外文翻译---上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

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上市公司财务舞弊的分析与思考

上市公司财务舞弊的分析与思考DTitle Analysis and Thinking listed companies’ financial fraud——Case study on SinovelAbstractAccompany with the development of capital market, financial fraud behavior always emerge in endlessly. From the collapse of Enron Corporation in foreign countries, WorldCom was traced to fraud, from Yunnan green earth in the domestic. Then just near Edmond Health Division fraud cases. The prohibition of financial fraud cases, and seriously hindered the healthy development o domestic, securities industry. Not only because significant losses to investors, but also seriously affected the resources configuration, harm to the capital market. Therefore, this shows that financial fraud of listed company’ research is imperative for financial fraud prevention and regulatory penalties have more far-reaching.Abroad is relatively more developed domestic capital, accounting profession has a lot of research on financial fraud, this is our country’s financial fraud has reference value and significance of the research. But considering our country’s social system legal environment, economic situation, combined with actual situation of our country to research the financial fraud of listed companies. This show adopts the way of theory research and case for analysis. Through the introduction to financial fraud and related concepts, and the analysis of risk factors, and combined with Sinovel cases. From the enterprise itself,intermediary institutions, government department three Angle analysis, and put forward suggestions to, finally summarizes the countermeasures to prevent financial fraud of listed companies.This article mainly is composed of six parts; the first part is the introduction, introduced in this paper, the research background, significance, purpose, literature review, research methods and contents. The second part is about the analysis of the dynamics of financial fraud of listed companies, mainly general risk factor and individual risk factors. The third part is to introduce Sinovel fraud cases and make a analysis an thinking. The fourth part of the listed company fraud proposes appropriate preventive measures. Finally, there are summarizes and thanks.Keyword Financial fraud Sinovel Precautions目录摘要............................................ 错误!未定义书签。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策一、引言上市公司财务舞弊是一个严重的问题，不仅损害了投资者的利益，也破坏了市场的公平和透明度。

随着经济全球化的发展，越来越多的上市公司参与国际业务，外文翻译在财务信息披露中变得至关重要。

然而，外文翻译过程中也可能出现财务舞弊的情况。

本文将探讨外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因，并提出相应的对策。

二、外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因（一）利益驱动上市公司为了满足融资需求、维持股价稳定或达到管理层的业绩目标，可能会采取财务舞弊手段。

在外文翻译过程中，通过故意歪曲或隐瞒关键财务信息，误导国外投资者和监管机构。

（二）缺乏有效的内部控制公司内部治理结构不完善，内部控制制度存在漏洞，导致财务部门和翻译部门之间缺乏有效的监督和制衡。

翻译人员可能在没有充分审核和监督的情况下，对财务信息进行错误或误导性的翻译。

（三）翻译人员专业素质不足部分翻译人员缺乏财务知识和专业素养，对财务术语和概念理解不准确，从而在翻译过程中出现错误。

此外，一些翻译人员职业道德缺失，为了个人利益而参与财务舞弊。

（四）监管不力对上市公司外文翻译的财务信息监管存在难度，不同国家和地区的监管标准和要求存在差异，导致监管漏洞。

同时，监管部门的资源和技术手段有限，难以对大量的外文财务信息进行及时、有效的审查。

（五）压力与竞争市场竞争激烈，上市公司面临巨大的压力。

为了在竞争中脱颖而出，一些公司不惜通过财务舞弊来美化业绩。

在外文翻译环节，这种舞弊行为可能更具隐蔽性。

三、外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的对策（一）加强内部控制建立健全的内部控制体系，明确财务部门和翻译部门的职责和权限，加强部门之间的沟通和协作。

