity of a bank. So the bank still enjoys the recourse right and should continue to demand the repayment of the fund.
10. Conclusion
Were analyzed by the non-performing loans management recycling. Bad credit risk management, there are still many problems to be solved, how the lending business in the international financial place needs to be further research and continue to explore. In short,
the management of non-performing loans of China's economic development has made a significant contribution, but there are still shortcomings in their own system, the external competitive environment in the development of the personal loan there are many adverse, which requires countries to fully understand individual housing loans an important role on the basis of, for the banks internal management and external risk management and reasonable planning to ongoing development. Personal loans also have to recognize their own position and where to adopt appropriate strategies and market positioning, innovation, adjustment, reform, focusing on risk management in order to more rapidly grow.
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不良贷款的管理和回收
威廉J鲍姆，阿伦S布林德
摘要随着我国金融体系建设的进一步发展和市场体制的迅速完善，银行的贷款业务逐渐向个人完全展开，个人贷款的业务种类不断增多，业务范围持续扩大，特别是个人住房贷款业务的发展更为迅猛。

我国个人住房贷款业务在其发展的同时，存在的不良信贷风险问题以及竞争形势不容乐观，在一定程度上阻碍了个人住房贷款业务的发展，要持续快速发展，必须加强对一系列问题的研究管理。

本文从分析目前不良贷款的情况，指出存在的问题以及问题出现的原因，并着重针对商业银行对不良贷款的回收和管理，借鉴先进的经验教训，并提出思考及相应对策进行管理，以加快这一业务的正确快速发展。

关键词：不良贷款管理回收
一、前言
在五级贷款分类法理论中，次级、可疑和损失类贷款被看做是不良贷款。

由于不良贷款的形成原因很难发现，信贷助理必须根据各类贷款的不n-性质，对这类不良资产采取有效的措施来管理、回收和处置。

在处理不良贷款时，银行应该明确担保人的责任，并及时处置担保物权。

只有在银行确认担保人丧失了担保能力，担保物权已经不能足额偿还贷款时，银行才能够处置不良贷款。

二、不良贷款形成原因
银行不良贷款形成的原因有很多。

但不论是什么原因，银行都对股东、存款人和银行债权人负有最大限度将资产变现的责任，将不良资产变现是银行回收贷款过程中最困难的环节。

对绝大多数银行来说，这一因素限制了银行的清偿力和流动性。

下面是对银行重组不良贷款和资产有利的几点建议：
1．通过司法或非司法方式执行担保物（处置所有权和存货）；
2．庭外和解主要集中在债务的协商、重组和偿还上，或会导致公司在财务、实体或运营上的重新安排；
3．通过正常的司法程序对借款人进行破产清算，该方式通过对企业进行清算、
重组或者私有化以收回部分或全部贷款。

（此外，政府有时也会出面领导一项重组，帮助银行解决不良贷款的问题，以维持银行业的稳定或整个经济的稳定。

例如政府成立资产管理公司，该类特殊机构专门从银行购买不良资产，然后对不良资产进行处理）
三、不良资产处理小组
当违法和违约产生大量不良贷款时，有些银行通过成立不良资产处理小组来改善资产的质量。

在不良资产处理小组成立后，银行就可以有效地将不良贷款从正常贷款中分离出来进行专门集中的处理。

成立不良资产处理小组有以下几个优点：
1．可以对不良贷款的回收进行集中处理；
2．可以培养更多的专业人才，开发先进的信用风险评估技术；
3．改善银行内部机制（以完善预警机制，满足银行在担保和信用信息方面的需求）。

在进行贷款组合重组方面，不良资产处理小组将会发挥很大的作用，尤其是在有效的技术支持的情况下。

四、贷款重组和展期
在市场经济国家，贷款逐个重组是处理不良贷款常见的方法，尤其是当借款人由于外部原因不能。

按合同的约定偿还贷款的时候。

这些重组安排并不改变贷款的额度、条款、利率安排、本金的偿还和担保的价值。

贷款协议的改变是为了使借款人能更好地履行合同。

而在有些情况下，银行会采取一些极端的措施，如替换公司管理层等。

该方式与不良贷款处理小组所做的工作有些相似：回收资产质量恶化的不良贷款。

然而，不良贷款工作小组通常以行业、区域或银行分支机构为基础，而逐个贷款重组是以单个具体的不良贷款为对象展开的。

贷款逐个重组有以下几方面的优点：
加强银行与客户之间的关系；如果银行的贷款准备金充分，就可以将贷款留在银行资产负债表上；保护该企业与其债权人、其他银行、其买家和员工的关系，可以维持该公司的信誉，避免公司破产或清算。

债转股对银行来说可能是对企业的前景过于乐观，这有可能增加由借款人造成的贷款损失，导致未来贷款资金回收的减少。

债转股在转型经济国家非常常见，例如中国、东欧国家和前苏联。

在经济转型国家，银行处理不良贷款最常用的方法是贷款展期。

贷款展期通常涉及以下两方面的技术问题：企业在按期偿还利息的前提下，在到期前或到期日对本金展期；在到期前或到期日对本金展期，并将利息转化为本金（这称做利息资本化）。

