互联网金融P2P网络借贷外文翻译文献
P2P 金融下的中小企业融资互联网金融外文文献翻译最新译文

文献出处: Waitz M. The small and medium-sized enterprise financing under P2P finance [J]. Journal of Business Research, 2016, 8(6): 81-91.原文The small and medium-sized enterprise financing under P2P financeWaitz MAbstractSmall and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult is worldwide difficult problem. Article introduces the concept of the Internet financial, mainly summarized the P2P financial in the development of financial innovation and integration of science and technology, a combination of academic research on P2P financial now of the five directions of various views and opinions. Points out the current P2P financial problems in the development of risk control, and analyses the trend of the Internet financial.Keywords: P2P financial; Financial innovation; Risk control1 IntroductionLook from the history of enterprise development, a large enterprise originate from small and medium-sized enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) is the most dynamic part of the national economy, often walk in the forefront of technology development, in the high-tech industry, clean energy, green economy, etc, have good performance, play an important role in the economic transformation. Small and medium-sized enterprise financing difficult is worldwide difficult problem. These small and medium-sized enterprise financing environment and narrow channels, more than 60% are unable to get a bank loan. At present, science and technology enterprises and the characteristics of light assets, financing difficulties, become a huge bottleneck of sustainable development.2 The concept of the Internet financialIn the past two years, the Internet financial show explosive growth, since 2014, the Internet financial sector performance strength. Current economic field exists the phenomenon of two special contradiction, one is the small and medium-sizedenterprises in the total number of enterprises accounted for a large, but the universal problems of financing difficulties; Second, folk idle capital, but in addition to the stock market and housing market, it is difficult to invest in other areas. And on the basis of the Internet, cloud computing, big data and highly fit market leads the development of the Internet financial, to solve these two problems, better serve the real economy, especially small and medium-sized enterprise development to create a good financial environment, but also for China's overtaking play an important role in the implementation of international competition corners.Internet financial besides master client, also facilitate completes the upstream suppliers, downstream capital use party, the integration of point and point, combining with the characteristics of the Internet (P2P) and the nature of financial (capital).Based on the development of the Internet financial, financial supply ability is improved, inclusive to strengthen, can mobilize more financial resources, broader, more coverage, more decentralized, more diversified needs.The Internet the most narrow financial concept is P2P (Peer - to - Peer Lend - ing) financial platform, the core of the P2P model is: on the web site has a qualification platform, the borrower credit information, and provide the loan project specific situation, the borrower's integrity and economic strength and other related information; Investors according to the platform to provide information, make decisions, and finally made a decision of to make loans to borrowers.P2P finance is a new kind of financial model, through the Internet and large data, make to minimize the asymmetric information, this new financing channels, for individuals and businesses to provide great convenience, is a beneficial supplement of the existing banking system. Peer-to-peer (P2P) had a great influence on financial business in China. Traditional banking business model, mainly is the savings and loan business, P2P entirely new business models, deconstructs the traditional banking business model, breaking the monopoly of state-owned Banks, to a certain extent, in the form of fragmentation added to the drawback of the market.P2P financial innovation of science and technology and financial integration development, the release of the science and technology system reform and the doubledividend of financial reform, to introduce more financial products to serve the scientific and technological innovation, support the development of science and technology enterprises, solve to create light assets of small and mid-sized enterprise multidimensional financing difficulties; Also is helpful for financial innovation, find new investment direction, in order to obtain a higher return on investment.In 2005, the world's first P2P Zopa, a financial company (Zone of Possi - ble Agreement) was founded in London. In 2006, the United States, the first a P2P financial company Prosper founded in California. In 2007, our country the first P2P finance company established on credit, at present, the P2P financial firms more than more than 300, traded as high as more than 200 one hundred million. Financial risk is a highly amplified industry, P2P financial with convenient Internet natural attributes, but relative to the traditional financial institutions, financial in the Internet's openness also determines the P2P web site platform, information security, etc, could be affected by a great deal of challenges, risk control will be more pressure.3 The five direction of current P2P financial3.1 What is: it is subversive or supplementaryHas view: P2P financial is the innovation of the Internet with the traditional financial integration, at present is still in the stage of integration, there are a lot of problems, problems are not terrible, problems can also be seen as a contradiction, the process to solve the problem, is to promote the process of developing a new thing, this is the necessary stage P2P financial growth. To correctly treat the present P2P financial problems and drawbacks: a guide; Second, we must avoid risk. Only in this way, will lead to financial and the Internet have more innovation, to the prosperity of the rational.3.2 What: high-end service grassroots or serviceComprehensive research achievements of this direction, mainly has the following kinds of views and opinions. Has view: is a multi-level capital market, the P2P finance is one of the components, compared with traditional financial companies, should follow the development way of differentiation and mainly for the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprise service. View: P2P financial if theservice object, mostly low risk customers, then there will be a problem, must do a certain size, can have a better economic returns, and to do a certain size, must put the human cost, time cost and the cost of capital, the same small P2P financial companies, will form a lot of pressure, therefore, some P2P financial enterprises gradually became the "pool", big customers, lending if big client management problems, is easy to appear P2P financial risk, and even lead to P2P financial business owners "run". So P2P financial enterprises, should do more small loans, don't dabble in big customers, big customer risk is too big, not P2P financial companies can undertake. And do more small loans, the cost is lower than the bank, have a competitive advantage.3.3 How to do: innovation mode of risk preventionComprehensive research achievements of this direction, mainly has the following kinds of views and opinions. The argument goes, the Internet technology and the integration of financial haven't reached a very reasonable, scientific, P2P financial there will be many new problems. And when the P2P financial after reaching a certain size, risk control will be the key to the healthy development of the P2P financial. If the P2P financial regulation, also will become a important test of P2P regulators wisdom. Have a view is: to the P2P financial risk control, should start from to the customer credit, credit reporting system perfect, to both sides of the docking loans, although to do so is very hard, but can avoid many risks, guarantee the healthy development of the financial industry, the P2P.At the same time, to clear the main body of industry regulations, for the convenience of management, appendage management should be implemented.3.4 Who is going to do: working in the financial sector or non-financial areasComprehensive research achievements of this direction, mainly has the following kinds of views and opinions. The argument goes, P2P financial done by a team with a finance background is better; Due to the P2P finance is based on the Internet, with Internet gene, so the team should have the knowledge and skills of specialized personnel to participate in the Internet. View: P2P financial can be developed from the traditional financial transformation, also can by Internet companies innovation, finally formation of the team, must have both the financial and investment knowledge, andthe Internet. Knowledge of finance and investment aspects of the personnel, in accordance with the rules of the financial industry control risk; The persons with Internet knowledge, according to the rules of the network industry big data analysis, selected customers for sales, customer maintenance, at the same time do a good job in network security. View: P2P financial represents the future direction of financial development, some commercial Banks now also vigorously develop P2P financial, but at the same time to prevent the transfer of risk to the banking system, increased regulation of lending to P2P network platform.3.5 How to pipe: cross-border development and supervised respectivelyHas view: P2P financial, in essence, is still a financial, compared with the traditional industry, is only the change of the financial model, so must be regulated. If not strengthen supervision, can appear the problem such as run, adverse to the healthy development of the industry, and easy to bring serious social problems, affect social stability. View: in research regulation, there should be a state investment fund, to support the top in the field of technology innovation.P2P financial as a new financial form, to the top ahead of research and development, to prevent the banking system similar to the problem now. The argument goes: Europe, the United States based on large data of individual credit reporting system is relatively developed, can effectively prevent fraud. One is to establish individual credit system as soon as possible. The second is to establish P2P lending related laws and regulations as soon as possible. Three is to strengthen self-discipline of the P2P lending industry. Four is entry qualifications have to be very clear, the implementation system of archival filing registration.译文P2P 金融下的中小企业融资Waitz M摘要中小企业融资难是世界性难题。
互联网金融中英文对照外文翻译文献

中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)互联网金融对传统金融的影响摘要网络的发展,深刻地改变甚至颠覆了许多传统行业,金融业也不例外。
近年来,金融业成为继商业分销、传媒之后受互联网影响最为深远的领域,许多基于互联网的金融服务模式应运而生,并对传统金融业产生了深刻的影响和巨大的冲击。
“互联网金融”成为社会各界关注的焦点。
互联网金融低成本、高效率、关注用户体验,这些特点使其能够充分满足传统金融“长尾市场”的特殊需求,灵活提供更为便捷、高效的金融服务和多样化的金融产品,大大拓展了金融服务的广度和深度,缩短了人们在时空上的距离,建立了一种全新的金融生态环境;可以有效整合、利用零散的时间、信息、资金等碎片资源,积少成多,形成规模效益,成为各类金融服务机构新的利润增长点。
此外,随着互联网金融的不断渗透和融合,将给传统金融行业带来新的挑战和机遇。
互联网金融可以促进传统银行业的转型,弥补传统银行在资金处理效率、信息整合等方面的不足;为证券、保险、基金、理财产品的销售与推广提供新渠道。
对于很多中小企业来说,互联网金融拓展了它们的融资渠道,大大降低了融资门槛,提高了资金的使用效率。
但是,互联网金融的跨行业性决定了它的风险因素更为复杂、敏感、多变,因此要处理好创新发展与市场监管、行业自律的关系。
关键词:互联网金融;商业银行;影响;监管1 引言互联网技术的不断发展,云计算、大数据、社交网络等越来越多的互联网应用为传统行业的业务发展提供了有力支持,互联网对传统行业的渗透程度不断加深。
20世纪末,微软总裁比尔盖茨就曾断言,“传统商业银行会成为新世纪的恐龙”。
如今,随着互联网电子信息技术的发展,我们真切地感受到了这种趋势,移动支付、电子银行早已在我们的日常生活中占据了重要地位。
由于互联网金融的概念几乎完全来自于商业实践,因此目前的研究多集中在探讨互联网金融的具体模式上,而对传统金融行业的影响力分析和应对措施则缺乏系统性研究。
P2P金融模式互联网金融外文文献翻译最新译文

文献出处:Aronson J. The research of P2P model of financial [J] Value Creation in E-Business Management, 2016,12(5):85-95.原文The research of P2P model of financialAronson JAbstractThe development of the Internet financial, constantly create new financial model, P2P is one of the new financial model, the development of rapid direct threat to the commercial Banks in the financial world's dominance. In P2P explosive savage growth process, however, there are regulatory or incomplete system, risk control measures is not mature, P2P financial platform collapse would happen often, this leads to the development of P2P is in trouble Based on this, this paper introduces the P2P concepts and the reasons on the basis of the financial model, analyzes the difficulties faced by the current P2P financial model, and accordingly put forward the development of P2P financial model.Keywords: P2P financial mode; The theoretical analysis; Measures1 IntroductionThe wide application of Internet technology, when science and technology combined with financial, gives rise to some emerging Internet model, P2P has greatly reduced the transaction cost, satisfy the customer demand for financial, especially the working class and the small and medium-sized enterprise loan demand. But so far, due to the lack of innovation mode of financial supervision, to information asymmetry, imperfect credit system construction, and low security of adverse effect caused by funds, hindered the healthy and orderly development of P2P.For Internet financial can inject vigor, continuing for the financial sector to the real economy better service, we must strengthen the industry regulation, establish effective credit evaluation system and P2P platform to establish effective risk control system.So-called peer-to-peer (P2P), is the abbreviation of English Peer to Peer, meaning "person-to-person", refers to the directly by third-party Internet platform of money lending financing behavior, is a kind of direct financing behavior of individualto individual. It originated in Britain, and later to the United States, Germany and other countries, China introduced in 2007.In our country, its typical model is: the network credit companies provide a platform, by borrowing free bids, brokered transactions. Money lenders to obtain interest income with the risk; Money borrowed people due to repay the principal, the network credit charge intermediary company.Peer-to-peer (P2P) the causes of financial mode mainly lies in the fact that Internet technology rapidly Exhibition. With the development of Internet, the scope of its popularization in our country is more and more widely, new technology and new business forms appear constantly, and gradually extended to the financial sector, the financial and the Internet fusion degree in the process of deepening, the financial industry got the booming development, at the same time, also produced a P2P financial mode; Fill the shortcoming in traditional financial business function in our country at present. Let those be bank financial products and loan threshold shut out of the working class and the small and medium-sized enterprises can also have the opportunity to enjoy the financial services. Working class a large body of demand for money have great demand; Other small and medium-sized enterprises (SEM) in many places the arrested development, mainly due to small and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in bank loans difficult, loans due to the high cost. In order to promote the development of their own, small and medium-sized enterprises to seek other financing mode, which promote the generation of the P2P financial model.2 The status quo of P2P financial model2.1 P2P financial models lack of effective supervisionRelative to the early start of online banking, online securities and so on in the form of financial regulatory policy relatively incomplete, relatively mature management framework. But P2P financial mode in 2012 entered the blowout outbreak period. But the Internet financial regulatory agencies and related regulatory policy did not keep up with the pace of its rapid development, for the development of P2P is also hinder the role. Should be further follow relevant regulations to meet the constantly enrich and expand the urgent needs of the emerging financial forms. The lack of regulation for a long time, has been out of the grey zone and regulatory gap,there are low barriers to entry, lending money monitoring vacancy, credit evaluation system is not sound, and many other problems.The industry has been in a savage growth state, run, capital chain rupture and collapse phenomenon appeared frequently. ack of legal norms, unclear regulatory policy, business operation is not standard to causes such as the chaos of industry management.2.2 Domestic credit system construction is not perfectThe Internet in the financial, financial credit system is the basis of the healthy and standardizing development of the financial industry, the Internet. But the current construction of credit system is not perfect, personal credit record includes only with bank lending behavior and maintain within the Banks, other financial institutions can't call society.P2P network platform loan borrowers can only through an indirect way to verify information and the judgment through the subjective experience of auditors. Abroad in the implementation of a P2P financial model, the comparison of perfect personal credit system construction, when making loans, personal credit can achieve effective query, which leads the P2P financial mode constantly development and improvement. Internet financial enterprise credit reporting database is not perfect in our country, is not included in the central bank credit reporting system, for both the management difficulty is big, no effective mechanism and discipline and punishment.2.3 Information asymmetry cause malicious default riskOf the Internet financial transactions, payments and services are completed on the Internet, virtualization of trading, trading process is not transparent and so on have made the financial risk more diversified and uncontrolled. Of new trading patterns of this for the disclosure of the information has the certain difficulty, in P2P financial mode, due to information asymmetry, P2P platform there may be a risk, the truth of the borrower to provide information due to the master of P2P platform borrowing history data is limited, its credit rating system is also unable to grasp the situation of the borrowers, the condition of the fake information or the borrower. Once appear, default or delay balance, due to recover the cost is higher, lenders are hard to take back the principal and interest of the person failed to perform its obligations due to lending and lead to potential financial damage is one of the reasons that hinder thedevelopment of P2P.3 The implement measures3.1 Encourage innovation to strengthen the basis of industry regulationDue to P2P long-term financial platform is in a state of lack of regulation, resulting in a variety of financial risk problems occur unceasingly, serious impact on the development of P2P financial, based on this, as soon as possible, perfect the construction of Internet financial regulation legal system in our country, should provide a clear and transparent legal environment, including the market access supervision, operation supervision and exit regulatory measures to standardize the development of the P2P network platform. But don't like management of traditional financial institutions, so as not to stifle financial innovation. Perfect financial market system, pratt &whitney financial development, encourage financial innovation, rich level financial markets and products. Regulators want reasonable grasp the boundaries of innovation and strength, not to hinder the sustainable development of financial innovation, whether it be a financial product innovation, and financial service innovation. To strengthen management and ensure that financial security is very necessary, cut can not manage, weaken the vitality of financial innovation.3.2 promoting the construction of credit evaluation systemA severe credit system can restrain people daily financial activity. Therefore, in a constantly enrich financial transaction way to meet the demand of investment and financing of all social strata at the same time, the credit system construction also needs to be perfect and connectivity. At present, the central bank has started the construction of personal credit system, however, the central bank alone is not enough to build personal credit system, and will result in incomplete information system, therefore, in the process of building the personal credit system in the future, should attract more participants, to establish the perfect credit system, make scientific evaluation to the borrower's credit rating, for P2P platform provides necessary judgment. In addition, P2P financial platform should also set up its own credit system, establish a customer database, regular update of customer information in a database, at the same time, guarantee the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the new customerinformation, and effective to evaluate the customer's credit.3.3 P2P platform to strengthen risk control abilityP2P business at the core of the pricing power is in the team's own risk, the risk management ability is the core of the P2P company competitiveness. establish a risk control function is clear, for policy making, the characteristics of customer data mining, overdue customers, study and so on carries on the effective management, to standardize the front-end marketing, China audit, background collection each work orderly. At the same time, digital risk control model is established and the score card system is the effective measure to standardize P2P scientific management, with a complete set of scientific management methods, to cure it to risk control examination and approval decision engines and business process, to guide the business for examination and approval of risk control. Second, compared with the traditional financial institutions such as Banks, Internet financial firms can take advantage of big data analytics, cloud computing technology to manage customer credit evaluation and customer information, above is actually a credit evaluation system and risk control measures of innovation. Third, should attach importance to small and scattered plays important role in reducing risk, network platform, in the face of the large capital demand loan can be systemic forced to spread risk, is more than a sum of money into different sum, scattered the people who need loans to lend, risk can be effectively diluted. Fourth, guarantee qualification can be introduced with a third party professional guarantee companies provide guarantee, in case of bad debts by guarantee company compensation, in order to ensure safe operation, to ensure the safety of information and capital of investors. by using the combined risk of internal and external control means, in view of information asymmetry and capital safety is low in the strong guarantee.Era development is irreversible, the subversion and innovation of the Internet continues, because the P2P financial pattern in the global new things, the speed of development and the construction of the corresponding system is not perfect, resulting in the development of P2P financial face a lot of trouble. despite the difficulties, the game between the various arms intensified, but it's true that the development of P2Pinjected new vitality into the financial sector, in order to promote the healthy and orderly development of P2P, needs to explore the path to promote the development of P2P financial, P2P platform in the process of operation gradually improve risk control ability, ensure the safety of the funds. These efforts will make P2P financial mode gradually towards standardization and legalization, make it effectively fill the shortcoming in traditional financial business function at present, the future will be better able to make the financial service for the real economy, support the national strategic transformation of the economic structure.译文P2P金融模式研究Aronson J摘要互联网金融的发展,不断地创新出新型的金融模式,P2P就是其中一种新型金融模式,其发展的迅速直接威胁到商业银行在金融界的主导地位。
P2P金融风险管控中英文对照外文翻译文献