定期对内部控制制度进行评估和完善，确保其有效性。

（二）提高翻译人员素质加强对翻译人员的培训，提高其财务知识水平和职业道德素养。

要求翻译人员具备相关的专业认证，确保其能够准确理解和翻译财务信息。

（三）强化监管加强国际间的监管合作，统一监管标准和要求，减少监管差异。

外文翻译---上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

Reasons and countermeasures of listed companies ' financial fraudPick to: financial fraud accompanied by China's reform and opening process and continuous development, bring social harm is more and more apparent, whether to financial fraud effective management by the people's widespread concern. On the listed company's financial fraud concepts and methods were summarized, from the interest drive, corporate governance, accounting personnel occupation moral standards, accounting and auditing system, in-depth analysis of the causes of financial fraud, and in view of the above reasons put forward the corresponding control measuresKey words: financial fraud; reasons; control countermeasures; listed companyIntroductionSince the beginning of Enron in late 2001, cases of financial fraud in listed companies at home and abroad frequently burst out. In early 2006, the Shanghai national accounting Institute Research Center for financial fraud (snaiFFRC) disclosed to "kelong" headed by the "2005 top ten most fraudulent financial companies of the listed companies" means is more amazing the financial fraud of "smart". Self, circulating trading, trading of yin and Yang, the packing channels, always accounting errors, large bath, mergers and acquisitions, restructuring, concealed stocks, the report cash traps, this is a top ten listing companies financial fraud trick.One, the concept of financial fraud and wayFinancial fraud is the subject of false financial information processing in accounting and reporting process, to obtain undue economic interests, used deceptive means to intentionally lied about the importance and financial facts of violations of laws and substantive violations. Financial fraud has four characteristics: unlawful, intentional sexuality, danger, and concealment. Specific means of financial fraud can be said to be endless, but the core is intact. Income fraud including fictitious earnings and revenue across periods; cost of fraud including cross-phase meter cost less and adjustment costs as well as costs of capital; corrupt cash fraud, should be the project assets, such as fraud, less provision for impairment; liabilities are generally less-total liabilities of fraud.Financial fraud means basically has the following several aspects:1.the use of improper accounting policies and accounting fraud. Management typically useintertemporal amortization class accounts for many share, share more, less or less cost to adjust profit. (1) the selection of inappropriate borrowing costs accounting method. In practice, many listed company through misuse of borrowing costs accounting, in build a project completed and not the final. (2) improper selection of equity investment accounting methods. Principles of enterprise accounting regulations: investment enterprises of joint control or significant influence, should adopt equity method; instead, it uses the cost method.But many companies use, when the investee company profit, should not use the equity method investment using the equity method of accounting; when the investee company loss, the equity method to the cost method .(3) improper selection of merging policy. (4) the improper selection of depreciation method.Extended depreciation, by accelerating method is changed into the straight line method, inpractice it is often seen. (5) the improper selection of income, cost confirmation method.Advance or delay the confirmation of income or expense is also listed companies generally adopt cheating. (6) the improper selection of the impairment provision method.2. use of enterprise internal control system defects and the weak link of fraud. As the cashier personnel use enterprise blank check, financial dedicated seal, legal person seal does not separate keeping malpractice, privately issued checks, misappropriation of public funds. Cozy with his duties incompatible staff collude with a fraud.3.related party transaction fraud. The related party transaction fraud, refers to the management using the related party transaction to hide losses, fictitious profits, and not in the statements and notes in accordance with the provisions as appropriate, full disclosure, the resulting information will have on the users of financial statements misleading a fraud method. Typically, Chinese listed companies using the purchase and sale of related fraud, fraud, entrusted with the operation of funds embezzlement, fraud and other four kinds of cost sharing related transactions by way of fictitious profit.4. the assets of fraud. Asset restructuring, mergers and acquisitions, debt restructuring, asset replacement form, occurring between the related parties. Assets reorganization of corrupt corrupt corrupt major mergers and acquisitions and debt restructuring in two ways.5. cover up fraud transaction or fact. Hide transaction or fact of fraud is through the use of accounting statements to hide transactions of listed companies or the truth, or has not been fully disclosed in the notes to the report deals truth an fraud methods.Second, the causes of listed companies ' financial malpracticeListed companies ' financial malpractice caused several of the following reasons:1. financial return far greater than the cost of fraud. To meet listing standards at some companies desperate to find ways to make financial fraud, and fraud, to meet the policy requirements. In addition, because the share price is times the income and earnings per share, and high stock market price/earnings ratio of deformity in China, so the main purpose of listed company's financial fraud is false profits. False profits of $ 1, the circulation market value of listed companies will increase 10 times times times. Relative to the fraud fraud income, cost is too low, from a certain extent, it is too low a fraud cost contributed some fraud.2. corporate governance structure is not perfect. Corporate governance structure is in fact about between owners, the Board of Directors and senior executive officers rights assigned and the arrangement of a system of checks and balances, the reality in China, led directly to the equity structure of listed companies malformations include the general meeting of shareholders, Board of Directors, Board of supervisors, which distort the relationship between corporate governance structure of checks and balances, which has provided an opportunity for financial fraud in listed companies. This is mainly manifested in the following aspects: (1) the ownership structure is not reasonable. As of the second half of 2006, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market, shares of over50 listed companies only 185, largest shareholder holding ratio of no more than 25 and only 219, 60~70 listed companies have invaded and occupied by large shareholders of listed company's funds. In the case of high concentration of ownership, possibilities of treatment failure of listed companies increased, listed companies, the greater possibility of financial fraud. (2) the independence of the Board is not strong, internal control is a serious problem. China listed company Director served as Senior Manager of the phenomenon is more prevalent, Director serves as the Senior Manager (internal control) more than 50 per cent of the sample company 32, more than 30 per cent of a sample of 65 companies. In this case, the operation of the Board is usually "Insider" or shareholder control, rather than based on the collective interest. This has led to the phenomenon of frequent corporate financial fraud. (3) the Supervisory Board weakening the oversight function, financial report difficulty in discharging its oversight functions. Based on analysis of listed company financial reporting fraud, Board of supervisors system in suppression of financial fraud in China did not play a role of Directors and managers of monitoring. Listed companies are required by law to set up a supervisory board, Board of supervisors actually are in a very awkward position, lower right or upper right of vulnerable rights of supervision or stronger right.3. accounting staff lack of professional ethics. Finance and accounting personnel who are directly involved in financial fraud, from the macro perspective, is mainly long term and not enough on accounting ethics education, lack of accounting professional standards; micro-perspective, strong sense of company accountants law, in order to meet company leaders of unhealthy psychological, thus violating the ethics of being practical and realistic, objective and fair. In addition, individuals driven by economic interests, has also led to some accountants deliberately forged, altered, hiding and destroyed the accounting information, taking advantage of his position of financial fraud.4. accounting and audit system is not sound. In recent years, although China is making a lot of accounting and auditing legislation, but from the practical point of view are not perfect and sound. Poor operability of some provisions, resulting in accounting fraud an opportunity. New accounting law "legal responsibility" chapter referred to "serious", "criminal", "significant losses" are not quantified, has no specific explanation. 2006 implementation of new accounting standards, provided more accounting options for management, which provides management with more profit opportunities. In addition, lack of punishment measures, social supervision is not strong, quality performance evaluation of accounting does not work, no ability to detect fraud, also can lead to occurrence of listed companies ' financial malpractice.Third, the governance of listed companies’financial fraud countermeasures1. coordinating the relationship between benefits and costs of financial fraud. We should increase the penalties for financial fraud, financial fraud costs more than it gains, so you can basically stop financial fraud. At the same time, in charge of financial malpractice should bear unlimited joint and several financial responsibility, which can to a large extent, inhibit their impulses of illegal counterfeiting. For those who dare to report the accounting officer shall provide ample rewards, so that its behavior is greater than the loss of income to report financial fraud. In this way, financial malpractice liability and they will take the initiative to give up the idea of financial fraud.2. perfect the corporate governance structure. Improve the internal governance structure of thecompany, is to prevent financial fraud, improve the quality of accounting information. (1) to improve the company's ownership structure, can solve the status of minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder is not symmetric. (2) the perfection of listed company's Board. In the establishment of external independent directors on the Board of the company, and provides that a certain proportion of the external independent directors, and established a number of specialized committees, raise the level of professionalization of the Board, to play the role of the Board. (3) improvement Board of supervisors of listed companies. As the Board of supervisors a mere formality, only to stand in the governance structure of the company, to further improve the system of Board of supervisors.3. raising the level of professional ethics of accountants. State management and accounting departments, should continuously strengthen the ideological education of accountants and accounting staff levels continue to improve, making it able to consciously resist financial malpractice, gradually establishing accounting integrity and fair image.4. accounting and auditing systems. Accounting standards and the flexibility of the system is the important basis for financial fraud to achieve. First of all, according to China's actual conditions, principles of system of accounting standards and make appropriate adjustments, in general lack of ethical culture in China now, improving the reliability of the accounting report is the key. Second, correctly handle the relationship between consistency and flexibility, reducing the options available to the company within the scope of accounting system as much as possible, especially when it comes to income and expenses recognized measuring principle, the depreciation of fixed assets, eight-asset impairment provision ratio and maximum detailed provisions should be made. Introduce specific implementation details will be quantitative and specific legal responsibility to explain, this has the advantage of parties a clear financial consequences of fraud, also in favour of the relevant departments to determine the financial fraud and punishable by appropriate penalties. Finally, give full play to the role of public opinion and the media. As the perfection of the securities market, market supervision is not limited to certified public accountants and the Government, the general public and the media has also been involved in the regulatory process.The endAt present, China is in an early stage of market economy, all kinds of deceptive behaviors emerge, accounting activity as a measure of economic activity, inevitably financial fraud. Financial fraud is not only an economic phenomenon, is also a visualization of the deep moral conviction. So, on the governance of financial fraud is a systems engineering, business, community and government supervision of Trinity system is required in all departments and make concerted efforts, coordinate with each other. Only an integrated approach to governance, to create good information environment for China's economic development.Reference.[1] Hou Yanlei, Zhai Yingmin. The financial fraud of listed companies analysis [J]. Economy and management,2006, (7):71-73.[2] Huang Xinjian . Chinese listed company's financial fraud and the Countermeasures Research [J]. Economic survey,2006, (4):77-79.[3] Wang Jianxin. The financial fraud of listed companies : motives and management [J ]. Market modernization,2008, (2):346-347.[4] Yang Yunshu . The financial fraud of listed companies analysis [J ]. Accounting research,2006,(5):62-63.[5]You Xiaofeng. Chinese Research on financial governance of Listed Companies [ M]. Beijing: Economic Science Press,2005: 144-145.[6] Zhang Aimin. The combination of internal and external, prevention of financial fraud of Listed Companies [ J]. Contemporary economy,2006, (2):18-19.[7]Hong Ge. Fraud in financial reports of listed companies governance approach [J]. Economic review,2005, (9):117-137.[8]Wang Haixia. Internal governance structure in listed companies and the prevention of financial fraud [J]. Auditing & Finance,2005, (7):23-24.上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策摘要：财务舞弊行为伴随着中国改革开放的进程而不断演进发展，带给社会的危害也愈来愈明显，能否对财务舞弊行为进行切实有效地治理受到人们的普遍关注。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策在当今复杂多变的经济环境中，上市公司财务舞弊问题日益严重，不仅损害了投资者的利益，破坏了市场的公平和透明，也给整个经济社会带来了负面影响。

本文旨在深入探讨外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因，并提出相应的对策，以维护市场的健康稳定发展。

一、外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因（一）利益驱动利益是导致外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的首要原因。

公司管理层为了达到个人或团体的经济利益，如获取高额薪酬、奖金、股票期权等，可能会操纵财务数据。

此外，公司为了满足上市要求、获得融资、避免退市等，也会不惜通过舞弊手段来美化财务报表。

（二）公司治理结构不完善公司内部治理结构的缺陷为财务舞弊提供了机会。

如果董事会、监事会等监督机制失效，管理层权力过大且缺乏有效制衡，就容易出现财务舞弊行为。

同时，内部审计部门独立性不足，无法发挥有效的监督作用，也使得财务舞弊难以被及时发现和制止。

（三）外部监管不力证券监管部门的监管力度不足，法律法规不够健全，对财务舞弊行为的处罚力度不够严厉，使得上市公司违法成本较低。

此外，审计机构、评级机构等第三方中介机构未能尽职尽责，也在一定程度上纵容了财务舞弊行为的发生。

（四）压力与动机公司面临的业绩压力、市场竞争压力以及来自股东和投资者的期望压力，都可能促使管理层采取不正当手段来达到预期的财务目标。

例如，当公司业绩不佳时，为了稳定股价、避免投资者恐慌抛售，管理层可能会选择财务舞弊。

（五）财务人员职业道德缺失部分财务人员缺乏职业操守和道德底线，为了个人利益或者迫于上级压力，参与或协助财务舞弊。

他们可能故意篡改财务数据、编制虚假财务报告，严重违背了会计职业的诚信原则。

（六）信息不对称上市公司与投资者之间存在信息不对称，投资者难以获取公司真实、准确、完整的财务信息。

这种信息差距使得上市公司更容易进行财务舞弊，而投资者难以察觉和防范。

二、外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的对策（一）完善公司治理结构建立健全的公司治理机制，优化董事会结构，增强董事会的独立性和专业性。

