关于费尔巴哈的提纲德文原版恩格斯版版版

德文版MIA??>??Deutsch??>??Marxisten??>??Marx/Engels??>??EinleitungKarl MarxThesen überFeuerbach1. ad Feuerbach(1845)Geschrieben im Frühjahr 1845.Nach der Ver?ffentlichung des Marx-Engels-Lenin-Instituts, Moskau 1932.Diese Version aus Karl Marx u. Friedrich Engels,?Werke, Bd.3, Berlin 1978, S.5-7. Transkription u. HTML-Markierung:?Einde O’Callaghan?für das?Marxists’ Internet Archive.1Der Hauptmangel alles bisherigen Materialismus (den Feuerbachschen mit eingerechnet) ist, da? der Gegenstand, die Wirklichkeit, Sinnlichkeit nur unter der Form des?Objekts oder der Anschauung?gefa?t wird; nicht aber als?sinnlich menschliche T?tigkeit, Praxis; nicht subjektiv. Daher die?t?tige?Seite abstrakt im Gegensatz zu dem Materialismus von dem Idealismus – der natürlich die wirkliche, sinnliche T?tigkeit als solche nicht kennt – entwickelt Feuerbach will sinnliche –von den Gedankenobjekten wirklich unterschiedne Objekte: aber er fa?t die menschliche T?tigkeit selbstnicht als gegenst?ndliche?T?tigkeit. Er betrachtet daher im?Wesen des Christenthum?nur das theoretische Verhalten als das echt menschliche, w?hrend die Praxis nur in ihrer schmutzig jüdischen Erscheinungsform gefa?t und fixiert wird. Er begreift daher nicht die Bedeutung der ?revolution?ren“, der ?praktisch-kritischen“ T?tigkeit.2Die Frage, ob dem menschlichen Denken gegenst?ndliche Wahrheit zukomme –ist keine Frage der Theorie, sondern eine praktische?Frage. in der Praxis mu? der Mensch die Wahrheit, i.e. Wirklichkeit und Macht, Diesseitigkeit seines Denkens beweisen. Der Streit über die Wirklichkeit oder Nichtwirklichkeit des. Denkens – das von der Praxis isoliert ist – ist eine rein scholastische?Frage.3Die materialistische Lehre von der Ver?nderung der Umst?nde und der Erziehung vergi?t, da? die Umst?nde von den Menschen ver?ndert und der Erzieher selbst erzogen werden mu?. Sie mu? daher die Gesellschaft in zwei Teile –von denen der eine über ihr erhaben ist – sondieren.Das Zusammenfallen des ?ndern[s] der Umst?nde und der menschlichen T?tigkeit oder Selbstver?nderung kann nur als revolution?re Praxis?gefa?t und rationell verstanden werden.4Feuerbach geht von dem Faktum der religi?sen Selbstentfremdung, der Verdopplung der Welt in eine religi?se und eine weltliche aus. Seine Arbeit besteht darin, die religi?se Welt in ihre weltliche Grundlage aufzul?sen. Aber da? die weltliche Grundlage sich von sich selbst abhebt und sich ein selbst?ndiges Reich in den Wolken fixiert, ist nur aus der Selbstzerrissenheit und Sichselbstwidersprechen dieser weltlichen Grundlage zu erkl?ren. Diese selbst mu? also in sich selbst sowohl in ihrem Widerspruch verstanden als praktisch revolutioniert werden. Also nachdem z.B. die irdische Familie als das Geheimnis der heiligen Familie entdeckt ist, mu? nun erstere selbst theoretisch und praktisch vernichtet werden.5Feuerbach, mit dem?abstrakten Denken?nicht zufrieden, will die?Anschauung; aber er fa?t die Sinnlichkeit nicht als praktische?menschlich-sinnliche T?tigkeit.6Feuerbach l?st das religi?se Wesen in das?menschliche?Wesen auf. Aber das menschliche Wesen ist kein dem einzelnen Individuum inwohnendes Abstraktum. In seiner Wirklichkeit ist es das ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verh?ltnisse.Feuerbach, der auf die Kritik dieses wirklichen Wesens nicht eingeht, ist daher gezwungen:1.von dem geschichtlichen Verlauf zu abstrahieren und das religi?seGemüt für sich zu fixieren, und ein abstrakt –?isoliert– menschlichesIndividuum vorauszusetzen.2.Das Wesen kann daher nur als ?Gattung“, als innere, stumme, dievielen Individuen?natürlich?verbindende Allgemeinheit gefa?t werden.7Feuerbach sieht daher nicht, da? das ?religi?se Gemüt“ selbst ein gesellschaftliches Produkt ist und da? das abstrakte Individuum, das er analysiert, einer bestimmten Gesellschaftsform angeh?rt.8Alles gesellschaftliche Leben ist wesentlich?praktisch. Alle Mysterien, welche die Theorie zum Mystizism[us] veranlassen, finden ihre rationelle L?sung in der menschlichen Praxis und in dem Begreifen dieser Praxis.9Das H?chste, wozu der anschauende Materialismus kommt, d.h. der Materialismus, der die Sinnlichkeit nicht als praktische T?tigkeitbegreift, ist die Anschauung der einzelnen Individuen und der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft.10Der Standpunkt des alten Materialismus ist die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, der Standpunkt des neuen die menschliche Gesellschaft oder die gesellschaftliche Menschheit.11Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschieden?interpretiert, es k?mmt drauf an, sie zu?ver?ndern.Anfang der SeiteZuletzt aktualisiert am?1888年版Marx/Engels Internet ArchiveTheses On FeuerbachWritten:?by Marx in the Spring of 1845, but slightly edited byEngels;First Published:?in German as an appendix to German editionof?Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical GermanPhilosophy?in 1888;Source:?Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical GermanPhilosophy, Progress Publishers 1946.1The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbachincluded –is that the things [Gegenstand], reality, sensuousness, areconceived only in the form of the?object?or of?contemplation, but notas?sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, it happened that the?active?side, in coradistinction to materialism, was set forth by idealism –but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such.Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as?objective?activity. Hence, in?Das Wesen des Christenthums, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significa nce of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity.2The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolates from practice is a purely scholastic question.3The materialist doctrine thaty men areproducts of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products pf other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who chnage circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence, this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society (in Robert Owen for example).The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice.4Feuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-estrangement, of the duplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world and a real one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secularbasis.?He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing stil remains to be done. For the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself, therefore, first be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionized in practice. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and transformed in practice.5Feuerbach, not satisfied with?abstract thinking, appeals to?sensuous contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.6Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.?In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is hence obliged:1.To abstract from the historical processand to define the religious sentiment[Gemüt] regarded by itself and topresuppose an abstract –?isolated?–human individual.2.The essence of man, therefore, can withhim be regarded only as “species”, asan inner, mute general character whichunites the many individuals only?in anatural way.7Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious sentiment” is itself a?social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs to a particular form of society.8Social life is essentially?practical. All mysteries which mislead theory into mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.9The highest point attained by?contemplative?materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is contemplation of single individuals and of “civil society.”10The standpoint of the old materialism is “civil” society; the standpoint of the new is?human?society, or associated humanity.11The philosophers have only?interpreted?the world, in various ways;the point, however, is to?change?it.1969年版Marx/Engels Internet ArchiveTheses On FeuerbachWritten:?by Marx in the Spring of 1845, but slightly edited by Engels;First Published:?As an appendix to?Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy?in 1888;Source:?Marx/Engels Selected Works, Volume One, p. 13 – 15. Note that this version differs from the version of Engels’ edition published in MECW Volume 5, pp. 6-8;Publisher:?Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, 1969; Translated:?W. Lough from the German;Transcription/Markup:?Zodiac/Brian Baggins;Copyleft:?Marx/Engels Internet Archive?() 1995, 1999, 2002. Permission is granted to copy and/or distribute this document under the terms of the?Creative Commons ShareAlike License;Proofread:?by Andy Blunden February 2005.IThe chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism – that of Feuerbach included – is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the?object or of contemplation, but not as?sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the?active?side was developed abstractly by idealism –which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as?objective?activity. Hence, in?The Essence of Christianity, heregards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-judaical manifestation. Hence he does not grasp the significance of “revolutionary”, of “practical-critical”, activity.IIThe question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely?scholastic?question.IIIThe materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as?revolutionary practice.IVFeuerbach starts out from the fact of religious self-alienation, of the duplication of the world into a religious world and a secular one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis.But that the secular basis detaches itself from itself and establishes itself as an independent realm in the clouds can only be explained by the cleavages and self-contradictions within this secular basis. The latter must, therefore, in itself be both understood in its contradiction and revolutionized in practice. Thus, for instance, after the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must then itself be destroyed in theory and in practice.VFeuerbach, not satisfied with abstract thinking, wants contemplation; but he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.VIFeuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence, is consequently compelled:1.To abstract from the historical processand to fix the religious sentiment assomething by itself and to presuppose anabstract –isolated –human individual.2.Essence, therefore, can