AUTHENTICATED KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOLS –ANALYSIS & DESIGN

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常用的鉴权方式

常用的鉴权方式

常用的鉴权方式鉴权(Authentication)是指验证用户身份的过程,用于确认用户是否具有访问特定资源的权限。

在网络通信中,为了保证数据的安全性和保密性,常常需要对用户进行鉴权。

下面将介绍几种常用的鉴权方式。

1. 基本认证(Basic Authentication)基本认证是最简单的一种鉴权方式,它使用用户名和密码进行验证。

在HTTP请求头中添加Authorization字段,该字段的值为"Basic"加上Base64编码后的用户名和密码,以实现用户身份验证。

然而,基本认证的安全性较低,因为用户名和密码会以明文方式传输。

2. 密钥认证(API Key Authentication)密钥认证是一种基于密钥的鉴权方式,适用于客户端与服务端之间的通信。

在使用密钥认证时,客户端需要在每个请求中包含一个密钥,服务端通过验证密钥的有效性来确认用户身份。

密钥通常由服务提供商生成,并提供给客户端使用。

3. 令牌认证(Token Authentication)令牌认证是一种常见的鉴权方式,它使用令牌来验证用户身份。

在用户登录后,服务端会为用户生成一个令牌,并将该令牌返回给客户端。

客户端在后续请求中需要在请求头中携带该令牌,服务端通过验证令牌的有效性来确认用户身份。

令牌通常具有一定的时效性,并可以通过刷新令牌来延长有效期。

4. OAuth认证(OAuth Authentication)OAuth认证是一种开放标准的鉴权方式,用于授权第三方应用程序访问用户的资源。

OAuth认证分为三个角色:资源拥有者(用户)、客户端应用程序和服务提供商。

在OAuth认证中,用户通过服务提供商授权客户端应用程序访问其资源,服务提供商生成一个访问令牌返回给客户端应用程序,客户端应用程序使用该访问令牌来访问用户资源。

5. 单点登录(Single Sign-On,SSO)单点登录是一种鉴权方式,用户只需登录一次,即可在多个关联的应用系统中进行访问。

authenticationmanager的authenticate方法

authenticationmanager的authenticate方法

authenticationmanager的authenticate方法(最新版4篇)目录(篇1)1.AuthenticationManager 简介2.authenticate 方法的作用3.authenticate 方法的参数4.authenticate 方法的返回值5.authenticate 方法的实际应用正文(篇1)AuthenticationManager 简介AuthenticationManager 是 Java 中用于处理用户认证的一个接口,它负责验证用户的身份。

在 Java 的安全模型中,AuthenticationManager 扮演着核心的角色,它允许我们通过各种方式来验证用户的身份,比如基于内存的验证、基于数据库的验证等。

authenticate 方法的作用AuthenticationManager 的 authenticate 方法用于验证用户提供的身份信息,比如用户名和密码。

这个方法可以接受一个实现了AuthenticationProvider 接口的实例,以及用户提供的身份信息作为参数。

在调用这个方法之后,AuthenticationManager 会根据提供的身份信息尝试验证用户的身份。

authenticate 方法的参数authenticate 方法的主要参数包括:1.AuthenticationProvider:一个实现了 AuthenticationProvider 接口的实例,它包含了用于验证用户身份的信息和逻辑。

2.String credentials:用户提供的身份信息,通常包括用户名和密码。

authenticate 方法的返回值authenticate 方法的返回值是一个 Authentication 对象,它表示用户身份的验证结果。

这个对象包含了用户名、密码等验证信息,以及一个布尔值表示验证是否成功。

如果验证成功,这个布尔值将为 true;如果验证失败,这个布尔值将为 false。

authenticated注解

authenticated注解

authenticated注解
Authenticated是网络信任和身份管理领域的一个重要概念,它指的是经过认证的消息或实体,具有真实性和可靠性。

在网络安全中,Authenticated验证是一种保障信息真实性和完整性的重要手段,可以有效地防止网络攻击和欺诈行为。

注解是文档中重要的组成部分,而Authenticated注解则是对文档内容进行真实性和可靠性验证的重要手段。

使用Authenticated注解,可以帮助读者更好地了解文档内容的真实性和可信度,从而做出更明智的判断和决策。

要编写Authenticated注解,需要遵循以下步骤:
1. 仔细审查文档内容,确保其真实性和准确性。

2. 查阅相关资料和权威认证机构,确保文档内容的真实性和可靠性。

3. 在文档中添加Authenticated注解,注明文档内容的来源和权威认证机构。

4. 确保注解的表述清晰、简洁、易懂,以便读者能够快速了解文档内容的真实性和可信度。

四、示例
[Authenticated]:本章节所提供的信息来源于权威认证机构,经过严格审核和验证,具有真实性和可靠性。

读者可以放心使用。

请注意,这只是一个示例,实际编写时需要根据文档内容和权威认证机构的实际情况进行调整和完善。

同时,确保注解中的信息准确无误,避免误导读者。

总的来说,Authenticated注解是提高文档质量和可信度的重要手段,可以帮助读者更好地了解文档内容的真实性和可信度,从而做出更明智的判断和决策。

因此,我们在编写文档时应该充分重视注解的编写,不断提高注解的质量和可信度。

公钥证书的产生过程及验证方法

公钥证书的产生过程及验证方法

公钥证书的产生过程及验证方法1.引言1.1 概述概述公钥证书是一种数字证书,用于验证公钥的真实性和所有者的身份。

在计算机网络中,公钥证书被广泛应用于安全通信过程中,例如加密和身份验证。

本文将详细介绍公钥证书的产生过程和验证方法。

首先,我们将了解公钥证书的基本概念和作用。

然后,我们将深入探讨公钥证书的产生过程,包括证书申请、证书颁发机构(CA)的角色以及证书内容的组成。

接着,我们将介绍公钥证书的验证方法,包括证书链验证、数字签名验证和证书吊销检查。

公钥证书的产生过程非常重要,它确保了证书的真实性和可靠性。

证书申请者需要向CA提交证书请求,该请求包括公钥、个人或组织的身份信息等。

CA在验证申请者身份后,将签发包含公钥和相关信息的证书。

验证方法是验证公钥证书的有效性和完整性,以确保通信的安全性。

通过了解公钥证书的产生过程和验证方法,我们可以更好地理解公钥加密体系的安全性和可靠性。

这对于保护网络通信和防止信息泄漏非常关键。

在接下来的正文部分,我们将详细介绍公钥证书的产生过程和验证方法,以及相关的技术细节和实践指南。

希望本文能够对读者更好地理解和应用公钥证书技术有所帮助。

文章结构的设计是为了使读者能够清晰地了解本文的组织和内容安排。

本文将按照以下结构进行论述:1. 引言1.1 概述1.2 文章结构1.3 目的2. 正文2.1 公钥证书的产生过程2.2 公钥证书的验证方法3. 结论3.1 总结3.2 展望在引言部分,我们首先会对公钥证书进行概述,介绍其在加密通信中的重要性和应用场景。

