95 Audit Committee Composition and Auditor Reporting
2018年美国注册会计师USCPA考试内容要更新,备考学习千万别错了
2018年美国注册会计师USCPA考试内容要更新，备考学习千万别错了根据AICPA协会发布的《USCPA-Exam-Blueprints》（2018年1月1日实行），2018年美国注册会计师USCPA考试内容有变化，下面小编整理了关于四个考试科目在2018年的具体变化及备考复习建议。
审计与鉴证（AUD）蓝图：在2018年“蓝图”中AUD科目有添加或删除新内容。
不过，修订了一个内容组和12个代表性任务，以反映SAS 130中的术语变化，这是对财务报表内部控制的审计，与财务报表审计相结合。
例如，第四章，A3，任务已更改如下：“从报告示例（例如，专业人士的说明性报告）开始，编制一份内部控制参与审计报告或内部控制审计报告，并结合实体财务报表的审计标准）。
”内容：2018年的USCPA考试，AUD科目将有一些显着变化。
宏景USCPA团队一直在努力修复相关课程材料，以确保候选人的成功：●SAS 132, The Auditor’s Consideration of an Entity’s Ability to Continue as a Going Concern （AU-C 570），Q1 不测试；●SAS 133, Auditor Involvement With Exempt Offering Documents（Amends AU-C 560 and 925），不适用于Q3测试；●PCAOB release 2017-001, The Auditor’s Report on an Audit of Financial Statements when the Auditor Expresses an Unqualified Opinion and Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards，Q1 测试可忽略不计（除正在审批的关键审计事项外）。
商业环境与概论（BEC）蓝图：没有代表性的任务改变。
审计报告意见类型有以下四种
审计报告意见类型有以下四种：无保留意见、保留意见、否定意见和无法表示意见(原为拒绝表示意见)。
下面对这四种意见作了简要解释。
AUDIT REPORTING___________________________________________________________________________Audit Reports are categorized into four categories. Each type is briefly described as follows:UNQUALIFIED OPINION（无保留意见）An unqualified opinion states that the financial statements are presented fairly in conformity with GAAP. However, in some instances, the standard unqualified report may be modified without affecting the unqualified opinion issued on the financial statements.QUALIFIED OPINION. （保留意见）A qualified opinion is issued when the financial statements present the entity's financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with GAAP except for the matter of the qual ification. Qualified opinions are issued, in some cases, when: (1) a scope limitation, or (2) a departure from GAAP exists.ADVERSE OPINION. （否定意见）When issuing an adverse opinion, the auditor concludes that the financial statements do not present the entity's financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with GAAP. This type of opinion is only issued when the financial statements contain very material departures from GAAP. DISCLAIMER OF OPINION.（无法表示意见）A disclaimer of opinion is issued when the auditor is unable to form an opinion on an entity's financial statements. A disclaimer may be issued in cases when: (1) the auditor is not independent with respect to the entity under audit, (2) a material scope limitation exists, or (3) a significant uncertainty exists. SAS No. 58 suggests seven principal reasons why an independent auditor my depart from the wording of the standard report. These are:1. Limitations on the scope of the auditor's examination.2. Division of responsibility.3. Lack of conformity with GAAP.4. A departure from an accounting principle set by the body designated to establish such principles.5. Lack of consistency.6. Uncertainties.7. Emphasizing a matter.AUDPORT: Expert System EvaluationThis knowledged-based system uses the criteria contained in Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58 to determine the type of audit opinion that should be rendered by an external auditor after conducting a financial audit under generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). Assessment of the educational impact of the Audport expert system is described in a paper by L. Murphy Smith and R. Stephen McDuffie, "Impact of an Audit Reporting Expert System on Learning Performance: A Teaching Note" (forthcoming in Accounting Education). This Web-based HTM (hypertext markup language) approach was developed by Professors Smith and McDuffie, with assistance from Ms. Jennifer Calhoun. Answer the questions that appear on the screen by clicking on the correct answer. Based upon your answers, the criteria contained in SAS No. 58 will be evaluated. As each criterion is evaluated you will be provided with information on the screen either that a particular type of audit opinion should be rendered by the auditor or that additional evaluation is necessary.If the type of audit opinion to be rendered has been determined, you have completed the evaluati on and can then quit the consultation. If additional evaluation is necessary to determine the type of audit opinion to render, this will be indicated to you and you will need to continue the consultation. The system only considers one audit problem for each consultation. However, many potential problems can be evaluated by the system.Two sets of terms are important when using this system, material versus pervasive and significant versus severe. Pervasive is of more concern than material, and severe is of more concern than significant. For example, a departure from generally accepted accounting principles that is not immaterial and is not justified either has a material affect on the financial statements or a pervasive affect on the financial statements, but not both. Depending on the situation, either a qualified opinion or an adverse opinion will be rendered.Significant and severe are used in describing a circumstance-imposed scope limitation. One or the other terms can be used to describe a situation but both terms can not be used to describe the same situation.A list of the questions that make up the AUDPORT Web-based expert system are available for you to review under 'AUDPORT questions' below. At any time during the consultation you may quit the consultation and return to the AUDPORT homepage.。
AUD_ISRE_2410_-_Review_of_Interim_Financial_Information_Performed_by_the_Independent_Auditor_of_the_
ISRE 2410July 2005 International Standard on ReviewEngagements 2410Review of Interim Financial Information Performed by the Independent Auditor of the EntityConforming AmendmentsMission of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC)To serve the public interest,IFAC will continue to strengthen the worldwide accountancy profession and contribute to the development of strong international economies by establishing and promoting adherence to high-quality professional standards, furthering the international convergence of such standards and speaking out on public interest issues where the profession’s expertise is most relevant.International Federation of Accountants545 Fifth Avenue, 14th FloorNew York, New York 10017, USAFax: +1 (212) 286-9570E-mail: IAASBpubs@Copyright © July 2005 by IFAC. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to make copies of this work provided that such copies are for use in academic classrooms or for personal use and are not sold or disseminated and provided further that each copy bears the following credit line: “Copyright © by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). All rights reserved. Used by permission.” Otherwise, written permission from IFAC is required to reproduce, store or transmit this document, except as permitted by law. Contact permissions@.INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ON REVIEW ENGAGEMENTS 2410REVIEW OF INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION PERFORMED BY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR OF THE ENTITY(Effective for reviews of interim financial information for periodsbeginning on or after December 15, 2006.Earlier adoption is permissible.)CONTENTSParagraphIntroduction...................................................................................................... 1-3General Principles of a Review of Interim Financial Information....................4-6Objective of an Engagement to Review InterimFinancial Information ...............................................................................7-9Agreeing the Terms of the Engagement ...........................................................10-11Procedures for a Review of Interim Financial Information..............................12-29Evaluation of Misstatements............................................................................. 30-33Management Representations........................................................................... 34-35Auditor’s Responsibility for Accompanying Information................................36-37Communication................................................................................................. 38-42Reporting the Nature, Extent and Results of the Review of Interim Financial Information................................................................................................ 43-63 Documentation.. (64)Effective Date (65)Appendix 1: Example of an Engagement Letter for a Review ofInterim Financial InformationAppendix 2: Analytical Procedures the Auditor May Consider WhenPerforming a Review of Interim Financial InformationAppendix 3: Example of a Management Representation LetterAppendix 4: Examples of Review Reports on Interim Financial InformationAppendix 5: Examples of Review Reports with a Qualified Conclusion for a Departure from the Applicable Financial Reporting FrameworkAppendix 6: Examples of Review Reports with a Qualified Conclusion for a Limitation on Scope Not Imposed by Management1REVIEW OF INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION PERFORMEDBY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR OF THE ENTITYAppendix 7: Examples of Review Reports with an Adverse Conclusion for a Departure from the Applicable Financial Reporting FrameworkInternational Standard on Review Engagements (ISRE) 2410, “Review of Interim Financial Information Performed by the Independent Auditor of the Entity” should be read in the context of the “Preface to the International Standards on Quality Control, Auditing, Assurance and Related Services,” which sets out the application and authority of ISREs.2REVIEW OF INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION PERFORMEDBY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR OF THE ENTITYIntroduction1. The purpose of this International Standard on Review Engagements (ISRE) is toestablish standards and provide guidance on the auditor’s professional responsibilities when the auditor undertakes an engagement to review interimfinancial information of an audit client, and on the form and content of the report. The term “auditor” is used throughout this ISRE, not because the auditoris performing an audit function but because the scope of this ISRE is limited toa review of interim financial information performed by the independent auditorof the financial statements of the entity.2. For purposes of this ISRE, interim financial information is financial informationthat is prepared and presented in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework1 and comprises either a complete or a condensed set offinancial statements for a period that is shorter than the entity’s financial year.3. The auditor who is engaged to perform a review of interim financialinformation should perform the review in accordance with this ISRE.Through performing the audit of the annual financial statements, the auditor obtains an understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internalcontrol. When the auditor is engaged to review the interim financial information, this understanding is updated through inquiries made in the courseof the review, and assists the auditor in focusing the inquiries to be made andthe analytical and other review procedures to be applied. A practitioner who isengaged to perform a review of interim financial information, and who is notthe auditor of the entity, performs the review in accordance with ISRE 2400,“Engagements to Review Financial Statements.” As the practitioner does notordinarily have the same understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control, as the auditor of the entity, the practitioner needsto carry out different inquiries and procedures to meet the objective of the review.General Principles of a Review of Interim Financial Information 4. The auditor should comply with the ethical requirements relevant to theaudit of the annual financial statements of the entity. These ethical requirements govern the auditor’s professional responsibilities in the followingareas: independence, integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality, professional behavior, and technical standards.5. The auditor should implement quality control procedures that areapplicable to the individual engagement. The elements of quality control thatare relevant to an individual engagement include leadership responsibilities for1For example, International Financial Reporting Standards as issued by the International Accounting Standards Board.1REVIEW OF INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION PERFORMEDBY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR OF THE ENTITYquality on the engagement, ethical requirements, acceptance and continuance ofclient relationships and specific engagements, assignment of engagement teams,engagement performance, and monitoring.6. The auditor should plan and perform the review with an attitude ofprofessional skepticism,recognizing that circumstances may exist that cause the interim financial information to require a material adjustmentfor it to be prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework. An attitude of professional skepticism means that the auditor makes a critical assessment, with a questioning mind, of the validity of evidence obtained and is alert to evidencethat contradicts or brings into question the reliability of documents or representations by management of the entity.Objective of an Engagement to Review Interim Financial Information7.The objective of an engagement to review interim financial information is toenable the auditor to express a conclusion whether, on the basis of the review,anything has come to the auditor’s attention that causes the auditor to believethat the interim financial information is not prepared, in all material respects, inaccordance with an applicable financial reporting framework. The auditor makes inquiries, and performs analytical and other review procedures in orderto reduce to a moderate level the risk of expressing an inappropriate conclusionwhen the interim financial information is materially misstated.8.The objective of a review of interim financial information differs significantlyfrom that of an audit conducted in accordance with International Standards onAuditing (ISAs). A review of interim financial information does not provide abasis for expressing an opinion whether the financial information gives a trueand fair view, or is presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance withan applicable financial reporting framework.9. A review, in contrast to an audit, is not designed to obtain reasonable assurancethat the interim financial information is free from material misstatement. A review consists of making inquiries, primarily of persons responsible for financial and accounting matters, and applying analytical and other review procedures. A review may bring significant matters affecting the interim financial information to the auditor’s attention, but it does not provide all of theevidence that would be required in an audit.Agreeing the Terms of the Engagement10. The auditor and the client should agree on the terms of the engagement.11. The agreed terms of the engagement are ordinarily recorded in an engagementletter. Such a communication helps to avoid misunderstandings regarding the nature of the engagement and, in particular, the objective and scope of the2REVIEW OF INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION PERFORMEDBY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR OF THE ENTITY3review, management’s responsibilities, the extent of the auditor’s responsibilities, the assurance obtained, and the nature and form of the report. The communication ordinarily covers the following matters:•The objective of a review of interim financial information. •The scope of the review. •Management’s responsibility for the interim financial information. • Management’s responsibility for establishing and maintaining effectiveinternal control relevant to the preparation of interim financialinformation.