财务报表舞弊上市公司会计舞弊外文文献翻译

财务报表舞弊上市公司会计舞弊外文文献翻译文献出处：Amara I, Amar A B, Jarboui A. Detection of Fraud in Financial Statements: French Companies as a Case Study[J]. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 2013, 3(3): 40-51.翻译后中文字数：7240第一部分为译文，第二部分为原文。

默认格式：中文五号宋体，英文五号Times New Roma，行间距1.5倍。

财务报表舞弊的检测：以法国公司为例摘要：本研究的目的是检验“舞弊三角”元素对财务报表舞弊行为的影响。

我们使用2001年至2009年期间的SBF250中的80家法国公司的样本数据，使用逻辑回归方法进行分析。

研究发现，对经理施加绩效考核的压力是导致财务报表舞弊的因素之一。

与财务困难（债务，流动性）和审计事务所规模等因素与舞弊无关。

关键词：舞弊，舞弊三角，压力，机会1.引言如今，全球经济经历了一系列金融危机，导致市场、投资者和舆论对公司账户的不信任。

在这里，只要强调一个事实，即安然公司，一家前美国的能源商品和服务公司，已经为所有社会伙伴造成了70万亿美元的损失。

因此，上述的借口带来了随之而来的经济危机，这种危机已经蔓延到全球所有新兴计划。

例如，广泛宣传的丑闻是Worldcom，Parmalat，Ahold 等的案例（Rezaee，2005年）。

当然，上面列出的财务丑闻不是商界信任危机的唯一原因。

影响经济的真正祸患无疑是“舞弊”。

所有的操作在一定程度上是固有的共同之处：它包括欺骗，违反了对社区造成损害的行为和法规。

正如Rouff（2003）所述，“舞弊是一种故意行为，其作者是一个真正的罪犯”。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译___ confidence and have taken n to address this issue. The n of ns, standards, and guidelines aims to ___ global financial systems.During ___, ___ in more than one country, and most of these ___ the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) ___; and (2) ___, the public accounting n, and global capital markets.In n, ___ activities, ___ financial fraud are significant and can have long-___, it is essential for companies to ___ fraud, ___.Global Regulatory n for Corporate and Accounting Reforms In response ___, U.S. lawmakers passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. This Act aims to protect public interest and restore investor confidence in the capital market. President Bush signed the Act into law on July 30, 2002. The Act ___ It requires executives, boards of directors, and ___, responsibility, ___. The Act, along with subsequent SEC initiatives, ___ since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies, such as NYSE, NASDAQ, and the State Societies of CPAs, have also ___ and their external auditors.Note: ___ if it should be ___.The ___ (IFAC) is a global ___ is to serve the public interest, ___ worldwide, and contribute to the development of strong nal ___ high-___ such as the Global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the nal n of Securities ns (IOSCO), the World Bank, and the European ___ 2002, the ___ in Financial Reporting to address theglobal ___. The task force's report, titled "Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An nal Perspective," ___ issuers. One of the key ___.All public ___ report to the board and address concerns related to financial n, internal controls, or the audit. It is ___ financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit n, as well as mending, working with, and monitoring the external auditors. The members of ___, and a majority should have ___.8. A principles-based approach ___ credentials, n, ___.Note: ___ (OECD) has been deleted as it is not clear how it relates to the rest of the text.___ (OECD) is a quasi-think tank consisting of 30 member countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. It also has working nships with over 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated n of its "Principles of Corporate Governance," ___ (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although these principles are nonbinding, they serve as a reference for nal n and n, as well as provide guidance for stock exchanges, investors, ns, ___ policymakers, investors, ns, ___ OECD and non-OECD countries.4. Recognizing the ___.6. ___ party ___.In n, member states of the European n have proposed a code of conduct for independent auditors, ___ every five years. Moreover, the nal governments of individual European countries ___. For example, in July 2002, the British ___ to the Company Law. These ___ misleading auditors, redefining the roles of directors, ___.全球企业和会计改革监管行动正在进行中，旨在恢复投资者对财务报告、会计行业和全球金融市场的信心。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策外文翻译：上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策在当前全球化的经济背景下，上市公司财务舞弊成为了一个严重的问题。

