Aggregating Governance Indicators
cfa esg 中英文笔记
cfa esg 中英文笔记CFA协会提供的ESG（环境、社会和治理）中英文笔记如下：中文笔记：ESG投资是一种关注企业环境、社会和治理状况的投资策略，旨在实现可持续的长期回报。
ESG因素可以帮助投资者评估企业的潜在风险和机会，从而做出更明智的投资决策。
在投资决策中考虑ESG因素，有助于投资者更好地理解企业的运营模式、战略方向和社会责任等方面的信息。
通过投资于重视ESG因素的企业，投资者可以获得更好的投资回报，同时为可持续发展做出贡献。
英文笔记：ESG investing is an investment strategy that focuses on the environmental, social, and governance factors of a company. It aims to achieve sustainable long-term returns. ESG factors can help investors assess potential risks and opportunities of a company, enabling them to make more informed investment decisions. Taking ESG factors into consideration in investment decisions helpsinvestors better understand a company's operating model, strategic direction, and social responsibilities. By investing in companies that prioritize ESG factors, investors can achieve better investment returns while contributing to sustainable development.。
控股股东股权质押压力会影响公司ESG_表现吗？
2023年第8期(总第529期)金融理论与实践摘要：基于2013—2020年沪深A 股上市公司的数据探讨了控股股东股权质押压力和公司ESG表现的关系，并研究了信息披露质量、盈余管理在其中的作用机制。
实证发现控股股东股权质押压力会降低公司的ESG 表现，而且将ESG 表现细分来看，控股股东股权质押压力主要降低公司在社会责任（S ）、治理水平（G ）方面的表现，对环境建设（E ）方面的影响并不显著。
研究其作用机制，发现控股股东股权质押压力会通过降低公司的信息披露质量、提高盈余管理水平，进而降低ESG 表现。
进一步分析发现，当公司存在较强的内部监督和外部监督时，都能够降低控股股东股权质押压力对公司ESG 表现的负面影响。
基于此，就严格管控控股股东的市值管理行为以及完善公司的ESG 建设提出相关建议。
关键词：控股股东股权质押压力；ESG 表现；信息披露质量；盈余管理；监督作用文章编号：1003-4625（2023）08-0097-13中图分类号：F832.5文献标识码：A Abstract Abstract::The relationship between controlling shareholders ’equity pledging pressure and ESG per⁃formance of companies is explored through the data of A-share listed companies from 2013to 2020,and the role of information disclosure quality and earnings management in the mechanism is investi⁃gated.The empirical evidence finds that the pressure of controlling shareholders ’equity pledges re⁃duces the ESG performance of companies,and the ESG performance shows that the pressure of con⁃trolling shareholders ’equity pledges mainly reduces the performance of companies in the areas of social responsibility (S)and governance (G),and does not have a significant impact on environmental construction (E).Examining the mechanism,it was found that pressure from controlling sharehold⁃ers ’equity pledges reduces the quality of information disclosure and increases the level of earnings management,which reduces ESG performance in turn.In further analysis,it is found that both strong internal supervisory and external supervisory can reduce the negative impact of controlling share⁃holder equity pledging pressure on a company ’s ESG performance.Based on this,recommendations are made to strictly control the market value management behaviour of controlling shareholders and to improve the ESG construction of companies.words Key words::pledge pessure;ESG performance;disclosure quality;earnings management;superviso⁃ry role洪瑞，席爱华（中国农业大学经济管理学院，北京100083）控股股东股权质押压力会影响公司ESG 表现吗？一、引言随着我国证券市场不断发展，加之股权质押易流通、易估值且不影响控股股东的地位等优势，股权质押作为一种标的物被各类金融机构等质权人所接受，越来越多的控股股东通过将股权质押给质权人来获得资金，以缓解自身资金困境，这也使得我国的股权质押业务迅速发展。
cfa esg例题
cfa esg例题
CFA协会提供了一些ESG（环境、社会和治理）相关的题目，这些题目主
要涉及金融领域。
以下是其中的一些题目：
1. 请分析一家公司在实施可持续性战略时面临的挑战和机遇。
2. 请评估一家公司的碳排放策略是否符合其长期价值创造目标，并说明理由。
3. 请解释一家公司如何通过其供应链管理实践来改善其ESG表现。
4. 请分析一家公司如何平衡短期财务表现和长期ESG目标之间的关系。
5. 请评估一家公司在应对气候变化方面的风险和机会。
6. 请说明一家公司如何通过资本结构调整来降低其财务风险并提高其ESG
表现。
7. 请分析一家公司如何通过投资可再生能源项目来改善其ESG表现。
8. 请解释一家公司如何通过其治理结构来提高其ESG表现。
9. 请评估一家公司在员工福利方面的政策和实践是否符合其ESG目标。
10. 请说明一家公司如何通过信息披露来提高其ESG表现。
这些题目旨在测试考生对ESG相关议题的理解和应用，包括对可持续性、
碳排放、供应链管理、财务表现与ESG目标之间的关系、气候变化风险、
资本结构调整、可再生能源投资、公司治理结构、员工福利以及信息披露等方面的分析。
宏观调控英语术语
宏观调控英语术语
宏观调控英语术语是指应用于宏观经济领域的一些专业术语，主要用于描述国家或政府在宏观经济领域进行的调控活动。
以下是一些常见的宏观调控英语术语：
1. Fiscal Policy：财政政策
2. Monetary Policy：货币政策
3. Interest Rate：利率
4. Inflation：通货膨胀
5. Deflation：通货紧缩
6. Recession：经济衰退
7. Stabilization Policy：稳定政策
8. Aggregate Demand：总需求
9. Aggregate Supply：总供给
10. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)：国内生产总值
11. Unemployment Rate：失业率
12. Exchange Rate：汇率
13. Balance of Payments：国际收支
14. Structural Adjustment：结构调整
15. Public Debt：公共债务
16. Money Supply：货币供应量
这些术语在宏观经济领域中被广泛使用，有助于描述和分析国家或政府在经济调控方面所采取的政策和措施。
了解这些术语可以帮助
我们更好地理解经济现象和政策。
Governance Indicators Where Are We_where should we be going
Governance Indicators:Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going?Daniel Kaufmann†Aart KraayProgress in measuring governance is assessed using a simple framework that distinguishes between indicators that measure formal rules and indicators that measure the practical application or outcomes of these rules.The analysis calls attention to the strengths and weaknesses of both types of indicators as well as the complementarities between them.It distinguishes between the views of experts and the results of surveys and assesses the merits of aggregate as opposed to individual governance indicators. Some simple principles are identified to guide the use and refinement of existing govern-ance indicators and the development of future indicators.These include transparently dis-closing and accounting for the margins of error in all indicators,drawing from a diversity of indicators and exploiting complementarities among them,submitting all indicators to rigorous public and academic scrutiny,and being realistic in expectations of future indicators.JEL codes:H1,O17Not everything that can be counted counts,and not everything thatcounts can be counted.