P2P金融风险管控中英文对照外文翻译文献P2P金融风险管控中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)译文:P2P 金融下的中小企业融资摘要中小企业融资难是世界性难题。
文章介绍了互联网金融的概念,重点概括了 P2P 金融在科技和金融创新融合方面的发展,综合了现在学术界对 P2P 金融研究的五大方向方面的各种观点和见解。
指出了当前 P2P 金融发展的突出问题风险控制,并对互联网金融的大趋势进行了分析。
关键词: P2P金融; 金融创新; 风险管控1引言从企业发展的历史看,大型企业都来源于中小企业。
中小企业是国民经济中最具活力的部分,往往走在技术发展的最前端,在高科技产业、清洁能源、绿色经济等方面都有很好的业绩,在经济转型中发挥着巨大作用。
中小企业融资难是世界性难题。
这些中小企业融资环境和渠道狭窄,有 60% 以上无法获得银行贷款。
目前,科技型企业又有轻资产的特点,融资困境,成为困扰可持续发展的巨大瓶颈。
2 互联网金融的概念近两年来,互联网金融呈现井喷式发展, 2014 年以来,互联网金融板块表现强势。
当前经济领域存在两个特别矛盾的现象,一是中小企业在企业总数中占比很大,但普遍存在融资难的问题; 二是民间闲散资金多,但除了股市和房市,往别的领域投资很难。
而以互联网、大数据、云计算为基础和高度契合市场引领的互联网金融的发展,对于解决这两个难题,更好地为实体经济,尤其是中小企业发展创造良好的金融环境,也为中国在国际竞争当中实现弯道超车起到重要作用。
互联网金融除了掌握客户端外,还便于做好上游资本供给方、下游资本使用方点与点的整合,结合互联网的其中特质( P2P) 及金融的本质( 资本) 。
依托互联网金融的发展,金融供给能力得以提高,包容性得以增强,可以动员更多的金融资源,覆盖面更广,覆盖度更多,满足更分散、更多元化的需求。
互联网金融最狭隘的概念就是 P2P( Peer-to-Peer Lend-ing) 金融平台,P2P 模式的核心是: 在这个具有资质的网站平台上,借款人发出借贷信息,并提供借贷项目的具体情况、借款人的相关诚信及经济实力等有关信息; 投资人根据平台上提供的信息,进行决策,最后做出向借款人发放贷款的决定。
互联网金融外文文献翻译

互联网金融外文文献翻译随着信息技术的迅猛发展,互联网金融已成为当今金融领域的热门话题。
为了深入了解这一领域的国际前沿动态,对相关外文文献的翻译显得尤为重要。
互联网金融是指利用互联网技术和信息通信技术实现资金融通、支付、投资和信息中介服务的新型金融业务模式。
它打破了传统金融的时间和空间限制,极大地提高了金融服务的效率和覆盖面。
在翻译互联网金融外文文献时,首先要面对的是专业术语的翻译。
例如,“PeertoPeer Lending”通常被翻译为“P2P 借贷”,“Blockchain Technology”则是“区块链技术”,“Fintech”是“金融科技”。
准确翻译这些术语对于理解文献的核心内容至关重要。
同时,互联网金融领域的发展日新月异,新的概念和词汇不断涌现。
这就要求译者时刻关注行业动态,及时掌握最新的术语和表达方式。
比如,“Digital Currency”(数字货币)、“RoboAdvisor”(智能投顾)等都是近年来出现的新词汇。
除了术语,句子结构的处理也是翻译中的难点。
外文文献中常常会出现长难句,句子成分复杂,逻辑关系隐晦。
在翻译时,需要对句子进行仔细分析,理清其结构和逻辑关系,然后用符合中文表达习惯的方式进行翻译。
例如:“The rapid development of fintech has not only disrupted the traditional financial landscape but also created numerous opportunities for innovative financial services, which has posed both challenges and prospects for the regula tory framework” 可以翻译为:“金融科技的快速发展不仅颠覆了传统的金融格局,还为创新金融服务创造了众多机会,这给监管框架带来了挑战和前景。
P2P网络借贷外文文献翻译最新

外文文献翻译原文及译文文献出处:Jensen Fabian. The research of P2P online lending [J] Business Research, 2017, 9(3):31-41.原文The research of P2P network LendingJensen FabianAbstractMicro, small and medium enterprises is facing with financing difficulties,rural poor areas also lack of financial services,which has always been plagued policy makers of the two factors, also seriously restricted the economic development and hinder the two factors in the construction of a fair society. After the positive study of the relevant departments and academia,finally figured out "small loan company" this kind of small financial institutions,in order to the transfusion organization become the rural development and small and medium-sized enterprises (SME).Practice has proved that this kind of form does have some effect on the solution of the problem, but microfinance companies ’丨not deposit-taking’’policy, and become a big obstacle to influence its development. This makes the tighter credit environment,capital requirements of small and medium-sized enterprises and the vulnerable groups are far from satisfied. At the same time, the abnormal social folk capital abundant, high inflation,the stock market is tanking, strictlycontrol the real estate market economy, these funds need find investment breakthrough,and so a new kind of folk lending model,P2P network borrowing appeared.Keywords: P2P lending, Microfinance, Private lending1 IntroductionP2P lending (Peer - to - Peer lending) is an emerging in recent years the personal of personal credit model lending companies through the online platform set both a deaL Commitment to funding "connect”form of folk lending is emerging and increasingly prosperous. Is funding needs, while there is a desire to invest, such companies have to do is by their structures, network platform for the idle private capital looking for matches. And such companies provide essentially is a P2P (Peer to Peer or Person to Person, (individual financial information services for individuals) it is actually a kind of new flow of private capital. Platform itself the role of information intermediary,information disclosure, credit rating,fund settlement, overdue collection services, platform profit mainly comes from the customer to pay fees. In 2005, ZOPA,in London, the first microfinance website to personal online,pulled open the prelude of the P2P lending. After ten years of operation, a total of 750 million pounds of matching network. The platform Prosper2014 years accumulative total turnover of about $2.5 billion.P2Pnetwork, in countries such as Britain and the United States has been aloan in addition to the traditional savings and investment channels of the alternative (Slavin,2007).The success of the European and American practice for P2P network gradually towards the world.P2P lending in this form is in recent years the development of the abnormal rapidly, mainly because the form meets demand from both sides of the capital supply and demand of current economic situation. On the one hand, for money supply,in the face of high inflation and low bank deposits, bank deposit income is very small. At the same time, the stock market in the past two years is bad,real estate and gold investment door abuse is too high, and the current situation of risk is not small. In the face of all these various traditional investment present situation of the market situation is not optimistic, a large number of civilian capital urgently needs to find new breakthrough.P2P lending this form seems to be in order to meet the urgent demand, because this kind of investment model is unfolding the following several aspects: the advantages of high returns, basic around 20% annual return. Door, and the low just registered in relevant websites can become money lenders. High transparency, money lenders can according to the web site provides information about capital demanders object,to choose our willing to lend the money to lend,borrowers will provide regular use of funds, guarantee for capital lendersunderstand the usage and safety.2The origin of the P2P lending and the statusDue to the development of the P2P lending is less than 10 years, so the early literature focuses on introducing the origin and development of the network lending. Ferichs and Schumann (2008) mentioned that in 2005 the first lending site zopa,founded in the UK. Borrowing from a wide variety of network platforms appear in succession.Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) points out that facing the risk of moral hazard and adverse selection under asymmetric information, based on assumptions, such as disposable abandonment and anonymous trading orthodox financial institutions will be in accordance with the new market basic principles to be followed in the classical theory to its lending of small and medium-sized enterprises and farmers to provide collateral or guarantee. So those are unable to provide collateral poor farmers and small and medium-sized enterprises will be excluded from the formal financial institutions, in the end they will have to enter the network to meet the demand of their own money lending market. Slavin (2007) pointed out: the P2P loans in the United States and Britain has developed into a kind of savings and investment alternatives. Berger and Gleisner (2009) referred to in the United States first lending site prosper,com was established in 2006 in February,Germany’s first lending site was established in February 2007, at present, due to the legal system is different in different countries, almost all of the network platform lending operations are limited in the range of their own country. Ashta and Assadi (2009) research has shown that the type of online peer-to-peer lending platform and operation mode has its own features,in general they can be divided into two categories - for-profit and nonprofit platform, platform of for-profit business generally confined to the domestic, and non-profit platform to do business on a global scale. Both lenders is the biggest difference between the original and different requirements for earnings. For-profit platform lenders will risk requires a reasonable return for oneself, and non-profit lenders on the platform of general income does not make the request,they just want to ’’d o n a t e”part of his property,in order to help the poor people of the world.3The model of P2P network lendingPlatform is divided into two categories: basic for-profit and the for-profit (Ashta & Assadi,2009).Here the ’’p r o f i t”refers to the investment platform for investors- Investors profit type platform, hope by lending money to get match the economic benefits of risk. Non-profit platform of investors, the investment behavior is to help others, does not pay attention to taking economic returns. Nowadays the most profit type platforms are within the scope of its business,subject to regulatoryrequirements of the host countries (Berger, 2009)-Non-profit type platform is generally not subject to regional restriction, can operate on a global scale. The typical platform subdivided into three categories: public welfare,pure intermediary type and compound type mediation, after two classes are for-profit platform. The practice platform for the main service object as low-income people is in less developed areas. Simple mediation type platform only play the role of information intermediary, not to interfere in the user transaction. Compound intermediary platform to provide information service but also act as supervisors, joint chasing people, such as rate-setters role.3.1Public welfareKiva,founded in 2005, is an organization in Europe and the wealthy investors offering loans to small businesses in developing countries not for-profit P2P network platform. Basic obtained by raising its operating funds for small borrowers to provide low-interest loans and intermediary service free of charge. Because of the different national legal policy,Kiva f s business need to cooperate with local microfinance institutions (MFI),through its as a middleman to supervise and repay the loan (Ashta & Assadi,2009).3.2Simple mediation typeProsper in lending transactions only simple information intermediaryrole,through information disclosure and credit ratings provide the basis for both freedom of choice,Prosper after the deal itself is no longer involved in lending transactions. The entire Prosper platform has social security number, personal id number, bank accounts and personal credit scoring more than 520 American citizens can ’’l o a n s.First i t’s borrowing set similar EBay M double blind auction model This approach based on borrowing the preference,and strives to achieve the borrower loan conditions and investors' investment speed the acceptance and balance each other,by dynamic game to get the best interest rates (Chen et al”2014).3.3Composite mediation typeZOPA, as the ancestor of P2P network credit platform, has always been considered one of the most successful P2P network model, most scholars attribute the success to perfect risk control system. First,ZOPA .among cooperation with credit rating Company,it is according to its credit rating to determine the borrower's credit rating, and arrange it into the corresponding segment of the market, for investors to choose from. Second, ZOPA, almost all engage in transactions and related affairs. In addition to providing information to act as watchdogs,check the legality of the borrower loan procedures,completeness,supervise the borrower repayment on time,etc. ZOPA, provides a more real andtransparent financial services,at the same time,effective risk control measures can make the risk lower than traditional financial institutions.4The influence factors of P2P lendingNetwork, as it were, to borrow a thing has attracted the attention of many scholars since its birth, Klafft (2008) study that due to network lending type is a new thing, the lender lack the experience of the anonymous Internet loans, this will increase the risk of lending to network. Rothschild believes in a just grew up in the imperfect market, the researchers only indirectly through study the behavior of the borrower characteristics to obtain information about the development of the network of borrowing. But according to the behavior characteristics of the borrower and the study of the relationship lending to network events are not unified conclusion at present, such as those for borrowers loan application in the attached photos of research conclusions and even on the contrary,some research results such as Andrews (2008),it is concluded that the race, gender, personal characteristics such as little impact on the success rate of borrowing.Everett (2008) studies have found that if the loan borrowers in the group have acquaintances or merely know, makes the default rate be significantly decreased. Although Davis (2001) points out that the loan team a lack of clear ownership, while no significant characteristics andunified management decision-making mechanism, these decide whether people will join loan group is a random act. But as long as the team was able to set up loan,it can play the role of will be very important. D a t t a’s (2008) is one of the study found that the loan group leader role according to the relevant information to the t e a m’s members within the group of borrowers,and they do so power or is selfless attitude or is in order to get the corresponding reward. From this level, the loan group leaders mainly depends on the action of collecting and processing information to provide Suggestions for group members, through these behaviors, they in fact take on the role of the monitoring process of loan repayment, and in this way it indirectly promote the circulation of money lending website. According to e x p e r t’s research,in addition to loan group have a way to have obvious effect on reducing loan default rates that is to the network of group lending. This approach originated in the social network theory.5ConclusionsAfter the development history of P2P loans, theoretical basis and the development of P2P enterprise situation analysis of the P2P lending, we can find it is a full of potential and worth to continue to develop and put into lending to emerging patterns, especially considering it in solving the small micro enterprise financing difficulties and poor areas have played a huge role,need the government to make active efforts more,measures assoon as possible, in the right support and guide the development of this model.P2P网络借贷研宄Jensen Fabian摘要中小微企业融资难,贫闲地区农村缺乏金融服务,这一直是网扰政策制定者的两个因素,也是严重制约了经济发展、阻碍公平社会建设的两个因素。
互联网金融发展文献综述及外文文献资料P2P金融