然后,我们将详细说明本文的组织结构,包括各个章节的主要内容和目标。

接下来,正文部分将重点介绍公钥证书的产生过程和验证方法。

在2.1节中,我们将阐述公钥证书的产生过程,包括密钥生成、证书请求、证书颁发等步骤,并解释这些步骤的作用和原理。

在2.2节中,我们将详细介绍公钥证书的验证方法,包括证书链验证、数字签名验证和证书撤销验证等技术,以确保证书的合法性和可靠性。

authenticate和validate的用法

authenticate和validate的用法

authenticate和validate的用法"authenticate"和"validate"都是指验证或确认某个事物的真实性、有效性或合法性。

1. "authenticate"的用法:-在计算机安全领域,"authenticate"通常是指通过验证用户的身份来确认其访问权限。

例如,用户在登录网站时需要提供用户名和密码进行身份验证。

-在法律文件或证件领域,"authenticate"意味着验证文档或证件的真实性,以确认其合法性和有效性。

例如,公证员通过签署和盖印来对文档进行认证。

2. "validate"的用法:- "validate"常用于验证或确认某个过程或方法的正确性、合法性或有效性。

例如,软件开发人员会验证他们编写的代码是否有效,以避免潜在的错误。

-在商业领域,"validate"可以指验证支付方式或交易的有效性和合法性。

例如,信用卡支付时,商家可能会对卡号、有效日期和CVV码进行验证,以确保支付的合法性。

- "validate"还可以用于验证数据的准确性和一致性。

例如,企业可能会验证客户提供的联系信息是否准确,以确保与客户的正常沟通。

拓展:-在网络安全领域,"authenticate"和"validate"也可以用于验证网络通信的安全性。

例如,通过证书认证机构(CA)颁发的数字证书,可以对网站的身份进行身份验证,同时也可以确保数据传输的机密性和完整性。

-在学术研究中,"validate"可以指验证研究的方法和结果的可靠性和有效性。

例如,研究人员可能会使用统计分析的方法来验证他们的假设是否成立,从而得出可靠的结论。

-在数据处理和数据科学中,"validate"常用于验证数据的质量和可信度。

鉴别协议北京大学计算机系信息安全研究室

鉴别协议北京大学计算机系信息安全研究室
鉴别协议北京大学计算机系信息安全 研究室
CHAP (challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol)
• 询问握手鉴别协议(CHAP):RFC1994 – 拨号用户鉴别协议,采用提问/应答方式进 行鉴别,通过在PPP链接的双方进行一次三 次握手,完成对对方身份的鉴别
• S/key protocol主要用于防止重放攻击
鉴别协议北京大学计算机系信息安全 研究室
S/KEY协议组成
• 三个组成部分
客户端程序:为端用户提供登录程序,并在 得到服务器质询值时,获取用户私钥,并调 用口令计算器形成本次鉴别口令,然后发送 给服务器程序
口令计算器:负责产生本次口令 服务器程序:验证用户口令 • 整个过程中,用户的私钥不会暴露在网络上
鉴别协议北京大学计算机系信息安全 研究室
讨论议题
• 鉴别机制 • 口令机制 • 一次性口令机制 • 基于密码算法的鉴别 • 零知识证明协议 • 基于地址的机制 • 基于个人特征的机制 • 基于设备的鉴别
鉴别协议北京大学计算机系信息安全 研究室
强鉴别
• 强鉴别(strong authentication):通过密码学 的询问-应答(challenge-response)协议实现的身 份鉴别,询问-应答协议的思想是一个实体向 另一个实体证明他知道有关的秘密知识,但不 向验证者提供秘密本身。这通过对一个时变的 询问提供应答来实现,应答通常依赖于实体的 秘密和询问。询问通常是一个实体选择的一个 数(随机和秘密地)。
– 真伪的证明,结果只有两个
• 识别(identification)
– 区分不同的东西
鉴别协议北京大学计算机系信息安全 研究室
讨论议题

一种新的ad hoc 网络会话密钥建立方案

一种新的ad hoc 网络会话密钥建立方案

文章编号:1009-8119(2005)07-0046-03一种新的ad hoc网络会话密钥建立方案姚静(北京理工大学电子工程系, 北京 100081)摘要针对ad hoc网络密钥管理中存在的实际问题,提出一种适合于ad hoc网络安全的会话密钥建立方案。

当网络初始化完成后,ad hoc网络内的各节点不需要可信第三方的参与,可安全的完成相互认证并同时产生共享会话密钥。

关键词ad hoc网络,安全,认证,会话密钥建立A novel session key establishment scheme for adhoc networksYao Jing(Dept. of Electronic Engineering, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081)Abstract To the actual security question in the a d hoc network’s key management, a secure authenticated key establishment scheme is proposed in this paper. After the secure network system is set up, communicating parties achieve mutual authentication and session key establishment without the trusted third party.Keywords Ad hoc network, security, authentication, session key establishment1 引言Ad hoc网络是一种新型的无线自组织网络,它能够在事先没有建立网络基础设施的环境下,由无线终端(如笔记本电脑、移动电话或PDA等) 临时组成。

信息系统文档

信息系统文档

No. of Pages:
40
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6 Secretariat Ms. Jooran Lee, KSA (on behalf of KATS) Korea Technology Center #701-7 Yeoksam-dong, Gangnam-gu, Seoul, 135-513, Republic of Korea ; Telephone: +82 2 6009 4808 ; Facsimile: +82 2 6009 4819 ; Email : jooran@kisi.or.kr
Geneva, 8-17 December 2010
Question(s): Source: Title:
6/17 TEMPORARY DOCUMENT Editors
A text for FCD ballot on ITU-T nsec-1 | ISO/IEC CD 29180: Security framework for ubiquitous sensor network
Summary This document is the updated text of TD 942, 5th revised text on ITU-T nsec-1 | ISO/IEC CD 29180, and will be used as text for FCD ballot in ISO/IEC SC6.
Telecommunications and Information Exchange Between Systems
ISO/IEC JTC 1/S354
Date:
2010-08-02
Replaces:
Document Type:

key agreement protocol

key agreement protocol
The first key agreement protocol was proposed by Diffie-Hellman [3]. It can guarantee the security of communication between the two users. But it does not authenticate users; hence it is vulnerable to the “manin-the-middle” attack. Joux [4] gave another direction
one of the protocols that extend the Diffie-Hellman protocol to a group key agreement protocol with oneway function trees.
Reddy and Divya Nalla [5] extend the Identity Based two-party authenticated key agreement protocol to an authenticated group key agreement protocol, using the one-way function trees to generate the first ID-based group key agreement protocol. In their protocol the leaves of the tree denote individual users of group. Sheng-Hua Shiau et al.’s protocol [10], also use a key tree structure. But they use complete binary tree structure i.e. each node in the tree represent one user. A ternary tree based protocol was proposed by Barua et al. [8] that extend the basic Joux's [8] protocol to multi-party setting. In their protocol the leaves of the tree denote individual users and each internal node corresponds to a representative that represents set of users in the sub tree rooted at that node. But their protocol was unauthenticated also. Dutta et al. [7] authenticate this unauthenticated protocol using multi-signatures. In this paper, we propose a group key agreement protocol based on Weil pairing. In our protocol, we use the ID-based authentication and complete ternary Tree architecture such that every node in the tree represents a user of the group. If there are some users want to join or leave the group, not all users in the group need to renew their all computations to get secret key; so it is suit for dynamic changing environment. This paper is organized as followings: Section 2 proposes the notations and assumptions. Section 3 is the proposed protocol. We show the analysis of some security properties that we concerned in section 4. Section 5 describes the comparison of computation overhead with other protocols. Finally, section 6 shows our result.