—Albert Einstein Most scholars,policymakers,aid donors,and aid recipients recognize that good governance is a fundamental ingredient of sustained economic development.This growing understanding,initially informed by a very limited set of empirical measures of governance,has spurred intense interest in developing more refined, nuanced,and policy-relevant indicators of governance.This article reviews progress in measuring governance,emphasizing empirical measures explicitly designed to be comparable across countries and in most cases over time.The goal is to provide a structure for thinking about the strengths and weaknesses of different types of governance indicators that can inform both the use of existing indicators and ongoing efforts to improve them and develop new ones.1 Thefirst section of this article reviews definitions of governance.Although there are many broad definitions of governance,the degree of definitional disagreement#The Author2008.Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK.All rights reserved.For permissions,please e-mail:journals.permissions@ doi;10.1093/wbro/lkm012Advance Access publication January31,200823:1–30can easily be overstated.Most definitions appropriately emphasize the importance of a capable state that is accountable to citizens and operating under the rule of law.Broad principles of governance along these lines are naturally not amenable to direct observation and thus to direct measurement.As Albert Einstein noted,“Not everything that counts can be counted.”Many different types of data provide infor-mation on the extent to which these principles of governance are observed across countries.An important corollary is that any particular indicator of governance can usefully be interpreted as an imperfect proxy for some unobserved broad dimension of governance.This interpretation emphasizes throughout this review a recurrent theme that there is measurement error in all governance indicators, which should be explicitly considered when using these kinds of data to draw conclusions about cross-country differences or trends in governance over time.The second section addresses what is measured.The discussion highlights the distinction between indicators that measure specific rules“on the books”and indi-cators that measure particular governance outcomes“on the ground.”Rules on the books codify details of the constitutional,legal,or regulatory environment; the existence or absence of specific agencies,such as anticorruption commissions or independent auditors;and so forth—components intended to provide the key de jure foundations of governance.On-the-ground measures assess de facto govern-ance outcomes that result from the application of these rules(Dofirmsfind the regulatory environment cumbersome?Do households believe the police are corrupt?).An important message in this section concerns the shared limitations of indicators of both rules and outcomes:Outcome-based indicators of governance can be difficult to link back to specific policy interventions,and the links from easy-to-measure de jure indicators of rules to governance outcomes of interest are not yet well understood and in some cases appear tenuous at best.They remind us of the need to respect Einstein’s dictum that“not everything that can be counted counts.”The third section examines whose views should be relied on.Indicators based on the views of various types of experts are distinguished from survey-based indi-cators that capture the views of large samples offirms and individuals.A category of aggregate indicators that combine,organize,provide structure,and summarize information from these different types of respondents is examined.The fourth section examines the rationale for such aggregate indicators,and their strengths and weaknesses.The set of indicators discussed in this survey is intended to provide leading examples of major governance indicators rather than an exhaustive stocktaking of existing indicators in this taxonomy.2A feature of efforts to measure governance is the preponderance of indicators focused on measuring de facto governance out-comes and the paucity of measures of de jure rules.Almost by necessity,de jure rules-based indicators of governance reflect the views or judgments of experts.In 2The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.23,no.1(Spring2008)contrast,the much larger body of de facto indicators captures the views of both experts and survey respondents.The article concludes with a discussion of the way forward in measuring govern-ance in a manner that can be useful to policymakers.The emphasis is on the importance of consumers and producers of governance indicators clearly recogniz-ing and disclosing the pervasive measurement error in any type of governance indi-cators.This section also notes the importance of moving away from oft-heard false dichotomies,such as“subjective”or“objective”indicators or aggregate or disaggre-gated ones.For good reason,virtually all measures of governance involve a degree of subjective judgment,and different levels of aggregation are appropriate for differ-ent types of analysis.In any case,the choice is not either one or the other,as most aggregate indicators can readily be unbundled into their constituent components. What Does Governance Mean?The concept of governance is not a new one.Early discussions go back to at least 400BCE,to the Arthashastra,a treatise on governance attributed to Kautilya, thought to be the chief minister to the king of India.Kautilya presents key pillars of the“art of governance,”emphasizing justice,ethics,and anti-autocratic ten-dencies.He identifies the duty of the king to protect the wealth of the state and its subjects and to enhance,maintain,and safeguard this wealth as well as the inter-ests of the kingdom’s subjects.Despite the long provenance of the concept,no strong consensus has formed around a single definition of governance or institutional quality.For this reason, throughout this article the terms governance,institutions,and institutional quality are used interchangeably,if somewhat imprecisely.Researchers and organizations have produced a wide array of definitions.Some definitions are so broad that they cover almost anything(such as