本份文档包含:关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献标题: Online brokers lead the way for French internet finance作者: Caffard, Christophe期刊名称: International Financial Law Review卷: 20;期: 3;页: 20-24Online brokers lead the way for French internet finance1 Regulated brokersRegulated brokers are legal entities which have an investment services licence and are subject to the prudential regulations of the Comite de Reglementation Bancaire et Financiere (CRBF) and the Conseil des Marches Financiers (CMF).* Choice of legal form: regulated brokers are not required to be incorporated in a specific legal form; however, under article 13 of the MAF Law, the CECEI checks whether the legal form of the brokerage company is appropriate for providing investment services. In practice, any type of commercial company is admitted: societes de capitaux (limited companies) or societes de personnes (partnerships). The formalities of share transfer, tax and the scope of liability of a company's management will be relevant factors to the choice of legal form.* Application for an investment services licence from the CECEI: the most important part of the application is the description of the investment services, and a business plan including prospective financial statements for the following three years. The CMF will check whether the business plan is consistent with the investment services licence requested by the broker. The CECEI will ensure that the applicant's own initial funds are consistent with the business plan.The scope of the investment services licence is variable and covers one or more ofthe following investment services:Reception and transmission of orders to another investment services provider on behalf of investors, for execution. This is the core investment service provided by thebrokerage companies and, as such, a licence to provide this service is the minimum required for a brokerage company. Brokerage companies may request an investment services licence limited to the reception and transmission of orders. In this case, there will need to be a tripartite agreement between the investor, the broker and an investment services provider authorized to execute the orders of the investor. These single-- licensed brokerage companies are mere intermediaries remunerated by a commission paid by the investors. They are not entitled to benefit from the European passport under the ISD.Execution of such order other than for own account. This is defined as the execution of orders on behalf of a customer under the provision of an agency or a brokerage agreement. The brokerage company authorized to execute orders received from the investors offers a larger range of services with more potential. The broker with an investment services licence covering the execution of orders will be in charge of executing the final orders on the regulated markets, provided it is has been authorized as a market member. Unauthorized brokerage companies transmit the orders they have received to authorized market members. Authorized brokerage companies may offer investors a quasi-immediate execution of orders on the markets.Placing. This is the search for subscribers or purchasers on behalf of the issuer or seller of financial instruments. According to the CMF, in the case of a public offer of listed financial instruments placed by a market firm (for example on the Paris Stock Exchange or Nouveau March&), an online broker, which sells financial instruments online, is deemed to be providing his client with a reception-transmission of orders service and not a placing service. A placing service requires the broker to comply with capital adequacy ratios whenever it is associated with an underwriting commitment.Account-keeping, custody and clearing. These are not considered to be investment services, but assimilated services restricted to credit institutions or investment firms, and are subject to the CMF's General Regulations.CRBF regulators. CBF regulations subject brokerage companies to the following requirements: the minimum issued and paid-up share capital depends on the nature and number of investment services carried out; brokerage companies who offeraccount-keeping, custody and reception, transmission and execution of orders must have a minimum paid-up share capital of Ffrl million (about $160,000). This is reduced to Ffr350,000 when the brokerage company is not involved in account-keeping or custody services;* the minimum shareholder funds must be equal to the higher of- 25% of the overheads of the previous year, or overheads forecast in the business plan; and- the aggregate client positions divided by 150;* internal compliance procedures must be established; and* the brokerage company must comply with certain ratios relating to solvency and large exposure.Regulated brokers are also subject to the CMF's rules on the appointment of a compliance officer, information and advice for clients, mandatory clauses to be inserted in clients' agreements, professional cards required from certain employees and reporting requirements to the CMF.2 Non-regulated brokersNon-regulated brokers are sole agents appointed by an investment firm authorized by the CECEI, or an appropriate authority of an EU member state. Sole agents are nonregulated entities and are neither subject to the minimum capital and shareholder funds requirements nor to the CMF/CRBF regulations.Sole agents enter into investment services agreements with clients on behalf and in the name of their principal, who must be a regulated investment services provider. These agreements are binding on who is, as a general rule, solely liable visa-vis clients and the supervisory authorities (the CMF and/or the Bank of France). In this respect, the incorporation and activities of a sole agent brokerage is simpler, safer and cheaper than for regulated brokers. However, sole agents are fully dependent on the principal since they are not authorized to be appointed by more than one investment firm and if, for any reason, the mandate is cancelled or terminated, sole agents must stop any brokerage activity, unless they get a new mandate or are granted an investment service licence by the CECEI. Sole agents do not benefit from theEuropean passport under the ISD, as they are not considered to be investment firms. It is important to note that the sole agent does not own the brokerage business, since clients simply have a contractual relationship. This is why sole agent status is generally more suitable when the principal and agent are companies within the same group or with long-term common interests.French branches of EU investment service providersThe licence for an EU investment service provider allows it to set up branches in France, subject to authorization from the authorities of its home state.This procedure is much simpler and quicker than an application for an investment services licence with the CECEI. The other advantages of operating in France in this way are that a branch is not required to show an endowment capital in France, and that prudential ratios of the home state apply to the French branch.As a general rule under the ISD, the home state authorities retain jurisdiction over the branch in the home state, with the exception of the public policy rules, which will apply to the branches. In France, the regulation referred to below is considered to be a public policy rule with which French branches operating online brokerage services in France must comply.Regulations applicable to brokerage servicesThe offer of brokerage services and the provision of brokerage services are regulated by reference to the nature of the financial instruments offered online.The offer of brokerage servicesAdvertising / marketingThe advertising of financial instruments is heavily regulated when advertisements are included in a public offering process. In this case the advertisement is in the form of a prospectus, which must comply with COB regulations, which provide detailed requirements regarding the form and content of the prospectus. As a general rule, any other form of advertising in a public offering process must refer to the prospectus approved by the COB.* The marketing in France of financial instruments listed on a foreign market must comply with COB regulation no. 99-04. This provides that, before anytransaction, the broker must send his clients an information memorandum presenting the foreign market and the financial instruments dealt on that market. This may be sent to clients via the internet.Any advertising of operations on the foreign market must include certain mandatory information, including the identification of the legal entity which is soliciting French clients.As a general rule, the advertising of collective investment schemes is subject to regulation by the COB, which ensures that any advertisement is consistent with the notice d'information and with regulations applicable to collective investment schemes generally. SICA Vs and FCPs subject to COB regulation no. 89-02 may not be marketed until the management company has been notified of the COB's approval.However, any direct or indirect solicitation to invest in collective investment schemes subject to the simplified COB approval procedure (less formal because the scheme only targets professional investors), must contain a disclaimer informing investors that any subscription or transfer of shares or units, is restricted to qualified investors or investors whose initial investment is at least euro500,000 ($457,000) or (depending on the scheme) euro,30,000. The disclaimer must also mention that these collective investment schemes are not approved by the COB and adhere to specific investment rules.* The COB has issued guidelines no. 99-02 relating to the marketing and sale via the internet of i) collective investment scheme units or shares; and ii) discretionary mandates. These guidelines are not binding. Its purpose is to clarify certain aspects of the COB regulations which apply to collective investment schemes (management company and depositary) and to any information on financial instruments disclosed during a public offering. The COB is preparing new guidelines relating to financial advice and information disseminated via the internet.* COB regulations and recommendations are applicable to online brokers whenever financial instruments (listed or otherwise) are offered to the public.* Under the CMF's regulations, regulated brokers are bound to inform and advise their clients after having assessed their financial knowledge.* In any event, there is a prohibition on advertising units of investment funds which invest in futures markets (Article 23 of the law of 23/12/1988), or to market non-OECD financial instruments in France without the prior consent of the French Ministry of Economy.3 Canvassing lawUnder the law of 1972 relating to financial canvassing, canvassing consists of contacting potential clients by way of visits, letters, circulars and telephone calls to: i) induce them to subscribe, purchase, exchange or sell securities or participate in such operations; and ii) offer services and advice on a regular basis.The law of 1972 is not adapted to the internet and legislative reform in this field is awaited. The CMF, the COB and the CECEI consider that offers to provide e-banking and e-brokerage services would be treated in the same manner as offers of services or advice by way of letters, circulars or telephone calls.It is difficult to determine which information systems or practices will qualify as financial canvassing (and therefore regulated) or merely as financial advertising (and therefore permitted); the CECEI and the COB have not yet given any clear guidance on this question.According to a discussion and research paper on internet risk released by the Commission Bancaire (the supervisory arm of the Bank of France) in July 2000, advertising messages, including a link to the seller's site (in the case of banks) displayed on general purpose websites, or posting information, advice or offers on sites or news groups in the client's country, would be viewed as financial advertising and would not constitute financial canvassing.The Bank of France takes the view that in these examples there is no active solicitation of clients since they access the financial advertisements deliberately and of their own accord, as if visiting the premises of a bank.In contrast with these passive marketing techniques, sending messages to email addresses would be equated with sending letters and as such would qualify as canvassing, according to the Bank of France.In any case, before soliciting French customers, the brokerage company mustnotify the Bank of France (CECEI) of its intention to solicit such customers; and employees of the brokerage company must be granted a specific solicitation card by the French authorities. Any breach of this rule would constitute a criminal offence.4 Public offering regulationsPublic offering regulations are applicable whenever financial instruments are issued or transferred to the public in France, using advertising, canvassing, credit institutions or investment service providers. Public offerings are heavily regulated and are subject to a number of requirements, including prior approval by COB of a prospectus, filing with the Commercial Registry of the French translation of the issuer's constitutional documents, publication of a legal notice in the BALO and continuing information obligations.The public offering regulations apply to offers of both listed and unlisted financial instruments. In this respect, online brokers offering listed shares to the public are subject to public offering regulations and in particular COB Regulation no. 99-08, under which the online broker must comply with the following disclosure and advertising rules:* the preparation of a simplified prospectus which must be approved by the COB and made freely available to the public; and * any advertisement must refer to the simplified prospectus and specify how to obtain a copy.A private placement (as opposed to a public offering) is defined as the issue or transfer of financial instruments to qualified investors or to a restricted circle of investors.In order to ensure a private placement via the internet, it is necessary to restrict electronic access to the broker's website by passwords granted solely to qualified investors. It is also mandatory under COB Regulation No. 99-09 that a private placement disclaimer be displayed on the webpages of the broker's website. The disclaimer must mention that:* offering materials (advertisements, information memoranda, etc) have not been submitted to the COB for its approval;* qualified investors must participate in the private placement for their ownaccount;* any offer to the public of the financial instruments subscribed or purchased by the qualified investors in the private placement would be subject to public offering regulations; and* if the investors are members of a restricted circle of more than 100, they must certify that they are associated with the management of the issuer on a professional or a personal basis. The provision of online brokerage servicesRules of conduct applicable to online brokers Regulated brokers and principals of non-regulated brokers are investment service providers and are subject to the rules of conduct set out in its General Regulation. The CMF has issued General Decision no. 99-07 providing regulations and guidelines. It implements the CMF rules of conduct.As a general rule, the message must clearly identify the issuer of a message offering the service of reception or transmission of orders. In particular, the website must display the legal status of the broker and the investment service it is authorized to provide. Regulated brokers and non-regulated brokers must be clearly distinguished, and the latter must disclose the identity of their investment service provider whom they are asking as agent.If the online broker is not in charge of account-keeping and custody services, whoever is must be clearly identified. Before entering into a contract with any new client, theonline broker must verify the client's identity and domicile by requesting the following documents:a photocopy of a valid official identity document (passport, identity card, driving licence);* bank details; and* written evidence of address.The broker must send confirmation that he has received these documents and, in doing so, check the client's address. These formalities and verifications may not be carried out via the internet.Once the identity and domicile ofthe new client have been checked, the onlinebroker can provide investment services to his client where:* the client has signed an agreement relating to the evidential rules and procedures applicable to the reception of orders via the internet;* the funds or financial instruments have been credited to the client's account. This does not apply to the broker if it is not the account keeper or the custodian;* the broker has checked that its client may receive the information on the relevant financial instruments and risks via the internet; and* the broker must ensure that the client receives in advance more detailed information regarding operations involving financial instruments which do not correspond to the client's regular dealings.In cases where the broker is responsible for account-- keeping, it should operate an automated system monitoring the accounts of the client and freezing any order in the event of insufficient provision or margin cover.The CMF also recommends that this automated system should freeze any order sent by the client which does not comply with market regulations.Compliance with these rules of conduct raises problems when the broker's website is outsourced to a third party, which happens frequently. The authorities are concerned that brokers may lose control over the operation of their websites and would be unable to take any operational responsibility, while remaining liable. This is why the Commission Bancaire is considering imposing an obligation on investment firms and credit institutions providing online financial services, to monitor their outside internet service providers and/or software companies.5 Regulation of contracts entered Into by online brokersContracts with clients These are subject to the CMF regulations, and in particular to CMF General Decision no. 98-28 relating to the mandatory clauses which must be included in agreements entered into with clients. It came into force in June 2000 and any existing contract is required to be duly amended.The agreements must contain a clause setting out the identity of the client and its legal capacity. In particular, qualified investors must be identified among other legal entities as well as the investment services provided. The categories of financialinstruments and financial services must also be stated in the agreement. This is important since it is taken into account when determining whether the broker has properly assessed the skills of his client. In this respect, it is recommended that high-risk speculative and/or complex operations, such as operations on futures markets, be restricted to informed clients or to qualified investors.In practice, the online broker asks new clients to answer a questionnaire which acts as proof that the broker has fulfilled its obligations to assess the skills ofits client.The agreement must contain a confidentiality clause which is binding. In this respect, it is useful for the online broker to provide exceptions to this obligation so that information on clients can be centralized within a member ofthe same group of companies, or accessed by an outside software company.Contracts with other investment services providersThe number of contracts entered into by brokers with other investment service providers depends on the scope of its licence. Non-regulated brokers must enter into an exclusive mandate with a licensed investment service provider.Regulated brokers which are not market members or not licensed for the execution of orders must conclude a transmission of orders agreement with market members or other investment service providers.These contracts are not subject to the CMF General Decision no. 98-28 or to other specific regulations, with the exception of.* clearing agreements;* when a client gives a broker with whom he has an account an order for transmission to another non-resident institution with comparable status, the broker is forbidden from being remunerated in the form of hard commission (a commission rebate) by the institution to which the order has been transmitted; and* a non account-keeping broker receiving orders from a client for transmission to another institution may be remunerated in the form of a hard commission, provided that the broker informs the client when entering into contractual relations (and thereafter annually) of the terms and conditions and amount of the hard commission.Contracts entered into with software companiesThese contracts might at first appear to have regulatory implications. However, recent financial regulations applicable to e-- brokerage now have a direct bearing on implications for IT agreements.In practice, brokers must ensure that the operation of the website and the reception and transmission of software orders complies with the CMF General Decision and any other applicable regulations applicable. The upgrade clause of the IT agreement entered into with the software company should address the question of the software being upgraded in the event of changes to applicable regulations.It is also recommended that any outsourcing agreement contains a clause which sets out how the online broker monitors the operation of the outsourced website.二、文献综述互联网金融发展文献综述摘要互联网金融的快速发展成为近年来中国经济金融领域备受瞩目的重要现象,国内学术界讨论互联网金融的文献数量也急速膨胀,但目前尚缺少对与互联网金融相关的各类文献进行全面梳理的综述类论文。
P2P网络借贷外文翻译文献综述

P2P网络借贷外文翻译文献综述P2P网络借贷外文翻译文献综述(文档含中英文对照即英文原文和中文翻译)译文:P2P 金融下的中小企业融资Waitz M摘要中小企业融资难是世界性难题。
文章介绍了互联网金融的概念,重点概括了 P2P 金融在科技和金融创新融合方面的发展,综合了现在学术界对 P2P 金融研究的五大方向方面的各种观点和见解。
指出了当前 P2P 金融发展的突出问题风险控制,并对互联网金融的大趋势进行了分析。
关键词: P2P金融; 金融创新; 风险管控1引言从企业发展的历史看,大型企业都来源于中小企业。
中小企业是国民经济中最具活力的部分,往往走在技术发展的最前端,在高科技产业、清洁能源、绿色经济等方面都有很好的业绩,在经济转型中发挥着巨大作用。
中小企业融资难是世界性难题。
这些中小企业融资环境和渠道狭窄,有 60% 以上无法获得银行贷款。
目前,科技型企业又有轻资产的特点,融资困境,成为困扰可持续发展的巨大瓶颈。
2 互联网金融的概念近两年来,互联网金融呈现井喷式发展, 2014 年以来,互联网金融板块表现强势。
当前经济领域存在两个特别矛盾的现象,一是中小企业在企业总数中占比很大,但普遍存在融资难的问题; 二是民间闲散资金多,但除了股市和房市,往别的领域投资很难。
而以互联网、大数据、云计算为基础和高度契合市场引领的互联网金融的发展,对于解决这两个难题,更好地为实体经济,尤其是中小企业发展创造良好的金融环境,也为中国在国际竞争当中实现弯道超车起到重要作用。
互联网金融除了掌握客户端外,还便于做好上游资本供给方、下游资本使用方点与点的整合,结合互联网的其中特质( P2P) 及金融的本质( 资本) 。
依托互联网金融的发展,金融供给能力得以提高,包容性得以增强,可以动员更多的金融资源,覆盖面更广,覆盖度更多,满足更分散、更多元化的需求。
互联网金融最狭隘的概念就是 P2P( Peer-to-Peer Lend-ing) 金融平台,P2P 模式的核心是: 在这个具有资质的网站平台上,借款人发出借贷信息,并提供借贷项目的具体情况、借款人的相关诚信及经济实力等有关信息; 投资人根据平台上提供的信息,进行决策,最后做出向借款人发放贷款的决定。
互联网金融,P2P网络借贷,P2P借贷外文翻译

译文原文出处:Decision Support Systems, Volume 49, Issue 1, April 2010, Pages 52-60Lauri Puro, Jeffrey E. Teich, Hannele Wallenius, Jyrki WalleniusP2P借贷中的借款人决策建议Lauri Puro, Jeffrey E. Teich, Hannele Wallenius, Jyrki Wallenius摘要在网上竞拍的设立与竞标过程中,人们总是面临艰难的战略决策。
在本项研究中,将介绍基于P2P贷款拍卖网站,帮助贷款人与借款人规范决策过程的模型——借款人决策建议模型(Borrower Decision Aid)。
在网上竞拍提供了中大量现实生活中的竞价数据,使笔者能够以此为决策者建立新的决策工具。
借款人决策建议模型(Borrower Decision Aid)将帮助借款人量化其战略选择,例如启动利率和贷款金额要求。
笔者将确定基于借款人,与贷款成功率、最终利率相关的变量。
1引言1.1背景是第一个基于网上逆向拍卖的P2P借贷市场。
在这个市场上,人们提出申请贷款,称为清单,然后其他人就这些清单进行出价。
获胜的投标者获得的提供贷款资金的机会,而利率由拍卖决定——竞争越激烈,利率就越低。
换句话说,这种方式越过中介银行连接了需要资金的人与愿意提供贷款的人。
通常情况下,一项贷款有多投标者(贷款人),因为大多数贷款人提供给每笔贷款50到200美元。
贷款人通过提供小额资金给多个贷款项目的方式来分散风险。
于2006年2月公开上线,至今已经促成超过1.5亿美元的贷款。
在本项研究中,我们将关注借款人的角色,即创建贷款清单的人。
在网上竞拍的过程中,借款人需要做出一些重要的战略决策,进而决定其是否能够获得提供贷款。
本项研究的目的就是为借款人的决策提供决定性的帮助。
在前人研究中,仅有少数讨论过竞拍过程中的决策建议,例如[1,8,15,16,23,25],但是他们的研究角度与本文不同。
P2P网络借贷金融文献综述及外文文献资料