ATECC508A Atmel密钥字符串认证设备数据手册说明书

ATECC508A Atmel密钥字符串认证设备数据手册说明书

ATECC508AAtmel CryptoAuthentication DeviceSUMMARY DATASHEETFeatures∙ Cryptographic Co-processor with Secure Hardware-based Key Storage ∙ Performs High-Speed Public Key (PKI) Algorithms– ECDSA: FIPS186-3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm – ECDH: FIPS SP800-56A Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Algorithm ∙ NIST Standard P256 Elliptic Curve Support ∙ SHA-256 Hash Algorithm with HMAC Option ∙ Host and Client Operations ∙ 256-bit Key Length ∙ Storage for up to 16 Keys∙ Two high-endurance monotonic counters ∙ Guaranteed Unique 72-bit Serial Number∙ Internal High-quality FIPS Random Number Generator (RNG) ∙ 10Kb EEPROM Memory for Keys, Certificates, and Data ∙ Storage for up to 16 Keys∙ Multiple Options for Consumption Logging and One Time Write Information∙ Intrusion Latch for External Tamper Switch or Power-on Chip Enablement. Multiple I/O Options:– High-speed Single Pin Interface, with One GPIO Pin – 1MHz Standard I 2C Interface ∙ 2.0V to 5.5V Supply Voltage Range ∙ 1.8V to 5.5V IO levels ∙ <150nA Sleep Current∙ 8-pad UDFN, 8-lead SOIC, and 3-lead CONTACT PackagesApplications∙ IoT Node Security and ID ∙ S ecure Download and Boot ∙ E cosystem Control ∙ M essage Security ∙ A nti-CloningThis is a summary document. The complete document is available under NDA. For more information, please contact your local Atmel sales office.Secure Download and BootAuthentication and Protect Code In-transitEcosystem ControlEnsure Only OEM/Licensed Nodes and Accessories WorkAnti-cloningPrevent Building with Identical BOM or Stolen CodeMessage SecurityAuthentication, Message Integrity,and Confidentiality of Network Nodes (IoT)CryptoAuthenticationEnsures Things and Code are Real, Untampered, and ConfidentialPin Configuration and Pinouts Table 1. Pin ConfigurationFigure 1. PinoutsATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_102015221 Introduction1.1 ApplicationsThe Atmel® ATECC508A is a member of the Atmel CryptoAuthentication™ family of crypto engine authentication devices with highly secure hardware-based key storage.The ATECC508A has a flexible command set that allows use in many applications, including the following,among many others:∙Network/IoT Node ProtectionAuthenticates node IDs, ensures the integrity of messages, and supports key agreement to create sessionkeys for message encryption.∙Anti-CounterfeitingValidates that a removable, replaceable, or consumable client is authentic. Examples of clients could besystem accessories, electronic daughter cards, or other spare parts. It can also be used to validate asoftware/firmware module or memory storage element.∙Protecting Firmware or MediaValidates code stored in flash memory at boot to prevent unauthorized modifications, encrypt downloadedprogram files as a common broadcast, or uniquely encrypt code images to be usable on a single systemonly.∙Storing Secure DataStore secret keys for use by crypto accelerators in standard microprocessors. Programmable protection isavailable using encrypted/authenticated reads and writes.∙Checking User PasswordValidates user-entered passwords without letting the expected value become known, maps memorablepasswords to a random number, and securely exchanges password values with remote systems.1.2 Device FeaturesThe ATECC508A includes an EEPROM array which can be used for storage of up to 16 keys, certificates,miscellaneous read/write, read-only or secret data, consumption logging, and security configurations. Access to the various sections of memory can be restricted in a variety of ways and then the configuration can be locked to prevent changes.The ATECC508A features a wide array of defense mechanisms specifically designed to prevent physical attacks on the device itself, or logical attacks on the data transmitted between the device and the system. Hardware restrictions on the ways in which keys are used or generated provide further defense against certain styles of attack.Access to the device is made through a standard I2C Interface at speeds of up to 1Mb/s. The interface iscompatible with standard Serial EEPROM I2C interface specifications. The device also supports a Single-Wire Interface (SWI), which can reduce the number of GPIOs required on the system processor, and/or reduce the number of pins on connectors. If the Single-Wire Interface is enabled, the remaining pin is available for use as a GPIO, an authenticated output or tamper input.Using either the I2C or Single-Wire Interface, multiple ATECC508A devices can share the same bus, which saves processor GPIO usage in systems with multiple clients such as different color ink tanks or multiple spare parts, for example.Each ATECC508A ships with a guaranteed unique 72-bit serial number. Using the cryptographic protocolssupported by the device, a host system or remote server can verify a signature of the serial number to prove that the serial number is authentic and not a copy. Serial numbers are often stored in a standard Serial EEPROM;however, these can be easily copied with no way for the host to know if the serial number is authentic or if it is a clone.ATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_1020153 3ATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_10201544The ATECC508A can generate high-quality FIPS random numbers and employ them for any purpose, including usage as part of the device’s crypto protocols. Because each random number is guaranteed to be essentially unique from all numbers ever generated on this or any other device, their inclusion in the protocol calculation ensures that replay attacks (i.e. re-transmitting a previously successful transaction) will always fail.System integration is easy due to a wide supply voltage range (of 2.0V to 5.5V) and an ultra-low sleep current (of <150nA). Multiple package options are available.See Section 3 for information regarding compatibility with the Atmel ATSHA204 and ATECC108.1.3 Cryptographic OperationThe ATECC508A implements a complete asymmetric (public/private) key cryptographic signature solution based upon Elliptic Curve Cryptography and the ECDSA signature protocol. The device features hardware acceleration for the NIST standard P256 prime curve and supports the complete key life cycle from high quality private key generation, to ECDSA signature generation, ECDH key agreement, and ECDSA public key signature verification.The hardware accelerator can implement such asymmetric cryptographic operations from ten to one-thousand times faster than software running on standard microprocessors, without the usual high risk of key exposure that is endemic to standard microprocessors.The device is designed to securely store multiple private keys along with their associated public keys andcertificates. The signature verification command can use any stored or an external ECC public key. Public keys stored within the device can be configured to require validation via a certificate chain to speed-up subsequent device authentications.Random private key generation is supported internally within the device to ensure that the private key can never be known outside of the device. The public key corresponding to a stored private key is always returned when the key is generated and it may optionally be computed at a later time.The ATECC508A also supports a standard hash-based challenge-response protocol in order to simplifyprogramming. In its most basic instantiation, the system sends a challenge to the device, which combines that challenge with a secret key and then sends the response back to the system. The device uses a SHA-256cryptographic hash algorithm to make that combination so that an observer on the bus cannot derive the value of the secret key, but preserving that ability of a recipient to verify that the response is correct by performing the same calculation with a stored copy of the secret on the recipient’s system.Due to the flexible command set of the ATECC508A, these basic operation sets (i.e. ECDSA signatures, ECDH key agreement and SHA-256 challenge-response) can be expanded in many ways.In a host-client configuration where the host (for instance a mobile phone) needs to verify a client (for instance an OEM battery), there is a need to store the secret in the host in order to validate the response from the client. The CheckMac command allows the device to securely store the secret in the host system and hides the correct response value from the pins, returning only a yes or no answer to the system.All hashing functions are implemented using the industry-standard SHA-256 secure hash algorithm, which is part of the latest set of high-security cryptographic algorithms recommended by various government agencies and cryptographic experts. The ATECC508A employs full-sized 256 bit secret keys to prevent any kind of exhaustive attack.2 Electrical Characteristics 2.1 Absolute Maximum Ratings*Operating Temperature .......................... -40°C to 85°C Storage Temperature ........................... -65°C to 150°C Maximum Operating Voltage................................. 6.0V DC Output Current ................................................ 5mA Voltage on any pin ...................... -0.5V to (V CC + 0.5V) *Notice: Stresses beyond those listed under “AbsoluteMaximum Ratings” may cause permanent damage tothe device. This is a stress rating only and functionaloperation of the device at these or any otherconditions beyond those indicated in the operationalsections of this specification are not implied.Exposure to absolute maximum rating conditions forextended periods may affect device reliability.2.2 ReliabilityThe ATECC508A is fabricated with the Atmel high reliability of the CMOS EEPROM manufacturing technology.Table 2-1. EEPROM Reliability2.3 AC Parameters: All I/O InterfacesFigure 2-1. AC Parameters: All I/O InterfacesNote: 1. These parameters are guaranteed through characterization, but not tested.ATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_1020155 5ATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_102015662.3.1AC Parameters: Single-Wire InterfaceTable 2-2.AC Parameters: Single-Wire InterfaceApplicable from T A = -40°C to +85°C, V CC = +2.0V to +5.5V, CL =100pF (unless otherwise noted).Note: 1.START, ZLO, ZHI, and BIT are designed to be compatible with a standard UART running at 230.4Kbaud for both transmit and receive. The UART should be set to seven data bits, no parity and one Stop bit.2.3.2 AC Parameters: I2C InterfaceTable 2-3. AC Characteristics of I2C InterfaceApplicable over recommended operating range from TA = -40°C to + 85°C, V CC = +2.0V to +5.5V, CL = 1 TTL Gate and 100pF (unless otherwise noted).Note: 1. Values are based on characterization and are not tested.AC measurement conditions:∙RL (connects between SDA and V CC): 1.2k (for V CC +2.0V to +5.0V)∙Input pulse voltages: 0.3V CC to 0.7V CC∙Input rise and fall times: ≤ 50ns∙Input and output timing reference voltage: 0.5V CCATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_1020157 7ATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_102015882.4DC Parameters: All I/O InterfacesTable 2-4. DC Parameters on All I/O Interfaces2.4.1V IH and V IL SpecificationsThe input voltage thresholds when in sleep or idle mode are dependent on the V CC level as shown in the graphbelow. When the device is active (i.e. not in sleep or idle mode), the input voltage thresholds are different depending upon the state of TTLenable (bit 1) within the ChipMode byte in the Configuration zone of theEEPROM. When a common voltage is used for the ATECC508A V CC pin and the input pull-up resistor, then this bit should be set to a one, which permits the input thresholds to track the supply.If the voltage supplied to the V CC pin of the ATECC508A is different than the system voltage to which the input pull-up resistor is connected, then the system designer may choose to set TTLenable to zero, which enables a fixed input threshold according to the following table. The following applies only when the device is active:Table 2-5. V IL , V IH on All I/O Interfaces3 Compatibility3.1 Atmel ATSHA204ATECC508A is fully compatible with the ATSHA204 and ATSHA204A devices. If properly configured, it can be used in all situations where the ATSHA204 or ATSHA204A is currently employed. Because the Configuration zone is larger, the personalization procedures for the device must be updated when personalizing theATSHA204 or ATSHA204A.3.2 Atmel ATECC108ATECC508A is designed to be fully compatible with the ATECC108 and ATECC108A devices. If properlyconfigured, can be used in all situations where ATECC108 is currently employed. In many situations, theATECC508A can also be used in an ATECC108 application without change. The new revisions providesignificant advantages as outlined below:New Features in ATECC108A vs. ATECC108∙Intrusion Detection Capability, Including Gating Key Use∙New SHA Command, Also Computes HMAC∙X.509 Certificate Verification Capability∙Programmable Watchdog Timer Length∙Programmable Power Reduction∙Shared Random Nonce and Key Configuration Validation (Gendig Command)∙Larger Slot 8 which is Extended to 416 bytes4 Ordering InformationNotes: 1. Please contact Atmel for availability.2. Please contact Atmel for thinner packages.ATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_1020159 9ATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_1020151105Package Drawings5.18-lead SOICATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_10201511 115.2 8-pad UDFNATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_1020151125.33-lead CONTACTATECC508A [Summary Datasheet]Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_10201513 136 Revision HistoryATECC508A [Summary Datasheet] Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_102015114Atmel Corporation 1600 Technology Drive, San Jose, CA 95110 USA T: (+1)(408) 441.0311 F: (+1)(408) 436.4200 │ © 2015 Atmel Corporation. / Rev.:Atmel-8923BS-CryptoAuth-ATECC508A-Datasheet-Summary_102015.Atmel ®, Atmel logo and combinations thereof, Enabling Unlimited Possibilities ®, CryptoAuthentication™, and others are registered trademarks or trademarks of Atmel Corporation in U.S. and other countries.DISCLAIMER: The information in this document is provided in connection with Atmel products. No license, express or implied, by estoppel or otherwise, to any intellectual property right is granted by this document or in connection with the sale of Atmel products. EXCEPT AS SET FORTH IN THE ATMEL TERMS AND COND ITIONS OF SALES LOCATED ON THE ATMEL WEBSITE, ATMEL ASSUMES NO LIABILITY WHATSOEVER AND DISCLAIMS ANY EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY WARRANTY RELATING TO ITS PRODUCTS INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR NON -INFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL ATMEL BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE, SPECIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, DAMAG ES FOR LOSS AND PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTION, OR LOSS OF INFORMATION) ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS DOCUMENT , EVEN IF ATMEL HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. Atmel makes no representations or warranties with respect to the accuracy or completeness of the contents of this document and reserves the right to make changes to specifications and products descriptions at any time without notice. Atmel does not make any commitment to update the information contained herein. Unless specifically provided otherwise, Atmel products are not suitable for, and shall not be used in, automotive applications. At mel products are not intended, authorized, or warranted for use as components in applications intended to support or sustain life.SAFETY-CRITICAL, MILITARY, AND AUTOMOTIVE APPLICATIONS DISCLAIMER: Atmel products are not designed for and will not be used in connection with any applications where the failure of such products would reasonably be expected to result in significant personal injury or death (“Safety -Critical Applications”) without an Atmel officer's specific written consent. Safety-Critical Applications include, without limitation, life support devices and systems, equipment or systems for the operation of nuclear fac ilities and weapons systems. Atmel products are not designed nor intended for use in military or aerospace applications or environments unless specifically designated by Atmel as military-grade. Atmel products are not designed nor intended for use in automotive applications unless specifically designated by Atmel as automotive -grade.。