the definition“rules,enforcement mechanisms, and organizations”offered in the World Bank’s W orld Development Report2002: Building Institutions for Markets).Others,like the definition suggested by North (2000),are not only broad but risk making the links from good governance to development almost tautological:“How do we account for poverty in the midst of plenty?...We must create incentives for people to invest in more efficient tech-nology,increase their skills,and organize efficient markets....Such incentives are embodied in institutions.”Some of the governance indicators surveyed capture a wide range of develop-ment outcomes.While it is difficult to draw a line between governance and the ultimate development outcomes of interest,it is useful at both the definitional and measurement stages to emphasize concepts of governance that are at least some-what removed from development outcomes themselves.An early and narrower Kaufmann and Kraay3definition of public sector governance proposed by the World Bank is that “governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development”(World Bank1992, p.1).This definition remains almost unchanged in the Bank’s2007governance and anticorruption strategy,with governance defined as“the manner in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy and provide public goods and services”(World Bank2007,p.1).Kaufmann,Kraay,and Zoido-Lobato´n(1999a,p.1)define governance as“the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.This includes the process by which governments are selected,monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies;and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”Although the number of definitions of governance is large,there is some con-sensus.Most definitions agree on the importance of a capable state operating under the rule of law.Interestingly,comparing the last three definitions cited above,the one substantive difference has to do with the explicit degree of empha-sis on the role of democratic accountability of governments to their citizens.Even these narrower definitions remain sufficiently broad that there is scope for a wide diversity of empirical measures of various dimensions of good governance.The gravity of the issues dealt with in these definitions of governance suggests that measurement is important.In recent years there has been debate over whether such broad notions of governance can be usefully measured.Many indicators can shed light on various dimensions of governance.However,given the breadth of the concepts,and in many cases their inherent unobservability,no single indicator or combination of indicators can provide a completely reliable measure of any of these dimensions of governance.Rather,it is useful to think of the various specific indi-cators discussed below as all providing imperfect signals of fundamentally unobser-vable concepts of governance.This interpretation emphasizes the importance of taking into account as explicitly as possible the inevitable resulting measurement error in all indicators of governance when analyzing and interpreting any such measure.As shown below,however,the fact that such margins of error arefinite and still allow for meaningful country comparisons across space and time suggests that measuring governance is both feasible and informative.Governance Rules or Governance Outcomes?This section examines both the rules-based and outcome-based indicators of gov-ernance.A rules-based indicator of corruption might measure whether countries have legislation prohibiting corruption or have an anticorruption agency. 4The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.23,no.1(Spring2008)An outcome-based measure could assess whether the laws are enforced or the anticorruption agency is undermined by political interference.The views offirms, individuals,nongovernmental organizations(NGOs),or commercial risk-rating agencies could also be solicited regarding the prevalence of corruption in the public sector.To measure public sector accountability,one could observe the rules regarding the presence of formal elections,financial disclosure requirements for public servants,and the like.One could also assess the extent to which these rules operate in practice by surveying respondents regarding the functioning of the institutions of democratic accountability.Because a clear line does not always distinguish the two types of indicators,it is more useful to think of ordering different indicators along a continuum,with one end corresponding to rules and the other to ultimate governance outcomes of interest.Because both types of indicators have their own strengths and weak-nesses,all indicators should be thought of as imperfect,but complementary proxies for the aspects of governance they purport to measure.Rules-Based Indicators of GovernanceSeveral rules-based indicators are used to assess governance(tables1and2). They include the Doing Business project of the World Bank,which reports detailed information on the legal and regulatory environment in a large set of countries;the Database of Political Institutions,constructed by World Bank researchers,and the POLITY-IV database of the University of Maryland,both of which report detailed factual information on features of countries’political systems;and the Global Integrity Index(GII),which provides detailed information on the legal framework governing public sector accountability and transparency in a sample of41countries,most of them developing economies.Atfirst glance,one of the main virtues of indicators of rules is their clarity.It is straightforward to ascertain whether a country has a presidential or a parliamen-tary system of government or whether a country has a legally independent anti-corruption commission.In