本份文档包含:关于该选题的外文文献、文献综述一、外文文献文献信息标题: Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2P Lending作者: Berger, Sven C; Gleisner, Fabian期刊名称: Business Research;第2卷;第1期;页码:39-65年份: 2015.Emergence of Financial Intermediaries in Electronic Markets: The Case of Online P2PLendingAbstractWe analyze the role of intermediaries in electronic markets using detailed data of more than 14,000 originated loans on an electronic P2P (peer-to-peer) lending platform. In such an electronic credit market, lenders bid to supply a private loan. Screening of potential borrowers and the monitoring of loan repayment can be delegated to designated group leaders. We find that these market participants act as financial intermediaries and significantly improve borrowers' credit conditions by reducing information asymmetries, predominantly for borrowers with less attractive risk characteristics. Our findings may be surprising given the replacement of a bank by an electronic marketplace.Keywords: Asymmetric information, intermediation, social lending, electronic marketsManuscript received July 7, 2008, accepted by Christian Schlag (Finance) March 5, 2009.1 IntroductionThe evolution of information technology in recent years has led to the development of electronic marketplaces where traditional intermediaries may be less important or even redundant for the economic interaction of market participants (Benjamin andWigand 1995, Evans and Wurster 1997, Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Within the financial services industry, the debate about disintermediation and the future relevance of financial intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 2001, Nellis, McCaffery, and Hutchinson 2000, Schmidt, Hackethal, and Tyrell 1999) is fueled by the increasing role of electronic lending markets (P2P Lending or Social Lending) where an electronic marketplace replaces a bank as the traditional intermediary and enables the brokerage of consumer loans directly between borrowers and lenders (Hulme and Wright 2006, Meyer 2007). A recent study predicts that within the next few years such social banking platforms may have a market share of ten percent of the worldwide market for retail lending and financial planning (Gartner Inc. 2008). For the US, the P2P lending market is estimated to grow to a volume of up to ten billion USD within the next 10 years (Bruene 2007). We examine more than 14,000 credit transactions on the American electronic P2P lending platform , covering all transactions that took place in the market between 2005-11 and 2007-09. Our analysis of the P2P credit market starts with the observation that, despite the direct mediation of loans in the marketplace, new types of intermediaries emerge as market participants provide paid intermediary services. In the paper we then focus on the following questions: (1) From a theoretical point of view, how can these intermediaries create value in the interaction between borrowers and lenders? (2) Should all borrowers make use of an intermediary, and can it make sense to pay for intermediary services? (3) From the borrowers' perspective, what is the economic impact of intermediation in the electronic lending marketplace? Our empirical analysis is confirmatory in nature. It is based on the literature on financial intermediation (e. g., Diamond 1984, Leland and Pyle 1976) from which we derive hypotheses on the role of intermediaries in electronic marketplaces.The electronic lending platform Prosper provides an excellent laboratory for studying intermediaries in electronic marketplaces. Prosper is the largest provider with nearly 90 million USD in loans originated in the examination period from 2005-11 to 2007-09, as market participants were permitted to act as paid intermediaries in this period. As of 2008-09-30, Prosper dominated the US market for P2P lending with atotal of 176 million USD in issued loans, followed by its competitor Lending Club with 19 million USD.1 At that time, the market share of P2P consumer loans represented a fraction of the around 490 billion USD of non-revolving consumer credit outstanding at commercial banks (Federal Reserve 2008). All loans on Prosper have an identical maturity of 36 months. Our data sample includes detailed information on 14,321 financial transactions as well as the market participants that chose to participate in the market and covers transactions with and without the use of an intermediary. This allows us to test for aspects of the financial transaction and individual factors that might influence the usage of intermediary services. In line with traditional intermediation theory, we find that financial intermediaries on electronic P2P lending platforms have significant impact on borrowers' credit conditions, suggesting that intermediation helps to reduce the prevalent information asymmetries. The intermediary primarily contributes by screening potential borrowers. A mandatory screening process by means of the intermediary's commitment to screen every borrower within the group significantly improves borrowers' access to credit. Following diligent screening, the intermediary's recommendation of a borrower signals better information about creditworthiness and thus leads to better credit conditions. Moreover, bidding on the screened borrower's credit listing has an even stronger impact on the resulting interest rate.Our results indicate that borrowers should consider the reputation of an intermediary as it serves as a good proxy for the future diligent assessment of borrowers. Intermediation costs can be compensated by lower interest margins for borrowers. These results are robust to self-selection regarding the choice of an intermediary and characteristics of the financial transaction. All in all, our results suggest that financial intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces may create substantial value for borrowers. Our findings are consistent with a stream of literature suggesting that electronic markets create business opportunities for new intermediaries (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Methlie and Pedersen 2002, Bakos 1991, Bakos 1998, Sen and King 2003). Despite the electronic credit marketplace enables the direct mediation of loans, new financial intermediaries emerge between borrowers and lenders. There areseveral reasons why our results are of particular interest also for banks and other financial service providers that face the strategic decision of an active involvement in electronic lending markets. One option could be to participate in these marketplaces and offer financial advisory. Another interesting possibility could be to enter the P2P lending market and to establish a new marketplace to support the existing retail operations and enable cross-selling. Eventually, lending marketplaces are potential customers for banks' transaction services.Our approach to examining the role of financial intermediaries on electronic lending platforms makes three important contributions to the literature: First, this is one of the first studies analyzing an electronic lending marketplace, and the first study to empirically examine intermediation on an electronic P2P lending platform. We explain how electronic credit markets work, and provide insights into the role of intermediaries in the marketplace. Second, we test theoretical predictions from the literature on financial intermediation with new data. Our sample of more than 14,000 transactions on a P2P lending marketplace includes detailed information on the involved market participants and the loan characteristics. The dataset covers the complete transaction history of the credit marketplace for a time period of almost two years. Third, we quantify the economic impact of intermediation and other transaction characteristics on borrowers' loan spread and show that the usage of financial intermediaries which are neither professional nor institutional but members of the network may significantly improve the terms of trade for the borrowers.The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section gives an overview of electronic P2P lending platforms and explains the functioning of these marketplaces. Section 3 summarizes the relevant previous literature on financial intermediation and derives hypotheses about the role of intermediaries on electronic lending platforms. Section 4 overviews the methodology employed, describes the data, and presents the empirical results of our analyses as well as robustness tests. In section 5 we conclude with a summary and the limitations of our study.2 Intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces2.1 Electronic marketplaces and disintermediationMarkets are essential for economic activity in mediating the demand for and supply of goods and services. Intermediaries help to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by (1) providing transaction processing capabilities, (2) bringing enhanced levels of knowledge and expertise, and (3) adding to the transactability of a given good or service (Chircu and Kauffman 2000).The internet has made e-commerce possible where electronic markets are becoming more important in coordinating supply and demand (Grieger 2003, Segev, Gebauer, and Farber 1999). Electronic markets can facilitate economic activity even under complex and insecure conditions (Cordella 2006), significantly reduce information and transaction costs, and may in this way displace traditional intermediaries (Malone, Yates, and Benjamin 1987). Many authors argue that once electronic markets emerge, traditional intermediaries may be threatened by an electronic brokerage effect also called disintermediation (for a literature overview see Chircu and Kauffman 2000). In sharp contrast to that, the theoretical contributions on electronic markets and disintermediation have not yet been supported by convincing empirical evidence (Chircu and Kauffman 2000, Sen and King 2003). Moreover, the displacement of traditional intermediaries may never occur. Authors like Sarkar, Butler, and Steinfield (1998) or Hagel and Singer (1999) argue that electronic markets may lead to new forms of intermediation.2.2 Electronic lending platformsElectronic lending platforms are electronic markets that mediate between borrowers and lenders of loans.Wefocus here on consumer loans between individual borrowers and lenders and exclude platforms for bonds or syndicated loans (Steelmann 2006). The electronic credit marketplace as a website in the World Wide Web constitutes the general conditions for peer-to-peer lending and provides the administration of current loans. Electronic lending platforms differ in the way loans are originated: Some providers mediate between borrowers and lenders themselves, whereas other providers match borrowers' credit listings and lenders' bids with an auction mechanism (Meyer 2007).The lion share of participants in the marketplace are private individuals, althoughthere are institutional lenders investing in some, too. There are numerous providers that operate nationally due to differing regulatory frameworks. Table 1 provides an overview of the three major Anglo-American and German providers and their business models. A recent development of the business model of P2P lending marketplaces is that lenders may trade loans prior to maturity, increasing the liquidity of P2P loans. As of February 2009, Prosper is still in the process, whereas Lending Club has already successfully registered with the SEC to create a secondary loan market. Despite differing business models, there is one distinctive feature that these marketplaces have in common: Transactions in electronic credit marketplaces occur anonymously between fictitious "screen names". Therefore, information is asymmetrically distributed between borrowers and lenders. Loans are not collateralized and lenders face the inherent risk of default (Steelmann 2006). Despite anonymous interactions, loan listings contain additional information on potential borrowers. Lenders can evaluate individual creditworthiness through quantitative as well as qualitative figures. , America's largest peer-topeer lending marketplace, provides an individual rating and an indicator of indebtedness in cooperation with the credit reporting agency Experian as the two main quantitative figures. The informational value of these figures should be considered high, although the degree to which consumer credit reports are accurate, complete or consistent is in dispute (Avery, Calem, Canner, and Bostic 2003). Most platforms give market participants the opportunity to provide additional personal information about their background, their financial standing and the purpose of the loan. This qualitative, "soft" information is mandatory and its validity is a priori not controlled. Borrowers thereby might have an incentive to overemphasize their "quality" (the present value of the prospective projects, their financial standing or payment behavior) in their personal descriptions (moral hazard).Among the emerging literature on electronic lending marketplaces, a number of working papers examine the role of borrowers' "soft" information that is conveyed in personal pictures and descriptions. A study by Herzenstein, Andrews, Dholakia, and Lyandres (2008) analyzes around 5,000 loan listings on during June 2006and finds that demographic attributes such as race and gender have only a small effect on the likelihood of the auction's funding success when compared to the impact of borrowers' financial strength and effort when listing and publicizing the auction.In contrast to that, Ravina (2008) shows that borrowers' characteristics such as beauty and race significantly affect loan fundability and loan pricing. Incorporating nearly 12,000 loan requests from 2007-03-12 and 2007-04-16 she finds that borrowers perceived as beautiful are more likely to get a loan and pay significantly lower credit spreads. Moreover, Ravina finds that black borrowers pay significantly higher spreads even though they are not more likely to default.A study by Pope and Sydnor (2008) analyzes around 110,000 loan listings on in a one-year period from 2006-06 until 2007-05. There results indicate significant racial disparities on the credit market: Loan listings of black borrowers are less likely to be funded and the spreads paid by blacks are higher than those by comparable whites. In contrast to Ravina (2008), they find that blacks have a higher relative default rate than white borrowers. Of course, it is impossible to evaluate whether P2P lending offers more or less equal access to credit compared to traditional consumer lending: Inherent in an analysis on P2P lending based on transaction data is a potential sample selection bias. Lenders using the online platform might represent those with a high probability of default or lenders whose credit applications have been rejected at traditional banks. For example, Agarwal and Hauswald (2008) find that small business lenders strategically self-select into electronic (transactional) lending with respect to the publicly available information on their creditworthiness. It follows that from observed transactions in a P2P marketplace a comparison to loan availability and loan pricing at traditional banking institutions is not possible.However, none of this is the aim of this paper: We focus on the role of intermediaries that emerge in the interaction between borrowers and lenders in the electronic P2P lending market. Central to our analyses are social networks on the Prosper marketplace called groups.2.3 Groups on In addition to personal profiles, borrowers and lenders can form groups. These smallercommunities within the marketplace review and assess the creditworthiness of individual members. Groups are potentially beneficial for market participants by providing and verifying information or obtaining additional information about borrowers that is not publicly available. Groups lack distinct ownership and governance features as they typically exist in credit cooperatives (Davis 2001, Taylor 1971). There is no ownership of the groups, and there is no collective decision mechanism on accepting group members or granting loans. Furthermore, groups do not exclusively deal with their members. At any time, lenders from outside the group may invest in a group member's loan listing. This implies that there is no rotation of money within the group, and no specific allocation process. There are two papers that specifically examine the role of groups on the P2P lending website : Freedman and Jin (2008) use transaction data from 200601-06 until 2008-07-31 covering around 290,000 loan listings and 25,000 funded loans. They find evidence for the idea that the monitoring within social networks provides a stronger incentive to pay off loans ex-post: Loans with friend endorsements and friend bids have fewer missed payments and yield significantly higher rates of return than other loans. Everett (2008) looks at the influence of group membership on loan default within 13,486 Prosper loans. The dataset covers funded loans from 2006-05-31 until 2007-11-06 and incorporates ex post loan performance information until 2008-05-07. He finds that membership in a group significantly decreases loan default risk if the group enforces real-life personal connections like, e.g., employees of the same company or alumni of a certain university. Both studies presented above look at social networks in the credit market but do not specifically take the group leader into account. It is, however, not the group as an institution per se, but the group leader who decides about membership and plays a substantial role in the lending process.2.4 Group leaders as financial intermediariesIn order to reduce information asymmetries, lenders must screen potential borrowers. Given the large number of available credit listings, it can be costly or impossible to process the information available about potential borrowers. Therefore, intermediaries emerge in the electronic marketplace offering intermediary services in order to assessand limit credit risk. Every participant in the online lending platform can found a group and become a group leader. Group leaders set membership criteria and administer the group. Groups are smaller communities within the marketplace where group members may share a bond based on employment, geography, education, common leisure activities, or other factors. The principle that people from close communities act more responsibly towards each other aims to lower the risk of defaults and therefore enables lending at better rates. Among the most important tasks of the group leader is the screening of borrowers within the group (a voluntary due diligence known as "vetting"). Within groups, it is common that borrowers send personal documents regarding their identity, income, and other pertinent information to the group leader. The group leader may also establish personal contact with the borrowers' employer to verify the personal income in order to recommend a borrower's credit listing.The assignment as a group leader may be timeconsuming, since a detailed "due diligence" of a potential borrower can take several hours. There are many individual motives for forming a group and becoming a group leader. Intrinsic motivation may result from altruism or related social returns from leading a group. As extrinsic motivation and as a more tangible example, the owner of an Apple computer store may run a group on Prosper to promote sales by providing an alternative form of consumer finance. Leading a group can also be even more directly monetarily motivated: Group leaders were permitted to receive remuneration ("fees") for their effort, acting as paid intermediaries. Group leaders collect a fee in the form of additional interest for providing intermediation services until 2007-09-12, when Prosper modified the fee concept (Prosper Marketplace Inc. 2007b). The incentive for borrowers to disclose information to the group leader is to attract more bids on their credit listing for the purpose of better interest rates. Group leaders also supervise the repayment of loans within their group. In the case of default, Prosper informs the group leader who can encourage loan repayment and may arrange limited repayments (called "community payments") on behalf of a member who is not able to do so. Group leaders thus serve as a financial intermediary by acting as middlemen betweenlenders and borrowers. Even though the electronic lending marketplace displaces the traditional depository institution as a financial intermediary (Datta and Chatterjee 2008), group leaders emerge as new intermediaries. The group leader facilitates the movement of capital from surplus units in the marketplace to deficit units by producing information, providing advice, and monitoring loan repayment. Where intermediary services were concerned, borrowers faced the choice between "free" or "paid" intermediaries. It is a priori not clear if intermediation created value for the electronic marketplace and, in particular, for the borrowers.Wefocus here on the value of intermediation for borrowers.3 Development of hypothesesThere is extensive research on financial intermediation. In this section we review the relevant intermediation literature in order to derive hypotheses about the role of intermediaries in electronic credit marketplaces. Traditionally, transaction costs and information problems have provided the foundation for understanding intermediaries (Allen and Santomero 1998, Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993, Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, Santomero 1984). Due to asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, financial markets can perform poorly or even fail when borrowers know their characteristics (the present value of the prospective projects), but lenders cannot distinguish between them. Market value then reflects average project quality (Akerlof 1970, Leland and Pyle 1976). As a result, "good risks" are driven out of the market and average project quality decreases (adverse selection). This can be the case if borrowers cannot be expected to be entirely straightforward about their characteristics since there may be a substantial reward for exaggerating positive qualities (moral hazard). In his seminal article, Diamond (1984) argues that intermediaries can help to overcome problems of asymmetric information by acting as "delegated monitors". When several lenders in a loan syndicate want to monitor a borrower and monitoring is costly, there will either be inefficiently high monitoring expenditure or a free-riding problem, where no lender has an incentive to monitor. In this case, a financial intermediary as a delegated monitor minimizes the costs of monitoring. In Diamond (1984) the intermediary holds deposits and writes loan contracts to borrowers, whichis not the case with the group leader in the electronic lending platform. Nevertheless, the argumentation is applicable to the lending platform Prosper for two reasons. Firstly, the capital of several lenders is syndicated into one loan. Secondly, lenders face a large number of potential borrowers in the marketplace. Lenders benefit from additional private information about borrowers in order to better assess credit risk and the appropriate borrowing rate required. Acquiring private information about credit listings implies a time-consuming (repeated) interaction with the borrower which is costly. Therefore, there are group leaders who act as intermediaries in producing additional private information about borrowers within groups. The intermediary realizes significant economies of scale by producing information for the marketplace. Intermediaries can solve another information problem prevalent in electronic marketplaces. Borrowers might not be willing to disclose proprietary information to a large number of lenders in a public financial market. Following Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), an intermediary acts as the facilitator of knowledge sharing, whereby proprietary information is only disclosed vis-à-vis the intermediary.In the marketplace, participants can voluntarily disclose additional private information regarding their credit listing. Within groups, borrowers may disclose proprietary information regarding their financial standing solely to the group leader. As group members, borrowers can thus avoid disclosing private information to the marketplace. Group leaders assess and recommend a borrower's credit quality based on additional private information, and at the same time preserve the privacy of proprietary information. Groups enable a better assessment of the borrowers' credit quality, resulting in potentially lower rates for borrowers.Finally, group leaders not only screen potential borrowers, but also monitor ongoing loan repayment in place of the potentially large number of lenders. In cases of loan default, Prosper informs the group leader who may encourage loan repayment and even arrange limited repayments by the group. If a borrower's loan is more than one month late, lenders can make what is called a "community payment" on behalf of a borrower who is temporarily not able to do so. These payments can be compared to a mutual insurance mechanism.All in all, the intermediary reduces uncertainty for lenders, which should be reflected in lower required risk premiums. The arguments provided above lead us to the first fundamental hypothesis:Hypothesis H1: Borrowers within groups are able to borrow at lower credit spreads. Next, we formulate three hypotheses that enable us to decompose the role of the group leader in the lending marketplace. With imperfect information about borrowers' credit quality, lenders can use publicly observable signals to assess credit risk (Riley 1975, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Spence 1973). Observable characteristics or actions can serve as signals. On the electronic lending platform Prosper, the recommendation of a credit listing by a group leader is a strong observable signal of credit quality. Borrowers can voluntarily provide additional private information regarding their financial standing to their group leader. Group leaders can then recommend credit listings within their groups. This observable recommendation serves as a signal of good credit quality for the marketplace.This leads to:Hypothesis H2: The recommendation of a credit listing by the group leader leads to lower credit spreads.The reliability of information produced by an intermediary is a prevalent problem in the intermediation literature. Group leaders might recommend credit listings within their group without prior diligent screening. It may be difficult or impossible for potential lenders to distinguish good information from bad. Group leaders can signal credibility of a recommendation by bidding on the recommended credit listing. The potential investment of the group leader is an observable signal for information quality (Leland and Pyle 1976). We derive:Hypothesis H3a: A group leader's bidding serves as a credible signal for the quality of the credit listing and results in lower credit spreads.Hypothesis H3b: A group leader's bidding on a credit listing signals information quality and has a stronger impact on credit spreads than a recommendation by the group leader.We derive two additional hypotheses about the reputation and the size of groups. Past activities within a group, especially regarding the diligent assessment of individualborrowers by the group leader, are only imperfectly observable. In contrast, the reputation of a group in the electronic marketplace is observable from its group rating. The group rating is a measurement of a group's performance in paying back its loans in comparison with expected (historical) default rates. A defaulted loan worsens a group's rating and therefore its reputation. Tirole (1996) shows analytically how a group's good reputation positively influences individual behavior. The group rating reflects a group's ability to assess borrowers' credit quality, and serves as a proxy for the group leader's behavior in the future.In addition to a group leader's general ability, we argue that group reputation serves as an effective mechanism to prevent collusion between the group leader and a borrower within the group. The phenomenon of collusion (see, e.g., Tirole 1991) could be a major concern for participants in the electronic lending marketplace. This would be the case if a potential borrower could "bribe" the group leader in order to receive a recommendation and a bid. With an increasing probability for such collusive behavior, the credibility of the observable actions of the intermediary would be significantly reduced. This would be reflected in a decreasing group rating due to higher than expected defaults within the group. We deduce:Hypothesis H4: A higher group rating leads to lower credit spreads.When deciding to join a group, market participants face the choice of group size. At first sight, a smaller group seems to offer a potentially closeknit community in the marketplace that facilitates the interaction and closer collaboration of group members with the group leader. This is fairly comparable to the stream of literature on relationship lending that emphasizes the exchange and evaluation of "soft information" within small banks (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005). On closer examination, and presumably more important, borrowers and lenders might prefer larger groups because they generate more opportunities for exchange, collectively provide more funds for loans, and, thus, offer easier access to credit. From an investor's perspective, in addition to a larger network, bigger groups are attractive because they may enable effective "peer-monitoring" which lowers credit risk. The concept of peermonitoring,。
P2P网络借贷金融发展文献综述及外文文献资料

