A Survey of Corporate Governance 译文 (1)
7A Survey of Corporate Governance
B. management discretion 经理人的自由
The methods of managers can discretion the investors' funds
常用的方法:
– – – –
a. expropriate directly 直接抽取法 b. transfer pricing-----low price sell to individual. 转移价格―控股公司中常用
解决的方式:从长远利益上协调投资者和 经理人的不一致
解决的方式: a. marginal value of control vs marginal value of benefit 控制权的边际价值vs 利益的边际价值 vs 代理收 益的边际价值 实践形式:绩效考核+股权,股票期权,收入损 失(dismissal of income)
b. some measures of performance vs share ownership, stock option
有效的激励模式:
c. the optimal incentive system is determined by : manager's risk aversion, the importance of his decisions, his ability to pay for the cash flow ownership up front w=f(manager's risk aversion, importance of his decisions, ability to pay for the cash flow ownership)
投资者的本位动机
C. inventive contracts 激励理论
英语科技论文写作(一)
作业
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如何写科技学术论文
如何写英语科技学术论文
四川大学制造学院苏真伟教授
Brief CV of Zhenwei Su
• 2004-2009: Sichuan University, professor • 1997-2004: UK Universities visiting scholar,post-doc, research fellow • 1982-1997: Sichuan University, PhD, lecturer, associate professor • 1978-1982: Xian Jiaotong University, Mechanical Engineering Department • 1970-1978: Farmer or worker in Sichuan
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当我们完成了某项研究之后，通常需要选 择一个合适的途径发表自己的研究成果， 那么怎样找到最合适自己研究领域的期刊 发表发表论文呢？您可以利用Web of Science数据库的检索结果分析功能 (Analyze)来解决这一问题。
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为什么要阅读文献
我们很多的时候，闷在实验室闭门 造车，实在不如稍抽出一点时间看看 文献。 我的大老板说，要想有成绩，别无 他法，只有读，读，大量的读文献， 尤其国外的。
主要的信息源
• 学术期刊（中文、英文） • 博士、硕士论文（中文、英文） • 学术网站（中文、英文） • 专利网站（中文、英文） • 书籍（中文、英文） 对低级研究人员：中文第一 对高级研究人员：英文第一
金融学精选专题-教学大纲
《金融学精选专题》教学大纲课程编号：151423B课程类型：□通识教育必修课□通识教育选修课□专业必修课☑专业选修课□学科基础课总学时：48 讲课学时：48 实验（上机）学时：0学分：3适用对象：金融学（数据与计量分析）专业本科生先修课程：无一、教学目标金融学精选专题是为金融学（数据与计量分析）专业本科生而开设的课程，没有先修课程要求。
通过本门课程的教学，使学生了解时下金融学前沿话题、探索金融研究方法、培养学生对金融学术的兴趣。
教学过程中，本课程采用课堂讲授与课堂讨论相结合的方式，详细介绍各个金融研究领域话题的发展历史，现状以及前沿话题。
本课程主要目标为：了解经典文章和模型、了解金融研究的发展历史和发展趋势、掌握金融研究的基本方法、探索金融研究的未来发展趋势。
二、教学内容及其与毕业要求的对应关系（一）教学内容1.知识体系专题1：资本结构专题2：公司治理专题3：分红政策专题4：并购重组专题5：房地产金融专题6：行为金融专题7：资本资产定价（上）专题8：资本资产定价（下）2.本课程教学重点本课程主要包括八个专题，覆盖公司金融和资本资产定价两大领域中的前沿专题。
本课程的重点为金融学各个领域的前沿学术研究问题。
本课程以讲授金融学中的经典理论和模型为基础，着重讲授金融研究的发展和和当代金融研究的热点问题。
本课程与金融学其他基础课程有部分重合，例如资本结构专题会和公司金融和金融衍生品课程中的内容有少量重合。
重合部分不是本课程的讲授重点。
为帮助学生理解课堂讲授的内容，本课程会适当回顾金融学基础知识，但不会作为重点讲授内容。
（二）教学方法和手段本课程采用课堂讲授与课堂讨论相结合的方式。
本课程的授课语言为英语。
针对每个专题，老师着重讲解经典文章和经典模型。
此外，老师将选取每个金融领域最前沿的文章，让学生在课堂进行汇报与分组讨论。
每个小组选择一个专题，对前沿文章进行汇报，其他学生参与课堂讨论。
课堂汇报与讨论推荐学生选用英文。
公司治理岗 英文
公司治理岗英文
1. Corporate Governance Position
2. Role in Corporate Governance
3. Job in Corporate Governance
4. Position in Corporate Governance Function
5. Corporate Governance Function Role
这些翻译都表达了在公司治理方面的工作职位或职责。
具体使用哪个翻译取决于上下文和使用习惯。
"Corporate Governance"指的是公司治理，涉及公司的组织架构、决策制定、监督机制、合规性等方面。
如果你需要更具体的翻译，可以提供更多关于该岗位的信息，例如工作内容、职责范围等，我将为你提供更准确的翻译。
此外，公司治理岗位通常涉及监督和管理公司的各个方面，确保公司的运营符合法律、法规和道德标准，并促进公司的可持续发展和价值创造。
无论是在国内还是国际环境中，公司治理岗位都非常重要，因为它有助于维护公司的透明度、问责制和良好的治理实践，从而保护股东、投资者和其他利益相关者的利益。
如果你对公司治理岗位有更深入的问题或需要更多信息，请随时提问。
我将尽力为你提供帮助。
CIA大纲中英文
SYLLABUS OF THE INTERNAL AUDIT ACTIVITY′S ROLE IN GOVERNANCE,RISK AND CONTROL内部审计在治理、风险和控制中的作用考试大纲ply With the IIA′s Attribute Standards (15-25 percent) （Proficiency Level）遵守国际内部审计师协会的属性标准（15%~25%）（要求熟练掌握）1.Define purpose, authority, and responsibility of the internal audit activity.明确内部审计的宗旨、权力和职责。
a.Determine if purpose, authority, and responsibility of internal audit activity are clearly documented and approved.确定内部审计的宗旨、权力和职责是否清楚地以书面形式记录并获得批准。
b.Determine if purpose, authority, and responsibility of internal audit activity are communicated to the engagement clients.确定内部审计的宗旨、权力和职责是否通报审计业务客户。
c.Demonstrate an understanding of the purpose, authority, and responsibility of the internal audit activity.阐明内部审计的宗旨、权力和职责。
2．Maintain independence and objectivity.保持独立性和客观性。
a.Foster independence.加强独立性。
1)Understand organizational independence.理解内部审计部门在组织上的独立性。
内部控制的概念
1936年美国会计师协会(AIA)首次正式提出了内部控制的概念。
此后，理论界和学术界不断推陈出新。
但基本上都没有突破会计控制的范围。
1992年COSO对内部控制的概念进行了突破和创新，并得到国际社会的高度认可。
但COSO内部控制框架流程与内部控制目标之间存在着逻辑缺陷，致使COSO内部控制框架的概念被质疑，实践中也缺乏可操作性和普适性。
实际上，COSO内部控制框架仅提供了一个较为全面的风险控制导引，各个国家和地区中的企业需要根据自身企业内部特征以及外部环境要素设计具有针对性的内部控制体系。