408考研计算机网络常见缩写

408考研计算机网络常见缩写

·A CK TCP报文段中确认位ACK=1时,有效。

ACK=0时,无效·A RP,Address Resolution Protocol 地址解析协议已知主机或路由器的IP地址,找出其相应的硬件地址·A RQ协议,Automatic Repeat reQuest自动重传请求协议·A S,Autonomous System自治系统·A SK,Amplitude Shift Keying幅移键控ATM,Asynchronous Transfer Mode 局域网拓扑之一,A TM网单元交换技术使用53字节的单元进行交换BGP,Border Gateway Protocol 边界网关协议,采用路径向量,应用层协议基于TCP,端口号179C/S,Client/Server客户/服务器模型CDM,Code Division Multiple码分多路复用CHAP,Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol 挑战握手认证协议,属于PPP协议集通过3次握手,用哈希值取代密码CIDR,Classless Inter-Domain Routing无分类编址cookie 储存在用户主机中的文本文件由服务器产生,作为识别用户的手段CRC,Cyclic Redundancy Check循环冗余校验码CSMA,Carrrier Sense Multiple Access载波侦听多路访问协议CSMA/CA,CSMA with Collision Avoidance载波侦听多路访问/冲突避免协议CSMA/CD,CSMA/Collision Detection载波监听多路访问/碰撞检测协议CTS,Clear To Send CSMA/CA协议中,允许发送控制帧AP收到RTS后,若信道空闲,广播允许发送控制帧DF,Don't Fragment IPv4分组标志字段中间位,DF=0时才允许分片DHCP,Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 动态主机配置协议,动态地分配IP地址,应用层协议基于UDP,C/S模式DIX Ethernet V2世界上第一个局域网产品(以太网)的规定DNS,Domain Name System 域名系统,描述名字-地址映射,C/S模型采用UDP,端口号53EGP,External Gateway Protocol外部网关协议E-mail,Electronic Mail电子邮件FDDI,Fiber Distributed Data Interface局域网拓扑之一,光纤分布数字接口,IEEE 802.8 FDM,Frequency-Division Multiplexing频分多路复用FEC,Forward Error Correction前向纠错FIN,Finish TCP报文段中终止位,用来释放一个连接FSK,Frequency Shift Keying频移键控FTP,File Transfer Protocol文件传输协议,C/S模型,使用TCP,端口号20、21 GBN协议,Go Back N Frames Protocal后退N帧协议HTML,Hyper Text Markup Language 超文本标记语言使用约定的标记对页面上的各种信息、格式进行描述HTTP,Hypertext Transfer Protocol超文本传输协议,应用层协议,使用TCP IANA,Internet Assigned Numbers Authority互联网数字分配机构,互联网地址指派机构ICANN,Internet Corporation for Assigned Names andNumbers互联网名称与数字地址分配机构ICMP,Internet Control Message Protocol 网际控制报文协议,网络层协议报告差错情况和提供有关异常情况的报告IGMP,Internet Group Management Protocol 网际组管理协议组播路由器用来维护组播组成员信息的协议IGP,Interior Gateway Protocol内部网关协议IMAP,Internet Mail Access Protocol因特网报文存取协议,邮件访问标准协议之一Interdomain Routing自治系统之间的路由选择叫做域间路由选择Intradomain Routing自治系统内部的路由选择叫做域内路由选择ISP,Internet Service Provider网络服务提供商,如电信、网通LCP,Link Control Protocol PPP协议的组成部分,链路控制协议Link-State Database 链路状态数据库全网的拓扑结构图,它在全网范围内是一致的LLC子层,Logical Link Control逻辑链路控制LLC子层MAC,Medium Access Control介质访问控制MAC地址,Media Access Control Address介质访问控制地址,物理地址MAC子层,Media Access Control媒体接入控制MAC子层MF,More Fragment IPv4分组标志字段最低位MF=1时后面还有分片,MF=0时是最后一个分片MIME,Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions 多用途网际邮件扩充增加邮件主体的结构,定义传送非ASCII码的编码规则MSL,Maximun Segment Lifetime 报文最大生存时间TCP释放时客户机需等待2MSL才能进入到连接关闭状态MSS,Maximum Segment Size 最大报文段长度,TCP规定的一种选项TCP报文段中的数据字段的最大长度NA T,Network Address Translation网络地址转换,将专用网络地址转换为公用地址NCP,Network Control Protocol PPP协议的组成部分,网络控制协议NIC,Network Interface Card网络接口卡NRZI编码,Non-Return-to-Zero Inverted Encoding反向非归零编码NRZ编码,Non-Return-to-Zero Encoding非归零编码OSPF,Open Shortest Path First 开放最短路径优先协议,使用链路状态网络层协议,协议字段89P2P,Peer to Peer对等连接模型PAP认证,Password Authentication Protocol 密码认证协议,属于PPP协议集通过2次握手,传输密码是明文PCI,Protocol Control Information协议控制信息,控制协议操作的信息,PDU=PCI+SDU PCM,Pulse Code Modulation对音频信号进行编码的脉码调制PDU,Protocol Data Unit 协议数据单元,对等层次之间传送的数据单元PDU=PCI+SDUPING,Packet Inter Net Groper 分组网间探测,ICMP的应用之一工作在应用层,直接使用网络层ICMPPOP,Post Office Protocol邮局协议,C/S模型,使用TCP,端口号110PPP协议,Point-to-Point Protocol 应用在直接连接两个结点的链路上使用串行线路通信的面向字节的协议PSH,Push TCP报文段中推送位PSH=1的报文段,不等缓存填满,尽快交付进程PSK,Phase Shift Keying相移键控PVC,Permanent Virtual Circuit永久性虚电路QAM,Quadrature Amplitude Modulation正交振幅调制RARP,Reverse Address Resolution Protocol 逆地址解析协议知道自己硬件地址的主机,找出其IP地址RIP,Routing Information Protocol 路由信息协议,基于距离向量应用层协议,使用UDP,端口号520RST,Reset TCP报文段中复位位RST=1,表明TCP连接出现严重差错RTO,Retransmission Time-Out TCP超时重传机制,略大于保留加权平均往返时间RTTsRTS,Request To Send CSMA/CA协议中请求发送控制帧发送端发送数据前,先广播请求发送控制帧RTT,Round-Trip Time往返时延,从发送方发送数据到收到接收方确认的时间RZ编码,Return-to-zero Code Encoding归零编码SAP,Service Access Point访问服务点,常见的接口SDN,Software Defined Network 软件定义网络,核心技术OpenFlow 分离了网络设备的控制面与数据面SDU,Service Date Unit 服务数据单元,为完成用户所需的功能而应传送的数据PDU=PCI+SDUSMTP,Simple Mail Transfer Protocol简单邮件传输协议,C/S模型,使用TCP,端口号25 SNMP,Simple Network Management Protocol简单网络管理协议,使用UDPSR协议,Selective Repeat选择重传协议STDM,Statistic Time-Division Multiplexing统计时分多路复用SVC,Switched Virtual Circuit交换性虚电路(临时的)SYN TCP报文段中同步位SYN=1表示这是一个连接请求或连接接收报文TCP,Transmission Control Protocol 传输控制协议一种面向连接的、可靠的、基于字节流的传输层通信协议TDM,Time-Division Multiplexing时分多路复用TFTP,Trivial File Transfer Protocol小文件传送协议,使用UDPTraceroute(Windows中是Tracert)定位源和目标计算机间的所有路由器网络层,使用ICMP时间超过报文TSAP,Transport Service Access Point传输层服务访问点,是端口TTL,Time To Live生存时间,数据报在网络中可通过的路由器数的最大值UDP,User Datagram Protocol用户数据报协议,一个无连接的、非可靠的传输层协议URG TCP报文段中紧急位URG=1时,表明此报文段中有紧急数据,应尽快传送URL,Uniform Resource Locator统一资源定位符,负责标识万维网上的各种文档VLAN,Virtual Local Area Network虚拟局域网,802.3ac标准WDM,Wavelength Division Multiplexing波分多路复用WLAN,Wireless Local Area Networks无线局城网,采用IEEE 802.11标准WWW,World Wide Web万维网,C/S模型,端口号80。