P2P网络借贷金融发展文献综述及外文文献资料引言P2P网络借贷是一种通过互联网平台连接借款人和出借人的金融模式。
随着互联网技术和金融市场的发展,P2P网络借贷在全球范围内得到了迅猛发展。
本文将综述P2P网络借贷金融发展的文献资料,并提供外文文献的相关资料。
本文综述P2P网络借贷的发展已经引起了全球学术界的广泛关注。
以下是一些相关研究的文献综述:1. 文献一:《P2P网络借贷的发展与监管》- 作者:张三- 出版日期:2018年- 摘要:该文献探讨了P2P网络借贷的发展趋势和监管挑战。
通过对行业现状和监管实践的分析,提出了促进P2P网络借贷健康发展的建议。
2. 文献二:《P2P网络借贷平台的风险与规范》- 作者:李四- 出版日期:2019年- 摘要:该文献分析了P2P网络借贷平台存在的风险,并提出了相应的规范建议。
通过对国内外相关案例的研究,总结了P2P网络借贷平台的规范经验和教训。
3. 文献三:《P2P网络借贷的金融创新与风险管理》- 作者:王五- 出版日期:2020年- 摘要:该文献讨论了P2P网络借贷作为金融创新模式的特点和风险管理策略。
通过对风险评估和风险控制的研究,探讨了P2P 网络借贷的可持续发展路径。
外文文献资料以下是一些相关的外文文献资料:1. 外文文献一:Title of Paper 1- 作者:Author 1- 出版日期:Publication Date 1- 摘要:Abstract of Paper 12. 外文文献二:Title of Paper 2- 作者:Author 2- 出版日期:Publication Date 2- 摘要:Abstract of Paper 23. 外文文献三:Title of Paper 3- 作者:Author 3- 出版日期:Publication Date 3- 摘要:Abstract of Paper 3结论综上所述,P2P网络借贷金融发展的文献资料揭示了该行业的发展趋势、监管挑战、风险管理策略等方面的研究成果。
互联网金融P2P网络借贷外文翻译文献

文献信息:文献标题:Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending(点对点(P2P)网络借贷的信用风险与贷款绩效评估)国外作者:Riza Emekter, Yanbin Tu, Benjamas Jirasakuldech, Min Lu 文献出处:《Applied Economics》, 2015, 47(1):54-70字数统计:英文3063单词,15818字符;中文5110汉字外文文献:Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in onlinePeer-to-Peer (P2P) lendingAbstract Online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending has emerged recently. This micro loan market could offer certain benefits to both borrowers and lenders. Using data from the Lending Club, which is one of the popular online P2P lending houses, this article explores the P2P loan characteristics, evaluates their credit risk and measures loan performances. We find that credit grade, debt-to-income ratio, FICO score and revolving line utilization play an important role in loan defaults. Loans with lower credit grade and longer duration are associated with high mortality rate. The result is consistent with the Cox Proportional Hazard test which suggests that the hazard rate or the likelihood of the loan default increases with the credit risk of the borrowers. Finally, we find that higher interest rates charged on the highrisk borrowers are not enough to compensate for higher probability of the loan default. The Lending Club must find ways to attract high FICO score and high-income borrowers in order to sustain their businesses.Key words: Peer-to-Peer lending; credit grade; FICO score; default riskI.IntroductionWith the advent of Web 2.0, it has become easy to create online markets and virtual communities with convenient accessibility and strong collaboration.One of the emerging Web 2.0 applications is the online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending marketplaces, where both lenders and borrowers can virtually meet for loan transactions. Such marketplaces provide a platform service of introducing borrowers to lenders, which can offer some advantages for both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers can get micro loans directly from lenders, and might pay lower rates than commercial credit alternatives. On the other hand, lenders can earn higher rates of return compared to any other type of lending such as corporate bonds, bank deposits or certificate of deposits. One of the problems in online P2P lending is information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender. That is, the lender does not know the borrower's credibility as well as the borrower does. Such information asymmetry might result in adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Theoretically, some of these problems can be alleviated by regular monitoring, but this approach poses a challenge in the online environment because the borrowers and the buyers do not physically meet. Fostering and enhancing the lender's trust in the borrower can also be implemented to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In the traditional bank-lending markets, banks can use collateral, certified accounts, regular reporting, and even presence of the board of directors to enhance the trust in the borrower. However, such mechanisms are difficult to implement in the online environment which will incur a significant transaction cost.To reduce lending risks associated with information asymmetry, current online P2P lending has the following arrangements. First, the Lending Club screens out any potential high-risk borrowers based on the FICO score. The minimum FICO score to be able to participate is 640. Second, the typical size of the loans produced in this market is small, which is under $35 000 at the Lending Club. Therefore, these loans are essentially microloans which pose a relatively small loss in case of default. Third, the market maker offers matchmaking systems which can be used to generate portfolio recommendations and minimize lending risks. Fourth, if a borrower fails to pay, the market maker will report the case to a credit agency and hire a collectionagency to collect the funds on behalf of the lender. Although there are certain structures imposed in the online P2P that help to minimize the risk, this form of lending is inherently associated with greater amount of risk compared to the traditional lending.The purpose of this article is to evaluate the credit risk of borrowers from one of the largest P2P platforms in the United States provided by the Lending Club, which help lenders to make more informed decisions about the risk and return efficiency of loans based on the borrowers' grade. There are two related research questions this article will address: (1) What are some of the borrowers' characteristics that help determine the default risk? and (2) Is the higher return generated from the riskier borrower large enough to compensate for the incremental risk? Lenders can allocate their investments more efficiently if they know what characteristics of the borrower affect the default risk. Each borrower is classified by credit grade with corresponding borrowing rate assigned by the Lending Club. To make an efficient allocation, a lender should know whether the higher interest rates set for high-risk borrowers are sufficient to compensate the lenders for the higher probabilities of a potential loss.Our findings suggest that borrowers with high FICO score, high credit grade, low revolving line utilization and low debt-to-income ratio are associated with low default risk. This finding is consistent with the studies by Duarte et al. (2012) who report that borrowers with a trustworthy characteristic will have better credit scores but low probability of default. This result also suggests that besides the loan applicants' social ties and friendship as reported by Freedman and Jin (2014) and Lin et al. (2013), the four factors discussed above are also important in explaining the default risk. When comparing with US national borrowers, the results show that the Lending Club should continue to screen out the borrowers with lower FICO score and attract the highest FICO score borrowers in order to significantly reduce the default risk. In relating the risk to the return, it shows that higher interest rate charged for the riskier borrower is not significant enough to justify the higher default probability. Our finding here is consistent with the study by Berkovich (2011) who reports that high quality loans offer excess return.II.Literature ReviewThree main streams of research have emerged in response to the growing popularity of P2P lending. The first stream of research examines the reasons for the emergence of online P2P lending. The second stream of research focuses on determining the factors that explain the funding success and default risk. The last stream of research investigates the performance of online P2P loan for a given level of the risk.Peer group lending has been emerging in local communities and has attracted the research in this area. Conlin (1999) develops a model to explain the existence of peer group micro-lending programmes in the United States and Canada. He finds that peer groups enable fixed costs to be imposed on the entrepreneurs while minimizing the programme's overhead costs. Ashta and Assadi (2008) investigate whether Web 2.0 techniques are integrated to support the advanced social interactions and associations with lower costs for P2P lending. Hulme and Wright (2006) study a case of online P2P lending house, Zopa, in the United Kingdom. They suggest that the emergence of online P2P lending is a direct response to social trends and a demand for new forms of relationship in financial sector under the new information age.There is extant literature that identifies the factors determining the funding success and default risk. Using the Canadian micro-credit data, Gomez and Santor (2003) find that group lending offers lower default rates than conventional individual lending does. Study by Iyer et al. (2009) shows that lenders can evaluate one third of credit risk using both hard and soft data about the borrower. Lin et al. (2013) analyse the role of social connections in evaluating credit risk and discover that strong social networking relationship is an important factor that determines the borrowing success and lower default risk. Lin et al. (2013) further report that applicants' friendship could increase the probability of successful funding, lower interest rates on funded loans, and these borrowers are associated with lower ex post default rates at Prosper. The importance of social ties in determining loans funded is also examined by Freedman and Jin (2014). The result shows that borrowers with social ties are more likely tohave their loans funded and receive lower interest rates. However, they also find evidence of risks to lenders regarding borrower participation in social networks.Several other studies examine whether certain borrowers' characteristics and personal information determine the success of loan funding and default risk. Herzenstein et al. (2008) show that borrowers' financial strength, their listing and publicizing efforts, and demographic attributes affect likelihood of funding success. Study by Duarte et al. (2012) further argues that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have better credit score with higher probabilities of having their loans funded and default less often. Larrimore et al. (2011) demonstrate that borrowers who use extended narratives, concrete descriptions and quantitative words have positive impact on funding success. However, humanizing personal details or loan justifi cations have negative influences on funding success. Qiu et al. (2012) further reveal that in addition to personal information and social capital, other variables, including loan amount, acceptable maximum interest rate and loan period set by borrowers, significantly influence the funding success or failure.Galak et al. (2011) further show that lenders tend to favour individual over group borrowers and borrowers who are socially proximate to themselves. They also find that lenders prefer the borrowers who are more like themselves in terms of gender, occupation and first name initial. More interestingly, Gonzalez and Loureiro (2014) have similar findings: (1) when perceived age represents competence, attractiveness has no effect on loan success; (2) when lenders and borrowers are of the same gender, attractiveness might lead to a loan failure (i.e., the ‘beauty is beastly' effect) and (3) loan success is sensitive to the relative age and attractiveness of lenders and borrowers. Herzenstein et al. (2011) find that herding in the loan auction is positively related to its subsequent performance, that is whether borrowers pay the money back on time.III.DataIn this section, the loan applicants' data is first described, followed by loan distribution based on loan purposes, credit grade and loan status and it ends with thedetailed descriptive statistics of the loan applicants. This study uses 61 451 loan applications in the Lending Club from May 2007 to June 2012 obtained from . Over the study period, the Lending Club lent about $713 million to borrowers. To address the borrowers' behaviour in online P2P lending, we first examine the main reasons for borrowing money from others. Table 1 lists the borrowers' self-claimed reasons summarized in the Lending Club. Almost 70% of loan requested are related to debt consolidation or credit card debts with a total loan amount requested of approximately $387 million and $108 million, respectively. The number of loan applications for education, renewable energy and vacation contribute less than 1% of total loans with the total loan requested ranging from 1 to 3 million. The borrowers state that their preferences to borrow from the Lending Club are lower borrowing rate and inability to borrow enough money from credit cards. The second purpose for borrowing is to pay home mortgage or to re-model home.Table 1. Loan distributions by loan purpose (May 2007–June 2012)Notes: The data is obtained from 61 451 loan applicants in the Lending Club, , from May 2007 to June 2012.The loan-seeking persons are asked to provide the reasons for requesting loans.The Lending Club uses the borrower's FICO credit scores along with other information to assign a loan credit grade ranging from A1 to G5 in descending credit ranks to each loan. The detailed procedure is as follows: after assigning a base score based on FICO ratings, the Lending Club makes some adjustments depending on requested loan amount, number of recent credit inquiries, credit history length, total open credit account, currently open credit accounts and revolving line utilization todetermine the final grade, which in turn determines the interest rate on the loan.Table 2 reports the loan distribution by credit grade. The majority of borrowing requests have grades between A1 and E5. The Highest loan amounts requested are from borrowers with ‘B' credit grade, which contribute 29.56% of total amount of loans requested. The total number of applicants for this ‘B' credit grade group is 18 707, which represents total loans of approximately $210 million. The lowest loan amounts requested are from borrowers with the lowest ‘G' credit grade which accounts for 1.53% of total loans. There are only 608 loan applicants for this lowest credit rating ‘G' group and it represents approximately $11 million in total loan value. According to the Lending Club's policy, a loan credit grade is used to determine the interest rate and the maximum amount of money that a borrower can request. The higher the loan grade, the lower the interest rate. A borrowing request with a low grade renders a higher interest rate as a compensation for a high risk held by lenders. Table 2. Loans distribution by credit grades (May 2007–June 2012)Notes: The Lending Club uses the borrowers’ FICO credit scores along with other information to classify a loan from Grade A1 to G5 in descending credit risk. Therefore, A1 credit grade represents the highest credit quality/low-risk borrowers, whereas G5 credit grade represents the lowest credit quality/ high-risk borrowers. Total amount of loans requested as a percentage of total loan is 19.35% for credit grade group ‘A’, 29.56% for ‘B’, 19.94% for ‘C’, 14.84% for ‘D’, 10.15% for ‘E’, 4.59% for ‘F’ and 1.53% for ‘G’.Finally, Panel A of Table 3 shows the loan status for all the loan requests on 20 July 2012. Overall, the default rate is 4.60% with total losses of approximately $29 million. Another 2.45% of total loan requests which constitute $18.6 million could be potentially lost because the borrowers are late in making payment within 30 days or 120 days and not paying the normal instalments. 17.98% of the loans are fully paid with an approximate value of $108 million. The $557 million loans are in current status account for 74.91% of total loans. Naturally, loans with a lower grade demonstrate a higher default rate. Therefore, study on risk management on P2P lending is relevant for the lenders to optimize their investment portfolios. Panel B of Table 3 reports the loan status for the matured loans. The overall loss rate is much higher for matured loans. Among 4904 matured loans, 914 loans are charged-off, which represent 18.6%. The total loss is $5.5 million which represents 13% of all matured loans amount. Less than 1% of the matured loans are late in terms of making payment with the unpaid balance of approximately $27 000. 80.77% or $33 million of matured loans are fully paid.Table 3. Loan distribution by the loan status (May 2007–June 2012)Table 4 reports the general characteristics and credit history of the online P2P loan applicants from the Lending Club. Based on our sample of 61 451 loanapplicants, the average monthly interest charged on a loan is 12.34%. On average, 471 days passed from the issue date of the loan. The average credit grade of a borrower is 25, which corresponds to credit category between B and C. The average size of a typical loan is $11 604 and the average monthly payment is $351. The borrower in general pays back $4384 a month and has $7873 left to be paid. The average ratio of the remaining balance to total loans is 63%.Examining the borrowers' characteristics, it shows that the mean income of a borrower from the Lending Club is $5796 with the debts to income ratio of 0.1381. On average, a borrower has 9.56 open credit lines and 22 total credit lines, carries $14 315 average revolving credit balance and almost half (51.6%) of his or her credit limit. In the last six months, there is 1 credit inquiry requested by an average borrower. Average FICO score category of a typical borrower is 3.48, which corresponds to a FICO score between 680 and 750.Table 4. Descriptive statistics (May 2007–June 2012)Notes: Credit Grade is the grade assigned by the Lending Club based on the FICOrano credit rating information along with other information. Credit Grade ‘1’ is the loan category of ‘G’ which is the riskiest class of loans. Credit Grade ‘7’ is the loan category of ‘A’ which is the lowest risk borrowers. FICOrano is the credit rating of the borrowers rated by credit card companies. FICO 6 corresponds to borrowers with the FICO score above 780, FICO 5 corresponds to FICO score between 750–779, FICO 4 = 714–749, FICO 3 = 679–713, FICO 2 = 660–678 and FICO 1 = 640–659, respectively.IV.ConclusionsCredit risk is an important concern for the P2P loans. This study employs the data from the Lending Club to evaluate the credit risk of the P2P online loans. We findthat credit score, debt-to-income ratio, FICO score and revolving line utilization play an important role in determining loan default. The credit categorization used by the Lending Club successfully predicts the default probability with one exception of next lowest credit grade ‘F'. In general, higher credit grade loan is associated with lower default risk.The mortality risk also increases with the maturity of the loans. Loans with lower credit grade and longer duration are associated with high mortality rate. The Cox Proportional Hazard Test results show that as the credit risk of the borrowers increases, so does the likelihood of loan being default. However, the higher interest rate currently charged for the riskier borrower is not significant enough to justify the higher default probability. This suggests that the lenders would be better off to lend only to the safest borrowers in the highest grade category of 7 or Grade A. Increasing spreads on riskier borrower may lead to a more severe adverse selection resulting in higher default risk.The Lending Club lenders should either extend credits only to the highest grade borrower or try to find more creative ways to lower the default rate among current borrowers. When comparing with the US national consumers, borrowers with relatively higher income and potentially higher FICO scores do not participate in the P2P market. Creating incentives to attract these types of borrowers would have a significant potential to decrease the default risk in this market.中文译文:点对点(P2P)网络借贷的信用风险与贷款绩效评估摘要近年来点对点(P2P)网络借贷开始兴起。
P2P互联网金融外文翻译文献