• Management’s responsibility for making all financial records and relatedinformation available to the auditor.• Management’s agreement to provide written representations to theauditor to confirm representations made orally during the review, as wellas representations that are implicit in the entity’s records.• The anticipated form and content of the report to be issued, including theidentity of the addressee of the report.•Management’s agreement that where any document containing interimfinancial information indicates that the interim financial information hasbeen reviewed by the entity’s auditor, the review report will also beincluded in the document. An illustrative engagement letter is set out in Appendix 1 to this ISRE. The terms of engagement to review interim financial information can also be combined with the terms of engagement to audit the annual financial statements.Procedures for a Review of Interim Financial InformationUnderstanding the Entity and its Environment, Including its Internal Control12. The auditor should have an understanding of the entity and itsenvironment, including its internal control, as it relates to the preparation of both annual and interim financial information, sufficient to plan and conduct the engagement so as to be able to:(a) Identify the types of potential material misstatement and consider thelikelihood of their occurrence; and(b) Select the inquiries, analytical and other review procedures that willprovide the auditor with a basis for reporting whether anything hascome to the auditor’s attention that causes the auditor to believe thatthe interim financial information is not prepared, in all materialREVIEW OF INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION PERFORMEDBY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR OF THE ENTITY4respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reportingframework.13. As required by ISA 315, “Understanding the Entity and its Environment andAssessing the Risks of Material Misstatement,” the auditor who has audited the entity’s financial statements for one or more annual periods has obtained an understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control, as it relates to the preparation of annual financial information that was sufficient to conduct the audit. In planning a review of interim financial information, the auditor updates this understanding. The auditor also obtains a sufficient understanding of internal control as it relates to the preparation of interim financial information as it may differ from internal control as it relates to annual financial information.14. The auditor uses the understanding of the entity and its environment, includingits internal control, to determine the inquiries to be made and the analytical and other review procedures to be applied, and to identify the particular events, transactions or assertions to which inquiries may be directed or analytical or other review procedures applied.15. The procedures performed by the auditor to update the understanding of theentity and its environment, including its internal control, ordinarily include the following:• Reading the documentation, to the extent necessary, of the precedingyear’s audit and reviews of prior interim period(s) of the current year andcorresponding interim period(s) of the prior year, to enable the auditor toidentify matters that may affect the current-period interim financialinformation.• Considering any significant risks, including the risk of managementoverride of controls, that were identified in the audit of the prior year’sfinancial statements.• Reading the most recent annual and comparable prior period interimfinancial information.• Considering materiality with reference to the applicable financialreporting framework as it relates to interim financial information to assistin determining the nature and extent of the procedures to be performedand evaluating the effect of misstatements.• Considering the nature of any corrected material misstatements and anyidentified uncorrected immaterial misstatements in the prior year’sfinancial statements.• Considering significant financial accounting and reporting matters thatmay be of continuing significance such as material weaknesses in internalcontrol.REVIEW OF INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION PERFORMEDBY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR OF THE ENTITY5• Considering the results of any audit procedures performed with respect tothe current year’s financial statements.• Considering the results of any internal audit performed and the subsequentactions taken by management.• Inquiring of management about the results of management’s assessment ofthe risk that the interim financial information may be materially misstatedas a result of fraud.• Inquiring of management about the effect of changes in the entity’sbusiness activities.• Inquiring of management about any significant changes in internal controland the potential effect of any such changes on the preparation of interimfinancial information.•Inquiring of management of the process by which the interim financialinformation has been prepared and the reliability of the underlyingaccounting records to which the interim financial information is agreed orreconciled. 16. The auditor determines the nature of the review procedures, if any, to beperformed for components and, where applicable, communicates these matters to other auditors involved in the review. Factors to be considered include the materiality of, and risk of misstatement in, the interim financial information of components, and the auditor’s understanding of the extent to which internal control over the preparation of such information is centralized or decentralized.17. In order to plan and conduct a review of interim financial information, arecently appointed auditor, who has not yet performed an audit of the annual financial statements in accordance with ISAs, should obtain an understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control, as it relates to the preparation of both annual and interim financial information.18. This understanding enables the auditor to focus the inquiries made, and theanalytical and other review procedures applied in performing a review of interim financial information in accordance with this ISRE. As part of obtaining this understanding, the auditor ordinarily makes inquiries of the predecessor auditor and, where practicable, reviews the predecessor auditor’s documentation for the preceding annual audit, and for any prior interim periods in the current year that have been reviewed by the predecessor auditor. In doing so, the auditor considers the nature of any corrected misstatements, and any uncorrected misstatements aggregated by the predecessor auditor, any significant risks, including the risk of management override of controls, and significant accounting and any reporting matters that may be of continuing significance, such as material weaknesses in internal control.REVIEW OF INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION PERFORMEDBY THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR OF THE ENTITY6Inquiries, Analytical and Other Review Procedures19. The auditor should make inquiries, primarily of persons responsible forfinancial and accounting matters, and perform analytical and other review procedures to enable the auditor to conclude whether, on the basis of the procedures performed, anything has come to the auditor’s attention that causes the auditor to believe that the interim financial information is not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework.20. A review ordinarily does not require tests of the accounting records throughinspection, observation or confirmation. Procedures for performing a review of interim financial information are ordinarily limited to making inquiries, primarily of persons responsible for financial and accounting matters, and applying analytical and other review procedures, rather than corroborating information obtained concerning significant accounting matters relating to the interim financial information. The auditor’s understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control, the results of the risk assessments relating to the preceding audit and the auditor’s consideration of materiality as it relates to the interim financial information, affects the nature and extent of the inquiries made, and analytical and other review procedures applied.21. The auditor ordinarily performs the following procedures:• Reading the minutes of the meetings of shareholders, those charged withgovernance, and other appropriate committees to identify matters that mayaffect the interim financial information, and inquiring about matters dealtwith at meetings for which minutes are not available that may affect theinterim financial information.• Considering the effect, if any, of matters giving rise to a modification ofthe audit or review report, accounting adjustments or unadjustedmisstatements, at the time of the previous audit or reviews.• Communicating, where appropriate, with other auditors who areperforming a review of the interim financial information of the reportingentity’s significant components.• Inquiring of members of management responsible for financial andaccounting matters, and others as appropriate about the following:o Whether the interim financial information has been prepared andpresented in accordance with the applicable financial reportingframework.oWhether there have been any changes in accounting principles or inthe methods of applying them.o Whether any new transactions have necessitated the application of a new accounting principle.o Whether the interim financial information contains any known uncorrected misstatements.o Unusual or complex situations that may have affected the interim financial information, such as a business combination or disposal ofa segment of the business.o Significant assumptions that are relevant to the fair value measurement or disclosures and management’s intention and abilityto carry out specific courses of action on behalf of the entity.o Whether related party transactions have been appropriately accounted for and disclosed in the interim financial information.o Significant changes in commitments and contractual obligations.o Significant changes in contingent liabilities including litigation or claims.o Compliance with debt covenants.o Matters about which questions have arisen in the course of applying the review procedures.o Significant transactions occurring in the last several days of the interim period or the first several days of the next interim period.o Knowledge of any fraud or suspected fraud affecting the entity involving:−Management;−Employees who have significant roles in internal control; or−Others where the fraud could have a material effect on the interim financial information.o Knowledge of any allegations of fraud, or suspected fraud, affecting the entity’s interim financial information communicated byemployees, former employees, analysts, regulators, or others.o Knowledge of any actual or possible noncompliance with laws and regulations that could have a material effect on the interim financialinformation.•Applying analytical procedures to the interim financial information designed to identify relationships and individual items that appear to be unusual and that may reflect a material misstatement in the interim7financial information. Analytical procedures may include ratio analysisand statistical techniques such as trend analysis or regression analysis andmay be performed manually or with the use of computer-assistedtechniques. Appendix 2 to this ISRE contains examples of analyticalprocedures the auditor may consider when performing a review of interimfinancial information.