即不同地区中的企业需要界定内部控制的边界，并基于此设计相应的内控模式、机制、方法，以实现企业的全面风险管理和高效的内部控制①。
因此，无论是基于理论层面还是实物层而，重视对内部控制本质、边界和目标等基本属性的研究，是构建企业内部控制体系的前提和基础。
既有文献针对内部控制本质及内涵的研究主要涉及两个层次的内容:一个层次是从企业系统和整体效率的视角界定内部控制的概念;另一个层次是企业内控系统的构成单元和子系统。
内部控制的组成部分或子概念主要包括两个方面:一个方而是按照层级结构来分的企业治理层面的控制和企业管理控制;另一个方面是为了满足不同需要而单独界定的企业各职能部门和各层级所确立的内部控制体系，如财务报告内部控制，会一计控制等概念，I-!前比较成型和有影响力!、勺是财务报告内部控制’、「「。
自华，高_立(2011)’‘在困内外相关研究的琴础_上，指出无沦从历史发展、时间考察还是理论逻辑方而看，财务报告内部控制陷入了一个为不能存在的系统寻找独立存在的理由的尴尬境地。
ICI此，应该尽早用“内部拄制”取代“财务报告内部控制”。
杨清香(2010) `"利用马克思认识论，对如何构建内部控制的概念框架问题进行了探讨，认为内部控制的本质是构建内部控制概念框架或理论体系的逻辑起点，内部控制的其他概念或理沦要素都是根据内部控制的木质演绛推论出来的。
210878169_ESG_表现与企业经营风险
价值工程0引言ESG 是指经济主体从环境（Environment ）、社会（Social ）和治理（Governance ）三个方面对企业进行综合评价的方法。
20世纪80年代以来，随着企业管理者和投资者利益冲突不断加剧，以及生态环境日益遭到破坏，越来越多的企业开始意识到在制定经营决策时要综合考虑社会责任和环境责任[1]。
环境、社会和公司治理为主的责任投资理念和可持续发展理念逐渐得到人们的关注和认可。
1992年，联合国环境规划署提出，希望金融机构在进行投资决策时考虑环境、社会和公司治理因素。
自此以后，国际上关于ESG 的关注持续升温，各类组织和机构提出一系列ESG 评价指标，逐渐形成完整的ESG 评价体系[2]。
由于国内ESG 投资还处于初期发展阶段，研究内容相对较少，但是ESG 责任中所包含的环境责任、社会责任和公司治理方面的研究如火如荼。
目前，投资者在投资决策时把公司ESG 表现作为一个重要的标准之一。
而公司对ESG 活动进行投入，会降低经营过程中的不确定性，缓解融资约束[3]，提高风险抵御能力。
本文在回顾和借鉴国内外研究成果的前提下，试图找出ESG 表现是否会影响企业经营风险，以及如何影响企业经营风险？1文献综述近年来，ESG 表现得到了政府和相关投资者的重视，使得企业越来越重视社会责任的承担和履行，ESG 表现成为衡量企业绩效的重要标准之一。
目前，关于ESG 表现的经济后果主要体现在以下几个方面。
在企业绩效方面，袁业虎等（2021）[4]研究发现，媒体关注度高的企业，ESG 表现越好，其企业绩效水平越高。
但是，Ruan 等（2020）[5]研究发现，ESG 表现与公司绩效是负相关的。
在企业价值方面，何音等（2019）[6]研究发现，企业积极履行一定的社会责任，有利于提高顾客对企业的认同感，进而提升企业价值。
根据Li 等（2018）[7]研究发现，上市公司ESG 披露水平越高，越有利于提升公司价值。
Internal auditing practices and internal control system
Internal auditing practices and internal control systemFaudziah Hanim Fadzil; Haron.Hasnah; Jantan.Muhamad.Internal auditing has undergone dramatic changes that have expanded its scope in a way that allows it to make greater contributions to the organization it serves. Internal auditing is also performed in diverse legal and cultural environments; within organizations that vary in purpose, size, and structure; and also by persons within or outside the organization. Furthermore, the internal auditing profession also walks a tightrope between serving as a management consultant and an independent professional. A survey done by the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG), The Institute of Internal Auditors Malaysia (Π AM) and Ernst and Young concluded that internal auditors are best placed to understand and appreciate the business processes of a company and they act as management consultant to reduce risks. Internal auditors also help run a company more efficiently and effectively to increase shareholders' value.As this is the case, internal auditors need to be out in front, leading the business units with regards to the internal control system and also focusing on strategic business objectives. The internal auditors also need to establish themselves as vital cogs in their organizations, rather than as observers who watch from the periphery and wait for events to impact them (Sawyer and Vinten, 1996).One issue that has emerged related to the internal auditing practices is; "what is a proper and sound measurement of the internal auditing practices?" Barrett (1986) notes, "effectiveness (of internal audit) can be described, but it is difficult to quantify and in the final analysis, effectiveness is determined by the perception of auditees". In the company environment, management is the most important auditee of the internal audit department since effectiveness of the internal auditing practices can be described through the expectations of management with regard to the internal auditing practices. The management will expect the internal auditors to perform their internal auditing practices to a certain level that is complying with the Standards for the Professional Practice ofInternal Auditors (SPPIA) (now known as the Professional Practice Framework (PPF)), since it can be easily described. Compliance with SPPIA is therefore an indication of the effectiveness of the Internal Audit Department.The auditing profession, both internal and external, has come under increasing scrutiny since the highly publicised collapse of energy trader, Enron (Vinten, 2003) in the USA last year. The uncovering of alleged irregularities at Technology Resources Industries Berhad (TRI) has highlighted the need for greater