财务舞弊不仅对公司自身造成损失，还会对整个市场造成负面影响。

因此，了解财务舞弊的原因，并采取有效的对策来防止和打击财务舞弊，对于保护股东权益和维护市场秩序至关重要。

上市公司财务舞弊的原因：1. 经济利益诱惑：上市公司为了实现自身的经济利益，可能会采取财务舞弊手段来虚增营收、利润等数据，以达到吸引投资者和提高股价的目的。

这种利益诱惑往往是由公司管理层的个人利益驱动，例如获得高额奖金、股票期权等。

2. 激进的业绩要求：上市公司常常会面临投资者、股东和分析师的高业绩预期。

为了满足这些要求，一些公司可能会采取不正当手段，如虚构交易、突击收入等，来提高企业的业绩。

3. 弱内部控制机制：一些上市公司的内部控制机制相对薄弱，缺乏有效的监管和审计。

这使得公司管理层有机会滥用权力，进行财务舞弊。

此外，内部控制不完善还容易导致数据造假、漏洞利用等问题。

上市公司财务舞弊的对策：1. 加强监管和审计：政府和监管机构应加强对上市公司的监管力度，确保财务报告的准确性和透明度。

同时，应加强对审计机构的监管，提高审计质量和独立性。

2. 加强内部控制：上市公司应建立健全的内部控制机制，包括风险管理、内部审计、内部监督等。

公司管理层应确保内部控制的有效执行，避免权力滥用和数据造假。

3. 提高公司治理水平：良好的公司治理可以有效地预防和遏制财务舞弊行为。

上市公司应加强董事会独立性，完善董事会职责和监督机制，加强对高管层和内部人员的监督和约束。

4. 加强投资者教育和保护：投资者应提高风险意识，加强对上市公司财务信息的分析和监督能力。

同时，监管机构应加强对投资者的保护，建立完善的投诉和举报机制，及时处理投资者的举报和投诉。

总结：上市公司财务舞弊是一个复杂且严重的问题，需要全社会的重视和共同努力来解决。

政府、监管机构、公司管理层和投资者等各方应加强合作，共同致力于建立一个公平、透明、规范的市场环境，为投资者提供可靠的财务信息，保护投资者权益，促进经济的可持续发展。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文翻译文献(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)原文：Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for Reforms1、IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investor confidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.2、Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.EXHIBIT 1. A SAMPLE OF CASES OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING3、Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsI. U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA 2002)In response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting. The statutes of the act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed, are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as the New York StockExchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA .The United States' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.II. International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world's most influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization ofSecurities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the European Communities(EC).In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, "Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective," includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are :1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body .2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit .3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively .4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have "substantial financial experience." They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and on the company.6. Audit committees should have regular private "executive sessions" with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer (CFO) and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management .8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members' credentials,remuneration and shareholdings.9. Reinforcing the role of the audit committee should improve the relationship between the auditor and the company. The audit committee should recommend the hiring and firing of auditors and approve their fees, as well as review the audit plan.10. The IFAC Code of Ethics should be the foundation for individual national independence rules. It should be relied on in making decisions on whether auditors should provide non-audit services. Non-audit services performed by the auditor should be approved by the audit committee.11. All fees, for audit and non-audit services, should be disclosed to shareholders.12. Key audit team members, including the engagement and independent review partners, should serve no longer than seven years on the audit .13. Two years should pass before a key audit team member can take a position at the company as a director or any other important management position .III. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is a quasi-think tank made up of 30 member countries, including the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (UK), and it has working relationships with more than 70 other countries. In 2004, the OECD unveiled the updated revision of its "Principles of Corporate Governance" that had originally been adopted by its member governments (including the U.S. and UK) in 1999. Although they are non-binding, the principles provide a reference for national legislation and regulation, as well as guidance for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties .The principles have long become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory initiatives in both the OECD and non-OECD countries.The 2004 updated version of "Principles of Corporate Governance" includes recommendations on accounting and auditing standards, the independence of board members and the need for boards to act in the interest of the company and theshareholders. The updated version also sets more demanding standards in a number of areas that impact corporate executive compensation and finance, such as :1. Granting investors the right to nominate company directors, as well as a more forceful role in electing them.2. Providing shareholders with a voice in the compensation policy for board members and executives, and giving these stockholders the ability to submit questions to auditors.3. Mandating that institutional investors disclose their overall voting policies and how they manage material conflicts of interest that may affect the way the investors exercise key ownership functions, such as voting .4. Identifying the need for effective protection of creditor rights and an efficient system for dealing with corporate insolvency .5. Directing rating agencies, brokers and other providers of information that could influence investor decisions to disclose conflicts of interest, and how those conflicts are being managed .6. Mandating board members to be more rigorous in disclosing related party transactions, and protecting so-called "whistle blowers" by providing the employees with confidential access to a board-level contact .4、ConclusionThe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the U.S. government's response to the wave of fraudulent corporate financial reporting experienced during the 1990s and early 2000s an represented a significant step in regaining investors' confidence in the global financial reporting process. The SOA created new and stricter statutes to avoid a repeat of previous corporate financial disasters. The Act not only applies to U.S. entities but also covers primarily large non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, as well as their non-U.S. external auditors, regardless of their nationality or place of business. Foreign entities have to comply with the SOA by June 2005 .Across the Atlantic, the IFAC, OECD and EU have recognize the recent eruption of corporate scandals in Europe and affirmed the inevitable need forcorporate governance reforms and regulation of the public accounting profession worldwide. The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) has passed the Code of Professional Ethics for international accounting firms. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has passed guidelines for improving corporate governance. The European Union (EU) has proposed a code of conduct for independent auditors, which include a five-year auditor rotation requirement. European countries are also individually involved in improving their corporate laws through governance codes of practice.Sourse: Badawi, Ibrahim M. Review of Business; Spring2005, Vol. 26 Issue 2, p8-14, 7p译文：全球公司会计舞弊和改革行为一、前言随着最近一系列公司虚假财务报告事件在美国发生,类似丑闻也在其他国家被曝光。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策一、引言在当今复杂多变的商业环境中，上市公司财务舞弊问题日益凸显，给投资者、企业自身以及整个经济社会都带来了严重的负面影响。

财务舞弊不仅损害了投资者的利益，破坏了市场的公平竞争环境，还可能导致企业声誉受损，甚至面临法律制裁。

因此，深入研究上市公司财务舞弊的原因，并提出有效的对策，具有重要的现实意义。

二、上市公司财务舞弊的原因（一）内部因素1、管理层道德缺失部分上市公司的管理层为了追求个人利益最大化，不惜违背职业道德，操纵财务数据以达到虚增利润、美化业绩的目的。

他们可能会受到高额薪酬、股权激励等因素的诱惑，从而走上财务舞弊的不归路。

2、内部治理结构不完善公司内部治理结构的缺陷为财务舞弊提供了可乘之机。

例如，董事会独立性不足，无法对管理层进行有效的监督；监事会形同虚设，未能发挥应有的监督作用；内部审计部门缺乏独立性和权威性，难以发现和阻止财务舞弊行为。

3、财务压力上市公司面临着来自股东、投资者、债权人等各方的压力，如果经营业绩不佳，可能会面临股价下跌、融资困难、债务违约等风险。

为了缓解这些压力，管理层可能会选择通过财务舞弊来粉饰财务报表。

4、企业文化扭曲一些公司过于强调短期业绩和利润，忽视了诚信经营和社会责任，形成了一种不良的企业文化。

在这种文化氛围的影响下，员工可能会为了迎合公司的要求而参与财务舞弊。

（二）外部因素1、监管不力相关监管部门在对上市公司的监管过程中，可能存在监管手段落后、监管力度不足、处罚力度不够等问题，使得一些上市公司敢于冒险进行财务舞弊。

2、审计独立性不足审计机构在对上市公司进行审计时，可能会受到经济利益、客户关系等因素的影响，导致审计独立性受损，无法客观、公正地出具审计报告，从而为财务舞弊行为提供了掩护。

3、法律法规不完善目前，我国针对财务舞弊的法律法规还不够完善，存在一些漏洞和模糊地带，使得财务舞弊者有机可乘。

同时，对于财务舞弊的处罚力度也相对较轻，不足以起到威慑作用。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策在当今复杂多变的商业环境中，上市公司财务舞弊现象时有发生，不仅损害了投资者的利益，也破坏了市场的公平和秩序。