•Reading the interim financial information, and considering whether anything has come to the auditor’s attention that causes the auditor tobelieve that the interim financial information is not prepared, in allmaterial respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reportingframework.22. The auditor may perform many of the review procedures before orsimultaneously with the entity’s preparation of the interim financial information. For example, it may be practicable to update the understanding of the entity and its environment, including its internal control, and begin reading applicable minutes before the end of the interim period. Performing some of the review procedures earlier in the interim period also permits early identification and consideration of significant accounting matters affecting the interim financial information.23. The auditor performing the review of interim financial information is alsoengaged to perform an audit of the annual financial statements of the entity. For convenience and efficiency, the auditor may decide to perform certain audit procedures concurrently with the review of interim financial information. For example, information gained from reading the minutes of meetings of the board of directors in connection with the review of the interim financial information also may be used for the annual audit. The auditor may also decide to perform, at the time of the interim review, auditing procedures that would need to be performed for the purpose of the audit of the annual financial statements, for example, performing audit procedures on significant or unusual transactions that occurred during the period, such as business combinations, restructurings, or significant revenue transactions.24. A review of interim financial information ordinarily does not requirecorroborating the inquiries about litigation or claims. It is, therefore, ordinarily not necessary to send an inquiry letter to the entity’s lawyer. Direct communication with the entity’s lawyer with respect to litigation or claims may, however, be appropriate if a matter comes to the auditor’s attention that causes the auditor to question whether the interim financial information is not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework, and the auditor believes the entity’s lawyer may have pertinent information.25. The auditor should obtain evidence that the interim financial informationagrees or reconciles with the underlying accounting records. The auditor8may obtain evidence that the interim financial information agrees or reconciles with the underlying accounting records by tracing the interim financial information to:(a)The accounting records, such as the general ledger, or a consolidatingschedule that agrees or reconciles with the accounting records; and(b)Other supporting data in the entity’s records as necessary.26. The auditor should inquire whether management has identified all eventsup to the date of the review report that may require adjustment to or disclosure in the interim financial information. It is not necessary for the auditor to perform other procedures to identify events occurring after the date of the review report.27. The auditor should inquire whether management has changed itsassessment of the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern.When, as a result of this inquiry or other review procedures, the auditor becomes aware of events or conditions that may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern, the auditor should:(a)Inquire of management as to its plans for future actions based on itsgoing concern assessment, the feasibility of these plans, and whethermanagement believes that the outcome of these plans will improvethe situation; and(b)Consider the adequacy of the disclosure about such matters in theinterim financial information.28. Events or conditions which may cast significant doubt on the entity’s ability tocontinue as a going concern may have existed at the date of the annual financial statements or may be identified as a result of inquiries of management or in the course of performing other review procedures. When such events or conditions come to the auditor’s attention, the auditor inquires of management as to its plans for future action, such as its plans to liquidate assets, borrow money or restructure debt, reduce or delay expenditures, or increase capital. The auditor also inquires as to the feasibility of management’s plans and whether management believes that the outcome of these plans will improve the situation.However, it is not ordinarily necessary for the auditor to corroborate the feasibility of management’s plans and whether the outcome of these plans will improve the situation.29. When a matter comes to the auditor’s attention that leads the auditor toquestion whether a material adjustment should be made for the interim financial information to be prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the applicable financial reporting framework, the auditor should make additional inquiries or perform other procedures to enable the auditor to express a conclusion in the review report. For example, if the9。
Audit quality and the relationship between auditee
Audit quality and the relationship between auditee’s agencyproblems and financial information qualityAbstractThis study examines the role of audit quality on the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. It contributes to the existing literature by considering agency theory and audit research concerned with audit quality. The following hypotheses are tested based on the underlying literature: 1）Auditee’s agency problems are positively associated with audit quality, 2）Audit quality is positively associated with financial information quality, and 3）Audit quality mediates the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. To provide insight on the above hypotheses a path analysis is employed for a sample of 932 S&P 1500 firms. Auditee’s agency problems are measured by leverage, management ownership and free cash flow. Moreover, audit quality is measured by audit fees and non-audit services fees （i.e. total fees）paid to the incumbent auditor. Finally, financial information quality is measured by absolute discretionary accruals. The results reveal that auditee’s agency problems are positively associated with audit quality. In addition, it is found that audit quality increases financial information quality. Finally, it is documented that audit quality is a potential mediator in the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. These findings imply that auditees’ agency problems explain the demand for a high quality auditor. Furthermore, these results suggest that high audit quality successfully fulfils its role as a monitoring mechanism which purpose is to assure financial information quality.1.INTRODUCTIONThis study investigates the role of audit quality on the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. Audit quality is one of the most important issues in audit practice today. The quality of the financial information is dependent, among other things, on audit quality (ISB 2000) . Several individuals and groups have an interest in the quality of audited financial information. External financial statement users, including current and potential investors, creditors, and others need reliable financial information on which to base their resource allocation decisions. Auditees, including management, audit committees, and boards of directors have an interest in quality audits, for example, to help to reduce the cost of capital. In addition, regulators and standard setters can increase the effectiveness of capital markets by promulgating rules and regulations that help ensure that audits improve financial information quality (ISB 2000).However, there have been concerns about audit quality in the present audit environment, where severe audit failures have come to light. It has been found that the perceived reliability of audited financial information has declined. In contrast, the perceived relevance of audited financial information has increased Hodge 2003 . Thus, it is evident that there is a need for further research on audit quality and how it is related to financial information quality.Audit quality has received considerable interest in both agency and audit research. According to agency literature one implication of agency problems is management propensity to produce substandard financial information （e.g. Warfield, Wild & Wild 1995; Chung, Firth & Kim 2005; Richardson 2006）. Auditing provides assurance about the quality and credibility of company’s financial information and thus, is considered a means to mitigate agency problems （Jensen & Meckling 1976）. Consequently, studies on agency issues have focused on the demand side of auditing and examined how the le vel of auditee’s agency problems affects the demand for audit quality (e.g. Jensen et al. 1976; DeFond 1992; Parkash & Venable 1993; Nikkinen & Sahlstr?m 2004; Lennox 2005) . On the other hand, audit research has concentrated on the supply side of audit quality and investigated how audit quality is reflected in financial information quality (e.g. Frankel, Johnson & Nelson 2002; Geiger & Rama 2003; Larcker & Richardson 2004) .No previous research, however, has attempted to adapt both agency and audit research to investigate audit quality. Thus, the objective of this research is to combine the demand and supply side perspectives of audit quality. More specifically, this study produces an integrated model of the determinants of financial information quality which includes variables concerning agency problems and audit quality. The modeldepicts relationships between measures of auditee’s agency problems, audit quality and financial information quality.1.1.Research problemThe purpose of this study is to examine the role audit quality plays on the relationship between agency problems and financial information quality. Although previous studies have uncovered important indicators of financial information quality, the paths between these indicators have not been explored. Accordingly, this research proposes and tests a model that establishes paths between auditee’s agency problems and audit quality as well as audit quality and financial information quality. In the proposed model, audit quality is expected to have a mediating role on the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. The mediating role maintains that audit quality is caused by agency problems and a cause of financial information quality.The model is summarized in figure 1. The theoretical concepts of the model are illustrated at the top of the figure. These are agency problems, audit quality and financial information quality. Operational measures for the variables are illustrated at the bottom of figure 1.Auditee’s agency problem is the independent variable in the model. Agency problems relate to potential conflicts of interests between management and shareholders or management and debt-holders. It is suggested that certain company specific characteristics affect the magnitude of agency problems. In this research agency problems are measured by leverage, management ownership and free cash flow. The model suggests that a company faces more severe agency problems when it has high leverage, low management ownership and high free cash flow. It is suggested that agency problems increase the demand for audit quality.Audit quality is the mediating variable in the model. Audit quality is measuredby total fees (i.e. audit fees and non-audit services fees) paid to the incumbent auditor. High levels of relative audit fees are expected to indicate higher audit engagement effort and thus higher audit quality. Thus, audit quality determined by total fees, is expected to affect auditor’s ability to ass ure financial information quality positively. In addition, total fees are expected to mediate the relationship between agency problems and financial information quality. Financial information quality is the dependent variable in the model.Financial information quality refers to how well financial statement information reflects the true economic circumstances of the company. Financial information quality is measured by absolute discretionary accruals. It is proposed that low magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals represents high earnings quality and, hence implicates high financial information quality.Collectively, the model is used to test following hypotheses:H1: Auditee’s agency problems are positively associated with audit quality.H2: Audit quality is positively associated with financial information quality.H3: Audit quality mediates the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality.The hypotheses are examined by path analysis which involves estimating a series of regression models. The sample includes 932 S&P 1500 firms.The results show that agency problems increase auditee’s incentives to hire high quality auditor. More specifically, a significant positive relationship is found between leverage and total fees as well as free cash flow and total fees. Moreover, a significant negative relationship is found between management ownership and total fees. Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported.In addition, results reveal that audit quality has a positive relationship with financial information quality. To be exact, a significant negative relationship is found between total fees and absolute discretionary accruals. This result confirms hypothesis 2.The results also reveal that audit quality has the potential to function as a mediator in the relationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. More specifically, it is found that total fees successfully mediate the relationship between leverage and absolute discretionary accruals as well as management ownership and absolute discretionary accruals. The ability of total fees to mediate the relationship between free cash flow and absolute discretionary accruals is, however, at the borderline. Thus, hypothesis 3 is partially supported.1.2.ContributionThe objective of this research is to investigate the effect of auditee’s agency problems and audit quality on financial information quality. This study contributes to the existing research by combining agency literature and audit literature concerned with audit quality. So far, research has examined relationships between audit ee’s agency problems and audit quality (e.g. Jensen et al. 1976; DeFond 1992; Parkash et al. 1993; Nikkinen et al. 2004; Lennox 2005) as well as audit quality and financial information quality (e.g. Frankel et al. 2002; Geiger et al. 2003; Larcker et al. 2004) . This research attempts to place these relationships into a more holistic model. More specifically, the proposed model suggests a mediating role of audit quality on therelationship between auditee’s agency problems and financial information quality. 