corporate governance in Malaysia.TRI had issued false invoices between 1998 and 1999, which amounts to MYR260 million (USD 68 million). According to Dato' Samad Alias, the President of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), "This could be the largest accounting fraud in Malaysian history". The false invoices was discovered by Telekom Malaysia, who took control of the TRI in June 2002, after conducting several internal audits, when Arthur Andersen was TRI's auditor. "We had to rely on the information prepared by the company's accountants", said Dato' Abdul Samad, who was then head of the Andersen's Malaysian office. If TRI was to restate 1998 and 1999 accounts, its net book value will reduce as much as MYR 198 million (Financial Times, 2002). The case has certainly shed a light on the importance of the role of internal auditors, which was only recognised and emphasised after irregularities were discovered.Internal auditors are often described as both a business partner and a policeman because of his work as a business partner with client management and also because he acts as an independent reviewer of management. As a business partner, the internal auditor is expected to provide expertise to assist an organization in meeting its objectives while as a policeman; an internal auditor is often thought of as an adversary looking for flaws. As such, the extent of the internal auditing practices plays an important factor on these roles. This study will provide empirical evidence whether compliance with internal auditing practices will lead to a better internal control system.The development of SPPIASPPIA are the criteria by which the operations of an internal auditing department are evaluated and measured and intended to represent the internal auditing practices, as it should be. It is also meant to serve the entire profession of internal auditing, in all types of organisations where internal auditors are found. It was first developed in June 1978, at the Internal Auditors International Conference in San Francisco. The SPPIA comprise of five general standards of:(1) independence;(2) professional proficiency;(3) scope of work;(4) performance of audit work; and(5) management of the internal audit department.This framework allowed the future expansion of the internal auditing practices until the new framework was released in January 2002.A new framework, called PPF was released in January 2002[1] and it consisted of three sets of standards: attribute, performance, and implementation standards. The attribute standards address the attributes of organisations and individuals performing internal audit services while the performance standards describe the nature of internal audit services and provide quality criteria against which performance of these services can be measured. The implementation standards on the other hand provide guidance applicable in specific types of engagements. However, this new framework is not utilised in this study because of the timing of its release.Internal control system. The internal control system plays an important role in the internal auditing practices since the internal auditors might be considered as being specialists in management control (Chambers et al, 1987). Internal auditing practices appraise the effectiveness of internal control systems, which is a definition of internal auditing and which also includes an appraisal of the actions by management to correct situations, which are at variance with planned outcomes. The definition of internal control systems reveals that it is not fundamentally different from management control, which has an essential component of control such as planning, organising, staffing and directing (Chambers et al, 1987). Senior management and the audit committee normally expect that the CAE will perform sufficient audit work and gather other available information during the year so as to form a judgement about the adequacy and effectiveness of the control processes. The CAE should then communicate that overall judgement about the organisation's system of controls to the senior management and the audit committee. This is necessary since internal auditors play an