第一种方式只有在借款人不能偿还贷款本金的情况下才合法合理，但在将来应该逐步减少对客户展期。

第二种方式通常反映出贷款和企业存在很大问题，该情况在转型经济国家的事务中是常见的。

此外，第二种方法需要做会计上的处理，这会使人误以为贷款是正常的，会虚增损益表和资产负债表的账面价值。

五、债转股、贷款出售和资产互换
债转股会导致银行成为企业的股东，这在不同的国家会有很大的不同。

在有些国家，银行持有企业的股份是很常见的（例如德国），而在另外一些国家会受到严格管制（如美国）或禁止（如中国，债转股通常通过资产管理公司来进行）。

将不良资产转换成股权，银行可以加强对企业管理层在借债方面的控制和监督。

对银行来说，这样做相当于增大了银行投资的风险，这有可能危及银行存款和资本的安全，需要投入更多管理时间和资源。

债转股基本上属于风险资本运营，大约只有1/10的案例是成功的。

对于债转股，银行必须接受低的账面价值和萧条的市场，但银行会对它们认为将来能够产生巨大收益的企业提供债转股的机会。

企业情况好转以后，银行就会卖掉所持有的股份，从而获取不菲的利润。

这一过程需要银行对企业当前的风险有准确的认识，这些风险必须是有限的。

债转股交易仅仅是纸上交易，不会降低银行的流动性。

但是，在一些把银行定位为金融中介机构的国家，债转股交易对银行来说可能存在失败的风险，也会为银行的运营流程改造、在现有管理层和员工等人力资源限制下进人新的领域、为避免额外风险而创建稳定审慎的管理机制等方面带来不利影响。

对损失不断增加的企业追加投资会增加银行未来的流动性风险，对这些企业在贷款上的支持会增加银行股东和存款人的风险。

相对债转股，银行出售贷款可以重构银行资产负债表。

然而，这种方法在经济转型国家并不常见，这是由于这些国家二级市场不发达。

六、不良资产证券化
不良资产证券化是指将不良贷款打包，然后通过一系列的法律安排、现金流和信用评级等环节向投资者发行证券。

不良贷款还包括坏账、过期贷款、有担保的应收账款，以及贷款虽然目前被按期部分偿还，但其流通股票被评为CCC级以下。

在资产证券化过程中，卖者应根据合理的标准选择最佳的资产组合，例如借款人所在地区、信用期限、货币、不良贷款的预期时间等方面进行考虑。

就整个过程来看，银行所要做的工作有风险评估、现金流预测、信贷份额确定等。

证券在销售给投资者以前须找评级机构对其进行评级，并获得监管当局的批准。

在此过程中，资产管理机构的参与对资产证券化尤为重要，因为资产管理机构在增加不良资产评级方面有非常专业的经验。

投资者的风险可以通过强化的信用风险技术最小化，违约风险和偿付风险也是应该重点考虑的方面。

七、法庭强制破产／清算
借助司法程序回收贷款是最后一道防线。

在实际操作中，银行应该把握好起诉的时间，这是由于诉讼需要银行投入很多时间、精力、资金和人员。

此外，法律诉讼还会对银行与客户之间的关系产生消极影响。

首先，在起诉前银行应该调查清楚客户的收入来源、资产质量，还要防止客户在
此期间隐藏和转移资产。

银行还可以申请法院对客户所拥有的资产进行保护。

其次，银行应该尽量完备信贷资料，以在法律诉讼中争取更多的有利条件。

再次，银行还要充分做好和解或诉讼失败的准备。

破产和清算是一种有效的庭外解决方法，这种方法可以帮助银行集中债务，有利于贷款人控制借款人的财务抵押和债务重组。

正是由于这个原因，很多国家（尤其是转型经济国家）采用了这种方法，它们也在努力通过正常破产来拓宽解决问题的机制，为银行提供更多需要的资源，并对企业实施更严格的财务规定。

八、执行担保
当一笔贷款到期或即将到期时，如借款人或其担保人都不能以现金偿还银行贷款，贷款人就会面临非常困难的境地。

或许通过协商，两方（贷款人和借款人）或三方（贷款人、借款人和担保人）能够达成一致意见。

根据各方达成的一致意见或法院的裁决，借款人或担保人可以以货代款的方式偿还银行债务，这也是处理不良贷款的一个重要的方法。

九、冲销坏账
根据国家有关法律和相关规定，如果一笔贷款被确认已经不能够收回，坏账可以被冲销。

冲销坏账是银行内部的行为，但对企业，银行应该保留债务追索权，并继续要求借款人偿还贷款。

十、结论
本文对个不良贷款管理回收进行了分析研究。

不良信贷风险管理仍然有很多问题需要解决，贷款业务如何在国际金融中占据一席之地等等这些都有待深入研究和继续探讨。

总之，不良贷款管理对中国经济的发展做出了重大贡献，但其在自身制度上还存在种种缺陷，外部的竞争环境个人贷款的发展还存在许多不利，这就需要国家在充分认识到个人住房贷款的重要作用的基础上，为银行内部自身管理与对外部风险管理合理规划，才能持续不断的发展。

个人贷款也要认清自身的位置所在采取适当的战略和市场定位，不断创新、调整、改革，注重风险管理，以得到更迅速，茁壮成长。

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