2.HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENTThe prior agency and audit research has determined relationships between auditee’s agency problems and audit quality as well as audit quality and financial information quality. These relationships will be discussed in this section. In the end of this section, a model combining the relationships will be introduced.2.1.Agency problems and audit qualityAgency literature suggests that certain company specific characteristics increase management incentives to act against shareholders’ or debt-holders’ interests. Agency problems can increase management propensity to produce substandard financial information in order to cover actions that have not been in the best interest of the shareholders or debt-holders (Jensen et al. 1976) . Prior research has determined a variety of company specific variables which potentially cause agency problems. This research focuses on agency problems generated by leverage, management ownership and free cash flow.Firstly, the agency problem of leverage postulates that managers (acting on behalf of shareholders) have incentives to transfer wealth from debt-holders by taking various actions such as paying dividends to shareholders at the expense of profitable projects or restructuring of debt (Jensen et al. 1976; Chow 1982; DeFond 1992; Parkash et al. 1993 ). Some of these actions can result in a decline in firm value because they involve suboptimal investment policies （Chow 1982 ）. Moreover, the literature suggests that firms with high leverage are more likely to face bankruptcy and such firms are more likely to engage in earnings management since they are closer to debt covenant violations (Gul & Tsui 2001) .Secondly, agency literature recognizes that low management ownership gives rise to an asymmetric information problem meaning that very often the manager is better informed about the activities and payoffs of the firm than the owner( Ng 1978; Ng & Stoeckenius 1979 ). Separation of ownership from management creates monitoring difficulties giving the potential for management to take non-value-maximizing actions. Thus, low management ownership creates an increased demand for accounting-based contractual constraints which are used to discourage managers from non-value-maximizing actions. Management may be motivated to mitigate these constraints by strategically choosing accounting policies and determining accounting accruals (Jensen et al. 1976 ). Accordingly it has been found that management ownership is positively associated with earnings explanatory power for returns and negatively related to the magnitude of discretionary accruals (Warfield et al. 1995) .Thirdly, the agency problem of the free cash flow postulates that in the presence of high free cash flow management has opportunities to make expenditures that have negative Net Present Values (NPVs ) rather than pay dividends to shareholders or purchase stock. The free cash flow agency problem can be implicated by firm’s poor financial performance and consequently poor stock market valuations. The free cash flow agency problem is also implicated by a relation between company’s free cash flow and accrual activities. Managers in firms with highfree cash flow may have incentives to smooth earnings in order to shirk the full impact of wasteful expenditures on earnings. Prior research has documented negative relation between free cash flow and the magnitude of discretionary accruals. These results can be explained by following rationale: income-decreasing accruals occur if managers wish to shift profits to future years when the full impact of expenditures hits earnings (Chung et al. 2005; Richardson 2006 ).According to agency theory auditing services are required to reduce agency problems arising from conflict of interests between shareholders and managers or debt-holders and managers (Jensen et al. 1976) . Studies focusing on agency issues predict that as agency problems become more severe management will demand higher audit quality in an effort to assure financial information credibility to shareholders, debt-holders or other investors (Chow 1982; Francis & Wilson 1988; DeFond 1992; Lennox 2005 ).Early studies used auditor reputation (size or brand name) as a measure of audit quality and documented that companies facing agency problems hire auditors with better reputation (Francis et al. 1988; DeFond 1992; Lennox 2005 ). More recent research has used audit fees as a proxy for audit quality. For example Nikkinen et al. (2004) examined the relationship between agency problems and total fees paid to incumbent auditor. They found a positive relation between free cash flow and total fees and a negative relation between management ownership and total fees. These results imply that management demands a higher quality audit as firm’s agency problems increase.Source：Johanna Miettinen Department of Accounting and Finance University of Vaasa。
Audit committee financial expertise and earnings management The role of status中文ppt
检验AC专业特长和地位对财务违法和错报重述的关系
结果：1、两个因素单独不会影响会计财务违法行为，两者结合可以减少 财务违法行为。（3列加入AC绝对地位，4列专长和绝对地位交乘项） 2、两个因素与基于错报的财务重述没有相关性，说明这两个因素只与蓄 意的财务违法行为相关。
2SLS内生性检验（220页表4B）
3、公司里的相对地位 审计委员会的地位是和公司最高级别的管理层对比 的。本文研究假设基础是审计委员会是根据蓝带委员会 组织、美国证券交易所和证券交易委员会所要求设立的。 一些人员组织的特征是由相对因素决定的，比如公 司地位。一些权力低的管理者会主动联合权力大的管理 者，以此来为自己获取更多的报酬。 总结：之前的文献主要研究通过公司治理而获得权 力，很少有文献考虑到审计委员的治理被要求有严格的 独立性，而且财报披露的监管要求其要有财务专长。
六、结论
一、问题提出 2002 年塞班斯法案的颁布提高了对公司财务报告质 量的要求，同时也提高了对审计委员会财务专长的要求。 几年来，为了提高董事会的效力，公司中独立董事 的比例逐渐提高，这会使审计委员会在公司的相对“地 位”降低。“地位”指影响公司经营的能力。 本文主要研究审计委员会财务专长的提高和在公司 相对地位的降低是否会影响企业盈余操纵和会计违法行 为？如何影响？
《Audit committee financial expertise and earnings management: The role of status》
Patrick G. Badolato et al.2014.JAE
一、问题提出
二、文献回顾与假设提出
三、实验设计
Hale Waihona Puke 四、回归结果五、进一步的研究与稳健性检验
Earnings management and corporate governance the role of the board and the audit committee
Earnings management and corporate governance: the role of theboard and the audit committeeAbstractWe examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. We conclude that board and audit committee activity and their members’ financial sophistication may be important factors in constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.1. IntroductionWe examine the relation between earnings management and the structure, background, and composition of a firm’s board of directors.Our results are consistent with the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendation, indicating that a lower level of earnings management is associated with greater independent outside representation on the board. We also find that the presence of corporate executives and investment bankers on audit committees are associated with a reduced extent of earnings management. Finally, our results show that more active boards, as proxied by the number of board meetings, and more active audit committees, as proxied by the number of committee meetings, are also associated with a lower level of earnings management.In Section 2 we discuss earnings management and the role of the board in controlling this problem. Section 3 contains our statistical methodology while Section 4 presents our sample selection and data source discussions. We present our results in Section 5 and conclusions in Section 6.2. Earnings management and the role of the Board of Directors●Earnings management●The role of boards●Board composition●Board structure●Other board considerations3. Statistical methodFocusing on current accruals because current accruals are easier for managers to manipulate. Table 1 provides summary statistics for the discretionary and non-discretionary current accruals for the entire sample and for each year in the analysis.4. Sample and data1.Sample selection2.Data( Table 2)●CEO duality●Number of board meetings●Board composition●Audit committee●Executive committee5. Results1.Overall board resultsTable 3 provides the univariate ordinary least square regression results with discre-tionary current accruals as the dependent variable and overall company and total board characteristic variables as the independent variables. Table 4 shows multiple regression results. Regression 1 in Table 4 contains variables intended to capture various director characteristics.Regressions 2 –6 contain various combinations of independent variables.2.Audit committee regression resultsThe results for the univariate regressions for the audit committee variables appear in Table 5.Table 6 provides multiple regression results for the audit committee variables.3.Executive committeeTable 7 gives the univariate regression results for the executive committee variables.Table 8 shows the multiple regressions including both executive committee and control variables. In regression 1, none of the independent variables are significant. as in regressions 2 and 3, the proportion of outside executive committee members has a significantly negative coefficient.The number of executive committee meetings has a negative coefficient, significant in regressions 3 and 4. Thus, a more active executive committee is associated with smaller discretionary current accruals.6. Conclusions●Audit committee members be independent board members with financial expertise.●Earnings management is less likely to occur or occurs less often in companies whose boardsinclude both more independent outside directors and directors with corporate experience.●Composition of the audit committee (and to a lesser extent the executive committee) isassociated with the level of earnings management and thereby may allow a committee to better perform oversight functions.●The proportion of audit committee members with corporate or investment bankingbackgrounds is negatively related to the level of earnings manage-ment.●The panel also recommends that these committees serve an active role.●An association between lower levels of earnings management and the meeting frequency ofboards and audit committees, making boards and audit committees more effective monitors of corporate financial reporting..。
阿伦斯-审计学：一种整合的方法-课后习题答案ch02
阿伦斯-审计学：⼀种整合的⽅法-课后习题答案ch02 Chapter 2The CPA ProfessionReview Questions2-1The four major services that CPAs provide are:1. Assurance services Assurance services are independentprofessional services that improve the quality of information fordecision makers. Assurance services include attestation services,which are any services in which the CPA firm issues a report thatexpresses a conclusion about the reliability of an assertion that isthe responsibility of another party. The four categories of attestationservices are audits of historical financial statements, attestation onthe effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, reviewsof historical financial statements, and other attestation services.2. Accounting and bookkeeping services Accounting services involvepreparing the client's financial statements from the client's records.Bookkeeping services include the preparation of the client'sjournals and ledgers as well as financial statements.3. Tax services Tax services include preparation of corporate,individual, and estate returns as well as tax planning assistance.4. Management consulting services These services range fromsuggestions to improve the client's accounting system to computerinstallations.2-2The major characteristics of CPA firms that permit them to fulfill their social function competently and independently are: 1. Organizational form A CPA firm exists as a separate entity to avoidan employer-employee relationship with its clients. The CPA firmemploys a professional staff of sufficient size to prevent one clientfrom constituting a significant portion of total income and therebyendangering the firm's independence.2. Conduct A CPA firm employs a professional staff of sufficient sizeto provide a broad range of expertise, continuing education, andpromotion of a professional independent attitude and competence.3. Peer review This practice evaluates the performance of CPA firmsin an attempt to keep competence high.2-3The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board provides oversight for auditors of public companies, includingestablishing auditing and quality control standards for public company audits, and performing inspections of the quality controls at audit firms performing those audits.2-4The purpose of the Securities and Exchange Commission is to assist in providing investors with reliable information upon which to make investment decisions. Since most reasonably large CPA firms have clients that must with the SEC each year (all companies filing registration statements under the securities acts of l933 and l934 must financial statements and other reports with the SEC at least once each year), the profession is highly involved with the SEC requirements.The SEC has considerable influence in setting generally accepted accounting principles and disclosure requirements for financial statements because of its authority for specifying reporting requirements considered necessary for fair disclosure to investors. In addition, the SEC has power to establish rules for any CPA associated with audited financial statements submitted to the Commission.2-5The AICPA is the organization that sets professional requirements for CPAs. The AICPA also conducts research and publishes materials on many different subjects related to accounting, auditing, management advisory services, and taxes. The organization also prepares and grades the CPA examinations, provides continuing education to its members, and develops specialty designations to help market and assure the quality of services in specialized practice areas.2-6Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements was first issued in 1986 and its purposes were to provide a framework for attest engagements and to develop standards for those engagements. In 2001, the Auditing Standards Board issued SSAE 10 in response to the need for more detailed standards for specific types of attestation services. SSAE 10 supercedes the previously issued standards and its main purpose is to improve the usefulness of the attestation standards and provide greater flexibility to practitioners in providing assurance services.2-7 The PCAOB now has responsibility for establishing auditing standards for public companies, while the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) of the AICPA establishes auditing standards for private companies. The ASB previously had responsibility for establishing auditing standards for both public and private companies. Existing auditing standards were adopted by the PCAOB as interim auditing standards for public company audits.2-8 Generally accepted auditing standards are ten general guidelines to aid auditors in fulfilling their professional responsibilities. These guidelines include three general standards concerned with competence, independence, and due professional care; three standards of field work including planning and supervision, study and evaluation of internal control, and the gathering of competent evidential matter; and four standards of reporting which require a statement as to presentation in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, inconsistency observed in the current period in relation to the preceding period, adequate disclosure, and the expression of an opinion as to the fairness of the presentation of the financial statements.2-8 (continued)Generally accepted accounting principles are specific rules for accounting for transactions occurring in a business enterprise. Examples may be any of the opinions of the FASB.2-9Auditors can obtain adequate technical training and proficiency through formal education in auditing and accounting, adequate practical experience, and continuing professional education. Auditors can demonstrate their proficiency by becoming licensed to practice as CPAs, which requires successful completion of the Uniform CPA Examination. The specific requirements for licensure vary from state to state.2-10For the most part, generally accepted auditing standards are general rather than specific. Many practitioners along with critics of the