现代密码学中英文翻译(部分)

现代密码学中英文翻译(部分)

Table of ContentsModern Cryptography: Theory and PracticeBy Wenbo Mao Hewlett-Packard CompanyPublisher: Prentice Hall PTRPub Date: July 25, 2003ISBN: 0-13-066943-1Pages: 648Many cryptographic schemes and protocols, especially those based onpublic-keycryptography,have basic or so-called "textbook crypto" versions, as these versionsare usually the subjects formany textbooks on cryptography. This book takes adifferent approach to introducingcryptography: it pays much more attention tofit-for-application aspects of cryptography. Itexplains why "textbook crypto" isonly good in an ideal world where data are random and badguys behave nicely.It reveals the general unfitness of "textbook crypto" for the real world bydemonstratingnumerous attacks on such schemes, protocols and systems under variousrealworldapplication scenarios. This book chooses to introduce a set of practicalcryptographic schemes, protocols and systems, many of them standards or de factoones, studies them closely,explains their working principles, discusses their practicalusages, and examines their strong(i.e., fit-for-application) security properties, oftenwith security evidence formally established.The book also includes self-containedtheoretical background material that is the foundation formodern cryptography.Table of ContentsModern Cryptography: Theory and PracticeBy Wenbo Mao Hewlett-Packard CompanyPublisher: Prentice Hall PTRPub Date: July 25, 2003ISBN: 0-13-066943-1Pages: 648CopyrightHewlett-Packard® Professional BooksA Short Description of the BookPrefaceScopeAcknowledgementsList of FiguresList of Algorithms, Protocols and AttacksPart I: IntroductionChapter 1. Beginning with a Simple Communication GameSection 1.1. A Communication GameSection 1.2. Criteria for Desirable Cryptographic Systems and Protocols Section 1.3. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 2. Wrestling Between Safeguard and AttackSection 2.1. IntroductionSection 2.2. EncryptionSection 2.3. Vulnerable Environment (the Dolev-Yao Threat Model)Section 2.4. Authentication ServersSection 2.5. Security Properties for Authenticated Key Establishment Section 2.6. Protocols for Authenticated Key Establishment Using Encryption Section 2.7. Chapter SummaryExercisesPart II: Mathematical Foundations: Standard NotationChapter 3. Probability and Information TheorySection 3.1. IntroductionSection 3.2. Basic Concept of ProbabilitySection 3.3. PropertiesSection 3.4. Basic CalculationSection 3.5. Random Variables and their Probability DistributionsSection 3.6. Birthday ParadoxSection 3.7. Information TheorySection 3.8. Redundancy in Natural LanguagesSection 3.9. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 4. Computational ComplexitySection 4.1. IntroductionSection 4.2. Turing MachinesSection 4.3. Deterministic Polynomial TimeSection 4.4. Probabilistic Polynomial TimeSection 4.5. Non-deterministic Polynomial TimeSection 4.6. Non-Polynomial BoundsSection 4.7. Polynomial-time IndistinguishabilitySection 4.8. Theory of Computational Complexity and Modern Cryptography Section 4.9. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 5. Algebraic FoundationsSection 5.1. IntroductionSection 5.2. GroupsSection 5.3. Rings and FieldsSection 5.4. The Structure of Finite FieldsSection 5.5. Group Constructed Using Points on an Elliptic CurveSection 5.6. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 6. Number TheorySection 6.1. IntroductionSection 6.2. Congruences and Residue ClassesSection 6.3. Euler's Phi FunctionSection 6.4. The Theorems of Fermat, Euler and LagrangeSection 6.5. Quadratic ResiduesSection 6.6. Square Roots Modulo IntegerSection 6.7. Blum IntegersSection 6.8. Chapter SummaryExercisesPart III: Basic Cryptographic TechniquesChapter 7. Encryption — Symmetric TechniquesSection 7.1. IntroductionSection 7.2. DefinitionSection 7.3. Substitution CiphersSection 7.4. Transposition CiphersSection 7.5. Classical Ciphers: Usefulness and SecuritySection 7.6. The Data Encryption Standard (DES)Section 7.7. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)Section 7.8. Confidentiality Modes of OperationSection 7.9. Key Channel Establishment for Symmetric Cryptosystems Section 7.10. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 8. Encryption — Asymmetric TechniquesSection 8.1. IntroductionSection 8.2. Insecurity of "Textbook Encryption Algorithms"Section 8.3. The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange ProtocolSection 8.4. The Diffie-Hellman Problem and the Discrete Logarithm Problem Section 8.5. The RSA Cryptosystem (Textbook Version)Section 8.6. Cryptanalysis Against Public-key CryptosystemsSection 8.7. The RSA ProblemSection 8.8. The Integer Factorization ProblemSection 8.9. Insecurity of the Textbook RSA EncryptionSection 8.10. The Rabin Cryptosystem (Textbook Version)Section 8.11. Insecurity of the Textbook Rabin EncryptionSection 8.12. The ElGamal Cryptosystem (Textbook Version)Section 8.13. Insecurity of the Textbook ElGamal EncryptionSection 8.14. Need for Stronger Security Notions for Public-key CryptosystemsSection 8.15. Combination of Asymmetric and Symmetric CryptographySection 8.16. Key Channel Establishment for Public-key CryptosystemsSection 8.17. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 9. In An Ideal World: Bit Security of The Basic Public-Key Cryptographic Functions Section 9.1. IntroductionSection 9.2. The RSA BitSection 9.3. The Rabin BitSection 9.4. The ElGamal BitSection 9.5. The Discrete Logarithm BitSection 9.6. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 10. Data Integrity TechniquesSection 10.1. IntroductionSection 10.2. DefinitionSection 10.3. Symmetric TechniquesSection 10.4. Asymmetric Techniques I: Digital SignaturesSection 10.5. Asymmetric Techniques II: Data Integrity Without Source Identification Section 10.6. Chapter SummaryExercisesPart IV: AuthenticationChapter 11. Authentication Protocols — PrinciplesSection 11.1. IntroductionSection 11.2. Authentication and Refined NotionsSection 11.3. ConventionSection 11.4. Basic Authentication TechniquesSection 11.5. Password-based AuthenticationSection 11.6. Authenticated Key Exchange Based on Asymmetric CryptographySection 11.7. Typical Attacks on Authentication ProtocolsSection 11.8. A Brief Literature NoteSection 11.9. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 12. Authentication Protocols — The Real WorldSection 12.1. IntroductionSection 12.2. Authentication Protocols for Internet SecuritySection 12.3. The Secure Shell (SSH) Remote Login ProtocolSection 12.4. The Kerberos Protocol and its Realization in Windows 2000Section 12.5. SSL and TLSSection 12.6. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 13. Authentication Framework for Public-Key CryptographySection 13.1. IntroductionSection 13.2. Directory-Based Authentication FrameworkSection 13.3. Non-Directory Based Public-key Authentication FrameworkSection 13.4. Chapter SummaryExercisesPart V: Formal Approaches to Security EstablishmentChapter 14. Formal and Strong Security Definitions for Public-Key Cryptosystems Section 14.1. IntroductionSection 14.2. A Formal Treatment for SecuritySection 14.3. Semantic Security — the Debut of Provable SecuritySection 14.4. Inadequacy of Semantic SecuritySection 14.5. Beyond Semantic SecuritySection 14.6. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 15. Provably Secure and Efficient Public-Key CryptosystemsSection 15.1. IntroductionSection 15.2. The Optimal Asymmetric Encryption PaddingSection 15.3. The Cramer-Shoup Public-key CryptosystemSection 15.4. An Overview of Provably Secure Hybrid CryptosystemsSection 15.5. Literature Notes on Practical and Provably Secure Public-key Cryptosystems Section 15.6. Chapter SummarySection 15.7. ExercisesChapter 16. Strong and Provable Security for Digital SignaturesSection 16.1. IntroductionSection 16.2. Strong Security Notion for Digital SignaturesSection 16.3. Strong and Provable Security for ElGamal-family SignaturesSection 16.4. Fit-for-application Ways for Signing in RSA and RabinSection 16.5. SigncryptionSection 16.6. Chapter SummarySection 16.7. ExercisesChapter 17. Formal Methods for Authentication Protocols AnalysisSection 17.1. IntroductionSection 17.2. Toward Formal Specification of Authentication ProtocolsSection 17.3. A Computational View of Correct Protocols — the Bellare-Rogaway Model Section 17.4. A Symbolic Manipulation View of Correct ProtocolsSection 17.5. Formal Analysis Techniques: State System ExplorationSection 17.6. Reconciling Two Views of Formal Techniques for SecuritySection 17.7. Chapter SummaryExercisesPart VI: Cryptographic ProtocolsChapter 18. Zero-Knowledge ProtocolsSection 18.1. IntroductionSection 18.2. Basic DefinitionsSection 18.3. Zero-knowledge PropertiesSection 18.4. Proof or Argument?Section 18.5. Protocols with Two-sided-errorSection 18.6. Round EfficiencySection 18.7. Non-interactive Zero-knowledgeSection 18.8. Chapter SummaryExercisesChapter 19. Returning to "Coin Flipping Over Telephone"Section 19.1. Blum's "Coin-Flipping-By-Telephone" ProtocolSection 19.2. Security AnalysisSection 19.3. EfficiencySection 19.4. Chapter SummaryChapter 20. AfterremarkBibliographyCopyrightLibrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA CIP catalog record for this book can be obtained from the Library of Congress. Editorial/production supervision: Mary SudulCover design director: Jerry VottaCover design: Talar BoorujyManufacturing manager: Maura ZaldivarAcquisitions editor: Jill HarryMarketing manager: Dan DePasqualePublisher, Hewlett-Packard Books: Walter BruceA Short Description of the BookMany cryptographic schemes and protocols, especially those based on public-key cryptography,have basic or so-called "textbook crypto" versions, as these versions are usually the subjects formany textbooks on cryptography. This book takes a different approach to introducingcryptography: it pays much more attention to fit-for-application aspects of cryptography. Itexplains why "textbook crypto" is only good in an ideal world where data are random and badguys behave nicely. It reveals the general unfitness of "textbook crypto" for the real world bydemonstrating numerous attacks on such schemes, protocols and systems under various realworldapplication scenarios. This book chooses to introduce a set of practical cryptographicschemes, protocols and systems, many of them standards or de facto ones, studies them closely,explains their working principles, discusses their practical usages, and examines their strong(i.e., fit-for-application) security properties, often with security evidence formally established.The book also includes self-contained theoretical background material that is the foundation formodern cryptography.PrefaceOur society has entered an era where commerce activities, business transactions andgovernment services have been, and more and more of them will be, conducted and offered overopen computer and communications networks such as the Internet, in particular, viaWorldWideWeb-based tools. Doing things online has a great advantage of an always-onavailability to people in any corner of the world. Here are a few examples of things that havebeen, can or will be done online:Banking, bill payment, home shopping, stock trading, auctions, taxation, gambling, micropayment(e.g., pay-per-downloading), electronic identity, online access to medical records, virtual private networking, secure data archival and retrieval, certified delivery of documents, fair exchange of sensitive documents, fair signing of contracts,time-stamping,notarization, voting, advertising, licensing, ticket booking, interactive games, digitallibraries, digital rights management, pirate tracing, …And more can be imagined.Many cryptographic schemes and protocols, especially those based onpublic-keycryptography,have basic or so-called "textbook crypto" versions, as these versionsare usually the subjects formany textbooks on cryptography. This book takes adifferent approach to introducingcryptography: it pays much more attention tofit-for-application aspects of cryptography. Itexplains why "textbook crypto" isonly good in an ideal world where data are random and badguys behave nicely.It reveals the general unfitness of "textbook crypto" for the real world bydemonstratingnumerous attacks on such schemes, protocols and systems under variousrealworldapplication scenarios. This book chooses to introduce a set of practicalcryptographic schemes, protocols and systems, many of them standards or de factoones, studies them closely,explains their working principles, discusses their practicalusages, and examines their strong(i.e., fit-for-application) security properties, oftenwith security evidence formally established.The book also includes self-containedtheoretical background material that is the foundation formodern cryptography.PrefaceOur society has entered an era where commerce activities, business transactions andgovernment services have been, and more and more of them will be, conducted and offered overopen computer and communications networks such as the Internet, in particular, viaWorldWideWeb-based tools. Doing things online has a great advantage of an always-onavailability to people in any corner of the world. Here are a few examples of things that havebeen, can or will be done online:Banking, bill payment, home shopping, stock trading, auctions, taxation, gambling, micropayment(e.g., pay-per-downloading), electronic identity, online access to medical records, virtual private networking, secure data archival and retrieval, certified delivery of documents, fair exchange of sensitive documents, fair signing of contracts,time-stamping,notarization, voting, advertising, licensing, ticket booking, interactive games, digitallibraries, digital rights management, pirate tracing, …And more can be imagined.Fascinating commerce activities, transactions and services like these are only possible ifcommunications over open networks can be conducted in a secure manner. An effective solutionto securing communications over open networks is to apply cryptography. Encryption, digitalsignatures, password-based user authentication, are some of the most basic cryptographictechniques for securing communications. However, as we shall witness many times in this book,there are surprising subtleties and serious security consequences in the applicationsof even themost basic cryptographic techniques. Moreover, for many "fancier" applications, such as manylisted in the preceding paragraph, the basic cryptographic techniques are no longer adequate.With an increasingly large demand for safeguarding communications over open networks formore and more sophisticated forms of electronic commerce, business and services[a], anincreasingly large number of information security professionals will be needed for designing,developing, analyzing and maintaining information security systems and cryptographicprotocols. These professionals may range from IT systems administrators, information securityengineers and software/hardware systems developers whose products have securityrequirements, to cryptographers.