principle,it is also straightforward to document details of the legal and regulatory environment,such as how many legal steps are required to register a business orfire a worker.This clarity also implies that it is straightforward to measure progress on such indicators.Has an anticorruption commission been established?Have business entry regulations been streamlined? Has a legal requirement for disclosure of budget documents been passed?This clarity has made such indicators very appealing to aid donors interested in linking aid with performance indicators and in monitoring progress on such indicators.Set against these advantages are three main drawbacks.They are less“objective”than they appear.It is easy to overstate the clarity and objectivity of rules-based measures of governance.In practice,a good deal of Kaufmann and Kraay5subjective judgment is involved in codifying all but the most basic and obvious features of a country’s constitutional,legal,and regulatory environments.(It is no accident that the views of lawyers,on which many of these indicators are based,are commonly referred to as opinions .)In Kenya in 2007,for example,a consti-tutional right to access to information faced being undermined or offset entirely by an official secrecy act and by pending approval and implementation of the Freedom of Information Act.In this case,codifying even the legal right to access to infor-mation requires careful judgment as to the net effect of potentially conflicting laws.Of course,this drawback of ambiguity is not unique to rules-based measures of gov-ernance:interpreting outcome-based indicators of governance can also involve ambiguity ,as discussed below .There has been less recognition,however,of the extent to which rules-based indicators also reflect subjective judgment.The links between indicators and outcomes are complex,possibly subject to long lags,and often not well understood .These problems complicate the interpretation of rules-based indicators.In the case of rules-based measures,some of the most basic features of countries’constitutional arrangements have little normative content on their own;such indicators are for the most part descriptive.It makes Table 1.Sources and Types of Information Used in Governance IndicatorsType of indicatorSource of information Rules-basedOutcomes-based Broad Specific Broad Specific ExpertsLawyers DBCommercial risk-rating agenciesDRI,EIU,PRS Nongovernmental organizations GIIHER,RSF ,CIR,FRH GII,OBI Governments and multilateralsCPIA PEF A Academics DPI,PIVDPI,PIV Survey respondentsFirmsICA,GCS,WCY IndividualsAFR,LBO,GWP Aggregate indicators combining experts and survey respondents TI,WGI,MOINote :AFR is Afrobarometer,CIR is Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset,CPIA is Country Policy and Institutional Assessment,DB is Doing Business,DPI is Database of Political Institutions,DRI is Global Insight DRI,EIU is Economist Intelligence Unit,FRH is Freedom House,GCS is Global Competitiveness Survey ,GII is Global Integrity Index,GWP is Gallup World Poll,HER is Heritage Foundation,ICA is Investment ClimateAssessment,LBO is Latinobaro´metro,MOI is Ibrahim Index of African Governance,OBI is Open Budget Index,PEF A is Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability ,PIV is Polity IV ,PRS is Political Risk Services,RSF is Reporters Without Borders,TI is Transparency International,WCY is World Competitiveness Yearbook,and WGI is Worldwide Governance Indicators.Source :Authors’compilation based on data from sources listed in table 2.6The W orld Bank Research Observer ,vol.23,no.1(Spring 2008)little sense,for example,to presuppose that presidential (as opposed to parliamentary)systems or majoritarian (as opposed to proportional)representation in voting arrangements are intrinsically good or bad.Interest in such variables as indi-cators of governance rests on the case that they may matter for outcomes,often in complex ways.In their influential book,Persson,Torsten,and Tabellini (2005)document how these features of constitutional rules influence the political process and ultimately outcomes such as the level,composition,and cyclicality of public spending (Acemoglu 2006)challenges the robustness of these findings).In such cases,the usefulness of rules-based indicators as measures of governance depends crucially on how strong the empirical links are between such rules and the ultimate outcomes of interest.Perhaps the more common is the less extreme case in which rules-based indi-cators of governance have normative content on their own,but the relative Table 2.Country Coverage and Frequency of Governance SurveysName Number of countries covered Frequency of survey W eb site Afrobarometer18Triennial www Cingranelli-Richards Human RightsDataset192Annual www Country Policy and InstitutionalAssessment136Annual www Doing Business175Annual www Database of Political Institutions178Annual Global Insight DRI117Quarterly www Economist Intelligence Unit120Quarterly www Freedom House192Annual www Global Competitiveness Survey117Annual www Global Integrity Index41Triennial www .globalintegrity .org Gallup World Poll131Annual www Heritage Foundation161Annual www Investment Climate Assessment94Irregular www Latinobaro´metro 17Annual www Ibrahim Index of African Governance48Triennial www Open Budget Index59Annual www Polity IV161Annual www /polity/Political Risk Services140Monthly www Public Expenditure and FinancialAccountability42Irregular www Reporters without Borders165Annual www World Competitiveness Yearbook47Annual www .imd.chSource :Authors’compilation.Kaufmann and Kraay 7importance of different rules for outcomes of interest is unclear.The GII,for example,provides information on the existence of dozens of rules,ranging from the legal