P2P互联网金融外文翻译文献随着信息技术的迅猛发展,互联网金融作为一种新兴的金融模式在全球范围内迅速崛起。
P2P 互联网金融作为其中的重要组成部分,引起了广泛的关注和研究。
本文旨在对相关的外文文献进行翻译和梳理,以加深对 P2P 互联网金融的理解。
P2P 互联网金融,即 peertopeer lending,是指个人通过互联网平台向其他个人或企业提供贷款的一种金融模式。
与传统金融机构不同,P2P 平台主要依靠互联网技术和大数据算法来实现借贷双方的匹配和风险管理。
在众多外文文献中,学者们对 P2P 互联网金融的发展历程、特点、优势和风险进行了深入的探讨。
一些研究指出,P2P 互联网金融的出现打破了传统金融机构的垄断,为投资者提供了更多的投资选择,同时也为借款人提供了更便捷、高效的融资渠道。
例如,在某些国家,由于传统银行贷款审批流程繁琐、门槛较高,许多中小企业和个人难以获得资金支持。
而 P2P 平台通过简化审批流程、降低门槛,使得这些群体能够更容易地获得所需资金,从而促进了经济的发展。
然而,P2P 互联网金融也并非完美无缺。
一方面,由于缺乏有效的监管和规范,一些 P2P 平台存在欺诈、跑路等风险,给投资者带来了巨大的损失。
另一方面,P2P 平台的信用评估体系尚不完善,难以准确评估借款人的信用风险,从而增加了平台的坏账率。
此外,网络安全问题也是P2P 互联网金融面临的一大挑战。
一旦平台遭受黑客攻击,用户的个人信息和资金安全将受到严重威胁。
为了应对这些风险和挑战,国外的一些研究提出了相应的对策和建议。
首先,政府应加强对 P2P 互联网金融的监管,建立健全相关法律法规,明确平台的准入标准和运营规范。
其次,P2P 平台应加强自身的风险管理能力,完善信用评估体系,提高风险识别和控制能力。
同时,平台还应加大对网络安全的投入,采取有效的安全措施保障用户的信息和资金安全。
在对 P2P 互联网金融的研究中,国外学者还运用了多种研究方法和模型。
互联网金融外文翻译文献

文献信息:文献标题:INTERNET FINANCE: DIGITAL CURRENCIES AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCE LIBERATING THE CAPITAL MARKETS(互联网金融:数字货币和替代金融解放资本市场)国外作者:Kim Wales文献出处:《Journal of Governance and Regulation》, 2015,4(1):190-201 字数统计:英文2505单词,13427字符;中文4405汉字外文文献:INTERNET FINANCE:DIGITAL CURRENCIES AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCE LIBERATING THE CAPITAL MARKETS Abstract This article discusses how the sudden shift in policy reform and innovation has the potential to liberate the financial markets. The economic potential of internet finance is beginning to take hold across the capital markets as industries like Peer–to–Peer Lending, Equity and Debt based Crowdfunding and virtual currencies and cryptocurrencies which are types of digital currency are quickly transforming the way businesses are being financed. From borrowing and lending, buying and selling securities, to conducting wire transfers internationally, these innovations are creating a new class and generation of investors will source investments opportunities. Helping institutions and governments assess risks and manage performance in order to determine where to deploy capital; and showing signs of lessening the inequality gap. Following the neolithic agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution, this new revolution will enable more people to access financial services in less traditional ways, especially the unbanked world with its huge potential. These new financial opportunities, such as peer – to -peer (P2P) lending, will be discussed and examined, and we will stress how they can allow people to bypasscurrent barriers in the global economy. We conclude by arguing that all these developments, energized by the efforts of innovators and entrepreneurs, have the potential to radically transform the world in which we live, while promoting the core values of industrialized societies including democracy, capital formation, sustainability, and equality without solely relying on tax increases.Key Words:Internet Finance, Digital Currencies, Capital Markets, Alternative FinanceIntroductionThe way we do business is being revolutionized. There is decreasing trust of traditional banks, mainly due to the aftershocks of the 2008 financial crisis and the string of scandals that has affected banks reputation since then, including the LIBOR interest rate rigging scandal, money laundering, high risk lending and tax evasion. As access to traditional funding becomes more elusive and as more and more people join the ranks of the “unbanked,” it is clear that new ways of creating business, job and capital, in a more equitable way must be found. And indeed, an economic revolution is underway, which is radically transforming the financial ecosystem, via emerging technologies, changing legislation, and alternative funding mechanisms.Barriers in the Global EconomyKendall and V oorhies (2014) note that in some countries, “the most important buffers against crippling financial setbacks are financial tools such as personal savings, insurance, credit, or cash transfers from family and friends. Yet these are rarely available because most of the world’s poor lack access to even the most basic banking services.” In addition, Webber (2014) notes that the World Bank calculates that about 75% “of the world’s poor is unbanked,” amounting to roughly 2.5 billion people who are unable to access any banking services. These unbanked people are often reliant on “a patchwork of informal and often precarious arrangements to manage their financial lives.”However, “technology and new business models are beginning to shape differenttypes of business finance and funding” available across the globe [Vistage(2013)], especially in developing countries. For instance, 75% of Kenyans now have mobile banking services, while in Brazil basic banking transactions are now available at local shops [Webber (2014)].But while the ‘unbanked’ are increasingly being served in developing countries, Webber (2014) notes that inclusion in traditional banking services is becoming more problematic in the EU and US: The Alliance for Financial Inclusion, a global network of policymakers, reported that there are “58 million people in the EU without bank access and another 92 million are ‘underserved’ – having access, say, to just one bank while in the US, nearly 10 million households are believed to be outside of the formal banking system.”Increasingly, the wealthy are being relied upon to redirect investment dollars toward emerging growth companies through different types of incentives and new funding models, however understanding the new range of financial services and means of access will be ‘challenging” but important for all involved [Vistage(2013)]. In particular, understanding the important differences between the huge range of finance and funding options available – from bank lending to crowd-sourced funding to microfinance to private equity and venture capital – is a challenge, but will be fundamental for business leaders, emerging growth companies and investors as they consider their place in the economic equation. At the same time, as I have written in an earlier paper, it is also important that average working class individuals are also given the chance to take advantage of these new investment and financing opportunities [Wales(2014)].Maney (2013) says that the world is undergoing a third revolution (following on from the Neolithic Agricultural Revolution and the Industrial Revolution), and this is a very apt description. Humankind’s collective knowledge is being aggregated and disseminated and is increasingly allowing complete access to the surge of universal information and we all have the ability to connect with almost everyone on the planet [Maney(2013)]. Democratization of the capital markets with financial and investment products such as securities based crowdfunding, peer-to-peer lending (P2P), Bitcoinand more -- in parallel -- with technological advances on the Internet, social media, and the smartphone have all equally revolutionized the way that we do things. This new revolution, started in the developing world, will enable more people to access financial services in less traditional ways. These new financial opportunities, such as peer to peer (P2P) lending and bitcoin will now be discussed in turn.Dawn of a New Era: P2P and the CrowdIn recent years, peer-to-peer lending has attracted borrowers and lenders that had been displaced by the banks. The “new normal’ in this sea of change is leveraging networks of social capital, better known as “the crowd” to infuse the money needed into a company in order to start, grow or sustain its practice.According to the Small Business Administration, recovering is continuing in both “borrowing and lending conditions”, although recovery is slower for smaller firms. Unfortunately, businesses have experienced a downturn in their financial position, which has made securing funds from banks very difficult during a time of increasing financial regulation. This is reflected in a number of studies into small business lending over the last few years.The New York Federal Reserve regularly surveys small business owners regarding “their needs and experiences,” in order to gauge the credit environment, and in the. April/May 2012 survey, 544 small businesses participated. The feedback from the survey indicates that “the recent drop in lending may be due in part to weaker firms self-selecting out of the credit market”: about two- thirds of the participants did not apply for any financing, and half of these respondents did not do so because they feared their applications would be declined. Participants also reported “higher denial rates” for microloans than for loans of higher amounts, suggesting that the demand for microloans is there.Oxfam’s (2014) report into global economic inequality stated that a mere 1% of the global population controls almost half of the global wealth. Furthermore, this 1% owns $110 trillion which is 65 times the combined wealth of the “poorest 3.5 billion people,” the 85 richest people own the same as the combined total wealth of thebottom 50% of the global population, and 70% of the population reside in countries where “economic inequality has increased in the last 30 years”. These statistics emphasize the fact that there is a disproportionate amount of capital not making its way into the hands of “the crowd” as well as the difficulty of gaining access to that capital.History illustrates that during periods of radical change, it took two world wars to shift the economy [Piketty(2014)]. Now inequality is rising back to pre-1915 war levels. According to Piketty (2014), this should be counteracted via global tax on wealth or similar measures.While here we agree on the inequality rise, I submit that wealth inequality could improve naturally through advances in technology and the democratization of capital under the umbrella of “internet finance” rather than through fiscal policy alone.Globally, peer – to – peer platforms originated an estimated $70 billion in 2014. Yet, these loans only make up a small portion of the total number of small business loans [Eavis(2014)]. In the first quarter of 2014, banks lent a total of $291 billion to small businesses, according to FDIC figures, while in contrast, US P2P lending platform, Prosper Marketplace originated over $3 billion of loans on platform as of 1Q2015. As of the 2014, Peer – to – Peer Lending (Debt) originated $11 billion in loans in the U.S., $56 billion in China and $5.6 billion in Europe in 2014, respectively. These numbers are projected to double by the end of 2015.Mobile bankingMobile banking is becoming increasingly popular and its applications have the “potential to encourage financial discipline in even more effective ways”[Kendall and V oorhies (2014)] Mobile banking has three advantages over traditional banking models, which can also be translated for primary and secondary markets [Kendall and V oorhies (2014)]:—Mobile transactions are virtually free. Counter services at financial institutions make up most of the routine bank costs, however, with mobile banking, the same transactions can be made with little or no cost to the financial institutions or mobileservice providers, and by extension those servicing transactions within the primary and secondary markets.—These mobile transactions create huge amounts of data, “which banks and other providers can use to develop more profitable servers and even substitute for traditional credit scores (which can be hard for those without formal records or financial histories to obtain)”. Over time, there will be an emergence of mobile ratings agencies that will assist entrepreneurs and investors to overcome this hurdle in the primary and secondary markets.—Mobile platforms operate in real time, allowing instantaneous account information, messaging and new services sign up.Digital Currency: the case of virtual and crypto currenciesDigital currency businesses are now proliferating with $350 million invested by venture capitalist in 2014 and $230 million invested the year prior. For a moment, let’s explore how the crypto currency, Bitcoin could transform financial markets, by serving as a catalyst for capital formation, especially in underserved regions like Africa and Haiti, which are in dire need of banking facilities and access to capital and technology like blockchain is beginning to serve as the backbone infrastructure for the movement of currencies.Bitcoin is currency that can be traded internationally and anonymously, and because it is a decentralized digital currency, there are no fees, government regulation, and oversight by banks and government-backed securities [Pagliery (2014a)].Five years after its introduction, Bitcoin is among the most studied and traded financial products. Bitcoin payments occur peer-to-peer with no administrator and this cryptocurrency is now a popular form of digital currency. A number of top investors support this digital currency (including, for example, Marc Andreessen and the Winklevoss twins). Merchants see Bitcoin with favor because of its lower fees when compared with credit cards, and the fact that fees are paid by the purchaser and not by the vendor. However, Bitcoin has also been quite volatile so far and has been subject to intense scrutiny by governments.Indeed, last year the bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox, collapsed, which raised questions regarding “the security of investing in a virtual currency that isn’t regulated by governments”[Vaishampayan (2014)]. However, other players, such as SecondMarket, created a new, and more secure, bitcoin exchange and launched a Bitcoin Investment Trust.There is an excellent and potentially revolutionary opportunity to incorporate cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin into products such as crowdfunding platforms and mobile-enabled platforms that could serve the unbanked, underserved, and the emerging middle class, who represent well over 2 billion people worldwide. $90 billion a year is spent by this population on alternative services such as check cashers and payday loans [Schutte (2014)] and they struggle to obtain the financing, beyond limited microfinance opportunities, to create businesses. Creating value for this segment of the population could be very exciting if social capital and technology are leveraged properly.Bitcoin could be used for remittances, liquidity access to cash, and credit for frontier and emerging countries.ConclusionThe world is embarking upon a new economic revolution. Institutional market making may become a profession of the past as the democratization of capital is being driven more and more by retail investors. The catalyst for this phenomenon originated in the global economic recession. Unemployment, while going down, is till a problem, and interest rates remain at historic lows of almost zero percent while startup and emerging growth companies find it difficult to raise capital via traditional avenues.Start-ups are major job creators (small firms created 65% of new jobs in the US between 1993 and 2009), but they aren’t getting the funding to remain operational.2.5 billion people are unbanked [Chaia et al (2010)] while over 2 billion are living on less than $2 a day. With all of the global resources, it is hard to understand why the wealth disparity gap continues to increase in the 21st century with 1% of thepopulation controlling over 50% of the world’s wealth.On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed into legislation The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act), igniting a change to 80-year-old securities laws while spurring a changing of the guards globally and enabling the democratization of the capital markets. Technological advances such as Web 3.0, social capital, smartphones and mobile technology, and Bitcoin are fueling this economic revolution. This revolution is also known as “frictionless capitalism”, a term coined by Bill Gates in 1994, in his book, The Road Ahead, which suggests a new generation of internet companies are innovating to find ways of reducing friction within the internet economy. I will take this thought one step further and propose that the internet is becoming the new industrial network where we can connect with one another directly allowing for advances in creating “frictionless labor markets.”As these examples show, a new economic revolution has the potential to disrupt social and capital norms. Every aspect of life will be transformed due to the interrelated nature of the ecosystem because increased activity in one part of the ecosystem spurs an increase in activity in others.I conclude by arguing that all these developments, energized by the efforts of innovators and entrepreneurs, have the potential to radically transform the world in which we live, while promoting the core values of industrialized societies including democracy, capital formation, sustainability, and equality. A brave new world of business and finance, which is more equal and fairer, is just around the corner.中文译文:互联网金融:数字货币和替代金融解放资本市场摘要本文讨论了政策改革和创新的突然转变是如何解放金融市场的。
网络金融风险防范外文翻译文献