intermediary role and assist in the discharge of the oversight function of audit committee. If the above internal audit function is not available, the management needs to apply other monitoring processes in order to assure itself and the board that the system of internal control system is functioning as intended. In thesecircumstances, the board of the company will need to assess whether such processes provide sufficient and objective assurance or regular review and appraisal of the adequacy and the integrity of the internal control systems in the company.Bursa Listing Requirements has established industry taskforce which formulated the "Statement on Internal Control: Guidance For Directors of Public Listed Companies" to fulfil the above circumstances. The aim of this guidance is to assist listed companies in making disclosures in their annual reports on the state of internal control, in compliance with the Listing Requirements of the KLSE. Pursuant to the requirements of the Code in relation to the Internal Audit Function, in May 2001, the securities Commission appointed the HAM to establish a separate industry taskforce to formulate these Guidelines to assist the board of public listed companies in effectively discharging their responsibilities in relation to establishing an Internal Audit Function. Risk assessment, control environment, control activities, information and communication and monitoring are five important characteristics in this guideline.The roles of internal auditors. In the revised statement of responsibilities of internal auditing issued by the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (2000) as part of the standards framework, the section on objectives states:The objective of internal auditing is to assist all members of management in the effective discharge of their responsibilities by furnishing them with analyses, appraisals, recommendations and pertinent comments concerning the activities reviewed. The internal auditor is concerned with any phase of business activity where he can be of service to management. This involves going beyond accounting and financial records to obtain a full understanding of the operations under review (p. 3).Sawyer and Vinten (1996) noted four benefits managers have gained from internal auditing assistance. These benefits were providing managers with the bases for judgement and action, helping managers by reporting weaknesses in control and performance and in recommending improvements, providing counsel to managers and boards of directors on the solutions of business problems, and supplying information that is timely, reliable and useful to all levels of management.Additionally, the statement sets forth the types of services that should be performed and the kinds of activities carried on by the internal audit function in attaining the overall objective. Internal auditors should first review and appraise the soundness and adequacy of the accounting, financial, and other operating controls, and promote effective controlsat reasonable cost. secondly, the internal auditors should ascertain the extent of compliance with established policies, plans, procedures, laws and regulations, which could have a significant impact on the company's operations. Then the internal auditors review the means of safeguarding assets and when appropriate, verify the existence of such assets and appraise the economy and efficiency with which resources are employed. Lastly, the internal auditors review operations or programs to ascertain whether results are consistent with established objectives and goals and whether the operations or programs are being carried out as planned.Reviewing and evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of an organisation's internal control system and the quality of performance in carrying out assigned responsibilities is representative of several primary core activities of internal audit work. The purpose of the review of the adequacy of the internal auditing is to ascertain whether the established system provides reasonable assurance that the organisation's objectives and goals will be met efficiently and economically.Adequate control is considered to be present