right to freedom of speech to the existence of an independent ombuds-man to the presence of legislation prohibiting the offering or acceptance of bribes. The Open Budget Index(OBI)provides detailed information on the budget processes,including the types of information provided in budget documents, public access to budget documents,and the interaction between executive and legislative branches in the budget process.Many of these indicators arguably have normative value on their own:having public access to budget documents is desir-able and having streamlined business registration procedures is better than not having them.This profusion of detail in rules-based indicators leads to two related difficulties in using them to design and monitor governance reforms.Thefirst is that as a result of absence of good information on the links between changes in specific rules or procedures and outcomes of interest,it is difficult to know which rules should be reformed and in what order.Will establishing an anticorruption com-mission or passing legislation outlawing bribery have any impact on reducing cor-ruption?If so,which is more important?Should,instead,more efforts be put into ensuring that existing laws and regulations are implemented or that there is greater transparency,access to information,or media freedom?How soon should one expect to see the impacts of these interventions?Given that governments typi-cally operate with limited political capital to implement reforms,these trade-offs and lags are important.The second difficulty in designing or monitoring reforms arises when aid donors or governments set performance indicators for governance reforms.Performance indicators based on changing specific rules,such as the passage of a particular piece of legislation or a reform of a specific budget procedure,can be very attractive because of their clarity:it is straightforward to verify whether the specified policy action has been taken.3Yet“actionable”indicators are not necessarily also“action worthy,”in the sense of having a significant impact on the outcomes of interest. Moreover,excessive emphasis on registering improvements on rules-based indi-cators of governance leads to risks of“teaching to the test”or,worse“reform illu-sion,”in which specific rules or procedures are changed in isolation with the sole purpose of showing progress on the specific indicators used by aid donors.Major gaps exist between statutory rules on the books and their implementation on the ground.To take an extreme example,in all41countries covered by the2006GII, accepting a bribe is codified as illegal,and all but three countries(Brazil, Lebanon,and Liberia)have anticorruption commissions or similar agencies.Yet there is enormous variation in perceptions-based measures of corruption across these countries.The41countries covered by the GII include the Democratic 8The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.23,no.1(Spring2008)Republic of Congo,which ranks200out of207countries on the2006 Worldwide Governance Indicators(WGI)control of corruption indicator,and the United States,which ranks23.Another example of the gap between rules and implementation(documented in more detail in Kaufmann,Kraay,and Mastruzzi2005)compares the statutory ease of establishing a business with a survey-based measure offirms’perceptions of the ease of starting a business across a large sample of countries.In industrial countries,where de jure rules are often implemented as intended,the two measures correspond quite closely.In contrast,in developing economies,where there are often gaps between de jure rules and their de facto implementation,the correlation between the two is very weak;the de jure codification of the rules and regulations required to start a business is not a good predictor of the actual con-straints reported byfirms.Unsurprisingly,much of the difference between the de jure and de facto measures could be statistically explained by de facto measures of corruption,which subverts the fair application of rules on the books.The three drawbacks—the inevitable role of judgment even in“objective”indi-cators,the complexity and lack of knowledge regarding the links from rules to outcomes of interest,and the gap between rules on the books and their implementation on the ground—suggest that although rules-based governance indicators provide valuable information,they are insufficient on their own for measuring governance.Rules-based measures need to be complemented by and used in conjunction with outcome-based indicators of governance.Outcome-Based Governance IndicatorsMost indicators of governance are outcome based,and several rules-based indi-cators of governance also provide complementary outcome-based measures.The GII,for example,pairs indicators of the existence of various rules and procedures with indicators of their effectiveness in practice.The Database of Political Institutions measures not only such constitutional rules as the presence of a par-liamentary system,but also outcomes of the electoral process,such as the extent to which one party controls different branches of government and the fraction of votes received by the president.The Polity-IV database records a number of out-comes,including the effective constraints on the power of the executive.The remaining outcome-based indicators range from the highly specific to the quite general.The OBI reports data on more than100indicators of the budget process,ranging from whether budget documentation contains details of assump-tions underlying macroeconomic forecasts to documentation of budget outcomes relative to budget plans.Other less specific sources include the Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability indicators,constructed by aid donors with