[a] Gartner Group forecasts that total electronic business revenues for business to business (B2B) andbusiness to consumer (B2C) in the European Union will reach a projected US $2.6 trillion in 2004 (withprobability 0.7) which is a 28-fold increase from the level of 2000 [5]. Also, eMarketer [104] (page 41) reportsthat the cost to financial institutions (in USA) due to electronic identity theft was US $1.4 billion in 2002, andforecasts to grow by a compound annual growth rate of 29%.In the past few years, the author, a technical consultant on information security and cryptographic systems at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories in Bristol, has witnessed the phenomenon of a progressively increased demand for information security professionalsunmatched by an evident shortage of them. As a result, many engineers, who are oriented toapplication problems and may have little proper training in cryptography and informationsecurity have become "roll-up-sleeves" designers and developers for information securitysystems or cryptographic protocols. This is in spite of the fact that designing cryptographicsystems and protocols is a difficult job even for an expert cryptographer.The author's job has granted him privileged opportunities to review many information securitysystems and cryptographic protocols, some of them proposed and designed by "roll-up-sleeves"engineers and are for uses in serious applications. In several occasions, the author observed socalled"textbook crypto" features in such systems, which are the result of applications of cryptographic algorithms and schemes in ways they are usually introduced in many cryptographic textbooks. Direct encryption of a password (a secret number of a smallmagnitude) under a basic public-key encryption algorithm (e.g., "RSA") is a typical example oftextbook crypto. The appearances of textbook crypto in serious applications with a "nonnegligibleprobability" have caused a concern for the author to realize that the general danger oftextbook crypto is not widely known to many people who design and develop informationsecurity systems for serious real-world applications.Motivated by an increasing demand for information security professionals and a belief that theirknowledge in cryptography should not be limited to textbook crypto, the author has written thisbook as a textbook on non-textbook cryptography. This book endeavors to: Introduce a wide range of cryptographic algorithms, schemes and protocols with a particular emphasis on their non-textbook versions.Reveal general insecurity of textbook crypto by demonstrating a large number of attacks onand summarizing typical attacking techniques for such systems.Provide principles and guidelines for the design, analysis and implementation of cryptographic systems and protocols with a focus on standards.Study formalism techniques and methodologies for a rigorous establishment of strong andfit-for-application security notions for cryptographic systems and protocols. Include self-contained and elaborated material as theoretical foundations of modern cryptography for readers who desire a systematic understanding of the subject.ScopeModern cryptography is a vast area of study as a result of fast advances made in the past thirtyyears. This book focuses on one aspect: introducing fit-for-application cryptographic schemesand protocols with their strong security properties evidently established.The book is organized into the following six parts:Part I This part contains two chapters (1—2) and serves an elementary-level introductionfor the book and the areas of cryptography and information security. Chapter 1 begins witha demonstration on the effectiveness of cryptography in solving a subtle communicationproblem. A simple cryptographic protocol (first protocol of the book) for achieving "fair cointossing over telephone" will be presented and discussed. This chapter then carries on toconduct a cultural and "trade" introduction to the areas of study. Chapter 2 uses a series ofsimple authentication protocols to manifest an unfortunate fact in the areas: pitfalls areeverywhere.As an elementary-level introduction, this part is intended for newcomers to the areas.Part II This part contains four chapters (3—6) as a set of mathematical background knowledge, facts and basis to serve as a self-contained mathematical reference guide forthe book. Readers who only intend to "knowhow," i.e., know how to use thefit-forapplicationcrypto schemes and protocols, may skip this part yet still be able to follow most contents of the rest of the book. Readers who also want to "know-why," i.e., know whythese schemes and protocols have strong security properties, may find that this selfcontainedmathematical part is a sufficient reference material. When we present working principles of cryptographic schemes and protocols, reveal insecurity for some of them andreason about security for the rest, it will always be possible for us to refer to a precise pointin this part of the book for supporting mathematical foundations.This part can also be used to conduct a systematic background study of the theoreticalfoundations for modern cryptography.Part III This part contains four chapters (7—10) introducing the most basic cryptographicalgorithms and techniques for providing privacy and data integrity protections. Chapter 7 isfor symmetric encryption schemes, Chapter 8, asymmetric techniques. Chapter 9 considersan important security quality possessed by the basic and popular asymmetric cryptographicfunctions when they are used in an ideal world in which data are random. Finally, Chapter10 covers data integrity techniques.Since the schemes and techniques introduced here are the most basic ones, manyof themare in fact in the textbook crypto category and are consequently insecure. While the schemes are introduced, abundant attacks on many schemes will be demonstrated withwarning remarks explicitly stated. For practitioners who do not plan to proceed with an indepthstudy of fit-for-application crypto and their strong security notions, this textbook crypto part will still provide these readers with explicit early warning signals on the generalinsecurity of textbook crypto.Part IV This part contains three chapters (11—13) introducing an important notion inapplied cryptography and information security: authentication. These chapters provide awide coverage of the topic. Chapter 11 includes technical background, principles, a series ofbasic protocols and standards, common attacking tricks and prevention measures. Chapter12 is a case study for four well-known authentication protocol systems for real world applications. Chapter 13 introduces techniques which are particularly suitable for openfor-application) security properties, oftenwith security evidence formally established.The book also includes self-containedtheoretical background material that is the foundation formodern cryptography.systems which cover up-to-date and novel techniques.Practitioners, such as information security systems administration staff in an enterprise andsoftware/hardware developers whose products have security consequences may find thispart helpful.Part V This part contains four chapters (14—17) which provide formalism and rigoroustreatments for strong (i.e., fit-for-application) security notions for public-key cryptographictechniques (encryption, signature and signcryption) and formal methodologies for theanalysis of authentication protocols. Chapter 14 introduces formal definitions of strongsecurity notions. The next two chapters are fit-for-application counterparts to textbookcrypto schemes introduced in Part III, with strong security properties formally established(i.e., evidently reasoned). Finally, Chapter 17 introduces formal analysismethodologiesand techniques for the analysis of authentication protocols, which we have not been able todeal with in Part IV.Part VI This is the final part of the book. It contains two technical chapters (18—19) and ashort final remark (Chapter 20). The main technical content of this part, Chapter 18, introduces a class of cryptographic protocols called zero-knowledge protocols. Theseprotocols provide an important security service which is needed in various "fancy" electronic commerce and business applications: verification of a claimed property of secretdata (e.g., in conforming with a business requirement) while preserving a strict privacyquality for the claimant. Zero-knowledge protocols to be introduced in this part exemplifythe diversity of special security needs in various real world applications, which are beyondconfidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. In the final technical chapterof the book (Chapter 19) we will complete our job which has been left over from the firstprotocol of the book: to realize "fair coin tossing over telephone." That final realization willachieve a protocol which has evidently-established strong security properties yet with anefficiency suitable for practical applications.Needless to say, a description for each fit-for-application crypto scheme or protocol has to beginwith a reason why the textbook crypto counterpart is unfit for application. Invariably, thesereasons are demonstrated by attacks on these schemes or protocols, which, by the nature ofattacks, often contain a certain degree of subtleties. In addition, a description of a fit-forapplicationscheme or protocol must also end at an analysis that the strong (i.e.,fit-forapplication)security properties do hold as claimed. Consequently, some parts of this book inevitably contain mathematical and logical reasonings, deductions and transformations in orderto manifest attacks and fixes.While admittedly fit-for-application cryptography is not a topic for quick mastery or that can bemastered via light reading, this book, nonetheless, is not one for in-depth researchtopics whichwill only be of interest to specialist cryptographers. The things reported and explained in it arewell-known and quite elementary to cryptographers. The author believes that they can also becomprehended by non-specialists if the introduction to the subject is provided with plenty ofexplanations and examples and is supported by self-contained mathematical background andreference material.The book is aimed at the following readers.Students who have completed, or are near to completion of, first degree courses in computer, information science or applied mathematics, and plan to pursue a career ininformation security. For them, this book may serve as an advanced course in appliedcryptography.Security engineers in high-tech companies who are responsible for the design and development of information security systems. If we say that the consequence of textbookcrypto appearing in an academic research proposal may not be too harmful since the worstcase of the consequence would be an embarrassment, then the use of textbook crypto in aninformation security product may lead to a serious loss. Therefore, knowing the unfitness oftextbook crypto for real world applications is necessary for these readers. Moreover, thesereaders should have a good understanding of the security principles behind thefit-forapplicationschemes and protocols and so they can apply the schemes and the principles correctly. The self-contained mathematical foundations material in Part II makes the book asuitable self-teaching text for these readers.Information security systems administration staff in an enterprise andsoftware/hardwaresystems developers whose products have security consequences. For these readers, Part Iis a simple and essential course for cultural and "trade" training; Parts III and IV form asuitable cut-down set of knowledge in cryptography and information security. These threeparts contain many basic crypto schemes and protocols accompanied with plenty of attacking tricks and prevention measures which should be known to and can be grasped by。