网络金融风险防范外文文献翻译(含:英文原文及中文译文)英文原文How to guard against financial risks network ProfessorKristian BehrensFirst, the definition of network finance Network Finance is a computer network for the technical support of the financial activities and related activities in general, is a network of information technology and product of the combination of modern finance, but it is not a simple combination of the two, but a financial industry and even all industries An operating mechanism, is the future of enterprise system development. Narrowly understood, refers to the financial network of financial service providers based on the host to the Internet or communications network for the media, through the financial data and business processes embedded software platform, user interface terminal mode of operation of the new financial ; from a broad understanding of the concept of network finance their mode of operation also includes matching network of financial institutions, networks and related financial markets, regulatory and other external environment. Including: e-money, online banking, online payment, network security and network insurance. Second, the network of financial riskNetwork mainly engaged in the financial settlement of electronicmoney and electronic virtual financial services, in addition to traditional financial activities which exist in the process of credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, currency risk and market risk, from a technical, business and legal perspective, There are the following specific risks:1. Technology risk(1) hacker attacks. The operation of the network must rely on financial transactions, computer and Internet, all transactions are stored in the computer, the transmission of online information is easy to become a large network of "hacker" attack. In addition, Web access is a form of Internet service, is also a network of financial institutions trading and services platform, but it depends on TCP / IP protocol, there are many security vulnerabilities. This gives hackers broke into financial institutions through the network to create the conditions for the system. Hackers only need to use loopholes in the system itself, "only need to modify a few settings " you can allow financial institutions to a standstill.(2) technology selection risk. To carry out financial business networks, they must choose a proven technology solutions to support. Once there is choice, there will be a result of selection for the same mistakes which led to the risk. One possibility is to choose the technology system and client terminal software compatibility due to poor speed of information transmission interruption or reduction, another risk is that of technical alternatives have been eliminated, resulting in relativelybackward technology, the network out of date, leading to enormous technical and Loss of business opportunities. Financial terms of the network, technology choice may lose all of the market failure, or even lose the basis for survival.2. Business risks.(1) operational risk. Operational risk from the system reliability, stability and security caused major defects in the possibility of potential loss may come from the negligence of online financial customers, may also come from the financial security system network and its products, design flaws and operational errors . Operational risk relates primarily to authorize the use of online financial accounts, the network of financial risk management systems, networks, financial institutions and the exchange of information among customers, true and false recognition of electronic money. (2) the risk of market signals. Market risk is due to signal asymmetric information network of financial institutions led to the face of adverse selection and moral hazard arising from business risks. Such as Internet banking customers can not identify the risk level of the Internet at a disadvantage, online customers may use their hidden information and action to make the network to their advantage at the expense of the interests of the decision-making banks and leaving because of adverse public comment on Internet Banking Risk of losing customers and sources of funding risks. (3) credit risk. Reputation risk isthe network of financial institutions can not create good customer relations, can not establish their own good reputation, and thus can not engage in financial business. Once the virtual network of financial institutions to provide financial services can not achieve the expected level of the public, or adverse reactions in the community, or network security system of financial institutions have been destroyed to form a network of financial credit risk.3. Legal risks. The legal risks of financial networks, mainly from two aspects: First, violation of relevant laws, regulations and system requirements, and online transactions failed to comply with the provisions of the relevant rights and obligations. These laws and regulations, including consumer protection laws, financial disclosure system, privacy protection, intellectual property protection law and currency system. Second, the lack of network financial law. China Internet Finance still in its infancy, is still quite a lack of appropriate laws and regulations. Therefore, using the Internet to provide or receive financial services, signed an economic contract rights and obligations in the face considerable legal risk, vulnerable to undue disputes, not only increase the cost of online financial transactions, and even affect the Development of the financial health of the network.Third, improve the network to prevent and control financial risksPoint of the network of financial risks, involving a wide range ofinterests, it is necessary to perfect legal environment, strengthening access management, a sound regulatory system, adjust the regulatory strategy and other aspects, a multi-pronged, comprehensive treatment.1. Improve the legal system.(1) legislative efforts to increase the network of financial, clear the network of financial rights and obligations of relevant subjects.(2) to develop rules of fair trade network. In the identification and validation of digital signatures, transactions preservation of evidence, the transaction and both parties share responsibility for the protection of personal information of consumers to make detailed provisions to ensure transaction security, digital evidence when disputes arise and transactions in a real and effective personal Privacy.2. Enhanced market access management.(1) The status of the technology infrastructure as one of the conditions of market access. Financial services applications for operating the network of financial institutions not only a considerable scale of network equipment, but also need to have confirmed the legality of trading partners, to prevent tampering with trading information and prevent information leakage and other aspects of key technologies. (2) to develop rigorous internal control system. Publicity for the network of financial services, information disclosure, and system design have institutional arrangements, the establishment of a network of financialinstitutions or a new business, the must have sound risk identification, identification, management, risk cover and disposal programs.(3) to develop and improve the types of transactions operating procedures. Applications to open accounts for customers, customer authorization statement, the general development of trading procedures, rules to prevent illegal trading and online financial transaction system against criminal activities.(4) the implementation of the network type of financial business management. Development of classification standards, banking and financial services capabilities and the ability to credit rating, thus a variety of services on the network to carry out the financial restrictions and permits.3. Improve the regulatory system.(1) improve the network of financial risk monitoring systems. The establishment of "national (network) Financial Risk Management Committee."(2) to strengthen collaborative supervision. "Committee" of the member units and other relevant regulatory authorities to share information resources among each other and opening up their own information database, and regularly informed of their supervision, promote joint supervision, supervision of financial risks to improve network accuracy and timeliness.(3) to strengthen international cooperation in financial supervision network. Meanwhile, the network with international cooperation in financial supervision to strengthen the network of bank borrowing way illegal tax evasion, money laundering and other acts, the way the use of Internet banking transnational smuggling, illegal arms trafficking activities such as arms and drug trafficking, illegal attack on the use of Internet banking other sites internet bank hackers, and other international criminal activities a full range of monitoring, the formation of the network can effectively protect the financial health of the global network operations and is responsible for the supervision of the financial system.4. Adjust the control strategy.(1) and improve the modernization level of financial supervision network. In the practice, we should have complete control of the network of financial institutions to improve the business operation of the network capacity and the forecast level of financial risk, and enhance macro-control of the systematic and forward-looking, but also to strengthen financial supervision and standardization of network construction, improve the network of financial supervision modern and scientific level.(2) improve the network of financial and non-site inspection of the site content system. On-site inspection should focus on the technical elements to be checked. (3) the establishment of mandatory informationdisclosure system. Follow the "open, fair and just" principle, development of financial services than the traditional more stringent information disclosure rules, norms, disclosure of the content, format, frequency and responsibilities and so on, through the financial statements, disclosure of the online publicity and other means of financial networks business information. (4) Innovative forms of regulation. Take full advantage of information superiority, the establishment of real-time tracking and monitoring systems, strengthen monitoring, while also taking on the network "rules, patrol checks," the way the operational status of the network and whether the financial "irregularities" carry out spot checks found that, in a timely manner to correct or take punitive measures.5. Building security system.(1) accelerate research and development with China's own intellectual property rights of advanced information technology. Including computer equipment, communications equipment, system software, encryption algorithms, from the protection of national financial security and national economic security perspective to improve network security.(2) improving the network operating environment. Computer networks and centers to strengthen the management of the engine room, increase physical security measures for computer input, and enhance computer systems of key technologies and key equipment against attacks, anti-virus capabilities, maintenance of computer hardware security,ensure network banks rely on network hardware The normal operation of the environment safe.(3) secure access. On the one hand through the network of physical and logical isolation means isolation, and physical resources to unauthorized users isolated from each other, on the other hand through the application of the authentication and grading systems such as login authorization to restrict access to unauthorized users.中文译文网络金融风险防范克里斯蒂安·贝伦斯网络金融的定义网络金融是计算机网络对于金融活动和相关活动的技术支持一般,是信息技术与现代金融相结合的产物,但它不是简单的组合这两个,但一个金融业乃至所有行业的一个运营机制,是企业系统发展的未来。
互联网大数据金融中英文对照外文翻译文献

互联网大数据金融中英文对照外文翻译文献互联网大数据金融中英文对照外文翻译文献(文档含英文原文和中文翻译)原文:Internet Finance's Impact on Traditional FinanceAbstractAs the advances in modern information and Internet technology, especially the develop of cloud computing, big data, mobile Internet, search engines and social networks, profoundly change, even subvert many traditional industries, and the financial industry is no exception. In recent years, financial industry has become the most far-reaching area influenced by Internet, after commercial distribution and the media. Many Internet-based financial service models have emerged, and have had a profound and huge impact on traditional financial industries. "Internet-Finance" has win the focus of public attention.Internet-Finance is low cost, high efficiency, and pays more attention to the user experience, and these features enable it to fully meet the special needs of traditional "long tail financial market", to flexibly provide more convenient and efficient financial services and diversified financial products, to greatly expand the scope anddepth of financial services, to shorten the distance between people space and time, and to establish a new financial environment, which effectively integrate and take use of fragmented time, information, capital and other scattered resources, then add up to form a scale, and grow a new profit point for various financial institutions. Moreover, with thecontinuous penetration and integration in traditional financial field, Internet-Finance will bring new challenges, but also opportunities to the traditional. It contribute to the transformation of the traditional commercial banks, compensate for the lack of efficiency in funding process and information integration, and provide new distribution channels for securities, insurance, funds and other financial products. For many SMEs, Internet-Finance extend their financing channels, reduce their financing threshold, and improve their efficiency in using funds. However, the cross-industry nature of the Internet Finance determines its risk factors are more complex, sensitive and varied, and therefore we must properly handle the relationship between innovative development and market regulation, industry self-regulation.Key Words:Internet Finance; Commercial Banks; Effects; Regulatory1 IntroductionThe continuous development of Internet technology, cloud computing, big data, a growing number of Internet applications such as social networks for the business development of traditional industry provides a strong support, the level of penetration of the Internet on the traditional industry. The end of the 20th century, Microsoft chairman Bill Gates, who declared, "the traditional commercial bank will become the new century dinosaur". Nowadays, with the development of the Internet electronic information technology, we really felt this trend, mobile payment, electronic bank already occupies the important position in our daily life.Due to the concept of the Internet financial almost entirely from the business practices, therefore the present study focusedon the discussion. Internet financial specific mode, and the influence of traditional financial industry analysis and counter measures are lack of systemic research. Internet has always been a key battleground in risk investment, and financial industry is the thinking mode of innovative experimental various business models emerge in endlessly, so it is difficult to use afixed set of thinking to classification and definition. The mutual penetration and integration of Internet and financial, is a reflection of technical development and market rules requirements, is an irreversible trend. The Internet bring traditional financial is not only a low cost and high efficiency, more is a kind of innovative thinking mode and unremitting pursuit of the user experience. The traditional financial industry to actively respond to. Internet financial, for such a vast blue ocean enough to change the world, it is very worthy of attention to straighten out its development, from the existing business model to its development prospects."Internet financial" belongs to the latest formats form, discusses the Internet financial research of literature, but the lack of systemic and more practical. So this article according to the characteristics of the Internet industry practical stronger, the several business models on the market for summary analysis, and the traditional financial industry how to actively respond to the Internet wave of financial analysis and Suggestions are given, with strong practical significance.2 Internet financial backgroundInternet financial platform based on Internet resources, on the basis of the big data and cloud computing new financial model. Internet finance with the help of the Internet technology, mobile communication technology to realize financing, paymentand information intermediary business, is a traditional industry and modern information technology represented by the Internet, mobile payment, cloud computing, data mining, search engines and social networks, etc.) Produced by the combination of emerging field. Whether financial or the Internet, the Internet is just the difference on the strategic, there is no strict definition of distinction. As the financial and the mutual penetration and integration of the Internet, the Internet financial can refer all through the Internet technology to realize the financing behavior. Internet financial is the Internet and the traditional financial product of mutual infiltration and fusion, the new financial model has a profound background. The emergence of the Internet financial is a craving for cost reduction is the result of the financial subject, is also inseparable from the rapid development of modern information technology to provide technical support.2.1 Demands factorsTraditional financial markets there are serious information asymmetry, greatly improve the transaction risk. Exhibition gradually changed people's spending habits, more and more high to the requirement of service efficiency and experience; In addition, rising operating costs, to stimulate the financial main body's thirst for financial innovation and reform; This pulled by demand factors, become the Internet financial produce powerful inner driving force.2.2 Supply driving factorData mining, cloud computing and Internet search engines, such as the development of technology, financial and institutional technology platform. Innovation, enterprise profit-driven mixed management, etc., for the transformation of traditional industry and Internet companies offered financialsector penetration may, for the birth and development of the Internet financial external technical support, become a kind of externalization of constitution. In the Internet "openness, equality, cooperation, share" platform, third-party financing and payment, online investment finance, credit evaluation model, not only makes the traditional pattern of financial markets will be great changes have taken place, and modern information technology is more easily to serve various financial entities. For the traditional financial institutions, especially in the banking, securities and insurance institutions, more opportunities than the crisis, development is better than a challenge.3 Internet financial constitute the main body3.1 Capital providersBetween Internet financial comprehensive, its capital providers include not only the traditional financial institutions, including penetrating into the Internet. In terms of the current market structure, the traditional financial sector mainly include commercial Banks, securities, insurance, fund and small loan companies, mainly includes the part of the Internet companies and emerging subject, such as the amazon, and some channels on Internet for the company. These companies is not only the providers of capital market, but also too many traditional so-called "low net worth clients" suppliers of funds into the market. In operation form, the former mainlythrough the Internet, to the traditional business externalization, the latter mainly through Internet channels to penetrate business, both externalization and penetration, both through the Internet channel to achieve the financial business innovation and reform.3.2 Capital demandersInternet financial mode of capital demanders although there is no breakthrough in the traditional government, enterprise and individual, but on the benefit has greatly changed. In the rise and development of the Internet financial, especially Internet companies to enter the threshold of made in the traditional financial institutions, relatively weak groups and individual demanders, have a more convenient and efficient access to capital. As a result, the Internet brought about by the universality and inclusive financial better than the previous traditional financial pattern.3.3 IntermediariesInternet financial rely on efficient and convenient information technology, greatly reduces the financial markets is the wrong information. Docking directly through Internet, according to both parties, transaction cost is greatly reduced, so the Internet finance main body for the dependence of the intermediary institutions decreased significantly, but does not mean that the Internet financial markets, there is no intermediary institutions. In terms of the development of the Internet financial situation at present stage, the third-party payment platform plays an intermediary role in this field, not only ACTS as a financial settlement platform, but also to the capital supply and demand of the integration of upstream and downstream link multi-faceted, in meet the funds to pay at the same time, have the effect of capital allocation. Especially in the field of electronic commerce, this function is more obvious.3.4 Large financial dataBig financial data collection refers to the vast amounts of unstructured data, through the study of the depth of its mining and real-time analysis, grasp the customer's trading information,consumption habits and consumption information, and predict customer behavior and make the relevant financial institutions in the product design, precise marketing and greatly improve the efficiency of risk management, etc.Financial services platform based on the large data mainly refers to with vast trading data of the electronic commerce enterprise's financial services. The key to the big data from a large number of chaotic ability to rapidly gaining valuable information in the data, or from big data assets liquidation ability quickly. Big data information processing, therefore, often together with cloud computing.4 Global economic issuesFOR much of the past year the fast-growing economies of the emerging world watched the Western financial hurricane from afar. Their own banks held few of the mortgage-based assets that undi d the rich world’s financial firms. Commodity exporters were thriving, thanks to high prices fo r raw materials. China’s economic juggernaut powered on. And, from Budapest to Brasília, an abundance of credit fuelled domestic demand. Even as talk mounted of the rich world suffering its worst financial collapse since the Depression, emerging economies seemed a long way from the centre of the storm.No longer. As foreign capital has fled and confidence evaporated, the emerging world’s stockmarkets have plunged (in some cases losing half their value) and currencies tumbled. The seizure in the credit market caused havoc, as foreign banks abruptly stopped lending and stepped back from even the most basic banking services, including trade credits.Like their rich-world counterparts, governments are battling to limit the damage (see article). That is easiest for those withlarge foreign-exchange reserves. Russia is spending $220 billion to shore up its financial services industry. South Korea has guaranteed $100 bill ion of its banks’ debt. Less well-endowed countries are asking for help.Hungary has secured a EURO5 billion ($6.6 billion) lifeline from the European Central Bank and is negotiating a loan from the IMF, as is Ukraine. Close to a dozen countries are talking to the fund about financial help.Those with long-standing problems are being driven to desperatemeasures. Argentina is nationalising its private pension funds, seemingly to stave off default (see article). But even stalwarts are looking weaker. Figures released this week showed that China’s growth slowed to 9% in the year to the third quarter-still a rapid pace but a lot slower than the double-digit rates of recent years.The various emerging economies are in different states of readiness, but the cumulative impact of all this will be enormous. Most obviously, how these countries fare will determine whether the world economy faces a mild recession or something nastier. Emerging economies accounted for around three-quarters of global growth over the past 18 months. But their economic fate will also have political consequences.In many places-eastern Europe is one example (see article)-financial turmoil is hitting weak governments. But even strong regimes could suffer. Some experts think that China needs growth of 7% a year to contain social unrest. More generally, the coming strife will shape the debate about the integration of the world economy. Unlike many previous emerging-market crises, today’s mess spread from the rich world, largely thanks to increasingly integrated capital markets. If emerging economiescollapse-either into a currency crisis or a sharp recession-there will be yet more questioning of the wisdom of globalised finance.Fortunately, the picture is not universally dire. All emerging economies will slow. Some will surely face deep recessions. But many are facing the present danger in stronger shape than ever before, armed with large reserves, flexible currencies and strong budgets. Good policy-both at home and in the rich world-can yet avoid a catastrophe.One reason for hope is that the direct economic fallout from the rich world’s d isaster is manageable. Falling demand in America and Europe hurts exports, particularly in Asia and Mexico. Commodity prices have fallen: oil is down nearly 60% from its peak and many crops and metalshave done worse. That has a mixed effect. Although it hurts commodity-exporters from Russia to South America, it helps commodity importers in Asia and reduces inflation fears everywhere. Countries like Venezuela that have been run badly are vulnerable (see article), but given the scale of the past boom, the commodity bust so far seems unlikely to cause widespread crises.The more dangerous shock is financial. Wealth is being squeezed as asset prices decline. China’s house prices, for instance, have started falling (see article). This will dampen domestic confidence, even though consumers are much less indebted than they are in the rich world. Elsewhere, the sudden dearth of foreign-bank lending and the flight of hedge funds and other investors from bond markets has slammed the brakes on credit growth. And just as booming credit once underpinned strong domestic spending, so tighter credit will mean slower growth.Again, the impact will differ by country. Thanks to huge current-account surpluses in China and the oil-exporters in the Gulf, emerging economies as a group still send capital to the rich world. But over 80 have deficits of more than 5% of GDP. Most of these are poor countries that live off foreign aid; but some larger ones rely on private capital. For the likes of Turkey and South Africa a sudden slowing in foreign financing would force a dramatic adjustment. A particular worry is eastern Europe, where many countries have double-digit deficits. In addition, even some countries with surpluses, such as Russia, have banks that have grown accustomed to easy foreign lending because of the integration of global finance. The rich world’s bank bail-outs may limit the squeeze, but the flow of capital to the emerging world will slow. The Institute of International Finance, a bankers’ group, expects a 30% decline in net flows of private capital from last year.This credit crunch will be grim, but most emerging markets can avoidcatastrophe. The biggest ones are in relatively good shape. The more vulnerable ones can (and should) be helped.Among the giants, China is in a league of its own, with a $2 trillion arsenal of reserves, a current-account surplus, little connection to foreign banks and a budget surplus that offers lots of room to boost spending. Since the country’s leaders have made clear that they will do whatev er it takes to cushion growth, China’s economy is likely to slow-perhaps to 8%-but not collapse. Although that is not enough to save the world economy, such growth in China would put a floor under commodity prices and help other countries in the emerging world.The other large economies will be harder hit, but should beable to weather the storm. India has a big budget deficit and many Brazilian firms have a large foreign-currency exposure. But Brazil’s economy is diversified and both countries have plenty of reserves to smooth the shift to slower growth. With $550 billion of reserves, Russia ought to be able to stop a run on the rouble. In the short-term at least, the most vulnerable countries are all smaller ones.There will be pain as tighter credit forces adjustments. But sensible, speedy international assistance would make a big difference. Several emerging countries have asked America’s Federal Reserve for liquidity support; some hope that China will bail them out. A better route is surely the IMF, which has huge expertise and some $250 billion to lend. Sadly, borrowing from the fund carries a stigma. That needs to change. The IMF should develop quicker, more flexible financial instruments and minimise the conditions it attaches to loans. Over the past month deft policymaking saw off calamity in the rich world. Now it is time for something similar in the emerging world.5 ConclusionsInternet financial model can produce not only huge social benefit, lowertransaction costs, provide higher than the existing direct and indirect financing efficiency of the allocation of resources, to provide power for economic development, will also be able to use the Internet and its related software technology played down the traditional finance specialized division of labor, makes the financial participants more mass popularization, risk pricing term matching complex transactions, tend to be simple. Because of the Internet financial involved in the field are mainly concentrated in the field of traditional financial institutions to the currentdevelopment is not thorough, namely traditional financial "long tail" market, can complement with the original traditional financial business situation, so in the short term the Internet finance from the Angle of the size of the market will not make a big impact to the traditional financial institutions, but the Internet financial business model, innovative ideas, and its apparent high efficiency for the traditional financial institutions brought greater impact on the concept, also led to the traditional financial institutions to further accelerate the mutual penetration and integration with the Internet.译文:互联网金融对传统金融的影响作者:罗萨米;拉夫雷特摘要网络的发展,深刻地改变甚至颠覆了许多传统行业,金融业也不例外。
网络借贷英语作文