本文将深入探讨外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊的原因，并提出相应的对策。

一、上市公司财务舞弊的原因（一）利益驱动上市公司为了满足资本市场的预期，获取更高的股价和更多的融资机会，往往会通过财务舞弊来美化业绩。

例如，虚构收入、利润，夸大资产规模等，以营造出公司经营良好、发展前景广阔的假象。

（二）内部治理缺陷部分上市公司内部治理结构不完善，董事会、监事会等监督机制未能有效发挥作用。

管理层权力过大，缺乏有效的制衡和约束，为财务舞弊提供了可乘之机。

（三）外部监管不足监管部门在监管手段、力度和信息获取等方面存在一定的局限性，难以对上市公司的财务状况进行全面、及时和准确的监管。

同时，对于财务舞弊行为的处罚力度相对较轻，不足以对违法者形成有效的威慑。

（四）审计失效审计机构在审计过程中可能存在独立性不足、专业能力欠缺或职业道德缺失等问题，导致未能发现或揭露上市公司的财务舞弊行为。

（五）压力与动机公司面临着来自股东、债权人、分析师等多方面的压力，如业绩考核压力、偿债压力等。

在这些压力下，公司管理层可能会选择通过财务舞弊来暂时缓解困境。

（六）文化与道德缺失一些上市公司缺乏诚信经营的企业文化和道德价值观，管理层和员工对财务舞弊行为的认识不足，甚至认为这是一种普遍存在的商业手段。

二、上市公司财务舞弊的对策（一）完善公司内部治理优化股权结构，避免股权过于集中或分散。

强化董事会的独立性和专业性，充分发挥其决策和监督职能。

建立健全监事会制度，加强对公司财务和经营活动的监督。

（二）加强外部监管监管部门应加大监管力度，创新监管手段，提高监管效率。

加强对上市公司信息披露的要求，确保其财务报告的真实性、准确性和完整性。

同时，加大对财务舞弊行为的处罚力度，提高违法成本。

（三）提高审计质量审计机构应保持独立性，加强审计人员的专业培训和职业道德教育，提高审计质量和风险防范能力。

财务报告舞弊外文翻译

财务报告舞弊,外文翻译：外文舞弊财务报告翻译财务报告舞弊定义舞弊风险因素怎么分析会计舞弊案例篇一：全球公司会计舞弊和改革行为【外文翻译】(1)外文文献翻译译文原文Global Corporate Accounting Frauds and Action for Reforms1、IntroductionDuring the recent series of corporate fraudulent financial reporting incidents in the U.S., similar corporate scandals were disclosed in several other countries. Almost all cases of foreign corporate accounting frauds were committed by entities that conduct their businesses in more than one country, and most of these entities are also listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Following the legislative and regulatory reforms of corporate America, resulting from the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, reforms were also initiated worldwide. The primary purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to identify the prominent American and foreign companies involved in fraudulent financial reporting and the nature of accounting irregularities they committed; and (2) to highlight the global reaction for corporate reforms which are aimed at restoring investorconfidence in financial reporting, the public accounting profession and global capital markets.2、Cases of Global Corporate Accounting FraudsThe list of corporate financial accounting scandals in the U.S. is extensive, and each one was the result of one or more creative accounting irregularities. Exhibit 1 identifies a sample of U.S. companies that committed such fraud and the nature of their fraudulent financial reporting activities.EXHIBIT 1. A SAMPLE OF CASES OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING3、Global Regulatory Action for Corporate and Accounting ReformsI. U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOA 2002)In response to corporate and accounting scandals, the effects of which are still being felt throughout the U.S. economy, and in order to protect public interest and to restore investor confidence in the capital market, U.S. lawmakers, in a compromise by the House and Senate, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. President Bush signed this Act into law (Public Law 107-204) on July 30, 2002. The Act resulted in major changes to compliance practices of large U.S. and non-U.S. companies whose securities are listed or traded on U.S. stock exchanges, requiring executives, boards of directors and external auditors to undertake measures to implement greater accountability, responsibility and transparency of financial reporting.The statutes of the act, and the new SEC initiatives that followed, are considered the most significant legislation and regulations affecting the corporate community and the accounting profession since 1933. Other U.S. regulatory bodies such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) and the State Societies of CPAs have also passed new regulations which place additional burdens on publicly traded companies and their external auditors.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) is expressly applicable to any non-U.S. company registered on U.S. exchanges under either the Securities Act of 1933 or the Security Exchange Act of 1934, regardless of country of incorporation or corporate domicile. Furthermore, external auditors of such registrants, regardless of their nationality or place of business, are subject to the oversight of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and to the statutory requirements of the SOA .The United States' SOA has reverberated around the globe through the corporate and accounting reforms addressed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the European Commission (UC); and authoritative bodies within individual European countries.II. International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) is a private governance organization whose members are the national professional associations of accountants. It formally describes itself as the global representative of the accounting profession, with the objective of serving the public interest, strengthening the worldwide accountancy profession and contributing to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high quality standards. The Federation represents accountancy groups worldwide and has served as a reminder that restoring public confidence in financial reporting and the accounting profession should be considered a global mission. It is also considered a key player in the global auditing arena which, among other things, constructs international standards on auditing and has laid down an international ethical code for professional accountants. The IFAC has recently secured a degree of support for its endeavors from some of the world's most influential international organizations in economic and financial spheres, including global Financial Stability Forum (FSF), the International Organization ofSecurities Commissions (IOSCO), the World Bank and, most significantly, the European Communities(EC).In October 2002, IFAC commissioned a Task Force on Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting to use a global perspective to consider how to restore the credibility of financial reporting and corporate disclosure. Its report, Rebuilding Public Confidence in Financial Reporting: An International Perspective, includes recommendations for strengthening corporate governance, and raising the regulating standards of issuers. Among its conclusions and recommendations related to audit committees are :1. All public interest entities should have an independent audit committee or similar body .2. The audit committee should regularly report to the board and should address concerns about financial information, internal controls or the audit .3. The audit committee must meet regularly and have sufficient time to perform its role effectively .4. Audit committees should have core responsibilities, including monitoring and reviewing the integrity of financial reporting, financial controls, the internal audit function, as well as for recommending, working with and monitoring the external auditors.5. Audit committee members should be financially literate and a majority should have substantial financial experience. They should receive further training as necessary on their responsibilities and onthe company.6. Audit committees should have regular private executive sessions with the outside auditors and the head of the internal audit department. These executive sessions should not include members of management. There should be similar meetings with the chief financial officer (CFO) and other key financial executives, but without other members of management.7. Audit committee members should be independent of management .8. There should be a principles-based approach to defining independence on an international level. Companies should disclose committee members' credentials,篇二：财务报表舞弊的原因,后果和威胁外文翻译财务报表舞弊的原因，后果和威胁财务报表舞弊是一种由企业蓄意欺骗或通过编制和传播重大误报的财务报表来误导财务报表使用者的行为，尤其是投资者和债权人，严重威胁市场参与者对已公布的经审计的财务报表信心。

上市公司财务舞弊的动因及防范措施

上市公司财务舞弊的动因及防范措施————————————————————————————————作者：————————————————————————————————日期：本科生毕业论文上市公司财务舞弊的动因及防范措施——Causes of financial fraud of listing Corporation and its preventivemeasures——学生姓名指导教师论文类别实践性年级专业学号二〇一六年五月声明及论文使用的授权摘要中国经济的蓬勃发展，带动了资本市场（特别是证券市场）的长期繁荣，从而我国的资本市场也开始走向历史舞台。

在全球经济趋于一体化的今天，国与国之间的经济合作也是大势所趋，许多国际投资机构也开始对我国产生浓厚的兴趣，引得大量境外资金通过各种方式涌入我国资本市场，中国上市公司数量这几年也通过不同形式出现快速增长。

然而所有事都有两面性，资本市场的发展在给经济繁荣做出贡献的时候，也不可避免得带来一些弊端。

近些年上市公司财务舞弊的案件屡见不鲜，经济损失最大的无疑就是市场中始终处于弱势的中小投资者们，所引发的极大的负面后果就是投资者对我国证券市场不再信任、甚至产生极大的怀疑，另外也在治理上市公司方面变得越来越棘手。

本文研究的绿大地财务舞弊案在我国众多上市公司舞弊案件中具有强烈的代表性，能集中反映出我国证券市场发展以来的相关问题。

所以，以绿大地财务舞弊案为例，深入分析其动因，并思考和提出一些防范措施及改进建议，具有为其他上市公司治理和中国证券市场健康发展提供参考借鉴的实际意义。

关键词：财务舞弊；动因；防范措施AbstractWith the prosperity and development of China's economy, and cooperation between countries, more and more international investment institutions will look to China, a large number of foreign capital into the Chinese stock market. Then listed company's financial fraud events but in recent years to emerge in endlessly, despite repeated prohibitions, which to the vast number of investors especially small investors caused huge economic losses, so that investors have the suspicion and mistrust of China's securities market, has great negative effects on China's securities market. In many listed companies' financial fraud case, the YUNNAN GREEN-LAND financial fraud has a strong representation, corrupt practices very typical, embodies a concentrated reflection of the securities market of our country since the developmentof all the problems. Therefore, motivation of financial fraud of the YUNNAN GREEN-LAND were in-depth analysis, and thinking and puts forward some preventive measures and suggestions to other listed companies for reference through the study on the case of the YUNNAN GREEN-LAND.Key words: financial fraud；motivation；measure目录引言 (1)一、文献综述 (2)（一）财务舞弊的含义 (2)（二）财务舞弊的动因理论 (2)1.冰山理论 (2)2.舞弊三因素理论 (3)3.GONE理论 (3)4.舞弊风险因子理论 (3)二、案例介绍 (5)（一）绿大地公司简介及涉案始末 (5)（二）绿大地财务舞弊的过程 (5)1.虚构经营活动，营造盈利假象 (5)2.变更经济事项，图谋上市机会 (6)3.粉饰报表业绩，避免退市风险 (7)三、案例分析——绿大地财务舞弊的动因分析 (9)（一）内部动因分析 (10)1.价值观念取向扭曲 (10)2.内部监督流于表面 (10)3.股权结构过于集中 (10)（二）外部动因分析 (11)1.经济效益大于造假成本 (11)2.政府机关为之保驾护航 (11)3.市场淡漠风险追求价值 (11)4.行业具有舞弊的便利性 (12)四、结论和启示 (13)（一）结论 (13)（二）防范措施 (13)1.针对内部动因提出的预防措施 (13)2.针对外部动因提出的预防措施 (14)参考文献 (16)致谢 (17)引言资本市场有着合理配置资源以提高资金利用效率的能力，但若想让市场能够维持良好秩序并有效地运转，市场上信息的质量就尤为关键，特别是财务信息。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策在当今的经济环境中，上市公司财务舞弊问题日益严重，不仅损害了投资者的利益，也破坏了市场的公平和透明。