profession believe the standards should provide more clearly defined guidelines as an aid in determining the extent of evidence to be accumulated. This would eliminate some of the difficult audit decisions and provide a source of defense if the CPA is charged with conducting an inadequate audit. On the other hand, highly specific requirements could turn auditing into mechanical evidence gathering, void of professional judgment. From the point of view of both the profession and the users of auditing services, there is probably a greater harm from defining authoritative guidelines too specifically than too broadly.2-11International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) are issued by the International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC) of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). ISAs are designed to improve the uniformity of auditing practices and related services throughout the world by issuing pronouncements on a variety of audit and attest functions and promoting their acceptance worldwide. A CPA who conducts an audit in accordance with GAAS may not comply with ISAs because there may be additional ISA requirements that extend beyond GAAS requirements.2-12 Quality controls are the procedures used by a CPA firm that help it meet its professional responsibilities to clients. Quality controls are therefore established for the entire CPA firm as opposed to individual engagements.2-13The element of quality control is personnel management. The purpose of the requirement is to help assure CPA firmsthat all new personnel should be qualified to perform their work competently. A CPA firm must have competent employees conducting the audits if quality audits are to occur.2-14 A peer review is a review, by CPAs, of a CPA firm's compliance with its quality control system. A mandatory peer review means that such a review is required periodically. AICPA member firms are required to have a peer review every three years. Registered firms with the PCAOB are subject to quality inspections. These are different than peer reviews because they are performed by independent inspection teams rather than another CPA firm.2-14 (continued)Peer reviews can be beneficial to the profession and to individual firms. By helping firms meet quality control standards, the profession gains if reviews result in practitioners doing higher quality audits. A firm having a peer review can also gain if it improves the firm's practices and thereby enhances its reputation and effectiveness, and reduces the likelihood of lawsuits. Of course peer reviews are costly. There is always a trade off between cost and benefits. A CPA firm also gives up some independence of activities when it is reviewed by another CPA firm.2-15The two divisions of practice that a CPA firm may belong to are the SEC Practice Section (renamed the Center for Public Company Audit Firms)and the Private Companies Practice Section. A firm may belong to one section, both sections, or neither. Many of the self-regulatory activities of the SECPS have been taken over by the PCAOB.Proponents of this division believe that this will improve the quality of practice by CPA firms and that it will improve self-regulation. Critics state that it establishes two classes of CPAs and implies a lower performance quality for firms that are not members of the SEC Practice Section.Multiple Choice Questions From CPA Examinations2-16 a. (1) b. (2) c. (3) d. (3)2-17 a. (2) b. (2) c. (3)Discussion Questions And Problems2-18a.The comments summarize the beliefs of many practitioners about theSarbanes–Oxley Act and the PCAOB. The arguments against the Act can be summarized as four arguments:1. Costs of complying with the Act are excessively high, especially therequirement to report on internal control over financial reporting,and will discourage companies from becoming public companies.2. Relative cost for local audit firms is excessively high.3. Additional oversight is not needed because sufficient qualitycontrols have already been implemented by most audit firms.4. Three other things already provide assurance of adequate quality:a competitive economic environment, legal liability, and auditingstandards.To support these comments, it can be argued that the profession has generally functioned well with relatively little controversy and criticism.2-18 (continued)The arguments against these comments are primarily as follows:1. Reporting on the effectiveness of internal control over financialreporting will provide benefits in improved controls, resulting inhigher quality financial reporting and reduced losses from fraud.2. The increased confidence in financial reporting will increase accessto capital and lower the cost of capital by reducing information risk.3. Changes in the scope of CPA practices and other threats to auditquality required government regulation.4. Regulation of public company audits will not affect most audit firmsthat do not have public company audit clients.b. There is no correct answer to this question. Different people reachdifferent conclusions, depending on the weights put on the various arguments. Time is needed to effectively assess both the costs and benefits of the Act.2-19 a. Engagement performanceb. Personnel managementc. Engagement performanced. Engagement performancee. Independence, integrity, and objectivityf. Monitoringg. Acceptance and continuation of clients and engagementsh. Personnel managementi. Personnel management2-20 a. Rossi and Montgomery's primary ethical consideration is their professional competence to perform all of the audit work for filingwith the SEC. In addition, if Rossi and Montgomery have performedbookkeeping services or certain consulting services for MobileHome, they will not be independent under PCAOB and SECindependence requirements. The firm must also be a registeredfirm with the PCAOB.b. The filing with the SEC, in addition to normal audited financialstatements, will require completion and registration with the SEC ofForm S-1 which includes an audited summary of operations for thelast five fiscal years as well as many additional schedules anddescriptions of the business. Each quarter subsequent to the filing,Form 10-Q must be filed; and within 90 days of the end of eachfiscal year Form 10-K must be filed with the SEC.In addition, Form 8-K must be filed whenever significant events have occurred which are of interest to public investors. These forms must be filed in conformity with Regulation S-X, whichrequires considerable disclosures in addition to those normallyrequired in audited financial statements.2-212-22 a. CPAs can provide the following information and Web links on their firm Web sites: Office locations or affiliationsLines of service the firm provides (audit, tax, management consulting, etc.)Industry specialization information for the firmOnline software tools and databasesLatest tax law developments applicable to clientsCalculators for retirement account decisionsOnline privacy management softwareb. CPA firms invest their resources to develop sophisticated Web siteslargely because of a desire to maintain a client-service approach.Increased competition motivates CPA firms to improve thetraditional paths of providing information to their clients. A CPA firmcan reach clients more quickly and efficiently with vital informationvia the firm’s Web site than through more traditional forms ofcommunication, such as a monthly or quarterly newsletter. Also, asmore clients become sophisticated in the area of technology, theyexpect their CPA firms to do the same by providing a useful Website that has links to other helpful tools and resources.c. The Internet is a useful tool for a CPA firm’s accounting andauditing practice in many ways. A firm’s Web site can be used tomarket the firm’s accounting and auditing practice. The Internetalso connects the firm’s global professional staff, making it easierfor staff from all over the world to provide client service on a timelybasis without having to be physically present at the client’s location.CPAs also use online resources and databases to remain currenton emerging business and standards-setting issues. Examplesinclude Standard and Poor’s Net Advantage Database andGoldman Sachs Research Database. These two databases provideextensive industry-specific information and coverage of companiesthat CPAs use on a subscription basis to stay current on industrydevelopments and to obtain industry data useful for auditing andconsulting.Internet Problem Solution: CPA Vision Project2-1 The CPA Vision Project [] is all about helping the “CPA profession stay on top of the change curve.”With input from CPAs across the nation, the CPA Vision process created a comprehensive and integrated vision of the profession’s future.1. What characteristics and professional services come to mind whenyou hear the term CPA? What is your impression of the public’sstereotype of CPAs?Answer: Student responses will vary.2. Fill in the missing words in the following Vision Statement:Answer:“CPAs are the trusted professionals who enable people and organizations to shape their future. Combining insight with integrity, CPAs deliver value by …Communicating the total picture with clarity and objectivity,Translating complex information into critical knowledge,Anticipating and creating opportunities, andDesigning pathways that transform vision into reality.3. Briefly describe the eight forces that will impact the profession.Answer: The eight forces are:1. Non-CPA Competitors - The number of new, non-CPA competitors, not bound by the profession's code of standardsand ethics is increasing at an alarming rate.2. Decline of new CPAs - The number of students and young people electing to join the CPA profession has dramatically declined.3. Technology Displacement - Many of the traditional, essential skills of CPAs are being replaced by new technologies thatare increasing in number and being rapidly developed, oftenfrom unexpected sources.4. Borderless World- As the world becomes borderless, the marketplace is demanding more complex, real-time adviceand services, presenting unlimited opportunities for CPAs to expand their skills, competencies, and services.5. Leadership Imperative - Corporations are conductingbusiness in a world of commerce that is global, technological, instantaneous, and increasingly virtual. The leadership they require from both internal and external advisors requires new insights, new skills, and extraordinary agility.6. Technological Advances - Technology will continue to challenge and reshape our lifestyles, work patterns,educational experiences, and communication styles and techniques. Technology will rewrite the "rules of business," leaving those who will not harness it and effectively integrateit far behind.7. Market Value Shifts- The perceived value of some of the profession's cornerstone services-accounting, auditing, andtax preparation-is declining in the marketplace.8. Pressure to Transform Finance from Scorekeeper toBusiness Partner - The CPA in business is being challengedto deliver value to the organization and help create asustainable competitive advantage.4. The CPA Vision Project suggests that “the increasing complexities of the global environment and the commodity characteristics of traditional services mandate that the CPA profession migrate up theeconomic value chain.” What is meant by “moving up the economicvalue chain,”and how are CPAs going to accomplish this? (Hint:See the “Final Report.”)Answer: Moving up the economic value chain means moving fromproviding low value products and services to providing higher valueproducts and services (i.e., services that will permit the professionto thrive in a knowledge-based, global economy). The higher on theeconomic value chain, the higher the revenue. “The more a productor service is refined and defined, the less market value it will have.For example: tax preparation services have been commoditizedand automated to the point that they can largely be preparedelectronically. Tax form preparation is a Platform 1 service - afoundation service. The higher economic value of this informationlies in understanding what the foundation service implies-the“where do we go from here”and the “so whats”of business andfinance. Higher Platform services, such as estate and financialplanning are where higher economic benefits exist for the future ofthe profession. Higher Platform services are, and will increasinglybe, the most valued services and functions, and therefore willcommand higher fees and salaries. Traditional services are thefoundation from which CPAs can leverage to higher valueservices.” The report describes 7 platforms.Obviously to move up the value chain CPAs need to develop expertise for and market higher value services. For some this mayrepresent “thinking out of the box.”(Note: Internet problems address current issues using Internet sources. Because Internet sites are subject to change, Internet problems and solutions are subject to change. Current information on Internet problems is available at ).。
英语词汇的奥秘智慧树知到课后章节答案2023年下武汉科技大学
英语词汇的奥秘智慧树知到课后章节答案2023年下武汉科技大学武汉科技大学绪论单元测试1.阅读英文原版的报刊和文学作品需要达到多少词汇量？答案:8000-9000词族2.阅读理解的基础是什么？答案:字词3.国家语委指定的《通用规范汉字表》主表收字8105个。
答案:对第一章测试1.英语是英伦三岛的本土语言。
答案:错2.古英语阶段，英语中的外来语主要是法语。
答案:错3.中古英语阶段，英语单词的读音和拼写都产生了很大的改变。
答案:对4.诺曼征服后，为了更好地统治英国，法国统治者以英语为主要交流语言。
答案:错5.法语构词成分的进入，极大地增强了英语的构词能力。
答案:对6.英语中的词缀，都是英语本族语构词成分。
答案:错7.在现代英语早期阶段，英语就已经成为一门世界性的语言。
答案:错8.英语中的外来词源，主要是拉丁语、希腊语和德语。
答案:错9.英语中的外来语单词数量远远高于本族语单词数量。
答案:对10.（），标志着英语逐步走入正轨，确立其国语的正式地位。
答案:塞缪尔编纂的《英语词典》的问世11.中古英语阶段，法语对英语的影响主要表现在哪些方面？答案:改变英语单词的发音和拼写;简化英语单词的词尾;增加英语单词的同义表达;影响英语单词的词义12.下列哪些单词是外来语单词？答案:doctorate;longevity第二章测试1.英语中不可再分的语言单位是语素。
答案:对2.汉语中，“人”和单人旁“亻”都是语素，都表达“人”的基本含义。
答案:对3.语素变体是同一个语素的不同表现形式，表达不同的语义。
答案:错4.一个语素受其前后语素字母发音的影响，呈现出不同的变体形式。
答案:对5.可以独立做单词使用的语素叫自由语素。
答案:对6.词根是一个单词中最重要的语素。
答案:对7.曲折词缀附加在词基上，能够生成新的单词。
答案:错8.英语中的曲折词缀都是后缀，表示词的语法意义。
答案:对9.从构词的角度来说，nature、natural和naturalization在英语里算作3个不同的单词。
法律英语_南京审计大学中国大学mooc课后章节答案期末考试题库2023年
法律英语_南京审计大学中国大学mooc课后章节答案期末考试题库2023年1.直接管理公司的机构是董事会，董事会的英文是Board of ________参考答案:Directors2.M&A是哪两种行为的简称？参考答案:merger and acquisition3.trial court的中文意思是参考答案:初审法院4.公司的解散可以表达为参考答案:dissolution_termination5.有权优先分配公司红利的股票是参考答案:preferred stock6.judicial system最准确的中文翻译为参考答案:司法审判系统7.下列选项中，可以译为“新设合并”的是参考答案:consolidated merger8.下列选项中，可以译为“薪酬委员会”的是参考答案:compensation committee9.在大陆法的dual boards 制度中，除了board of directors意外，还包括board of ________ （监事会、监察委员会）参考答案:supervisors10.“立法机关”英文应表达为参考答案:legislature11.Justice的意思有参考答案:正义_大法官12.“非法的”在英文中可以表达为unlawful_illegal_wrongful13.“合法的”在英文中可以表达为参考答案:legal_legitimate_legit14.violation的意思有参考答案:违法_侵犯（权利）15.“自愿解散”在英文中可以译为参考答案:voluntary dissolution_Dissolution by agreement16.下列选项中，可以译为劳动法的有参考答案:labour law_Employment Law_Employment Act17.世界贸易组织的英文应表达为参考答案:World Trade Organization18.plea bargaining 的意思是控辩交易19.下列选项中属于指控文件的有参考答案:complaints_informations_indictment20.arrest warrant中文意思是参考答案:逮捕令21.“法律”在英文中可以表达为参考答案:Law_Code_Statute_Act22.公司章程在英文中可以表达为 _____ of association参考答案:articles23.betrothal的中文意思是？参考答案:婚约24.下列选项中，表示婚姻的英语有参考答案:marriage_matrimony25.divorcee practice的中文意思是参考答案:离婚律师业务26.下列选项中表示“律师”的有参考答案:lawyer_attorney_counsel27.Office of the court的中文意思是参考答案:律师28.The regulation of the legal profession is primarily the concern of the states,each of which has its own requirements for admission to （）.对法律职业的管制主要是州政府的事。