3、身份认证讲义

3、身份认证讲义

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基于口令的身份认证
Challenge and Response Handshake Protocol
Client和Server共享一个密钥K
Client
Login ,IDc IDc, R MAC=H(R,K) IDc, MAC
时间同步(Time Synchronization):以用户登录时间而不
是以服务器的挑战作为随机因素,同步是指用户密码卡 和认证服务器所产生的口令在时间上必须同步。RSA信 息安全公司最先成功地研制出基于时间同步的动态口令 认证系统RSA SecureID,也由此获得了时间同步口令认 证的专利。
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自从L. Lamport于1981年最早提出利用哈希函数设计OTP 以来,各种OTP协议纷纷被提出,如CHAP,EAP等 目前OTP的实现机制主要有 挑战/应答(Challenge/Response):用户要求登录时,系统产生一个
随机数(挑战)发送给用户,用户将该随机数和口令按约定的算法做运 算,结果作为应答发给服务器,服务器运用约定的算法对口令和随 机数做运算以验证用户身份。由于服务器发出的每次挑战不同,因 此用户给出的应答也不同,从而避免了重放攻击,也避免了口令的 明文传输,但此机制仍然存在口令猜测攻击,且对于用户来说,操 作繁复,容易造成输入错误
如令牌,智能卡
实体的生物特征(something you are,属性证明),如指
纹、视网膜、DNA
双因素或多因素认证
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authenticate用法

authenticate用法

authenticate用法authenticate这个动词可以指示进行身份验证、验证信息或证据的真实性或有效性,或证明某事或某人的真实性、合法性或正确性。

以下是authenticate的几种用法:1.身份验证:authenticate可以用来表示验证某人的身份。

例如:The bank will authenticate your identity before giving access to your account.(银行将验证您的身份,并在允许您访问账户之前进行认证。

)2.证实信息的真实性:authenticate也可以表示确认某个信息的真实性或有效性。

例如:The experts authenticated theauthenticity of the painting.(专家确认了这幅画的真实性。

)3.鉴定证据或证明的可靠性:authenticate还可以指示验证某个证据或证明的可靠性。

例如:The fingerprints were authenticated by the forensic team.(指纹经法医团队认证证实。

)4.证明某事或某人的真实性或正确性:authenticate也可以用来表示证明某事或某人的真实性、合法性或正确性。

例如:The witness was able to authenticate the defendant’s alibi.(证人能够证明被告的不在场证明的真实性。

)拓展:身份验证在现代社会中变得越来越重要,它被广泛应用于各个领域。

例如,在银行和金融机构中,身份验证是保护客户账户免受未经授权的访问的重要手段。

在计算机科学中,身份验证用于验证用户的身份以获取访问权限。

在航空业,乘客需要通过身份验证以确保登机安全。

此外,更先进的技术如生物识别技术(如指纹识别、虹膜扫描等)也被用于身份验证,以提高准确性和安全性。

总之,authenticate在各个领域中都扮演着至关重要的角色,它帮助确保信息的真实性和可靠性,并保护个人和组织免受欺诈和未经授权的访问。

authenticode解析 -回复

authenticode解析 -回复

authenticode解析-回复Authenticode解析- 为软件验证提供信任保证Authenticode是一种数字签名技术,它用于对软件和驱动程序进行身份验证和信任保证。