inputs of recipient countries,and several large cross-country surveys offirms—including Kaufmann and Kraay9the Investment Climate Assessments of the World Bank,the Executive Opinion Survey of the World Economic Forum,and the World Competitiveness Yearbook of the Institute for Management Development—that askfirms detailed questions about their interactions with the state.Examples of more general assessments of broad areas of governance include ratings provided by several commercial sources,including Political Risk Services, the Economist Intelligence Unit,and Global Insight–DRI.Political Risk Services rates10areas that can be identified with governance,such as“democratic accountability,”“government stability,”“law and order,”and“corruption.”Large cross-country surveys of individuals such as the Afrobarometer and Latinobaro´metro surveys and the Gallup World Poll ask general questions,such as“Is corruption widespread throughout the government in this country?”The main advantage of outcome-based indicators is that they capture the views of relevant stakeholders,who take actions based on these ernments, analysts,researchers,and decisionmakers should,and often do,care about public views on the prevalence of corruption,the fairness of elections,the quality of service delivery,and many other governance outcomes.Outcome-based govern-ance indicators provide direct information on the de facto outcome of how de jure rules are implemented.Outcome-based measures also have some significant limitations.Such measures,particularly where they are general,can be difficult to link back to specific policy interventions that might influence governance outcomes.This is the mirror image of the problem discussed above:Rules-based indicators of gov-ernance can also be difficult to relate to outcomes of interest.A related difficulty is that outcome-based governance indicators may be too close to ultimate develop-ment outcomes of interest.To take an extreme example,the Ibrahim Index of African Governance includes a number of ultimate development outcomes,such as per capita GDP(gross domestic product),growth of GDP,inflation,infant mor-tality,and inequality.While such development outcomes are surely worth moni-toring,including them in an index of governance risks making the links from governance to development tautological.Another difficulty has to do with interpreting the units in which outcomes are measured.Rules-based indicators have the virtue of clarity:either a particular rule exists or it does not.Outcome-based indicators by contrast are often measured on somewhat arbitrary scales.For example,a survey question might ask respondents to rate the quality of public services on afive-point scale,with the distinction between different scores left unclear and up to the respondent.4In contrast,the usefulness of outcome-based indicators is greatly enhanced by the extent to which the criteria for differing scores are clearly documented.The World Bank’s Country Performance and Institutional Assessment(CPIA)and the Freedom House indicators are good examples of outcome-based indicators based 10The W orld Bank Research Observer,vol.23,no.1(Spring2008)。
cfaesg专业词汇对照
cfaesg专业词汇对照
CFAESG是一个专业术语，代表了“Corporate Finance and Environmental, Social, and Governance”（公司财务与环境、社
会和治理）的缩写。
这个术语涉及到公司财务和环境、社会和治理
方面的相关内容。
在这个术语中，CFA代表公司财务，ESG代表环境、社会和治理。
在公司财务方面，CFA涉及到公司的财务运作、资本结构、投
资决策、财务报表分析等内容。
而在环境、社会和治理方面，ESG
则涉及到公司在环境保护、社会责任和良好治理方面的表现和实践。
这些方面的综合表现对于投资者和利益相关者来说都是重要的因素。
在对照方面，可以将CFAESG术语中的CFA与ESG进行对比。
CFA代表了公司财务方面的内容，包括财务数据分析、投资组合管理、财务规划等，而ESG代表了环境、社会和治理方面的内容，包
括公司的环保政策、社会责任实践、治理结构等。
通过对照CFA和ESG，可以更好地理解公司的全面表现，从而更全面地评估其投资价
值和社会责任。
总的来说，CFAESG代表了公司财务与环境、社会和治理的综合
概念，对于投资者和公司管理者来说都具有重要意义。
通过对照CFA和ESG，可以更好地理解和评估公司的综合表现，从而做出更全面的决策。
管理者过度自信的量化指标研究
管理者过度自信的量化指标研究发表时间：2014-11-18T14:14:38.903Z 来源：《价值工程》2014年第1月上旬供稿作者：袁晓红[导读] 资本市场有效性不足，因而难以用股票期权和CAR 来衡量管理者的过度自信。
Study on the Quantitative Indicator for Manager's Overconfidence袁晓红YUAN Xiao-hong（汕头职业技术学院经济管理系，汕头515000）（Department of Economics and Management，Shantou Polytechnic，Shantou 515000，China）摘要院随着行为财务理论的兴起，过度自信理论倍受人们的关注。
而在这一类研究中，实证研究远远滞后于理论研究，其中的主要原因是研究者们难以找到一个可行的方法来度量管理者的过度自信。
本文将对我国现有的关于管理者过度自信量化指标的研究做以梳理，并在此基础提出适合中国实际情况的量化指标。
Abstract: With the rise of behavioral finance theory, overconfidence theory is attracting more and more attention. But the empiricalresearch in this field is far lagging behind the theoretical research. The main reason is that the researchers are hard to find a feasiblemethod to measure managers' overconfidence. In this article, the existing research on managers overconfidence quantitative indicators aresummarized, and based on this, quantitative indicators suitable for China's actual situation are put forward.关键词院过度自信；量化指标；行为财务理论Key words: overconfidence；quantitative indicators；behavioral finance theory中图分类号院C931.3 文献标识码院A 文章编号院1006-4311（2014）01-0176-030 引言随着财务研究的不断深入，学者们发现资本市场中的许多经济现象与传统的财务理论不一致，开始对传统的理论假设提出质疑，产生了“行为公司财务理论”。
wgidataset世界银行治理数据库
Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996-2009This file contains aggregate indicators of six dimensions of governance. The indicators are con unobserved components methodology described in detail in the paper. The six governance indi units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outc "Est." provides the point estimate. The column labeled "S. E." contains the corresponding stand errors have the following interpretation: there is roughly a 70% chance that the level of governan one standard error of the point estimate of governance. The column labeled "N" contains the nu of governance data in which each country appears. Details on the concepts measured by each and the interpretation of the point estimates and standard errors can be found in the accompany 2010 release of the WGI incorporates revisions to data for previous years. This release of the d releases.The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-gove and international organizations. The aggregate indicators in no way reflect the official pos its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. As discussed in detail in the acco countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to margins of error that are cl Consequently, precise country rankings should not be inferred from this data References from Research ProjectDaniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010). "The Worldwide Governance Indi Methodology, Data and Analytical Issues". World Bank Policy ResearchDaniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2009). "Governance Matters VIII: Govern 2008". World Bank Policy Research June 2009Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2008). "Governance Matters VII: Govern 2007". World Bank Policy Research June 2008Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2007). "Governance Matters VI: Governa 2006". World Bank Policy Research #4280 July 2007Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006). "Governance Matters V: Governa 2005". World Bank Policy Research # 4012 September 2006Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2005). "Governance Matters IV: Governa 2004". World Bank Policy Research #3630, May 2005Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi (2003). "Governance Matters III: Governa 2002". WBER, Volume 12, N.12Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (1999a). "Aggregating Governance Indi Research Department Working Paper No. 2195.Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton (1999a). "Governance Matters". World Department Working Paper No. 2196.All papers and charts downloadable at e constructed using ane indicators are measured inoutcomes. The column labeled standard error. The standard ernance lies within plus or minu s e number of individual sources each indicator, its components, panying paper.Note that thethe data supersedes previous nses on the quality ofdents in industrial and governmental organizations, al position of the World Bank, accompanying papers,are clearly indicated.e Indicators : A Summary of overnance Indicators for 1996-overnance Indicators for 1996-overnance Indicators for 1996-vernance Indicators for 1996-vernance Indicators for 1996-vernance Indicators for 1996-e Indicators". World Bank Policy World Bank Policy Research。
leading indicator lagging indicator 指标
leading indicator lagging indicator 指标Leading indicator: A leading indicator is a measurable factor or variable that changes before a change in the economic or business cycle occurs. It can help predict future trends or developments and provide early signals of economic activity. Examples of leading indicators may include stock market performance, building permits, consumer confidence index, and new orders for durable goods.Lagging indicator: A lagging indicator is a factor that changes after a change in the economic or business cycle has occurred. It is used to confirm or validate a trend that has already taken place. Lagging indicators reflect past performance and do not provide predictive insights. Examples of lagging indicators may include unemployment rate, inflation rate, and GDP growth rate.指标的中文翻译：领先指标：领先指标是在经济或商业周期发生变化之前发生变化的可衡量因素或变量。
指标 区别 index indicator
指标区别index indicator指标和区别在日常生活中经常被提及，无论是在商业领域、经济学、环境保护还是其他领域中。
这两个概念都与数据分析、评估和绩效度量有关，帮助我们了解特定问题或情况的状态和趋势。
本文将一步一步回答关于指标和区别的问题，并解释它们在各个领域的应用。
首先，让我们来了解指标的概念。
指标是一种用于衡量特定情况或问题的标准或参考点。
它可以是数量、比例、比率、百分比或其他数据形式。
指标有时也被称为测量指标或度量指标。
它们是定量或定性数据的表征，通常用图表、表格或图形的形式呈现。
指标在各个领域中广泛应用，包括金融、经济、环境、健康和教育等。
然后，我们来讨论区别的含义和用途。
区别是一种对比或比较不同事物之间异同的方式。
它可以是定性或定量的，根据不同领域的需求而变化。
区别有助于我们了解特定事物之间的差异，分析其优缺点或确定其特定特征。
区别可以通过分类、对比、分析或评估来实现。
在商业、市场、研究和学术领域中，区别是进行数据分析、市场研究和学科研究的重要工具。
接下来，让我们比较一下指标和区别之间的区别。
指标是一种测量工具，用于了解特定问题或情况的状态和趋势。
它通常是定量的，可以用来评估绩效、发展趋势或比较不同组织或个体之间的差异。
另一方面，区别是一种比较或对比工具，用于分析不同事物之间的差异和相似之处。
它可以是定性的或定量的，可以用来分析特定领域中特定事物的特征和优缺点。
此外，在应用上，指标更注重于提供有关特定问题或情况的量化数据，并通过统计分析和数据可视化的方式进行更详细的解释。
它们可以帮助我们了解绩效、趋势和关键因素。
区别，另一方面，更侧重于对不同事物之间的差异和相似之处进行比较和解释。
它可以帮助我们分析特定领域中的动态和趋势，以及不同事物之间的差异和影响。
在实践中，指标和区别通常是相互关联的，同时使用可以为我们提供更全面准确的数据分析和理解。
总结起来，指标和区别在数据分析、评估和绩效度量中具有重要作用。
esg 表现对企业财务绩效影响的模型
英文回答：ESG （Environment， Society and Governance） indicators are bing more and more important in business governance， and a growing body of research shows that good ESG performance has a positive impact on the financial performance of enterprises。
In order to explore in depth the impact of ESG performance on the financial performance of enterprises， we need to develop a model that integrates ESG factors and financial performance indicators。
In this model， the ESG factor will be considered as a self—variant， while the financial performance indicators of the enterprise will be driven by variables and the relationship between the two will be explored through various analytical methods。
This will help us to understand more accurately the impact of ESG factors on the financial performance of enterprises and provide a scientific basis for more targeted policies。
ecological indicators 评价
ecological indicators 评价生态指标评价是指通过对生态系统中不同要素、过程和功能进行观测和测量，从而确定生态系统的健康状况和环境质量的评估方法。
生态指标评价旨在帮助人们了解和保护生态系统，促进可持续发展和环境保护。
生态指标评价的目的是提供客观、可量化的信息，帮助管理者和决策者制定科学有效的环境管理和保护政策。
通过观测和测量不同生态要素和过程的变化，评价者可以获得关于生态系统健康状况和环境质量的重要信息。
在生态指标评价中，评价者通常使用多个不同的生态指标来描述生态系统的各个方面。
这些指标可以是物理、化学或生物的，用于衡量不同生态过程的运行情况。
例如，生物多样性指标可以用来评估一个生态系统中不同物种的多样性水平，而水质指标可以用来衡量水体中各种污染物的浓度。
在评估生态系统健康状况时，生态指标评价通常基于长期观测数据的统计分析。
通过对长期数据集的分析，评价者可以确定生态系统中生态过程和要素的变化趋势，并从中得出结论。
这些结论可以用于决策者制定政策，以保护和改善环境质量。
然而，在进行生态指标评价时也会面临一些困难和挑战。
首先，选择合适的生态指标非常重要，因为不恰当或不准确的指标可能导致评价结果的失真。
其次，数据采集和处理也是一个复杂的过程。
必须确保数据的准确性和可靠性，并进行适当的统计分析以得出可靠的结论。
此外，评价结果的解释和传达也是非常重要的，以确保结果能够被决策者和公众理解和接受。