if administrative management has planned and organised in a manner, which provides reasonable assurance that the organisation's objectives and goals will be achieved efficiently and economically. Reasonable assurance is provided when cost-effective actions are taken to restrict deviations, such as improper or illegal acts, to a tolerable level.The role of internal auditing in the review of effectiveness of the system of internal control is to ascertain whether the system is functioning as intended. Effective control is present when the administrative management directs the system in such as way as to provide reasonable assurance that the organisation's objectives and goals will be achieved. The purpose of the review for quality of performance is to ascertain whether the organisation's objectives and goals have been achieved.The primary objectives of an organisation's system of internal control are to provide administrative management with reasonable assurance that financial information is accurate and reliable; the organisation complies with policies, plans, procedures, laws, regulations and contracts; assets are safeguarded against loss and theft; resources are used economically and efficiently; and established objectives and goals for operations or programs can be met. Internal auditing focuses on an evaluation of this system or framework of internal control.A second type of audit work that internal auditors are guided to perform is reviewing the accuracy and reliability of financial and operating information and the means used to identify, measure, classify and reportsuch information. Information systems provide data for decision-making, control, and compliance with external requirement. Therefore, internal auditors should examine information systems and determine whether financial and operating records and reports contain accurate, reliable, timely, complete and useful information, and controls over record keeping and reporting are adequate and effective.The performance of reviews of the systems established to ensure compliance with policies, plans, procedures, laws, regulations and contracts represents a third element of audit activity described by the standards. Administrative management is responsible for establishing the systems designed to ensure compliance with such requirements as laws, rules, regulations, policies and procedures. The internal auditors role is to determine whether the systems designed by management are adequate and effective and whether the activities audited are complying with the appropriate requirements.Further, as described by the standards, the internal auditor's role includes providing appraisals with recommendations regarding administration management established objectives and goals for operations and programs.。
文献导读
1. The Theory of the Firm and Agency Problems★Coase, R., 1937, The nature of the firm, Economica4, 386 - 405★Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz, 1972, Production, information costs and economic organizations, American Economic Review, 777-795.★Williamson, O., 1971, The vertical integration of production: Market failure considerations, American Economic Review, 112-123.★Williamson, O., 1981, The modern corporation: Origins, evolution, attributes, Journal of Economic Literature, 1537-1568.Alchian, A. and S. Woodward, 1988, The firm is dead; Long live the firm: A review of OliverE. Williamson’s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Journal of Economic Literature,65-79.★Jensen, M. and W. Meckling, 1976, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305- 360Fama, E. and M. 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绿色信贷与企业债务融资成本研究综述
绿色信贷与企业债务融资成本研究综述摘要：绿色信贷源于绿色金融，常被称为可持续融资或环境融资。
它主要通过对企业债务融资利率设限以期达到限制重污染企业或增加绿色企业的贷款投资。
本文通过阐述国内外绿色信贷与企业债务融资成本的研究现状，并对二者之间的关系进行简要梳理和总结，以便后期能够更深入的研究相关问题。
关键词：绿色信贷；债务融资成本一、引言改革开放政策推行以来，我国的经济迅猛增长，国际地位也不断提高。
然而，与经济发展速度相对应的是我国的环境污染和资源浪费问题层出不穷。
企业作为环境问题的制造主体，其对环境造成的污染问题一直备受关注。
2012年2月，原中国银监会发布了《绿色信贷指引》，该文件对国家支持的绿色行业提供更充足的信贷资源与优惠利率，对国家不鼓励甚至限制的重污染行业减少贷款额度并提高他们的借款利率，引导资本由“两高”产业向绿色产业转型。
本文旨在对绿色信贷的产生与企业债务融资成本影响因素二者之间的国内外发展状况做一个简要梳理，以便于今后更深入的研究相关问题。
二、绿色信贷绿色信贷的概念源于绿色金融，绿色信贷在国外属于可持续融资或环境融资的研究范围，是一种将生态环境保护嵌入到金融业中、推动实现经济与环境协调发展的创新金融工具。