本文将深入探讨上市公司财务舞弊的原因，并提出相应的对策，以期为规范上市公司财务行为、维护市场秩序提供有益的参考。

一、上市公司财务舞弊的原因（一）利益驱动1、融资需求上市公司为了满足融资条件，如发行股票、债券等，可能会通过财务舞弊来美化财务报表，以吸引投资者的资金。

2、维持股价当公司股价面临下跌压力时，管理层为了避免股东的不满和自身利益受损，可能会操纵财务数据来维持股价的稳定。

3、高管薪酬高管的薪酬往往与公司的业绩挂钩，为了获取高额薪酬，他们可能会指使财务人员进行舞弊，以提高公司的业绩表现。

（二）内部治理结构不完善1、股权结构不合理股权过于集中，大股东可能会为了自身利益而操纵公司财务，侵害中小股东的利益。

2、董事会独立性不足董事会成员与管理层关系密切，无法有效监督管理层的行为，导致财务舞弊难以被发现和制止。

3、内部审计失效内部审计部门缺乏独立性和权威性，无法对公司的财务活动进行有效的监督和审计。

（三）外部监管不力1、法律法规不完善现行的法律法规对财务舞弊的处罚力度不够，违法成本较低，使得一些上市公司敢于冒险舞弊。

2、监管资源不足监管部门人力、物力有限，难以对众多上市公司进行全面、及时的监管，给财务舞弊留下了空间。

3、监管手段落后监管部门的监管手段相对单一，主要依赖于定期的财务报告审查，对公司的日常经营活动和财务数据的实时监控不足。

（四）会计制度和准则的缺陷1、会计准则的灵活性会计准则在某些方面存在一定的灵活性，为上市公司进行财务舞弊提供了可乘之机。

2、会计估计的主观性在会计处理中，一些项目如资产减值准备、折旧方法等需要进行会计估计，这就给了公司管理层操纵财务数据的空间。

（五）社会诚信缺失社会整体诚信意识淡薄，道德观念弱化，使得一些上市公司在追求经济利益的过程中不择手段，不惜通过财务舞弊来获取非法利益。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策外文翻译：上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策引言上市公司财务舞弊是指公司操纵财务报表以获取不正当利益的行为。

财务舞弊对投资者、股东和整个市场都会带来严重的经济损失和信任危机。

本文将探讨外文研究文献中关于上市公司财务舞弊的原因以及可能的对策。

财务舞弊的原因1. 绩效压力上市公司通常面临来自股东、投资者和分析师的高期望压力。

管理层为了满足这种压力，可能会采取不正当手段来提高业绩，比如虚报收入或减少负债。

绩效压力是导致财务舞弊的主要原因之一。

2. 薪酬激励计划薪酬激励计划可以激励员工为公司创造更高的利润，但如果激励计划设计不合理或监督不到位，员工可能会通过不正当手段来达到奖励目标，从而导致财务舞弊的发生。

3. 薄弱的内部控制上市公司应建立有效的内部控制机制，以确保财务报表的真实、完整和准确。

然而，薄弱的内部控制可能会导致财务舞弊的发生。

比如，没有适当的审计程序、缺乏独立性的董事会或审计委员会，以及管理层滥用权力等。

4. 管理层诚信缺失财务舞弊的另一个重要原因是管理层的诚信缺失。

当企业高层管理人员缺乏道德和道德标准时，他们可能会利用公司资源谋取个人利益，包括操纵财务报表。

5. 不透明的财务报告如果财务报表不透明，投资者将很难了解公司的真实财务状况。

不透明的财务报告为财务欺诈提供了机会，因为管理层可以通过各种方式掩饰真实的财务状况。

对策1. 加强内部控制公司应建立完善的内部控制机制，包括制定严格的审计程序和内部审计制度。

此外，建立一个独立、专业的审计委员会可以提高内部控制的有效性，并监督财务报表的准确性和透明度。

2. 提高管理层的道德标准公司应通过培训和教育提高管理层的道德和道德标准，加强其对企业伦理和道德风险的认识。

此外，建立有效的奖惩制度，以激励和约束管理层的行为。

3. 加强财务报告的透明度公司应确保财务报表的透明度和准确性，以提高投资者对公司财务状况的了解。

透明度可以通过清晰的财务报表、充分披露的信息和和适当的沟通渠道来实现。

外文翻译---上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策引言上市公司财务舞弊是指企业在财务报表中故意掩盖真实的经济状况，以欺骗投资者、骗取融资、规避监管等目的进行的违法、违规行为。

财务舞弊对企业和投资者都带来了巨大的损失，并严重损害了金融市场的信誉和稳定。

本文将探讨上市公司财务舞弊的原因，并提出相应的对策。

上市公司财务舞弊的原因财务舞弊的原因是多样的，主要包括以下几个方面：1. 利益驱动上市公司财务舞弊往往源于对利润和业绩的追求。

企业为了实现高额的利润，可能会选择使用不当的财务手段来美化财务报表，使得企业看起来更具吸引力，以吸引更多的投资者和融资机构。

2. 缺乏有效监管监管机构对上市公司的监管力度不够，或者在监管中存在漏洞，也是财务舞弊的原因之一。

当企业感受到监管机构的弱势时，就有可能冒着被发现的风险进行财务造假。

3. 内部控制体系不健全公司内部控制体系的薄弱是财务舞弊的另一个原因。

如果企业在内部控制方面存在漏洞，管理体系不完善，那么不法分子就有机可乘，很容易找到可以利用的弱点进行财务舞弊。

4. 职业道德缺失职业道德缺失也是导致财务舞弊的原因之一。

在一些企业中，管理层或相关人员缺乏职业道德观念，只关心个人利益，而忽视了对公司和投资者的责任。

这种缺乏道德约束的行为往往会导致财务舞弊的发生。

对策建议为了避免上市公司财务舞弊的发生，我们可以从以下几个方面提出对策：1. 加强监管力度监管机构应加大对上市公司的监管力度，建立严格的监管制度，并及时发现和处理财务舞弊行为。

监管机构还应加强对上市公司内部控制体系的审核，确保其健全有效。

2. 完善内部控制体系上市公司应建立健全的内部控制体系，加强对财务报表的审查和监督，确保报表的真实准确。

企业还应加强对员工的培训和教育，提高其职业道德水平，增强诚信意识，减少财务舞弊的发生。

3. 强化公司治理提高公司的治理水平也是预防财务舞弊的重要对策之一。

公司应建立独立的董事会和审计委员会，加强对公司经营和财务报告的监督。

上市公司会计舞弊成因分析及防范策略

上市公司会计舞弊成因分析及防范策略上市公司会计舞弊（Accounting Fraud）是指公司为了做美化财务报表而采取的不合规的会计操作行为。

会计舞弊是对市场经济秩序的严重破坏，严重扰乱了市场的公平竞争环境，损害了投资者的权益。

因此，分析其成因并制定相应的防范策略对于保障市场稳定和投资者利益至关重要。

会计舞弊的成因主要包括以下几点：1.管理层动机：管理层追求个人利益最大化，为了达到自身的目标，可能会采取违法违规的会计操作手段。

例如，为了提高企业价值，会计报表可能被操纵以影响股价。

2.内控缺失：公司内部的监管机制和内部控制不健全，缺乏有效的制度和流程。

例如，公司可能没有独立的审计委员会，监督会计人员或审计师的工作；也可能缺乏审计流程和内部审计机制。

3.缺乏专业素质的会计人员：一些公司会安排没有专业背景或经验的人员从事会计工作，或者会计人员缺乏诚信和专业道德，容易被利益驱使。

4.不合理的业绩指标和目标：一些上市公司设定过高或不合理的业绩指标和目标，为了实现这些目标，可能会进行不正当的会计操作。

为了防范上市公司会计舞弊，可以采取以下策略：1.加强内控制度建设：完善公司的内部管控体系，确保公司内部控制的有效性。

例如，建立独立的审计委员会，并设立内部审计部门，加强对会计操作的监督和审计。

2.提高会计人员的专业素质与道德水平：加强对会计人员的培训和教育，提高其专业素质和道德水平，加强对会计人员的监管。

3.加强外部监管与审计：加强对上市公司的监管力度，加大对上市公司财务报表的审计力度。

加强对会计事务所的监督，确保审计质量。

4.引入市场机制：加强投资者保护机制，提供举报渠道，并设立举报奖励制度，鼓励投资者积极参与监督，对会计舞弊行为进行检举。

5.加大对会计舞弊的惩罚力度：建立健全的法律法规体系，对会计舞弊行为进行惩罚。

加大对会计舞弊行为的打击力度，对违法违规行为严厉处罚，形成有效的震慑力。

综上所述，会计舞弊对市场经济和投资者利益造成了巨大的伤害，防范会计舞弊是保障市场秩序和投资者权益的重要任务。

上市公司财务风险文献综述中英文资料外文翻译文献

中英文资料外文翻译文献上市公司财务风险的评价及控制的文献综述中国从资本市场建立开始，上市公司也随之不断地发展，上市的公司从行业、类型到地区、规模都呈现多样化趋势。