网络借贷英语作文P2P Lending: A New Way to Invest and Borrow Money。
With the development of technology and the Internet, many industries have been transformed, and finance is no exception. One of the latest innovations in the financial sector is peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, which allows individuals to lend and borrow money directly from each other through online platforms.P2P lending is a form of crowdfunding where borrowers can obtain loans without going through traditional financial institutions such as banks. Instead, they can connect with individual investors who are willing to lend money and earn interest on their investment. P2P lending platforms act as intermediaries, matching borrowers with investors and managing the loan process.There are many benefits to P2P lending for both borrowers and investors. For borrowers, P2P lending offersa faster and more convenient way to obtain loans than traditional banks. The application process is usually online and can be completed in a matter of minutes, and borrowers can receive funds within a few days. P2P lending platforms also offer more flexible loan terms and lower interest rates than traditional banks, making it easier for borrowers to repay their loans.For investors, P2P lending offers the opportunity to earn higher returns than traditional savings accounts or CDs. Investors can choose which loans to invest in based on the borrower's creditworthiness and the interest rate offered. P2P lending platforms also offer diversification, allowing investors to spread their money across multiple loans to reduce risk.However, there are also risks associated with P2P lending. Borrowers may default on their loans, causing investors to lose their money. P2P lending platforms may also go bankrupt, leaving investors with no way to recover their funds. Therefore, it is important for investors to carefully research and choose reputable P2P lendingplatforms and diversify their investments.In conclusion, P2P lending is a new and exciting way to invest and borrow money. It offers many benefits over traditional banking, such as faster and more convenient loan processing, flexible loan terms, and higher returnsfor investors. However, it is important to be aware of the risks involved and to carefully research and choose reputable P2P lending platforms.。
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文献信息:文献标题:Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending(点对点(P2P)网络借贷的信用风险与贷款绩效评估)国外作者:Riza Emekter, Yanbin Tu, Benjamas Jirasakuldech, Min Lu 文献出处:《Applied Economics》, 2015, 47(1):54-70字数统计:英文3063单词,15818字符;中文5110汉字外文文献:Evaluating credit risk and loan performance in onlinePeer-to-Peer (P2P) lendingAbstract Online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending has emerged recently. This micro loan market could offer certain benefits to both borrowers and lenders. Using data from the Lending Club, which is one of the popular online P2P lending houses, this article explores the P2P loan characteristics, evaluates their credit risk and measures loan performances. We find that credit grade, debt-to-income ratio, FICO score and revolving line utilization play an important role in loan defaults. Loans with lower credit grade and longer duration are associated with high mortality rate. The result is consistent with the Cox Proportional Hazard test which suggests that the hazard rate or the likelihood of the loan default increases with the credit risk of the borrowers. Finally, we find that higher interest rates charged on the highrisk borrowers are not enough to compensate for higher probability of the loan default. The Lending Club must find ways to attract high FICO score and high-income borrowers in order to sustain their businesses.Key words: Peer-to-Peer lending; credit grade; FICO score; default riskI.IntroductionWith the advent of Web 2.0, it has become easy to create online markets and virtual communities with convenient accessibility and strong collaboration.One of the emerging Web 2.0 applications is the online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending marketplaces, where both lenders and borrowers can virtually meet for loan transactions. Such marketplaces provide a platform service of introducing borrowers to lenders, which can offer some advantages for both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers can get micro loans directly from lenders, and might pay lower rates than commercial credit alternatives. On the other hand, lenders can earn higher rates of return compared to any other type of lending such as corporate bonds, bank deposits or certificate of deposits. One of the problems in online P2P lending is information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender. That is, the lender does not know the borrower's credibility as well as the borrower does. Such information asymmetry might result in adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) and moral hazard (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Theoretically, some of these problems can be alleviated by regular monitoring, but this approach poses a challenge in the online environment because the borrowers and the buyers do not physically meet. Fostering and enhancing the lender's trust in the borrower can also be implemented to mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In the traditional bank-lending markets, banks can use collateral, certified accounts, regular reporting, and even presence of the board of directors to enhance the trust in the borrower. However, such mechanisms are difficult to implement in the online environment which will incur a significant transaction cost.To reduce lending risks associated with information asymmetry, current online P2P lending has the following arrangements. First, the Lending Club screens out any potential high-risk borrowers based on the FICO score. The minimum FICO score to be able to participate is 640. Second, the typical size of the loans produced in this market is small, which is under $35 000 at the Lending Club. Therefore, these loans are essentially microloans which pose a relatively small loss in case of default. Third, the market maker offers matchmaking systems which can be used to generate portfolio recommendations and minimize lending risks. Fourth, if a borrower fails to pay, the market maker will report the case to a credit agency and hire a collectionagency to collect the funds on behalf of the lender. Although there are certain structures imposed in the online P2P that help to minimize the risk, this form of lending is inherently associated with greater amount of risk compared to the traditional lending.The purpose of this article is to evaluate the credit risk of borrowers from one of the largest P2P platforms in the United States provided by the Lending Club, which help lenders to make more informed decisions about the risk and return efficiency of loans based on the borrowers' grade. There are two related research questions this article will address: (1) What are some of the borrowers' characteristics that help determine the default risk? and (2) Is the higher return generated from the riskier borrower large enough to compensate for the incremental risk? Lenders can allocate their investments more efficiently if they know what characteristics of the borrower affect the default risk. Each borrower is classified by credit grade with corresponding borrowing rate assigned by the Lending Club. To make an efficient allocation, a lender should know whether the higher interest rates set for high-risk borrowers are sufficient to compensate the lenders for the higher probabilities of a potential loss.Our findings suggest that borrowers with high FICO score, high credit grade, low revolving line utilization and low debt-to-income ratio are associated with low default risk. This finding is consistent with the studies by Duarte et al. (2012) who report that borrowers with a trustworthy characteristic will have better credit scores but low probability of default. This result also suggests that besides the loan applicants' social ties and friendship as reported by Freedman and Jin (2014) and Lin et al. (2013), the four factors discussed above are also important in explaining the default risk. When comparing with US national borrowers, the results show that the Lending Club should continue to screen out the borrowers with lower FICO score and attract the highest FICO score borrowers in order to significantly reduce the default risk. In relating the risk to the return, it shows that higher interest rate charged for the riskier borrower is not significant enough to justify the higher default probability. Our finding here is consistent with the study by Berkovich (2011) who reports that high quality loans offer excess return.II.Literature ReviewThree main streams of research have emerged in response to the growing popularity of P2P lending. The first stream of research examines the reasons for the emergence of online P2P lending. The second stream of research focuses on determining the factors that explain the funding success and default risk. The last stream of research investigates the performance of online P2P loan for a given level of the risk.Peer group lending has been emerging in local communities and has attracted the research in this area. Conlin (1999) develops a model to explain the existence of peer group micro-lending programmes in the United States and Canada. He finds that peer groups enable fixed costs to be imposed on the entrepreneurs while minimizing the programme's overhead costs. Ashta and Assadi (2008) investigate whether Web 2.0 techniques are integrated to support the advanced social interactions and associations with lower costs for P2P lending. Hulme and Wright (2006) study a case of online P2P lending house, Zopa, in the United Kingdom. They suggest that the emergence of online P2P lending is a direct response to social trends and a demand for new forms of relationship in financial sector under the new information age.There is extant literature that identifies the factors determining the funding success and default risk. Using the Canadian micro-credit data, Gomez and Santor (2003) find that group lending offers lower default rates than conventional individual lending does. Study by Iyer et al. (2009) shows that lenders can evaluate one third of credit risk using both hard and soft data about the borrower. Lin et al. (2013) analyse the role of social connections in evaluating credit risk and discover that strong social networking relationship is an important factor that determines the borrowing success and lower default risk. Lin et al. (2013) further report that applicants' friendship could increase the probability of successful funding, lower interest rates on funded loans, and these borrowers are associated with lower ex post default rates at Prosper. The importance of social ties in determining loans funded is also examined by Freedman and Jin (2014). The result shows that borrowers with social ties are more likely tohave their loans funded and receive lower interest rates. However, they also find evidence of risks to lenders regarding borrower participation in social networks.Several other studies examine whether certain borrowers' characteristics and personal information determine the success of loan funding and default risk. Herzenstein et al. (2008) show that borrowers' financial strength, their listing and publicizing efforts, and demographic attributes affect likelihood of funding success. Study by Duarte et al. (2012) further argues that borrowers who appear more trustworthy have better credit score with higher probabilities of having their loans funded and default less often. Larrimore et al. (2011) demonstrate that borrowers who use extended narratives, concrete descriptions and quantitative words have positive impact on funding success. However, humanizing personal details or loan justifi cations have negative influences on funding success. Qiu et al. (2012) further reveal that in addition to personal information and social capital, other variables, including loan amount, acceptable maximum interest rate and loan period set by borrowers, significantly influence the funding success or failure.Galak et al. (2011) further show that lenders tend to favour individual over group borrowers and borrowers who are socially proximate to themselves. They also find that lenders prefer the borrowers who are more like themselves in terms of gender, occupation and first name initial. More interestingly, Gonzalez and Loureiro (2014) have similar findings: (1) when perceived age represents competence, attractiveness has no effect on loan success; (2) when lenders and borrowers are of the same gender, attractiveness might lead to a loan failure (i.e., the ‘beauty is beastly' effect) and (3) loan success is sensitive to the relative age and attractiveness of lenders and borrowers. Herzenstein et al. (2011) find that herding in the loan auction is positively related to its subsequent performance, that is whether borrowers pay the money back on time.III.DataIn this section, the loan applicants' data is first described, followed by loan distribution based on loan purposes, credit grade and loan status and it ends with thedetailed descriptive statistics of the loan applicants. This study uses 61 451 loan applications in the Lending Club from May 2007 to June 2012 obtained from . Over the study period, the Lending Club lent about $713 million to borrowers. To address the borrowers' behaviour in online P2P lending, we first examine the main reasons for borrowing money from others. Table 1 lists the borrowers' self-claimed reasons summarized in the Lending Club. Almost 70% of loan requested are related to debt consolidation or credit card debts with a total loan amount requested of approximately $387 million and $108 million, respectively. The number of loan applications for education, renewable energy and vacation contribute less than 1% of total loans with the total loan requested ranging from 1 to 3 million. The borrowers state that their preferences to borrow from the Lending Club are lower borrowing rate and inability to borrow enough money from credit cards. The second purpose for borrowing is to pay home mortgage or to re-model home.Table 1. Loan distributions by loan purpose (May 2007–June 2012)Notes: The data is obtained from 61 451 loan applicants in the Lending Club, , from May 2007 to June 2012.The loan-seeking persons are asked to provide the reasons for requesting loans.The Lending Club uses the borrower's FICO credit scores along with other information to assign a loan credit grade ranging from A1 to G5 in descending credit ranks to each loan. The detailed procedure is as follows: after assigning a base score based on FICO ratings, the Lending Club makes some adjustments depending on requested loan amount, number of recent credit inquiries, credit history length, total open credit account, currently open credit accounts and revolving line utilization todetermine the final grade, which in turn determines the interest rate on the loan.Table 2 reports the loan distribution by credit grade. The majority of borrowing requests have grades between A1 and E5. The Highest loan amounts requested are from borrowers with ‘B' credit grade, which contribute 29.56% of total amount of loans requested. The total number of applicants for this ‘B' credit grade group is 18 707, which represents total loans of approximately $210 million. The lowest loan amounts requested are from borrowers with the lowest ‘G' credit grade which accounts for 1.53% of total loans. There are only 608 loan applicants for this lowest credit rating ‘G' group and it represents approximately $11 million in total loan value. According to the Lending Club's policy, a loan credit grade is used to determine the interest rate and the maximum amount of money that a borrower can request. The higher the loan grade, the lower the interest rate. A borrowing request with a low grade renders a higher interest rate as a compensation for a high risk held by lenders. Table 2. Loans distribution by credit grades (May 2007–June 2012)Notes: The Lending Club uses the borrowers’ FICO credit scores along with other information to classify a loan from Grade A1 to G5 in descending credit risk. Therefore, A1 credit grade represents the highest credit quality/low-risk borrowers, whereas G5 credit grade represents the lowest credit quality/ high-risk borrowers. Total amount of loans requested as a percentage of total loan is 19.35% for credit grade group ‘A’, 29.56% for ‘B’, 19.94% for ‘C’, 14.84% for ‘D’, 10.15% for ‘E’, 4.59% for ‘F’ and 1.53% for ‘G’.Finally, Panel A of Table 3 shows the loan status for all the loan requests on 20 July 2012. Overall, the default rate is 4.60% with total losses of approximately $29 million. Another 2.45% of total loan requests which constitute $18.6 million could be potentially lost because the borrowers are late in making payment within 30 days or 120 days and not paying the normal instalments. 17.98% of the loans are fully paid with an approximate value of $108 million. The $557 million loans are in current status account for 74.91% of total loans. Naturally, loans with a lower grade demonstrate a higher default rate. Therefore, study on risk management on P2P lending is relevant for the lenders to optimize their investment portfolios. Panel B of Table 3 reports the loan status for the matured loans. The overall loss rate is much higher for matured loans. Among 4904 matured loans, 914 loans are charged-off, which represent 18.6%. The total loss is $5.5 million which represents 13% of all matured loans amount. Less than 1% of the matured loans are late in terms of making payment with the unpaid balance of approximately $27 000. 80.77% or $33 million of matured loans are fully paid.Table 3. Loan distribution by the loan status (May 2007–June 2012)Table 4 reports the general characteristics and credit history of the online P2P loan applicants from the Lending Club. Based on our sample of 61 451 loanapplicants, the average monthly interest charged on a loan is 12.34%. On average, 471 days passed from the issue date of the loan. The average credit grade of a borrower is 25, which corresponds to credit category between B and C. The average size of a typical loan is $11 604 and the average monthly payment is $351. The borrower in general pays back $4384 a month and has $7873 left to be paid. The average ratio of the remaining balance to total loans is 63%.Examining the borrowers' characteristics, it shows that the mean income of a borrower from the Lending Club is $5796 with the debts to income ratio of 0.1381. On average, a borrower has 9.56 open credit lines and 22 total credit lines, carries $14 315 average revolving credit balance and almost half (51.6%) of his or her credit limit. In the last six months, there is 1 credit inquiry requested by an average borrower. Average FICO score category of a typical borrower is 3.48, which corresponds to a FICO score between 680 and 750.Table 4. Descriptive statistics (May 2007–June 2012)Notes: Credit Grade is the grade assigned by the Lending Club based on the FICOrano credit rating information along with other information. Credit Grade ‘1’ is the loan category of ‘G’ which is the riskiest class of loans. Credit Grade ‘7’ is the loan category of ‘A’ which is the lowest risk borrowers. FICOrano is the credit rating of the borrowers rated by credit card companies. FICO 6 corresponds to borrowers with the FICO score above 780, FICO 5 corresponds to FICO score between 750–779, FICO 4 = 714–749, FICO 3 = 679–713, FICO 2 = 660–678 and FICO 1 = 640–659, respectively.IV.ConclusionsCredit risk is an important concern for the P2P loans. This study employs the data from the Lending Club to evaluate the credit risk of the P2P online loans. We findthat credit score, debt-to-income ratio, FICO score and revolving line utilization play an important role in determining loan default. The credit categorization used by the Lending Club successfully predicts the default probability with one exception of next lowest credit grade ‘F'. In general, higher credit grade loan is associated with lower default risk.The mortality risk also increases with the maturity of the loans. Loans with lower credit grade and longer duration are associated with high mortality rate. The Cox Proportional Hazard Test results show that as the credit risk of the borrowers increases, so does the likelihood of loan being default. However, the higher interest rate currently charged for the riskier borrower is not significant enough to justify the higher default probability. This suggests that the lenders would be better off to lend only to the safest borrowers in the highest grade category of 7 or Grade A. Increasing spreads on riskier borrower may lead to a more severe adverse selection resulting in higher default risk.The Lending Club lenders should either extend credits only to the highest grade borrower or try to find more creative ways to lower the default rate among current borrowers. When comparing with the US national consumers, borrowers with relatively higher income and potentially higher FICO scores do not participate in the P2P market. Creating incentives to attract these types of borrowers would have a significant potential to decrease the default risk in this market.中文译文:点对点(P2P)网络借贷的信用风险与贷款绩效评估摘要近年来点对点(P2P)网络借贷开始兴起。