Cowan（1998）认为环境融资是可持续发展的重要部分，需要充分利用信贷、互换等以市场为基础的工具，为金融创新与环境保护二者之间搭建桥梁。
Jeucken（2001）指出，目前金融机构的投资资金面临的问题主要是环境风险，发展绿色金融已成为其保持自身可持续发展的现时客观要求。
Lee& Zhong（2015）认为，商业银行可以利用新型衍生金融工具开展绿色信贷，通过发行混合债券等规避可再生能源产业存在的融资风险和信用风险。
国外学者在定义绿色信贷时，主要研究绿色信贷在金融市场中对环境保护或经济的可持续发展方面的宏观研究，而国内有关绿色信贷的研究起步相对较晚，在2007年原中国银监会颁布《节能减排授信工作指导意见》后，绿色信贷政策才逐渐得到了国内学者的普遍关注。
金融学期刊(JF)创刊以来50篇最经典论文
金融学期刊（JF）创刊以来50篇最经典论文1) Portfolio Selection证券组合选择Harry Markowitz Volume 7, Issue 1March 19522) Capital Asset Prices: A Theory Of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions Of Risk资本资产价格：风险条件下的市场均衡理论William F. SharpeVolume 19, Issue 3September 19643) Efficient Capital Markets: Review Of Theory And Empirical Work有效市场：理论与经验研究的评论Eugene F. FamaVolume 25, Issue 2May 19704) The Cross-Section Of Expected Stock Returns股票预期收益的横截面（分析）Eugene F. Fama, Kenneth R. FrenchVolume 47, Issue 2June 19925) Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders反投机、拍卖和竞争性密封投标William VickreyVolume 16, Issue 1March 19616) A Survey Of Corporate Governance关于公司治理的调查Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. VishnyVolume 52, Issue 2June 19977) Legal Determinants Of External Finance外部融资的法律层面决定因素Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. VishnyVolume 52, Issue 3July 19978) Corporate Ownership Around The World世界各地的企业所有权Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei ShleiferVolume 54, Issue 2April 19999) On the Pricing Of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure Of Interest Rates 企业债务的定价：利率的风险结构Robert C. MertonVolume 29, Issue 2May 197410) Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis And Prediction Of Corporate Bankruptcy财务比率，判别分析和企业破产预测Edward I. AltmanVolume 23, Issue 4September 196811) The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, And The Failure Of Internal Control-Systems近代工业革命，退出，和内部控制系统的失灵Michael C. JensenVolume 48, Issue 3July 199312) On Persistence In Mutual Fund Performance共同基金绩效的持久性Mark M. CarhartVolume 52, Issue 1March 199713) On The Relation Between The Expected Value And The Volatility Of The Nominal期望值和名义股票超额回报波动性的关系Lawrence R. Glosten, Ravi Jagannathan, David E. RunkleVolume 48, Issue 5December 199314) Returns To Buying Winners And Selling Losers: Implications For Stock Market Efficiency购买赢家和卖掉输家的回报：对股市效率的启示Narasimhan Jegadeesh, Sheridan TitmanVolume 48, Issue 1March 199315) Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, And Financial Intermediation信息不对称、金融结构和金融中介Hayne E. Leland, David H. PyleVolume 32, Issue 2May 197716) The Pricing Of Options On Assets With Stochastic Volatilities具有随机波动性资产期权定价John Hull, Alan WhiteVolume 42, Issue 2June 198717) Efficient Capital Markets: II有效资本市场IIEugene F. FamaVolume 46, Issue 5December 199118) Does The Stock Market Overreact?股市反应过度了吗？Werner F. M. De Bondt, Richard ThalerVolume 40, Issue 3July 198519) Multifactor Explanations Of Asset Pricing Anomalies对资产定价异常现象的多因素解释Eugene F. Fama, Kenneth R. FrenchVolume 51, Issue 1March 199620) The Capital Structure Puzzle资本结构之谜Stewart C. MyersVolume 39, Issue 3July 198421) The Performance Of Mutual Funds In Period 1945-1964共同基金在1945年-1964年的绩效Michael C. JensenVolume 23, Issue 2May 196822) Debt And Taxes负债和税收Merton H. MillerVolume 32, Issue 2May 197723) What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence From International Data我们对资本结构了解多少呢？来自国际数据的一些证据Raghuram G. Rajan, Luigi ZingalesDecember 199524) The Benefits Of Lending Relationships: Evidence From Small Business Data借贷关系的好处：来自小企业数据的证据Mitchell A. Petersen, Raghuram G. RajanVolume 49, Issue 1March 199425) Measuring And Testing The Impact Of News On Volatility衡量和检验新闻对波动性的影响Robert F. Engle, Victor K. NgVolume 48, Issue 5December 199326) Investor Psychology And Security Market Under- And Overreactions投资者心理和证券市场的过度反应/反应迟钝Kent Daniel, David Hirshleifer, Avanidhar SubrahmanyamVolume 53, Issue 6December 199827) Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, And Risk逆向投资、外推法和风险Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. VishnyVolume 49, Issue 5December 199428) A Simple Model Of Capital Market Equilibrium With Incomplete Information 一个简单的信息不完全的资本市场均衡模型Robert C. MertonVolume 42, Issue 3July 198729) Insiders And Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed And Arms-Length DebtRaghuram G. RajanSeptember 199230) Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Time? 