中国的上市公司，特别是上市公司中的ST公司，存在着严重的财务风险问题，财务风险比较大，对上市公司的发展会有很大的影响。

因此对上市公司财务风险问题的研究是十分重要的。

通过对这一领域大量文献的研究，从企业财务风险的成因、评价体系及控制三个角度综述，加强分析，以期对上市公司财务风险的理论和实践研究提供借鉴和指导。

（一）国外研究综述西方古典经济学家在十九世纪就已经提出了风险的概念，认为风险是经营活动的副产品，经营者的收入是其在经营活动中承担风险的报酬。

从狭义上看，企业的财务风险是指由于利用负债给企业带来的破产风险或普通股收益发生大幅度变动的风险。

这种观点立足于企业筹资时过多举债或举债不当。

西方国家强调全面风险管理的观念是从资金运动到资本经营整个体系的过程，对财务风险的控制包括风险预警、风险识别、危机处理等内容。

美国经济学家富兰克.H.奈特(Frank H.Knight)在1921年出版的(Risk，Uncertainty and Profit)一书中认为：风险是指“可度量的不确定性”。

而“不确定性”是指不可度量的风险。

风险的特征是概率估计的可靠性，概率估计的可靠性来自所遵循的理论规律或稳定的经验规律。

与可计算或可预见的风险不同，不确定性是指人们缺乏对事件的基本知识，对事件可能的结果知之甚少，因此，不能通过现有理论或经验进行预见和定量分析①。

②Ross, Westerfield, Jordan(1995)在《Fundamentals of Corporate Finance》提到①[美] Frank H.Knight,王宇，王文玉译.《风险、不确定性和利润》[M]．中国人民大学出版社．2005；②此段原文如下：“The debt finacing increases the risks borne by the stockholders. The extra risk that arises from the use of debt finacing is called the financial risk of the firm equity. In other word,financial risk is the equity risk债务筹资会增加股东的风险，使用债务筹资所产生的这部分额外风险称为公司股东的财务风险。