尽管生态指标评价存在一些困难和挑战，但它仍然是评估环境质量和生态系统健康状况的重要工具。
通过评估生态指标，我们可以了解生态系统的真实状况，从而采取必要的措施保护和改善环境。
此外，生态指标评价还可以帮助决策者制定可持续发展的政策和措施，以平衡经济发展和环境保护的需求。
综上所述，生态指标评价是一种重要的工具，可用于评估生态系统健康状况和环境质量。
通过观测和测量不同生态过程和要素的变化，评价者可以获得关于生态系统的重要信息，并制定相应的环境管理和保护政策。
农业银行esg计量方法
农业银行esg计量方法农业银行的ESG计量方法农业银行作为中国领先的综合性金融机构，致力于可持续发展和环境社会治理（ESG）的实践。
为了评估和监测其在ESG领域的绩效，农业银行采用了一套综合的ESG计量方法。
农业银行的ESG计量方法主要分为三个维度：环境（Environment）、社会（Social）和治理（Governance）。
首先，农业银行关注环境绩效评估，该部分主要评估银行在环境保护、资源利用和碳排放等方面的表现。
其次，社会维度考虑到银行的社会责任，并重点关注银行在社区发展、就业机会和消费者权益等方面的表现。
最后，治理维度评估了农业银行的组织结构和决策机制的有效性，包括治理机构、高层管理和透明度等方面的因素。
为了确保计量的准确性和可比性，农业银行采用了一系列的指标和评估方法。
首先，他们利用环境科技创新与农业可持续性指数（ETS指数）来评估环境方面的表现。
其次，他们使用社会责任评级机构对银行的社会绩效进行评估。
最后，农业银行采用了国际认可的公司治理评估指标，例如国际公司治理协会的评估标准。
农业银行的ESG计量方法不仅有助于评估银行在ESG方面的表现，还有助于提高银行的可持续发展能力。
通过这些评估和监测，农业银行能够及时了解自身在ESG领域的表现，并采取相应的措施来改进其在环境、社会和治理方面的绩效。
此外，这些计量方法也可以提供给利益相关者参考，使他们更好地了解农业银行的ESG实践和贡献。
总之，农业银行采用了一套综合的ESG计量方法来评估和监测其在环境、社会和治理方面的绩效。
这些计量方法不仅有助于银行改善自身的ESG表现，还能提供参考给利益相关者，促进更可持续发展的金融行业。
蛰伏 指标 -回复
蛰伏指标-回复什么是蛰伏指标，以及它在不同领域中的应用。
蛰伏指标（Lagging Indicator）是用于衡量某个事件或现象发生之后的结果的指标。
与之相对的是领先指标（Leading Indicator），它可以帮助预测未来发展趋势。
蛰伏指标主要用于分析已经发生的事件或现象，其结果可能需要一段时间才能显现出来。
在不同领域中，蛰伏指标被广泛应用于分析和评估不同方面的绩效和效果。
在经济领域中，蛰伏指标被用来衡量经济活动的增长和发展。
一项常用的蛰伏指标是国内生产总值（GDP）。
GDP反映了一个国家或地区经济活动的总量，但它在数据发布时通常具有滞后性，需要一段时间才能反映出实际经济状况。
其他经济蛰伏指标包括劳动力市场数据、制造业产出等。
这些指标的发布和分析可以帮助政府、企业和投资者评估经济的健康状况和未来发展趋势。
在金融市场中，蛰伏指标被用来评估不同资产类别的风险和回报。
例如，股票市场中的市盈率（P/E ratio）是一个常用的蛰伏指标。
市盈率反映了一个公司的股票价格相对于其每股盈利的关系，较高的市盈率可能意味着市场对该公司未来的盈利表现抱有更大的期望。
其他金融蛰伏指标包括债券收益率、股市指数等，它们的波动通常具有滞后性，需要一段时间才能反映市场的实际表现。
通过分析这些指标，投资者可以进行风险评估和投资决策。
在环境领域中，蛰伏指标被用来评估环境保护和可持续发展的效果。
例如，二氧化碳排放量是一个环境蛰伏指标。
二氧化碳是主要的温室气体之一，其排放量的增加与全球气候变化密切相关。
然而，二氧化碳排放量的变化往往需要一段时间才能被测量和监测到。
其他环境蛰伏指标包括能源消耗、水资源利用等。
通过分析这些指标，政府和环保组织可以评估环境政策和措施的效果，并制定相关的改进计划。
在健康领域中，蛰伏指标被用来评估疾病的传播和控制。
例如，在流行病学中，病例报告率是一个常用的蛰伏指标。
病例报告率反映了某种疾病在特定时间和地区内的发病情况，但它通常需要一段时间才能收集和统计。
stata 泰尔指数 -回复
stata 泰尔指数-回复什么是泰尔指数？泰尔指数（Theil Index）是用来衡量社会经济不平等水平的一种方法。
它由荷兰经济学家埃米尔·泰尔（Emmanuel Theil）于1967年提出，可以分为两个主要类型：个体泰尔指数和总体泰尔指数。
个体泰尔指数衡量的是不同个体之间的收入或财富不平等程度。
它通过计算不同个体的收入或财富占总体收入或财富的比例来衡量，越高的比例代表更大的不平等。
总体泰尔指数则是对整个经济体或社会群体的不平等水平进行度量。
它通过将个体泰尔指数进行加权平均来计算，加权的方式可以是根据个体的人口比例或收入比例来确定。
如何计算泰尔指数？泰尔指数的计算需要以下三个步骤：1. 数据准备：首先，需要收集相应的经济数据，如个体的收入或财富数据，并将其按由小到大的顺序排列。
2. 计算权重：根据个体的人口比例或收入比例，计算每个个体的权重。
可以采用等权重（即每个个体的权重相等）或根据实际情况进行加权计算。
3. 计算指数：根据个体的收入或财富数据和对应的权重，计算个体泰尔指数。
然后，根据个体泰尔指数和相应的权重，计算总体泰尔指数。
以个体泰尔指数为例，其计算公式如下：Theil Index = (1/N) * Σ(xᵢ/X) * ln(xᵢ/X)其中，N为个体数，xᵢ为个体i的收入或财富数据，X为总体的收入或财富数据。
以总体泰尔指数为例，其计算公式如下：Theil Index = Σ(wᵢ * Tᵢ)其中，wᵢ为个体的权重，Tᵢ为个体i的个体泰尔指数。
如何解读泰尔指数？泰尔指数的取值范围是[0,1]，越接近0代表经济或财富分布越均等，越接近1代表经济或财富分布越不均等。
当泰尔指数为0时，表示收入或财富完全均等分配，即每个个体获得相同的份额，并不存在不平等现象。
当泰尔指数为1时，表示收入或财富完全不均等分配，即富人占有绝大部分的收入或财富，而穷人只获得极少的份额。
除了泰尔指数的数值解读，还可以通过比较不同群体或不同时间点的泰尔指数来分析不平等的变化趋势。
斯琴塔娜政府经济学两个模型
i
i0
BP
O
资本完全流动时的BP曲线
Y
蒙代尔-弗莱明模型（M-F模型)
蒙代尔-弗莱明模型是以资本具有完全流动性为假设前提 的开放经济模型，它是一类特殊的IS-LM-BP模型，其特 殊性表现在BP曲线由于资本的的完全流动性而成为一条 水平线。
分析对象：开放经济下的小型国家
蒙代尔-弗莱明模型着重分析了在资本完全流动（流量分 析法）的前提下财政政策和货币政策的不同效应。
AD-AS模型
模型：P不变---r和y 现实生活中，价格不可能保持不变 AD-AS 模型：P可变---P和y
IS-LM
AD-AS
总需求(Aggregate Demand )是指社会所有的消费者 在每一个价格水平上愿意并且能够购买的所有商 品和劳务的市场总和。 总供给(Aggregate Supply )是指社会所有的生产者 在每一个价格水平上愿意并且能够提供的所有商 品和劳务的市场总和。 AD-AS模型是指商品市场、货币市场和劳动力市 场同时处于均衡时的物价水平和总产出水平相互 关系的模型。
E1 E E2
BP
LM1
i*
O
Y*
Y1 Y2
Y 说明：在固定汇率制度和资
本完全流动的情况下，财政 政策是有效的。
P
AS P0 Y
3、AS曲线的一般形状
P
AS
O
2018/8/8
Y
11
4.总供给曲线AS总结
不同的总供给曲线并不是对立的，分 别解释了不同经济阶段的情况，即资 源大量闲置、资源逐渐利用和资源充 分利用。 ① 凯恩斯总供给曲线 资源远未充分利用，价格不变， 总供给可增加。 ② 常规总供给曲线 现被认为是短期总供给曲线的一 般情况，资源尚未充分利用。总 供给与价格同向变动。 ③ 古典总供给曲线 现被认为是长期总供给曲线，资 源已充分利用。无论价格如何变， 总供给都不会增加。
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Aggregating Governance IndicatorsDaniel KaufmannAart KraayPablo Zoido-LobatónThe World BankDevelopment Research GroupMacroeconomics and GrowthandWorld Bank InstituteP O L I C Y R E S E A R C H W O R K I N G P A P E R 2195Summary findingsIn recent years the growing interest of academics andpolicymakers in governance has been reflected in theproliferation of cross-country indices measuringvarious aspects of governance.Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón explain how asimple variant of an unobserved components modelcan be used to combine the information from thesedifferent sources into aggregate governance indicators.The main advantage of this method is that it allowsquantification of the precision of both individualsources of governance data and country-specificaggregate governance indicators.Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón illustrate themethodology by constructing aggregate indicators ofbureaucratic quality, rule of law, and graft for a sampleof 160 countries. Although these aggregate governanceindicators are more informative about the level of This paper—a joint product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group; and Governance, Regulation,and Finance, W orld Bank Institute—is part of a larger effort in the Bank to study the causes and consequences of governance for development. Copies of this paper are available free from the W orld Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433.Please contact Diane Bouvet, Room J3-273, telephone 202-473-5818, fax 202-334-8350, email dbouvet@. This paper is also available on the W eb at /wbi/governance/working_papers.htm. The authors may be contacted at dkaufmann@, akraay@, or pzoidolobaton@. October 1999. (39 pages)The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.governance than any single indicator, the standard errors associated with estimates of governance are still large relative to the units in which governance is measured. In light of these margins of error, it is misleading to offer very precise rankings of countries according to their level of governance: small differences in country rankings are unlikely to be statistically—let alone practically—significant. 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