为什么随着时间推移股市波动性会发生变化？G. William SchwertVolume 44, Issue 5September 198931) The Determinants Of Capital Structure Choice资本结构决策的决定因素Sheridan Titman, Roberto WesselsVolume 43, Issue 1March 198832) Inferring Trade Direction From Intraday Data从当日数据推断交易方向Charles M.C. Lee, Mark J. ReadyVolume 46, Issue 2June 199133) The New Issues Puzzle新股发行之谜Tim Loughran, Jay R. RitterVolume 50, Issue 1March 199534) The Limits Of Arbitrage套利限制Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. VishnyVolume 52, Issue 1March 199735) Noise噪声Fischer BlackVolume 41, Issue 3July 198636) Investor Protection And Corporate Valuation投资者保护和公司估值Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny Volume 57. Issue 3June 200237) The Theory Of Capital Structure资本结构理论Milton Harris, Artur RavivVolume 46, Issue 1March 199138) The Long-Run Performance Of Initial Public Offerings首次公开发行股票的长期绩效Jay R. RitterVolume 46, Issue 1March 199139) Initial Public Offerings And Underwriter Reputation首次公开发行和承销商商誉Richard Carter, Steven ManasterVolume 45, Issue 4September 199040) Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information信息不对称下的股利政策Merton H. Miller, Kevin RockVolume 40, Issue 4September 198541) A Simple Implicit Measure Of The Effective Bid-Ask Spread In An Efficient Market买卖价差(Bid-Ask Spread)有效市场下有效买卖差价的简单内隐测量Richard RollSeptember 198442) Empirical Performance Of Alternative Option Pricing Models备选的期权定价模型的实证绩效Gurdip Bakshi, Charles Cao, Zhiwu ChenVolume 52, Issue 5December 199743) Compensation And Incentives: Practice vs. Theory薪酬和激励：实践和理论George P. Baker, Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. MurphyVolume 43, Issue 3July 198844) Are Investors Reluctant To Realize Their Losses?投资者不愿意意识到他们的损失？Terrance OdeanVolume 53, Issue 5October 199845) Size And Book-To-Market Factors In Earnings And Returns盈余和收益的规模和账面-市值因素Eugene F. Fama, Kenneth R. FrenchVolume 50, Issue 1March 199546) Security Prices, Risk, And Maximal Gains From Diversification证券价格、风险和来自多元化的最大收益John LintnerVolume 20, Issue 4December 196547) An Empirical Comparison Of Alternative Models Of The Short-Term Interest-Rate对短期利率备选模型的实证比较K. C. Chan, G. Andrew Karolyi, Francis A. Longstaff, Anthony B. SandersJuly 199248) Risk Management Coordinating Corporate Investment And Financing Policies风险管理协调企业投融资政策Kenneth A. Froot, David S. Scharfstein, Jeremy C. SteinVolume 48, Issue 5December 199349) Disentangling The Incentive And Entrenchment Effects Of Large Shareholdings解析大股东激励和壕沟防御效应Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, Larry H. P. Lang Volume 57, Issue 6December 200250) Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects Of Bond Indenture Provisions 公司证券估值：债券契约条款的一些作用Fischer Black, John C. CoxVolume 31, Issue 2May 1976。
Bertrand and Mullainathan_2003
Sendhil Mullainathan
Baker et al (2008)中文英文论文翻译
• The first emphasizes that investors are less than fully rational. It views managerial financing and investment decisions as rational responses to securities market mispricing. 第一次强调投 资者是少于完全理性。它认为筹资和投资的管理决定是对证券市场错误定价的理性反应，。
[1]. Irrational investors approach非理 性投资者的方法
• Assuming that securities market arbitrage is imperfect, and thus that prices can be too high or too low.假设证券市场套利的就是不完美的并因而那价格可以太高或太低 • Two key building blocks: 构建基块的两个关键 1.Irrational investors must influence securities prices. This requires limits on arbitrage.非理性投 资者必须影响证券价格。这就要求对套利限制 2.Managers must be smart in the sense of being able to distinguish market prices and fundamental value.经理们必须能够区分市场价格和基本价值的意义上的智能。 • Why assume that managers are “smart” in the sense of being able to identify mispricing?为什 么假设管理者是"智能"意义上的能够识别错误定价吗？ 1.Having superior information about their own firm or creating an information advantage by managing earnings.拥有自己的公司的高级信息或通过管理收入创造信息优势。 2.Having fewer constraints than equally “smart” money managers including short horizons and short-sales constraints.具有比同样"智能"钱经理包括短的视野和卖空约束较少约束。
公司简介翻译
2. 逐字翻译引起的表达繁冗、拖沓 例2 为了实现信息化数据化, ⋯ 原译: In order to achieve the goal of being fully equipped with information and data , ⋯ 改译: In order to achieve informationization and datumization , ⋯ 原译严格根据原文翻译,在表达上比较繁琐,而 informationization 和datumization 具有 modernization 类似的构词方法,在表意上更加简 洁。