be comprehendedonly as “genus”, as an internal, dumbgenerality which naturally unites themany individuals.VIIFeuerbach, consequently, does not see that the “religious sentiment” is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs to a particular form of society.VIIIAll social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.IXThe highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is contemplation of single individuals and of civil society.XThe standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or social humanity.XIThe philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.2002年版Karl Marx 1845 Theses On FeuerbachWritten: by Marx in Brussels in the spring of1845, under the title “1)?ad?Feuerbach”;Marx’s original text was first published in1924, in German and in Russian translation, bythe Institute of Marxism-Leninismin?Marx-Engels Archives,?Book I, Moscow. The English translation was first published in the Lawrence and Wishart edition of?The GermanIdeology?in 1938.?The most widely known version of the?Theses?is that based on Engels’ edited version,published as an appendix to his?LudwigFeuerbach?in 1888, where he gave it thetitle?Theses on Feuerbach;Translated: by Cyril Smith 2002, based on work done jointly with Don Cuckson.1The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism —that of Feuerbach included —is that the Object?[der Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object?[Objekts], or of contemplation?[Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity, practice?[Praxis], notsubjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism —but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such.?Feuerbach wants sensuous objects?[Objekte], differentiated from thought-objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective?[gegenst?ndliche]?activity. In?The Essence of Christianity[Das Wesen des Christenthums], he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance?[Erscheinungsform][1]. Hence he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’, of ‘practical-critical’, activity.2The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a?practical?question. Man must prove the truth,?i.e., the reality and power, thethis-sidedness?[Diesseitigkeit]?of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.3The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine is bound to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society.?The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change?[Selbstver?nderung]?can be conceived and rationally understood only as?revolutionary practice.4Feuerbach starts off from the fact of religious self-estrangement?[Selbstentfremdung], of theduplication of the world into a religious, imaginary world, and a secular?[weltliche]?one. His work consists in resolving the religious world into its secular basis. He overlooks the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing still remains to be done.?For the fact that the secular basis lifts off from itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only be explained by the inner strife and intrinsic contradictoriness of this secular basis. The latter must itself be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionised. Thus, for instance, once the earthly family is discovered to be the secret of the holy family, the former must itself be annihilated?[vernichtet]?theoretically and practically.5Feuerbach, not satisfied with?abstract thinking, wants?sensuous contemplation?[Anschauung]; but hedoes not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity.6Feuerbach resolves the essence of religion into the essence of man?[menschliche Wesen?= ‘human nature’]. But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.?In reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations.?Feuerbach, who does not enter upon a criticism of this real essence is hence obliged:1. To abstract from the historical process and todefine the religious sentiment regarded by itself, and to presuppose an abstract —isolated - human individual.2. The essence therefore can by him only be regardedas ‘species’, as an inner ‘dumb’ generality which unites many individuals only in a?natural way.7Feuerbach consequently does not see that the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a?social product, and that the abstract individual that he analyses belongs in reality to a particular social form.8All social life is essentially?practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.9The highest point reached by contemplative?[anschauende]?materialism, that is, materialism which does not comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is the contemplation of single individuals and of civil society?[bürgerlichen Gesellschaft].10The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society or social humanity.11Philosophers have hitherto only?interpreted?the world in various ways; the point is to?change?it.1.?“Dirty-Jewish” — according to MarhsallBerman, this is an allusion to the Jewish God of the Old Testament, who had to ‘get his hands dirty’ making the world, tied up with asymbolic contrast between the Christian God of the Word, and the God of the Deed, symbolising practical life. See?The Significance of theCreation in Judaism, Essence of Christianity 1841。