英文版昆曲介绍
The English version of Kunqu opera promotes the understanding and application of traditional Chinese culture and history among Western audiences, facilitating the international seminar of Chinese culture
Stage setting: English Kunqu Opera typically uses a simple stage set, often with a single backlog and props that are symbolic and minimalist, emphasizing the focus on the actors' performance
Viewing Guide and Precautions
Comparison and communication with the Chinese version of Kunqu opera
Performance style: English Kunqu Opera maintains many of the essential elements of Kunqu Opera, such as mime, structure, and formal expression, while also incorporating local performance styles and techniques
Attention
Viewers should approach the performance with an open mind and approve the art and effort that goes into each performance
Audit committee characteristics and earnings management evidence from Malaysia 读书笔记
三，应该同时考虑审计委员会的活跃程度和独立性。
四，成员的独立性和审计委员会的活跃程度并没有明显的关系，两者并 没有足够的数据支撑其应该一起考虑。（审计委员会成员的独立性并不 会推动审计委员会的活跃程度。）
结论
(1)完全独立的审计委员会能够减少盈余管理。
(2)拥有会计专业知识背景的成员和开会频率的相互作用能 够减少盈余管理。 (3)在负的UME比正的UME公司审计委员会特征的抑制盈余管 理行为的作用更加突出。
研究的不足ຫໍສະໝຸດ (1)不适用于其他国家的数据。（马来西亚自身上市公司的特
点） (2)横截面的数据不足以说明全部问题。 (3)会计技术处理和会计估计可能是另外一种有目的的信号传 递。
研究展望
成员具有政治背景，公司具有政府项目和 审计委员会在公司治理中扮演的角色
实证检验
检验结果
假设
H1 H2 H3
结果
不显著，拒绝 不显著，拒绝 不显著，拒绝
H4
H5 H6
显著，接受
显著，接受 部分显著
另外的解释
一，Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002证明了独立审计委员会的独立性利用 “比例”（非执行董事比例）与盈余管理替代变量之间没有显著的关系。 即只有在全部成员都为非执行董事的情况下，考虑审计委员会的独立性 才有意义，才会对盈余管理产生影响。 二，区分行业的潜在影响并没有影响结果。（T5里第一二栏均显示一 致。）
关键词
盈余；审计委员会；会计处理；马来西亚
研究背景
1.亚洲金融危机后
2.马来西亚颁布了公司治理 法
研究目标
第一，在马来西亚的公司里，审计委员会是否存在某 些特征能对降低盈余管理起到作用？ 第二，去衡量审计委会会成员的专业知识背景和活跃 程度水平的相互作用能否作用于公司治理效率。
最高审计机关欧洲组织审计质量指南
最高审计机关欧洲组织审计质量指南下载提示：该文档是本店铺精心编制而成的，希望大家下载后，能够帮助大家解决实际问题。
文档下载后可定制修改，请根据实际需要进行调整和使用，谢谢！本店铺为大家提供各种类型的实用资料，如教育随笔、日记赏析、句子摘抄、古诗大全、经典美文、话题作文、工作总结、词语解析、文案摘录、其他资料等等，想了解不同资料格式和写法，敬请关注！Download tips: This document is carefully compiled by this editor. I hope that after you download it, it can help you solve practical problems. The document can be customized and modified after downloading, please adjust and use it according to actual needs, thank you! In addition, this shop provides you with various types of practical materials, such as educational essays, diary appreciation, sentence excerpts, ancient poems, classic articles, topic composition, work summary, word parsing, copy excerpts, other materials and so on, want to know different data formats and writing methods, please pay attention!欧洲组织审计质量指南简介审计是确保公共部门和机构运作有效、透明和合规的重要工具。
内部审核争议问题处理方案
内部审核争议问题处理方案英文回答：Controversial Internal Audit Issues: Dispute Resolution Mechanisms.Internal audits play a crucial role in ensuring the accuracy, reliability, and compliance of an organization's financial and operational activities. However, there may be instances when the findings and recommendations of internal auditors are contested, leading to disputes and disagreements. To address such situations effectively, organizations should establish robust dispute resolution mechanisms that ensure fairness, transparency, and timely resolution.Types of Internal Audit Disputes.Internal audit disputes can arise from various sources, including:Disagreements over the scope and methodology of the audit.Challenges to the accuracy and validity of audit findings.Conflicts over the interpretation of accounting standards or regulations.Resistance to implementing recommended corrective actions.Dispute Resolution Process.To resolve internal audit disputes efficiently, a structured process should be followed, typically involving the following steps:1. Informal Resolution:The first step is to attempt to resolve the disputeinformally through direct communication between the internal audit team and the parties involved. This can be achieved through meetings, discussions, and document exchanges.2. Mediation:If informal resolution is not successful, an independent mediator can be appointed to facilitate discussions and help the parties reach a consensus.3. Arbitration:In cases where mediation fails, arbitration may be necessary. Arbitration involves the appointment of an impartial arbitrator who reviews the evidence and issues a binding decision.4. Management Review:As a last resort, the dispute may be escalated to the audit committee or senior management for review andresolution.5. External Escalation:In rare cases, the dispute may be escalated to external regulatory authorities or professional bodies for intervention.Best Practices for Dispute Resolution.To ensure the effectiveness of internal audit dispute resolution mechanisms, the following best practices should be considered:Establish clear roles and responsibilities for each party involved in the process.Create a fair and impartial process that allows all parties to present their views.Seek professional assistance from mediators or arbitrators when necessary.Document all steps and decisions throughout the process.Establish timeframes for dispute resolution to prevent delays.Foster a culture of open communication andcollaboration between internal audit and other stakeholders.中文回答：内部审计争议问题的处理方案。
thebusinessvoice
audit reformaccountancy december 201197The voice of audit committees, and in particular their chairs, has been largely absent from the current debate on the future of audit. With the publication of the European Commission’s proposedreforms for the audit market, hearing from those who are on the front line when it comes to the work of auditors could have a signifi cant infl uence.ICAEW commissioned Brunswick Research to interview audit committee chairs of a quarter of the UK’s FTSE 100 companies in September/October to get their views on the EU proposals and to understand how they feel reform will impact on their role.The fi rst question that audit committee chairs have is ‘Why?’. They want to know the rationale for audit market reform and do not feel the case has been made convincingly. They think the UK audit sector is ‘fi t for purpose’, highly expert and professional. UK audit fi rms and auditors are ‘best in class’ and world leaders in terms of quality, excellence and professionalism.They have not seen clear evidence that fundamental issues relating to audit either precipitated or accelerated the fi nancial crisis. As a result, they feel that the proposals are designed to solve a problem (the conditions which led to the banking crisis) with the wrong solution (major reform of audit). As one chair puts it: ‘I think this green paper is trying to correct a wrong that doesn’t exist.’Nonetheless, chairs do see merit in some of the proposals as ways to help maintain audit quality,THEBUSINESS VOICENew research shows audit committee chairsquestion the impact of EU audit reform on their role and audit quality. Simon Thompson independence and overall market confidence. Fewwould argue against more competition but theyrecognise the challenges of creating an expanded market. The ideal scenario, they say, would be forthe Group A fi rms to become more competitive within the FTSE 100. There is no question about the quality of the Group A, but they are perceived to lack the necessary scale and size at present to conduct audit at this level.Audit committee chairs believe the size of themarket has reached its lower limit. If the Big Four became the Big Three, real concerns would emergearound lack of choice and the prospect of confl ictsand confi dentiality issues. They have mixed views about the EU proposals on tendering and auditorrotation, but support greater openness around thetendering process.JOINT AUDIT OPPOSITIONThere is real opposition from audit committee chairs to joint audits. They have serious concerns about whether issues will ‘fall between the cracks’, the additional costs involved (paying two fi rms and the committee’s increased workload) and the challenges of two audit fi rms working effectively together. They acknowledge the Commission’s concerns that auditors should be able to demonstrate greater independence. They feel this should be addressed through more effective communication and greater transparency around the audit process. The majority think existing safeguards work well and that auditor independence is reinforced by audit partner rotation.They fear that some proposed reforms could have a fundamental impact on the role of audit committees and their responsibilities: the fi nancial crisis has already increased demands on their time. They agree that the committee’s role must be clearly delineated and should not compromise or replace the role of the main board, especially on strategic risk decisions, the business model and signing the annual report.Finally, audit committee chairs wantpolicymakers and regulators to recognise the limitations of external audit. They do not want to see audit quality compromised in pursuit of broader reform.Simon Thompson is ICAEW head of corporate communications. View the research, Views of Audit Committee Chairs: Their Perspectives on the European Commission’s Draft Proposals for Reform of the Audit Market, at/aaf, choosing the ‘Audit and Beyond’ optionThis green paper is trying to correct a wrong that doesn’texist。
Audit Committee Charter
Audit Committee CharterSECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARTERPurposeThe role of the Audit Committee is to assist the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Fossil Group, Inc. (the “Company”) in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities related to:∙the accounting and financial reporting practices of the Company and its subsidiaries, including the integrity of the Company’sfinancial statements;∙the surveillance of administration, disclosure and financial controls;∙the Company’s compliance with legal and regulatory requirements;∙the Company’s monitoring and enforcement of its Code of Conduct and Ethics;∙the qualifications and independence of any independent auditor of the Company; and∙the audit of the Company’s financial statements, includi ng the performance of the Company’s internal audit function and theCompany’s independent auditor(s).The Audit Committee shall also prepare the report required by the rules of the Securities Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) to be included in the Company’s annual proxy statement.CompositionThe Board shall appoint an Audit Committee of at least three members, consisting entirely of independent directors of the Board (as determined by the Board), and shall either designate one member as chairperson or delegate the authority to designate a chairperson to the Audit Committee. Members of the Audit Committee shall be appointed by the Board upon the recommendation of a majority of the independent directors and may be removed by the Board in its discretion.IndependenceThe independence of Audit Committee members shall be determined pursuant to the rules and regulations set by the SEC, Section 10A(m) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) and the rules and requirements of the NASDAQ Stock Ma rket (“NASDAQ”). No member of the Audit Committee shall have participated in the preparation of the financial statements of the Company or any current subsidiary of the Company at any time in the past three years.Financial ExpertiseAll members of the Audit Committee must be able to read and understand financial statements prepared in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles at the time of their appointment. In addition, the Audit Committee must have at least one committee member who meets the requirements of an “Audit Committee Financial Expert,” as such term is defined in Item 407(d)(5) of Regulation S-K of the Securities Act of 1933.In addition, if an Audit Committee member ceases to be independent for reasons outside the member’s reasonable control, his or her membership on the Audit Committee may continue until the earlier of the Company’s next annual shareholders’ meeting or one year from the occurrence of the event that caused the failure to qualify as independent. If the Company is not already relying on this provision, and falls out of compliance with the NASDAQ requirements regarding Audit Committee composition due to a single vacancy on the Audit Committee, then the Company will have until the earlier of the next annual sha reholders’ meeting or one year from the occurrence of the event that caused the failure to comply with this requirement. The Audit Committee shall cause the Company to provide notice to NASDAQ immediately upon learning of the event or circumstance that caused the non-compliance, if it expects to rely on either of these provisions for a cure period.MeetingsThe Audit Committee shall meet as often as it determines but no less than once per quarter, either in person or telephonically, and at such times and places as the Audit Committee shall determine. The Audit Committee should have unrestricted access to and meet regularly with each of management, the principal internal auditor of the Company and the principal outside auditing firm to discuss any matters that the Audit Committee or any of these groups believes should be discussed. In addition, the Audit Committee or its chairperson should meet with the independent auditors, management and the internal auditor quarterly to review the Company’s financial stat ements. A majority of the members of the AuditCommittee present in person or by telephone shall constitute a quorum. The Audit Committee shall report regularly to the full Board of Directors with respect to its activities.Relationship with Independent AuditorsThe Audit Committee shall be directly responsible, in its capacity as a committee of the Board, for the appointment, compensation, retention and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm engaged for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or performing other audit, review or attest services for the Company. In this regard, the Audit Committee shall have the sole authority to (A) appoint and retain, (B) determine the funding for, and (C) when appropriate, terminate, the outside auditing firm, which shall report directly to the Audit Committee. The Audit