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中文版A_Survey_of_Corporate_Governance
公司治理综述Andrei Shleifer; Robert W. VishnyThe Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2. (Jun., 1997), pp. 737-783.1．写作背景投资者将资金投入到公司，如何能保证收回收益？保证资金不被管理者非理性投资或占用？投资者将资金投入公司后，就与其资本分离。
控制公司的经理就有可能占用投资者的资金。
虽然先进的市场经济解决了公司治理的一些问题，保证大量的资金流向公司，给投资者回报，但这并不意味着公司治理问题就被解决了，或者公司治理机制已不能再改进。
公司治理研究在实践上非常重要。
即使在发达的市场经济中，关于各种公司治理机制孰优孰劣仍有争议。
例如，Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) and Romano (1993a)对美国公司治理体系进行了大量乐观评价，而Jensen (1989a, 1993)相信它是有严重缺陷的，Jensen认为一种主要的变革，即从现代的公司形式到更高得多的举债经营形式，例如LBOs, 是合乎程序的。
还有一些讨论，主张用德国和日本的公司组织形式来替代盎格鲁——撒克逊人的公司治理体制（例如，Roe (1993) and Charkham (1994)）。
但是，美国、德国、日本和英国有某些全世界最好的公司治理系统，它们之间的区别相对于它们与其他国家的区别可能较小。
而根据Barca (1995) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1995)的研究，认为意大利公司治理机制是如此落后，以致于从根本上阻碍了外部资金流入公司。
在一些发展中国家，包括一些转型经济体，公司治理机制实际上是不存在的。
（Boycko,Shleifer, and Vishny (1995))认为在俄罗斯，公司治理机制的缺陷导致许多私营企业的经理层把公司的资产大量转移，以及提供给公司的外部资金实际上并不存在。
两类代理问题与公司治理文献综述
两类代理问题与公司治理文献综述引言在现代商业环境中，公司治理是一个重要的议题。
公司治理被定义为对企业行为和资源分配的监督和控制，以确保公司能够有效地履行其职责，并最大化股东价值。
而代理问题是公司治理中的一个核心问题，它指的是公司所有权者（股东）和经营者（公司管理层）之间的利益冲突。
代理问题的存在会导致经理人的自私行为和资源浪费，从而影响公司的长期发展和利益相关者的利益。
本文将综述两类代理问题与公司治理之间的关系，并探讨这些问题对公司治理的影响及相关的文献研究现状。
2. 股东与债权人之间的代理问题除了股东与经理人之间的代理问题外，股东与债权人之间的代理问题也是公司治理中的一个重要议题。
债权人是公司的债权持有人，他们向公司提供资金，并期望按时收回本金和利息。
在公司经营过程中，由于信息不对称和利益冲突等原因，股东有可能会采取行为，损害债权人的利益。
公司可能会追求高风险的项目以获取高回报，但这可能会增加债务偿还的风险。
公司也可能会通过资本结构调整等手段损害债权人的利益。
这些行为会降低债权人对公司的信任，增加公司的融资成本，影响公司的经营活动和发展。
二、文献综述1. 代理问题的理论研究代理问题的理论研究从经济学、金融学和管理学等不同角度展开。
在经济学领域，代理问题被视为信息经济学和合同理论的一个重要研究对象。
根据不完全合同理论，代理问题源于经理人和股东之间的信息不对称和利益冲突，导致无法完全通过合同约束经理人的行为。
而在金融学和管理学领域，代理问题的研究主要从董事监督、激励机制、公司治理结构等方面展开。
相关研究表明，董事监督、激励机制和公司治理结构等因素对代理问题的解决具有重要作用。
2. 代理问题的实证研究除了理论研究外，代理问题的实证研究也是公司治理领域的重要内容。
实证研究主要通过统计数据和经验分析，探讨代理问题对公司绩效、股东价值和利益冲突的影响。
在股东与经理人之间的代理问题研究中，相关学者发现，激励机制、公司持股和股权激励等因素对解决代理问题具有显著影响。
商务英语阅读教程—英译汉
Unit 11. The World Bank’s key role is to improve living standards and assist developing nations through making credit and other forms of assistance available to achieve a sustainable development.世界银行的关键作用是通过提供信贷和其他形式的援助来实现可持续开展来提高生活水平和协助开展中国家。
2. So in order to smooth out the international business cycle, and thus reduce the duration and damage of recessions, OPEC could temper oil prices and control booming or slumping economic growth.所以为了消除国际商业周期，从而减少经济衰退的时间和损失，石油输出国组织可以调低油价，控制经济增长或萧条。
3. Its members benefit from liberalized trade gaining access to a larger demand market, new technologies, managerial techniques, raises in living standards, and employment opportunities.其成员受益于自由贸易进入更大需求市场，新技术，管理技术，提高了生活水平和就业时机。
4. Under his influence, the organiza tion’s international secretariat was established in Paris and he was instrumental in creating the ICC International Court of Arbitration in 1923.在他的影响下，该组织的国际秘书处在巴黎成立，他在1923年创立了国际商会国际仲裁法庭。
corporate governance的定义
corporate governance的定义
公司治理（Corporate Governance）是指一套机制和制度安排，用以确保公司管理层的行为符合股东和其他利益相关者的利益，同时促进公司的长期稳定发展。
这套机制涵盖了公司的内部管理和外部监管，以及公司与各利益相关者之间的关系管理。
首先，公司治理的核心目标是保护股东权益。
股东作为公司的所有者，享有公司的经营成果和承担风险。
因此，公司治理机制应确保管理层以股东利益最大化为目标，避免管理层滥用职权、损害股东利益的行为发生。
其次，公司治理还包括了对公司内部管理层的监督和制衡。
这通常通过设立董事会、监事会等内部机构来实现。
董事会负责制定公司的战略和政策，并对管理层进行监督；监事会则负责监督董事会的决策和管理层的执行情况，确保公司的运营符合法律法规和股东利益。
此外，公司治理还涉及到公司与各利益相关者之间的关系管理。
这些利益相关者包括员工、客户、供应商、债权人等，他们的利益与公司的发展密切相关。
因此，公司治理机制应确保公司在追求自身利益的同时，充分考虑并维护这些利益相关者的权益。
最后，公司治理还强调透明度和信息披露。
公司应及时、准确、全面地披露其财务状况、经营状况和风险信息，以便股东和其他利益相关者做出明智的决策。
总之，公司治理是一套复杂的机制和制度安排，旨在确保公司的管理层以股东和其
他利益相关者的利益为出发点，促进公司的长期稳定发展。
良好的公司治理结构有助于提高公司的竞争力和市场信誉，为公司的长期发展奠定坚实的基础。
corporate governance的定义
corporate governance的定义
企业治理（corporate governance）是指确保企业有效运作、增加经营者责任和透明度、以及保护股东和利益相关者利益的制度和实践。
它涉及制定和执行决策的框架、监督机制、行为准则和权力分配。
企业治理旨在建立一种透明、负责任和可持续的企业运营模式，以维护股东权益、保护利益相关者利益，并提高企业的管理效能和长期价值。
企业治理关注以下方面：
1.权力和责任：企业治理规定了企业管理者和董事会成员的
权力和责任，确保他们行使权力时不滥用，负责任地履行
职责。
2.企业结构：企业治理规定了企业的结构和组织形式，包括
董事会的角色和职责、管理层和股东的权利与责任、以及
各个利益相关者的参与方式。
3.信息披露与透明度：企业治理要求企业向股东和利益相关
者提供准确、及时和全面的信息，确保信息的公平与透明，减少对关键信息的隐藏和不完整披露。
4.决策和风险管理：企业治理规定了决策过程和风险管理机
制，确保决策过程合理、合法，并包括适当的风险评估和
管理机制。
5.激励和报酬：企业治理制定了激励和报酬机制，以确保管
理层和董事会成员的行为与企业利益一致，并与企业绩效
和长期目标相匹配。
企业治理的实践和规范因国家、行业和企业而异，可以通过法律、制度、监管机构和自律准则来实施和监督。
良好的企业治理有助于提高企业的稳定性、信誉和长期价值，为股东、利益相关者和整个经济体创造持续的利益。