会计舞弊财务舞弊外文文献翻译

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财务报表舞弊：从学术的角度分析【外文翻译】

外文文献翻译原文：Financial Statement Fraud: Insights from theAcademic LiteratureFactors Affecting Financial Fraud At An OrganizationStatement on Auditing Standards (SAS)No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, states that three conditions are generally present when fraud occurs. First, there is an incentive or a pressure to commit fraud. Second, circumstances provide an opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated weak controls or ability of management to override controls. Finally, there is an attitude or rationalization for committing fraud. These conditions collectively are known as the fraud triangle. We reviewed the academic ﬁndings related to the presence of these conditions in cases of ﬁnancial statement fraud. This helps prov ide a basis for understanding the development of the questionnaires and checklists in SAS No. 82 and SAS No. 99. The following is a detailed description of these three elements：Incentives/PressuresThe incentive to misstate earnings can arise due to press ure to meet analysts’ forecasts, compensation and incentive structures, the need for external ﬁnancing, or poor performance. Dechow et al. (1996), using a sample of 92 ﬁrms subject to accounting enforcement releases during the period 1982–1992, ﬁnd that an important motivation to manipulate earnings is the desire to attract external ﬁnancing at low cost. .Erickson et al.(2006) investigate whether executive equity incentives are associated with accounting fraud. They examine a sample of ﬁrms accused of fraud during the 1996–2003 period and do not ﬁnd any relation between equity incentives and the likelihood of the ﬁrm reporting fraudulent ﬁnancial information.. In contrast, Efendi et al. (2007),using a sample of ﬁrms that restated their ﬁnancial statements, ﬁnd the likelihood of a misstatedﬁnancial statement increases when the CEO has a sizable amount of stock options “in-the-money.” Theyalso ﬁnd that misstatements are more likely for ﬁrms constrained by debt covenants, ﬁrms raising new debt or eq uity capital, or ﬁrms that have a CEO who serves as the chairman of the board. Beneish (1999a) ﬁnds that, for a group of ﬁrms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC, managers are more likely to sell equity holdings and exercise stock appreciation rights in periods when earnings are inﬂated, suggesting insider trading behavior may be informative about earnings overstatements. Summers and Sweeney (1998) ﬁnd similar results for the relationship between insider trading and fraud. More recently, th ere is evidence that hundreds of ﬁrms were involved in intentional backdating of stock options (Lie 2005), which again provides evidence that stock option compensation provides incentives for fraudulent behavior.A Glass Lewis & Co. (2006) report states that about half of the companies implicated in backdating their stock options have restated their ﬁnancial statements.With regard to poorly performing ﬁrms, Rosner (2003) examines whether failing ﬁrms are more likely to engage in income-increasing manipulation, and whether auditors detect the over- statements in ﬁrms they perceive to be failing. Her ﬁndings suggest that the behavior of failing ﬁrms that do not appear distressed on the basis of accrual data, but nonetheless show signiﬁcant decreased cash ﬂows, is consistent with material earnings overstatements in non-going-concern years that are followed by overstatement reversals in going-concern years. The accrual behavior of these ﬁrms resembles that of ﬁrms sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange Commis sion (SEC) for fraud.OpportunitiesStatement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (AU Section 316) provides examples of risk factors that may increase the opportunity to commit ﬁnancial statement fraud (AICPA 2002).These risk factors include the nature of the ind ustry or the entity’s operations such as signiﬁcant complex or related party transactions, ineffective monitoring of management, a complex organizational structure such as one that involves several legal entities, and ineffective controls due to a lack of monitoring of controls or circumvention of controls. . Albrecht and Albrecht (2003) also discussfactors increasing the opportunity to commit fraud and note that having an effective control structure is probably the single most important step to eliminate (or minimize) opportunity to commit fraudulent acts.Several studies have shown that ineffective monitoring of management in the form of weak corporate governance is associated with a higher likelihood of fraud. Dechow et al. (1996) ﬁnd that ﬁrms manipulat ing earnings are more likely to have less independent boards, more likely to have a unitary structure for chairman and CEO, more likely to have a CEO who is also the ﬁrm’s founder, less likely to have an audit committee and less likely to have an outside blockholder. Beasley (1996) also ﬁnds that the proportion of independent members on the board of directors islower for ﬁrms experiencing ﬁnancial fraud compared to no-fraud ﬁrms.Similarly, Farber (2005) ﬁnds that fraud ﬁrms have poor governance relative to no-fraud ﬁrms (fewer independent board members, fewer audit committee meetings, fewer ﬁnancial experts on the audit committee, a smaller percentage of Big 4 auditing ﬁrms, and a higher percentage of CEOs who are also chairman of the board). The results are consistent with independent corporate governance mechanisms being more effective in the monitoring function.Because of their ability to detect and, in some cases, investigate fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting, external auditors also act as a s igniﬁcant deterrent by reducing the opportunity to commit fraud. Most of the studies examining the auditor’s role in constraining managers’ attempts to manage earnings examine discretionary accruals. High discretionary accruals are not necessarily indicative of fraud, but possibly are indicative of aggressive and opportunistic reporting.Researchers have argued that Big N auditors constrain managers’ attempts to manage earnings through accruals and document evidence consistent with higher discretionary accr uals for ﬁrms audited by non-Big N auditors (Becker et al. 1998；Francis et al. 1999).Carcello and Nagy (2002) examine the relation between auditor industry specialization and ﬁnancial fraud and ﬁnd a negative relation. Knapp and Knapp (2001) examine the effects of audit experience on the effectiveness of analytical procedures in detecting ﬁnancial statement fraud and ﬁnd that auditmanagers are more effective than audit seniors in assessing the risk of fraud with analytical procedures. Similarly, Bernardi (1994) ﬁnds that managers outperform seniors in a fraud detection case when they are exposed to an initial evaluation of client integrity and competence；however, this ﬁnding is attributable to managers with a high level of moral development.Academic studies have also investigated whether the length of the client-auditor relationship is likely to impact the quality of the audit. Findings generally suggest that longer auditor tenure is associated with greater earnings quality (Iyer and Rama 2004；Myers et al. 2003). Speciﬁcally related to the frequency of ﬁnancial statement fraud, Carcello and Nagy (2004) compare ﬁrms cited for fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting from 1990 through 2001 to a set of control ﬁrms and other nonfraud ﬁrms and ﬁnd that fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting is more likely to occur in the ﬁrst three years of the auditor-client relationship.Attitudes/RationalizationsAccounting standards can contribute to reducing both the opportunity and attitude toward fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting. Nelson et al. (2002) ﬁnd that the precision of accounting standards inﬂuences managers’ attempts to manage earnings. They ﬁnd that when accounting standards are precise, managers are more likely to attempt earnings management with transaction structuring (such as structuring a lease in a particular way to avoid a capital lease classiﬁcation or by opportunistically timing sales of available-for-sale securities), and auditors are less likely to adjust those attempts. Managers were more likely to make attempts that decrease income withunstructured transactions (such as increasing or decreasing estimates involving judgment) when standards were imprecise. Managers are more likely to make attempts to increase earnings, but auditors are more likely to require adjustment in those cases, particularly if the amount is material.Hernandez and Groot (2007a) use a sample of audit partner risk assessments made as part of client acceptance or continuance decisions for a Big 4 audit ﬁrm in theNetherlands and ﬁnd that manager integrity, honesty, and ethics are considered to be the most important factors in fraud risk assessments, followed by concerns about aggressive revenue recognition and accounting estimates. Gillett and Uddin (2005) ﬁnd the attitude of the CFO toward the behavior of fraudulent reporting to be a major inﬂuence on intention to misreport；however, compensation structure was not found to be a good indicator of intentions to report fraudulently.In summary, academic research documents evidence of a relation between many of the incentives, opportunities, and attitudes identiﬁed in the auditing standards and the existence of fraud. This would suggest that the use of checklists identifying the existence or absence of these incentives and/or opportunities for particular clients would be helpful in an auditing setting. As discussed in the next section, however, the ﬁndings on the beneﬁts of checklists in identifying fraud are mixed.Procedures And Ability Of Auditors To Detect FraudCurrent professional standards and authoritative guidance require auditors to provide reasonable assurance that ﬁnancial statements are free from material misstatements, whether caused by errors or fraud. What constitutes “reasonable assurance” has been extensively and inc onclusively debated in the literature and within the accounting profession (PCAOB 2005；Rezaee 2004；Har-rington 2003).The lack of a commonly accepted deﬁnition of reasonable assurance coupled with limitations of audit methods in identifying fraud, cost constraints of audits, and high expectations by investors have widened the expectation gap regarding auditor responsibility for detecting ﬁnancial statement fraud. The CEOs of the six largest International Audit Networks believe that there should be a constructive dialog among investors of global companies and capital markets, auditors, and regulators to narrow the “expectation gap” (International Audit Networks 2006).Symptoms of fraud are often referred to as “red ﬂags.” SAS No. 99 identiﬁes “red ﬂags” as risk factors and further categorizes those risk factors in the three areas included in the fraud triangle: pressures/incentive, opportunity, and attitudes/rationalizations. Albrecht and Albrecht(2003) categorize the symptomsof fraud into six types: (1) accounting anomalies；(2) internal control weaknesses；(3) analytical anomalies；(4) extravagant lifestyles；(5) unusual behaviors；and (6) tips and complaints. One of the major challenges in identifying fraud is that while symptoms of fraud (“red ﬂags”) are observed frequently, the presence of such issues is not necessarily indicative of fraud (Albrecht and Romney 1986) and investigation of such anomalies usually results in a conclusion that fraud was not the underlying cause. It is also difﬁcult to co mbine and weight fraud risk factors to assess overall fraud risk and formulate an audit plan (Patterson and Noel 2003). Further, due to attempts by perpetrators to conceal their acts, “red ﬂags” may be relatively few in frequency and minor in amount, at le ast in the early stages of fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting.Studies examining the use of questionnaires or checklists in assessing fraud risk have found mixed results. In one of the ﬁrst studies in this area, Pincus (1989) examines the efﬁcacy of a “redﬂags” questionnaire for assessing the risk of material fraud of a client using 137 auditors as subjects. Her ﬁndings suggest that the use of a questionnaire was dysfunctional for the fraud case, i.e., questionnaire users assessed the risk of fraud to be lower than nonusers. Similarly, Asare and Wright (2004) study the impact of alternative risk assessment methods (risk checklist versus no checklist) and audit program development (standard program versus no program) on the quality of audit procedures chosen and the propensity to consult fraud experts, with data based on a case from an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). The authors ﬁnd that auditors given the standard audit program designed a relatively less effective audit program than those without the standard program (relative to a benchmark program from a panel of experts), and auditors using a standard checklist made lower risk assessments than those without a checklist. However, they did ﬁnd a higher fraud risk assessment was as sociated with a propensity to seek consultation of fraud experts.Source：Chris E. Hogan and Uma K. Velury. Financial Statement Fraud:Insights from theAcademic Literature[J]. Journal of Practice & Theory, 2008,11：231—252.译文：财务报表舞弊：从学术的角度分析（一）财务舞弊的动因——组织的影响因素SAS第99号审计准则对舞弊财务报告的思考得出：构成财务报告舞弊的因素有以下三点：首先，因激励或压力而进行舞弊；其次，环境提供了一个机会，诱使舞弊行为的发生，例如，控制或管理能力薄弱的环境更容易引发舞弊。

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策

外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策以下是为您起草的一份关于外文翻译上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策的协议：1、合同主体11 甲方（委托方）姓名：＿___________________________身份证号：＿___________________________12 乙方（受托方）姓名：＿___________________________身份证号：＿___________________________2、合同标的21 甲方委托乙方进行关于上市公司财务舞弊原因及对策的外文翻译工作。

22 翻译的外文资料由甲方提供，包括但不限于相关学术论文、研究报告等。

23 乙方应按照甲方的要求，准确、完整地将外文资料翻译成中文。

3、权利义务31 甲方的权利义务311 有权要求乙方按照约定的时间、质量完成翻译工作。

312 应按时向乙方提供所需的外文资料，并保证资料的真实性和合法性。

313 按照本协议的约定，向乙方支付相应的翻译费用。

32 乙方的权利义务321 有权要求甲方按时提供相关资料和支付费用。

322 应严格遵守翻译行业的规范和标准，保证翻译质量。

323 对甲方提供的外文资料进行保密，不得泄露给任何第三方。

324 按照约定的时间完成翻译工作，并向甲方提交翻译成果。

4、违约责任41 若甲方未按时提供外文资料或支付费用，每逾期一天，应按照未支付费用的一定比例向乙方支付违约金。

42 若乙方未按照约定的时间提交翻译成果，每逾期一天，应按照翻译费用的一定比例向甲方支付违约金。

43 若乙方的翻译质量不符合要求，甲方有权要求乙方重新翻译，若重新翻译仍不符合要求，乙方应退还甲方已支付的翻译费用，并承担因此给甲方造成的损失。

44 若因乙方泄露甲方提供的外文资料而给甲方造成损失的，乙方应承担赔偿责任。

5、争议解决方式51 本协议在履行过程中如发生争议，双方应首先友好协商解决。

52 若协商不成，任何一方均可向有管辖权的人民法院提起诉讼。