Committee will be responsible for resolving any disputes between the outside auditing firms and the Company’s management.Responsibilities and DutiesTo fulfill its responsibilities and duties the Audit Committee shall:A. Financial Reporting Processes and Documents/Reports Review1.Evaluate annually the performance of the Audit Committee and reviewand reassess the adequacy of the Audit Committee charter.2.Review and discuss with the independent auditor(s): (A) the scopeof the audit, the results of the annual audit examination by the auditor and any accompanying management letters, and anydifficulties the auditor encountered in the course of their audit work, including any restrictions on the scope of the outsideauditing firm’s activities or on access to requested information, and any significant disagreements with management; (B) any reports of the outside auditing firms with respect to interim periods, as deemed appropriate by the Audit Committee; and (C) any other matters required to be discussed by the independent auditor with the Audit Committee under auditing standards adopted by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.3.Review and discuss with management and the independent auditor(s)the annual audited and quarterly unaudited financial statements of the Company, including (A) an analysis of the auditor’s judgment as to the quality of the Company’s accounting principles, setting forth significant financial reporting issues and judgments made in connection with the preparation of the financial statements; (B)the Company’s disclosures under “Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations,”including the development, selection and reporting of accounting policies that may be regarded as critical; and (C) major issues regarding the Company’s accounting principles and financial statement presentations, including any significant changes in the Company’s selection o r application of accounting principles and financial statement presentations.4.Recommend to the Board whether the financial statements should beincluded in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K.5.Evaluate whether management is setting the appropriate tone at thetop by communicating the importance of strong control systems.6.In accordance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act review anddiscuss the adequacy of the Company’s internal controls, any significant deficiencies and material weaknesses if any in internal controls, and any significant changes in such controls with the Company’s independent auditors, internal auditors and management, and the adequacy of disclosures about changes in internal control over financial reporting.7.Review with the Compa ny’s independent auditors, internal auditorsand management the adequacy and effectiveness of the Company’s information management systems.8.Periodically review and discuss with the Company’s principalinternal auditor the scope of the internal audit plan, results of the audits conducted by the Company’s internal auditors, inclusive of findings, recommendations, management’s response and any significant difficulties encountered during the course of the audit.9.Periodically review and discuss the adequacy and effectiveness ofthe Company’s disclosure controls and procedures and management reports thereon.10.Review disclosures made to the Audit Committee by the Company’sChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer during their certification process for the Form 10-K and 10-Q about anysignificant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls or material weaknesses therein and any fraud involving management or other employees who have a significant role in the Company’s internal controls. Revi ew and discuss with management (including the senior internal audit employee) and the independent auditor the Company’s internal controls report and the independent auditor’s attestation of the report prior to the filing of the Company’s Form 10-K.11.Review and timely discuss with management and the principal outsideauditors any material financial or non-financial arrangements ofthe Company which do not appear on the financial statements of the Company.12.Discuss with management any matters that could have a materialimpact on the Company’s financial statements.13.Review annually reports of fees for audit, non-audit and legal feesfor services rendered.14.Review and discuss with the independent auditors their reportregarding (A) all critical accounting policies and practices to be used; (B) all alternative treatments of financial information within generally accepted accounting principles that have been discussed with management officials of the Company, ramifications of the use of such alternative disclosures and treatments, and the treatment preferred by the principal independent auditors; and (C) other material written communications between the independent auditors and Company management, such as any management letter comments and schedule of unadjusted differences.15.Review with financial management and the principal outside auditingfirm the Company’s Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filings with the SEC (including any amendments thereto containing amended or restated financial statements) prior to their filing or prior to the release of earnings reports. Discuss with management the Company’searnings press releases, including the use of “pro forma” or “adjusted” non-GAAP information, as well as financialinformation and earnings guidance provided to analysts and rating agencies. Such discussion may be done generally (consisting of discussing the types of information to be disclosed and the types of presentations to be made). The chairperson of the Audit Committee may represent the entire Audit Committee for purposes of this review.16.Discuss with management and the independent auditor the effect ofregulatory and accounting initiatives on the Company’s financial statements.17.Ensure that a public announcement of the Company’s receipt of anaudit opinion that contains a going concern qualification is made promptly.18.Review and discuss with management the Company’s major financialrisk exposures and the steps management has taken to monitor and control such exposures, including any risk assessment or risk management policies, and cyber security risk oversight.19.Keep the independent auditor informed of the Committee’sunderstanding of the Company’s relationships and transactions with related parties that are significant to the Company; and review and discuss with the independent auditor the auditor’s evaluation of the Company’s identification of, accounting for, and disclosureof its relationships and transactions with related parties,including any significant matters arising from the audit regarding the Company’s relationships a nd transactions with relatedparties.20.Review and discuss with management its annual and interimevaluation of the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern.B. Independent Auditors1.Approve in advance all auditing services and internalcontrol-related services to be provided by the principal outside auditing firm, including any written engagement letter relatedthereto. By approving the audit engagement, the audit servicecontemplated in any written engagement letter shall be deemed to have been pre-approved.2.Establish policies and procedures for the engagement of theprincipal outside auditing firm to provide permissible non-audit services, which shall require pre-approval by the Audit Committee of all permissible non-audit services to be provided by the outside auditing firm (other than with respect to de minimis exceptions described in Section 10A(i)(1)(B) of the Exchange Act that areapproved by the Audit Committee prior to the completion of theaudit). Ensure that approval of non-audit services are disclosed to investors in periodic reports required by Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act.3.Delegate the authority to grant pre-approval of audit and non-auditservices to one or more designated members of the Audit Committee who are independent directors. Any such delegation shall bepresented to the full Audit Committee at its next scheduled meeting.4.At least annually, (A) consider the independence of the principaloutside auditing firm, including whether the outside auditingfirm’s performance of permissi ble non-audit services iscompatible with the auditor’s independence; (B) obtain and reviewa written report by the outside auditing firm describing anyrelationships between the outside auditing firm and the Company or any other relationships that may adversely affect the independence of the auditor; (C) discuss with the outside auditing firm anydisclosed relationship or services that may impact the objectivity and independence of the auditor; and (D) present to the Board the Audit Committee’s conclusions with respect to the independence of the outside auditing firm.5.Ensure rotation of the audit partners as required by law.6.Review the experience and qualifications of the senior members ofthe independent auditor team and the quality control procedures of the independent auditors.7.Establish policies for the hiring of employees and former employeesof the outside auditing firm.C. Outside AdvisorsThe Audit Committee shall have the authority to retain such outside counsel, accountants, experts and other advisors as it determines appropriate to assist the Audit Committee in the performance of its functions. The Audit Committee shall have sole authority to approve related fees and retention terms and shall receive funding for these appointments and ordinary administrative expenses from the Company.D. Oversight of the Company’s Internal Audit Function1.Review the appointment and replacement of the senior internalauditing employee.2.Review the significant reports to management prepared by theinternal auditing dep artment and management’s responses.3.Discuss with the independent auditor, management and the seniorinternal auditing services employee the audit services department responsibilities, budget and staffing and any recommended changes in the planned scope of the internal audit.4.Review with the senior internal auditing services employee anydifficulties encountered by the audit services function in thecourse of its audits, including any restrictions on the scope of its work or access to required information.E. Ethical and Legal Compliance1.Establish, review and update periodically a code of conduct andethics that applies to the Company’s directors, officers andemployees and ensure that management has established a system to enforce the code of conduct and ethics.2.Approve, if the duty is not delegated to a comparable body of theBoard, all material related party transactions, which refers to transactions required to be disclosed under Item 404 of Regulation S-K of the Exchange Act.3.Review with the Company’s counsel any legal, tax or regulatorymatter that could have a material impact on the Company’s financial statements.4.Establish procedures for the receipt, retention, treatment andcommunication to the Audit Committee of complaints received by theCompany r egarding violations of the Company’s Code of Conduct and Ethics (including suspected fraud), accounting, internalaccounting controls or auditing matters of the Company.5.Establish procedures for the confidential, anonymous submission byemployees of concerns, including concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.6.Obtain from the independent auditor assurance that Section 10A(b)of the Exchange Act has not been implicated.7.Perform any other activities consistent with this Charter, theComp any’s bylaws and governing law, as the Audit Committee or the Board deems necessary or appropriate.Limitation of Audit Committee’s RoleWhile the Audit Committee has the responsibilities and powers set forth in this Charter, it is not the duty of the Audit Committee to plan or conduct audits or to determine that the Company’s financial statements and disclosures are complete and accurate and are in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and applicable rules and regulations. These are the responsibilities of management and the independent auditor. Further, it is not the duty of the Audit Committee to conduct investigations or to ensure that the Company and its employees comply with laws and regulations and the Company’s Code of Conduct an d Ethics.。
certified internal auditor考试题
certified internal auditor考试题Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) Exam QuestionsThe Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) exam is designed to assess the knowledge, skills, and abilities of internal auditors. It is a rigorous certification process that tests individuals on various topics related to internal audit, risk management, governance, and internal controls. In this article, we will explore sample questions from the CIA exam, providing you with an opportunity to assess your own understanding of the subject matter.1. Auditing Basics:Question: What is the purpose of an internal audit?Answer: The purpose of an internal audit is to provide independent and objective assurance and consulting services. Internal auditors evaluate an organization's operations, assess the effectiveness of its internal controls, and provide recommendations for improvement.2. Risk Management:Question: What is the difference between inherent risk and control risk?Answer: Inherent risk refers to the susceptibility of a process or activity to error or misstatement in the absence of controls. Control risk, on the other hand, is the risk that a material misstatement will not be prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis by an organization's internal controls.3. Governance and Organizational Structure:Question: What are the responsibilities of the audit committee?Answer: The audit committee is responsible for overseeing an organization's internal and external audit activities, financial reporting process, and risk management practices. It ensures that the organization has appropriate internal controls, compliance programs, and ethical practices in place.4. Internal Control:Question: What are the components of the COSO Internal Control Framework?Answer: The COSO Internal Control Framework consists of five components: control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities. These components work together to provide an effective system of internal control.5. Fraud:Question: What are the red flags of fraudulent activities?Answer: Red flags of fraudulent activities include excessive and unexplained journal entries, unrecorded or improperly recorded transactions, unauthorized or unusual payments, and conflicts of interest. Other indicators may include a lack of segregation of duties, pressure to achieve financial targets, and a disregard for internal controls.6. IT Audit:Question: What is the purpose of an IT audit?Answer: The purpose of an IT audit is to evaluate an organization's information systems, security controls, and data integrity. IT auditors assess the effectiveness of IT governance, risk management, and control processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information assets.7. Ethics and Professional Conduct:Question: What are the ethical principles that internal auditors should adhere to?Answer: Internal auditors should adhere to the principles of integrity, objectivity, confidentiality, and competency. They should demonstrate professional behavior, maintain their independence, and avoid conflicts of interest. Internal auditors should also comply with applicable laws, regulations, and professional standards.These sample questions provide a glimpse into the diverse topics covered in the Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) exam. Aspiring internal auditors must thoroughly study these subjects to successfully pass the examination and earn the prestigious CIA certification. Remember, continuous learning and professional development are essential for any internal auditor seeking to excel in their career.。