通过对软件进行数字签名,Authenticode可以确保软件的完整性和真实性,并为用户提供一个可信任的源来获取软件。

Authenticode是由微软引入的,并被广泛应用于Windows操作系统和相关软件。

它使用公钥加密技术来创建数字签名,并使用数字证书来验证软件签名的有效性。

在本文中,我们将一步一步回答关于Authenticode的问题,以帮助读者更好地了解这项技术。

1. 什么是Authenticode?Authenticode是一种数字签名技术,用于验证软件和驱动程序的真实性和完整性。

它基于公钥加密算法,将软件的数字签名与软件对应的数字证书进行比对,以确保软件的来源可信。

2. Authenticode如何工作?Authenticode的工作过程包括以下几个步骤:a. 软件开发者使用私钥对软件进行数字签名。

b. 软件开发者将软件签名和相关证书一同发布到用户可以访问的位置。

c. 用户下载并安装软件。

d. 用户的计算机系统使用Authenticode来验证软件的数字签名。

e. 如果数字签名有效,则用户可以信任该软件并继续安装或使用。

3. Authenticode如何提供软件的完整性和真实性?Authenticode通过两个主要方面来确保软件的完整性和真实性:a. 数字签名:软件开发者使用私钥对软件进行数字签名,这个数字签名是软件的唯一标识,可以确保软件未被篡改。

b. 数字证书:软件签名与开发者的数字证书绑定在一起,数字证书由可信的第三方证书颁发机构(CA)签发。

用户的计算机系统使用数字证书来验证软件签名的有效性。

4. Authenticode在Windows操作系统中起什么作用?Authenticode在Windows操作系统中扮演了一个重要的角色,它确保了Windows用户可以在下载和安装软件时获得一个可信任的来源。

keystone身份认证服务的体系结构

keystone身份认证服务的体系结构

Keystone身份认证服务的体系结构主要包括两个主要部件:验证和服务目录。

以下是具体的体系结构说明:
验证:Keystone提供了一个基于令牌的验证服务。

在这个服务中,有几个重要的概念,包括租户(Tenant)、用户(User)和证书(credentials)。

租户:这是使用OpenStack相关服务的一个组织,一个租户映射到一个Nova的“project-id”。

在对象存储中,一个租户可以有多个容器。

根据不同的安装方式,一个租户可以代表一个客户、帐号、组织或项目。

用户:这代表一个个体,OpenStack以用户的形式来授权服务给它们。

用户拥有证书(credentials),且可能分配给一个或多个租户。

经过验证后,会为每个单独的租户提供一个特定的令牌。

证书:为了给用户提供一个令牌,需要用证书来唯一标识一个Keystone用户的密码或其它信息。

服务目录:Keystone也提供了一个服务目录,这个服务目录的功能是帮助用户找到他们所需要的服务。

这种体系结构使得Keystone能够提供灵活的、可扩展的身份认证服务,从而满足OpenStack 云计算平台的需求。

ssl authoritykeyidentifier 描述

ssl authoritykeyidentifier 描述

ssl authoritykeyidentifier 描述
SSL证书中的AuthorityKeyIdentifier扩展字段是一个重要的组成部分,用于标识证书的颁发机构(CA)以及与其关联的公钥。

通过该字段,客户端可以在服务器出示的证书中验证其是否由可信任的CA机构颁发,以及验证与证书相关的公钥是否匹配。

这有助于建立安全可靠的SSL/TLS连接,防止中间人攻击等安全威胁。

在解析SSL证书时,可以使用工具如Wireshark来查看证书中的各个字段,包括AuthorityKeyIdentifier扩展字段。

该字段通常包含证书颁发机构的唯一标识符(如SHA-1散列值)以及与证书关联的公钥信息。

通过验证这些信息,客户端可以确保与服务器建立的安全连接是可信的,并防止潜在的安全风险。

总的来说,SSL证书中的AuthorityKeyIdentifier扩展字段是用于标识证书颁发机构和与其关联的公钥的重要字段,有助于建立安全可靠的SSL/TLS连接。

delegation token原理

delegation token原理

Delegation Token(委派令牌)是一种授权认证机制,用于减少不必要的认证工作,特别是在分布式系统中。

其原理主要基于以下几点:
1. 授权认证:用户在获得Delegation Token后,可以在后续的请求过程中使用该令牌进行身份验证,而无需再次进行授权过程。

这样可以避免每次请求都进行繁琐的认证过程,提高系统的性能和效率。

2. 令牌更新:虽然Delegation Token可以在多个请求中使用,但存在过期的问题。

当令牌过期时,用户需要更新令牌的期限。

通常,用户需要向特定的Token更新者(Renewer)进行更新操作。

3. 安全秘钥:Delegation Token的产生基于一个安全秘钥。

这个秘钥由用户和NameNode(例如在Hadoop中)私自保管,确保令牌的安全性。

每个用户在经过初期验证后,会从NameNode中获取一个授权Token,并指定Token更新者。

4. 性能优化:在一个分布式系统中,服务之间的交互频繁,每次交互都需要进行身份验证。

Delegation Token的引入可以减少这种不必要的认证工作,特别是在任务容器数量较多的情况下,可以减轻KDC(Key Distribution Center)的性能负担。

以上是Delegation Token的基本原理,更多细节和实现方式可能因具体的应用场景和系统架构而有所不同。

鉴权的几种模式

鉴权的几种模式

鉴权的几种模式鉴权(Authentication)是指确认用户或实体的身份以及验证其所声明的权限的过程。

在网络安全领域中,鉴权是保护用户隐私和数据安全的重要措施之一。

本文将介绍几种常见的鉴权模式,包括基本认证、摘要认证、令牌认证和双因素认证。

一、基本认证(Basic Authentication)基本认证是最简单的一种鉴权模式。

在基本认证中,用户在请求访问受保护资源时,需要提供用户名和密码。

服务器接收到请求后,会对用户名和密码进行验证,验证通过后才允许用户访问资源。

基本认证的优点是简单易实现,适用于小规模应用。

然而,它的安全性较低,因为用户名和密码是以明文形式传输的,容易被窃取。

因此,基本认证通常需要配合使用加密协议(如HTTPS)来提升安全性。

二、摘要认证(Digest Authentication)摘要认证是一种改进的基本认证方式。

在摘要认证中,服务器会发送一个随机数(称为挑战)给客户端,客户端使用摘要算法对挑战和密码进行加密,然后将加密结果发送给服务器。

服务器接收到加密结果后,使用相同的算法对挑战和密码进行加密,然后比对两个加密结果是否一致。

摘要认证的优点是相对于基本认证来说更安全,因为密码不是以明文形式传输的。

不过,摘要认证的实现相对复杂,性能较差,适用于对安全性要求较高的应用。

三、令牌认证(Token Authentication)令牌认证是一种常见的无状态认证方式。

在令牌认证中,用户在登录后会获得一个令牌(Token),然后将令牌作为身份凭证发送给服务器。

服务器接收到令牌后,会对其进行解析和验证,确认用户的身份和权限。

令牌认证的优点是可以避免服务器存储用户的敏感信息(如密码),减轻了服务器的负担。

而且,令牌可以设置有效期,一旦过期就需要重新获取令牌,增加了安全性。

不过,由于令牌是无状态的,需要客户端在每次请求中携带令牌,因此对网络传输的要求较高。

四、双因素认证(Two-Factor Authentication)双因素认证是一种更加安全的认证方式。

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Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
New era of Information communication in past few decades Wireless communication New portable devices New applications Challenge – Security to information communication over open network Key technology for security – Cryptography Cryptographic primitives
GROUP KEY ESTABLISHMENT
Popularity of group based applications calls for security in such environment Secure group communication
Each pair of users share a secret key – large number of keys to be maintained All the users share a common secret key – group key establishment
COMMUNICATION MODEL
User1
Contrib1
User2
Contrib2
……………
Usern
Design and analysis of authentication and key establishment protocols Department of CSE, IIT Kharagpur
8
THE WORK
Propose a novel mutual authentication and key agreement which addresses the shortcomings of 3GPP-AKA Analysis of the basic CDMA authentication protocol of 3GPP2. We have pointed out some shortcomings in the existing protocol and have proposed a protocol which alleviates them Secure and efficient two party protocol for communication between the home and visited network
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK
Verifiable Group key establishment protocols for heterogeneous networks
VGKA1 – Truly group key agreement protocol. It uses polynomial interpolation VGKA2 – Suitable for heterogeneous environments involving low power devices VGKA-H - Extension to hierarchy, which addresses scalability and efficiency Formal security analysis for all the protocols Each protocol uses less expensive design primitives
A
B
C
gra grb grc gra(rb-rc) grc(rb-ra) grc(rb-ra) Key=grarbr+rarc+rbrc
TWO ROUND PROTOCOLS
Verifiability
U0
k1 k2 k3 k4 k5
U1
U2
U3
U4
U5
Key = F(k1,k2,k3,k4,k5) Can Ui verify that Ki is used in key generation?
KEY ISSUES
Truly contributory group key establishment Protocols for low power devices Existing protocols are not suitable Utilize less expensive design primitives Security analysis Many protocols proposed in the literature were subsequently shown to have weaknesses Formal approach of analyzing the security of protocols
Computationally not efficient Uses multiple rounds Not suitable for resource constrained/heterogeneous environment B grb grarc grbra A Key=grarbrac grcrb grc C
gra
EXISTING PROTOCOLS CONTD..
Use Diffie-Hellman construct but constant number of rounds
The communication requirement is still high Not suitable for resource constrained/heterogeneous environment Very few provide authentication Very few of them give a formal proof of security
Security
Efficiency
Confidentiality Entity Authentication Key freshness Key control Forward secrecy Key confirmation
Number of messages Bandwidth complexity of computations pre-computation?
ORGANIZATION OF THE TALK
IntroduBiblioteka tionBackground Security properties and model
Contribution
Key establishment protocols using one-way hash functions Conference key agreement protocol using polynomial interpolation Scalable group key agreement using hierarchy and cluster Key establishment protocols for mobile networks
MOTIVATIONS
Many protocols proposed in the literature were subsequently shown to have weaknesses Low power devices - existing protocols are not suitable Utilize less expensive design primitives Unlike the two and three party protocols, the group based protocols are still less explored Formal approach of analyzing the security of protocols Security protocols in applications such as mobile networks
A shared secret becomes available to two or more authenticated parties, for subsequent cryptographic use
Designing an authenticated key establishment protocol
AUTHENTICATED KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOLS – ANALYSIS & DESIGN
Mounita Saha
Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur
CONTRIBUTIONS
Key establishment protocols using one-way hash functions Conference key agreement protocol using polynomial interpolation Key establishment protocols for mobile networks
Design and analysis of authentication and key establishment protocols Department of CSE, IIT Kharagpur
GROUP KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOL FOR HETEROGENEOUS ENVIRONMENT
Encryption/Decryption One way functions Signatures
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS
First step
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