AbbottAuditCommitteeCharter
Audit Committee Charter1. Purpose. The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors shall assist the Board infulfilling its oversight responsibility with respect to:•Abbott’s accounting and financial reporting practices and the audit process;•the quality and integrity of Abbott’s financial statements;•the independent auditors’ qualifications, independence, and performance;•the performance of Abbott’s internal audit function and internal auditors;•legal and regulatory compliance as it relates to financial matters, including accounting, auditing, financial reporting, and securities law issues (recognizing thatother board committees assist the Board of Directors in reviewing other areas of legaland regulatory compliance); and•Abbott’s enterprise risk management, including major financial risk exposures (recognizing that other board committees assist the Board of Directors in reviewingcertain aspects of risk management);and shall prepare the report required by the rules of the Securities and ExchangeCommission to be included in Abbott’s annual proxy statement.2. Organization. The Audit Committee shall be composed of at least three (3) directors.Each member must satisfy the independence and financial literacy requirements of theNew York Stock Exchange, Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, therules under Section 10A (which rules shall be deemed included in any reference in thischarter to Section 10A of the Exchange Act), and this charter, as such requirements areinterpreted by the Board in its business judgment. At least one member of the AuditCommittee shall have accounting or related financial management expertise, as suchqualification is interpreted by the Board in its business judgment. Director’s fees andcommittee fees are the only compensation an Audit Committee member may receivefrom Abbott. No member of the Audit Committee may serve simultaneously on the audit committee of more than three public companies. Abbott’s Board shall appoint, and may remove, members of the Audit Committee and the Committee’s Chairman, acting on the recommendation of Abbott’s Nominations and Governance Committee.3. Authority and Responsibilities. The Audit Committee is directly responsible for theappointment, termination, compensation, and oversight of the work of Abbott’sindependent auditors (including the resolution of disagreements between managementand the independent auditors regarding financial reporting) for the purpose of preparing or issuing an audit report or related work. It shall report regularly to the Board.Abbott’s independent auditors shall report directly to the Audit Committee. Abbott’s internal auditors shall be ultimately accountable to the Audit Committee and the Board of Directors. The Audit Committee shall pre-approve all audit and permissible non-audit services to be rendered by the independent auditors. Alternatively, Abbott may enter into engagements to render such services pursuant to pre-approval policies and procedures established by the Audit Committee; provided, that such polices and procedures are detailed as to the particular service, the Audit Committee is informed of each service and such policies and procedures do not include the delegation of Audit Committee responsibilities under the Exchange Act to management. Moreover, the pre-approval requirement for permissible non-audit services shall be waived under certain circumstances described in Section 10A of the Exchange Act.The Audit Committee may, to the extent it deems necessary or appropriate, conduct or authorize investigations into any matter within the scope of its authority and may retain legal counsel, accountants and others to assist it in the conduct of its responsibilities, including investigations. The Audit Committee shall receive appropriate funding, as determined by the Audit Committee, from Abbott for payment of (a) compensation to the independent auditor employed by Abbott for the purpose of rendering or issuing an audit report or performing other audit, review or attest services for Abbott, (b) compensation to any special legal, accounting or other consultants employed by the Audit Committee and (c) ordinary administrative expenses of the Audit Committee that are necessary or appropriate in carrying out its duties. The Audit Committee may consult with management and may delegate any of its responsibilities and duties to one or more members of the Audit Committee, except to the extent such delegation would be inconsistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act or the listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange.The Audit Committee shall:•Prepare the report required by the rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission to be included in Abbott’s annual proxy statement.•Meet separately, periodically, with Abbott’s independent auditors, with Abbott’s management and with Abbott’s internal auditors.•At least annually, evaluate the qualifications, performance, and independence of Abbott’s independent auditors and appoint a firm of independent public accountants to act as Abbott’s independent auditors. This evaluation shall include the review and evaluation of the lead partner of Abbott’s independent auditors and take into account the opinions of Abbott’s management and internal auditors. In connection with this evaluation and appointment, the Audit Committee shall obtain and review a report by Abbott’s then current independent auditors describing:the independent auditors’ internal quality-control procedures;any material issues raised by the most recent internal quality-control review, or peer review, of the independent auditors, or by any inquiry or investigation bygovernmental or professional authorities, within the preceding five years,respecting one or more independent audits carried out by the independentauditors, and any steps taken to deal with any such issues; andall relationships between the independent auditors and Abbott.The Audit Committee shall discuss with the independent auditors any relationships disclosed in that report and shall, if necessary, take appropriate action to ensure the auditors’ independence.•Oversee compliance of Abbott’s rotation policy for the partners and employees of its independent auditors with the requirements of Section 10A of the Exchange Act. The Audit Committee shall consider the regular rotation of Abbott’s independent auditors and report its conclusions to the Board.•Meet to review and discuss with management and the independent auditors: the annual audited financial statements and quarterly financial statements, including Abbott’s specific disclosures under Management’s Discussion andAnalysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (that is, under thesection captioned “Financial Review”) and the matters required to be discussedpursuant to Auditing Standards Section AU 380, as adopted by the PublicCompany Accounting Oversight Board, before their incorporation into Abbott’sfilings with the Securities and Exchange Commission;the independent auditors’ report on the effectiveness of Abbott’s internal control over financial reporting;the scope, procedures and fees for the proposed audit for the current year and, at its conclusion, review that audit including any comments or recommendations by the independent auditors;earnings releases (paying particular attention to any use of “pro-forma” or “adjusted” non-GAAP information), as well as financial information and earnings guidance provided to analysts and rating agencies (this may be done generally and need not occur in advance of each earnings release or each instance in whichAbbott may provide earnings guidance);the responsibilities, budget and staffing of Abbott’s internal audit function;major issues regarding accounting principles and financial statement presentations, including significant changes in Abbott’s selection or application of accounting principles and major issues as to the adequacy of Abbott’s internalcontrols and any special audit steps adopted in light of material controldeficiencies;analyses prepared by management or Abbott’s independent auditors setting forth significant financial reporting issues and judgments made in connection with thepreparation of financial statements, including analyses of the effects of alternativeGAAP methods on the financial statements; andthe effect of regulatory and accounting initiatives, as well as off-balance sheet structures (if any), on Abbott’s financial statements.•Review and discuss with Abbott’s independent auditors: any problems or difficulties encountered in the course of the audit work, including any restrictions on the scope of the independent auditors’ activities or on access to requested information andmanagement’s response, and any significant disagreements with management;any report by the independent auditors required by Section 10A of the Exchange Act including any report relating to critical accounting policies and practices to beused in connection with the audit of Abbott, all alternative treatments of financialinformation within generally accepted accounting principles that have beendiscussed with management, the ramifications of the use of those alternativedisclosures and treatments, and the treatment preferred by the independentauditors, and other material written communications between the independentauditors and management; andany information obtained from the independent auditors with respect to illegal acts in accordance with Section 10A.•Review and discuss with Abbott’s internal auditors the internal audit function, the department’s authority and responsibilities, budget, staffing, independence, and reporting obligations, the proposed audit plan for the coming year, the coordination of thatproposed audit plan with Abbott’s independent auditors, the results of the internal audit and a specific review of any significant issues.•Review and discuss (with management, the internal auditors and the independent auditors, as appropriate) Abbott’s enterprise risk management, including major financial risk exposures, and the steps management has taken to monitor and control thoseexposures, including Abbott’s risk assessment and risk management policies.•Adopt policies governing the hiring of employees or former employees of the independent auditors who were engaged on Abbott’s account in compliance with Section 10A of the Exchange Act.•Establish procedures for:the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints received by Abbott regarding accounting, internal accounting controls or auditing matters, andthe confidential, anonymous submission by employees of concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters.•Review any disclosures made to the Audit Committee by Abbott’s chief executive officer or chief financial officer relating to their certification obligations under Rule 13a-14under the Exchange Act.•Review with the independent auditors, internal auditors and financial management, the adequacy, effectiveness and quality of the Corporation’s accounting and financialreporting principles, policies, procedures and controls, and elicit from them anyrecommendations for improvements.4.Annual Performance Evaluation. The Audit Committee shall review and assess the adequacyof its charter annually and recommend any proposed changes to the Board for approval. It also shall conduct an annual evaluation of the Audit Committee’s performance.。
世界审计组织INTOSAI绩效审计指南正文翻译版
世界审计组织效益审计指南前言1998年，在蒙特维地亚召开的世界审计组织会议上，与会代表一致同意对《世界审计组织审计准则》进行重组，以明确《职业道德规范》和《审计准则》之间的联系，并促进信息更新。
大家还同意开发《世界审计组织审计准则》实施指南。
虽然这些审计准则的重点是财务审计，但它们也覆盖了效益审计的内容。
大会认为，一旦《世界审计组织审计准则》实施指南编写完毕，世界审计组织的审计准则就完整成套了。
大家注意到，各国最高审计机关在答复1997年的《世界审计组织审计准则》问卷时都提出了为财务和效益审计编制指南的要求。
大会讨论表明，这些指南将协助各国最高审计机关实施《世界审计组织审计准则》。
世界审计组织审计准则委员会将与其他常设委员会和工作小组一起协商，完成所要求的指南开发工作。
鉴于效益审计的特点，大家认为，为这种审计单独开发指南是比较明智的做法。
正如许多国家指出的那样，开展效益审计需要特别的指南，因为效益审计在本质上有别于财务审计。
本文件的目的是开发效益审计指南，也就是朝着上述目标前进一步。
我们根据《世界审计组织审计准则》和实际经验为实施指南提供了一种可行框架。
虽然此文件不是一种技术文件或手册，但它针对效益审计的特殊要求和特点收录了一些具有实际指导意义的准则和其他内容。
编制此文件的目的是为以下工作提供指南：1.协助各国最高审计机关的效益审计师高效率、有成效地；管理和开展先进的效益审计；2.提倡高效率、有成效的效益审计实务；3.为进一步开发效益审计方法和专业发展提供依据；4.制定有助于审计师行使专业判断的基础框架并创造一种有助于效益审计师提高技术、全面实现其潜力的环境。
效益审计师在工作中可能会面临一定程度的多样性和模糊性。
他们需要对有关活动和管理工作进行分析。
他们可能会面临熟悉各种被审计单位机构环境和课题内容的必要性。
他们需要以符合逻辑的、有充分证据支持的方式，就复杂的事项撰写报告。
这些指南可以在上述领域为他们提供帮助，但通过其他方法提高自身的审计技术在很大程度上要依靠效益审计师自己完成。
审计职业规范准则及相关法律责任
第一节 审计职业标准概述 第二节 独立审计准那么
第三节 注册会计师的法律责任
第三章 第一节 审计职业标准概述
一、审计职业标准的含义和内容 1、含义：
对审计人员素质与资格、行为标准的权威性标准 ，是衡量和评价审计质量的根本标准。
2、内容： 技术标准即审计准那么---约束审计工作 职业道德标准---约束审计人员的行为
第三章 第二节 独立审计准那么
一、美国审计准那么 2、美国民间审计准那么〔美国注册会计师协会1972年〕 Generally Accepted Auditing Standards □Standards of reporting The report shall state whether the financial statements are
第三章 第二节 独立审计准那么
一、美国审计准那么 2、美国民间审计准那么〔美国注册会计师协会1972年〕 Generally Accepted Auditing Standards □ Standards of field work The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if
殊目的审计业务出具审计报告 23中国注册会计师审计准那么第１６０２号——验资 24中国注册会计师审计准那么第１６１１号——商业
银行财务报表审计 25中国注册会计师审计准那么第１６１２号——银行
间函证程序 26中国注册会计师审计准那么第１６１３号——与银
行监管机构的关系
第三章第三节 中国注册会计师职业标 准和审计准那么
单位使用效劳机构的考虑
13中国注册会计师审计准那么第１３０１号——审计证据
14中国注册会计师审计准那么第１３１１号——存货监盘
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Audit committee composition and auditor reporting
Joseph V Carcello; Terry L Neal The Accounting Review; Oct 2000; 75, 4; ABI/INFORM Global pg. 453
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